2016 i issue 9 · 2018-12-10 · 4 heliops frontline the team kia kaha media group po box 37 978,...

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CELEBRATING DECISION MAKINGGood decision-making is about as fundamental to helicopter flying as one can get. LTC Tony Somogyi explains the approach taken at HAATS (High-altitude ARNG Aviation Training Site) when the margins are small and the risks high in the Rockies of Colorado.

HARD TIMES HIT U.S. ARMY HELICOPTERSThe Pentagon is drastically cutting back on the Army’s helicopter budget, and that spells trouble for military preparedness as well as the OEMs. We examine the ramifications.

AUTOMATION THREAT & ERROR MANAGEMENT IN HELICOPTER OPERATIONSPART ONEA new era... A new culture

MODERN GUNSHIP - RUSSIAN STYLEThe Mil Mi-28N is the first new-generation attack helicopter of the Russian Air Force. Alex Mladenov looks the program and its development.

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COVER PHOTO: U.S. Soldiers hook-up a M777A2 howitzer to a CH-47 Chinook helicopter to be airlifted from Forward Operating Base Hadrian in Deh Rawud village in Uruzgan province to Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. U.S. Army photo by Mark Doran

4 HELIOPS FRONTLINE

THE TEAM

Kia Kaha Media Group

PO Box 37 978, Parnell, Auckland 1001, New Zealand

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NEWS [email protected]

PUBLISHER Ned Dawson

EDITOR Mark Ogden

DEPUTY EDITOR Alan Norris

SUB EDITORLeigh Neil

EUROPEAN EDITOR Alexander Mladenov

NORTH AMERICAN EDITOR Buzz Covington

PROOFREADERBarbara McIntosh

GRAPHIC DESIGNDot Design

www.heliopsmag.com

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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HELIOPS FRONTLINE 5

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FROM THE EDITOR

he US military helicopter forces are facing an interesting conundrum. On one hand, the requirement for helicopter support for military operations remains high, while at the same time, budgets for the purchase of new military helicopters appear to be decreasing. John Persinos’ story on the financial

stresses faced by the US army is telling. Interestingly, the argument is that the priority remains on ‘readiness’ and so procurement has been hit. This would in some ways make sense except that while US manufacturers are facing a decreasing order book for helicopters, dubious projects such as the F-35 and aircraft not even requested by the Pentagon are attracting an ever-increasing portion of the procurement funding pie – it would appear priorities of the US Congress are quite skewed.

And now, there is now some serious questioning as to whether funding cuts are impacting the safety of US military helicopter operations at home.

According to an article in ‘Stars and Stripes, a threefold increase in helicopter crash deaths last year is raising questions about whether the budget cuts are endangering crews by forcing significant cuts in funds for maintenance and training. Twelve helicopter crashes last year killed 30 personnel, and they were nearly all home-station training accidents. The continued pace of operations has meant that units deploying to conflict areas get priority for training and the home units have to manage their maintenance and training needs within reduced budgets. At the beginning of 2016, apparently nearly 20% of the US Marine helicopter force was in maintenance.

US Navy costs due to accidents is now increasing. Now this is not just helicopters; it includes the fighter aircraft but the increasing costs of training accidents has to raise the questions about the validity of the economy of cutting base budgets to meet operational requirements. Something has to give and it appears the areas facing the biggest budget hits are the ones suffering the highest costs and loss rates. It will be a challenge for the US Forces to reign in the accidents while trying to juggle a budget still focused on operations overseas.

Interestingly, China is increasing spending on its military – up over 7% in 2016 alone with it growing by over 130% between the 2006 and 2015. Russia’s defense spending is up 91% compared with 2006. Although still the biggest spender on defense by far, the US budget fell by just under 2.5% in 2015 but it still represents over 3% of GDP whereas most of the top spending countries are expending between 1 and 2% of GDP.

Maybe the US just can’t afford to be the world’s policeman anymore and will be forced to be more inwardly looking or isolationist. If the US does move that way, it will force those nations who presently rely on its coverage to stump up more to defend themselves.

Conundrum in the house

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INDUSTRY NEWS

TIGER HAD IN POLANDPolska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Airbus Helicopters are in discussions regarding potential areas of cooperation around the Tiger HAD project and possible future Tiger production in Poland.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY RECEIVE CH-47FsBoeing has delivered three CH-47Fs to the Australian Army two and half months ahead of schedule adding to the existing fleet of seven.

RAF SAR TRAINING UNIT NOW 202 SQN.Following the recent disbandment of UK military Search & Rescue the RAF Valley based SAR Training Unit has been formally reassigned as 202 (Reserve) Squadron and will become the maritime and mountains training element of the Defense Helicopter Flying School.

HELIOPS FRONTLINE 9

INDUSTRY NEWS

MV-22 USS CARL VINSON FLIGHT OPSIn preparation for the replacement of the C-2 Greyhound, USS Carl Vinson has carried out V-22 Osprey landings and takeoffs as the aircraft type is scheduled to become the logistics platform for future carrier operations.

UNMANNED K-MAX AT MCAS YUMATwo Kaman K-MAXs have arrived at MCAS Yuma and will use the training ranges in Arizona and California for future test and development of the type with the US Marines.

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INDUSTRY NEWS

FIRST TWO H145MS TO ROYAL THAI NAVY The Royal Thai Navy has taken delivery of the first two H145Ms from an order of five and will be used for training pilots in Germany with final acceptance and entry into service by the end of 2016.

FORT RUCKER GETS AH-64 TRAINERFort Rucker’s Aviation Learning Center has added an AH-64D/E Longbow Apache Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight Trainer so that students can familiarize themselves with the cockpit before they actually set foot in the real cockpit.

MEXICAN NAVY MI-17S OVERHAULEDRussian Helicopters has completed its first contract for after-sale maintenance of 19 Mi-17-1Vs operated by the Mexican Navy.

HELIOPS FRONTLINE 11

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INDUSTRY NEWS

PAKISTAN AW139 FOR SARPakistan has signed a contract for an undisclosed number of AW139s which is part of a fleet renewal program; deliveries are expected in 2017 and include a logistic support and training package.

RUSSIA TO REPAIR CZECH MI-8TsRussian Helicopters and Czech Company Lom Praha has signed a contract for the repair of Mi-8Ts owned by the Czech Republic Ministry of Defense.


TUNISIA TO RECEIVE 24 OH-58DsThe US State Department has approved a sale to Tunisia of twenty-four OH-58D Kiowa Warriors, Aircraft equipment, training, and support with an estimated value of $100.8 million.

WILDCATS FOR 815 SQUADRONThe first four of 12 new Wildcats has been delivered to the UKs 815 Naval Air Squadron as they switch from Lynx Mk8 after 35 years. Over the next 11 months the Yeovilton based squadron will retire the Lynx as its successor takes over as the wings of front-line destroyers and frigates.

INDUSTRY NEWS

KING STALLION LIFTS EXTERNAL LOADThe CH-53K King Stallion successfully completed an external lift of a 27,000 pound payload executed at 100 feet above ground while performing hover maneuvers.


INDUSTRY NEWS

HFORCE COMPLETES FIRST FIRINGThe two-week firing campaign involving an HForce-equipped H225M took place on a dedicated range in Belgium and demonstrates the ballistic weapons, electro-optical system and helmet mounted display on a H225M.

ROCKWELL COLLINS CONTRACT FOR INDIAN CH-47FBoeing Company has selected Rockwell Collins to provide its Common Avionics Architecture System for 15 CH-47F Chinooks for the Indian Ministry of Defense.

FIRST SEA HAWKS DELIVERED TO DENMARKThree MH-60R Seahawks have been delivered to Air Squadron 723, Karup Air Base in Denmark it marks the first delivery to the Danish Defense, who are replacing their former fleet of Lynx helicopters with the Seahawk.


SERBIA RECEIVES MI-17V-5The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia has taken delivery of two Mi-17V-5s and the contract also includes retraining pilots and technical personnel of the Serbian air force on the new type.

INDUSTRY NEWS

PHILIPPINE NAVY ORDERS TWO AW159sThe Philippine Navy have ordered two AW159s and the order includes training and multi-year support with is delivery scheduled for 2018.

NEW SAR OPS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDSAAR Airlift division have commenced operations for SAR and Support Helicopter services for the UK Ministry of Defense in the Falkland Islands operating a single AW189 and S-61N.


INDUSTRY NEWS

BELL MATES V-280 WING AND FUSELAGEBell Helicopter has successfully joined the V-280 Joint Multi Role Technology Demonstrator wing and nacelles to the aircraft fuselage and the aircraft is expected to achieve its first flight in 2017.

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QATAR ORDER 24 AH-64EsBoeing has been awarded a $667M contract for twenty-four AH-64Es from Qatar, along with one Longbow crew trainer, ground support equipment and Thales Avionics.

UK TRAINING CONTRACT AWARDEDAirbus Helicopters in the UK has been selected by Ascent as the Aircraft Service Provider for the UK’s Military Flying Training System. It will deliver 29 H135s and three H145s plus an integrated support solution over the course of 18 months as part of a contract worth £500 million over 17 years.

INDUSTRY NEWS



TECH THOUGHTS

pen most Aviation or Defence magazines (including this worthy tome!) and you will doubtless come across advertisements for beautiful looking integrated systems – whether for cockpits, mission avionics or Defensive Aids Suites. Sometimes, Helicopter OEMs will actively advertise a platform that have all of these elements combined and interconnected – claiming to reduce

crew workload through integration and automation. It looks like a pilot’s dream, but is it?

As a Staff Instructor on the UK Qualified Helicopter Tactics Instructor’s Course I used to sit in on the platform capability briefs presented by both the trainees (mainly UK) and the overseas observers. One brief that struck me was that by an overseas officer; he talked about his new platform that was highly integrated. It certainly looked impressive, but I was a little concerned over the high degree of automation/integration, which seemed to inhibit the sharing of workload through the crew. I was also concerned over the manual release of IR decoy flares. “Not a problem” he replied “the MWS1 can cue an auto dispense and I can back up with a manual dispense on the Collective”. Hmmm. I asked him how many MWS had a 100% PDec2 in all circumstances (answer – none) and then asked where the cabin dispense buttons were. “We haven’t got any” was the response. Hmmm…again. So I asked what happened if a MANPAD approached the aircraft from the rear hemisphere (most MANPADS are “tail-chasers”, relatively few use Proportional Navigation) and the MWS didn’t declare (therefore the DIRCM would not engage either)? “The crewman tells me and I release flares….” was the unconvincing answer. Given that MANPADS approach at speeds up to 600m/s (1200 m/s for the Starstreak HVM….) a 3Km shot could be impacting in 4-5 seconds from launch – the delay between the crewman seeing the shot, passing the message on a (possibly busy) intercom, the pilot reacting and initiating a manual release and the flares “rising” to the correct temperature in the Missile FoV could very well be fatal. “Fit a wander lead for the crewman with a manual dispense, and put flare buttons at all cabin windows” was my suggestion. He came back a couple of days later saying that it was potentially prohibitively expensive as the system was fully integrated and it was a “delta” from the Contracted SRD. It would need to wait a few years for the next “refresh”. Was integrated “a good thing” for this aircraft?

It is easy to understand why OEMs like heavily integrated platforms; it enables them to control the aircraft specification for certification clearance and, perhaps more importantly, it gives them a reliable revenue stream as any future modification will need to be passed through them, if not for the modification itself then for regression testing and clearance. An old boss of mine when I worked in the CH-47 Project Team (yes, you

Integrated or Federated?

OBY PAUL KENNARD

1. Missile Warning System – traditionally UV sensor based but moving to IR technology.2. Percentage Declaration – the “success rate” for the MWS to see and warn of a Missile.


TECH THOUGHTS

Wes…) likened an integrated system to a bowl of spaghetti; you could see the end of the “string” that you wanted to pull out and modify (perhaps fitting a new MWS, EO/IR turret or Secure Radio) but when you started tugging more strings (ie sub-systems) fell out, and if you pulled too hard the whole bowl of spaghetti (cockpit/mission avionics) ended up on your lap. His point was that in a fully integrated system where sub-systems are interconnected and rely, for example, upon the aircraft cockpit’s Multi Function Displays to present data to the crew (typically an EO/IR image or DAS display) attempts to modify them can be complicated and expensive. The introduction of new Hardware/Software has to be proved not to interfere with any part of the legacy Primary Flight Display (PFD) or controls. As a PFD is usually DO-178B DAL3 A (as the crew MUST be able to rely on it to pilot the aircraft) to prove that a new sub-system does not introduce rogue 0s and 1s extensive regression testing is required to confirm that the high-grade SW is not infected or degraded. An integrated system gives the OEM the power to influence what subsystems are fitted to “their” platform and, given the propensity for militaries to offload increasing amounts of airworthiness and assurance Risk back to manufacturers, this can also be quite lucrative.

Cost is not the only driver; it takes time to complete such testing and to declare the new capability “safe” on an integrated system. Therefore, a “federated” system might be preferable – especially if it is physically separated from “Flight Critical Systems” – e.g. by having its own dedicated display. Clearly, however, the argument against Federation is lack of cockpit space for separate displays, potential duplication of functionality (e.g. stand alone GPS/INS) and extra demand for antennae locations on the aircraft’s exterior. It goes without saying that there is also an unwelcome increase in electrical demand and aircraft weight.

What’s to be done then? If fully integrated is costly, anti-competitive and time consuming and Federated is sub-optimal from a SWAP/C4 perspective, is there a 3rd way? Increasingly, the answer appears to be in Open Architecture systems, using a “Systems of Systems Architecture” (SOSA). A true SOSA configuration identifies the “needs” of the various subsystems (eg GPS Time, INS Position, Platform Attitude data) and ensures that the right data gets to the right LRU at the right time. SOSA relies upon Open Interfaces, rapid data transfer and solid firewalls to contain low DAL SW well away from Flight Critical SW. Attempts to create more “plug and play” DAS architecture are well underway; NATO SCI-2605 has recommendations “relating to the potential development of a DAS / ASE Open Architecture STANAG” as one of its objectives and defines Open Interfaces as “a government agreed, non-proprietary, standardised interface that is available to and widely endorsed by all relevant system and subsystem stakeholders”. The next logical step is to enable not only subsystem components to re-use data efficiently but to link the systems themselves, via agreed protocols, such that the platform can, if required, re-route data to improve battle tolerance and failure modes. For rotorcraft (and indeed for UAVs) such advanced networks are surely the future “state of the art” and permits militaries to leverage the benefits of open competition and allows Industry to compete on platforms where they are not the traditional incumbent. v

3. See http://www.do178site.com/do178b_questions.php for some explanation of -178B.4. Space, Weight and Power / Cost. Often Thermal Burden is also a major factor.5. https://www.cso.nato.int/ACTIVITY_META.asp?ACT=2143


VIEWPOINT

he U.S. Air Force came out on top (and the Army and Navy lost) in the latest Pentagon budget, which is good news for overly expensive, gold-plated boondoggles like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and bad news for the rotorcraft workhorses that actually save lives and respond to terrorism.

Pentagon budgeting is a brutal zero-sum game. The triumphant get windfalls, whereas the losers can suffer for years. The big loser this year: the U.S. Army.

As I make clear in my feature article in this issue of Frontline, the U.S. Army’s $125.1 billion request is $1.4 billion lower than the service’s approved fiscal 2016 budget. Army aircraft accounts for the largest decline, from $5.9 billion in fiscal 2016 to 3.6 billion for fiscal 2017. Aviation comprises 25% of the Army’s procurement pie, so it’s not surprising it would get slashed when the Pentagon is looking for ways to save money. The U.S. Navy also took a big hit.

And yet, expensive fixed-wing programs in the U.S. Air Force with entrenched lobbying constituencies are protected in the latest budget. As of May, a spending proposal in Congress would allot $1.4 billion for an additional 14 Super Hornet combat fighters manufactured by Boeing that weren’t even included in the Pentagon’s FY 2017 budget request.

An additional $1.5 billion would go toward acquiring 11 of Lockheed Martin’s hugely expensive F-35s.

Helicopter cutbacks will hit Sikorsky, maker of the popular UH-60 Black Hawk for the Army and SH-60 Seahawk for the Navy, but fixed-wing budgets still enjoy plenty of largesse.

This budgeting goes against the U.S. military’s professed desire to operate in a leaner, fitter and more flexible manner. Fixed-wing fighters like the F-35, which were originally designed for dogfights with Soviet combat jets, are not the best way to meet the “asymmetrical” threats posed by terrorists.

Rather than make America and the world safer, throwing money at Cold War era “white elephants” actually weakens national security. It siphons away funds from transformative technologies and the development of the electronic battlefield, only to waste it on needlessly complex weapons systems that in many cases don’t even work right.

The brave men and women who serve as pilots with the National Guard, the Army, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and various para-public agencies need advanced rotorcraft to fulfill their vital roles in first response, disaster relief, search and rescue, medevac, and the like.

The unique qualities of rotorcraft are perfectly suited for the threat of terrorism. As witnessed by the

The Shortsightedness of Pentagon Beancounters

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BY JOHN PERSINOS

The push to reduce aircraft weight is changing the way helicopter pilots approach their flying routines, all for the better.


VIEWPOINT

atrocities in Orlando, Florida in June, this war is persistent and perpetual. Helicopter surveillance and response are the correct tools in this fight; mind-bogglingly expensive fixed-wing combat jets are not.

Helicopters boast enormous strategic military relevance. In a time of shrinking force structures, force mobility is more important than ever. This is true for land forces, which need transports to move personnel and equipment and to provide firepower, and naval forces, which more than ever need to rely on shipborne helicopters to patrol larger areas with fewer ships.

Cutbacks in Navy helicopter procurement are particularly troubling, as China flexes its muscles in the Pacific Rim and the Middle Kingdom’s neighbors look to America for reassurance. The Pentagon’s strategic pivot to Asia will be difficult in the face of helicopter procurement curtailment.

The U.S. Navy’s MH-XX program represents a stark illustration of the gap between current and future programs. This program, meant to create a successor to the SH-60, MH-60R, and MH-60S, has a funding plan calling for just $19 million through FY 2018.

There is no chance of creating a successor that will enter production until 2026, at the very earliest. Yet the last MH-60R/S will be delivered to the Navy before the end of the decade. The rotorcraft industry will need to endure a 6-10 year gap between current generation helicopter procurement and the arrival of the next generation. That’s not acceptable.

The Tragedy of Comanche

Making matter worse, the recent history of U.S. military rotorcraft development is not encouraging. A substantial amount of U.S. military rotorcraft research and development spent over the past 20 years has gone to programs that were later cancelled, such as the RAH-66 Comanche.

Sikorsky’s ill-fated Comanche is a sad example of a boondoggle that should have been cancelled long before it finally got the axe. Designed during the Cold War, to help respond to a possible Soviet invasion of Europe, the Comanche was an ever-deepening money pit with unnecessary bells and whistles. Despite underperforming in test flights, the helicopter was kept alive through the tenacious lobbying of its manufacturer. Billions were squandered.

Military helicopter pilots need to pressure elected officials and ask them bluntly: Do you serve the interests of your constituents and the public welfare, or do you exist to simply enrich the coffers of the defense contractors who contribute to your campaigns?

The world will always be a dangerous place and we’ll always need robust defense spending. The real question is, do budget and strategy planners have the right priorities? Are taxpayers getting the biggest bang for their buck?

To fund its operations, the Pentagon won’t be holding a bake sale anytime soon. The military brass maintain a firm grip on the congressional purse strings and they always gets a huge chunk of the budgetary pie, regardless of geopolitical or political vicissitudes.

U.S.-based aerospace/defense companies are on a roll. Not only will federal budgetary levels for military aerospace remain robust for the foreseeable future, but overseas demand for American-made weapons systems — especially emerging market demand for sophisticated fighter aircraft — will more than make up for any cosmetic program cutbacks. Rising nations in the Asia Pacific region, in particular, are ordering a lot of expensive combat jets from American-based aerospace manufacturers.

It’s puzzling, then, why Congress felt the need to eviscerate the U.S. Army’s helicopter budget. These aircraft provide enormous utility to the country’s fighting personnel. The helicopter community should urge its representatives in Washington, DC to reconsider their misplaced priorities and restore funding for the machines that perform vital workaday roles on battlefields, over the seas, in cities, and in neighborhoods. v

GOOD DECISION-MAKING IS ABOUT AS FUNDAMENTAL TO HELICOPTER

FLYING AS ONE CAN GET. LTC TONY SOMOGYI EXPLAINS

THE APPROACH TAKEN AT HAATS (HIGH-ALTITUDE ARNG AVIATION

TRAINING SITE) WHEN THE MARGINS ARE SMALL AND THE RISKS HIGH IN THE ROCKIES OF COLORADO.

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elebrating decision-making sounds about as exciting celebrating Continuation from

Fifth Grade to Middle School but that is exactly what should be highlighted about a day involving multiple search and rescues in the high country of Colorado. People like to celebrate the hoist operations that we conduct at 14,000 feet or the one wheel landing that make the news because that’s “Sexy.” Yet we need to be keenly aware that as military pilots, while good decisions are rarely applauded, you can bet your wings that a poor decision will be revisited more times than you would like.

IT’S ABOUT RISK As the Commander of the High-

altitude ARNG Aviation Training Site (HAATS), I have multiple levels of risk to evaluate. In training, I must trust that my Instructors can read a student quickly, challenge that student by pushing their limits and yet allow learning to take place without damaging the aircraft. This is high frequency because the training is conducted weekly and low probability because of the experience of my instructors. Yet what really makes the hair stand up on the back of my neck is Search and Rescue (SAR) decision-making.

SAR’s for the HAATS tends to be a medium frequency, high-risk mission. Medium frequency meaning that we flew 29 missions last Fiscal Year (FY) so there’s some familiarity, but still high risk for a multitude of reasons. In addition to “normal” risk associated

with flying in the mountains, SAR missions can become complicated quickly. These complications arise from variables such as relying on SAR Teams as our ground counterpart, the elevations where people get lost or injured in Colorado, the severity of the situation before we are notified, the expectation of what we are supposed to be able to accomplish, and the ever present “sense of urgency.”

Mount Blanca MissionOn 11 July 2015, we received a call

for two missing hikers around Mount Blanca. Flight for Life (FFL) Colorado, whom we work with quite frequently, was also called to search because it was presumed that since the two had been missing for two days they were probably in need of medical attention. Ground teams began to move into the area, and FFL was able to locate the two individuals. Due to the terrain they were in, it was decided that a hoist operation might be needed, as FFL was not going to be able to land near them. The crew received this information after launching and landing at the Incident Command (IC) for a face to face. This was the first good decision to set the tone for the day; land and conduct a face to face with the IC. A face to face typically alleviates any misperceptions we got from translating the situation through numerous Operations Centers; it also updates information that may have changed since our dispatching. This decision was especially important in this case since we do not often work with this county and communication available with the field teams was already questionable. This also

C

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last resort. Since no ground teams were on site and wouldn’t be for a few hours due to terrain, and three and two wheel landings were not possible, a hoist was determined to be the best option. We do not have Medics at HAATS to ride the hoist down and assess a victim. As a result, the Crew Chief went down on the rescue seat making this the second decision to celebrate even though this was out of the norm. This gave him the opportunity to assess the survivors and determine if the seat would work. More importantly, he made sure they were securely attached to the seat vice relying on them being able to read and comprehend the instructions on the seat after no sustenance for two days.

MEANWHILE, BACK AT CRESTONE PEAK

While conducting the hoist work on Mount Blanca, back at HAATS we received word from the Colorado Joint Operations Center (JOC) of a

prevented us from entering the search area and being surprised (by FFL). Even though we have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with them that places us on a common frequency, we typically forget to blind call or even tune it up at times if we do not suspect they are there.

After receiving an accurate LAT/LON, the crew launched to assess. It was determined that it would take hours for the ground team to get to them. About this time, we were receiving word from Mountain Rescue Aspen about a follow-on mission on Mount Snowmass for a fallen climber. This was relayed to the crew roughly the time they arrived over the survivors. They decided that it was just as easy to pick up the two seemingly okay survivors and save fuel for the possible follow-on mission. We have a SAR Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that emphasizes to land first, two wheel landing second, one wheel landing third, and hoist as a

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third mission that was approved and became the next priority. A female hiker who happened to be ten weeks pregnant, fell on Crestone Peak and had a possible broken femur, broken ribs, difficulty breathing and was becoming hypothermic as reported by her hiking partner. Crestone Peak and Crestone Needle, like so many mountains in the Aspen area, are nasty places to work and one of the few places that make me cringe when we have to send aircrews there. The crew was going to Alamosa for fuel, so we decided to talk to them by phone when they landed to give them the follow-on mission, hopefully with a little more clarity. Although not celebrated at the time, this decision slowed the Operational Tempo and allowed us at HAATS to coordinate ground teams and talk with a good connection. Slowing the OPTEMPO is sometimes difficult, especially with a victim like this, but it is necessary to prevent pushing a bad situation. One thing we like to reiterate from time to time for both our aircrews and ground team members is, “don’t make their emergency, your emergency!”

It was pretty evident that this mission was going to require a hoist. Patient packaging is not our forte; we rely on the SAR Teams we work

with for that. As luck would have it, the team from Western State that we trained for Hoist Operations during the spring, were on their way there from Gunnison. It was decided to have them go to another airfield where we would link up with them and a team from Saguache County, insert the teams, package the victim, then hoist and go. It was also determined that this mission had the possibility to run into night requiring Night Vision Goggles. At this point, it was determined crew rest was not an issue, so we adjusted the risk accordingly and didn’t have much in the way of mitigation to apply yet. Now it was time for the real “decision party” to begin.

While en route to Crestone Peak, the aircrew was notified that FFL was taking the Snowmass mission. After picking up the Saguache Team and locating the survivors, the team was inserted. The survivors were on the leeward side of the mountain, in a steep drainage on an “island” of sorts made of one large rock and running water on both sides from the melting snowpack above. There was no place to land near the injured party, so the team was inserted as close as possible to them and would have to traverse the couloir to make contact with them. Ironically,

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 29

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one week later we would be back at the same spot for a climber who was not so lucky and missed the “island” in the fall and subsequently died. The aircrew went back to pick up the Western State Team, donned their NVGs and inserted them to package and hoist the survivor.

REASON TO TELL THE STORYThe teams made it to the survivor,

packaged her, and were ready for the hoist. The Blackhawk is a powerful machine but at 14,000 feet, even it has limits. Operating on the leeward side of the mountain, the downdraft and turbulence was so strong, that maintaining a stabilized hover was virtually impossible. Working backward now through our SAR SOP from hoist to landing had to occur. I say backward because now the ground team has to move the survivor with ropes in

unforgiving terrain. Their safety had to be balanced along with the capabilities of the aircraft and crew.

This was the best decision of the night and the reason to tell the story; moving away from the hoist and opting to land, sacrificing speed and the “hero” image that comes with doing a live hoist. It was also one of the hardest for both the ground teams and the survivor to hear. The turbulence was bad; to the point that a one wheel was not going to be stable enough to load the survivor over the rugged terrain. Two wheels were marginally better, and there wasn’t a place for it to be executed. Unfortunately, the team would have to move the survivor 1500ft vertically down the mountain, possibly at night with no illumination, to where the aircraft could get all three wheels on the ground to load.

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 31

The decision became complicated because there was a serious concern as whether the survivor would make it through the night given limited medical support by the SAR Teams. This was a tough decision to make given the circumstances but the right call from a safety standpoint.

The aircrew went back to Alamosa for fuel and planned on returning at 0100 for pick up and a status check since they were going to be out of communications with the team. Meanwhile, the rest of us in the Command Center at HAATS were beginning to wonder what the issue was. I know from our experiences with fallen climbers about how much time it takes to complete the complicated portion of the mission, and I am respectful of the workload going on in the aircraft enough to stay out of

the cockpit, but the lack of contact was becoming disturbing. We finally received a call from the aircraft when they were back in Alamosa about what the proposed plan was.

Now I have some decisions to make as a Risk Manager.

I understand that they do not want to leave the victim or the team in the field, but I have to be the one weighing the risk versus the reward. The risk being that this crew had completed one mission and was just jerked around on another mission, only to end up on this mission. They took NVGs with them but those were for recovery purposes; flying unaided in the mountains of Colorado can be a death sentence. We had not cycled the crew for NVGs, so they had been at work since noon and were going on 9 hours of duty day already, and the pick-up was not until

32 HELIOPSFRONTLINE

0100. Pick-up at 0100 placed the most dangerous portion of the mission in the 11th hour of their duty day; they still had a two-hour flight home to HAATS on top of it through the Colorado high-country. I know they have not eaten and probably hadn’t hydrated too much. I normally wouldn’t worry so much about a person’s diet, but I also knew that they only had two small bottles of oxygen each and probably exhausted one so far, so I was concerned about hypoxia adding to the issue.

VARIABLESWe discussed all the variables and

why the crew made the decision not to do the hoist. I had to make a decision as to if they should go back and pick-up the victim or trust that she was in good hands to this point and was going to be able to be roped down and carried out. At a minimum, the crew needed to make contact and let the ground team know what was going on, which could happen on the way home. There was a

waiting Air Ambulance in a soccer field in town, but that is as “remote” as that aircraft’s contract would allow under NVGs. So the carry out of the victim would be a long and arduous process. Hypothermia, broken ribs, broken femur, in the backcountry, and who was ten weeks pregnant also factored into the situation; we are not heartless. It was decided that the crew would return at 0100. If the team made it to the Pickup Zone (PZ) and a safe extraction and delivery to the awaiting Air Ambulance could be conducted, the mission would continue with some mitigation.

First of all, and not because I was worried about the crew becoming “Aretha Franklin” like in the Snicker’s commercial from a lack of food, they needed to eat. They were able to coordinate late night food with the airport. Secondly, they needed to make sure they were good with oxygen for the pickup and the trip home. As luck would have it, the first mission was only around 12,000 feet MSL and was

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executed fairly quickly, so they all had oxygen remaining. Finally, the last and most critical item to manage at this point was crew rest. They assured me they felt okay now, which didn’t matter to me because they were coming off adrenalin and the critical time to be awake was over four hours from now. I urged them to try to nap but having experienced it many times myself; it is hard to turn the brain off during a SAR knowing you have to go back out, so sleep is difficult at best.

I could only offer some mitigation; short of ordering them to come home and I was not sure my conscious would have allowed me to do that. First of all, it was easy for me to say that being back at Command Center at HAATS and not out there in the field. It was reiterated to think of the crew before the victim or the SAR Teams. If they had an accident, now they were making that victim’s emergency, their emergency. This was not lost on the crew. Secondly, and most important, they were going to have to cross monitor each other performance. I was not there to watch the crew, and truthfully only each

crewmember knew how tired he was; externally could be faked for the most part. The crew was familiar enough with each other that hopefully they could identify mistakes being made in performance/load calculations or just normal crew procedures and use it as an indicator to determine if the risk was increasing. Third, if the ground team was not successful in moving the victim to the PZ, they had to determine what additional time and coordination must take place, and if not executed quickly, they may have to leave them all in the field and return home. There was no going back to Alamosa for fuel and they still needed about two hours of fuel to get home. Finally, and I hate doing it especially to the all-volunteer SAR Teams who incidentally are the true Hero’s in this and all our SARs, the ground teams would have to walk out. We assumed all the risk to get the victim out; the very capable ground teams could handle the hike and coordinate for transportation.

LEADERSHIPAs the commander of the HAATS,

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 35

I only get to manage the risk at my level to the best of my abilities. In the State of Colorado, ultimately The Adjutant General (TAG) who is the two-star leader of both the Army and Air National Guard, is the one that has to approve the highest level of risk. My conduit to him is through the State Army Aviation Officer, who happens to be my predecessor in this job and is well versed about the ins and outs of these missions. I rely on his tutelage since I still haven’t seen it all; and his ability to articulate to the TAG the risk he is about to assume. This is extremely important because sometimes Senior Leaders will “assume” risk not fully knowing what they are “assuming,” to which we owe them a detailed explanation so they can make an informed decision. With the mitigations in place, he trusted the team and allowed the mission to continue.

I do not know that the decision to go back and pick up the victim is a celebration type decision; it was just a decision. It was calculated and mitigated, however. The crew was airborne again at 1245. Once they were in radio range, the SAR Teams communicated that they had the

victim in the designated PZ where all three wheels could make contact with the ground. Their efforts saved this individual and as I understand it, the baby too. The landing in the soccer field and subsequent transfer to the Air Ambulance went quickly, and the crew was on their way home.

Incidentally, the “cross monitor” piece I spoke of earlier paid off. On the return trip home, one of the crewmembers became “Aretha Franklin” like. Probably the most benign portion of the mission vice being under NVGs and this crewmember became knit-picky about every task that was occurring at the time. Simultaneously, all the crewmembers told him to get back on oxygen, and Aretha disappeared… v

HAATS HISTORY

1985 Colorado Aviators begin training Colorado crews.

1986 Colorado High Altitude Training Site (CHATS) forms.

1987 Other states facing deployments in Honduras request assistance from CHATS to train crews prior to deployment. First SAR mission conducted.

1991 CHATS becomes a Federal Training site and renamed HATS under the command of the Western ARNG Aviation Training Site (WAATS) and began to receive NGB directed funds.

1995 HATS becomes HAATS, and receives a stand alone TDA. Falls under the command of TAG-Colorado, with direct funding from NGB.

2010 United States Coast Guard stations Instructor at HAATS full time, making HAATS a Multi-Service School House.

Present Only DoD Aviation Training site for Power Management and mountain environmental flight training. Trains aircrews from all branches and components for NGB and Ft. Rucker.

LTC Tony Somogyi has been the Commander at the High-altitude ARNG Aviation Training Site (HAATS) for a little over three years and has been assigned there since 2007. He is a 1998 graduate of the University of North Dakota with a BS in Aeronautical Studies and earned his COMM/INS Rotorcraft through the Air Battle Captain Program there. LTC Somogyi spent 8 years on Active Duty as an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior pilot in various positions including a deployment to Iraq in 2003. He is a Master Aviator and now flying the CH-47D and UH-72A. In addition to training students from all around the world in the Art and Science of Power Management, HAATS conducts many SAR missions each year in the high country of Colorado.


The Pentagon is drastically cutting back on the Army’s

helicopter budget, and that spells trouble for military preparedness

as well as the OEMs. We examine the ramifications.

STORY BY JOHN PERSINOSPHOTO SOURCES: THE RESPECTIVE OEMS


The U.S. Army’s FY 2017 budget calls for

purchasing 36 Black Hawks, down from 107

units of the utility helicopter in fiscal 2016.


here’s an old saying among American helicopter pilots: “Scratch a helicopter and there’s bound to be a coat of green paint underneath.” It’s

testimony to the fact that many pilots and aircraft models trace their beginnings to the U.S. Army.

This fiscal year, though, Uncle Sam is getting stingy with Army helicopter programs and the entire industry will feel the ripple effects.

The U.S. Army’s $125.1 billion request is $1.4 billion lower than the service’s approved fiscal 2016 budget. Army aircraft accounts for the largest decline, from $5.9 billion in fiscal 2016 to 3.6 billion for fiscal 2017.

“The immediate result is the procurement of fewer Black Hawks, Apaches and Chinooks,” said Army Lt. Gen. Michael E Williamson at a House Armed Services hearing in March.

Aviation accounts for 25% of the Army’s procurement pie, so it’s not surprising it would take a hit when the Pentagon is looking for ways to save money. Prolific bank robber Willie Sutton was once asked: “Why do you rob banks?” And he famously answered: “Because that’s where the money is.” When it comes to the Army, that’s where the money is – with helicopters.

To make up for less procurement money, the budget emphasizes modernization of its three “prime” programs: the AH-64E Apache and CH-47 Chinook, both made by Boeing, and Sikorsky Aircraft’s UH-60M Black Hawk.

The FY 2017 budget expedites the “Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative” (a fancy euphemism for aircraft procurement cutbacks) by purchasing 52 Apaches, 22 Chinooks, and 36 Black Hawks. By comparison, the Army purchased 64 Apaches, 39 Chinooks and 107 Black Hawks in fiscal 2016 (see chart on next page).

“We’ve sifted through the latest numbers and the upshot is unmistakable: U.S. Army helicopter procurement numbers are rapidly declining,” says Richard Aboulafia, vice president of analysis at the Teal Group, aerospace consultants based in Virginia.

Looking at the three key programs – CH-47, UH-60M and AH-64E – procurement is falling from almost $4 billion for 175 helicopters in FY 2012

to just $2.6 billion for 110 helicopters in FY 2017. And the decline is scheduled to continue through the end of the decade. Clearly, the helicopter procurement surge that accompanied the Iraq and Afghanistan build-ups has merely served to hasten the end of current programs of record.

This falloff in Army aircraft procurement should be seen in a much broader context. Key Marine and Navy programs, such as the MH-60R and S, V-22, UH-1Y, and AH-1Z, are also on track to fall drastically over the next few years. The USMC CH-53K is about the only new program on the horizon, except for the FVL concept, a high-risk long shot that might not produce anything tangible until 2.

All of this represents serious pressure on the U.S. rotorcraft industry, which depends on both civilian and military demand. These shrinking military numbers are coinciding with a civilian sector under intense pressure from the recession in the offshore oil and gas transport, a sector that’s reeling from low energy prices.

“Despite these program reductions, there are still three primes, the CH-47, UH-60M and AH-64E,” says Aboulafia. “It’s hard to see a way to reduce this number to two and still be viable. There’s a floor to these cutbacks.”

And yet, expensive fixed-wing programs with entrenched lobbying constituencies are protected in the latest budget. As of May, a spending proposal in Congress would allot $1.4 billion for an additional 14 Super Hornet combat fighters manufactured by Boeing that weren’t even included in the Pentagon’s FY 2017 budget request.

An additional $1.5 billion would go toward acquiring 11 of Lockheed Martin’s hugely expensive F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. The proposal would also allot $450 million for four of Boeing’s C-40A planes for the Navy and Marine Corps.

“Gold-plated programs, some of them anachronistic relics of the Cold War, are getting money at the expense of cost-efficient helicopter workhorses that are needed for the nation’s first line of defense,” says Tom Scarlett, a lawyer and aerospace analyst based in Washington, DC. “In the Pentagon’s latest budget, the Air Force won and the Army lost.”

T


THE U.S. ARMY’S DWINDLING HELICOPTER FLEETArmy helicopter procurement, in value and units, fiscal 2012 to 2017

Source: Teal Group

FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17

AH64 680 800 900 1123 1353 1066 27 44 39 48 64 52

UH60 1850 1650 1230 1469 1702 929 103 104 70 105 107 36

CH47 1400 1360 930 1017 1104 590 45 44 39 32 39 22

Total Value 3930 3810 3060 3609 4159 2585Total Units 175 192 148 185 210 110

Lockheed Martin, the largest defense contractor in the world, in late 2015 purchased from United Technologies the Sikorsky Aircraft division for $9 billion in cash. The move added the Pentagon’s largest helicopter builder to Lockheed Martin’s already fulsome military aircraft portfolio.

Among Sikorsky’s most popular products are variants of the UH-60 Black Hawk, flown by the U.S. military and also exported to countries around the world. The durable Black Hawk is considered the “aerial Jeep” of the U.S. Army and is prized for its versatility and scalability.

Despite threats of defense cutbacks, one program that isn’t slated to take a significant hit is the most expensive U.S. weapons program in history: Lockheed Martin’s F-35.

The F-35 is the most advanced combat jet fighter ever built and the Navy, Air Force and Marines are devoted to their respective iterations of the program. More than 2,443 of the planes are on order and about 65 already have been built, at a cost of $84 billion.

The unit cost for an F-35 currently hovers at around $161 million. According to estimates from the Teal Group, it could cost up to $1.5 trillion to develop, build, fly, and maintain all the F-35s on order for 55 years, the full operational lives of the planes.

The DoD’s overall military budget for FY 2017 calls for 63 F-35s in fiscal 2017, down from 66 this year, and a total of 37 fewer F-35s over the next five years. That’s a reduction, to be sure, but proportionately not nearly as drastic as the hit taken by Army helicopters.

“The F-35 is sucking a lot of oxygen out of military aircraft procurement, creating a ‘zero sum’ situation that’s clobbering the Army’s rotorcraft budget,” Scarlett says. “There’s a domino effect.”

While Lockheed Martin benefits from relatively robust fixed-wing budgets, it’s getting hurt on the rotorcraft side with its new corporate acquisition of Sikorsky. “The decline in offshore work hasn’t helped, either. After the military, the oil industry has perhaps become Sikorsky’s number one customer,” Scarlett says.

However, the massive collapse of worldwide oil prices has cut deeply into the budget for Sikorsky’s S-92 and S-76 aircraft for offshore transportation.

The helicopter industry will find little solace from whoever wins the White House this year. Republican Donald J. Trump has promised to beef up the military budget, but he has also questioned American commitments to NATO and South Korea in a more fundamental way than any mainstream candidate in decades. Those commitments are


The Army will buy 22 Chinooks in 2017,

compared to 39 units of the heavy-lift,

tandem-rotor transport helicopter last year.


heavily helicopter-centric. Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton would probably keep Pentagon spending roughly where it has been under President Obama.

THE NATIONAL GUARD FEELS THE PINCH

One falling domino is the U.S. National Guard. The latest military budget numbers pit Army needs against the Guard — and the Guard is losing.

Indeed, the U.S. National Guard these days is caught in a vise: its budget keeps getting smaller while at the same time its responsibilities have burgeoned. The condition of the National Guard’s helicopter-intensive aircraft fleet remains precarious.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2017 budget proposes an Army National Guard (ARNG) end strength of 335,000 soldiers, the same level as the previous fiscal year. In addition, the FY 2017 budget continues a reorganization of Army aviation that began in fiscal 2015, divesting all Kiowa Warriors and transferring all Apache helicopters to the Active Army.

More than 50% of National Guard members have military combat experience. Now that the Cold War is a distant memory and military priorities are re-oriented to fighting terrorism, the U.S. Army is trying to modernize and consolidate its operations — in large part by handing off

more responsibilities to an already overburdened National Guard.

The Guard is finding it harder and harder to fulfill its expanding number of missions, especially since Guard members simultaneously hold civilian jobs and the majority of them are married.

National Guard and Reserve units maintain a high degree of combat readiness because they comprise contingency forces that can be deployed with regular Army units. The traditional role of the National Guard is to serve as a front-line defense for state governors in emergencies. In recent years, though, units have been asked to perform considerably more helicopter search and rescue and civilian disaster relief.

Since 9/11, a crucial mission assigned to the Guard requires it to be the first response to terrorism involving chemical and biological weapons. Meanwhile, so far this year, Guard units have fought wildfires in California; responded to floods that likely resulted from global climate change; conducted relief operations in developing nations; and provided counterdrug support to local law enforcement agencies.

POLITICIANS GET INTO THE ACTThe Connecticut delegation in Congress counts

Stamford, CT-based Sikorsky as a major source of good, high-paying manufacturing jobs in the state.

The Army’s FY 2017 budget plans to purchase 52 Apaches, down from 64 units of the combat helicopter last fiscal year.


Foreign exports of American-made aircraft — notably, emerging market demand for variants of Sikorsky’s Black Hawk — will more than compensate for any Pentagon cutbacks. Sikorsky recently delivered this S-70i BLACK HAWK Black Hawk to Jalisco, the first state government in Mexico to acquire the newest variant of the military utility aircraft.

Accordingly, lawmakers are working hard to soften the blow of planned Army Aviation budget cuts.

In February, several U.S. Representatives from the state signed a letter to the leaders on the House Armed Services panel, asking them to put money back into the Army budget to buy new Black Hawks.

To come up with additional funding to develop a new search and rescue helicopter in 2017 built by Sikorsky and called the HH-60W, the military jettisoned plans to replace with new Black Hawks the 62 aging Vietnam War-era UH-1N “Huey” helicopters that guard intercontinental ballistic missile bases in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming.

“The failure to modernize these weapons has created a glaring gap in the security of our nation’s nuclear weapons,” stated the bipartisan letter, signed by a total of 15 Democrats and Republicans.

What’s more, at a congressional hearing in March on the Pentagon’s helicopter budget, Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Armed Services Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee, angrily decried the cutbacks to the Army’s helicopter fleet. “I can assure you this committee is going to reverse this dangerous decision…and is working to provide the necessary funding,” Turner said.

But at least for Sikorsky and its iconic Black

Hawk, there’s a silver lining amid the gloom.Foreign exports of American-made aircraft —

notably, emerging market demand for variants of Sikorsky’s Black Hawk — will more than compensate for Pentagon cutbacks.

Rising nations in the Asia Pacific region are placing huge orders for new or upgraded Black Hawks from Sikorsky, as they use these versatile flying machines to fight terrorism, drug runners and piracy.

Another popular Sikorsky model is the S-92, the advanced, carbon composite-made helicopter with state-of-the-art cockpit capabilities that’s making inroads with the offshore oil and gas sector, as well as with the world’s militaries.

Both the Black Hawk and S-92 are considered among the most technologically advanced helicopters in the world and can be adapted for a host of uses in the military, police, fire, energy, utility, search and rescue fields. The widespread customer base of these aircraft also provides Sikorsky (and by extension its new parent Lockheed Martin) with a steady stream of long-term and lucrative aftermarket work.

Once sacred helicopter programs such as the Black Hawk, Apache and Chinook are feeling the pinch from military budget cutbacks. But until the day that U.S. Army aviation budgets are restored, these time-tested rotorcraft models will find succor overseas. v


The Mil Mi-28N is the first new-generation attack helicopter of the Russian Air Force. ALEX MLADENOV looks the program and its development.

PHOTOS BY ALEX MLADENOV, ANDREY ZINCHUK AND RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS


nitially inducted in 2009, and now serving with five front-line squadrons in addition to one combat training

squadron, the long-time coming and much-suffering Mi-28N program was originally launched in the late 1970s. It was the Soviet Union’s direct response to the development of the then Hughes (later McDonnell Douglas and now Boeing) AH-64 Apache. Due to the serious deficiencies of Soviet and later on Russian defense avionics, it was initially built and tested in a day-only version as the industry was unable to provide any working night mission systems. The new rotorcraft, offered by the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant (Mil MHP), initially known simply as the Mi-28 (NATO reporting name Havoc), boasted considerably improved battlefield survivability, when compared to its predecessor Mi-24 Hind, (at least in theory), thanks to extensive armor protection measures, increased flight-critical system redundancy and improved agility.

The Mi-28 however, was never launched into production as it lost the Soviet competition for a new-generation attack helicopter to the single-seat and highly-automated Kamov Ka-50 Hokum. Then in the early 2000s, the new-generation helicopter competition of the newly-independent Russia was renewed. Russian Air Force (RuAF) asked both Mil MHP and Kamov to develop new-generation attack helicopters endowed with night attack operating capabilities. The end result from this rather expensive and extensive effort was available in the late 2000s in the form of two new day/night attack rotorcraft designs - the Mi-28N and Ka-52. In 2011 a third night attack-capable type appeared, the Mi-35M (a deep Mi-24 upgrade).

NIGHT-CAPABLE HAVOC

The prototype of the Mi-28N Night Hunter, vehicle OP-1, was built by Mil MHP in 1994-1995 and made its maiden flight in November 1996 without its intended, highly integrated avionics suite. The program pace was very slow due to severe underfunding and as result the second Mi-28N prototype, dubbed OP-2, did not fly until March 2004. The real push to the Mi-28N’s development effort was in 2003 when the Russian MoD announced that its rotorcraft procurement

plan for the Army Aviation branch included as many as 50 new-generation attack helicopters.

There were no budget funds allocated for the production of the pre-series batch which prompted Rostvertol (the company responsible for the production of the Mi-28N) to assume the risk by funding the initial phase of the development program through a bank credit of US$15 million obtained from a Russian bank in 2005. History showed that this Rostvertol venture was a wise one as it helped the acceleration of the Mi-28N’s development and managed to keep the program aloft. The development was further accelerated in 2006 when Russia’s defense budget at last funded the production of a six-helicopter batch intended for the type’s extensive test and evaluation effort by the RuAF.

The first of three initial production Mi-28Ns (c/n 01-01), ordered by the Russian MoD for developmental work, was completed by Rostvertol in late 2004 and took the air for the first time 25 January 2005. Then, in October 2007, the long-awaited full-rate production approval was granted by the Russian MoD. The first four production-standard aircraft were handed over to the RuAF in January 2008. In June 2009, 12 production-standard Mi-28Ns were reported to have been taken on strength. The type, however, was officially commissioned into RuAF service as a combat-capable combat system in February 2014, after addressing most of the serious teething troubles that had been discovered and documented by the RuAF during the testing phase and the initial operation.

MI-28N AT A GLANCE

The Night Hunter is being promoted by Mil MHP as an heavily-armored attack helicopter purposely designed for carrying out anti-tank warfare and destruction of well-defended and hardened targets as well as performing a raft of auxiliary tasking such as aerial mine laying, suppression of area targets, destruction of small sea and river vessels and low-altitude slow-speed aircraft.

Past and current Russian attack helicopter doctrines call for the aircraft to approach the

I


target area at high speed and treetop altitude, in order to delay detection as long as possible before executing a rapid pop-up to acquire the target and unleash its ordinance in a shallow dive. The Night Hunter cannot effectively fire its weapons when in hover and so its battlefield survivability had to be ensured through extensive armoring of airframe’s most vulnerable areas. This could allow it to sustain much heavier combat punishment than its predecessor Mi-24 when employing the same low-level running, close quarter attack tactics.

The two-man crew is accommodated in a narrow tandem cockpit with an extensive armor protection; the gunner-operator in the front and pilot-commander in the rear seat. The Mi-28N’s aircrew compartment has a 10-mm thick armor protection made of aluminum alloy reinforced with ceramic plates. It is advertised as being capable of withstanding hits from 20-mm projectiles. The windshields of both cockpits are made from 42-mm thick armored glass capable of withstanding hits from 12.7-mm bullets; the flat side windows are 22-mm thick capable of protecting the aircrew from 7.62-mm bullets. The composite main rotor blades are reportedly able to sustain hits by up to 30-mm projectiles.

The pilot/commander has an elevated seat in the separated cockpit. In contrast to the Mi-24dual-controls, only the pilot of the Mi-28N has flight controls, while the gunner is tasked with en-route navigation, target search and handling both the ATGM system and gun turret. The pilot operates the forward-firing weapons - 80-mm and 122-mm rockets, and 23-mm gun-pods in addition to the 30mm turreted gun when in forward-firing position.

To increase chances for aircrew survival, both the cockpits feature an all-new rescue system centered around the Zvezda Pamir-K energy-absorbing seats combined with the energy-attenuating undercarriage and jettisonable cockpit doors, main rotor blades and stub wings. Mil sources boast that the seat/undercarriage combination enables the pilot and the gunner to survive crash landings with a descent rate of up to 40fps (12m/s), as impact forces acting on the aircrew are being reduced from 60- to 12-G.

The Mi-28N has a five-blade main rotor and a low-noise X-shaped tail rotor. All prototypes and pre-production aircraft plus a number of the initial production aircraft were powered by two Klimov TV3-117VMA turboshafts, installed


in widely-spaced nacelles above each wingroot, rated at 1,636kW (2,194shp) each. The air intakes are provided with FOD and dust protection devices. Starting from 2010, the production examples began receiving the more powerful Klimov VK-2500-02 engines, each rated at 1,789kW (2,400shp) in one engine inoperative (OEI) conditions in order to improve the speed and rate of climb performance to the levels required by the RuAF in the original technical specification. The fuel system has a capacity of 1,500 liters of internal fuel accommodated in self-sealing bladder tanks

with an option for up to four 557-litrer external fuel tanks on the wind pylons for ferry flights.

INITIAL PRODUCTION CONFIGURATION

The Night Hunters delivered so far are in the so-called initial production configuration. It has limited operational capabilities compared to the original technical specifications due to the lack the originally-conceived mast-mounted radar, a fully-integrated self-defense suite and helmet-mounted


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cueing system. All of these advanced systems are still in various stages of development and slated to be added at a later stage. Initial plans called for all of these systems to be installed on both the newly built and already delivered airframes but now it seems that all the advanced kit will be added only on the new Mi-28NM version.

The baseline Mi-28N introduced the interim BREO-28N integrated avionics suite with night-vision/all-weather capability. The pilot cockpit has two LCD multifunctional displays used to present flight and navigation information, airframe/engine system data, weapon stations status and targeting information. In addition, the pilot is provided with an ILS-28 head-up display to aim his forward-firing weapons. The weighty and bulky OPS-28N Tor electro-optical system is the primary targeting sensor, integrating a three-channel sensor

package into a common gyro stabilized drum-shaped platform under the nose. It can steer 110o left and right, 13o up and 40o down. Developed by Krasnogorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant, the Tor houses the package of three sensors behind a pair of optically flat windows, including a FLIR, TV-camera and a laser rangefinder. The FLIR has two fixed field of view (FoV) positions – with 3x and 8x zoom respectively, while the TV-channel is provided with a 20x zoom capability. Mi-28N pilots tend to comment that in daylight conditions, with rain and smoke obscuring the battlefield, with direct visibility not exceeding 0.8nm (1.5km), the OPS-28N’s outdated FLIR sensor limited Ataka-V launches to distances not exceeding 1.6nm (3km). The TV-sensor of the system provides greater daylight mission capability as it can detect main battle tanks (MBTs) at up to 3.8nm (7km) in good


visibility while enabling ATGM launches at up to 2.7nm (5km).

Mi-28N’s night flying at low altitude is facilitated thanks to the Skosok or GEO-ONV1-01 night vision goggles (NVGs) and the UOMZ TOES-520 electro optical payload. Installed under the ‘pimple’ radome in the nose, the payload integrates a FLIR, a pack of two daylight TV cameras and laser rangefinder, and is usable for navigation purposes only.

NIGH HUNTER’S WEAPONS SUITE The radio beam-riding 9M120 Ataka-V anti-tank

guided missile (ATGM) system is the Mi-28N’s only guided weapon. This supersonic missile uses radio beam-riding guidance and has a maximum range of 3.13nm (5.8km); its tandem warhead boasts armor penetration capability of

up to 850mm after defeating explosive armor. In theory, up to 16 ATGMs can be carried on two under-wing launchers but in real-world conditions up to eight can be carried in two four-round units. The Ataka-V missile also comes in another two versions, equipped with thermobaric/high explosive and blast-fragmentation warheads respectively, intended for use against buildings and personnel.

Mi-28N’s unguided ordinance can be carried on four pylons under the stub-wings (each with load capacity of 1,058lb [480kg]) and includes 80mm S-8 rockets fired from B8V-20 20-round packs (maximum load of 80 rockets in four packs) and S-13 122-mm rockets fired from five-round B13 packs (maximum load of 20 rockets in four packs). In addition, the Mi-28N can use a pair of forward-firing UPK-23-250 gun pods with GSh-23 23-mm


twin-barrel guns, provided with 250 rounds each. Twin-round Strelets packs with two 9M39 Igla-V air-to-air missiles, usable for anti-helicopter and anti-UAV operations can be also used - up to eight air-to-air missiles can carried onto four Strelets twin missile launcher units suspended under the inner and outer wing pylons.

The 2A42 30mm gun has a maximum rate of fire of 900rpm and is provided with 500 rounds. Originally developed as an infantry weapon for the

new-generation Russian infantry fighting vehicle, it was modified for airborne use, installed in a massive NPPU-28 gun turret under the nose. The turret is provided with two-axis stabilization and can be steered through 1100 degrees left and right, 130 up and 400 down. The armor-piercing shell, when unleashed at 4,950ft (1,500m), can penetrate a steel plate 15mm thick at an angle of arrival of 600 and its maximum effective aiming range is 13,200ft (4,000m).

MI-28 DEVELOPMENT STORY

In the early and mid-1980s, Mil MHP built two prototypes and two pre-series vehicles of the day-capable Mi-28. It was advertised as an new-generation attack helicopter using the conventional gunship, configuration externally similar to that of the Boeing AH-64 Apache. The maiden flight in hover was made on 10 November 1982, while the first forward flight on the airfield circuit followed on 10 December that year. There were two prototypes built which underwent protracted and rigorous comparative trials in 1985-1986. The Mi-28A was an improved version for testing, built in two copies in 1988; the first of these made its first flight in over on 7 January and first forward flight on 19 January that year.


NIGHT HUNTER ENTERS RUSSIAN MILITARY SERVICE

The first four Mi-28Ns were ceremonially handed over to the Russian Army Aviation’s 334th Combat Training and Aircrew Conversion Centre in Torzhok. Then the first front-line squadron to be re-equipped with the Mi-28N was drawn from the 487th Independent Helicopter Regiment stationed at Budyonnovsk in Russia’s Southern Military District (MD), not far away from the Republic of Chechnya. This unit took on strength its first Night Hunters in April 2009 and two years later its fleet numbered 16. The squadron was declared to

have attained initial operating capability for day missions only in the summer of 2010, while in 2011 its pilots commenced mastering the difficult art of night combat operations as well as complex mountain flying techniques.

The 393rd AB AA at Korennovsk also stationed in the Southern MD, took on strength in October 2010 its first batch of eight Mi-28Ns. In 2011, eight more Mi-28Ns were introduced.

The third Mi-28N-equipped squadron was assigned to the 546th Air Base stationed at Rostov-on-Don, also in the Southern MD, receiving its initial batch of six attack helicopters in mid-

HAVOC IN THE SYRIAN WAR

The first photographs of the Mi-28N Havoc operating out of Russian air base in Latakia in Syria (known as Hmeimim air base) showed aircraft flying around the base on 15 March 2016. Close-up images taken by casual observers in the Latakia area emerged later in the month and their three-digit serials (including ‘201 blue’) showed that most if not all of the Havocs deployed to Syria had been sourced from the 16th Army Aviation Brigade at Zernograd. Wearing overall grey and green-and-brown camouflages, the Mi-28Ns deployed to Syria were active in the battle for Palmyra in late March, pounding ground targets with 80mm rockets, cannon and ATGMs in running attacks at ultra-low level. They were first identified flying in anger on March 26, when they pounded Islamic State (IS) positions in the vicinity of Palmyra. A Night Hunter, flown by a crew from Budyonnovsk, was lost in an accident just after midnight on 12 April. Flying a night-vision goggle (NVG) mission, it collided with terrain near Homs; both crewmembers were killed. The Russian MoD stated that enemy fire was not involved. Later on, there was information that pilot disorientation was the main cause for the accident.


2012. In 2015 the unit was re-designated as the 16th Army Aviation Brigade (AAB) and was moved to Zernograd.

The fourth squadron equipped with the Mi-28N was included into the structure of the newly-established 15th Army Aviation Brigade at Ostrov in the Western MD. It received a total of 12 Mi-28Ns between August 2013 and April 2014.

The fifth and so far the last Mi-28N squadron is assigned to the 549th Air Base at Pribilovo near St Petersburg, in the Western MD. It took on strength its first Night Hunters in June 2014 and at the year-end its fleet numbered some ten aircraft. It fully converted to the new type in 2015, when it received six more examples.

By April 2016, no fewer than 90 production-standard Mi-28Ns are reported to have rolled off the line at Rostvertol and taken on strength by the RAA - including 10 units in 2009, 12 in 2010, 12 in 2011, 14 in 2012, 14 in 2013, 12 in 2014 and 12 in 2015. In addition, Iraq took 11 Mi-28NEs in 2014 and 2015 (with four more expected in the second half of 2016), while Algeria took its first four examples in May 2016.

The Russian MoD’s initial procurement plan included no less than 50 Mi-28Ns to the end of 2012, with 70 more expected to follow to 2018. Unit price was said to be about US $24 million at the time. In fact, the numbers of the basic Mi-28N version were cut to about 90, with the last of these taken on strength by the Russian military in

late 2015. Then, the production line at Rostvertol switched to rolling out two new Night Hunter variants for the RAA – initially the slightly-improved Mi-28UB, equipped with dual controls. An order for 24 was placed in April 2016, with deliveries slated for completion in late 2018. Then, from 2019 onwards, the radically improved Mi-28NM should follow suite.

EXPORT CUSTOMERS The export version of the type, dubbed

Mi-28NE, was launched at Rostvertol in 2013, and it will continue in production alongside the Mi-28UB and Mi-28NM until the end of decade at the earliest.

The launch customer for the Mi-28NE was the Iraqi Air Force, with an order for 15 examples. The Mi-28NE contract was signed in 2013 and the first deliveries were reported in August 2014. Not after long Algeria became the largest customer for the type as in it placed an order for 42 helicopters December 2013, based on the improved Mi-28NU airframe. First deliveries were made in May 2016.

The Mi-28NE developed for Algeria comes equipped with a more comprehensive integrated self-protection suite comprising the L150 Pastel radar warning, L370-2 missile warning and L140 Otklik laser warning sensors as well as engine infrared suppressors. There are also eight UV-26 36-round chaff/flare dispensers for ejecting 16-mm chaff and flares cartridges housed in the wingtip


MI-28NE PERFORMANCE

Empty weight: 17,358lb (7,890kg)

Maximum take-off weight: 26,620lb (12,100kg)

Maximum combat load: 5,280lb (2,400kg)

Maximum speed in shallow dive: 161kt (300km/h),

Maximum cruising speed: 145kt (270km/h)

Maximum backwards and sideways speed: 54kt (100km/h)

Maximum rate of climb at sea level: 18,696fpm (13.6m/s)

OGE hovering ceiling: 14,760ft (4,500m)

Service ceiling (dynamic): 16,400ft (5,000m)

Service ceiling (static): 14,860ft (3,600m)

Combat radius on internal fuel (with 10 minutes reserves): 108nm (200km)

Range on internal fuel (5% reserve, with normal warload, at sea level): 242nm (450km)

Ferry range with four external tanks: 593nm (1,100km)

G limits: from +3 to -0.5.


pods. In addition, the Mi-28NE is offered with the President-S integrated self-protection suite, which also includes a directional infrared jammer housed in a turret under the fuselage.

Most of the export Mi-28NEs (except of the initial deliveries to Iraq) come equipped with the NO-25E mast-mounted radar as an option. The initial Iraqi Air Force Mi-28NEs lacked the radar but it was noticed installed on the follow-on deliveries taken in early 2015.

IMPROVED NIGHT HUNTER DERIVATIVES

The Mi-28UB is an enhanced Mi-28N derivative with dual controls and featuring a number of cockpit ergonomics improvements. It retains the mission avionics of its predecessor and is fully combat-capable, although it is intended for mainly for both conversion (type rating) and operational training of new Mi-28N pilots. While the original Mi-28N has controls only in the rear cockpit, the Mi-28UB is also equipped with a full set of controls in the forward (instructor’s) cockpit and improved crash-resistant seats. In addition, both cockpits are made wider by 140mm for improved aircrew comfort, especially when flying with night vision goggles (NVGs). Modified crash-resistant seats were also installed in both cockpits.

The Mi-28UB also comes equipped with the NO-25 mast mounted radar. Its developmental program, originally intended for the Mi-28N, proved to be a very protracted undertaking. Installed on a Night Hunter prototype, it was flight-tested for the first time on February 16, 2007 and by mid-2016 it was still passing through

its test & evaluation phase. The radar, intended to be integrated on the Mi-28NM, Mi-28UB and Mi-28NE versions, is supposedly capable of searching a 90o sector in front of the helicopter to provide image of the underlying terrain that could be useful for rapid cueing of OPS-28N’s sensors towards a selected target. Maximum detection range against MBTs on the battlefield claimed by its manufacturer GRPZ is in the region of 11nm (20km). There is also a Moving Target Indicator (MTI) mode which is useful for detecting moving ground targets while air targets can be detected at up to 10.8nm (20km).

The use of the Mi-28UB for the majority of the pilot conversion course is expected to facilitate better training and shorten the type rating effort two- to three-fold. The first Mi-28UB first took to the air at Rostvertol on 9 August 2013. This new derivative was set to enter series production in late 2015 or early 2016.

It should also be noted that Algeria, one of the two existing export customers for Mi-28NE (featuring an mission avionics configuration similar to that of the Mi-28UB, but also including the GRPZ NO-25E mast-mounted radar in its export version), has already expressed a firm requirement that all 42 ordered helicopters shall be equipped with dual controls. The contract with Algeria for the Mi-28NE sale was concluded in December 2013 via Rosoboronexport, Russia’s military and paramilitary aircraft export organization.

MI-28NM – THE LATEST NIGHT HUNTER

The latest Mi-28 derivative for the RuAF, boasts


an all-new mission avionics and targeting suite, self-protection suite and significantly improved flight performance. Dubbed Mi-28NM, it has been under development since 2009. It is set to become the definitive Night Hunter which will introduce the NO-25 mast-mounted radar as well as a Vitebsk fully-integrated self-protection suite and the new GOES-451M multisensory day/night optronic targeting payload (similar to the GOES-451 installed onto the Ka-52), combined with an improved flight/navigation avionics suite and new longer-range ATGMs. It will also receive a new datalink system enabling an expanded range of net-centric operations.

The performance improvements will be achieved by the means of a new lighter airframe structure, more effective main and tail rotor

systems, new main gearbox and use of up-rated Klimov VK-2500P turboshafts with full-authority digital engine control (FADEC). The weapons suite is expected to be expanded with the new 9M123 Khrizantema radar-guided ATGM with a range of up to 19,680ft (6,000m). The wider unguided ordinance selection will comprise free-fall bombs and napalm canisters. The new Night Hunter derivative will also feature a simplified maintenance and longer time between overhauls (TBO) intervals for all major systems.

The Mi-28NM is still in development at Mil MHP and its first prototype is expected to make its maiden flight in 2017, with production expected to be launched at Rostvertol by 2018 at the earliest, while fielding into squadron service would be initiated no earlier than 2020 in the best case. v

PART ONE

STORY BY MORNE WI ID

A NEW ERA... A NEW CULTURE

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 67

68 HELIOPSFRONTLINE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYWhile this article is primarily looking at offshore helicopter operations – much of

what is written here directly applies to the military helicopter world as well. Modern helicopter cockpits these days are as advanced and sophisticated as

most of the Airliners currently in service globally. Great technological improvements have made been made in the last decade in the ergonomics and user-interface of auto-pilots and Flight Directors in both single and multi-turbine helicopters. So what makes the Airline environment so different from Offshore Helicopter Operations? How do we operate our machines and utilise the on board avionics (Autopilots and Flight Directors) differently compared to our high-flyer colleagues?

This article will focus on the dynamic and hostile environment we operate in as offshore helicopter crews and the significant threats we face on a daily basis. It will focus on the behavioural and cultural aspects of helicopter pilots and address some of the hazardous attitudes that crews occasionally display when flying in marginal weather and the over reliance on the helicopter’s design characteristics to go lower and slower to get the “job done”. These attributes have been cited as contributing factors in recent offshore incidents and accidents and they will both be analysed in detail and to provide the end-user with the some mitigating strategies to effectively manage threats and errors as they occur during both normal and emergency situations.

INTRODUCTIONThe information presented in this article adapts both an operational (operator-

practical) and theoretical (academic-systematic) approach to address the issues at hand when looking at defining a rationale model for Automation Threat and Error Management in helicopter operations. The influences of the organisational and professional cultures will be discussed to highlight their impact on the safety culture within an organisation.

Furthermore, a new culture, “The Chopper Culture,” will be introduced and discussed as it has never been defined in any text book nor researched. This stems from an industry where helicopter pilots start their flying career with the skill to operate a machine at low level with the ability to change altitude, speed and heading in quickly in mostly hostile environments. Pilots are trained to fly the machine by the “feel of their pants” and this becomes part of their automated behaviour leading to the acceptance of a wider risk envelope in flying.

In 2006 an Australian Black Hawk S70-A-9 crashed on the deck of HMAS Kanimbla killing the pilot and a SAS trooper. While the report blamed “pilot error” it also cited a culture of calculated risk which made such a tragedy inevitable. Although the crash was a culmination of unnoticed risk-taking and lapses in safety management; a “can do culture” or “cowboy culture”, inadequate supervision, and pressure for preparing for missions were also flagged as contributing factors.

To draw a comparison between pilots in the Airlines and Offshore industry, Crew Resource Management (CRM) (especially use of automation in a procedural environment) and IFR skills, it is important to draw on some of the differences between the early careers of fixed wing and rotary wing pilots and how they advance to the multi-engine / multi-crew Airline and Offshore cockpits.

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 69

It is difficult to find a specific starting date for the field of “safety culture” in aviation or other high risk industries. It can be argued that as organizations have always had a culture, safety culture per se has always been present.

Fixed wing pilots normally start their flying with a small charter company with a reasonable amount of supervision from instructors and senior pilots on base. They mostly operate in an environment where IFR procedures and skills are developed at an early stage of their careers. Furthermore, they normally obtain a multi-engine rating much earlier when compared to helicopter pilots and have the ability to develop CRM skills in a controlled environment between airfields (prepared surfaces).

Helicopter pilots on the other hand, start their careers in remote areas as single pilots with very little supervision (often none) and normally manage and operate their machines with only a mechanic occasionally onsite to do maintenance. IFR training is very limited and only provided as a means of recovering from inadvertent IMC. Also, single engine helicopters are not as well equipped to fly IFR compared to some of the smaller fixed wings. They are also less stable, so helicopter pilots do not develop their IFR skills until much later, sometimes only when getting a twin-engine IFR rating.

This single-pilot behaviour and operating framework, combined with limited CRM and IFR skills, produce very independent and strong minded individuals that can operate in isolation from others. This must be a focus point in the Automation Threat and Error Model for Helicopter operations viewed in the context of a multi-crew and sometimes multi-cultural environment.

CULTURES AND SAFETY CLIMATETo develop a better understanding of the associated Risks and Threats present

when flying advanced and modern helicopters with sophisticated Avionics in a hostile offshore environment, it is important to review some of the cultural aspects of helicopter professionals and to focus on some of the aspects that influence and define the safety climate of an organisation.

The following section discusses the different cultures and factors of a healthy safety climate and the article will be aiming to draw on this background information to lay the foundation of an Automation Threat and Error Management Model.

DEFINING SAFETY CULTURE - WHAT IS A SAFETY CULTURE?It is difficult to find a specific starting date for the field of “safety culture” in

aviation or other high risk industries. It can be argued that as organizations have always had a culture, safety culture per se has always been present. However as previously discussed, there is a close link between safety management and safety culture; safety culture is an intrinsic part of safety management and effective modern safety management cannot exist without a culture that addresses safety. It is generally accepted that the science of safety culture evolved from the aftermath of a series of disasters. Safety cases started to evolve after the 1987 Piper Alpha disaster that introduced a systematic approach to safety management.

In the mid-eighties the oil and gas companies, such as Shell, started to implement systems and address cultural issues by realising safety was of prime importance and that it was not just a matter of individual personal responsibility.

70 HELIOPSFRONTLINE

They developed a set of eleven principles of enhanced safety management based largely on the experience of another industry leader, DuPont. This occurred in a generally top down, prescriptive regulatory environment which could at times be contrary to common sense or even sound engineering practice.

This evolution has been characterised as having four phases. The first is generally considered the “technical period” during which there were rapid technological developments and accidents were viewed as having mechanical causes. The second phase was the “human error” period where the limitations of humans were identified as being the major cause of breakdowns. The third phase is referred to as the “sociotechnical” period where the negative impact of ergonomics and poor design were seen as a cause of human error. The final stage is often called the “safety culture” period which recognises that operators are not performing their duties or interacting with technology in isolation, but are rather working as coordinated teams within an organizational culture (Wiegmann et al, 2007: p1-12).

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 71

KEY TRAITS & FEATURES OF CULTUREThe safety culture of an organization has a large role to play in effectiveness

of its safety and risk management practices. The safety culture sets up the environment in which the workers of an industry operate. When it comes to aviation, the culture influences how the crew and passengers of an aviation operation interact.

It is important to understand the influences that are affecting the environment and the safety culture within which people work.

DEFINING THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF CULTURECulture surrounds us and influences the values, beliefs, and behaviours that

we share with other members of groups. Culture serves to bind us together as members of groups and to provide clues and cues as to how to behave in normal

72 HELIOPSFRONTLINE

and novel situations. When thinking of culture, what comes to mind first is national culture, the attributes that differentiate between natives of one culture and those of another. For pilots, however, there are three cultures operating to shape actions and attitudes.

The first, of course, is national culture. However, since national cultures are highly resistant to change and unique to every country, the focus here is on the professional and organizational cultures, as they are possible to modifiy given strong incentives (Helmriech, 1999). As mentioned in the introduction, a new culture not defined in any text book or subject to academic research (which may be further explored), the “Chopper Culture” will also be discussed in outlining the uniqueness of helicopters pilots and their attributes, strengths and weaknesses.

PROFESSIONAL CULTUREOn Professional Culture, Helmriech (1998) states: “A very positive aspect of the

culture of pilots is pride in their profession. They love their work and are strongly motivated to do it well. This can help organizations work toward safety and efficiency in operations. The professional culture of pilots also has a strong negative component in a near-universal sense of personal invulnerability. It has been found that the majority of pilots in all cultures feel that their decision making is as good in emergencies as normal situations, that their performance is not affected by personal problems, and that they do not make more errors in situations of high stress. This misplaced sense of personal invulnerability can result in a failure to utilize the Crew Resource Management (CRM) practices that have been outlined in this course as countermeasures against error.”

The transition from single pilot VFR to multi-crew twin-engine IFR offshore operations is also a significant adjustment for many pilots. This equally applies for military pilots transitioning into the commercial world. Pilots from both backgrounds have a fixed mindsets of how to manage themselves in an emergency or high stress situation. This can sometimes lead to conflict among crewmembers adjusting to this new operating environment. One of the most effective ways to merge these different professional cultures and backgrounds together, is the implementation of Standard Operating Practices (SOPs). Well defined SOPs is there to ensure crews comply with company procedures and policies and to provide a platform for crews to develop a mutual understanding of what is required from them. In return, companies provide pilots with an opportunity to define and shape a new professional culture and to operate as well equipped and trained crews in a hostile and high risk environment.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTUREOn Organizational Culture, Helmriech (1998) states: “The organization provides

the shell within which national and professional cultures operate and is a major determinant of behaviour. It is at the organizational level that the greatest leverage can be exerted to create and nourish a safety culture. To achieve this requires the strong and demonstrated commitment of senior management as well as policies

There is no question that we are a unique group of individuals and professionals that greatly differ from our airline colleagues and high flyers and that we can truly justify our own “Chopper Culture”.

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 73

that encourage open communication and action instead of denial as a reaction to problems and risks uncovered.”

“THE CHOPPER CULTURE” I have been involved in military and offshore helicopter flying and operations

since 1989. During this time I have met some exceptional and remarkable helicopter pilots with very diverse skills and qualifications from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. It has been fascinating to witness the very distinct personalities and social characteristics of helicopter pilots and how they conduct themselves as professionals both in the cockpit and the workplace when interacting with others.

When looking at the nature of our employment, a large number of offshore helicopter pilots are required to tour away from home, sometimes to very hostile and remote areas around the world. This lifestyle and rotational cycle do take a certain type of individual to be able to function and operate for extended periods and to get the job done in an environment that is usually less than ideal or safe. Without the early flying experiences of helicopter pilots operating in the “bush” with very little supervision, there will be very few people that would be able to survive this challenge.

There is no question that we are a unique group of individuals and professionals that greatly differ from our airline colleagues and high flyers and that we can truly justify our own “Chopper Culture”. It has to be factored into our discussions to develop an understanding how this can contribute to some of the incidents and accidents seen in recent years within the Offshore Industry.

SAFETY CULTURENational Culture, Professional Culture, and Organizational Culture all have major

influences on an organization’s Safety Culture and the way “we do business around here”. Wiegmann et al (2002) conducted a comprehensive study of safety culture

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and from the various definitions, both inside and outside the aviation industry, found several commonalities that exist regardless of the industry being considered.

These commonalities are:1. Safety culture is a concept defined at the group level or higher, which refers to

the shared values among all the group or organization members;

2. Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization, and closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory systems;

3. Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level of an organization;

4. The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ behaviour at work;

5. Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward systems and safety performance;

6. Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn from errors, incidents, and accidents; and

7. Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change.

From these commonalities Weigmann et al (2002) determined the following definition of Safety Culture:

“Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behaviour based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values”.

It is important to note that this definition is stated in neutral terms. The definition implies that an organization’s safety culture exists on a continuum and that the safety culture can either be a good or bad culture.

When looking at the nature of our employment, a large number of offshore helicopter pilots are required to tour away from home, sometimes to very hostile and remote areas around the world. This lifestyle and rotational cycle do take a certain type of individual to be able to function and operate for extended periods and to get the job done in an environment that is usually less than ideal or safe

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 75

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100I S S U E S

The HeliOps 100th Issue Anniversary Poster is a must have collectable for anyone who is involved in the helicopter industry – civil or military. Its a collection of some amazing paint schemes of some operators we have worked with over the years. There is a limited print run on our 100th Anniversary Issue Poster so grab yours while you can. They make a great addition to your office, hangar, home or as a gift for friends and colleagues.

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76 HELIOPSFRONTLINE

SAFETY CLIMATEWiegmann et al (2002) identified that the term safety climate was often used

synonymously with the term safety culture. There is, however, a distinction between the two terms. Wiegmann et al (2002) found that safety climate differs from safety culture in the following ways:

1. Safety climate is a psychological phenomenon, which is usually defined as the perceptions of the state of safety at a particular time;

2. Safety climate is closely concerned with intangible issues such as situational and environmental factors; and

3. Safety climate is a temporal phenomenon, a “snapshot” of safety culture, relatively unstable and subject to change.

HELIOPSFRONTLINE 77

Using these points and a detailed study of various definitions for safety climate, Wiegmann et al (2002) determined the following definition:

“Safety climate is the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among individual perceptions of the organization. It is therefore situationally based, refers to the perceived state of safety at a particular place at a particular time, is relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on the features of the current environment or prevailing conditions.”

MATURITY OF THE SAFETY CULTUREWestrum (cited in Westrum & Adamski, 1999) suggests that the critical feature

of organizational culture is information flow. Hudson (2001) further developed this work by defining five distinct climates that define stages of an organization’s safety culture. These five stages are:

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1. Pathological: The organization cares less about safety than about not being caught;

2. Reactive: The organization looks for fixes to accidents and incidents after they happen;

3. Calculative: The organization has systems in place to manage hazards; however the system is applied mechanically. Staff and management follow the procedures but do not necessarily believe those procedures are critically important to their jobs or the operation;

4. Proactive: The organization has systems in place to manage hazards and staff and management have begun to acquire beliefs that safety is genuinely worthwhile; and

5. Generative: Safety behaviour is fully integrated into everything the organization does. The value system associated with safety and safe working is fully internalised as beliefs, almost to the point of invisibility (Hudson 2001).

These five stages provide a model for measuring the maturity of an organization’s safety culture, culminating in the Generative stage. It might be worthwhile for the reader to identify which safety culture your own organisation portrays, as this will ultimately impact on the Safety Climate and the way pilots conduct their duties.

PART 2 of this article will introduce a NOTECH framework for Offshore Helicopter Operations, consisting of four categories: cooperation, leadership and managerial skills, situation awareness, and decision-making (with elements below those). Thanks to Dr Suzanne Kearns, Associate Professor at Western University, President of University Aviation Association, for sharing thoughts on the manuscript.

The NOTEC framework will assist us to develop an understanding of how some a breakdown of these elements can contribute to Threats being mismanaged and Errors committed by crews as part of normal line flying duties which potentially can place the helicopter in an unsafe condition / state and if not managed / restored by the crews, an incident of accident occur. The Threat and Error Management will be utilised to highlight how the incorrect use of automation can lead to disaster.

This will further be achieved by reviewing the latest AS332L2 accident in Sumburgh, Scotland in 2013 and a S92 incident that occurred off the coast of Newfoundland in 2011 and the causes and contributing factors in these 2 events. v

Culture surrounds us and influences the values, beliefs, and behaviours that we share with other members of groups. Culture serves to bind us together as members of groups and to provide clues and cues as to how to behave in normal and novel situations.

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21ST CENTURY MULTI-ROLE CAPABILITY

BELLHELICOPTER.COM

With every mission, the Bell AH-1Z and UH-1Y earn the reputation of being the most capable attack and utility helicopters flying

today. Individually or combined, these helicopters accomplish a wide array of missions, effectively and efficiently, anywhere in the

world. The Bell AH-1Z and UH-1Y – among the most combat-effective and survivable aircraft on the modern battlefield.

http://www.bellhelicopter.com

2016 i issue 9 · 2018-12-10 · 4 heliops frontline the team kia kaha media group po box 37 978,...

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