2014.02.14 - naec invitation_employment and fiscal policy in the aftermath of financial crisis

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EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD, Paris 14 February 2014 NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

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Page 1: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS

Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD, Paris 14 February 2014

NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Page 2: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Introduction

Employment at this stage of European history Based on my previous CPB experience Minimum wages? EPL? Wage subsidies?

?

Page 3: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Introduction

Employment at this stage of European history Based on my previous CPB experience Minimum wages? EPL? Wage subsidies?

Page 4: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Introduction

Employment at this stage of European history Based on my previous CPB experience Minimum wages? EPL? Wage subsidies? Housing and macro policy On-going research

Page 5: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts 2. Theory framework 3. Outline of the model 4. Policy experiment 5. The 10 commandments

Page 6: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts 2. Theory framework 3. Outline of the model 4. Policy experiment 5. The 10 commandments

Page 7: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

The effect of Financial Crises

15 cases (Reinhart & Rogoff) Peak to Trough (%)

Duration (years)

Income per head -9 1.9

Unemployment 7 4.8

House prices -36 6.0

Stock prices -56 3.4

Sovereign debt 86 3.0

Page 8: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

GDP effect largely permanent Sweden Finland

Hong Kong, Indonesia

Page 9: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

House price slumps

Benetrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke

Page 10: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Anecdotical Evidence on Europe

House price decline ↔ Unemployment Small decline: Ger, Swe, Nl (till 2010) Strong decline: Esp, Ire, UK, Denmark, Nl (since

2010) Denmark and Nl high mortgage debt, unemployment

Spain 25% males work in construction fall in human capital

Current account since 2002 Surpluses: Ger, Swe, Denmark, Nl, Austria, Finland Deficits: UK, Gre, Esp, Por

Page 11: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

House prices

Page 12: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Unemployment

Page 13: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Sovereign debt interest rate

Page 14: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

House price overvalued?

Page 15: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

House prices, wealth, employment Mian & Sufi

Page 16: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Decomposition of demand

Page 17: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Fiscal multiplier

Page 18: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts 2. Theory framework 3. Outline of the model 4. Policy experiment 5. The 10 commandments

Page 19: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

House price decline = Wealth transfer between generations

High house prices Good for current generation: wealthier Bad for future generation: must buy expensive houses

Hence: fall in house prices = wealth transfer Large! 30% decline = 60% of GDP = 80% of sovereign debt

Balance budget reduction in tax deductibility = intergenerational wealth transfer Value of housing captures NPV deductibility

Page 20: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Saving response

Take a real, not a financial view of saving What is saving in a small open economy? Export more! Shift of employment from domestic to tradable

Page 21: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Keynes or Friedman?

Paradoxical situation Only current income matters?

House price decline would be irrelevant Argument relies on Permanent Income

Hypothesis Can we do macro without rigid prices?

Would be much simpler! It turns out we cannot

Page 22: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts 2. Theory framework 3. Outline of the model 4. Policy experiment 5. The 10 commandments

Page 23: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Structure of Economy Overlapping generations model Blanchard-Yaari

Workers die at fixed rate 2. 5%, new cohorts enter

Once and for all shock, perfect foresight after 5 industries + share in consumption

Tradable 20% Domestic 25% Informal 25% Construction/Land 5% Government 25%

Cobb Douglas utility Both inter-temporal and across commodities Hence: constant gross consumption shares over lifetime

Page 24: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Unemployment

Workers enter unemployed Industry specific human capital Switching industries requires unemployment

2-5 years period

No congestion effects Runs counter to empirical evidence

Page 25: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Labour reallocation

If wages are flexible Hiring industries pay full wage Non-hiring industries pay lower, clearing wage

downsizing by retirement Firing industries pay lower bound wage

firing = quitting unemployment = good limit to wage reductions, though at low levels: 50% fall

If wages are inflexible Wage determined by competitiveness on global

market Drop in industry demand? Firing workers

Page 26: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Government

Pays interest on debt 1.5% Pays its civil servants (Pays mortgage subsidy) Collects consumption tax

VAT … but also income tax: pension contributions are tax

exempt Policy instrument: future taxes

We assume an exponential path back to LR equilibrium Hence:

Model = system of linear differential equations … if there is no construction (housing is only land)

Page 27: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

What not?

Apart from housing, no capital Constant interest rate

Hence: no sovereign debt crisis

No financial intermediation No uncertainty / precautionary saving No bequest motive More general: no behavioural issues Perfectly elastic demand for tradable

Page 28: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts 2. Theory framework 3. Outline of the model 4. Policy experiment 5. The 10 commandments

Page 29: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Policy experiment

Start from a steady equilibrium Applies to the Netherlands (?) … but not to Spain (excess construction, bubble) … and Denmark (overheating?) … Germany (catching up due to labour market reform)

Shock to productivity ↓and debt↑ (e.g. 10%) Hence: excess housing (e.g. 5%)

Policy response, fully credible Perfect foresight of adjustment path

Page 30: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

What policy response?

No response = No option: higher interest Raise taxes to cover only higher interest?

Optimal from tax smoothing perspective Sovereign debt becomes random walk Increases vulnerability for future shocks

Hence: recovery of old public debt level 60%? Temporarily higher taxes, converging to steady state

Question however: at what speed? Risk of (too much) overshooting

Page 31: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Phases in adjustment process

Typical adjustment process 1. Initial non-hiring/firing in domestic

(construction?) Firing only under wage inflexibility Accelerator mechanism

2. Substitution to informal industry due to high tax

3. Domestic starts rehiring 4. Construction starts rehiring

Page 32: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Effect on wealth and consumption

Human capital current generation falls 1. Lower wages in non-hiring industries 2. Unemployment

Financial capital falls due to house prices Hence: permanently lower consumption

Retirement + interest rate = 4% Fits wealth effect of 4 cents per euro

New generations gross consumption unaffected Conditional on tax policy

Consumption effect lasts long Unemployment effect not

Page 33: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Implications for debt and deficit

Higher taxes reduce wealth current generation … and induce inter-temporal substitution Hence: aggregate consumption postponed Leads to employment shift to tradable

… which reduces value of human capital … and hence current consumption ... and house prices, hence consumption

Short run effect on deficit is negative Might even be negative? Open research question Fits multiplier studies Auerbach & Gorodnichenko

Page 34: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Welfare evaluation

Optimal fiscal policy = setting wealth distribution between generations

Market is efficient Hence, postponing hurts future generations? Might be false: taxation leads to distortions

Temporary overshooting Inefficient unemployment instead of retirement Substitution to informal sector

All depends crucially on degree of wage flexibility Assuming wage flexibility contradicts empirical evidence

Page 35: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Other things

Tax treatment mortgage interest: balance budget reform makes things worse!

Same applies to NPV of market distortions Italy … and in the future Germany?

Bubbles? Lead to excess consumption Adjustment unavoidable Critical role trade balance Also bubble adjustment can be overshooting

Page 36: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts 2. Theory framework 3. Outline of the model 4. Policy experiment 5. The 10 commandments

Page 37: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

The 10 Commandments (I)

1. House price decline = intergenerational wealth transfer (large!)

2. House price variability, not level is main concern

3. Reduction sovereign debt = substitute, not complement

4. Adequate response fiscal policy: intergenerational insurance

5. Requires long run stance fiscal policy

Page 38: 2014.02.14 - NAEC Invitation_Employment and Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

The 10 Commandments (II) 1. House price decline = intergenerational wealth transfer

2. House price variability, not level is main concern

3. Reduction sovereign debt = substitute, not complement

4. Adequate response fiscal policy: intergenerational insurance

5. Requires long run stance fiscal policy

6. Shock therapy likely to be counterproductive 7. Maybe adverse short run response budget

deficit 8. Hence: budget deficit=wrong control variable 9. Hence: EU regulatory framework inadequate

role output gap 10. Applies also to product market reforms