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IMPROVING THE

US RESPONSE TO

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

AND THE CONGRESS

Brookings-Bern Project on

Internal Displacement

June 2010


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IMPROVING THE US RESPONSE TO INTERNAL

DISPLACEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS

by Roberta Cohen and Dawn Calabia

Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

June 2010


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III

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Roberta Cohen co-ounded the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and served as

its co-director or more than a decade. She co-authored together with Francis M. Deng the

rst major study on internal displacement,Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis o Internal Dis-

placement(Brookings, 1998), and was co-recipient with Deng o the Grawemeyer Award or

Ideas Improving world Order (2005). She is currently Senior Adviser to the Project, a non-

resident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution specializing

in human rights and humanitarian issues, a Senior Associate at Georgetown Universitys

Institute or the Study o International Migration, and Senior Adviser to the Representa-

tive o the UN Secretary-General or the Human Rights o Internally Displaced Persons,

Walter Klin. She is the author o numerous articles on human rights and humanitarian

issues and was awarded the DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Ocers, RetiredState

Department) Fitieth Anniversary Award (2002) or Exemplary Writing on Foreign A-

airs and Diplomacy, in particular on reugees and internally displaced persons. She is a

ormer Deputy Assistant Secretary o State or Human Rights in the Department o State

and a member o US Delegations to the UN General Assembly, Commission on HumanRights and Organization or Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Dawn Tennant Calabia, has worked on displacement and oreign policy issues or over

30 years and is currently Senior Adviser at Reugees International, a Washington based

advocacy organization ocused on prevention and resolution o orced displacement. Ms.

Calabia worked or eleven years with the United Nations in Washington, rst as external

relations ocer or UNHCRs oce or the US and the Caribbean(1993-2001) and then

as Deputy Director and Acting Director o the UN Inormation Center, an oce o the

UN Secretariat (2001-2004). She earlier served as Director o Policy and Development orthe US Catholic Conerence o Bishops Migration and Reugee Services, one o the largest

reugee resettlement organizations, and has conducted numerous act nding missions on

reugee situations. From 1978 to 1989 she served on Capitol Hill as a sta member o the

House Foreign Aairs Committee ocusing on reugee, development and human rights is-

sues and as senior legislative director or then Representative Stephen Solarz o New York.

She is a member o the Council on Foreign Relations, treasurer and board member o the

Womens Foreign Policy Group, and Vice President or Advocacy o the United Nations

Association o the National Capital Area. She was honored by President Clinton or her

work with reugee women and children in 1993. She holds an M.S.S. rom Fordham Uni-versity and a B.A. rom St. Johns University o New York.


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CONTENTS

xi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

1 IDPs as a particularly vulnerable group

4 The beginnings o an international response

9 BACKGROUND TO US RESPONSE

13 ACHIEVEMENTS

13 The adoption o a US government policy on IDPs

14 Assignment o institutional responsibility or IDPs

15 Training in IDP protection

16 More resources allocated or IDPs

18 Greater Congressional ocus on IDP situations

21 Inclusion o IDPs in State Department human rights reports

21 US support or regional arrangements or IDPs

22 US insistence on more eective international institutional arrangements

25 SHORTCOMINGS AND CHALLENGES

25 Continued omission rom US law o adequate reerence to IDPs

27 Absence o an overall US government policy on humanitarian aid

28 Failure to disseminate, implement and monitor the USAID IDP policy29 Lack o adequate IDP specialized sta in the State Department and USAID

31 Continued lack o institutional clarity in dealing with IDPs

40 Insucient Congressional attention to US policy toward IDPs

42 Funding shortalls

44 Lack o attention to early recovery and reintegration

46 Inadequate oversight o international institutional arrangements

49 Insucient attention to IDP protection by UN peacekeepers

51 Failure to acknowledge IDP problem at home53 Ambivalence toward Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

54 Human rights reports need improvement


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59 THE WAY FORWARD

59 Part One: Legislation

59 Reerence IDPs in legislation60 Increase fexible unds or response

61 Part Two: Policy Measures

61 Adopt an overall policy on humanitarian assistance

62 Update and reissue USAIDs IDP Policy

63 Extend the USAID IDP Policy to all US government oces dealing with

internal displacement

63 Evaluate implementation o USAID IDP Policy

64 Include in USAID perormance evaluations implementation o the IDP Policy

64 Expand training in the IDP Policy and other IDP rameworks

65 Part Three: Institutional Arrangements

65 Clariy roles and responsibilities or IDPs within the US government

70 Strengthen the capacity o oces involved with internal displacement

74 Strengthen NSC coordination o government programs involved with IDPs

75 Part Four: Advocacy

75 Intensiy bilateral diplomacy on behal o IDPs

77 Mobilize international support or the Guiding Principles

77 Apply the Principles at home

79 Deepen analysis o IDP situations in State Department human rights reports

81 Part Five: Oversight and Funding by the Congress

81 Increase oversight and unding o IDP situations

81 Hearings

82 Increased Funding

83 Part Six: Promoting More Eective Regional and International Action on IDPs

83 Support greater regional action on IDPs

84 Press or more eective international institutional arrangements

84 Active senior participation in the UN humanitarian reorm process

85 A clear message o support or UNHCR


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86 Attention to early recovery and reintegration

88 Close monitoring o the cluster approach

89 Support or the work o the RSG90 Support greater civilian protection by UN peacekeepers

91 Recognize the importance o helping IDPs behind insurgent lines

91 Promote the application o the responsibility to protect (R2P) to IDPs

92 Support the inclusion o IDPs in peace processes

92 Develop a more multilateral humanitarian response

95 CONCLUDING OBSERVATION


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ACRONyMS

ASEAN Association o Southeast Asian Nations

AU Arican Union

BHA Bureau or Humanitarian Assistance, OFDA, USAID

CERF Central Emergency Response Fund, UN

CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program, DOD

CMM Confict Management and Mitigation Oce, USAID

CCF Complex Crisis Fund, USAID

CRS Congressional Research ServiceDART Disaster Assistance Response Teams, USAID

DCHA Bureau or Democracy, Confict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID

DHS Department o Homeland Security, US

DOD Department o Deense, US

DPKO Department o Peacekeeping Operations, UN

DRC Democratic Republic o Congo

DRL Bureau o Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, State Department

ERMA Emergency Reugee and Migration Account, US

EU European Union

EXCOM Executive Committee o UNHCR

FAA Foreign Assistance Act o 1961

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization, UN

FFP Food or Peace program, USAID

GAO Government Accounting Oce, US

HFAC House Foreign Aairs Committee, US Congress

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee, UN

ICRC International Committee o the Red Cross

IDA International Disaster Assistance (USAID account)

IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Geneva

IFRC International Federation o Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IHL International humanitarian law

IO Bureau o International Organization Aairs, State Department

IOM International Organization or Migration

VIII

IMPROVING THE US RESPONSE TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS


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Ix

MONUC UN Organization Mission in Democratic Republic o Congo

MRA Migration and Reugee Assistance Act o 1962, as amended

NGO Non-governmental organization

NSC National Security Council, US

OAS Organization o American States

OFDA Oce o U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

OSCE Organization or Security and Cooperation in Europe

OTI Oce o Transition Initiatives, USAID

PAHO Pan American Health Organization

PPC Bureau or Policy and Program Coordination, USAIDPRM Bureau o Population, Reugees and Migration, State Department

QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, USG

RC Resident Coordinator, UN

RC/HC Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, UN

RI Reugees International

RSGRepresentative o the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rightso Internally Displaced Persons

S/CRS Oce o the Coordinator or Reconstruction and Stabilization, StateDepartment

SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SPLA/M Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement, Southern Sudan

UNDP UN Development Program

UNFPA UN Population Fund

UNHCR UN High Commissioner or Reugees

UNIFEM UN Development Fund or Women

UNOCHA UN Oce or the Coordination o Humanitarian AairsUNOHCHR UN Oce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights

USAID US Agency or International Development

USIP US Institute o Peace

WFP World Food Program


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xI

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy

As the single largest donor o humanitarian aid, the US response is critical todetermining how eectively internally displaced persons (IDPs), reugees andother aected populations are dealt with in humanitarian crises. Although the

United States over the past decade has taken important steps to integrate the needs o IDPsinto its policies and programs, there remain many signicant ways to improve its responseto situations o mass displacement.

There are today a total o more than 60 million persons internally displaced within theirown countriesan estimated 26 million orcibly uprooted by confict and human rights

violations and some 36 million uprooted by sudden-onset natural disasters. They needincreased US attention because they are a particularly vulnerable group or whom interna-tional norms, policies, budgets and institutional structures are not as strong as or the 10.5million reugees o concern to UNHCR who have a special protection regime and one

which has been supported by the US since 1950.

Hundreds o thousands o uprooted people caught up in their countries without the basic

necessities o lie constitute not only a humanitarian and human rights problem but a po-litical and security concern. Not only can national stability be disrupted, but confict anddisplacement can spill over borders and undermine regional security. In countries where USmilitary operations, or military operations supported by the US, have directly or indirectlydisplaced large numbers o people, the US government has a special responsibility. A ailureto protect and reintegrate displaced people in Iraq or Pakistan, or example, will pose seri-ous obstacles to stability and development in those countries or decades to come.

Among the steps taken by the US over the past decade to better integrate internal displace-

ment in its policies and programs are: 1) the adoption o a USAID policy on IDPs in 2004;2) the designation o USAID/OFDA as the lead government coordinator on internal dis-placement; 3) the greater involvement o the State Departments Bureau o Population, Reu-gees and Migration (PRM) with IDPs. It now is the primary under and implementer oIDP emergency programs in a number o countries and principal interlocutor with majorinternational organizations (e.g. UNHCR, ICRC, IOM) that protect and assist IDPs; 4)increased allocations o unds or IDPs; 4) training o sta in IDP protection; 5) inclusiono inormation about IDPs in the State Departments human rights reports; and 6) eorts atregional and international organizations to promote more eective international institutional

arrangements or IDPs. The Congress has played an important role in drawing attention tothe plight o IDPs through increased hearings, legislation and nancial support.


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Nonetheless, serious shortcomings and challenges exist and must be addressed i US humani-tarian, security and development goals are to be met. The report identies the ollowing:

1) Inadequate reerence to IDPs in US law. There is no explicit reerence to IDPs in theMigration and Reugee Assistance Act (MRA) o 1962 or adequate reerence to IDPs ortheir protection in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) o 1961. Lack o specic mention

weakens the oundation o US support or IDPs.

2) The absence o an overall US government policy on humanitarian aid.Governmentsta, NGOs and experts regularly note the absence o an overall humanitarian policy toguide US work in the humanitarian area. As a result, questions regularly arise about the

objectives o that aid, the precise meaning o vulnerability, who the beneciaries should beand the extent to which IDPs should be protected and assisted.

3) Failure to disseminate, implement and monitor the USAID IDP Policy. USAID staoutside OFDA and the Bureau or Democracy, Confict and Humanitarian Assistance(DCHA), which houses OFDA, are generally not amiliar with the USAID IDP Policy.

State Department, National Security Council and Congressional sta are even less awareo the policys provisions. The policy is reported not to be regularly applied in all countries

with internal displacement. No evaluations have been conducted o how the policy has

been disseminated and implemented.

4) Lack o adequate IDP specialist sta in the State Department and USAID. AlthoughPRM sta claim to have a holistic approach toward reugees and IDPs, the history andmandate o the bureau refect a longstanding predisposition toward reugees. The one part-time position specic to IDPs cannot make up or decades o an exclusive reugee ocus. AtUSAID, the single sta person in OFDA devoted to IDPs cannot possibly ensure that the

oce is proactive on protection in each emergency and persuade the agency to eectivelyimplement the IDP Policy.

5) Continued lack o institutional clarity in dealing with IDPs. The relationship betweenUSAID/DCHA and States PRM has been marred by tur battles and dierences in ap-proach as to how to address reugee and IDP needs. Disagreements have delayed protectionand assistance or IDPs and produced less than coherent leadership on internal displace-ment. Currently, eorts are underway to improve working relationships, but questions ariseabout how to divide responsibilities between the two oces since a 2004 agreement, how

best to monitor the UNs cluster approach, how to address protection in natural disasters,and who should be the principal lead and advocate when it comes to IDPs.


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xIII

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy

6) Insufcient Congressional attention to US policy toward IDPs. How best to equip

the US to deal with internal displacement has not been addressed. The implementation

o USAIDs IDP Policy has not been reviewed nor the reasons or the US to develop anoverall humanitarian policy. The Congress has supported enlarging the Deense Depart-

ments role in humanitarian assistance and development programs but has not suciently

increased humanitarian and development aid or USAID or given its ocials the same

authority and fexibility in making program and unding decisions as US military com-

manders have in programs related to humanitarian aid and stabilization.

7) Funding shortalls. The diplomacy and development legs o US oreign policy have

lagged tremendously behind the military leg. Foreign assistance and State Department

operations amount to only 1.4 percent o the US budget. Although IDP programs havereceived more unding than in the past, both government and NGO sta have expressed

concerns about the disparities in levels o unding and types o assistance provided or

reugees and IDPs.

8) Lack o attention to early recovery and reintegration. The gap between humanitarian

emergency aid, early recovery and development aid remains wide with insucient atten-

tion paid to IDP situations ater the immediate emergency is over. OFDA resources are

generally insucient or protracted displacement and or the transition rom relie to the

recovery and reintegration needs o IDPs. USAID development programs have lacked the

fexibility to engage earlier in emergency situations.

9) Inadequate oversight o international institutional arrangements. The lack o US

support or UNHCRs enlarged involvement with IDPsuntil recent yearsundermined

UNHCRs perormance with IDPs. Now that US policy has become supportive o UNH-

CRs role with IDPs, it remains to be seen whether the US will ensure that UNHCR ullls

its promised obligations to IDPs. The early recovery cluster led by UNDP has not received

strong support rom the US. Nor has the US contributed substantially to multilateral undslike the CERF intended or sudden and neglected emergencies. Some experts claim the US

has ailed to punch its weight in the UN humanitarian policymaking process.

10) Insufcient attention to IDP protection by UN peacekeepers. Many have called

upon the US to promote greater protection or IDPs by international peacekeepers in in-

ternal confict situations. Too oten protection has been neglected because o lack o troops

and resources, unclear mandates, and other serious decienciesall areas on which the US

has not suciently weighed in.


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11) Failure to acknowledge IDP problems at home. The US has not treated those up-rooted by natural disasters in the US as IDPs and has not applied to them the UN Guid-

ing Principles on Internal Displacement. FEMAs latest drat National Disaster RecoveryFramework makes no mention o the Guiding Principles and gives little attention to theprotection o IDPs. Because the US is oten considered a model worldwide, the way it ad-dresses internal displacement at home can infuence governments abroad.

12) State Department human rights reports need improvement. While some o the re-ports provide cogent analyses o orced displacement, others provide minimalist accounts

with little analysis. Forced displacement is not viewed as a grave violation o human rightseven though the Rome Statute o the International Criminal Court considers it in certain

circumstances to be an international crime. No section o the report covers genocide, warcrimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, to which IDPs are oten subjected.Nor is lack o access to ood, medical care and shelter treated as clear violations o humanrights, in particular the right to lie.

Both humanitarian and security concerns make it essential or the US to improve the USresponse to internal displacement and to modernize and revamp those o its long standinglaws, policies, resource mechanisms, institutional arrangements and aid programs that nolonger meet their intended goals. By taking steps to improve its response, the US will bring

needed help to one o the most abused and vulnerable populations in the world, which inturn will reinvigorate American leadership in the humanitarian arena. The ollowing rec-ommendations are oered:

PART ONE: LEGISLATION

The Foreign Assistance ActInclude IDPs and their host communities as a group o concern in the FAA so as to

establish a rm base or US policy and programs with IDPs.Establish that policies and programs to prevent urther displacement and resolve situa-tions o displacement are priorities or US diplomacy and oreign assistance.Reerence the need or protection in all phases o displacement and support the applica-tion o the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as a ramework or response.Recognize that IDP situations, like reugee crises, require a response that extends be-

yond the emergency phase to include care and maintenance, early recovery, return orresettlement, and reintegration.Clariy that the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) und is to cover not only the

emergency phase but protracted emergency situations and early recovery activities (incoordination with development unds).


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ExECUTIVE SUMMARy

Require USAID to report on its overall response to situations o internal displacement,its implementation o the USAID IDP Policy, and the mechanisms utilized to address

displacement rom its early stages until durable solutions can be ound.

The Migration and Reugee ActMake specic reerence to IDPs and their host communities in the MRA.Change the name o the MRA to refect the US and international communitys in-

creasing involvement with IDPs.Encourage PRM in its unding o UNHCR and ICRC to make sure that these agen-cies proportionately and adequately ocus on IDPs.Provide or greater monitoring, coordination and evaluation o PRMs unded pro-

grams or IDPs, reugees and others o concern.

Flexible undsEnsure adequate and fexible unding mechanisms to enable quick and equitable re-sponse to the needs o displaced populations.Enable PRM to draw down its emergency response unds (i.e. ERMA) more easily or

IDP and reugee emergencies by authorizing the Secretary o State or PRMs AssistantSecretary to complete the drawdown rather than having to wait or a Presidential ap-proval.

Create a new fexible und at USAID to enable it to support early recovery programs.Provide contingency unds and the ability to move unds around accounts more easily

or both PRM and USAID.

PART TWO: POLICY MEASURES

Adopt an overall policy on humanitarian assistance to guide decisions on humanitar-ian aid.

The policy should promote principles o neutrality and impartiality in providing assistance;end unjustied disparities in aid among reugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups; dene

vulnerability and apply it uniormly in the provision o aid; address the needs o specialgroups; provide aid to communities and amilies aected by or hosting IDPs or reugees;link humanitarian and development aid; set the parameters, conditions and oversight re-quirements or military involvement in humanitarian aid and requirements; promote co-

operation with local and international NGOs; and ensure participation in internationaleorts at humanitarian reorm, including multilateral unding mechanisms. The policyshould express a clear commitment to the integration o IDP needs in US policy and pro-

grams and in multilateral humanitarian response.


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Update and reissue USAIDs IDP Policy

Implementation o USAIDs IDP Policythe rst and so ar only US government policy

document to give priority to IDPsshould be strengthened. Because o changes that haveoccurred since its adoption, the policy should be updated to give greater emphasis to natu-

ral disasters and their protection problems; endorse UN humanitarian reorm (which be-

gan in 2005); and take into account the greater role the State Department (PRM and IO)

will play in situations o internal displacement given UNHCRs and the UNs expanded

role with IDPs. The USAID Administrator should then disseminate the IDP Policy and

its Implementation Guidelines to all oces and eld missions explaining that addressing

internal displacement reinorces USAIDs humanitarian and development goals and is an

essential component o US oreign policy.

Extend the USAID IDP Policy to cover all US government ofces dealing with

internal displacement

All oces in the US government involved with internal displacement should be instructed

to ollow the relevant precepts and principles o the USAID IDP Policy.

Evaluate implementation o USAID IDP Policy

The evaluation should address how eectively the policy has been integrated into USAID

strategic and country plans, how USAID can best determine the number o IDPs assisted

by its programs, the extent to which the programs encompass all phases o displacement,

and identiy ways to improve overall reporting and program response.

Include in USAID perormance evaluations implementation o the IDP Policy

Annual perormance evaluations o USAID mission directors should include how well they

integrate internal displacement into their programs and promote solutions or IDPs.

Expand training in the IDP Policy and other IDP rameworks

All USAID sta dealing with IDPs should be expected to know the provisions o the

IDP Policy and the Guiding Principles. PRM sta should receive mandatory training in

the IDP Policy, the Guiding Principles and other essential rameworks or IDPs (e.g., the

Framework on Durable Solutions or IDPs, the Framework or National Responsibility).

The training should also extend to all other government oces whose work impacts on

internal displacement (Department o State, Department o Deense etc.).


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ExECUTIVE SUMMARy

PART THREE: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Clariy roles and responsibilities or IDPs within the US governmentBecause IDP situations require a coordinated government wide approach, encompassing

a broad range o interventions, and because creating a single humanitarian oce within

USAID or the State Department could prove disruptive and unnecessary, DCHA/OFDA

and PRM, the two oces most directly and strongly engaged with IDPs, should develop a

genuinely shared responsibility or dealing with situations o internal displacement. Neither

USAID nor State has sucient capacity or skills to deal with the entirety o the issue. Most

importantly, care needs to be taken that their bureaucratic disagreements never be allowed

to undermine protection and assistance to IDPs. A shared responsibility would include:

Senior oversight by the USAID Deputy Administrator and the Deputy Secretary o

State or Management.

A new division o labor between DCHA and PRM to refect the changes that have

occurred since their 2004 agreement. A new MOU should spell out 1) how PRM and

USAID should best coordinate in situations o orced displacement caused by confict

(whether PRM/States role should include preventing and nding solutions to confict

and whether USAID s role should include reconstruction and development solutions

in confict and disaster situations); 2) whether USAIDs lead role in natural disasters

should include protection o the human rights o IDPs or whether PRM should over-

see that responsibility; 3) whether PRM and USAID should divide responsibilities

according to the kind o emergency (conficts or natural disasters); and 4) whether and

how PRM and USAID should ll particular gaps (e.g., early recovery measures, dis-

parities in reugee and IDP assistance, education or IDP children).

In dividing responsibilities, there should be agreement on 1) a comprehensive approach

toward IDPs, reugees and other vulnerable groups; 2) greater fexibility in operationse.g. DCHA/OFDA should be able to und projects lling gaps in multilateral pro-

grams, including UNHCRs, while PRM should have greater acility in providing grants

to NGOs or work with IDPs; 3) more transparent reporting by USAID on IDP pro-

grams; 4) a sharpened ability by DCHA to engage multilaterally at the policy level by

providing core unding to OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF and other international oces.

Joint eorts should be made to mainstream the issue o internal displacement into all

relevant parts o USAID and the State Department and also to promote the integra-

tion o IDP issues into other parts o the government whose work impacts on displace-ment (e.g. DOD).


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Strengthen the capacity o ofces involved with internal displacement At USAID . An OFDA director should be designated immediately (the appointment

does not require Senate conrmation and has been vacant since January 2009) and allother senior positions should be lled as soon as possible. Every relevant oce in USAIDshould have an IDP ocal point to ensure that the IDP Policy is ully implemented andintegrated into agency programs. OFDAs budget should be doubled (currently $845million) so it can deal with protracted crises and early recovery as well as new emer-gencies. Its 250 sta should be increased to enable OFDA to pay greater attention toprotection in the eld, to better monitor and evaluate its programs, and to provide hu-manitarian aid or IDPs and others beyond the emergency phase until they can accessdevelopment programs. USAIDs regional bureaus and country missions (which have $5

billion in development unds in FY 2010) should be expected to devote unds and sta tobetter integrate IDPs in their mid-and long-term development goals and engage at theearliest stage to support the recovery and reintegration o displaced populations. To thisend, USAID country directors should be expected to enhance their diplomatic skills andengage in advocacy with governments or the reintegration o displaced populations. TheUSAID Administrator should have a regular seat at the oreign policy table.

At PRM . The bureau should be renamed the Bureau or Population, Displacement andMigration or even better, the Bureau or Humanitarian Aairs, serving as principal

humanitarian adviser to the Secretary o State and responsible or supporting programswith multilateral organizations and NGOs. It should cooperate closely with a revital-ized USAID in developing US humanitarian policy, upholding humanitarian prin-ciples, and together with USAID leading and coordinating US eorts to resolve dis-placement and contribute to confict prevention, confict management and post confictreconstruction and stabilization. It should support programs or all persons aectedby humanitarian emergenciesreugees, IDPs, stateless persons and other aectedpopulationswhether in camps urban settings or with host amilies. It should engagein humanitarian diplomacy with oreign governments, ensure US attention to the hu-

manitarian consequences o oreign policy decisions, mobilize donor governments inhumanitarian eorts to prevent and resolve displacement, monitor multilateral andNGO humanitarian action and work to ensure that the organizations unded by theUS promote equitable treatment o displaced people and durable solutions or them.

PRMs emergency ERMA unds should be doubled and its regular MRA unds orinternational organizations and NGOs increased. It should be able to und closer to30 percent o UNHCRs budget and a substantial percentage o UNHCRs IDP pillar.More o PRMs NGO projects should ocus on IDPs. The Assistant Secretary should

continue to have a discretionary und o at least $30 million to respond to emergingsituations requiring special attention.


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ExECUTIVE SUMMARy

PRMs sta (now 139) should be increased by 20 or more percent and the 28 reugeecoordinators in the eld increased to at least 50 (Arica should have at least 5). They

should be expected to equitably cover both reugee and IDP situations and be taskedwith evaluating particularly vulnerable IDP cases or resettlement. At least one seniorand several mid-level ocials with specic IDP experience and expertise should beadded to ollow worldwide IDP crises on a ull-time basis, promote political programsto address these situations and monitor and evaluate the IDP work o UN agencies andNGOs. Without this kind o armative action, IDPs risk becoming an ater-thoughtin a reugee bureau.

At other State Department ofces

DRL: A human rights ocer in the Bureau o Democracy, Human Rights and Laborshould be expected to ocus on the protection and human rights dimension o displace-ment, work with PRM and USAID to develop strategies or enhancing the humanrights o IDPs and other aected populations in emergencies, and help improve thereporting on internal displacement in the human rights reports.

IO: The US Ambassador to the UN Economic and Social Council should encourageOCHA and UNDP to strengthen the early recovery cluster, given the clusters relation-ship to the economic development and stabilization o war-torn societies; give prior-ity to promoting solutions or displaced populations; ollow the UNs appointment andevaluation o Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators; call or reconstruction programs touse the economic capacities o displaced populations; and support the eorts o the UNPeacebuilding Commission to integrate programs or displaced persons in its work.

US Embassies: A directive to US Embassies should call attention to the conditionscausing mass displacement and assure Embassy involvement in promoting preventivesteps against confict and displacement. Chies o Mission should appoint ocal pointson serious displacement situations (as has been done in Iraq where there is a SeniorCoordinator or Iraqi Reugees and Displaced Persons) to gather inormation or dip-

lomatic intercessions, promote multilateral initiatives and monitor how UN agenciesand NGOs are perorming.

At the NSC : It should regularly bring together representatives rom USAID, State, DODand other relevant government oces to ensure collaboration, avoid duplication and un-necessary competition and identiy the most eective way orward in humanitarian cri-ses. To improve coordination, consideration should be given to reviving the ContingencyPlanning Policy Coordination Committee which could identiy US capacities and assetsor displacement crises, bring the key players together, and ensure that policies and pro-

grams or IDPS are integrated into the programs o all relevant government oces romthe emergency phase through reintegration and development.


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PART FOUR: ADVOCACY

Intensiy bilateral diplomacy on behal o IDPs. US ocials rom the Secretary o Statedown should regularly use bilateral relationships with governments to increase protection

or and promote solutions or IDPs, as they have done in the case o Pakistan, Iraq and Sri

Lanka. The diplomacy should in particular encourage governments to adopt policies and

laws on internal displacement and assume their national responsibilities or their displaced

populations. It should encourage resolution o protracted situations o displacement which

have gone on or more than ten years. USAID should also engage in advocacy and negotia-

tions with governments, and with non-state actors, to promote protection and solutions or

the displaced.

Mobilize international support or the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The US

should support the wide dissemination o the Guiding Principles by international agen-

cies and NGOs, their translation into local languages and the convening o workshops to

promote understanding o their provisions and how to apply them. US ocials at the UN

should ensure that reerence to the Guiding Principles is included regularly in UN resolu-

tions and reports pertaining to displaced populations. Further, the US should apply the

Guiding Principles at home and emphasize the importance o adhering to the international

law upon which the Principles are based. Doing so would infuence other countries to ap-

ply them, and also enhance the US response to disasters and help the government avoid

international criticism o its practices as well as costly lawsuits at home.

Deepen analysis o IDP situations in State Department human rights reports.

Provide a more sophisticated analysis o internal displacement in the section o the

reports on Internally Displaced Persons.

Make clear that the deliberate uprooting o people rom their lands and homes is aserious human rights violation and in certain circumstances a war crime and crime

against humanity.

Create a separate section in the reports on genocide, war crimes, crimes against hu-

manity and ethnic cleansing.

Identiy new and creative ways o dealing with economic and social rights in line with

President Obamas support o a US policy ocus on reedom rom want. For example,

the deliberate withholding o ood and medicine should be treated as a violation o theright to lie.


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Include a section on governmental attitudes toward international and non-governmen-tal humanitarian assistance which indicates whether governments are trying to obstruct

lie-supporting aid to their displaced and other aected populations.

The Assistant Secretary should acknowledge the particular vulnerabilities o IDPs

when speaking o internal conficts to draw attention to their plight.

PART FIVE: OVERSIGHT AND FUNDING BY CONGRESS

Hearings

Congressional hearings should be held on the US response to internal displacement, inparticular how the US is dealing with IDPs worldwide in both conficts and natural di-sasters and recommend how to improve the responseespecially in countries where USpolicies have directly or indirectly caused mass displacement. In addition, Congress shouldhold a special hearing on displacement in Arica, which houses most o the worlds IDPs

(12-13 million).

FundingDeense Secretary Robert Gates and members o Congress have been urging increased

resources or diplomacy and humanitarian and development aid. USAID and State pro-grams to provide lie saving assistance and protection need to be signicantly increased.OFDA should be awarded $1.7 billion (rom $845 million), and PRMs emergency und

ERMA should be provided with $200 million (rom $100 million). USAIDs Interna-tional Disaster Assistance (IDA) und and Complex Crisis Fund (CCF) should be in-creased to enable USAID to cover protracted situations and early recovery initiatives or

a new special und should be created or this purpose. PRMs regular MRA unds shouldbe increased to ensure that US support or UNHCRs budget is close to 30 percent othe total. The US should work out its dierences with the UNs CERF and other pooled

unds and should increase its contribution so as to signal a more multilateral approach tohumanitarian aid.

PART SIX: PROMOTING MORE EFFECTIVE REGIONAL AND

INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON IDPS

Support greater regional action on IDPsThe US should promote the more active role o regional organizations in the Americas,

Europe, Asia and Arica in addressing mass displacement. In Arica, or example, the USshould provide support or civil society programs that promote ratication and implemen-


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tation o the 2009 Arican Union Convention on IDPs and press or national laws and

policies to carry out the Conventions provisions.

Press or more eective international institutional arrangements

Participate actively in the UN humanitarian reorm process;

Send a clear message o support to UNHCR and donor governments that the US sup-

ports the reugee agencys expanded role in protecting and nding solutions or IDPs.

Encourage UNHCR to strengthen its protection role with IDPs and undertake proac-

tive advocacy with governments and non-state actors on behal o IDPs; create a corps oUNHCR protection ocers than can be deployed quickly to IDP situations; provide host

amilies and communities aected by displacement with assistance; increase engagement

with urban IDPs; reinvigorate the search or durable solutions or protracted IDP situa-

tions; and develop the capacity to carry out protection responsibilities in natural disasters.

Help raise the 22 percent o its budget UNHCR has promised to devote to IDPs.

Take the lead in promoting policy development in the area o early recovery, support the

early recovery cluster led by UNDP, and mobilize other donor governments, interna-

tional nancial institutions and the private sector to support early recovery initiatives, e.g.

reestablishing local governance structures, basic services, and job creation and livelihood

programs. Such initiatives can build local capacity, reduce dependency and jumpstart re-

construction, in short assist communities to be on the road to security and development.

Closely monitor the perormance o the UNs cluster approach to ensure that it is

achieving results or IDPs, be ready to speak out when it is not and take steps with the

UN to remedy deciencies, and increasingly join with other states to promote morecoordinated international action or IDPs.

Support the work o the Representative o the UN Secretary-General on the Human

Rights o IDPs, in particular: 1) ensure that the successor to the current RSG is an

experienced and strong advocate or IDPs, enjoys the same access to the UNs senior

political and humanitarian oces and has an independent institution ready to support

his/her work; 2) provide political and nancial support or the work o the RSG and

mobilize other donors to do likewise; 3) evaluate whether a ull-time paid person (the

position is currently voluntary) with sucient sta and resources would better be ableto serve as a catalyst or international response to internal displacement.


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Support greater civilian protection by UN peacekeepers, by 1) insisting upon clearSecurity Council mandates with priority given to civilian protection; 2) pressing inte-

grated missions, where humanitarian and development eorts are part o the peace-keeping operation, to work to protect humanitarian space and give a high degree oautonomy to humanitarian operations; 3) ensuring better training or UN peacekeepersin protection; and 4) oering to peacekeeping operations experienced US personneland specialized equipment.

Promote strategies to reach IDPs trapped in areas held by non-state actors, includingthrough support or organizations that can gain access to the IDPs.

Promote the application o the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine to IDPs. Whenthe UN applies the concept, the US should make sure that the protection strategy isdesigned to help IDPs beyond the emergency phase to encompass saety and sustain-ability in areas o return or resettlement.

Support consultations with and the inclusion o IDPs in peace processes so that theirneeds are incorporated into peace agreements.

Develop a more multilateralhumanitarian response by involving non-traditional do-

nors and southern NGOs. Discussions with China and other potential donors, orexample, should encompass their adherence to Good Humanitarian Donorship prin-ciples subscribed to by 36 governments.

The Obama Administration has the opportunity to make a dierence in the lives o count-less millions o uprooted people and contribute as well to promoting greater security anddevelopment in countries beset by confict and disaster. Taking the steps outlined aboveshould serve this country and many others in circumscribing the conficts and disasters that

will inevitably afict the 21st century.


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INTRODUCTION

The United States response to humanitarian emergencies is critical in determininghow eectively reugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other aectedpopulations are dealt with by the international community. This report ocuses on

one crucial aspect o US response to humanitarian emergencies: its policies toward the tenso millions persons orcibly uprooted inside their own countries, known as the internallydisplaced. It explores the background to US engagement with internal displacement,assesses the achievements and shortcomings o US policies, and suggests recommendations

or improving the response.

Beore discussing United States policyand how it can catch up when it comes to IDPprotection, assistance and reintegration supportit is important to understand the natureo internal displacement, its relationship to reugee protection and the way the interna-tional community has perceived and addressed the needs o IDPs.

IDPS AS A PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE GROUP

Humanitarian emergencies disrupt the lives o massive numbers o people. Those whobecome uprooted are among the most vulnerable. Some become reugees, feeing across in-ternational borders in search o asylum rom persecution and violence, while others becomeinternally displaced, seeking reuge inside their own countries.1 Forced rom their homes byconfict and human rights violations, and in the case o IDPs by natural disasters as well,both reugees and IDPs generally suer severe deprivation and abuse requiring interna-tional protection and assistance and later reintegration and development support. One onlyhas to look at the IDP camps in Darur, Sudan and the reugee camps across the border in

Chad to see the lie threatening conditions both groups endure.

Although the international community has long recognized the need or international pro-tection and assistance or reugees, a concerted awareness o IDPs as a group dates backonly two decades. Yet IDPs are among the worlds most vulnerable population groups,

1 According to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the internally displaced are describedas persons or groups o persons who have been orced or obliged to fee or to leave their homes or placeso habitual residence, in particular as a result o or in order to avoid the eects o armed confict, situationso generalized violence, violations o human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have notcrossed an internationally recognized State border. See Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UNDoc. E/CN.4/2998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998.


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the US Agency or International Development (USAID) points out in its IDP Policy.2They regularly lose their homes, communities, livelihoods and property, may live in camps,

makeshit settlements or with relatives, ace obstacles in securing documents, and needspecial protection rom being orcibly returned to danger zones. Oten they have highermalnutrition and mortality rates and greater exposure to sexual violence than others in thepopulation, and encounter restrictions on their movement, lack o access to education and

jobs, and obstacles to regaining land, housing, property rights and civil and political rights.3As Walter Klin, the UN Secretary-Generals Representative on the Human Rights oInternally Displaced Persons has observed, Forced displacement is not a passing event inpeoples lives. It is a devastating transormation.4

Reaching IDPs and addressing their needs requires special strategies. Because they residewithin their own countries, they are under the jurisdiction o their governments, which o-ten do not have the capacity or willingness to protect and assist them. In civil war situations,international access to IDPs may be obstructed or barred and reaching them may pose risksor humanitarian sta. Moreover, because they have no ormal status under internationallaw as do reugees under the 1951 Reugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, internationalorganizations sometimes nd they have no clear protection mandate in their case.5 Indeed,issues o sovereignty have stood in the way o creating an international agency at the UNdedicated to protection and advocacy or IDPs comparable to the role the UN High Com-

missioner or Reugees (UNHCR) has played with those who fee across borders.

Yet addressing the needs o IDPs is important to achieving US and international humani-tarian, security and development goals. The number o IDPs in the world today should bereason enough to persuade the US government and international organizations to reori-ent and expand their programs and make them more holistic. In 2008, 26 million persons

were estimated to be uprooted inside their own countries by confict and human rightsviolations, and 36 million more by sudden-onset natural disasters, a total o more than 60million. By contrast, the total number o reugees that same year was 10.5 million (leaving

2 USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy, PD-ACA-558, October 2004, p. 3 [henceorthUSAID IDP Policy].

3 Ibid; See also Erin D. Mooney, The Concept o Internal Displacement and the Case or Internally Dis-placed Persons as a Category o Concern, Reugee Survey Quarterly, UNHCR, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2005, pp.14-21.

4 Walter Klin, Strengthening the rights o internally displaced persons, Statement at Conerence on TenYears o the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Achievements and Future Challenges, Oslo, 16October 2008.

5 See the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status o Reugees, supplemented by the 1967 Protocol Relating tothe Status o Reugees. For some o the diculties international organizations ace in protecting IDPs, see,or example, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Saeguarding humanitarian space and areview o key challenges or UNHCR, PDES 2010/01, February 2010.


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INTRODUCTION

3

aside 4-5 million Palestinian reugees or whom a special protection and assistance regimewas created).6 Hundreds o thousands o uprooted people caught up in their countries

without the basic necessities o lie constitute a humanitarian and human rights emergencyrequiring urgent attention. And a political emergency as well, or they can disrupt na-tional stability, especially in ragile states where the displaced have no access to livelihoodsor education and can become vulnerable to criminal activity and recruitment into armedorces or terrorist groups. Furthermore, the ailure to address the needs o IDPs can spillover borders into reugee fows and undermine regional and international stability. Thoseengaged in national and international peacemaking and peace building eorts regularlynd that the participation and support o displaced populations is essential to achievingsustainable solutions.7 In act, the rebuilding o war-torn societies oten depends on the

eective reintegration and political participation o the displaced, especially in countrieswhere one-ourth or more o the population has been uprooted.

In countries where US military operations, or military operations supported by the US, havedirectly or indirectly displaced large numbers o people, the US government has a specialresponsibility. In Iraq, a recent Rand Corporation study ound that a ailure to reintegratedisplaced people could pose serious obstacles to stability and development in the country.Indeed, absent concerted eorts to integrate displaced populations into new homes andsaeguard their lives and livelihoods, poverty among the displaced will worsen, dispro-

portionately aecting women and minorities and boding ill or Iraqs overall economicdevelopment. In addition, The lack o adequate mechanisms or recovering property,resolving competing claims, and implementing decisions is likely to be a destabilizing ac-tor or years, perhaps decades, to come.8 In Pakistan, where an estimated 3 million people

were uprooted by military operations in 2009,9 their successul return and reintegration willaect stability in the country as well.

That attention must be paid to addressing both IDP and reugee concerns more compre-hensively has also become increasingly clear. The vulnerabilities o IDPs and reugees may

6 For IDP statistics, see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC ), Global Overview o Trendsand Developments in 2008, April 2009; and UN Oce or the Coordination o Humanitarian Aairs andIDMC, Monitoring disaster displacement in the context o climate change, 22 September 2009, p. 9. Forreugee statistics, see UNHCR,2008 Global Trends: Reugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displacedand Stateless Persons, 2009, p.2.

7 See Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Internal Displacement and the Construction o Peace, Sum-mary Report, Bogota, Colombia, 11-12 November 2008.

8 See Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant and Dalia Dassa Kaye, The Impact o U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq onDisplaced and Other Vulnerable Populations, Rand Corporation, p. 30, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/oc-casional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pd; see also Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng,Masses in Flight:The Global Crisis o Internal Displacement, Brookings Institution, 1998, pp. 5, 292-294.

9 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement at Record High, Press Release, May2010, at www.internal-displacement.org


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vary at times and their legal regimes are separate,10 but operationally, recognition has grownthat humanitarian emergencies must be addressed in a more holistic manner with policies

designed to protect and assist both groups no matter which side o the border they are on.Indeed, the longstanding disparity in treatment between the twowith IDPs oten morenumerous and in worse straits yet reugees receiving the lions share o aid and attentionis no longer considered routinely acceptable. In act, in appealing or more unds in 2005to enable the reugee agency to expand its protection role or IDPs, High CommissionerAntnio Guterres observed that UNHCR can help to ensure that millions o IDPs benetrom the same kind o assistance and protection given consistently to reugees around the

world.11

THE BEGINNINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

While the establishment o UNHCR in 1950 and the adoption o the 1951 Reugee Con-vention (and 67 Protocol) permitted the development o long-standing structures, budgetsand policies or addressing reugee protection both at the UN and within the US govern-ment, a oundation or dealing with IDP protection only began to be developed in the early1990s and remains fedgling.

In 1990, the UN assigned to its Resident Coordinators (RCs) in the eld the role o coor-dinating assistance to IDPs and the ollowing year, created the post o Emergency RelieCoordinator (ERC) to strengthen the coordination o humanitarian assistance.12 In 1992,a Representative o the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (RSG) wasappointed to ocus attention on the human rights dimension o the problem and has been

working ever since to improve conditions or IDPs around the world despite the positionsbeing only part-time and voluntary.13 In 1994, the ERC, or Under-Secretary-General orHumanitarian Aairs, became the reerence point or requests or protection and as-sistance or IDPs and has been serving as the overall coordinator or the UN response to

10 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status o Reugees, supplemented by the 1967 Protocol Relating tothe Status o Reugees, provides reugees with substitute legal protection since reugees are outside theircountries; IDPs being within their own countries are subject to the laws and jurisdiction o their govern-ments.

11 Message rom the High Commissioner on UNHCRs engagement with Internally Displaced Persons, Ge-neva, 30 November 2005.

12 For chronology o institutional arrangements or IDPs, see Roberta Cohen and Jacques Cuenod, Improv-ing Institutional Arrangements or the Internally Displaced, The Brookings Institution-Reugee Policy GroupProject on Internal Displacement, October 1995, p. 2; and UN Oce or the Coordination o HumanitarianAairs,No Reuge: The Challenge o Internal Displacement, 2003, p. 33.

13 The name o the position changed in 2004 to the Representative o the UN Secretary-General on the Hu-man Rights o IDPs. Francis M. Deng served as RSG rom 1992-2004, and Walter Klin rom 2004 toSeptember 2010.


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INTRODUCTION

IDPs as head o the Oce or the Coordination o Humanitarian Aairs (OCHA) andChair o the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).14 On the ground, UN and other

international agencies and NGOs have increasingly become involved in humanitarian as-sistance, protection and development programs or IDPs, working with governments topromote more eective national and international response. Indeed, most governmentstoday no longer regard people displaced within their countries as strictly a national problemand regularly request outside involvement and aid in internal confict situations and naturaldisasters.

A normative ramework or IDPs, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, wasintroduced by the RSG into the UN in 1998 and has become the acknowledged inter-

national ramework or the protection o IDPs as well as the basis or laws and policiesadopted by a growing number o countries.15 The Principles set orth the human rights oIDPs and the responsibilities o governments and international organizations toward thesepopulations. Using the Principles as a guide, the Arican Union (AU) in 2009 adoptedthe rst legally binding instrument on IDPsthe AU Convention or the Protection andAssistance o Internally Displaced Persons in Arica.16 Once in orce, it could become thebasis or greater governmental responsibility toward the large number o displaced personsin Arica (some 12 million) and serve as a stepping stone toward greater international ac-countability toward IDPs.

In the US, USAID and the State Departments Bureau o Population, Reugees and Mi-gration (PRM) became the principal oces involved in supporting greater protection andassistance or IDPs. Indeed, as early as 1991, USAIDs Oce or Foreign Disaster Assis-tance (OFDA) was acknowledged to have the responsibility or assisting people displaced

within their own country as a result o natural or man-made disasterswhile PRM wasacknowledged as a primary under and implementer o aid to IDPs in particular coun-tries (through its support o UNHCR and other international organizations).17 In 2004,

14 The IASC is composed o the heads o the UNs major relie and development organizations and includesas standing members the Red Cross Movement, major NGO umbrella groups, the International Organi-zation or Migration, the Oce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights, the Representative o theSecretary-General on the Human Rights o IDPs, and the World Bank. The IASC develops humanitarianpolicies, decides on divisions o responsibilities and addresses gaps in international humanitarian response.

15 See UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome 2005, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para. 132, athttp://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html; and Walter Klin, The Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement as International Minimum Standard and Protection Tool, Reugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 24,No. 3, 2005.

16 Arican Union Convention or the Protection and Assistance o Internally Displaced Persons in Arica, 22October 2009, Art. 12(3) [henceorth The Kampala Convention].

17 A 1991 amendment to the State Departments Foreign Aairs Manual (2 FAM 066.3) states that the Oceo US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has the responsibility or assisting people displaced within theirown country as a result o natural or man-made disasters. The State Departments Bureau o Population,


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USAID adopted a policy on internally displaced persons which endorsed a comprehensiveresponse toward reugees and IDPs, and to achieve this goal, made addressing IDP prob-

lems a priority.18

At the UN, a Humanitarian Reorm process in 2005 sought to make the international re-sponse to IDP emergencies more predictable and accountable. It sharpened the previouslyrelied upon collaborative approach19 among the dierent UN agencies by assigning leadcoordination roles to agencies in their areas o expertise.20 UNHCR thus took on the leadcoordination role or the protection o IDPs displaced by confict and also the lead roleor camp management and emergency shelter in confict situations.21 Although the US andsome other donors at times objected to the agencys assuming a greater role with IDPs,

arguing that UNHCR was unable ully to meet reugee needs, the UN reorm processprevailed and UNHCR assumed one o the major roles or IDPs in the UN system in line

with its expertise or uprooted people.22 In 2009, UNHCR sought to enlarge its role evenmore by announcing that it would be willingsubject to international agreementto actas lead coordinator or the protection o IDPs in natural disasters.23

Reugees and Migration (PRM) has the responsibility or coordinating assistance to reugees although it isacknowledged as a primary under and implementer o aid to IDPs in particular countries.

18 USAID IDP Policy, p. 1.19 Under the collaborative approach, the dierent UN agencies shared the responsibility or IDPs coordi-

nated by the Emergency Relie Coordinator. But many evaluations ound the system to be ailing becausethe agencies basically picked and chose the situations in which they wished to become involved, resulting inan ad hoc and unpredictable response. See Dennis McNamara, Who does what? Forced Migration Review,Supplement, October 2005, p. 6; and Cohen and Deng,Masses in Flight, pp. 159-168. For the reorm pro-cess, see Jan Egeland, Toward a stronger humanitarian response system, Forced Migration Review, Supple-ment, October 2005, pp 4-5. The reorm process began as an eort to improve the international response tointernal displacement, but then added other issues as it progressed. See Je Crisp, Esther Kiragu and Vicky

Tennant, UNHCR, IDPs and humanitarian reorm, Forced Migration Review, December 2007, pp. 12-14.

20 Under the UNs 2005 reorms, UNHCR assumed the lead coordinating role or the clusters on protection,camp coordination/management, and emergency shelter in confict situations (whereas in natural disasters,

IOM assumed the lead on camp coordination/management, and IFRC on emergency shelter); UNICEFassumed the lead on nutrition and also on water/sanitation/hygiene; WHO on health; WFP on logistics;FAO on agriculture; OCHA and others on telecommunications; and UNDP on early recovery. See www.humanitarianreorm.org

21 UNHCR in its 2010 global appeal reported that it is the lead or co-lead o these dierent clusters. UNHCRGlobal Appeal 2010-2011, p. 45, at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4b0509619&query=global appeal 2010

22 The UN General Assembly and UNHCRs Executive Committee authorized the agency to be involved withgroups other than reugees, including IDPs, returned reugees and stateless people, see http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49ed83046.html

23 Opening Statement by Mr. Antnio Guterres, UN High Commissioner or Reugees, at the 60th Sessiono the Executive Committee o the High Commissioners Programme (ExCom), Geneva, 28 September2009. As o this writing, the ERC, donor governments, and other international agencies have not endorsedUNHCRs suggestion. Lead responsibility or the protection o IDPs in natural disasters remains a shared


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While all o these eorts represent an important progression toward developing policiesand institutional mechanisms or IDPs, the gap between the international communitys

good intentions and the reality on the ground or IDPs remains considerable. Internal dis-placement remains one o the most signicant challenges acing the humanitarian commu-nity, declared John Holmes, the UN Under-Secretary-General or Humanitarian Aairsin 2008: Internally displaced persons are less clearly identied and protected than reugeesbut are oten particularly vulnerable.24 A statement o American NGOs issued at the endo 2008 alsoobserved that when compared to reugee protection, the global response tointernal displacement is weak, characterized by incomplete access to the displaced, lacko clarity as to mandates and responsibilities, and unding that alls well short o what isrequired. In consequence, hundreds o thousands o people suer unnecessarily.25 There is

still too little accountability in current approaches toward IDPs who remain exposed to awide range o discrimination and human rights violations as a result o deliberate policiesor simple neglect.26 The NGO statement called upon the United States as a leading donorand voice in the humanitarian eld to improve its response to internal displacement, inparticular by addressing the disparity between reugee and IDP protection and becominga much stronger advocate or nding solutions or internally displaced people.27

This paper will examine the steps the US government is taking to create a more compre-hensive approach to both reugee and IDP protection throughout all phases o displace-

ment. It will discuss the progress made, identiy the shortcomings and challenges thatremain to be overcome, and present a set o recommendations or the way orward.

responsibility o UNHCR, UNICEF and the Oce o the UN High Commissioner or Human Rights.24 John Holmes, Foreword, Ten Years o the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Forced Migration

Review, December 2008, p. 3.25 Reugees International, NGO Statement on US IDP Policy, 19 December 2008. The statement was signed

by 22 NGOs [henceorth NGO Statement on US IDP Policy].26 IDMC, Global Overview o Trends and Developments in 2008, p. 9.27 NGO Statement on US IDP Policy.


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BACkGROUND TO US RESPONSE

O ver the past decade, three reports have examined United States policy towardinternally displaced persons. Two were written by ormer USAID and StateDepartment ocials and the other was published directly by the US government.

The rst was authored by James Kunder, a ormer director o the USAID Oce o US ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA) and subsequently USAID Acting Deputy Administrator[henceorth called the Kunder report].28 Published in 1999 by the Brookings InstitutionProject on Internal Displacement and the U.S. Committee or Reugees, it was entitled

The U.S. Government and Internally Displaced Persons: Present But Not Accounted For.Thesecond was a 2001 report o the US General Accounting Oce (GAO), requested bythe Senate Foreign Relations Committee and entitled Internally Displaced Persons Lack

Eective Protection [henceorth the GAO report].29 The third was a US Institute o Peace(USIP) report, Orphans o Confict: Caring or the Internally Displaced,30 published in 2005and authored by Donald Steinberg who served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary o Statein the State Departments Bureau o Population, Migration and Reugees (PRM) andAmbassador to Angola [henceorth the USIP report].

All three reports call or greater US and international attention to promoting protectionand assistance or IDPs. In the Kunder report, six elements are identied to indicate

whether the US government is taking the problem o IDPs seriously. They remain relevanttoday:

1) Legislation to provide a sound statutory basis or US action (neither the Migration andReugee Assistance Act (MRA) nor the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) specically reerto IDPs);

2) Congressional hearings, inquiries and budget reviews relevant to IDPs;

3) Policy documents that authorize government action on IDPs;4) A lead government agency or IDPs;5) Adequate nancial and human resources; and6) Expanded ties with international organizations and NGOs.

28 James Kunder, The U.S. Government and Internally Displaced Persons: Present But Not Accounted For, BrookingsInstitution Project on Internal Displacement and U.S. Committee or Reugees, November 1999 [hence-orth Kunder report].

29 US General Accounting Oce,Internally Displaced Persons Lack Eective Protection, August 2001 [hence-orth GAO report].

30 Donald Steinberg, Orphans o Confict: Caring or the Internally Displaced, US Institute o Peace, October2005 [henceorth USIP report].


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Among his recommendations were:

An examination o current law to determine whether IDPs are adequately coveredprior to, during and subsequent to displacement;

Congressional hearings on internal displacement and on the adequacy o the US gov-ernment response;

The designation o a lead government oce on internal displacementeither or allsituations or on a case by case basis, and the establishment o an inter-agency coordina-tion mechanism to guide IDP policy and programs.

An authoritative policy document on IDPs within a broader Presidential Directive oninternational migration issues;

Adequate nancial and human resources or IDP programs so that unding gaps canbe identied, eective policies developed, advocacy undertaken, participation in inter-national debates assured, and targeted assistance and protection programs carried out;and

Strengthened linkages with UN and regional ora and NGOs on internal displace-ment.31

The GAO report similarly ound that both the US and the international community werenot dealing eectively with internal displacement. While recognizing the need or addi-tional resources, it said international organizations had ailed to take a proactive approachtoward IDP protection (i.e., physical security in addition to ood, medicine and shelter),had not provided adequate training to sta and relie workers, and had ailed at eectivecoordination in the eld, at reporting on IDP situations and at the sharing o inormation

among UN agencies, governments, and NGOs, all o which the report argued could go along way toward improving protection and assistance or IDPs.32

As or the US, it underscored that the government has no overall policy or lead oce tocoordinate its eorts or dealing with internally displaced persons and that US humani-tarian interests would be better served with clear policy direction and senior leadership

within the ederal bureaucracy on internal displacement issues.33 Although the govern-

31 Kunder report, pp. 2-3, 16-17.32 GAO report, p. 34.33 GAO report, pp. 29, 34.


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ment, it noted, relied on coordination and cooperation among the dierent oces involved with IDPs, there was no overall policy on the unding priority or IDPs34 and little

coordination among the various agencies involved directly or indirectly in assisting IDPs.The result was limited awareness, overlapping bureaucratic mandates, and ragmented andduplicative eorts, which in turn undermined the US response to humanitarian crises.35

The GAO report urther ound insucient attention to internal displacement in theState Departments annual Country Reports on Human Right Practices and no standardormat or reporting on IDPs even though they are particularly vulnerable to humanrights violations.36 Among its recommendations were that the US work to advance moreproactive policies and programs to protect and assist internally displaced persons, ocus

on IDP issues in its human rights reports, and seek with other UN member states tostrengthen international organizations protection eorts.37 Although the author was in-clined to recommend a lead government oce or IDPs, the State Department quashedthe recommendation in avor o improved coordination and cooperation among the ocesinvolved. 38 The report, however, noted that i problems were to arise in coordinating theresponse, the administration might consider designating a lead oce.39

The USIP report o 2005 builds on the idea o a lead oce. Ater noting the shortcomingso USAID as the lead oce, it calls or its reinorcement, namely the appointment o a

watchdog in the State Department to serve as the counterpart on the political side o theU.S. government to deal with potential and actual situations o internal displacement.40

The watchdog would insist that senior policymakers, especially regional assistant secre-taries, address the root cause o displacement and would interace with a senior ocial atUSAID and at the NSC.

Internal government reports also began to call upon the US to address more eectively theinternal displacement issue.41 A 2000 internal State Department report [henceorth the

34 GAO report, p. 32.35 In Colombia, or example, the World Food Program (WFP) received unds rom our dierent US unding

sources to support the same type o ood assistance programs. Moreover, the unds were provided withoutcoordination and knowledge about whether this would be complementary or duplicative. See GAO report,p. 30.

36 GAO report, pp. 32-3.37Ibid., p. 34.38 GAO report, p. 31, and Cohen interview, 1999.39 Ibid.40 USIP report, p. 14.41 See or example, Department o State,Interagency Review o U.S. Government Civilian Humanitarian and

Transition Programs, January 2000 [henceorth Halperin-Michel reportthe report was co-chaired by Mor-ton Halperin, Director o the State Department Policy Planning Sta and James Michel, Counselor toUSAID]; and Dina M. Esposito, USAID and Internally Displaced Persons: A Discussion Paper, prepared or


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Halperin-Michel report] called or unied humanitarian leadership in emergencies, not-ing that the current decentralized operational structure gives rise to bureaucratic confict

and overlap, especially in regard to internally displaced persons.42

A 2002 USAID reportpointed out that even though IDPs were oten among the most vulnerable populations inconfict settings, they have not received the attention rom donors that their number andplight demand.43 Non-governmental groups and experts similarly urged the US to givegreater ocus to IDPs.44 Reugees Internationals President, or example, told Congress in1999 that the silence is deaening as hundreds o thousands o people are displaced [in theDemocratic Republic o Congo (DRC)]45

With large numbers o internal conficts producing millions o IDPs (e.g. Sudan, Colom-

bia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, the DRC, the ormer Yugoslavia), and recommendationscoming rom many infuential quarters, the US government began in 2001 and 2002 totake steps to better integrate programs or the internally displaced into its work.

USAID/DCHA/OFDA, 2 December 2002 [henceorth Esposito report].

42 Halperin-Michel report, p. 13.43 USAID, Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity, PD-ABW-900,

2002, as quoted in USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy Implementation Guidelines,Internal USAID Document, 2004, p. 4 [henceorth USAID Implementation Guidelines].

44 See, or example, Reugees International (RI), Bulletin, 6 August 2001, which warned that the ocus on longterm development [to the Federal Republic o Yugoslavia] must not come at the expense o humanitarianassistance to IDPs, reugees and other vulnerable people; as well as RI Bulletin, 22 June 1999; RI Bulletin14 September 2000; RI Bulletin 25 April 2001; and RI Bulletin 8 June 2001, which called or greater atten-tion to IDPs in Ethiopia, the DRC and Angola, and or more eective international arrangements or IDPs.See also Roberta Cohen and James Kunder, Human Rights and Humanitarian Emergencies, Policy Brie83, Brookings Institution, June 2001; and Roberta Cohen, Weakened U.S. Support Endangers AngolasInternally Displaced Masses,Arican Reugee Network, Vol. 11, No. 3, March 2002, pp. 4-5.

45 Lionel Rosenblatt, Testimony beore House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on In-ternational Operations and Human Rights, 9 March 1999.


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ACHIEVEMENTS

Some o the main achievements o the US over the past decade have been:

THE ADOPTION OF THE USAID POLICY ON IDPS

Following several years o negotiations and drating, USAID, the government lead onIDPs, released in 2004 the USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy.46

The policy points out that there are important humanitarian, human rights, developmentand political reasons or the US government to help integrate IDPs into the economic andsocial abric o their societies. It strongly links US humanitarian and development goals toUS national security interests and underscores that the ailure to respond adequately to theneeds o ailed states and large displaced populations can produce national and regionalinstability, aect longer-term development, and in some instances enable disaected in-dividuals to turn to international extremism.

The policy broadly encompasses all phases o displacement, rom the pre-emergency period

through long term reintegration and development aid. This is noteworthy since attentionis oten ocused on the emergency needs o the displaced to the exclusion o the dicul-ties they ace during return, resettlement and reintegration. The ultimate goal, the policystates, is to enable IDPs to become ully productive contributors to economic and socialprogress in their local communities and countries.

The policy also breaks ground in addressing the protection needs o the beneciaries,pointing out that material assistance alone oten cannot ensure the wellbeing o IDPs.47It speaks o enhancing the saety o IDPs rom violence, abuse, exploitation, and harass-

ment, calls or the inclusion o practical protection measures in humanitarian assistanceand development strategies, and notes that relie and development assistance are oten

jeopardized by confict, unchecked human rights violations and the physical endanger-ment o IDPs. This ocus on protection, it should be noted, required an amendment tothe USAID/OFDA Field Operations Guidewhich had earlier excluded protection romUSAID responsibilities and unding.48

46 USAID IDP Policy, supra note 2.47Ibid., p. 8.48 USAID/OFDA, Field Operations Guide or Disaster Assessment and Response, version 3.0, no date, page III-2,

as cited in the Kunder report, p. 12, said that Assessment Teams and DARTs should not assume any respon-


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Further, the policy recognizes that IDPs must not be prioritized alone. Support must alsobe provided: 1) to host amilies that absorb and support IDPs at great local expense; and

2) to other at risk populations caught up in emergencies which may endure comparablesuering. As a USAID ocial explained, crises are also elt by those in a society who donot leave their homes. Food shortages, civil unrest, loss o livelihoods and limited economicgrowth aect displaced and non-displaced alike.49

ASSIGNMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR IDPS

As early as 1991, USAIDs OFDA (its major humanitarian arm) was acknowledged to have

the responsibility or assisting people displaced within their own country as a result onatural or man-made disasters. 50 USAIDs IDP policy strengthened this role by makingUSAID the lead U.S. Government agency or addressing internal displacementand thelead coordinator on IDP issues at the policy level in aected countries. Its responsibili-ties include public and private advocacy to ensure assistance and protection or IDPs, andthe planning, implementation and coordination o short and long-term programs to re-spond to both immediate needs and longer term durable solutions. In particular, USAIDis expected to promote: liesaving humanitarian access to needy populations; protectionor IDPs during allphases o displacement; accountability and evaluation o international

programs or IDPs; and wider international recognition o the UN Guiding Principles onInternal Displacement. In carrying out these responsibilities, it is expected to work closely

with other US government oces as well as international organizations, NGOs, host gov-ernments and local institutions.

USAID Implementation Guidelines (a companion document to the IDP policy) providedetailed internal guidance or sta on how to carry out the policy in the dierent phases odisplacement: pre-emergency preparedness, early emergency, care and maintenance, tran-sitional reintegration and long-term development.51 Like the policy, the Guidelines high-

light the importance o protection and state that IDPs should be granted the ull securityand protection provided or under applicable norms o international human rights, inter-national humanitarian law, and national law. They then provide examples o protectionproblems and the protection strategies and approaches that should be taken by USAIDsta (in particular Disaster Assistance Response Teams - DART) and their NGO partnersunder headings such as: protection o physical security and reedom o movement; preserv-

sibility or the protection o IDPs.49 Letter rom USAID ocial to Director o International Relations and Trade, U.S. General Accounting O-

ce, 31 July 2001, contained in GAO report, pp. 54-5.50 See supra note 17.51 USAID Implementation Guidelines.


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