2018.0104 flying lessons - mastery flight training

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FLYING LESSONS for January 4, 2018

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference as a scenario unfolds. So apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.

FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight-training.com

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This week’s LESSONS: Reversionary Mode

“You will perform at or just below your everyday standard under stress.” —Dr. Tony Kern, Col USAF (ret.), Convergent Technologies, Inc.,

at the 2017 Bombardier Safety Standdown See: http://www.safetystanddown.com/aviation-safety-seminars/experts/tony-kern-ed-d http://www.safetystanddown.com

“Partial panel” isn’t what it used to be. In glass cockpit airplanes, a still-small but rapidly growing percentage of general aviation aircraft, there are often multiple screens and, at times, completely redundant Attitude/Heading Reference Systems (AHRS). Multiscreen installations usually have the capability of entering a reversionary mode if the primary screen fails for some reason but AHRS data is still available. Sometimes automatically, always available manually, in the reversionary mode the required flight and some navigation and monitoring functions (traffic alerts, engine data, etc.) transfer to the alternate screen.

In reversionary mode the pilot still has more information for precision flight, situational awareness and hazard avoidance than most pilots—including airline and military—have had for the entire history of flight. Flying “partial panel” this way takes a little practice to alter your scan, but it does very little to reduce your ability to fly.

Pilots have a type of reversionary mode, too. Unlike digital avionics, however, in our case the reversionary mode can severely limit our ability to function. Avionics enter reversionary mode when systems fail and data is not presented in the form of visual information. Pilots enter reversionary mode when workload commands our attention and tasks our ability to process all


the information and data coming at us. Like the glass panel that sheds some capabilities in order to stay within its diminished bandwidth, we too will stop doing some things when we can no longer do them all. The trouble is, we do not have an automated logic for deciding which things we’ll stop doing—we just start forgetting things.

Let me give you an example. If you are not instrument rated or not familiar with U.S. IFR procedures please bear with me; I’ll try to make at least the key points clear to everyone.

In late November I took an Instrument Proficiency Check (IPC) with FLYING LESSONS reader Chris Hope, who was the 2015 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year. I flew up to Chris’ home base in the Kansas City, Missouri area for my IPC flight. I knew Chris would give me a good workout, to test my abilities and let me learn from the experience. He did not disappoint. See http://www.generalaviationawards.com/award-winners/2015-national-general-aviation-awards-winners/

Without going into too much detail, we departed Lee’s Summit (KLXT, index 1 on the map), simulating takeoff into instrument conditions in vectors to Midwest National Airport (KGPH, index 2).

Chris gave me headings to simulate radar vectors in the clear, cold and very turbulent low-level air. I was throttled back to remain below Turbulent Air Penetration Speed; that speed reduction and the strong northerly wind aloft (despite winds at the surface favoring the south runway), we were only getting about 125 knots ground speed.

We intercepted KGPH’s ILS Runway 18, turning inbound initially with a strong tailwind. I voiced that we would probably have to descend at 700 feet per minute or more (as opposed to the normal 500-600 fpm) because of the high ground speed southbound. But quickly the wind changed; we bounced through the wind shear that accompanied the shift, and as it turned out a normal descent kept us on the glideslope.

The published missed approach procedure includes a route toward the Napoleon VOR (ANX, index 3), and a holding pattern there. However, my preflight planning revealed that ANX was temporarily out of service. A NOTAM on the ILS 18 approach directed that the alternate missed approach procedure was in effect. Unusually, an alternate missed is printed on the approach chart: an initial climb south and then a turn northeast, in a long (as I recall, about 24 mile) trek toward the Braymer VOR (BQS).

During my approach briefing, which I do aloud whether or not I have an instructor on board, I stated another unusual situation: Although the standard missed approach procedure is included in the GPS database and available to provide navigation guidance to me (or the autopilot) at the touch of the SUSPEND button after beginning my climbout, the alternate missed is not. If I had to fly the missed approach procedure (a good bet on an IPC), I would have to manually navigate to the Braymer VOR and in the hold. I set up the #2 VOR to navigate to BQS “old school.”

Once I began the missed and was tracking the VOR toward BQS, I programmed “Direct To” BQS in the GPS. When I crossed the fix and began entering the hold, I used the GPS’ OBS (omnibearing selector) mode to plot a line that corresponded to the hold’s inbound course. The hold itself did not appear on the GPS map page.


After the hold Chris instructed me to go direct to a point southeast of the Lee’s Summit airport that is the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) for an RNAV (GPS) approach. As soon as I was en route he simulated attitude and heading indicator failure (redundant systems in this particular airplane, but I’m game for a training challenge). So there I was, I was partial panel, no autopilot available, under the hood, in continuous light and occasional moderate turbulence, using the GPS NAV 1 page and a terribly bouncy magnetic compass for heading …when he pulled the landing gear motor circuit breaker. Entering asking “Air Traffic Control” (Chris) for an extended hold at the IAF, I cranked the gear down by hand in the hold. Then I flew the circle-to-land approach into KLXT.

That’s a whole lot to have happen in a short time. And that’s the point. You see, I’m pretty good with checklists. I’m not a slave to them—I use cockpit flows and practiced procedures, but then use a printed checklist to confirm I’ve not missed anything. I was on my best checklists-and-flows behavior on this flight. Before Start, Starting, Taxi, Before Takeoff, Takeoff, Climb, Level-Off, Descent, Approach, I was doing them all.

But when workload got very high, the checklist was the first thing to go. I was almost at the hold at Braymer before I remembered to consult the Climb and Level-Off checklists after my missed. Later, I skipped the Approach checklist because I was just too busy hand-flying, real old-style partial panel. I did use the manual landing gear extension checklist in the holding pattern.

That’s when I remembered what Tony Kern had said at the Safety Standdown about a month before. I was still commanding the airplane…but under stress, I was operating a little below my normal level of performance. Wishing I had time to get a drink from a bottle of water in the copilot’s seat-back pocket because I was by then very dehydrated, I fixed the situation by taking a breath, shaking out the cramp in my gear-extension arm, and then…pulling out the Approach checklist to get myself back in the flow, working back up to my usual performance level.

The workload of simulated systems failures in IMC put me in the pilot reversionary mode. I work hard to maintain my skills. On that day under that workload I was good enough, even though I was below my usual performance level (I earned my IPC endorsement). To get back up to speed I had to force myself to get back to basics—fly the airplane, get ready for the approach, and consult the checklist to make up for any lapses my reversionary state created.

On a bad day you still need to be very, very good. Is your “normal” good enough that, even when things get busy and you operate below your peak performance, that you are still able to fly precisely and to the standards of your certificates and ratings, while dealing with unusual status and potentially emergency situations?

Comments? Questions? Let us learn from you, at [email protected]

See https://www.pilotworkshop.com/nto-ifr?ad-tracking=turner-nto-ops

Thanks, Tom. Your impact on my personal flying techniques and knowledge is indispensable, and much appreciated. A rare educator is one in whom their learners not only have complete confidence, but also fun while learning. You set the bar. – Andrew Urban

Please help cover the costs of providing FLYING LESSONS through the secure PayPal donations button at www.mastery-flight-training.com.

Or send a check to Mastery Flight Training, Inc. to 247 Tiffany Street, Rose Hill, Kansas USA 67133. Thank you, generous supporters.


Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS:

Harkening back to recent LESSONS about inflight fires, reader Mark Sletten reminds us:

You didn't mention the most obvious way to differentiate between an engine fire and an electrical fire--smell. An electrical fire means melting electronic components and/or wire insulation, which makes a very distinctive smell. You'll smell an electrical fire long before you see any smoke or flames.

I’ve had an electrical fire in flight, in a Cessna 152. You’re right—the smell of burning insulation is unmistakable. If it wasn’t so toxic, it might be a good idea for instructors to burn a little wiring and insulation for students as part of their training, just so they’ll recognize that smell. In my case (the C152), wiring for a temporarily removed VOR indicator (“head”) wasn’t quite as covered and secured as my mechanic thought. Silly me did a Commercial-grade steep turn (about 2Gs in level flight), which caused the wire to fall against something metal behind the panel and release a big spark. Hearing the noise and smelling the electrical smoke, I transitioned into another maneuver: emergency descent. I never thought “engine fire” because I knew what it smelled like. See http://www.mastery-flight-training.com/20171214-flying-lessons.pdf

About that emergency descent—reader Jeff Edwards adds:

I investigated three inflight fires in 1996 (Valujet and two military aircraft). No one had more than five minutes from detection until control was lost. My personal lesson learned is that the pilot needs get the aircraft on the ground ASAP. An airport or runway is usually too far to meet the five-minute rule.

Long-time reader Guy Mangiamele also wrote about the same report:

I was curious on the quote below from the in-flight fire FLYING LESSONS:

But flaps and gear (if retractable) willmost likely make the touchdown more survivable….

My question wasn’t about flaps, but about the gear. In my Super Viking, for example, lowering the gear is a huge commitment with the engine stopped. Until I read this, my mental planning for engine failure (or intentional shut down) always had the gear up unless I had the luxury of a lot of altitude still to lose in the last 30 seconds of my glide to a paved runway. If I am forced to land off airport (field, uneven terrain, or even to a paved runway with a tight glide), my thought was always that the ground “roll” would be shorter and there would be less chance of upset or flipping the airplane over the ground. Flaps, of course, yes, immediately prior to touchdown. Thoughts?

Lowering the landing gear isn’t about protecting the airplane, it’s about absorbing some of the shock of impact to protect the airplane’s occupants. However, if lowering the gear is impossible or riskier than not doing so, for reasons of landing surface roughness, type-specific systems, or pilot workload, then leave it up. It’s your call. The best argument against shortening the ground “slide” is that deceleration forces decrease with the square of distance traveled. A longer ground roll, even if the gear breaks off, is more survivable…. if the airplane doesn’t flip over.

Impact G-Forces and Seat Belt Protection

(From the American Bonanza Society)

The goal is to land slowly enough, and roll or slide far enough, that occupants do not exceed about 9Gs of deceleration force. Any more and you can’t expect good-condition seat belts and shoulder harnesses to protect you. For example from the table above, if you touch down at 65 knots ground speed, you need to slide no less than 21 feet without hitting anything hard. That’s


not very far, but it has to be smooth. If your touchdown speed is in the 80-knot range the distance required to remain below 9G is 32 feet—about 50% more distance for a 23% increase in touchdown speed.

Gear up or down, to minimize the deceleration forces it’s vital to slow to the appropriate speed prior to touchdown. This is not the Best Glide speed. For example, in the airplanes I know best, the Beech A36 Bonanza, the Best Glide speed is 110 knots, and the published Landing Without Power speed is 83 knots.

It’s been over 25 years since I flew a BL17-30A. It’s a great airplane. I still have a copy of the Operations Manual. It does not specifically state the engine-out touchdown speed. It is not even clear what the appropriate Best Glide speed is—on the Forced Landing (Complete Power Failure) checklist the first step is “Airspeed - SLOW to 110 MPH, or BEST GLIDE SPEED.” It then gives a table of distance vs. altitude in a glide, where it states: “Airspeed - 102 MPH @ 3325 lbs. Reduce 1 MPH/100 lbs. less than 3325 lbs.” Those figures, however, are for distance, not least rate of descent or touchdown. The Normal Procedures Landing (Obstacle) checklist calls for touching down at 90 MPH (about 78 knots). That would be my target engine-out short final speed, full flaps whether gear up or gear down, flaring from there…probably touching down somewhere around 70 knots ground speed.

Whatever the circumstances, touch down Wings level, Under control, at the Slowest safe Speed, and you have the maximum chances of survival. You might be able to gear landing gear down manually, but do not sacrifice the W-U-SS goal to protect the airplane. Instructor Rich Graham continues the discussion:

Do you happen to have the “Fire Inflight Decision Tree” available in a format for PowerPoint? I would love to show the decision tree to my club members (students and pilots) and discuss each block on the tree. I seriously doubt most of them have even thought about an inflight fire. As a former F-4 and SR-71 pilot in the Air Force, inflight fires were discussed frequently and often appeared on our simulator profiles.

If you receive FLYING LESSONS Weekly by email blast you can click on the diagram and go to a pdf copy. In the online version I include the link beneath the diagram. I do that with all the diagrams I generate for FLW, so people may download them, and use them, and print a copy and post it in their flight school or FBO.

That said, I emailed you the PowerPoint so you would not have to screen-shoot the pdf and load it into a slideshow for your club pilots. Perhaps I should make a special web page for them all. I’ll add that to my to-do list!

I’m awed that an SR-71 pilot finds value in my work. I loved watching the SRs doing low approaches at Vandenberg AFB while I was going through Minuteman initial qualification in 1984. Boy, I envied you! I bet you did talk about fires a lot—we did too, in our roughly 6x15ft living space, 60-feet-underground below two nuclear-proof blast doors “capsules”, and in the Launch Control Center simulators.

Reaching back a little farther before the holidays, reader John Townsley comments on the use of checklists:

While I like the CONCEPT of digital check lists, but the reality of single pilot EXECUTION in a clutch leaves much to be desired. I fly with an older panel GPS, ForeFlight on my iPad, and VOR/ILS in my panel. While an iPad checklist (in ForeFlight or a stand-alone App) is initially attractive, I find pulling a checklist up means I must depart from my digital navigation tools. From experience this adds an unwanted loss of situational awareness along with more (potentially distracting) steps. Knee board EP checklists require fewer steps to access and keep my chart (with my aircraft icon) firmly in front of me. Day or night it is important to me to know relative locations where I might land should an immediate return to terra firma be necessary. Finding even nearby airports and sometimes roads can be challenging in some situations.

I agree completely, John. I was not clear. In the Debrief section of the December 14 LESSONS several readers and I discussed the fear that ForeFlight, Garmin, et al might stop producing customizable checklists because of liability fears and a recent FAA SAFO. I like the idea of editable electronic checklists because they are easy to customize to the specific equipment in


your airplane. Once you’ve customized your checklist, however, I suggest printing it out and laminating or binding it (whatever makes sense for you) in a hard copy to use in flight.

I recall when the first Stormscope with a programmable checklist became available. I was teaching at an international flight safety simulator-based training company, and one of my students asked me what checklist he should load into the device. I thought for a moment, then quipped: “Total electrical failure.” OK, that’s a bit Luddite of me. But like you, John, I want to be able to use checklists—normal and emergency—without having to exit the navigation pages of my avionics or tablet device. See: http://www.mastery-flight-training.com/20171214-flying-lessons.pdf https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USAFAA/2017/04/27/file_attachments/808068/SAFO17006.pdf

Frequent Debriefer John Scherer joined a chorus (see what I did there?) of pilots who responded to last week’s Unified Flying Theory discussion:

Tom, I loved your article on technician or artist! I have had this conversation many times, both in the Air Force and with my daughter, who teaches violin. In the case of the violin, my daughter, of course, has to [be a] technician to get the notes right, etc. But she also has to “feel” the music. She says many of her students master the “technician” part, but far fewer can combine technician with artist.

I saw the same in teaching the C-5 [Galaxy]. Being a technician was a given because of the massive ground school and repetitive training [the Air Force required]. But becoming an artist was just not accomplished by many pilots. Landing, for example: You could land the C-5 like a technician—listen to the 50, 40, 30, 20, 10 [foot altitude] callouts on the radar altimeter, then level the aircraft and walk the throttles back and accept a touchdown. The artist could learn to judge the height by sight, ease the throttles back and hold her off like a Cessna 152 for a grease job. That took years of training and experience—especially to land on the centerline with no crab. The best pilots, in my view, are technicians with just the right touch of artistry. Hope I can continue to do that in my flying career.

See http://www.mastery-flight-training.com/20171228-flying-lessons.pdf

Questions? Comments? Suggestions? Let us know, at [email protected]

Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend

Pursue Mastery of Flight.

Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety Flight Instructor Hall of Fame 2015 Inductee 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year Three-time Master CFI

FLYING LESSONS is ©2018 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For more information see www.mastery-flight-training.com, or contact [email protected].

2018.0104 flying lessons - mastery flight training

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