2009_world bank_climate change governance

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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4941

Climate Change Governance

James Meadowcrot

The World BankDevelopment Economics

World Development Report TeamMay 2009

BackgRound PaPeR to the 2010 WoRld develoPment RePoRt

WPS4941


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Produced by the Research Support Team

Abstract

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the fndings o work in progress to encourage the exchange o ideas about development

issues. An objective o the series is to get the fndings out quickly, even i the presentations are less than ully polished. The papers carry the

names o the authors and should be cited accordingly. The fndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those

o the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views o the International Bank or Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and

its afliated organizations, or those o the Executive Directors o the World Bank or the governments they represent.

Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4941

Climate change governance poses dicult challenges orcontemporary political/administrative systems. Thesesystems evolved to handle other sorts o problems and

must now be adapted to handle emerging issues oclimate change mitigation and adaptation. This paperexamines long-term climate governance, particularlyin relation to overcoming institutional inertia thathampers the development o an eective and timelyresponse. It argues that when the infuence o groupsthat ear adverse consequences o mitigation policies iscombined with scientic uncertainty, the complexity oreaching global agreements, and long time rames, thenatural tendency is or governments to delay action,to seek to avoid antagonizing infuential groups, andto adopt less ambitious climate programs. Conficts opower and interest are inevitable in relation to climate

This paperprepared as a background paper to the World Banks World Development Report 2010: Development in a ChangingClimateis a product o the Development Economics Vice Presidency. The views expressed in this paper are those o theauthors and do not refect the views o the World Bank or its aliated organizations. Policy Research Working Papersare posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

change policy. To address climate change means alteringthe way things are being done today especially in termso production and consumption practices in key sectors

such as energy, agriculture, and transportation. But someo the most powerul groups in society have done wellrom existing arrangements, and they are cautious aboutdisturbing the status quo. Climate change governancerequires governments to take an active role in bringingabout shits in interest perceptions so that stable societalmajorities in avor o deploying an active mitigation andadaptation policy regime can be maintained. Measures tohelp eect such change include: building coalitions orchange, buying o opponents, establishing new centerso economic power, creating new institutional actors,adjusting legal rights and responsibilities, and changingideas and accepted norms and expectations.


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ClimatechangegovernanceApapercontributingtothe2010WorldBankWorldDevelopmentReport

JamesMeadowcroft

1

1CanadaResearchChairinGovernanceforSustainableDevelopment. CarletonUniversity,Ottawa.

[email protected].


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2Thispaperexploresthechallengeofclimatechangegovernance,examininginparticularthe

rolenationalgovernmentscanplayinputtinginplaceinstitutions,policies,plansandmeasures

topromotemitigationof,andadaptationto,humaninducedclimatechange.

Thediscussionisorganizedintofiveparts.Thefirstexaminesthegeneralcharacteristicsofthe

problem.The

second

explores

preliminary

considerations

in

developing

governance

responses

toclimatechange.Thethirddiscusseskeydimensionsofclimatechangegovernance.The

fourthconsiderssomeexamplesofrecentinnovations.Andthefinalsectiondrawssome

additionalconclusions.

Attheoutsettwopointsshouldbeemphasizedaboutthescopeoftheanalysispresentedhere.

First,thefocusisonnationalpoliticalunitsanddomesticaction,andnotoninternational

organizationsandthearchitectureoftheglobalclimateregime.Ofcourse,collectiveactionat

thegloballevelisrequiredtoaddressclimatechange.Butthediscussionheredealswith

nationalratherthaninternationalgovernance.Despitechangingpatternsofsocietal

interaction,increasedinternationaleconomicinterdependence,andsomesurrenderof

sovereigntytosupranationalinstitutions,statesremainthemostimportantcentersofpolitical

powerinthemodernworld(PierreandPeters,2000).Statesmakeandenforcedomesticlaw.

Theypossesssignificantfinancialresources,basedontheirpowersofcompulsorytaxation.

Theymaintainsystemstoadjudicatedisputes,redistributeresources,andcompelobedience

(Gill2003).Mechanismsofrepresentationanddemocracyallowstatestoclaimtoact

legitimatelyforthecommongoodoftheircitizens.And,ofcourse,itisstatesthatconclude

agreementsattheinternationallevel.Amongthemanylessonsthatarealreadybecomingclear

fromthe2008financialcrisisisthatstatesremainthemostpowerfulagenciesformobilizing

collectiveresourcesfordealingwithacutesocietalproblems.

Second,thispaperdealsprimarilywithprocessandinstitutionalreformstodevelopclimate

changegovernanceratherthanwiththedesignofspecificinstruments(forexample,carbon

taxesorgreenhousegascapandtradesystems).Itisconcernedmorewithoverallsystemsof

governanceforclimatechangethanwiththeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofparticularpolicy

approaches. Ofcourse,specificinstrumentsandapproachesimposeparticulardemandson

publicbodies.Carbontaxes,forexample,requireaneffectivesystemofnationaltaxation,while

capandtradesystemsrequireappropriatemechanismsofregulatoryoversight.

1.ClimatechangeasagovernancechallengeThereisnowconvincingscientificevidencethathumanactivityisalteringtheglobalclimate

(IPCC2007).Althoughuncertaintyremainsaboutthetimingandimpactofclimatechange,itis

alreadyclearthattherearerisksofsignificantadverseconsequences(Schellnhuberetal2006).

Stabilizinggreenhousegasconcentrationsintheatmospherewillrequireadramaticreduction

ofannualemissions,eventuallytoasmallproportionofcurrentlevels.Governmentsina

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3numberofdevelopedcountriesarealreadydiscussingreductionsof80%on1990levelsbymid

century.Andgreenhousegasemissionsfromdevelopingcountrieswouldalsohavetopeakwell

beforethistimeifsomeofthemoresignificantclimaterisksidentifiedbythe

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)aretobeavoided(Hhne,Phylipsenand

Moltmann2007).Moreover,andnotwithstandingfuturemitigationefforts,incomingdecades

societieswill

have

to

adapt

to

warming

to

which

we

are

already

committed.

Internationalemissionsreductionsonthescalenowbeingcontemplatedwouldrequirea

dramaticchangetoexistingpatternsofproductionandconsumption.Thetransitiontoalow

carbonemissioneconomyimpliesatransformationofkeyeconomicsectorsincluding

agriculture,transport,construction,forestryandenergy.Itrequiresthedevelopmentand

deploymentofnewtechnologiesandtheemergenceofnewwaysofdoingthings.

Governmentshaveacriticalroletoplayinorientingandacceleratingtheshifttoalowcarbon

developmenttrajectory.

Todateindividualcountrieshavebeenlargelyfreetodeterminethedegreeoftheir

engagementwiththeclimateissue.Somestateshaveintroducedsignificantmeasures,while

othershavevirtuallyignoredthematter.Inthenextfewdecadesthiswillchangeastheactual

andanticipatedimpactsofclimatechangebecomeclearer,andtheinternationalconsensus

favoringaction(bothmitigationandadaptation)continuestoevolve.Thisdoesnotmeanthat

nationswithdifferentlevelsofwealth,anddifferentactualandhistoricemissions,willbe

expectedtocontributeequallytomitigationefforts.Butitdoesmeanthatadoptingan

appropriateresponsetoclimatechangewillincreasinglybeconsideredasanormalcomponent

ofwhatgoodgovernanceatthenationallevelentails.Governmentsthatwishtoberegarded

aslegitimatebytheircitizens,andbytheinternationalcommunity,willhavetodisplaytheir

credentialsonthisfront.Moreover,statesthataretakingvigorousactionwillhaveless

patiencewith

those

who

are

not

seen

to

be

bearing

their

share

of

the

common

burden.

Inotherwords,governanceforclimatechangeisincreasinglynonoptional.Itwillnotjustbe

lefttoenthusiasticcountries,torichindustrializedcountries,ortohighpercapitaemitters.

Sinceclimatechange,andtheresponsestoclimatechange,willhaveimportanteconomic

consequences,theissuewillinevitablybecomeentwinedwithotherinternationaleconomic

issuesincluding:a)internationalfinancialflows,b)tradepolicyandc)developmentassistance.

Forexample,thereisalreadydiscussioninanumberofcountries(includingtheUnitedStates

andEuropeanUnionmemberstates)concerningbordertaxadjustments(tariffs)topenalize

imports

from

jurisdictions

deemed

to

be

taking

insufficient

action

on

climate

change.

As

mitigationcostsriseinthedevelopedstates,andconcernaboutthemigrationofcarbon

emittingindustries(andtheirassociatedjobs)tounregulatedjurisdictionsgrows,thisissuewill

inevitablyattractmoreattention.

Theserealitiescreateadditionalpowerfulincentivesfordevelopingcountriestoengageearly

withtheclimatechangeissue,minimizingpotentialeconomicandpoliticalfalloutthatcould

harmtheirdevelopmentefforts.InsuchacontextMexicosrecentadoptionofanemissions

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4controltargetmakessoundeconomic,aswellasenvironmental,sense.So,too,doesthe

interestofcertainoilexportingstatesintheGulfincarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)and

renewableenergytechnologies.

Thereareanumberofwellknownfeaturesoftheclimatechangeissuethatpresentdifficulties

forexisting

governance

mechanisms.

These

include:

societalreach:greenhousegassesareassociatedwithindustrialandagriculturalactivitieswhichhavesustainedrisinglivingstandardsoverthepasttwocenturies.Fossilfuelsstill

provide80%ofglobalprimaryenergy.Thetransformationofexistingproductionand

consumptionpatternstoreduceemissionsdramatically,aswellasthenecessaryadaptations

toclimatewarming,willrequirechangethatreachesdeepintocurrentpractices.Consciously

steeringsocietaladjustmentonsuchascaleisinmanywaysunprecedented.

scientificuncertainty:althoughmuchisnowunderstoodabouttheprocessesdrivingclimatechangeandtheimplicationsforhumansocieties,enormousuncertaintiesremain:particularly

about

the

sensitivity

of

the

climate

system

(how

much

warming

will

result

from

a

given

increaseinatmosphericconcentrationsofgreenhousegasses);regionalclimateimpacts;and

theconsequencesforecosystems.Thereisconcernabouttippingpointsatwhichradical

discontinuitiesincurrentclimatepatternscouldoccur(Lentonetal2008).Although

knowledgeissteadilyincreasing,uncertaintieswillcontinuefortheforeseeablefuture.

distributionalandequitylinkages:climatechange,andresponsestoclimatechange,willimpactdifferentgroupsindifferentways.Someoftheseimpactscanbeanticipated,others

remainuncertain.Climatechangeshufflesthedeck changingthepatternsofriskand

opportunitytowhichcountries,regions,industries,socialstrata,andindividualsareexposed.

Equityissues(domesticandinternational)havealwaysbeenamongthemostdifficultfor

governmentstohandle.Andclimatechangelayersnewdimensionsontopofestablished

concerns(regional

disparities,

North/South

tensions,

fuel

poverty,

and

so

on).

longtimeframes:greenhousegasemissionsfromfossilfuelcombustionhavebeenrisingsincethedawnoftheIndustrialRevolution;theclimatesystemevolvesoverdecades,

centuriesandmillennia;andmanagingclimatechangeislikelytobeagovernancechallenge

throughoutthiscentury.Suchlongtermissuesfitpoorlywithafouryearelectoralcycle,the

twoorthreeyeartenureofministersandseniorofficials,andthedailyorweeklyrhythmsof

everydaypolitics.

globalimplications:thecausesandimpactsofclimatechangeareinternational.Andeconomicandothertiesbetweennationsmakeacollectiveresponseessential.Yet

coordinatinginternationaleffortsonsuchascaleisamajorchallenge

Eachofthesefactorscontributestomakingclimatechangeatrickyproblemforgovernmentsto

manageeffectively(seetable1).Ofcourse,noneofthesefeaturesisuniquetoclimatechange.

Otherproblemsandpolicyareasdisplaysimilarcharacteristics,althoughrarelyalltogetherand

tosuchadegree.

Thatexistinggovernancestructuresandprocessesarenotideallysuitedtomanageclimate

changeishardlysurprising.Moderngovernanceinstitutionswiththeirwellknown

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5constitutionalmechanisms,representativeinstitutions,federalstructures,functional

differentiationofministries,professionalbureaucracies,policyframeworks,andsoon,

emergedthroughcomplexandlongtermprocessesofinstitutionalevolution,crossnational

imitationandlearning,anditerativelessondrawinganddesign.Overthecourseofthe

twentiethcentury,governmentactivitiesintheOECDstatesfocusedlargelyonsecurity(the

maintenanceof

order,

the

administration

of

justice),

economy

(promoting

economic

growth,

monetarystability,competitionandconsumerprotection),andwelfare(welfarestate,public

provision,socialsafetynet).Inlessdevelopedregionsthefocusofgovernmentattentionover

thepastsixdecadeshasbeenacceleratingdevelopmentamultidimensionalprocessthat

involveseconomic,socialandpoliticaladvance.Fromthelate1960smoderninstitutionsof

environmentalgovernancecameintobeingacrossthedevelopedworld,spreadinglaterto

developingcountries.Buttheyremainweakcomparedtomoreestablishedareasof

governmentcompetence(Meadowcroft2009).Theemergenceofclimatechangenowrequires

afurtherphaseofinnovationandadjustmenttogovernancepractices.

Therehasbeendiscussionintheliteratureaboutthedifficultiesdemocraticstatesencounter

whendealingwithclimatechange(andenvironmentalproblemsmoregenerally)(Laffertyand

Meadowcroft1996;Eckersley2004).Andsomesuggestionthatdemocraticstatesdonot

performbetterthannondemocraticstatesinreducinggreenhousegasemissions.Various

factorsthathinderdecisiveactionindemocraticstatesarecited,including:thetendencyfor

politicianstohesitatetointroducereformsthatmayantagonizevoters(imposinghigherenergy

taxesforexample);theincentivesforpoliticalleaderstotrytoattractvotesbyopposingmore

vigorousmeasurethatmightbesuggestedbytheiropponents;theinfluenceofpowerful

economiclobbiesthatcanmobilizetoprotecttheirinterestsandresistchange(ascompared

withthemorediffuseconcernforlongtermclimateprotectionheldbyordinaryvoters);the

existenceofmultiplevetopointsandchecksandbalancesthatslowdecisionmaking;andthe

ambivalentrole

of

the

media

in

simplifying

and

polarizing

debate.

Suchmechanismsarereal,andappreciatingtheiroperationisimportantinordertodevelop

moreeffectivegovernancearoundclimatechange.Ontheotherhand,itisnotclearthatatthis

pointcomparisonsbetweentheclimateperformanceofdemocraticandnondemocraticstates

areparticularlymeaningfulorhelpful.Thesortsofmechanismsdescribedabovearealways

operativeindemocraticpolities:perverseresultsoftenarisefromtheoperationofpoliticaland

administrativeprocesses.But,ofcourse,parallelprocessesarealsoatworkinnondemocratic

statesitisjustthattheyarehiddenfromview.Overthelongterm,governmentsinnon

democraticstatesalsohavetopayattentiontotheimpactsofpolicyontheircitizens;andwhile

political

and

policy

competition

are

organized

differently,

they

still

take

place.

Theresultsoflargenstudiesthatcompareclimatepolicyperformancebetweendemocratic

andnondemocraticstatesmustbetreatedwithcaution.Aperiodofatleasttwentyyearsis

generallyregardedastheminimumoverwhichmeaningfulstudiesofpolicychangeshouldbe

conducted(Sabatier1993),andinthecaseofmajorlongtermissueslikeclimatechangethe

periodisprobablylonger.Moreover,theabsenceofnondemocraticadvancedindustrialized

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6statessubjecttobindingemissionreductioncommitmentscreatesagapinthecasesonwhich

generalizationsarefounded.

Theargumentforthesuperiorityofdemocraticpoliticalsystemsdoesnotturnontheclaim

thatdemocraciesalwaysmakewisedecisions.Obviously,thisisnotthecase.Nevertheless,the

flexibilityand

adaptiveness

of

democratic

systems,

and

the

capacity

of

electorates

and

politicianstolearnlessonsfrompreviousroundsofpolicyfailure,shouldnotbe

underestimated.Voterscancometosupportpolicies topromotelongertermgoodsor

collectivevalues thatcontradicttheirimmediateeconomicinterests.Forexample,inthe

1970stherewasconsiderablediscussionaboutthefiscalcrisisofthestate(OConnor1971;

Offe1982),broughtonbyvoterdemandsforexpensivepublicservicesencouragedbytheever

moreextravagantpromisesofpoliticalparties.Yetthisdidnotultimatelyleadtopolitical

breakdown.Electoratesgraduallylearnedthatgovernmentspendingcouldnotgrow

indefinitelyandthatlongtermdeficitsencouragestagflation,andthenentrepreneurial

politicianssuccessfullysoldpublicservicecutbacksandpublicexpenditureretrenchmentas

shorttermpainrequiredforlongtermgain.

Differenttypesofpoliticalsystemsareunderpinnedbycomplexpolitical,economicandcultural

factors,anditisunlikelythatinthenearfuturetherelativeperformanceonclimatemitigation

willmotivatemovementstowardsmoreorlessdemocraticorauthoritarianpoliticalforms.

Nevertheless,itistruethatinthelongertermsmajorgovernmentfailuresinmanagingclimate

riskscouldcontributetowardspoliticalinstabilityandregimechange.

Offarmoreinterestthanthecontrastbetweendemocraticandnondemocraticstatesisthe

variationinperformanceamongstateswithineachgrouping.Thus,forexample,certain

developedstateshavewitnessedpolicylinkedemissionsreductioninrecentyears(Germany,

theUnited

Kingdom,

Sweden)

while

others

have

failed

to

control

emissions

growth

(Canada,

theUnitedStates).Politicalsystemcharacteristics(electoralandpartyarrangements,

presidentialorparliamentaryconstitutionalforms,federalorunitarystructures,andsoon),

influencethearticulationofinterests,theconductofpoliticalcontests,andthedevelopment

andimplementationofpolicy.Buthowtheseplayouttosupportorweakenclimateinitiatives

dependonmanyparticularcircumstances.Structuraleconomicfactors,administrativeand

legalpractices,andideationaldimensions(suchaspoliticalcultureandideologicalfissures)also

playanimportantrole.Forexample,onthestructuralside,countrieswithmajorfossilfuel

exportindustrieshaveprovenlessenthusiasticaboutemissionsreductionsandmorehesitant

toembracetheshifttorenewableenergies.SwedenandNorwayprovideanillustrationhere.

Despite

similar

political

traditions,

high

levels

of

concern

about

climate

change,

and

enthusiasticparticipationininternationalclimateagreements,Swedenhasmadeanexplicit

commitmenttoendingfossilfueldependencethathasnotbeenmatchedbyNorway.

Moreover,thereisevidencethatcountrieswithmoreconsensual(asopposedtoconflictualand

litigatious)politicalcultures,andstrongtraditionsofstateinterventiontopromotecollective

projects(suchasocialdemocratic,andcorporatiststates)canmoreeffectivelyaddress

environmentalproblems(LaffertyandMeadowcroft2000;Duit2008).

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7Thusratherthanframingthediscussionintermsoftheperformanceofdemocraticandnon

democraticstates,itmaybemoreproductivetoexaminemechanismsthatcanfavorsound

climatepolicymoregenerally,whilekeepinginmindthatthesemustbeadapteddifferently

dependingonparticularinstitutionalconfigurations.

Climatechange

governance

remains

very

new.

A

number

of

developed

states

have

introduced

systemsofgreenhousegasemissionscontrols,butpolicyexperienceinthisareaisbarely

fifteenyearsold.Initiativesaroundadaptationarenewerstill.Thussocietiesareonlybeginning

tolearnwhatapproachesaremoreorlesspromising.Withrespecttoclimatechange,thereis

norulebookoragreedbestpracticemanualongovernancethatcanservetotransferlessons

fromonecountrytoanother.Forthisreason,discussioninthispaperisorganizedaroundsome

keythemesandpracticalexamples.

2.InitialconsiderationsBeforeexamininggovernanceimplicationsofclimatechangeinmoredetailitisnecessaryto

discussbrieflythreegeneralissues:thelinkagebetweenadaptationandmitigation;the

differentiationofclimatechangegovernancerequirementsaccordingtothelevelofnational

development;andtheparticularsignificanceofenergyanddeforestation.

1)Adaptationandmitigation

Climatechangegovernancerequiresactionontwofronts:adaptationandmitigation.

Adaptationimpliestheadjustmentofsocietytoachangingclimate.Mitigationrequiresshiftsin

currentbehaviortoendpracticesdrivingfurtherclimatechange.Neithercanbeavoided.

Adaptationis

required

because

climate

change

is

already

underway,

and

further

warming

from

existingemissionsisinevitable.Mitigationisrequiredbecausethereisnowaytoadaptoutof

climatechange.Aslongasgreenhousegasemissionscontinueatsubstantiallevels,their

concentrationintheatmospherewillrise,andsowillaverageglobaltemperatures.

Governanceofadaptationrequiresknowledgeofanticipatedregionalandlocalclimateeffects.

Anditrequiresplanningtodealwithexpectedimpactsonhumanactivity.Astheclimate

continuestochange,thescaleofthenecessaryadaptationwillalsoevolve.Importantclimate

issuesdetailedinscientificreportsrelatetosealevelrise,extremeweatherevents,and

changingtemperatureandprecipitationpatterns.Ecosystemstressesandbiodiversitylosswill

increase.

This

has

the

potential

to

disrupt

human

settlement

patterns,

infrastructure,

and

agriculture;togeneratesignificantandgrowingeconomiccosts;andtothreatendirectly

livelihoodsandwellbeingofhumanpopulations(Stern2007).Thepoorestcountriesandgroups

arelikelytobemostvulnerabletothesepressuresastheyarea)mostdirectlydependenton

naturalresourcesystems(forexampleagriculture)forlivelihoodsandb)haveleastresourcesto

adjusttochange.

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8Criticalelementsrequiredforsuccessfuladaptationincludethefollowing:enhancingscientific

understandingofregionalandlocalclimatechange,andecosystemandsocietalimpacts;the

systematicmonitoringofclimate,ecosystemandsocietalimpacts;accountingforclimateissues

inlongtermplanningforinfrastructureandforkeysocioeconomicsectors;developingpublic

educationaroundanticipatedclimateimpactstoencourageindividualandcollectiveadaptation

(changesin

farming

practices,

development

of

new

crop

varieties,

etc);

initiating

societal

debateabouttheimpactsofclimatechangeandappropriatesocietaladjustments.

Particulargovernancemeasuresthatcanbetakeninclude:arequirementforclimatechange

impactstobeaddressedinnational,regionalandlocalplanningprocesses(forexampleland

useplanning);thepreparationofperiodicnationalandregionalreportsonadaptationand

anticipatedlongrangeadaptationcosts;theestablishmentofregionalandsectorbased

adaptationforumswithkeystakeholderstoexploreimpactsandresponses;collaborationwith

theinsuranceindustrytoidentifyvulnerabilitiesandtakeremedialaction;theintegrationof

climateadaptationintoplanningforprotectedareasandinagricultureandnaturalresource

managementplans;andtheincorporationofadaptationissuesintoworkofresearchfunding

councils.

Governanceofmitigationrequiresanunderstandingofemissionssources,costeffective

abatementpotentials,andpolicyapproaches.Anarrayofpolicyinstrumentsisavailableto

encouragemitigation.Thedifficultylieslessinthedesignofapproachesthanitdoesinthe

politicalwilltoimplementthem.Forcountriespursuingmandatoryemissionsabatementthe

introductionofacostforcarbondioxideemissionsprovidesaneconomywideincentiveto

movetowardlesscarbonintensivepathways.Eveninsituationswhereeconomicresources

availableforclimatechangemitigationareextremelylimiteditisgenerallypossibletoidentify

noregretspolicieswhichcanencouragemitigationatlittleornegativeeconomiccost.The

abolitionof

subsidies

for

fossil

fuel

usage

(although

politically

challenging)

can

bring

substantial

economicandenvironmentalbenefits.Energyefficiencyisanotherpromisingarea,where

analysissuggeststherearemanypotentialgains.Regulatorystandardstoraiseminimum

efficiencyrequirementsforindustrialequipment,consumerproducts,andbuildingstandards

havearoletoplayhere. Provisionofadditionalfinancialassistancetodevelopingcountriesto

encouragemitigationefforts,andenhancedmechanismsformitigationtechnologytransfer

fromdevelopedtodevelopingnations,areanimportantfocusforongoinginternationalclimate

negotiations.

2)Levelsofsocioeconomicdevelopment

Thelevelofsocioeconomicdevelopmentandtheeffectivenessofexistinggovernance

arrangementshavedirectrelevanceforclimatechangegovernanceandforthepriorities

governmentswilladoptinrelationtothisarea.

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9Allstatesrequireinstitutionscapableofundertakingclimatechangegovernance.Butthe

particularinstitutionalformsandcapacitieswillvaryaccordingtonationalcircumstance.Inthe

mostgeneralsenseitistruetosaythat:

1. countrieswitheffectiveandresilientgovernanceinstitutionswillbeabletobuildonthat

base

to

develop

institutions

more

specifically

adapted

to

manage

climate

change,

whilecountrieswithlesseffectiveandmorebrittlegeneralgovernancearrangements

willhavetoestablishmoremodestgoalsintheclimatesectorastheyconcentrateon

morepressinggovernanceissues;and

2. economicallydevelopedstateswillrequiremoreelaborateinstitutionalmechanismstoensurethecontrolandreductionofabsolutegreenhousegasemissions,whileless

developedcountrieswillplacemoreshorttermemphasisongovernanceforadaptation,

andonsectorspecificorprojectbasedmitigationactivities.

Anumberofeffortshavebeenmadetoassigncountriestodifferentgroupsforthepurposeof

determininginternationalclimateobligations(BaerandAthanasiou2007;Hhne,Phylipsenand

Moltmann2007).ListsofcountriesrankedbypercapitaandabsoluteGNP,percapitaand

absolutegreenhousegasemissions,inclusionornotasAnnex1partiesundertheKyoto

Protocol,theavailabilityornotoflowcostabatementoptions,andsoon,donotcorrespond

verydirectlywithoneanother.Thedifferentlevelsofeffortexpectedofeachofcountry,as

wellasthescaleofresourcestobemadeavailabletothelessdevelopedcountriesbythemost

developedcountries,isthesubjectofongoinginternationalnegotiation.

Notwithstandingthis,thefollowinggeneralobservationscanbemade:

Highincome

countries

(whether

or

not

they

have

binding

emissions

reduction

targets

under

the

KyotoProtocol,butwithdueattentiontotheirsize,andtothescaleoftheirgreenhousegas

emissions)shouldaimtodevelopacomprehensivesystemofclimategovernanceinstitutions

withthecapacity:1)tocontributeactivelytointernationalclimategovernance(atthepolitical,

administrativeandscientificlevels);2)tomonitor,controlandreducetheirgreenhousegas

emissions;3)toensureappropriateadaptationpoliciesandmeasures;and4)toprovide

assistancetopoorerdevelopingcountries;

Lowincomecountriesshouldaimtodevelopacompetentbasicclimateadministrationwith

capacities:1)toparticipateininternationalclimateprocesses;2)tocompletebasicscientific

assessments

of

climate

change

vulnerabilities,

current

emissions

and

future

scenarios;

3)

to

monitorlocalecosystemsandclimateimpacts;4)todeveloppubliceducationandstakeholder

engagementaroundadaptation;and,5)tosolicitandfruitfullydeployinternationalfunds

relatedtoclimatechange.

Middleincomecountriespresentamorecomplexandvariedpicture,andtheextentandfocus

oftheirclimatechangeactivitiesandgovernancemechanismswillvarywithnational

circumstances.Issuessuchaspercapitaincome,attainmentonthehumandevelopmentindex,

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10size,rateofeconomicgrowth,percapitaemissions,andAnnex1statuswillinfluence

internationalexpectationsaboutmitigationefforts.Countrieswhoseincomelevelsare

approachinghighincomestatusshouldworktodevelopmoreelaborateclimategovernance

structures.Largeandrapidlygrowingstatesthataspiretoanenhancedinternationalrolein

comingdecadeswillneedsophisticatedinstitutionsforclimategovernance,asovertimethey

willbe

expected

to

make

amajor

contribution

to

mitigation

efforts,

and

are

likely

to

experience

majoradaptationchallenges(Hhneetal2008).

Onascaleofseveraldecadesthedifferenceintheclimatechangegovernancerequirements

betweenhighandlowincomecountrieswillremainquitestark,withthehighincomecountries

requiringelaboratepolicyframeworkstoreduceemissions,whilelowincomecountries

emphasizeadaptation.Yetultimatelyallcountrieswillrequiresystemstogovernboth

mitigationandadaptation.

Astimepasses,andthepressurestodrivedownemissionsfurthergrows,moredifficultissues

willhavetobebroughtintointernationalclimatechangedebates.Twoelementswhichhave

beenpresentfromtheoutset,butwhichgovernmentsandinternationalinstitutionshavesofar

beenunabletoaddressadequately,arelevelsandratesofgrowthofconsumptionandof

humanpopulations.Overthelongterm,consumptiongrowthandpopulationgrowthcannotbe

treatedasexogenousvariables,andnationalauthoritieswillhavetotakeresponsibilityforthe

policyregimesputinplacetoorienttheirlongtermdevelopment.

3)Theenergyanddeforestationlinkages

Climatechangeislinkedtoenergyproductionandconsumption,becausefossilfuelusageisthe

singlelargestcontributortogreenhousegasemissions.Indeed,theIEAhasarguedthatwhatis

neededisnothingshortofanenergyrevolution(IEA2008).

Affluentcountriesgenerallyhavehighenergyuseandhighgreenhousegasemissions,although

amongthesecountriesthelevelofemissionsfromthemostcarbondioxideintensive

economies(suchastheUnitedStates,AustraliaandCanada)areaboutfourtimethoseofthe

leastcarbondioxideintensiveeconomies(suchasSweden).Thedeploymentoflowcarbon

emittingenergysystemsisthereforeacriticalresponsetoclimatechange.Approachesto

reduce

emissions

from

the

energy

sector

include

energy

efficiency

gains

(throughout

the

production/consumptioncycle);expansionofestablishedlargescalelowcarbongeneration

systems(hydro,nuclear);deploymentofnewrenewables(suchassolar,wind,wave,tidal,

geothermal,biomass,smallscalehydro,andsoon);andcarboncaptureandstorageonlarge

fossilfuelgeneratingfacilities.Climategovernanceandenergygovernanceneedtobedrawn

together.Institutionsandpoliciesarerequiredtoacceleratethedevelopmentanddeployment

oflowcarbonenergytechnologies.Sinceenergyprojectstypicallyinvolvelongleadtimes,large

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11capitalinvestments,andlongprojectlifetimes,longtermpublicsectorplanningiscriticalif

energyandclimatepolicyobjectivesaretobemetsuccessfully.

Lowincomecountriestypicallyhavelowpercapitaenergyconsumptionandlowpercapita

carbonemissions.Meetingbasicenergyneeds,forhumanandeconomicdevelopmentgoals,is

thepriority

here.

Nevertheless,

energy

policy

decisions

should

be

made

in

full

awareness

of

climateimplications.Inparticular,careshouldbemadetoavoidsubstantialfinancial

commitmentstotechnologiesthatarelikelytoberapidlysupersededastechnologicaladvances

gatherpaceinthenextdecade.Fundswillbeavailablefrominternationaldonorsand

internationalcarbonmarketstoencourageashifttolowcarbonemissionspathways.

Middleincomecountriesfindthemselvesbetweenthesituationsdescribedabove.Although

manymaynotimmediatelyfacetheprospectofmandatoryemissionscaps,theymaycometo

acceptsomeformofinternationallyagreedmitigationobligation.Evenifthisisnotthecase,

overtime(withincreasedaffluenceandhigherpercapitaemissionslevels)suchcontrolswill

come.Itthereforemakessensetoexplorelowemissionsenergydevelopmenttrajectoriesin

thepresent.Thismayavoidreinforcingpathdependencewithahighcarbonemitting

infrastructure,whichwillprovecostlytoreplaceinthefuture.Thisisallthemoreso

consideringthepotentialcobenefitsofmanylowcarbonoptions(financialsavingfromenergy

efficiency,environmentalandhumanhealthbenefitsfromreducingdependenceonfossilfuels,

energysecurityfromreducingdependenceonimportedfuel,andsoon).Insomecontexts,low

carbonoptionscanalreadycompeteonanevenbasiswithcarbonemittingfuels(IEA2008).

Deforestationcurrentlyaccountsfor25%30%ofhumangeneratedcarbondioxideemissions,

withmostoccurringintropicalandtemperateareasofAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmerica. Reducing

thisrate,anddevelopingwaystomanageforestsmoresustainablyisonewayinwhichmiddle

andlow

income

countries

can

make

acontribution

to

mitigation

in

the

coming

decade.

There

is

substantialevidencethatmuchofthedeforestationgenerateslittlelongtermeconomicvalue

orcontributiontosustainablelivelihoods.Soimprovementofgovernanceintheforestsector,

andtheintegrationofclimateconcernsintothisgovernance,canbringeconomicandsocialas

wellasclimatebenefits.Tacklingthisproblemwillrequireeffortsoflowandmiddleincome

suppliercountriesandlargetimberconsumers,aswellasfundingfromhigherincomestates.

Brazilprovidesanexampleofacountrywhosegovernmenthasrecentlyreaffirmedits

commitmenttostrengthenactioninthisarea.

3.Key

dimensions

of

climate

governance

Wewillnowexplorefourdimensionsofclimategovernanceandsomeinstitutionalinnovations

withwhichtheyareassociated.

1)Buildingstrategiccapacity

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12Climatechangegovernancerequiresstrategiccapacity.Strengtheningcapacitiestoaddressthis

problemcanbeconsideredunderfourheadings:

a)Leadership

Themost

important

factor

influencing

the

success

of

climate

change

governance

to

date

has

beenengagement(ornot)bythetoppoliticalleadership.Insituationswherepoliticalleaders

havetakenanactiveinterest,mattershavemovedforward.Thereisnothingthatfocusesthe

mindsofofficialsandexternalstakeholdersmorethantheknowledgethattheprimeminister

orpresidentisactivelyinterestedinafile.

However,leadershipisnotjustanindividualquestion,butalsoaninstitutionalone.Establishing

leadershipcapacityintheclimatechangeareacaninclude:

creationofacabinetcommitteeonclimatechange,oracabinetcommitteewhichlinksclimatechangewithacriticalareasuchasenergyandclimatechange;

designation

of

a

senior

government

minister

to

take

particular

responsibility

for

climate

changepolicy;

selectionofanadministrativeleadagencyonclimatechange; establishmentofanintragovernmentalcoordinatingcommittee(chairedbythelead

agency)tobringtogetherofficialsfromacrossgovernmentworkingonclimatechange;

introductionofregularreportingtoparliamentonclimatechangeobjectives,policyandperformance.

Incaseswhereinitiativesaroundclimatechangearenotdeveloped,afirststepcanbethe

creationofanationaltaskforceorparliamentarycommissionwithamandatetoconduct

hearings,investigatetheissue,educatethepublic,andreportbacktothegovernmenton

priorities.

Internationally,therearethreebasicorganizationalmodelsfordevelopingadministrative

leadershipcapacityaroundclimatechange.First,placingresponsibilityforclimatechangepolicy

withintheenvironmentministryoragency;second,establishinganindependentclimate

changeauthority(asecretariatoragency,perhapslinkedtothePrimeMinistersoffice);and

third,linkingclimatechangewithanotherseniorministry(suchasenergy).Examplesofthese

threeapproachesareprovidedby:Sweden(theMinistryoftheEnvironment);Australia(The

AustralianGreenhouseOffice(until2008));andtheUnitedKingdom(thenewlyformed

DepartmentofEnergyandClimateChange).

Theoption

pursued

by

most

states

has

been

to

lodge

responsibility

for

climate

change

with

the

environmentaldepartment(withforeignaffairsplayinganimportantroleinrelationto

internationalnegotiations).Afterall,climatechangeisanenvironmentalproblemandthe

regulationofemissionsisacoreelementofthepolicyresponse(asitisonmoretraditional

pollutionissues).Andyetproblemswiththisapproach(relatedtothecrosscuttingnatureof

climatepolicy,thesignificanteconomicimplications,thechallengesofadaptationand

mitigation,andthegeneralweaknessofenvironmentalministries)haveledsomestatesto

pursuealternatives.

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13

Primafaciethereisnoreasontopreferoneofthesepatternsovertheother.True,climate

changegovernanceshouldnotsimplybeconsideredasanenvironmentalissue:its

implicationsextendacrossgovernment,andmanagingclimatechangeimpliesinitiativesin

manykeyareas energy,industry,spatialplanning,urbanaffairs,transport,international

relations,and

so

on

(see

section

2below).

On

the

other

hand,

depending

on

the

concrete

politicalandadministrativecontextinthegivencountry,andprovidedadequateweightisgiven

totheenterpriseandappropriateintegrativemeasuresareenacted,theleadclimateagency

canbestructuredinvariousways.Eachmodelhasadvantagesanddisadvantages.Thestand

alonemodelcanresultinisolationfrommoreestablishedcentralandlinedepartments,and

Australiahasnowabandonedit.Yetinanothercontext withstrongexecutivesupport it

maybepractical.Theenvironmentministrybaseprovidescoreexpertiseandanestablished

institutionalhome,buttypicallythesearejuniorministries.Thelinkagetotheenergyministry

engagesakeysectoralconnection(fossilfuelcombustionliesattherootofclimatechange),

butitalsocontainssomerisks:climatepolicymaybecapturedoroverwhelmedbymore

establishedenergypolicyorientationsand/orothersectoralconnectionsmaybeneglected.

Atpresentitisstilltooearlytosaywhetheranyofthesemodelshasadecisiveadvantageover

theothers.Thekeyisthat,whereveritislocated,theleadclimatechangeagencymustenjoy

appropriateresources,politicalsupportfromthetop,andauthoritytoengagewithother

groupsworkinginclimatechangeacrossthewholeofgovernment.

b)Knowledgeandtheprovisionofexpertadvice

Increasedunderstandingofclimatechangeandthetransmissionofsoundscientificadviceare

essentialforgoodgovernance.Issueshereinclude:

establishingasystemtoprovideauthoritativeadvicetogovernment.Thiscanbeorganizedinavarietyofwaysincludingappointmentofachiefclimatechangeadvisor

orestablishmentofanationaladvisorycommittee.Arequirementthatadvicebe

publishedatregularintervalscanincreasetheperceivedpublicimportanceofthe

climateissue;

supportingthecontinuingdevelopmentofscientificknowledgeabouttheclimatesystemandthepotentialimpactsofclimatechange,especiallyonthehomejurisdiction;

ensuringthemonitoringofclimateandecosystemsacrossthecountry; developingcapacityineconomic,policyandsocialsciencesrelatedtoclimatechange,

becausesuchknowledgeisacrucialsupportforpolicy.

Thepotentialofeachcountrytodevelopactivitiesundertheseheadingsislinkedtothe

maturityofthenationalscientific,academic,technical,andeconomicinfrastructure.

Nevertheless,eventhepoorestcountriesshouldbeabletoestablishanationaladvisory

capacityanddomesticmonitoring.Avarietyofcapacitybuildingopportunitiesrelatedto

climatechangeexist,andgovernmentsindevelopingcountriesshouldmakeapriorityof

accessingthesefunds.

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14

c)Definingthenationalinterestandelaboratingastrategicpolicyframework:

Nationalgovernmentsassumeresponsibilityforrepresentingthecollectiveinterestsoftheir

citizens,domestically

and

internationally.

But

understandings

of

what

constitutes

the

national

interestarecontestedandchangeovertime.

Itseemsobviousthatgovernmentsshouldapproachclimatechangefromtheperspectiveofa

rigorousassessmentoftheirnationalinterestestablishingtheirpolicystanceonthebasisof

anoverallappreciationoftherisks,andalsothecostsandbenefitsofpotentialmitigationand

adaptationactions.Yetinmanycountriesthepolicystancehasevolvedinanadhocway,in

responsetocontingentdomesticpoliticalcircumstances,andtheneedtopresentpositionsin

internationalnegotiations.Inshort,thevisionispartialandfragmented.Ithasnotbeenbased

onadetailedscientific,economicandpoliticalassessment.Anditdoesnotconsiderthe

nationalinterestinamultidimensionalwaythatincludeslongtermconsiderations,andthe

collectivegoodofaprosperousandpeaceful internationalsystem.

Goodgovernanceonclimatechangerequiresaredefinitionofnationalinterestsinlightof

climatechangerisks.Thisnecessarilyentailsanefforttounderstandthepotentialimplications

ofclimatechange,andthecostsandbenefitsofpossiblemitigationandadaptationresponses.

Onthebasisofsucheffort,allgovernmentsshouldbeabletoformulateanoverallperspective

onthesignificanceofhumaninducedclimatechangeonlongtermnationalwelfare.

Somegovernmentshaveconcretizedsuchaperspectivebyadoptinganindicativetemperature

targetstatingthattheirpoliciesareintendedtorestrainglobalaveragetemperatureincreases

tosome

specified

value

(for

example,

2degrees

centigrade

for

the

European

Union).

Others

havefocusedonspecificdomesticemissionsreductiontargets(sayby2020and2050).Still

othershavefocuseddomesticactiononadaptation.Atpresentthereisnoagreedinternational

objectiveintermsofatemperaturetarget,atmosphericconcentrationtarget,orglobal

emissionsleveltarget.

Somegovernmentshavecommissionedmajorstudiestoassessclimatechangeandevaluate

appropriateresponses.ProminentexamplesaretheSternReview(UnitedKingdom,2007),the

GarnautClimateChangeReview(Australia,2008),andtheearlierreportsofGerman

ParliamentaryEnqueteCommissions(startingin1987).

Sinceclimatechangerequiresaresponsestretchingoverdecades,governmentsneedto

establishaclearstrategicpolicyframework.Thiscanprovidethestabilityrequiredto

encouragelongterminvestments(inenergyandinfrastructure,forexample)requiredto

controlemissionsandtoadapttochangingclimates.Itwillalsogroundpolicyinitiativesin

distinctivenationalconditions,includingimportantpoliticalandculturalvalues.ThusAustralias

strategicapproachhassoughttoemphasizestewardshipofauniqueislandcontinent;while

14


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15Swedenhaslinkedclimatechangepolicytotraditionalvaluesandbuildingagreenwelfare

state(Papadakis2000;Eckerberg2000).

Theparametersofthisstrategicpolicyframeworkwillvaryaccordingtoparticularnational

circumstances.Itshouldincludespecificationof:

thecountysoverallperspectiveonclimatechange; nationalobjectiveswithrespecttomitigationandadaptation; thebodiesresponsibleformakingandimplementingclimatechangepolicy themainpolicyapproaches,instruments,andfundingmechanisms; whatisexpectedfromothersocietalactors(layersofgovernment,business,civil

society,individualcitizens);

theapproachtointernationalcooperationaroundclimatechange.Inhistoricalterms,manycountrieshavedevelopedsimilaroverarchingandfutureoriented

strategicperspectiveswithrespecttoeconomicdevelopmentobjectivesand/orstrategic

defensepolicy.

It

is

not

an

issue

of

producing

asingle

showpiece

climate

change

document,

but

ratherofensuringthatthecorestrategicorientationiscleartothegovernmentitselfaswellas

tokeyexternalstakeholders.OverthepastdecadeanumberofEuropeancountries(suchas

Sweden,NorwayandtheNetherlands)havedevelopedthissortofframeworkforclimate

policy.TheNetherlands,forexample,haslinkedclimatepolicytothecountrysunique

vulnerabilitytosealevelrise;toitstraditionasanenvironmentalpolicyinnovator;andtoits

opentradeorientedeconomicstructure.

d)Buildingorganizationsfocusedonalowcarbonemissioneconomy

Existinginstitutionsandprogramsshouldbeadaptedtoaddressclimatechangeissues,butitis

alsonecessary

to

establish

bodies

that

are

focused

particularly

on

the

development

of

alow

carboneconomy.Suchspecializedbodiescanfocusonthisissue,buildnetworksofinnovation,

developexpertise,andnurtureemergingapproachestomitigationandadaptation.Awebof

suchinstitutionscanacceleratechange.

Althoughmanyclimatechangeprogramswillberundirectlybykeygovernmentdepartments

(suchasenvironment,industry,energy,health,andsoon),itisadvantageoustoencouragethe

developmentoforganizationsoutsidedirectministerialcontrol.Thesemaytakemanyforms

includingindependentagencies,publiclyfundedtrusts,jointpublic/private/notforprofit

partnerships,andsoon.Theadvantagesofsuchquasiindependentbutpubliclyfunded

organizationalforms

are

many:

they

are

protected

from

everyday

political

interference

by

politicians;theyarefreedfromcumbersomegovernmentrulesoverpurchasing,hiringand

operations;theycanmovemorequicklytoadapttocircumstancesandexploitopportunities;

theirmandatesandorganizationalformscanbestructuredspecificallyforcertaintasks

(educationorresearchorsupportingfirms);theycanbuildtheirownindependentreputations

foreffectivenessandobjectiveassessments;andtheymayhavemorecredibilitywiththepublic

andwithstakeholdersthanpoliticallylinkedofficials.

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16

Areasfortheattentionofsuchbodiesfocusedonthelowcarbonfutureinclude:

researchonthetransitiontoalowcarboneconomy,includingsocialandculturaldimensionsaswellasscientificandtechnologicalones;

educationofthepubliconthescienceofclimatechange,anticipatedimpacts,andcritical

policy

choices;

stimulationofpublicdebateandcontroversyaroundoptionsforalowcarbonfuture; criticalassessmentofnationalandinternationalpolicymeasures,andconstructive

criticismoftheperformanceofgovernmentandothersocialactors;

supportforthedevelopmentoflowcarbontechnologiesthatarenotyetreadyforcommercialization;

encouragementforcommunityengagementwithclimatechange; trainingforprofessions(buildingtrades,designers,andsoon)inlowcarbon

technologiesandprovidinghelptopublicandprivatebodiesseekingtoreducetheir

carbonfootprint;

assistanceforthoseseekingtoestablishnewbusinessesinthelowcarbonsector.Ofcourse,differenttypesoforganizationwouldbesuitedtodifferenttasks.Examplesofsuch

bodiesestablishedintheUnitedKingdomincludetheCarbonTrustandtheTyndallCentrefor

ClimateResearch(seesection4abelow).InGermanyresearchorganizationssuchasthe

WuppertalInstituteforClimate,EnvironmentandEnergyplayanimportantrole.InSwedenThe

MistraFoundationforStrategicEnvironmentalResearch(establishedwithfundingfromthe

formerwageearnerfunds)issupportingeducationandresearcharoundclimatechange.The

InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopmentinCanadaprovidesanotherexample.

Overtime,theobjectiveshouldbetocreateanarrayoforganizations,moreorless

independentofgovernment(fundedtosomeextent,oratsomepoint,throughthepublic

purse),butallalignedwiththepoliticalgoalofestablishingalowcarbonemissioneconomic

system.Byoperatingatmultiplelevels,inmultipleforums,withdifferenttypesofpublicsand

stakeholders,thesegroupscanacceleratechangeprocesses.Inevitablytherewillbesome

redundancyandoverlapsamongsuchbodies,andsomecompetitionandjostlingoverspheres

ofoperation.Somegroupsmayfailtoachievedefinedobjectives,whileotherswillexpand

morequicklythananticipated.Butthegoalisasystemoforganizationsofdifferenttypes,with

differentremits,whichtakenalltogetheracceleratechangetowardsalowcarbonfuture.

Inadditiontothespecificfunctionseachofthesegroupsperforms,collectivelytheyprovide

leadershipfor

acomplex

and

protracted

transition

towards

the

carbon

emission

free

economy.

Combinedwitha)greenbusinessorganizationsandb)notforprofitgreenorganizations,they

provideanorganizationalweightthatcanhelpovercomeinstitutionalinertia(within

governmentandwithout)thatisslowingdownsocietaladjustment.Thusbuildingthesesemi

independentagencies(inadditiontoprovidingsupportforgreenbusiness)isanimportant

strategicmeasuregovernmentscantaketostrengthenlongtermeconomicandpolitical

supportforthelowcarbonemissioneconomy.

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17

2)Integratingclimatechangeintodevelopmentdecisionmaking

Centraltothenotionofsustainabledevelopment,firstformulatedbytheBrundtland

Commissionmorethantwentyyearsago,istheideathatenvironmentanddevelopment

decisionmaking

should

be

linked

(WCED

1987).

Climate

change

represents

aperfect

case

in

point.Climatechangepoliciescanonlybesuccessfuliftheyareformulatedinrelationto

economicandsocialrealitiesandgoals.Inparticular,climatechangepoliciesneedtobe

integratedintothedevelopmenttrajectoriesofa)keysocioeconomicsectors(energy,industry,

transport,andsoon);andb)keyregions(cities,provinces,andsoon)(Lafferty2004).

Integrationimpliesanattempttofindsynergiesamongdifferenttypesofgoals(Gibsonetal

2005).Forexample,somemitigationapproachescanprovidepositiveeconomicbenefits

(removingsubsidiesthatencourageenergyusesavesmoneyaswellasloweringemissions)

and/orhealthbenefits(fuelswitchingfromcoaltogasreducesurbanairpollutionand

associatedrespiratorydisease;improvementsinruralcookstovescanimproveindoorair

quality).Ashiftawayfromdeeptillageagriculturemayprovidediversebenefitsincluding

reducedsoilerosion,highercarbondioxideretentioninthesoil,reducedfertilizerinputs,and

soon.

Intermsoftheorganizationoftheworkofgovernment,approachesforintegrationinclude:

establishingindividualsandgroupsresponsibleforclimatechangeineachministryoragency

requiringclimatechangemitigationandadaptationimplicationstobeaddressedinnational,sector,andregionaldevelopmentplans

establishingsectorandregionalclimatechangeroundtablestobringtogetherstakeholders

to

explore

climate

implications

of

current

development

paths

integratingclimatechangeintothemandatesofallpublicbodies,especiallythosewithanimportantroleinenergygovernance,andforestryandlanduseplanning.

requiringclimatechangeimpactassessmentsforallmajorinfrastructureprojects(mitigationandadaptationimplications)

Moregenerally,integrationrequirestheconsiderationofclimatechangewhendeveloping

sectorpolicies(Lenschow2002;NilssonandEckerberg2007).Thustransportpolicyshouldbe

madewithclimatechangemitigationinmind.Thesamegoesfortheconstructionindustry,and

soon.Byintegratingclimatechangeconsiderationsinatthestart,abatementandadjustment

costscan

be

kept

down.

Forexample,overthepasttwodecadestheemphasisonenergypolicyinthemanycountries

hasbeenonmarketreform,withtheintroductionofcompetitionintotheenergysector,and

developmentofregulatoryinstitutionsfocusedondeliveringlowpricesandreliablesuppliesto

consumers(DoernandGattinger2004).Butinmanycase,climatechangedidnotfeature

prominentlyinthenewarchitectureoftheelectricitysupplysystem.Asclimatechangemoves

upthepoliticalagenda,adjustmentsmustbemadetothemandatesofbodiesintheelectricity

17


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18supplysectorsothatthedevelopmentoflowcarbonelectricitysuppliesandenergyefficiency

becomesanexplicitpartoftheirresponsibilities.

Equityconsiderationsalsoformanimportantelementofclimategovernanceintegration.

Referencehasalreadybeenmadetothecomplexequityimplicationsofclimatechange.A

concernwith

fairness

is

abasic

property

of

human

social

interactions.

Equity

is

valued

in

its

own

right.And,fromtheperspectiveofgovernance,italsohasimportantinstrumentalvalue.Thisis

becauseperceptionsoffairnessmakesocialactorsmorewillingtoacceptsacrifices,and

perceptionsofinequitygeneratesocialresistanceandmaketheeffectiveimplementationof

policymoredifficult.Thedistributionalimplicationsofadaptationandmitigationpolicies

thereforeneedtobecarefullyassessed.Forexample,theremovaloffossilfuelsubsidies,orthe

impositionofacarbontax,mightadverselyaffectvulnerablegroups,andredistributive

measuresmayberequiredtoprotectthepoorfromsuchabatementstrategies.

Researchsuggeststhatintimesofcrisisorganizationsinboththepublicandprivatesectorare

moreopentoalternativestotraditionalwaysofdoingbusiness.Stakeholderswhoare

convincedthattheymustchangeinordertosurvivecan(inappropriateconditions)cometo

shareavisionforrenewalthatencompassessignificantchange.Thussectorandregional

redevelopmentplansprovideagoodcontextforintegratingclimatepolicywitheconomicand

socialinitiatives.

Inthecontextofthecurrenteconomicdownturn,forexample,thereisanopportunityfor

governmentstolinkeconomicstimuluswithclimatepolicies.Infrastructureinvestmentcanbe

targetedatsectorsandprojectswithanemissionsreductionpotential.Andclimatechange

adaptationcriteriacanbeaddedtoprojectgoalstomakesurenewinfrastructurewillbeable

toweatherconditionsthatwillemergeovercomingdecades.Swedenprovidesandexampleof

acountry

which

used

aprevious

economic

crisis

to

leverage

environmental

change.

In

the

1990sSwedenfacedaseriouseconomicdownturnwhichthreatenedjoblossesandtraditional

welfarespending.Ratherthanabandoningenvironmentalgoalsthegovernmentplace

sustainabledevelopmentatthecoreofitseconomicstimuluspackage(Eckerberg2000).

Climatechangegovernancerequiresboththeestablishmentofspecificinstitutions,groupsand

policiesandtheintegrationofclimatechangeintothenormalpracticeofgovernment. The

balanceofemphasisbetweenthesetwoimperativeswillvaryovertimeandfromcountryto

country.

3)

Societal

mobilization

Societalmobilizationiscriticaltodevelopinganeffectiveresponsetoclimatechange.Afterall,

itiscommunities,business,familiesandindividualsthatwillhavetochangetheirbehaviorsand

toprovidethesocialandtechnologicalinnovationsrequiredtoreducegreenhousegas

emissionsandtoadapttoachangingclimate.Acentraldimensionofclimatechange

governanceinvolvesfindingapproachestoactivatedynamicforcesinsocietytoengagewith

theclimatechallenge.Importantapproachestothistaskinclude:

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19 sendingconsistenteconomicsignalsthatencouragesomebehaviorsanddiscourage

othersthroughoutsocietyforexample,encouragingenergyefficiencyand

discouragingtheuseofenergyproducedfromhighcarbonemissionsources;

developingpubliceducationaboutclimatechangemitigationandadaptation.Thisincludeschangestothecurriculumofschools,collegesanduniversities.Themedia

provideacritical

link

to

the

public,

and

activities

can

be

organized

to

raise

the

awarenessofjournalists.Professionalorganizations(doctors,scientists,nurses,

architects,engineers,publicservants,teachers,farmers,andsoon),business

associationsandtradeunionsalsohaveanimportanteducationalpotential.Theycan

communicatewiththeirmembersandbringthemtailoredmessagesthataremore

likelytobebelieved.

engagingcitiesandlocalities.Climatechangeisalwaysexperiencedlocally;thevastmajorityoftheworldspopulationnowlivesincities;andthelocallevelofgovernment

isclosesttotheeverydaylifeofcitizens.Ifmitigationandadaptationactivitiesareto

becomeconcreteforordinarycitizens,citiesandlocalgovernmentsarekey.The

development

of

neighborhood

based

activities

can

activate

a

great

dynamic

potential

forchange.

encouragingparticipationofstakeholdersinkeysocioeconomicsectors.Manyoftheconcretestrategiesforemissionsreductionandadaptationmustbedevelopedand

appliedatthesectorlevel,andthemobilizationofkeysectorplayers(businesses,labor

organizations,andenvironmentalorganizations)isessentialforinnovation(Glasbergen,

Biermann,andMol2007).

encouraginginformedpublicdiscussion.Climatechangegovernanceinvolvescomplexandcontesteddecisionsanddifficultpolicychoices.Thesedecisionsaffectlongterm

societalwelfareandthedistributionofcostsandbenefits.Itisonlyrightthatcitizensbe

involvedinthesedecisions.Byinvolvingtheminpublicdebateanddiscussiontheycan

cometo

appreciate

more

clearly

the

difficult

trade

offs

policy

makers

confront,

and

they

willbemorewillingtoassumetheirpartofthecollectivesocietalburdenofadjustingto

climatechange.

Traditionally,governmentsareambivalentaboutsocietalmobilization.Onetheonehand,itis

nicetohavecitizensactivelysupportinggovernmentinitiativesandapplaudingministerial

statements.Ontheotherhand,activecitizensandstakeholderstendtobedemanding,and

moreopenpublicdebatecanalsobringmorecriticismofofficialsandresistancetoproposed

policy.Sometimesstakeholdersandpublicscanmobilizetoblockneededreforms.Inother

casestheyresistdistributionalconsequencesofgovernmentaction.Moreover,indeveloped

countriesgovernments

are

sometimes

wary

of

taking

on

an

educational

role,

arguing

that

at

mosttheycanprovideinformation,andconsumersmustbelefttomakeuptheirownminds.

Inanycase,inmanycontextsconsumersaredistrustfulofmessagescomingfromgovernment

(forexample,reassurancesaboutfoodsafety).Publicskepticismisusuallybasedonprevious

experienceswherepoliticallymotivatemessagesturnedouttobefalseoronesided.

Butthedepthofsocietalchangerequiredbyclimatechangeadjustmentandthelongtime

frameoverwhichtheissuewillplayout(50100yearsandmore)meanthatsuccessfulpolicy

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20cannotbeengineeredbyvisionarypoliticiansandefficientbureaucratsbehindthebacksof

thecitizens.Ifthepopulationisunhappywiththeorientationofpolicytheywillultimatelyhave

manyoccasionstoundermineimplementationorensureachangeoforientation.Moreover,

governmentscannotknowinadvancetheappropriateshapeoflowcarboneconomic

institutionsdecadesfromnow.Moreover,resistancewillcomeanyway(assomeactorstryto

avoidcosts

imposed

by

adaptation

or

mitigation).

So

it

is

preferable

to

involve

key

stakeholders

inpolicydebatesanddesignfromtheoutset.

4)Learninghowtodoclimatechangegovernance

Humansocietiesareatthebeginningofaprocessofunderstandingtheclimatechangeissue,

andofdevelopinginstitutionsandapproachessuitedtoitsmanagement.Preciselybecausewe

havesuchlimitedexperienceitisimportanttoadoptalearningorientedapproachtoclimate

changegovernance.

Centraltosuchanapproachare:

theefforttodeveloppolicyinaniterativemanner,whereobjectivesarecarefullyspecified,policytoolsareselected,policiesareimplemented,andthentheresultsare

criticallyassessed,beforeanewroundofpolicydesignandimplementationislaunched;

thecarefulformulationofmeasurablegoals,targetsandindicators,becausewithclearobjectivesitiseasiertodeterminetheextenttowhichprogressisbeingmadetoattain

them;

theestablishmentofmonitoringprogramstotrackclimaterelatedchangesandtheimpactsofpolicy;

thecreationofanarrayofindependentassessmentorganizationsthatcanproviderigorousevaluationofthestateoftheenvironment,humanpressuresandthe

effectivenessof

policy.

Basing

such

organizations

outside

the

purview

of

the

executive

branchofgovernmentensuresthattheycanofferindependentadvice,thatcanbe

trustedbythepublic,andwillnotbecompromisedbypoliticalinterference

(Meadowcroft2007b);

theadoptionofanexperimentalapproachinthefieldsofpolicydesign,socialinnovationandtechnologicaldevelopment.Inmanyspheresoflifehumansdevelop

experimentstotrialnewideas,gainexperience,andsortoutmoreorlesspromising

innovations.Governmentsalsoneedtoexperimentwithpolicyoptions,andtosupport

promisingnewsocialpractices,andalternativetechnologicalsolutions(Kemp,Rotmans

andLoorbach2007).Experimentsalwaysinvolverisk:becauseonecannotknowin

advancewhich

will

succeed

and

which

will

fail.

But

by

managing

portfolios

of

experiments,onecanmoderatethisriskandidentifywinners.Andevenunsuccessful

venturesareoftenrichwithlessons;

theencouragementoftransparencyinclimatechangegovernance; thepromotionofsocietalreflexivity acontinuingprocessofcollectivereflection

aboutsocialgoalsandthemeansofattainingthem,involvingpoliticalforums,policy

makinginstitutionsandthepublicsphere(Grin2006;VoandKemp2006).

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21

Despitetheobviousrelevanceofalearningorientedapproach,governmentsareoften

reluctanttotalkintheseterms.Officialsinmanycountries(includingmanydeveloped

democraticstates)remainhorrifiedatthethoughtofindependentappraisalsofthe

effectivenessofpolicymeasuresandgovernmentoperations.Politiciansworrythatcallinga

policyapproach

experimental

may

give

the

impression

it

has

not

been

thought

through.

There

ispressuretocomeupwithfirmanswerstopolicyproblems.Butexplainingwhywecannot

havealltheanswerstoday,andwhyitissometimesgoodtotrialpolicyinnovations,andthen

drawlessonsfromtheexperience,ispartofthepubliceducationchallengeconfronting

governments.Itisnotjustaboutthecauseandpotentialimpactsofclimatechangethatcitizens

requireeducation.Theyalsoneedabetterappreciationofthescience/policyinterface,ofthe

needtoadoptsoundpolicyinaclimateofpervasiveuncertainty,andoftheimportanceofa

learningorientedpublicpolicy.

TheNetherlandsprovidesanumberofexamplesoflearningorientedenvironmentalpolicy.

TheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyPlansNEPPIIV,from1989to2002)establishedaniterative

processthatdrewlessonsfromeachroundofpolicymakingtodevelopaprogressivelymore

comprehensiveandcoherentapproachtomanagingenvironmentalburdens(NEPP42002).The

NetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency(PBL2008)providesindependentassessment

ofsocialtrendsandpolicyimpactsintheareaofenvironment,climatechangeand

sustainability.Suchassessmentsareroutinelyusedtoadjustpolicyorientations,andhavebeen

soughtoutbygovernmentofficialsandpoliticians.Moreover,thetransitionmanagement

approach(Rotmans,KempandM.vanAsselt2001)adoptedsinceNEPP4in2002isexplicitly

centeredonthenotionoftransitionexperimentstoacceleratemovementtowards

sustainability(seeSection4cbelow).

Withrespect

to

reflexivity,

this

is

best

understood

as

aproduct

of

the

interaction

of

diverse

societalinstitutionsandongoingprocessesofdebateandlessondrawinginthepublicsphere.

Criticalelementsforitsdevelopmentare:abroadandvibrantcivilsocietycapableof

independentevaluationofpolicyperformanceandsubstantialselforganization;transparency

ofpolicymaking,andoftheclimateperformanceofcorporationsandpublicbodies(for

examplethroughcompulsoryreportingrequirements);andcontinuingopennesstoreconsider

notjustthemeansforpolicyattainmentbutalsothegoalsofpolicy.

4.Someexamplesofrecentgovernanceinnovations2

2ThissectiondrawsmaterialdirectlyfromascopingpaperrecentlycompletedforthePolicy

ResearchInitiativeinCanada:JamesMeadowcroftandFrancoisBregha,Governancefor

sustainabledevelopment:meetingthechallengeahead,Ottawa,2009).

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22Overthetwodecadesgovernments(particularlyindevelopedcountries)haveexperimented

withavarietyofclimategovernanceapproaches.Thissectionbrieflypresentsthreeexamples

drawnfromtheUnitedKingdom,SwedenandtheNetherlands.

a)TheUnitedKingdom

OverthepastdecadetheUnitedKingdomhasdevelopedasetofinnovativeapproachesfor

climatechangegovernance.Thishasincludedthecreationofneworganizationsanddetailed

policyframeworks.ThemostrecentadditionstothesystemareincludedintheClimateChange

Act2008.KeyprovisionsofthisActincludethecreationofperiodiccarbonbudgetsandthe

establishmentofastatutoryClimateChangeCommitteetoadvisegovernmentonitsemissions

reductionstrategies.

TheUnitedKingdomengagedearlywiththeclimatechangeissue.Throughacombinationof

factors includingafirmcommitmentattheprimeministeriallevel,astrongandinfluential

scientificinput,andfortuitouscircumstancesthatresultedinsignificantemissionsreductions

(theswitchfromcoaltogas)ithasemergedasaninternationalleaderinthisarea.An

importantfeatureoftheUKeffortonclimatechangehasbeentheemphasisonprocessesthat

establishgovernmentresponsibilityinthisarea,andinstitutionbuildingthecreationof

publiclysupportedbodieswithexplicitremitslinkedtoclimatechange.

Suchinstitutionsinclude:

TheCarbonTrust,setupin2001toencourageinnovationforalowcarboneconomy.TheTrustoperatesasanindependentcompany,carryingouteducationalworkand

providingloansandgrants.Itoperatesaventurecapitalfundandtechnologyincubator.

Ithas

also

launched

aCarbon

Trust

Standard

and

Carbon

Label.

A

typical

example

of

its

workistherecentannouncementofTheOffshoreWindAccelerator:afiveyear30

millionpoundresearchanddemonstrationprojecttoreducethecostofoffshorewind

inthenearandmidtermfuture.Theprojectfocusesonissuessuchasdeepsea

foundations,reductionofwakeeffects,andelectricalcontrolsystems.Industrial

partnersincludesomeofthelargestplayersinwindandoffshoredevelopmentsuchas

ScottishPowerandStatoilHydro.

TheTyndallCentreforClimateResearch,hasbeensetuptocoordinateinterdisciplinaryresearcharoundclimatechange,mitigationandadaptation.Aconsortiumestablished

bysixmajorresearchinstitutionsandinvolvingdozensofotherpartners,ithasbeen

financedby

three

UK

Research

Councils.

TheHadleyCentreforClimatePredictionandResearch,istheofficialcenterforscientific

researcharoundclimateintheUK.ItisbasedintheUKMetofficeandpartlyfundedby

theDepartmentfortheEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs.TheCentrehasbeen

involvedinthedevelopmentoflongtermclimatemodels,butalsohasprogramsfor

outreachandeducationaroundclimatechange.

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23RecentgovernmentalreorganizationintheUKincludestheestablishmentofanewDepartment

ofEnergyandClimateChange(October2008).Itmergestheenergydivisionfromthe

DepartmentofBusinessEnterpriseandRegulatoryreform(BERR)andtheclimatechange

sectionfromtheDepartmentfortheEnvironmentandRuralAffairs(DEFRA).Thenewministry

isresponsibleforenergysecurityandclimatechange.ItisledbyaSecretaryofStateand

includestwo

Ministers

of

State

and

aParliamentary

Under

Secretary

of

State.

The

purpose

of

thechangeistomorecloselyintegrateenergyandclimateinitiatives.

However,themostinterestingrecentinnovationsareintheClimateBill2008.Keyprovisionsof

thislegislationinclude:

ProvidingastatutoryfoundationfortheofficialUKcarbondioxideemissionstargetsofatleasta26%reductionby2020,anda80%reductionby2050,basedon1990levels..

Establishingasystemoffiveyearcarbonbudgetswhichsetannuallevelsforpermissibleemissions.Threebudgetsspanningafifteenyeartimehorizonwillbeactiveatanygiven

time,presentingamediumtermperspectivefortheevolutionofcarbonemissionsover

the

economy

as

a

whole.

The

first

budgets

relate

to

the

years

2008

2012,

2013

2017,

and20182022.

EstablishingaCommitteeonClimateChange,asanindependentexpertadvisorybodywhichcanmakerecommendationstogovernmentconcerningthepathwaytothe2050

targetandtoadvisespecificallyon:thelevelofcarbonbudgets,reductioneffortneeded

bysectorsoftheeconomycoveredbytradingschemes,andothersectors,andonthe

optimumbalancebetweendomesticactionandinternationaltradingincarbon

allowances(DEFRA2008).TheCommitteewillreportannuallytoparliament,and

governmentwillberequiredtoformallyreplytoitsreports.Everyfiveyearsthe

Committeewillofferamorecomprehensiveassessmentofthecountrysoverall

progresstowardsthelongtermtargets.

Whileitisfartooearlytotellhowthissystemwillworkoutinpractice,itcontainsanumberof

promisingfeatures.First,thenotionofcarbonbudgetsemphasizestoallsocietalactorsthe

ideaofacarbonconstrainedworld:thattheeconomymustfunctionwithinlimitsdefinedby

ecosystemfunctions.Justasafamilymustlivewithinitsfinancialbudget,somustthenation

livewithinitscarbonbudget.Second,itplacestheemissionsreductioneffortswithinalong

termperspective,butalsolinkstheshortterm,mediumtermsandlongterm.Theannual

accounting,fiveyearbudget,fifteenyearbudgetedperiod,andfortyyeargoalsareconnected

sothatthelinkbetweencurrentbehaviorandlongtermobjectivesremainspresent.Third,the

establishmentofanindependentexpertgroupatarmslengthfromgovernmentemphasizes

thatscientific

knowledge

must

orient

action

and

decisions

must

not

be

driven

by

everyday

politicalconcerns.Fourth,theregularreportingmechanisms,andthedirectinvolvementof

Parliamentemphasizethesignificanceoftheissueandopenpossibilitiesforcontinuouspolicy

adjustmentandlessondrawing.

b)Sweden

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24Swedenhasbeenafrontrunnerinclimatepolicysincetheissueemergedontheinternational

agendainthelate1980s.Thisrepresentsacontinuationofthecountrysleadershipin

environmentalmattersfromthelate1960s,signaledbyitshostingofthe1972UnitedNations

ConferenceontheHumanEnvironment.Whilemanynationslaterabandonedenergyefficiency

measuresadoptedinthewakeoftheoilpricerisesofthe1970s,Swedencontinuedtopromote

energyefficiency

and

non

fossil

based

energy

resources.

In

1991

Sweden

became

only

the

secondcountryintheworld(afterFinland)tointroducecarbontaxes.Awideportfolioofpolicy

initiativesoverthepasttwentyyearshasincludedparticularemphasisondistrictheating,

biomass,andimprovedenergyefficiency.Districtheatingnowaccountsforabout40%ofthe

heatingmarketinSwedenwithmorethan60%ofthefuelforsuchsystemscomingfrom

biomass. Biomassisalsoincreasinglyimportantintheforestrysector.Since2003Swedenhas

operatedagreencertificatesystemtopromoterenewableenergy.By2008oilusehadfallento

30%ofthetotalenergysupply,from70%in1970.Greenhousegasemissionshadalsofallenby

morethan40%sincethemid1970s.

LeadershiponclimatechangeissuesrestswiththeMinistryoftheEnvironmentwhichon

energyrelatedclimateissuesnowworkscloselywiththeMinistryofEnterprise,Energyand

Communications.Examplesofrecentpolicyinitiativesincludethecreationofanational

networkforwindpower(SME2008)toexpandtherelativelyunderdevelopedwindsector,

measurestoimprovefurthertheenergyefficiencyofthehousingstock,industrialplants,and

thetransportsector.

Overall,theSwedishapproachhasreliedheavilyongovernmentinterventionandplanning.It

hasalsoemphasizedconsultationwithkeystakeholdersandmunicipalities.ALocalAgenda21

movementplayedanimportantpartinmobilizingthepublicandlocalcommunitiesinthe

1990s(EckerbergandForsberg1998).

OneofthemostinnovativefeaturesoftheSwedishapproachhasbeenthedevelopmentof

integratedsystemofenvironmentalobjectives.Thishassentclimatepolicywithinabroaderset

ofgoalsrelatedtoendingtheintergenerationaltransferofenvironmentalburdens.

AdoptedbytheSwedishParliamentafterextensiveconsultationwithstakeholders,the

environmentalobjectivesincludeallmajorenvironmentalissuesandhavebeenoperationalized

throughquantitativetargetsandindicators.TheinitiativeisoverseenbyanEnvironmental

ObjectivesCouncil(composedofkeygovernmentagenciesandimportantsocietal

stakeholders)whichissupportedbyasecretariatbasedintheSwedishEnvironmental

Protection

Agency.

In1999Parliamentadopted15broadenvironmentalobjectiveswhichwereseenasintegralto

theambitiousgoalofresolvingallmajorexistingenvironmentalproblemswithinone

generation(2020forallobjectivesexceptclimatechange,whichwas2050).Thefirstofthe

sixteenobjectivesisaReducedclimateimpact.Othersrelatetocleanair,theozonelayer,

eutrification,andsoon. In2005asixteenthobjectivewasaddedrelatedtobiodiversity.

24


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25Severalyearsweretakentoelaboratethedetailedcontentofthegoals,todevelopfeasible

timelinesfortheirattainment,tofixinterimtargets,selectappropriateindicators,anddevise

implementationapproaches.Allrelevantstakeholdersincludingcentralministriesandagencies,

otherlayersofgovernments,business,andcivilsocietyactorswereconsultedandactively

involvedindevelopingtheobjectivesandtheplansfortheirattainment.In2002anational

EnvironmentalObjectives

Council

was

created

to

monitor

the

effort.

It

is

composed

of

representativesfromcentralgovernmentagencies,countyadministrativeboards,local

authorities,nongovernmentalorganizationsandbusiness.Itsprincipalresponsibilitiesareto

monitorandassessperformance,coordinateimplementationeffortsandadvicethe

governmentonadditionalmeasuresthatmayberequired(EOC2008).TheEnvironmental

ObjectivesCouncilpublishesannualreportstrackingprogresstowardstheattainmentofthe

objectives.Everyfouryearsitpublishesmoredetailedstudiesthatassesstheoverallstatusof

theinitiativeandmakerecommendationstothegovernment.

Themostimportantinstrumentforrealizingtheenvironmentalobjectivesisthenational

EnvironmentalCode(adoptedin1998)whichharmonizesenvironmentallawinSweden.The

countyadministrativeboardsandthemunicipalitiesareresponsibleforregionalgoals.Atthe

nationallevel,responsibilityforeachobjectivehasbeenassignedtoaleadagency.

IntermsofclimatechangegovernancetheSwedishsystemofenvironmentalobjectiveshasa

numberofinterestingfeatures.First,itsetsclimatemitigationwithintheframeworkofa

broadereffortontheenvironmentalfront.Althoughtheoriginalgoalofresolvingall(domestic)

environmentalproblemswithintwentyyearsnowappearshopelesslyoptimistic,itreflecteda

strongpoliticalcommitmenttoleaveabetterworldtothenextgenerationbycleaningup

environmentalpollutionandmovingtowardssustainableuseofthebiosphere.Thisnormative

framehasbeenbroadlyacceptedinSwedenandconstitutesasignificantideational

underpinningfor

avigorous

climate

policy.

Second,althoughthisapproachemployswidespreadcollaborationandconsultation,anda

varietyofpolicyinstruments(includingeconomicinstruments),itrestsonastrongregulatory

roleforcentralgovernment.ItreliesonthestrengthsoftheSwedishplanningapproachand

theadministrativecompetenceofthebureaucracy.Lundqvisthasdescribedthisas

sustainabilitythroughmanagementbyobjectives(2004).Thusgovernmentandpublicservice

havenothesitatedtotakeanactiveleadershiproleinhelpingtoarticulateclearlongterm

societalgoals.

Third,

while

this

system

was

developed

in

a

relatively

centralized

and

homogeneous

state

with

astrongtraditionofgovernmentalsteering,thereareelementsthatcouldbeadaptedtoother

circumstances.Ofparticularinterestare:theestablishmentofanindependentmulti

stakeholderbodytoconductassessmentsandprovideadvice;thesettingofgeneralgoalswith

quantifiabletargets,indicatorsandinterimobjectives;theassignmentofclearresponsibility

withingovernmentfortheattainmentofeachobjective;thepublicationofregular

assessments;andtheactiveroleofparliamentinsettingtheparametersoftheinitiative.

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26c)TheNetherlands

TheNetherlandshasalsobeenapioneerinenvironmentalandclimatepolicy(Andersonand

Liefferink1997).ItsNationalEnvironmentalPolicyPlansachievedearlyprominencefortakinga

comprehensiveandlongtermviewofmanagingnationalenvironmentalburdens.Overthepast

decadeagreat

deal

of

emphasis

has

been

placed

on

new

policy

instruments,

including

negotiatedagreementsbetweengovernmentandindustry,includingintheenergyefficiency

andclimatechangeareas(DriessenandGlasbergen2002).TheNetherlandswasanearly

adopterofacarbontax,hasextremelyactiveresearchnetworksaroundclimatechange

(includingeconomicandsocialaswellasnaturalscientificfields),andhasbeenavigorous

proponentofEUclimatepolicy.

Transitionmanagementisoneofthemostdistinctivegovernanceperspectiveswithdirect

relevancetoclimatechangetobedevelopedintheNetherlands. Thisapproachfocuseson

identifyingpromisingpathwaysfortheevolutionofkeysocietalsectors(theenergysystem,

agriculture,healthcare,andsoon),anddevelopingaportfoliooftransitionexperimentsto

accelerateinnovationandexplorepotentialavenuesforchange.Theseactivitiesaresupported

bygovernmentandcarriedoutincollaborationwithkeysocietalstakeholders.

TransitionmanagementwasfirstadoptedbythegovernmentintheFourthNational

EnvironmentalPolicyPlan(NEPP)in2002.ThePlanpointedtotheneedforlargescale

transitionsinkeysocietalsectorsinordertoaddresspersistentenvironmentalproblems.For

example,themobilitysystemrequiresafundamentaltransformation(becauseofitscurrent

dependenceonoil)ifsocietyistoavoidthedangerousclimatechangecausedbygreenhouse

gasemissions.Similarchangeswererequiredinotherareas.Butsuchdeepchangemighttake

oneormoregenerationstoachieve.Andtheideaoftransitionmanagementwasintroduced

asatechnique

for

consciously

orienting

and

managing

such

long

term

change.

Thetheoreticalunderpinningsoftransitionmanagementweredevelopedbyanumberof

prominentDutchresearchersconcernedwithinnovationpolicyandsustainabilitydevelopment

(KempandRotmans2005;Geels2005).Theyexaminedhistoricalcasesofearliersocio

technologicaltransitionanddrewlessonsaboutthecharacterofchangeprocesses.Keyinsights

revolvedaroundtheimportanceofprotectednicheswhereemergingtechnologiesmature,the

valueofexperimentstotryoutalternatives,theimportanceofnetworkingamonginnovators,

andthetendencyfordominantsociotechnologicalregimestoresistsystemchangeandfavor

incrementaladjustmentstoestablisheddesigns.

IntheNetherlandstheapproachwastakenupwithparticularenthusiasmbytheMinistryfor

Economicaffairswhichhasresponsibilityforenergypolicy.Initialstepsinvolvedconsultation

withstakeholders,thedevelopmentoflongrangeenergyscenarios,andtheselectionofkey

themestoensureaclean,affordable,andsecureenergysupply.Transitionplatformswere

establishedtoelaboratemoredetailedvisionsaroundsixthemes(chainefficiency,green

resources,newgas,sustainablemobility,sustainableelectricity,andthebuilt

environment)andtoidentifytransitionpathwaystorealizethesevisions.Fundinghasbeen

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27providedfordozensoftransitionexperiments,proposedbydifferentcombinationsof

stakeholders,totryoutnovelpracticesintheenergyfield.Otherdevelopmentshaveincluded

theestablishmentofaTrendsettersDesktoassistinnovativefirms.In2005governanceofthe

wholeprocesswasformalizedthroughasteeringcommittee(TaskforceontheEnergy

Transition,ledbytheChairmanofShell),andaninterdepartmentalcoordinatingcommittee

thatincluded

representatives

from

six

implicated

ministries.

AcrosstheNetherlandstransitionexperimentsnownumberinthehundreds.Forexample,in

thehealthcaresectorasteeringcommitteejudgesproposalssubmittedbystakeholders,and

supportisprovidedforthemostpromisingapproachestoimprovingpatientcare.Atthecoreof

transitionmanagementistheideaofencouraginginnovators,developingcollaborative

visioningexercisesofthefuture,andsupportingpracticalexperimentswhichpushbeyond

establishedpracticesanddefinealternativetechnologicalandsocialpathways.

Withrespecttoclimatechangegovernancetransitionmanagementhasanumberofinteresting

features.First,itisdeliberatelyfocusedontheproblemsofpathdependence,institutional

inertia,and

system

lock

in.

It

seeks

to

probe

the

limits

of

existing

approaches

and

develop

morefundamentalalternatives. Itattemptstochartaroleforgovernmentinseekingto

accelerateandorientchangeinthedesired lowcarbonemissions directions.Second,it

emphasizesnetworksandthemobilizationofinnovators.Whilemanygovernmentregulation

andsubsidyprogramsengagewiththemainstream,orevenlaggingenterprises,thisapproach

istargetedatthemostinnovativefirmsandtechnologies.Third,ittriestoavoidpicking

winnersintheshortterm,insteadencouragingcompetitionamongtechnologicalandsocial

options,andleavingopenforthefuture(andselectiveprocesses)thedeterminationofwhich

alternativesbestsatisfyevolvingsocialneeds.

5.FurtherdiscussionClimatechangegovernanceposesdifficultchallengesforcontemporarypolitico/administrative

systems.Inthefirstsectionofthispaperreferencewasmadetofivekeyfeatures:societal

reach,scientificuncertainty,distributionalandequitylinkages,longtimeframes,andglobal

implications.Aboveall,itistheinteractionsamongtheseelementsthatmatter.Thusthedeep

societalreach,andthedistributionalandequitylinkages,meanthatestablishedinterestscan

feelthreatenedbytheimplementationofmitigationinitiatives.Andwhentheinfluenceof

groupswhofearadverseconsequencesofmitigationpoliciesiscombinedwithscientific

uncertainty,thecomplexityofreachingglobalagreements,andlongtimeframes,thenatural

tendencyis

for

governments

to

delay

action,

to

seek

to

avoid

antagonizing

influential

groups,

andtoadoptlessambitiousclimateprograms.Thisisallthemoretruewhenthereareother

pressingproblems(includingeconomicdislocation,reformofhealthandpensionsystems,and

developmentimperatives)thatrequireattention.

Conflictsofpowerandinterestarethereforeanimportantexplanatoryfactorfortheslowness

governmentshaveevidencedinestablishingadequateclimategovernanceregimes.Thisreality

27


30/42

28shouldnotbepaperedover,butshouldbeaddresseddirectly.Avigorousapproachtoclimate

changegovernance(especiallyonthemitigationside)cannotavoiddisturbingpowerful

economicandpoliticalinterests.Toaddressclimatechangemeanschangingthewaythingsare

beingdonetodayespeciallyintermsofproductionandconsumptionpracticesinkeysectors

suchasenergy,agriculture,construction,andsoon.Butsomeofthemostpowerfulgroupsin

societyhave

done

well

from

existing

arrangements,

and

they

are

cautious

about

disturbing

the

statusquo.

Thisisnottosuggestthatinterestsarefixed.Infacttheyarehighlymutable.Andtheycanbe

redefinedbychangedunderstandings,consciousagreements,newincentivestructures,or

otherwisealteredcircumstances.Climatechangegovernancerequiresgovernmentstotakean

activeroleinbringingaboutsuchshiftsininterestperceptionssothatstablesocietalmajorities

infavorofdeployinganactivemitigationandadaptationpolicyregimecanbemaintained.

Avarietyofapproachesmaybeofusehere,including:

Buildingcoalitionsforchange.Societalchangeisadifficultprocessthatimposescostsonsocial

actors.Governmentscanuseavarietyoftoolstobuildchangecoalitionsincludingmoral

injunctions,publicinformationandeducation,andmaterialincentives.Coalitionbuildingisa

basicfeatureofpoliticalaction,andmostsuccessfulpoliticianshaveaninstinctivegraspofthe

needtobuildalliancesandrecruitalliesinordertosecuresupport.Whatmaynotimmediately

beclear,however,ishowalliancesaretobebuilttosupportmajordisturbancestoestablished

waysofdoingbusiness,suchasthoseimpliedbymanagingclimatechange.Oneapproachisto

emphasizecobenefits.Thusmitigationpolicycanbelinkedtoindustrialpolicyandinnovation

policy.Somoneyinvestedinemissionsreductionisnotseenaswasted,butasdeployedto

developnewtechnologies,establishnewfirmsandproductlines,create`greenjobs,export

markets,and

so

on.

Mitigation

policy

can

also

be

linked

to

heath

policy.

For

example,

reducing

coaluse(byincreasingefficiency,fuelswitchingtooilorgas,ordevelopingnoncarbon

2009_world bank_climate change governance

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