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News Monitor

May

2014

This Issue:

• Mexico’s federal government delivers significant blow to Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel leadership

• Senate elects new IFAI commissioners with mixed reactions from experts

• Mexico ranks 79th out of 99 countries on “Rule of Law Index 2014”

• Human rights activist searching for disappeared son murdered in Sinaloa

•

Justice in M

exico

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

Top (left to right): Fernando Martínez Magaña, Galindo Mellado Cruz, Juan Fernando Álvarez Cortez Bottom (left to right): Juan Manuel Rodríguez García, Leonor Nava Romero

www.justiceinmexico.org

About the Project: The Justice in Mexico Project is a research initiative hosted at the University of San Diego. The Justice in Mexico Project conducts and disseminates research on four broad areas: crime and violence; transparency and accountability; justice system reform; and human rights and civil society. The project receives generous financial support from the MacArthur Foundation. To make a financial contribution to our organization, please contact us at: [email protected]. About the Report: The Justice in Mexico Project produces monthly news reports based on regular monitoring of international, national, and sub-‐national developments affecting the rule of law in Mexico. The project also provides periodic updates to its news blog and stores archives of past reports at http://www.justiceinmexico.org. This report was compiled by Cory Molzahn, Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodriguez, and David Shirk, with the research assistance and direct contributions from Chris Allison, Laura Calderón, Tiana Carriedo, Leticia Corona, Dom Pera, Alicia Piña, and Diana Sánchez. Any opinions expressed in attributions for this summary are those manifested in the media reports and op-‐ed pieces compiled herein, and not those of the University of San Diego, the Justice in Mexico Project, or its sponsors. Please report any questions, corrections, or concerns to [email protected]. About the Cover: Mexican drug cartel leaders taken down in May 2014. Photo Credit (top to bottom, left to right): Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA), Excélsior, Oranización Editorial Mexicana (OEM), Reuters (Tomás Bravo), and Reuters. ©Copyright Justice in Mexico Project, 2014. All rights reserved.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE 1

MÉXICO EVALÚA DIRECTOR OFFERS MIXED COMMENTARY ON MEXICO'S SECURITY SITUATION 1 MEXICO'S FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DELIVERS SIGNIFICANT BLOW TO LOS ZETAS AND GULF CARTEL LEADERSHIP 2 VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN TAMAULIPAS AS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTS NEW SECURITY STRATEGY 3 MICHOACÁN REMAINS IN STATE OF UNCERTAINTY AS DISARMAMENT DEADLINE PASSES 5 MEXICAN AUTHORITIES SEIZE 44 TONS OF MARIJUANA IN TIJUANA 7

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 8

SENATE ELECTS NEW IFAI COMMISSIONERS WITH MIXED REACTIONS FROM EXPERTS 8 THREE FEDERAL JUDGES SUSPENDED FOR ALLEGEDLY FAVORING CASINO MOGUL 9 MICHOACÁN'S FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL, INTERIM GOVERNOR ARRESTED 10 FORMER AGUASCALIENTES GOVERNOR REYNOSO FEMAT ARRESTED FOR ALLEGED EMBEZZLEMENT 11

JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 12

MEXICO RANKS 79TH OUT OF 99 COUNTRIES ON "RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014" 12 AROUND THE STATES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOLDS "SIXTH FORUM ON SECURITY AND JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING CRIMINAL REFORM" 12

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 14

UN HUMAN RIGHTS VISITOR COMMENTS ON TORTURE IN MEXICO 14 MEXICO'S CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES APPROVES MAJOR REFORMS TO THE MILITARY CODE OF JUSTICE 15 HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST SEARCHING FOR DISAPPEARED SON MURDERED IN SINALOA 16 MIGRANTS, HUMAN TRAFFICKING VICTIMS IN MEXICAN SPOTLIGHT 17

Index

Justice in Mexico I News Monitor

1

Crime and Violence

México Evalúa director offers mixed commentary on Mexico’s security situation A year and a half after Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto took office in December 2012, analysts and observers continue to debate his administration’s achievements and shortcomings in controlling the public security situation. To discuss Mexico’s current situation and offer her insights, México Eválua’s Edna Jaime sat down with Justice in Mexico Contributor Leticia Corona. Jaime is the founder and director of México Eválua, an organization dedicated to the analysis, monitoring, and evaluation of public policies in Mexico. To start, Jaime discussed the reasons why Mexico continues to perform poorly and suffer from weak a rule of law, insecurity, high rates of violence, and weak institutions. To date, she says, the Federal Government has not been clear about its official security policy and strategy:

“We currently have a lot of fragmentation of these organized crime groups; it seems they stopped being a national security threat and now they have become a public security threat. The problem is that we [in Mexico] do not have a way to deal with this national insecurity because we do not have the judicial institutions for security at the local level to confront the problem of insecurity in the country. [Former President Calderón’s strategy of going after the leaders of the cartels was successful in capturing them, but it did not solve the problem of insecurity, kidnappings, killings, [and] extortions, [as] the perception of fear increased during his administration. It is still not clear to me what the security strategy is for the [Peña Nieto administration]; it seems he is continuing to take the same approach as the former administration of President Calderón.”

Jaime further explained that Mexico’s lack of a strong rule of law, which is fundamentally important as the base for functional and equitable communities, fosters an environment where corruption and impunity can flourish. Jaime attended the 2013 World Justice Forum hosted at the Hague and brought special attention in this interview to the World Justice Project’s recently released “Rule of Law Index 2014,” a report that ranks countries’ strength of rule of law, quality of governance, and criminal justice system, among

other indicators. In overall scores, Mexico ranked 79th lowest of 99 countries, with nearly identical scores as Russia, Madagascar, China, and Egypt, among others. It had the fifth lowest score of all countries in the Western Hemisphere, only ranking higher than Guatemala (83rd), Nicaragua (85th), Bolivia (94th), and Venezuela (99th).

Edna Jaime. Photo: Noticias MVS.

Jaime also recognized that violent crimes, such as kidnappings and extortions, have increased in Mexico, as Justice in Mexico reported in “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013.” However, there has been a discernable decrease in intentional homicides—a drop of roughly 15% between 2012 and 2013 according to data from Mexico’s National Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP). Similarly, Mexico also fared far better on constraints on government powers (48th) and open government (32nd) in the World Justice Project report than it did on the other indicators measured. As such, Jaime concluded by stating that she is optimistic about the Peña Nieto administration’s progress with its reforms and Mexico’s movement in the right direction, though she cautioned that the government still has to regain its authority and hold its citizens accountable:

“It is going to be two years since the President won the elections [in July 2012] and we are still in this learning curve. The capture of [Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán in February 2014] shows that there is internal coordination between the Mexican agencies that are in charge of security and external coordination with the United States for these types of precise interventions. This is good news because, among other things, the

Crime and Violence

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

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Mexican government can recover [its] authority, for which in the past it has been systematically humiliated. The Mexican government should be able to set the rules and limitations, not vice-‐versa, and [El Chapo’s] apprehension is a step in the right direction, meaning not everything is bad news. I think the capture of [El Chapo] does mark a very important accomplishment for this new administration and we hope this will be accompanied by more concrete measures to overcome crime and the crimes that most affect citizens. [Nevertheless], although they captured El Chapo, violent crimes continue to increase such as kidnappings…[T]his has made Mexicans feel vulnerable in their sense of security.”

Sources:

“WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.” World Justice Project. March 5, 2014.

Heinle, Kimberly et. al. “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysist

Through 2013.” Justice in Mexico. April 15, 2014.

Mexico’s federal government delivers significant blow to Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel leadership The Peña Nieto administration continued its kingpin strategy this month targeting Mexican organized crime leaders. Officials took down four prominent leaders from several powerful drug cartels—three from Los Zetas and one from the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo, CDG)—as well as a high-‐ranking member of street gang Los Rojos, which collaborates closely with the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO). Within one week in mid-‐May, the notoriously brutal organized crime group Los Zetas lost three high-‐ranking members with the death of Galindo Mellado Cruz, alias “El Mellado” or “Z-‐9,” and the arrests of Fernando Martínez Magaña, alias “Z-‐16,” and Juan Fernando Álvarez Cortez, alias “El Ferrari.” El Mellado was killed in a firefight on May 9 in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, along with six other individuals—one of which was identified as a Mexican soldier. El Mellado was known as one of the founders of Los Zetas, the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel that split off in 2009 and 2010, though authorities believe he no longer served in a leadership role for the cartel. Just days after El Mellado’s death, federal forces, including members of Mexico’s Navy (Secretaría de la Marina, SEMAR), arrested Z-‐16 on May 14. Z-‐16 was believed to be the Zetas leader in the Nuevo Laredo region of Tamaulipas, overseeing weapons-‐, human-‐, and drug trafficking through the U.S.-‐Mexico border state. He had been named as one of 12 main priorities to be dealt with under the new security strategy unveiled in Tamaulipas this month. With the strategy’s

unveiling, according to National Security Commission (Comisión Nacional de Seguridad, CNS) Director Alejandro Rubido García, the suspect had fled Nuevo Laredo and was picked up in Monterrey, Nuevo León where he was allegedly in hiding. As reported by EFE, a Zetas financial operator was arrested just hours before Z-‐16, though it is unclear if the two arrests are connected. Three days after Z-‐16’s arrest, the Zetas regional leader in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, was detained in an operation involving members of the Secretaries of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) and Navy (SEMAR), and the Federal Police (Policía Federal, PF). On May 17, authorities arrested El Ferrari in Monterrey, Nuevo León, after he had fled Ciudad Victoria to avoid arrest. According to CNS Director Rubido García, El Ferrari—who was also named as a top objective of the new Tamaulipas security strategy—had connections to organized crime outside of Ciudad Victoria, including in the municipalities of El Mante, San Fernando, Hidalgo, Padilla, and Llera, Tamaulipas. He has since been placed under the watch of Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) for Special Investigations on Organized Crime (Subprocuraduría Especializada en Investigación de Delincuencia Organizada, SEIDO).

From top left to bottom right: Fernando Martínez Magaña,

Galindo Mellado Cruz, Juan Fernando Álvarez Cortez, Juan Manuel Rodríguez García, and Leonor Nava Romero.

Photos: SEDENA, Excélsior, Organización Editorial Mexicana, Reuters (Tomás Bravo), and Reuters.

Meanwhile, authorities also arrested a regional leader for the Gulf Cartel (CDG) who controlled the territory along the Río Grande near the U.S.-‐Mexico border in Tamaulipas. Members of SEDENA led an operation on May 25 that resulted in the arrest of Juan Manuel Rodríguez García, better known as “Juan Perros.” Authorities believe Juan Perros was behind some of the recent violence that has erupted in Tamaulipas, having fueled the conflict between rival cartels Los Zetas and the CDG. According to CNS Director Rubido García, the suspect has a history of involvement in a variety of illicit activities, including


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homicide, kidnapping, and extortion. Not a single shot was fired as authorities detained Juan Perros in a hotel room in Nuevo León where he was staying with his wife and children. Rubido García said that Juan Perros, similar to Los Zetas’ Z-‐16 and El Ferrari, was suspected of having relocated to Nuevo León to avoid arrest following his identification as one of the top 12 priorities under the new security strategy. The suspect has been transferred to the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) for holding. One week before Juan Perros’ detention, Mexico’s Federal Police (Policía Federal, PF) arrested the leader of the street gang Los Rojos (The Reds), Leonor “El Tigre” Nava Romero, in Guerrero. Authorities believe El Tigre worked closely with BLO leader Héctor Beltrán Leyva and was responsible for drug trafficking, kidnappings, extortion, and organized crime-‐related killings. As the Associated Press reported, CNS Director Rubido García added that El Tigre is suspected of being involved in the 2008 killings of eight Army soldiers in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. El Tigre’s arrest comes just one month after Federal Police arrested Los Rojos’ leader Antonio Reyna Castillo in April 2014. The killings and arrests add to the ongoing success the Peña Nieto administration has had in removing cartel leadership in 2014, coming on the heels of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s arrest in February; the takedown of three of four Knights Templar Organization (KTO) leaders in a three-‐month span; the arrest of two Gulf Cartel leaders in February and April; and the arrest of the Beltrán Leyva Organization’s second-‐in-‐command in April, among others. As Justice in Mexico explains in “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013,” although President Enrique Peña Nieto promised to break from his predecessor’s kingpin strategy, his administration has done anything but that, and has continued in former President Felipe Calderón’s footsteps by targeting cartel leaders and high-‐ranking members.

Sources:

Heinle, Kimberly et. al. “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 15, 2014.

Associated Press. “Muere ‘El Mellado’, fundador de los Zetas en

enfrentamiento en Reynosa.” Excélsior. May 11, 2014.

EFE. “Detienen en Monterrey a Fernando Martínez Magaña, líder de los Zetas en Nuevo Laredo.” 20 Minutos. May 15, 2014.

“Autoridades capturan a Leonor Nava, líder de ‘Los rojos’ en Guerrero.”

CNN México. May 17, 2014.

“Mexico nabs drug gang leader in state of Guerrero.” Associated Press. May 17, 2014.

Redacción. “Detienen al jefe de ‘Los Zetas’ en Ciudad Victoria.” Proceso.

May 19, 2014.

Pansza, Arturo R. “Confirma Rubido García la captura de “El Ferrari”, jefe “Zeta” en Tamaulipas.” La Prensa. May 20, 2014.

Ibarra, Porfirio. “Mexico captured alleged cartel capo near border.”

Associated Press. May 25, 2014.

Vicenteño, David. “Segob confirma captura de ‘Juan Perros.’” Excélsior. May 26, 2014.

Violence continues in Tamaulipas as federal government implements new security strategy Tamaulipas, a border state in northern Mexico, continues to be a hot spot of organized crime and drug-‐related violence. Authorities ultimately attribute the recent dramatic spike in violence to three sources: intra-‐cartel fighting within the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo, CDG); inter-‐cartel fighting between the CDG and the rival Zetas; and the CDG’s confrontations with police and members of the military.

Tamaulipas State Police. Photo: La Verdad

de Tamaulipas.

According to multiple sources, at least 41 victims of such violence were killed within the last week of April and first week of May, while more than 70 such deaths were confirmed in April alone. April 29 saw the most casualties, with 17 victims killed in multiple gunfights between suspected organized crime groups (OCGs) and federal forces in the city of Reynosa, which shares a border with McAllen, Texas. Several criminal organizations, specifically Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel, have increasingly implemented a strategy of street blockades (narcobloqueos), with members stationing themselves in high trafficked areas within Reynosa to ambush passing by federal and local authorities. The Gulf Cartel has recently experienced a shakeup in leadership with the arrests of two high ranking CDG leaders: Jesús Alejandro Leal Flores, alias “El Metro 24” or “El Simple,” on April 2; and Javier Garza Medrano, alias “Comandante 14,” in late February. Many argue that the resulting power vacuum is the root cause of the increased regional violence, as intra-‐cartel fighting has broken out among members loyal to the divided factions.

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

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Meanwhile, fights between officials and OCGs, both through narcobloqueos and official operations to apprehend cartel leaders, have also ensued. One such operation in the Altavista neighborhood in Ciudad Victoria on May 5 led to the arrest of five Los Zetas members—Oscar de la Sota Eliud Gallegos, Baltasar Abraham Camarillo, Leija Esteban Ruiz, Karina Hernandez Guevara Nayely, and Mayte Ruiz Candelaria Leija—though the intended target, Zetas leader known as “Cabeza de Marrano,” was not located. The coordinated effort between State Police and members of the Army and Navy, however, did result in multiple sustained injuries, and the death of six individuals, including the head of investigations for the State Police (Policía Estatal Acreditable), Salvador Haro Muñoz. El Grupo de Coordinación Tamaulipas (GCT) confirmed that the clash was the culmination of an investigation conducted by Haro Muñoz to capture Zetas’ leader Cabeza de Marrano.

Members of the Mexican Navy patrol the streets in Tamaulipas. Photo: Víctor Hugo Valdivia, Proceso.

In response to the escalating violence in Tamaulipas, the federal government began operating its new statewide security strategy there this month, similar to the ones launched in previous years in Michoacán and Ciudad Juárez. On May 13, Ministry of the Interior Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong announced the “New Security Strategy in Tamaulipas,” effective immediately. As translated by Mexico Voices, the strategy, has three objectives: “to dismantle the composition and operation of criminal organizations; to seal the trafficking routes of drugs, weapons, and undocumented persons; and to guarantee efficient and reliable security to local institutions.” As the federal government takes control of the state’s security, the state has been broken up into four monitored regions—Frontera, Río Bravo, Valle Hermoso, and Matamoros—and will see the deployment of an undisclosed number of federal troops on the ground. An influx of Federal Police (Policía Federal, PF) will join the troops as they begin providing 24/7 security watch in the urban zones, along specified highways, and at the airport. Four new regional prosecutors will also be named—one for each of the partitioned zones—and a new Institute for Police Training

and Investigation will soon be created, which will serve to train and strengthen state and municipal police forces. The institute falls in line with one of the security strategy’s objective of cleaning and vetting all police forces in Tamaulipas in an effort to root out corrupt ties with organized crime. Having only been in effect since mid-‐May, the strategy’s presence has already been felt. On the one hand, the security’s targeting of high level members of criminal organizations operating in the state has quickly delivered on some of its objectives. The federal government has named 12 high-‐priority suspects and members of criminal organizations for federal forces to focus their attention. Within ten days after announcing the new strategy, three of the 12 persons-‐of-‐interests were arrested, two regional leaders from Los Zetas—Fernando Martínez Magaña, “Z-‐16,” and Juan Fernando Álvarez Cortez, “El Ferrari”—and one regional leader from the Gulf Cartel—Juan Manuel Rodríguez García, “Juan Perros.” Through the new security strategy, and targeted blows like this to criminal organizations, Tamaulipas Governor Egidio Torre Cantú is optimistic. “We are going to reestablish the environment that allows citizens of Tamaulipas to recapture the tranquility and peace that they deserve. Therefore,” he continued, “we are going to strengthen the coordination among federal resources and the other orders of government.” On the other hand, there are expressed concerns about an increased military presence in domestic matters, and the resulting civilian human rights violations at the hands of unaccountable soldiers. (See Justice in Mexico’s “Armed With Impunity: Curbing Military Human Rights Abuses” for more information on the topic). The Nuevo Laredo Human Rights Committee (Comité de Derechos Humanos de Nuevo Laredo, CDHNL) reported only two days after the new strategy was announced that soldiers and military personnel were making the center and residents in the surrounding neighborhood feel threatened by their presence. As Proceso reported, “more than 100 members of the Secretary of the Navy [Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR] deployed to Nuevo Laredo surrounded the [CNDHL] office, an ’intimidating and threatening’ act, accused the organization’s president, Raymundo Ramos Vázquez.” Ramos also claimed that unidentified soldiers without authorization demanded entrance to his office “to review files of documented abuses,” referring to the Committee’s ongoing work to document cases of military human rights abuses. As the federal government addresses the situation through the new strategy, citizens within Tamaulipas, meanwhile, are continuing to turn to social media outlets for knowledge and news on breaking violence and the narcobloqueos. El Universal reports that “Valor por Tamaulipas,” a Twitter and Facebook group with over 150,000 followers that reports on daily violence and instability in the region, for example,


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urges citizens to avoid the violent areas if at all possible, and to have a plan in place when gun battles occur. The increased violence has had a clear psychological effect on citizens and their perceived safety, evidenced by reports of high absentee rates in schools, upwards of 70% as reported by El Universal, as students are staying home to avoid the risk of being caught in a firefight. For its part, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) is keeping a close eye on the situation. It launched an investigation into the violence on April 29 that killed 17 people in Reynosa, two of which were minors who happened to be caught in the crossfire between OCG members and federal forces.

Sources:

“Narco organization eyes ‘Valor por Tamaulipas.’” Justice in Mexico Project. February 20, 2013.

“Outburst of violence in Tamaulipas likely iinked to takedown of two Gulf

Cartel leaders.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 15, 2014.

Associated Press. “Drug Violence Erupts in Mexico’s Tamaulipas State.” Al Jazeera America. April 29, 2014.

Redacción. “Crisis en Reynosa; suman 17 muertos.” El Universal. May 1,

2014.

Redacción. “Narcobloqueos colapsan Reynosa luego de embate anti-‐zetas.” Proceso. May 6, 2014.

Redacción. “Con ‘nueva estrategia’ gobierna federal busca frenar

narcoguerra en Tamaulipas.” Río Doce. May 13, 2014.

Muñiz, Erick and Julia Le Duc. “La seguridad en Tamaulipas queda bajo el control del gobierno federal.” La Jornada. May 14, 2014. Translated by

Mexico Voices.

Leticia Díaz, Gloria. “Marinos asedian a defensor de derechos humanos en Tamaulipas.” Proceso. May 15, 2014.

“Mexico’s government delivers significant blow to Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel

leadership.” Justice in Mexico Project. May 29, 2014.

Michoacán remains in state of uncertainty as disarmament deadline passes The May 10 deadline for members of Michoacán’s self-‐defense groups (grupos de autodefensa) to either disarm or officially join the Rural Defense Corps (Cuerpos de Defensa Rural) and register their weapons has passed. As part of the Peña Nieto administration’s strategy to rein in the security situation in Michoacán, on April 4, self-‐defense groups agreed to the terms with the federal government. Several groups waited until the last day to register their weapons, including those from the municipalities of Tepalcatepec and La Ruana. As group leader Estansliao Beltrán, also known as Papa Smurf or Papá Pitufo, said following the registrations, “With this we now have a commitment. We are the government.” For his part, Michoacán Security Commissioner Alfredo Castillo Cervantes, recognized that

the people of Michoacán “did not rise up against the State, but rather requested the presence of the State.” He continued, “And today, those who now represent the State are you.” According to the Associated Press, as of May 10, authorities had registered more than 6,000 weapons, and more than 120 group members had been provided with uniforms, 9mm pistols, .223 caliber rifles, and perhaps most importantly, the legitimacy of the State.

Security Commissioner Alfredo Castillo Cervantes (blue

shirt) is pictured here with self-defense group leader Estanislao Beltrán (second from left) and several self-defense members following the May 10 registration.

Photo: Miguel Dimayuga, Proceso.

Despite the initial stated plan to incorporate former self-‐defense members into a Rural Defense Corps under the control of the Mexican Army (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, Sedena), a new police force was alos created: the Rural State Police (Policía Rural Estatal). While members of the Corp will operate under SEDENA, assisting in intelligence to combat organized crime but on a voluntary basis, community members joining the Rural State Police will be under the command of the state government and will receive a wage. The State Rural Police will replace the traditional municipal police forces and will operate primarily in and around the municipalities where they live and are assigned, though they can be called on to respond to larger threats in other municipalities. As such, the new model closely resembles the unified police model (mando único) strongly advocated by former President Felipe Calderón and then Public Security Secretary Genaro García Luna, under which state police forces across the nation would assume a tighter control over the historically corrupt municipal police forces. These reforms have come quickly, and initial reports indicate that infrastructure and training needs could prove to be hindrances, at least early on. Upon visiting the municipality of Tepalcatepec, El Universal reported that the new police force there lacks the facilities, operative and logistical structures, and training and equipment to properly safeguard its local population. They also currently lack a salary structure, as well as other benefits for performing their duties.

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

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Despite the passing deadline, it is clear that unilateral disarmament is far from over, and that internal rifts continue to divide the self-‐defense groups. Largely at the center of such resistance and concern over the government’s strategy has been José Manuel Mireles, the former leader of the Tepalacatepec group and widely known as the face of the movement. Leading up to the May 10 deadline, Mireles expressed his concern with dismantling the groups. He argued that the groups’ presence in Michoacán has made the municipalities safer, while the areas still under government control continue to suffer and experience high levels of daily violence, “between three and five murders…and hundreds of cases of extortion.” In an interview with Noticias MVS, Mireles clarified that the disarmament deadline only means the groups’ “outfits are going to change, though [their] fight will remain the same.” As Proceso reported, Mireles sees autonomous self-‐defense groups as playing a fundamental role in achieving a safer Michoacán and thus vowed that the fight would continue until Michoacán had been secured.

Figure José Manuel Mireles waves to

crowds in Michoacán in February 2014. Photo: AFP, Getty Images.

Tension within the groups has further grown with the removal of Mireles as the movement’s official spokesman and from his seat on the General Council of the Self-‐Defense Groups (Consejo General de las Autodefensas), the reasoning for which was two-‐fold. First, in the days leading up to the May 10 deadline, the former leader released an unauthorized 20-‐minute video speaking to President Enrique Peña Nieto, expressing his concerns and his hopes for Mexico, and asking the president to engage in direct dialogue and conversation with the groups. Mireles then proceeded to explain his desire and the desire of the people of Michoacán to be able to live free from the fear of violence. Second, authorities announced they have launched an investigation into Mireles’ alleged connection with the murder of five younger autodefensa members in an incident that occurred in Caleta de Campos, Michoacán on April 27. Mireles denies the claim, saying that he did not arrive to the scene until hours after the murders had occurred because he was at a village meeting when the news broke. He also clarified that a picture that had surfaced of him standing next to one of the bodies was only taken per orders from

the Office of the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Público, MP) who were on the scene. The allegations of Mireles’ involvement surfaced from group leader Estanislao Beltrán, among others. Beltrán has portrayed Mireles as an out of control vigilante who refuses to cooperate with the Mexican government. In response, Mireles publicly claimed that Beltrán has extensive ties to a gang known as “Los Viagras,” a small group in the Knights Templar Organization (KTO). Mireles claims that the allegations against him are a fabricated attempt to remove him from power, as he has been a nuisance to both the government and KTO operations. Furthermore, Mireles claims that he remains the last line of defense between the people of Michoacán and KTO control. A similar rift formed between self-‐defense leaders Hipólito Mora and Luis Antonio Torres, “El Americano,” each of who accused the other of having ties to the KTO. On May 21, Commissioner Castillo announced on his Twitter account that the two leaders had reconciled, emphasizing that the mending of ties between autodefensa leaders was fundamental to restoring order to the state. Since the creation of the self-‐defense groups in February 2013, a lack of centralized power and coordination has been a point of concern for the groups and the Peña Nieto administration. As Proceso reports, Mireles admits to a “Colombianization” effect in which each regional self-‐defense group has operated autonomously from both the Mexican state and other organizations. Mireles has expressed concern that such disaggregation could lead the groups to become more like the unchecked paramilitary forces in Colombia than the self-‐defense community groups Michoacán citizens have sought to create. As if in reaction to these concerns, on May 28 self-‐defense groups convened in Mexico City for the National Meeting of Citizen Self-‐defense Groups (Encuentro Nacional de Autodefensas Ciudadanas), where Mireles and La Ruana self-‐defense group founder Hipólito Mora were featured speakers. In that meeting, held at the Siqueiros Cultural Convention Center (Polyforum Cultural Siqueiros), self-‐defense leaders, alongside social leaders, priests, and former legislators, proposed the formation of a “National Self-‐defense Front” (Frente Nacional de Autodefensas). During his speech, Mireles stressed that this was not a call to insurrection or to take up arms, but to “awaken the nation and demand justice and public security.” He also clarified that he would not be the leader of such a movement were it to come to fruition. During his speech, he emphasized that the battle the autodefensas are waging is not against the government, but rather criminal groups; nevertheless, he did not shy from openly criticizing officials central to the federal government’s efforts in Michoacán to quell the violence between the Knights Templar and the self-‐defense groups. He particularly criticized Interior Minister Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, for his aggressive stance toward disarming the autodefensas; and Commissioner Castillo, who he accused of negotiating with criminals.


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Sources:

Olmos, José Gil. Mireles, “El alzado líder de las autodefensas en Michoacán.” Proceso. November 23, 2013.

Fausset, Richard and Cecilia Sanchez. “Mexican vigilante leader refuses

government order to disarm.” Los Angeles Times. April 7, 2014.

“Self-‐defense groups agree to disarm or officially join “Rural Defense Corps” in Michoacán by May 2014.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 15, 2014.

Redacción. “Preocupa a Mireles la conversión de comunitarios en

paramilitares.” Proceso. May 5, 2014.

“Mensaje de José Manuel Mireles a Enrique Peña Nieto.” Rio Doce. May 7, 2014.

Arce, Alberto. “Mexico to Transform Anti-‐Cartel Vigilante Forces.”

Associated Press. May 10, 2014.

Olmos, José Gil. “Empieza la verdadera guerra” en Michoacán.” Proceso. May 10, 2014. Translated by Mexico Voices.

Redacción. “Autodefensas ahora son policías rurales; “somos gobierno”:

Papá Pitufo.” Proceso. May 10, 2014. Translated by Mexico Voices.

Macías, Verónica. “Policía Rural estará en nómina y bajo las reglas de la estatal.” El Economista. May 11, 2014.

Muédano Enviado, Marcos. “Rurales operan en improvisado cuartel.” El

Universal. May 12, 2014.

Redacción. “El MP me pidió bajar un cadaver y sostenerle la cabeza para una foto: Mireles.” Aristegui Noticias. May 12, 2014. Translated by

Mexico Voices.

Hernández Navarro, Luis. “El teatro de sombras michoacano.” La Jornada. May 13, 2014. Translated by Mexico Voices.

“Líderes de autodefensas dejan atrás diferencias en Michoacán.” CNN

México. May 21, 2014.

Gil Olmos, José. “Proponen la creación del Frente Nacional de Autodefensas.” Proceso. May 28, 2014. Translated by Mexico Voices.

Mexican authorities seize 44 tons of marijuana in Tijuana The Associated Press reported this week on a large marijuana bust in the city of Tijuana, Mexico, which lies just across the U.S.-‐Mexico border from San Diego, California. On Thursday, May 1, members of the Tijuana Municipal Police (Policía Municipal) and Secretary of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) carried out a federal search warrant, raiding a warehouse in the Granjas Familiares del Matamoros neighborhood. According to Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR), authorities seized 44 tons (39 metric tons) of marijuana that was separated into approximately 4,000 smaller containers. Authorities have not yet arrested any suspects. The most recent seizure adds to the high number of drugs seized in the border towns in recent years. In October 2013, 325 pounds of cocaine and at least eight tons of marijuana were discovered in a tunnel connecting Otay Mesa—just

east of San Diego—with a location just outside of the Tijuana Airport. Meanwhile, more than 40 tons of marijuana was found in 2012, while another 32 tons were found in 2011. Yet “the largest seizure to date” in Tijuana, reports the Associated Press, was 148 tons of marijuana in 2010.

The U.S.-Mexico border fence cuts between San Diego, California on the left and Tijuana, Baja California on the

right. Photo: Wikipedia.

Along with major drug busts in past years has come the discovery of several tunnels connecting the United States and Mexico, presumably used to transport drugs and other illicit materials. As Justice in Mexico reported, two new tunnels running between San Diego and Tijuana were discovered in April 2014, marking the sixth and seventh such exposed passageways in the area in the past four years, the ninth and tenth since 2006, and the most recent discoveries since the Otay Mesa tunnel in October 2013.

Sources:

“32 tons of marijuana seized in advanced San Diego-‐Tijuana drug tunnel.” Justice in Mexico Project. December 1, 2011.

Spagat, Elliot and Jacques Billeaud. “Drug Tunnels Discovered Between U.S.-‐

Mexico Border Contained Railcar System, Tons of Pot.” Associated Press, Huffington Post. July 13, 2012.

“Three suspects arrested after drug tunnel found between San Diego and

Tijuana.” Justice in Mexico Project. November 10, 2013.

“Two drug tunnels connecting to Tijuana found near San Diego, California.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 15, 2014.

Associated Press. “Decomisan 44 toneladas de marihuana en Tijuana.”

Yahoo Noticias. May 3, 2014.

Associated Press. “PGR anuncia decomiso de 44 toneladas de marihuana en Tijuana.” Noticias Terra. May 3, 2014.

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Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

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Transparency and Accountability

Senate elects new IFAI commissioners with mixed reactions from experts Experts and civil society organizations are lauding the recent Senate process for electing the seven new commissioners of Mexico’s Federal Institute of Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, IFAI) for its transparency and innovation, although some have expressed regret that the Senate left out candidates with experience within the organization. Nevertheless, most agree that the new commissioners are professionals, with extensive knowledge of the field. They mark the first commissioners elected under the new transparency law passed in the Mexican Congress last year, which expanded the IFAI’s reach and autonomy, increased the number of commissioners from five to seven, and changed the process for appointing commissioners. Previously, they had been nominated by the president and confirmed in the Senate. Under the recent reforms, applicants are selected in Senate committees, followed by a floor vote in which two thirds must approve a candidate. The candidates were approved on April 30, and President Enrique Peña Nieto did not object to any of them.

The newly elected IFAI members were presented before

the Senate. Photo: Senado de la República.

The seven commissioners were selected from a pool of 147 applicants, and all but one—Rosendoevgueni Monterrey Chepov—were included in the list of 25 recommended applicants submitted to the Senate by a committee of experts in the area of transparency. Francisco Javier Acuña Llamas, who will be in his position until 2023, was information, documentation, and transparency coordinator for the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Power

(Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación), and has also served on the faculties of Buenos Aires University in Argentina, Paraguay’s National Eastern University (Universidad Nacional del Este de Paraguay), and Peru’s Electoral and Government School (Escuela Electoral y de Gobierno de Perú), as well as the law program at Mexico’s National Autonomous University (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM).

Photo: Wikimedia Commons.

The election of Monterrey Chepov drew the most criticism, as he was not on the expert committee’s list of 25 recommended candidates, and senators from the National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional, PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD) claim that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) backed him because of his supposed close ties with President Enrique Peña Nieto. Monterrey Chepov served as commissioner and president of the State of Mexico’s (Estado de México, Edomex) local transparency institute while Peña Nieto was governor of that state. He had previously worked in Edomex’s treasury ministry as transparency and public information coordinator in the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE), and as technical secretary of the National Institute of Historic Studies of Mexican Revolutions (Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de las Revoluciones de México, INEHRM). Until his appointment to the IFAI, he was an economist at the University of the Valley of Mexico (Universidad del Valle de México, UVM). Óscar Mauricio Guerra Ford, who was mentioned in Senate committees as being one of the most qualified candidates, had served as president of the Federal District’s (Distrito Federal, DF) transparency institute (InfoDF) since 2006. He was also an economics professor at UNAM, as well as assistant director of the UNAM Foundation (Fundación UNAM). Both Guerra Ford and Monterrey Chepov will serve in their posts until 2022.

Transparency and Accountability


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Meanwhile, María Patricia Kurczyn Villalobos and Joel Salas Suárez will both be in their posts until 2020. Kurczyn Villalobos has experience primarily in academia as a researcher in UNAM’s Legal Investigations Institute (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, IIJ), where she specialized in labor law, human rights, and gender equality issues. She is also a member of the Mexican Bar association and the Attorneys’ College (Colegio de Abogados), one of Mexico’s primary legal associations. Salas Suárez was head of the Transparency and International Cooperation Policies Unit (Unidad de Políticas de Transparencia y Cooperación Internacional) of the government’s anti-‐corruption agency (Secretaría de la Función Pública, SFP), among other positions in the same agency. The final two commissioners are Ximena Puente de la Mora and Areli Cano Guadiana, both of whom will serve until 2018. Before her appointment as IFAI commissioner, Puente de la Mora served as commissioner of Colima’s transparency institute (Infocol), and previously had worked primarily in academia, as a law professor at the University of Colima, as well as working as an investigator in various U.S. and German academic institutions. Cano Guadiana served as director of Transparency, Services and Procedures (Transparencia, Servicios y Trámites) in the Miguel Hidalgo delegation in the Federal District. From 2006 to 2012, she was a commissioner for InfoDF. The expert committee’s list of recommended applicants included several current IFAI officials, though none were ultimately selected. This drew criticism from the committee, which said that the Senate was ignoring the importance of establishing some continuity during a time of transition for the agency. It will now be up to the seven newly appointed commissioners to select who will be the agency’s president by means of a secret vote.

Sources:

Torres, Mauricio. “Un comité de expertos sugiere al Senado 25 finalistas

para el nuevo IFAI.” CNN México. April 21, 2014.

Morales, Alberto. “Elogian expertos elección de comisionados del IFAI.” El Universal. May 2, 2014.

Torres, Mauricio. “¿Quiénes son los 7 nuevos comisionados que llegan al

IFAI?” CNN México. May 14, 2014.

Morales, Alberto and Juan Arvizu. “Rinden protesta los nuevos comisionados del IFAI.” El Universal. May 15, 2014.

Three federal judges suspended for allegedly favoring casino mogul Mexico’s Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal, CJF) in early May suspended two federal judge magistrates (magistrados), Magistrates Eduardo Ochoa Torres and José Manuel Rodriguez Puerto, and an additional

federal judge, Javier Rubén Lozano Martínez, for allegedly issuing rulings favoring one of Mexico’s leading casino operators. The CJF is also accusing Judge Lozano Martínez of participating in an influence peddling network. All three are based in northern states along the U.S-‐Mexico border, with Ochoa Torres and Lozáno Martínez in Monterrey, Nuevo León and Rodríguez Puerto in Tamaulipas. Also implicated in the CJF’s investigation is Mario Alberto Prado Rodríguez, former technical secretary for Daniel Francisco Cabeza de Vaca, who served as former President Felipe Calderón’s legal counsel. The CJF claims to have audio recordings tying the four men to Juan José Rojas Cardona, Mexico’s “Casino Czar,” who until recent government action operated 26 casinos, primarily in Mexico’s border region.

Mexico's "Casino Czar," Juan José Rojas Cardona.

Photo: Proceso.

These recent suspensions, handed down on May 7, followed an extensive anticorruption investigation involving the Mexican judiciary and the casino industry dating back to 2011. In January, the CJF initiated disciplinary procedures against former District Court Judge Luis Armando Jerezano Treviño and Judicial Secretary (secretario de juzgado) Gerardo Tiscareño Mercado, both based in Saltillo, Coahuila, for allegedly arranging favorable legal decisions for casinos operating in the northern state. Jerezano Treviño had been suspended by the CJF in September 2011 under the same suspicions. In addition, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency opened its own investigation into Jerezano Treviño, identifying several U.S. bank accounts belonging to the former judge it says contained at least $3.2 million (USD) in illicit funds. The U.S. Department of Justice seized the funds, determining that the majority originated from bribes paid for favorable court rulings, at least in part by criminal organizations. In 2006, Jerezano Treviño granted an injunction ordering Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) to return properties it had seized from Juan Chapa Garza, determined to be a proxy for Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo, CDG) founder Juan García Ábrego. In a press release, the CJF said that it would continue administrative proceedings against those implicated in the alleged influence peddling network to the extent of its constitutional authority.

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

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At the center of the Mexican government’s crackdown on corrupt practices in the casino industry has been Juan José Rojas Cardona, Mexico’s so-‐called “Casino Czar.” On April 25 of this year, Mexico’s Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación, SEGOB) ordered the closure of seven casinos belonging to Rojas Cardona for irregularities in obtaining operating licenses in 2005. Shortly thereafter, the Rojas Cardona family decided to close its 20 other establishments in Mexico in order to protect its clientele, according to Eduardo Campos, spokesman for Entretenimiento de México, which administers Rojas Cardona’s casino chain. In May, SEGOB revoked the operating licenses of 19 of those establishments, which were opened in accordance with a permit issued to Entretenimiento de México in May 2005 to open 50 gambling establishments with license to operate until 2030.

Sources:

Otero, Silvia. “CFJ actúa contra juez federal y secretario por anomalías.” El Universal. January 23, 2014.

Otero, Silvia. “DEA halla más cuentas de Jerezano.” El Universal.

February 6, 2014.

“Denuncia CJF a dos magistrados y un juez por favorecer a ‘El Zar de los Casinos.’” Proceso. May 14, 2014.

Mendieta, Eduardo. “Segob revoca permisos a los casinos de Rojas Cardona.”

Milenio. May 21, 2014.

Former Aguascalientes Governor Reynoso Femat arrested for alleged embezzlement Former Aguascalientes Governor Luis Armando Reynoso Femat, of the National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional, PAN), was arrested on May 2 for allegedly embezzling $26 million pesos (about $2 million USD). Reynoso Femat served as Aguascalientes governor from December 2004 through November 2010. He had previously served as mayor of the city of Aguascalientes. Reynoso Femat was apprehended as he left the left an Aguascalientes bullfighting ring in the company of his wife, Margarita Zapata Vallejo. The former governor is alleged to have sold properties belonging to the state’s housing authority (Instituto de Vivienda del Estado de Aguascalientes, IVEA) at prices that fell short of their actual value. He was later transferred to the state penitentiary (Centro de Readaptación Social, Cereso) in Calvillo, Aguascalientes. Reynoso Femat’s attorney, Julio César Serna Delgado Ventura, called his client’s arrest arbitrary, maintaining that the former governor was shown no arrest warrant, and was told he was required only as a witness. “The Public Prosecutor acquired [the arrest warrant] after my client had been detained. When they showed it to him, it was still warm,” he said. Serna Ventura is currently seeking to bring a

constitutional injunction (amparo) before a federal judge for the former governor’s release. Reynoso Femat had already been brought before a court to face two investigations against him by Aguascalientes authorities—one resulting from the alleged purchase of a medical CT scanner in 2008 at a cost of $13.8 million pesos ($1.06 million USD), that never arrived at its designated hospital; as well as separate accusations of defrauding the IVEA of $17 million pesos ($1.3 million USD). He has paid $19 million pesos in bonds in order to face the legal proceedings against him outside of prison; however he has not yet posted bond for the most recent allegations brought against him, which remains a possibility given that the crimes are not federal in nature.

Former Aguascalientes Governor Luis Armando

Reynoso Femat. Photo: El Universal.

Interviewed by reporters from inside his prison cell, Reynoso Femat called his arrest a “political reprisal,” though at the behest of his attorney he did not clarify. He has thus far refused to give an official statement, but continued to question how the Aguascalientes Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado, PGJE) was able to open an investigation into 500 pages of documents on the morning of May 1, and within three hours manage to obtain an arrest warrant. Reynoso Femat’s attorneys meanwhile requested an extension of the 144 hours allowed by the constitution for presenting evidence on their client’s behalf.

Sources:

Álvarez, Xóchitl. “Presentarán a Reyhoso Femat en rejilla de juzgado.” El Universal. May 3, 2014.

Álvarez, Ángel. “Detienen al ex gobernador de Aguascalientes, Reynoso

Femat.” La Crónica de Hoy. May 4, 2014.

“Reynoso Femat acusa revancha política en su detención.” Proceso. May 4, 2014.


11

Michoacán’s former secretary general, interim governor arrested Michoacán’s former secretary general and interim governor, José Jesús Reyna García, was formally arrested for alleged links to organized crime on Wednesday, May 7 after a federal judge in the State of Mexico (Estado de México, Edomex) ordered his arrest. Reyna, a member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), was removed from his role as secretary general in early April after Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduria General de la Republica, PGR) for Special Investigations on Organized Crime (Subprocuraduria Especializada en Investigacion de Delincuencia Organizada, SEIDO) “found possible connections with criminal organizations,” specifically the Knights Templar Organization (Caballeros Templarios, KTO). Reyna will remain at the Altiplano maximum-‐security prison in Edomex as the judicial proceedings unfold.

Former Michoacán Secretary General José Jesús

Reyna García. Photo: 1a Plana.

While under an order for arraigo—a form of preventative detention to hold suspects without charges for up to 40 to 80 days—authorities found enough proof of Reyna’s involvement with criminal organizations’ leaders to warrant an arrest. As SEIDO Director Rodrigo Archundia explained in a press conference, Reyna was arrested “as a result of testimonials and declarations, financial trails, and other various pieces of expert evidence gathered by the Criminal Investigation Agency [Agencia de Investigación Criminal].” The PGR also referenced Reyna’s alleged participation in a meeting with Servando “La Tuta” Gómez Martínez, the only remaining leader of the Knights Templar Organization. A video released in late April on Facebook showed Reyna meeting with La Tuta and former Michoacán PRI Deputy José Trinidad Martínez Pasalagua. It is interesting to note that this video was released around the same time as another video was published to YouTube that showed La Tuta meeting with Arquimedes Useguera Solorio—the former mayor of the Lázaro Cárdenas municipality who has since been arrested—and Omar Soto Gil, the former treasurer of the Lázaro Cárdenas. According to SEIDO Director Archundia, “Taking all of this evidence together, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público de la Federación) had the

obligation of presenting this information before the courts, taking judicial action against [Reyna].” Reyna’s arrest comes at a time when coordinated efforts between the federal government and Michoacán’s self-‐defense groups (grupos de autodefensa) have made notable strides in taking down the Knights Templar leadership. Authorities arrested or killed three of the four KTO leaders in the first three months of 2014, leaving La Tuta as the only remaining leader. According to national security documents reported on by Excélsior, however, La Tuta has since gotten involved as one of the leaders of a new hybrid criminal organization that has emerged in Michoacán. The group known as “La Tercera Hermanidad” (The Third Brotherhood, H3) includes elements of rival criminal organizations, like the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG) and the Knights Templar, along with members of self-‐defense groups in the region, including group leaders from the municipalities of La Huacana and Buenavista Tomatlán. While details on the leadership and structure of H3 are not yet clear, the emergence of this group leads to new challenges for federal officials attempting to control organized crime in Mexico.

Sources:

Castillo, Gustavo et. al. “Arraigo de 40 días y destitución de Reyna por posible nexo templario.” La Jornada. April 6, 2014. Translated by

Mexico Voices.

“Former secretary general of Michoacán under arraigo for alleged ties with organized crime.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 11, 2014.

Murata, Gloria. “Difunden video de presunta reunión entre ‘La Tuta’ y

Reyna.” Milenio. April 22, 2014.

“April 2014 News Monitor.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 2014.

Becerril, Andrés. “Autodefensas dan origen a otro cartel; nace en Michoacán La Tercera Hermandad o H3.” Excélsior. May 6, 2014.

Macías, Verónica. “Jesús Reyna, la cara del narcopoder.” El Economista.

May 7, 2014.

Redacción. “Pide Reyna ampliar plazo para aportar pruebas.” El Universal. May 8, 2014.

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

12

Justice System Reform

Mexico ranks 79th out of 99 countries on “Rule of Law Index 2014” With just two years remaining until the June 2016 deadline when the New Criminal Justice System (Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal, NSJP) is supposed to be fully implemented and operational nationwide, Mexico scored rather poorly on the World Justice Project’s (WJP) “Rule of Law Index 2014.” Released in March 2014, the report ranks a country’s strength of rule of law, quality of governance, and criminal justice system based on surveys of perception and experiences administered to over 100,000 households in three cities per country. The index takes into consideration the following nine factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice, and informal justice. In Mexico, the WJP focused its survey in Guadalajara, Jalisco; Mexico City; and Monterrey, Nuevo León. In overall scores, Mexico ranked 79th lowest of 99 countries, with nearly identical scores as Russia, Madagascar, China, and Egypt, among others. Meanwhile, Canada ranked 11th and the United States not far behind at 19th. Mexico also had the fifth lowest score of all countries in the Western Hemisphere, only ranking higher than Guatemala (83rd), Nicaragua (85th), Bolivia (94th), and Venezuela (99th). In civilians’ perceptions and experiences with the criminal justice system, Mexico ranked much worse, coming in at 97th of 99. The WJP explained that Mexico’s low ranking is due to problems within the civil justice system, widespread corruption, weak and ineffective police forces, and a nascent criminal justice system that is still very much in the process of being implemented and integrated nationwide. In a recent article with El Universal, WJP Investigative Coordinator Alejandro Ponce discussed Mexico’s high levels of impunity. “If there is an official or bureaucrat found to be engaging in acts of corruption, the probability that he or she will be punished is extremely low,” he said. Despite the low rule of law rankings, Mexico did fare far better on the constraints on government powers (48th of 99 countries) and open government (32nd) indicators; while compared to the rest of Latin America it also scored well on open government (4th of 16 countries) and regulatory enforcement (6th). The report also highlighted Mexico’s effective checks on government power and its open government, acknowledging that they are “supported in

large part by a long constitutional tradition with an independent judiciary, and strong protections for free speech and freedom of religion.” Nevertheless, efforts to strengthen Mexico’s rule of law, notably through the New Criminal Justice System, will continue. Alejandro Martí, the president of civil society organization México S.O.S. that has been one of several such organizations at the forefront of the NSJP’s implementation, acknowledged this month that civil society will continue to do its role in monitoring and evaluating the new system as it unfolds. “We are fighting not just for [the system] to be implemented,” he said, “but also for the implementation to be evaluated so we can ensure that it’s functioning correctly…”

Sources:

“WJP Rule of Law Index 2014: Country Profile Mexico.” World Justice Project. March 5, 2014.

“WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.” World Justice Project. March 5, 2014.

González, Isabel. “El nuevo modelo de justicia, en 2016: ONG.” Excélsior.

May 7, 2014.

El Universal. “Reprueba México en rubro de justicia.” El Diario de Coahuila. May 26, 2014.

Michel, Elena. “México, en los últimos lugares de AL con acceso a la justicia.”

El Universal. May 26, 2014.

Around the States: federal government holds “Sixth Forum on Security and Justice: Implementing Criminal Reform” On May 14 and 15, Mexico’s federal government hosted the “Sixth Forum on Security and Justice: Implementing Criminal Reform” (VI Foro sobre Seguridad y Justicia: Cómo sí implementar la reforma penal) in an effort to review, analyze, and coordinate future steps on the nationwide implementation of the New Criminal Justice System (Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal, NSJP). This forum in particular looked at the quality of justice being implemented under the new judicial system, whereas the previous five meetings focused more on working towards the passage of Mexico’s National Penal Procedures Code (Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales), which was approved in March. It also focused heavily on civil society’s role in the implementation and monitoring process of the NSJP implementation, recognizing civil society’s fundamental role

Justice System Reform


13

in creating and shaping the NSJP. As such, the forum was attended by the presidents of Mexican civil society organizations Renace and México S.O.S., Ernesto Canales and Alejandro Martí, respectively; representatives from the 100 organizations comprising Mexico’s National Network in favor of Oral Trials and Due Process (Red Nacional a favor de los Juicios Orales y Debido Proceso); and the president of the Supreme Court, Juan Silva Meza, among others. While the federal government moved forward with the NSJP on the national level, the states continued to make their own progress. These are some of the developments around the states as they move towards full operation of the NSJP:

Sources:

Esto es la Justicia. “Mapa de Avance: Puebla.” Secretaría Ténica del Consejo

de Coordinación para la Implementación del Sistema de Justicia Penal. December 2013.

Pérez, Lucía. “Realizan primer juicio oral en Coahuila.” El Siglo de Torreón.

April 29, 2014.

Notimex. “Inaugurará Peña Foro sobre Seguridad y Justicia.” El Universal. May 6, 2014.

González, Isabel. “El nuevo modelo de justicia, en 2016: ONG.” Excélsior.

May 7, 2014.

“Anuncia PGJE creación de agencia especializada en feminicidos.” BCS Noticias. May 11, 2014.

“En dos meses los juicios orales en Sinaloa, afirma Malova.” Crítica Polítiica.

May 12, 2014.

Cano, Lidchy. “Falta de espacios retrasan implementación de juicios orales: Abogados.” Municipios Puebla. May 18, 2014.

Notimex. “Integran mando único en 20 municipios de Michoacán.” Milenio.

May 19, 2014.

Carrillo, Lorena. “Imparten asignatura sobre teoría del delito.” Periódico Zócalo. May 21, 2014.

Cano, Lidchy. “Ponen en marcha en Izúcar una sala provisional para juicios

orales.” Municipios Puebla. May 22, 2014.

• State A�orney General Adonai Carreón Estrada announced the crea�on of a new agency within the state’s Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) dedicated to inves�ga�ng femicide and crimes against women. The government also presented the dra� of BC Sur’s Law of Equality between Men and Women (Ley de Igualidad entre Mujeres y Hombres).

Baja California

Sur

• The first oral trial in Coahuila was held on April 29 in the Frontera municipality for a case involving inten�onal homicide. Weeks later, UNAM law professor Arturo Flores Albor taught a criminal law course in Piedras Negras to lawyers and fellow law professors as part of the state’s efforts to train NSJP operators.

Coahuila

• State Governor Fausto Vallejo announced that 20 municipali�es in Michoacán have ini�ated opera�ng the new unified police force (Mando Único), a transi�on expected to be finished by early June at the latest. The new force seeks strengthen coordina�on and opera�on among the municipal police forces.

Michoacán

• Puebla’s local director in Izúcar de Matamoros of the La�n American Lawyers Confedera�on, Asunción Mon�el Meléndez, spoke out on the state’s failure to construct infrastructure and courtrooms needed for the NSJP despite the state’s exemplary progress made in judicial training, educa�on, and prepara�on. Nevertheless, Izúcar de Matamoros did open its first oral trials courtroom on May 21.

Puebla

• Mario López Valdez, the governor of Sinaloa, announced that the state was on pace to complete construc�on of its Center for Criminal Jus�ce by July 2014. The center, which will house oral trials and cost an es�mated $199 million pesos ($15.4 million USD) to construct, was 80% complete by mid-‐May.

Sinaloa

Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2014

14

Human Rights and Civil Society

UN human rights visitor comments on torture in Mexico Following his visit to Mexico in April, Juan E. Méndez, special rapporteur on torture for the United Nations, expressed concern that there is a “generalized situation” of torture in Mexico that needs to be addressed. Méndez, who is from Argentina, was in Mexico from April 21 through May 2 investigating the increase in allegations of torture in Mexico as part of a review of the country’s protocols and protection mechanisms for human rights. He engaged in over 100 meetings with officials and representatives at the local, state, and federal levels, and visited prisons, migration centers, and psychiatric hospitals in the Federal District (Distrito Federal, DF), Nuevo León, Baja California, Chiapas, and Nayarit. Méndez’s evaluations will assist in developing plans to prevent, investigate, and sanction the practices of torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.

U.N. Special Investigator Juan Méndez.

Photo: Miguel Dimayuga, Proceso.

The Peña Nieto administration has claimed some success in reducing the incidence of torture and otherwise abusive treatment, which has been widely blamed on the militarization of the country’s public security operations during the federal government’s military-‐led offensive against organized crime groups dating back to December 2006. During the six-‐year tenure of former President Felipe Calderón (2006-‐2012), Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) registered a 500% increase in reports of torture and otherwise cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, with 7,253 such cases reported. The Peña Nieto administration points to a decline in the recommendations handed down by the CNDH regarding the matter as evidence that the

situation is improving. Moreover, the CNDH itself reported in late April that there was a 30% decline in reported cases of torture between 2012 and 2013, crediting its own National Mechanism of Prevention of Torture in Mexico (Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención de la Tortura en México). Méndez acknowledged that this decline could be a result of fewer cases of torture, but stressed that it could also stem from victims’ lack of confidence in the authorities to respond. Méndez blames the “generalized and normalized” use of torture largely on the militarization of public security functions in Mexico, though he made clear that police forces are also to blame for employing torture, which generally occurs during the first 12-‐24 hours of detention to extract information or a confession before handing subjects over to the corresponding public prosecutor’s office. Aside from concern over the widespread presence of the military in Mexican civil society, he also criticized what he termed the “colonization” of state and local police forces through the appointment of former military officers to their ranks, on the grounds that they bring a military mentality to civilian law enforcement, which raises the risk of human rights being ignored or disregarded. The methods employed, says Méndez, include verbal threats; beatings; the use of plastic bags to induce asphyxia; electric shock, often applied to victims’ genitalia; waterboarding; and acts of humiliation, such as forced nudity. Méndez said that impunity is at the core of the continuing problem of torture by security forces, as there are no solid mechanisms in place to pursue allegations of abuse. In the court system, he said, the burden of proof that torture has been employed to extract a confession has fallen on the accused, who is not given an opportunity to do so until he or she appears before a judge, often weeks after the fact when physical signs have since disappeared. Perhaps in anticipation of this criticism, in the days leading up to Méndez’s visit in April the Mexican Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, SCJN) for the first time set parameters that judges must follow in cases where a defendant claims that torture was used against him, particularly to extract a confession. The decision came in a ruling involving a woman sentenced to 25 years in prison for the murder of her husband, who later claimed that her confession came amidst psychological torture. The SCJN did not rule on her culpability, but rather issued an injunction (amparo), relieving her of her sentence. Moreover, the

Human Rights and Civil Society


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justices ruled that judges must initiate a prompt investigation into alleged of torture, and that the burden will fall on the responsible authorities to prove that such acts did not take place. In response to his prison visits, Méndez expressed concern about overcrowding, a well-‐documented problem, particularly in Mexico’s state prisons which have increasingly been tasked with housing federal prisoners, stressing their institutional capacities, which result in multiple prison breaks during recent years. He also mentioned abuses against women as a primary concern. Moreover, Méndez said that during his visit to an adolescent internment center in Monterrey, Nuevo León, he found that prisoners are locked up for as many as 22 hours per day, and forced to do excessive exercise as a form of punishment. Méndez said that he expects to release his final report on torture in Mexico either by the end of this year, or in March of 2015 during the meeting of the United Nations’ Committee Against Torture. For his part, Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, undersecretary of Multilateral Issues and Human Rights (Asuntos Multilaterales y Derechos Humanos) of Mexico’s Foreign Ministry (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, SRE), acknowledged that torture remains a problem in Mexico that needs to be addressed. In an interview with El Universal, he agreed with Méndez that the majority of cases occur shortly after subjects are apprehended. He added that Mexico’s federal laws regarding torture often differ from those of the 32 states, making cooperation difficult. Nevertheless, he expressed confidence that the justice reform measures currently being implemented across the states would address much of the problem, and added that the U.N.’s recommendations would be included in Mexico’s National Human Rights Program (Programa Nacional de Derechos Humanos), which will be made public in the coming months.

Sources:

Otero, Silvia. “SCJN fija criterios a jueces ante casos de tortura a detenidos.”

El Universal. April 2, 2014.

Redacción. “Resuelve la Corte que denuncias por tortura se investiguen de oficio.” Proceso. April 2, 2014.

“UN Special Investigator visits Mexico to review protocols and protections against the practice of torture.” Justice in Mexico Project. April 26, 2014.

Notimex. “Tortura en México baja 30% en 2012 y 2013: CNDH.” El Universal.

April 27, 2014.

León, Mariana and Liliana Alcántara. “Endémica, la tortura en México, alerta ONU.” El Universal. May 3, 2014.

Díaz, Gloria Leticia. “Tortura: la impunidad, el tema central.” Proceso.

May 7, 2014.

Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies approves major reforms to the Military Code of Justice Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados) unanimously approved historic reforms to the Military Code of Justice (Código de Justicia Militar) on April 30, less than one week after the Mexican Senate approved the reforms on April 24. These reforms will require all cases involving human rights abuses committed by members of the military against civilians to be tried in civilian courts. Previously, Mexico’s Military Prosecutor (Ministerio Público Militar) held jurisdiction over trying these cases; military officials conducted investigations and trials behind closed doors, leaving the victims and their families in the dark while fostering an environment of impunity.

Soldiers patrol in rural Guerrero. Photo: Jessica Torres, Proceso.

According to The Washington Office of Latin America (WOLA), roughly 5,000 cases were brought before the Military Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia Militar) alleging human rights violations committed by members of the military against civilians between 2007 and 2012, of which only four resulted in convictions. WOLA also noted that Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comision Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) received three times more complaints of human rights violations by soldiers in 2013, compared to 2007. This increase coincides with the large influx of military troops on the ground in Mexico as part of former President Felipe Calderón’s efforts to combat organized crime, violence, and drug trafficking, which he declared immediately after taking office in December 2006. Since passing through Congress, the reforms have been sent to President Enrique Peña Nieto for his formal approval. In a joint press release between several Mexican human rights advocacy organizations—the Miguel Agustín Pro Juaréz Human Rights Center (Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez), the Fundar Center for Analysis and Investigation (Fundar Centro de Información y Análisis), the Mexican Institute of Human Rights and Democracy (Instituto

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Mexicano de Derechos Humanos y Democracia), and the Montaña-‐Tlachinollan Human Rights Center (Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Montaña-‐Tlachinollan)—, the organizations called these reforms a “triumph for the victims of military abuses,” especially for the victims of cases previously brought before the Inter-‐American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). The reforms, however, are somewhat limited in that cases involving the infringement of human rights that were investigated and tried by the military cannot be brought to court again, nor will cases involving human rights violations by soldiers against soldiers be tried in civilian court, cautions the press release. Nevertheless, President Peña Nieto’s pending approval of these reforms will bring Mexico into compliance with previous IACHR rulings and related decisions by Mexico’s Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia Nacional, SCJN).

Sources:

Cervantes, Jesusa. “Disputed Reforms Passed that Fence In Military Laws.” Proceso. April 30, 2014.

“Mexican Congress Approves Historic Reforms to the Military Code of

Justice.” Washington Office on Latin America. April 30, 2014.

“Senate Approves Reform to Try Soldiers in Civilian Courts.” Justice in Mexico Project. May 1, 2014.

Human rights activist searching for disappeared son murdered in Sinaloa On May 12, 2014, two days after the “March for National Dignity: Mothers Searching for their Daughters, Sons, Truth, and Justice” (Marcha por la Dignidad Nacional: Madres Buscando a sus Hijas, Hijos, Verdad y Justicia), Sandra Luz Hernández, human rights activist and mother of missing Édgar García Hernández, was killed in Culiacán, Sinaloa. One gunman, later identified by the Sinaloa State Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado, PGJE), shot Hernández dead in an apparent ambush. For the past two and a half years, Hernández had been searching for information about her son Édgar who had been taken from his home by a group of men armed with AK-‐47s. Like many other relatives of missing persons in Mexico seeking to find their loved ones, Hernández said she was met with indifference by the authorities. When she reported the disappearance to the PGJE, where her son had worked as a clerk, Marco Antonio Higuera Gómez, the state attorney general, asked Hernández how she thought Édgar was able to afford a new Toyota truck. As reports indicate, Hernández understood such questions as implying that the authorities thought that her son was a criminal. Both she and her friends believed that as a consequence of this assumption, the police did not launch a prompt and thorough investigation. Because of the authorities’ lack of urgency in finding her son, Hernández investigated the case

herself, going to the media and following tips and leads about the disappearance of her son.

Mexicans walk in the "March for National Dignity" protest

on May 10 calling on the government to do its part in finding the disappeared. Photo: Francisco Olivera,

La Jornada.

According to Mexican news source Río Doce, the day before her death, Hernández was approached by a woman claiming to have information about her son, and told that she would soon receive a phone call with more information. The next day, and after meeting with authorities to review her son’s case, Hernández received a call from the informant, directing her to meet in the Benito Juárez neighborhood of Culiacán. While making her way there to see what information she could get, Hernández was shot 15 times allegedly by the suspect. Nine days later, police arrested 25-‐year old Valenzuela. In a press conference, the attorney general said that Valenzuela admitted to having killed Hernández for “personal reasons” and that he also indicated that her son was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Manuel Alonso Ruiz Haro in January 2012. Given the irregularities in the investigation of Édgar’s disappearance, Hernández’s role as an outspoken activist, and the accusations that have come to light since the arrest of the PGJE’s 25-‐year old suspect, many organizations are calling for a more complete and thorough investigation into the facts. The National Commission on Human Rights (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) has also launched its own investigation into the murder and has requested that Culiacán authorities provide protection to Hernández’s family members. Over the past few years, the problem of disappearances in Mexico has received an unprecedented level of attention by civil society groups, intergovernmental agencies, and international human rights NGOs. In response to the growing mobilization of these groups, the Peña Nieto administration released in early 2013 a database that identified over 26,000 people as missing. The database,


17

compiled by the previous administration of Felipe Calderón (2006-‐2012), was said to be inaccurate, with the current administration claiming it over counted the number of missing and relatives of the missing claiming that it did not include those they knew to have disappeared. More recently, the CNDH put the figure of missing at 24,800 while Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong of the Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación, SEGOB) said that the actual figure is 8,000. As the Associated Press clarified, “Osorio Chong’s initial report was unclear about whether the 8,000 were in addition to the 13,000 still missing from the previous [Calderón] administration. But his department later said the 8,000 figure was the current tally for both [the Calderón and Peña Nieto] administrations.” Families of the disappeared have criticized the government for its back-‐and-‐forth reporting on official statistics, calling it a “game of numbers” (juego de cifras) and that its process to calculate the true number of disappeared “continues without clarity.”

Sandra Luz Hernández. Photo: Río Doce.

Legislative progress according rights to the missing varies across Mexico’s 31 states and the Federal District (Distrito Federal, DF). In a first for the country, the state of Coahuila approved on May 19, a law recognizing and guaranteeing the juridical rights of a missing person and providing relatives and those close to the missing person appropriate protections. The new law aligns Coahuila with Mexico’s obligations under international law and Mexico’s own Victims’ Law (Ley de Víctimas), approved in January 2013.

Sources:

Valdez, Javier. “Sandra Luz Hernández, héroe a quien solo la muerte pudo detener.” Río Doce. May 15, 2014.

Valdez, Javier. “Caso Sandra Luz: una madre muerta, su hijo desaparecido y

ningún detenido.” Río Doce. May 18, 2014.

Martínez Carballo, Nurit. “ONU celebra ley de Coahuila sobre desapariciones.” El Universal. May 19, 2014.

Wilkinson, Tracy. “In Mexico, activist mother of missing man is slain.”

Los Angeles Times. May 20, 2014.

“Desaparecidos: actuar ya.” La Jornada. May 21, 2014. Translated by Mexico Voices.

Press Release. Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos. May 21, 2014.

Morales, Alberto and Arvizu, Juan. “Osorio: cifra de desaparecidos

descendio a 8 mil.” El Universal. May 22, 2014.

Monjardín, Alejandro. “Asesina a Sandra Luz por temor a que le 'echara al Gobierno.'” Noroeste. May 22, 2014.

“Critican familiars de desaparecidos ‘juego de cifras’ del gobierno.”

La Jornada. May 23, 2014.

“Mexico recalculates number of missing to 8,000.” Associated Press. May 23, 2014.

Migrants, human trafficking victims in Mexican spotlight Several incidences in May have called into question the protection of human rights for vulnerable populations in Mexico, particularly that of migrants. On April 30, the Tabasco state police, Federal Police (Policía Federal, PF), and National Migration Institution (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM) oversaw an operation that led to the arrest of 291 undocumented Central American migrants, which included children and at least three expectant mothers, outside the municipality of Emiliano Zapato in Tabasco. Two days later, the INM detained another group of undocumented migrants in the community of Pakalná in the bordering state of Chiapas, though the exact number of migrants detained was not reported.

Central American migrants en route through Mexico.

Photo: Associated Press.

The arrests provoked accusations from several civil society organizations in Mexico criticizing the INM and police for violating the migrants’ human rights. For one, Marta Sánchez of the Mesoamerican Migrant Movement (Movimiento Migrante Mesoamericana, MMM) alleged that the police in the Tabasco incident had violently assaulted the group of migrants, which included several Mexican priests and human rights activists that accompanied the migrants during and after their arrest. A shelter for migrant refugees, “La 72,” also condemned the police forces for detaining the migrants, and for jeopardizing the migrants’ safety, particularly of those who fled into surrounding hills

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without protection or shelter to avoid their arrest. Furthermore, human rights activists criticized the INM for accusations of sexually assaulting and injuring several individuals in the May 2 arrests in Chiapas. Outside of openly criticizing the authorities involved, civil society organizations also generated an official document with almost 90 signatories demanding that the Peña Nieto administration respect the rights, asylum requests, and principles of humanity in their policy towards migrants. Activists and citizens were particularly angered by the federal government for pretending to plan a delivery of visas to the group of nearly 300 migrants, only to attack and arrest group members a few days later. According to Proceso as translated by Mexico Voices, the civil society organizations found the state and federal police, and INM to be partaking in “cruel and inhumane treatment,” and demanded that the government stop the process underway to deport the migrants from Mexico.

Migrants in Chiapas, Mexico. Photo: Hugo Cruz, Proceso.

Highlighting the vulnerability of the migrant population, exactly one week prior to these arrests, 44 Guatemalan migrants were rescued in Chiapas, all victims of human trafficking. The operation to free the victims came after an anonymous tip warned Mexican officials of a human trafficking organization in Guatemala that has ties to Mexico and the United States. Once the Chiapas Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado, PGJE) confirmed the validity of the information and the criminal organization’s existence, the INM rescued the victims from a house in the Villaflores municipality where they were held captive. It was reported that at least two minors and six women were among the 44 victims. Six alleged offenders were also arrested and are being held in custody by Chiapas police as they face human trafficking charges. One of the detained suspects, who goes by the name Milton Rocael Sebastián Cardona, is among Guatemala’s most wanted suspects for transporting migrants from Guatemala to the United States.

Such incidences in Tabasco and Chiapas exemplify the risks that Central American migrants face as they travel north from countries like Guatemala and Honduras, not only from human trafficking and criminal organizations, but also from public security forces. Nevertheless, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) did take action this month to bring justice to the 2010 San Fernando massacre, during which a mass grave containing 72 deceased migrants was found in Tamaulipas. The migrants, 58 men and 14 women, were predominantly natives of Central American countries and were shot and killed while in transit through Mexico. Authorities believe that members of the Zetas—a notoriously brutal Mexican organized crime group—were behind the massacre. On May 20, 2014, CNDH Director Raúl Plascencia Villanueva announced to the Senate that his commission had reopened investigations into the massacre to review the investigative processes and ensure that no information or data had been overlooked. The CNDH had closed investigations into the matter, and issued a subsequent recommendation (Recomendación No. 80/2013) in December 2013 to Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam and Tamaulipas Governor Egidio Torre Cantú. CNDH and fellow human rights activists hope that reopening the San Fernando case can ultimately bring those responsible for the murders to justice and help the victim’s families in their healing. As Plascencia Villanueva said, “The CNDH is not looking to dispute or argue with the victims [about what happened]. Rather, we’re seeking to assist them; we’re seeking to help them.”

Sources:

Redacción. “Marina encuentra 72 cuerpos en fose en Tamaulipas.” El Universal. August 25, 2010.

“Recomendación 80/2013.” Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos.

December 23, 2013.

Mandujano, Isaín. “Rescatan a 44 migrantes guatemaltecos en Chiapas.” Proceso. April 24, 2014.

EFE. “Interceptan en México a casi 300 migrantes centroamericanos.”

Univisión. May 1, 2014.

EFE. “Interceptan a casi 300 migrantes centroamericanos.” Milenio. May 1, 2014.

Redacción. “Denuncian nueva redada contra migrantes, ahora en Chiapas.”

Proceso. May 2, 2014. Translated by Mexico Voices.

“Migrants, human trafficking victims in Mexican spotlight” Justice in Mexico Project. May 3, 2014.

Notimex. “La CNDH reabrirá expediente de massacre de 72 inmigrantes.”

Excélsior. May 20, 2014.

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