2007-2008 human rights council report card

8/10/2019 2007-2008 Human Rights Council Report Card

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HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL REPORT CARD:

GOVERNMENTPOSITIONSONKEYISSUES

2007 2008


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REGIONAL GROUPS OTHER CROSS-REGIONAL BLOCS

African Group (13 members)Asian Group (13 members)

Eastern European Group (6 members)Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC) (8 members)Western European and Others Group (WEOG) (7 members)

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)(15 members on the Council)

European Union (EU) (7 members on the Council

)Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (28 members on the Council)Group of Arab States (5 members on the Council)

COUNTRY COUNTRY COUNTRY

Angola

Azerbaijan

Bangladesh

Bolivia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Brazil

Cameroon

Canada

ChinaCuba

Djibouti

Egypt

France

Gabon

Germany

Ghana

Guatemala

India

Indonesia

Italy

Japan

Jordan

Madagascar

Malaysia

MaliMauritius

Mexico

Netherlands

Nicaragua

Nigeria

Pakistan

Peru

Philippines

Qatar

Republic of Korea

Romania

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Slovenia

South AfricaSri Lanka

Switzerland

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Uruguay

Zambia

MEMBERSHIP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: 2007-2008 CYCLE

DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL GROUPS AND BLOCS

Regional groups form the basis for geographic representation on the Human Rights Council (the Council) through designated seats. The

membership of the Council consists of 13 member states from the African Group, 13 from the Asian Group, 6 from the Eastern European

Group, 8 from the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and 7 from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). These

seats are subject to annual elections held in May to fill one third of the 47-member body. The regional groups serve as the primary form of

political organization and negotiation centers at the Council. Several trends in these regional groups were noticeable over the 2007-2008 cycle,

including the African Groups policy of speaking as a group with little exception, and GRULAC and the Asian Group speaking collectively

only on occasion. In addition to these regional groups, there are several cross-regional blocs active at the Council that represent geopoliti-

cal alliances, including the European Union (EU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Group of Arab States, and the

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The OIC, with 15 members on the Council during the 2007-2008 cycle, carried more weight than any of

the single regional groupings. The OIC frequently spoke and voted as a group, and was joined in its positions on many issues by the African

Group, as well as Cuba and Nicaragua. The EU, with 7 members on the Council this cycle, almost always spoke and voted as a group. Cana-

da, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Ukraine voted regularly with the EU. Slightly less active at the Council, the

NAM, with its 28 members on the Council, and the Group of Arab States with 5 members, occasionally spoke as a group on such topics such

as the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Throughout the cycle, select countries in GRULAC and non-OIC African and Asian states served as

swing states on a range of thematic and country-specific issues.

OFFICERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: 2007-2008PRESIDENT:Mr. Doru Romulus Costea (Romania)

VICE-PRESIDENTS:Mr. Mohamed-Siad Doualeh (Djibouti), Mr. Boudewijn van Eenennaam (Netherlands) & Mr. Dayan Jayatilleka (Sri Lanka)VICE-PRESIDENT AND RAPPORTEUR:Mr. Alejandro Artucio (Uruguay)


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ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT POSITIONS ON

KEY HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 2007-2008

As part of its regular series of reports monitoring United Nations

human rights bodies, the Democracy Coalition Project (DCP)

undertook once again to provide an independent analysis of the

performance of states at the UN Human Rights Council (the

Council) during the Councils second year of work.

During the 2007-2008 year (also referred to as the second cycle), the

Council convened the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth regular sessions,

as well as the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh special sessions. During

this cycle, the Council focused on addressing country specific and

thematic human rights issues and launched the Universal Periodic

Review (UPR). It also started the process of review, rationalization,

and improvement of special procedures mandates, and selected and

or renewed the terms of mandate holders. In addition, the Council

deliberated on its working methods and procedures, including the

participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Altogether, the Council adopted 128 resolutions and decisions, and

4 presidential statements, including 54 dealing with country-specific

situations.1It renewed or established 35 special procedures mandates

and held two working groups to review the human rights records of

32 UN member states under the new UPR mechanism.

METHODOLOGY

DCP has selected a set of indicators from the debates and decisions

taken by the Council over the 2007-2008 cycle and tracked

government positions for them.2They consist of key thematic,

country-specific, and procedural issues identified by DCP as key

indicators of a governments commitment to the promotion and

protection of human rights.

DCP did not track the positions of governments on all the decisions

and issues considered by the Council as some issues lacked

substantive debate among member states; some debates did not resultin any action or produce sufficient government positions to warrant

tracking; and on some resolutions and issues, DCP did not take

positions. In our analysis, we discuss what we believe were the most

significant debates of the second cycle even if positions for them were

not tracked.3

To establish the positions of governments on these issues, DCP

consulted the public record through available documentation and

webcasts provided on the Human Rights Council webpage and

through summaries of debates provided by the Council Monitor

published by the International Service for Human Rights. Based on

this information, each country was evaluated against a preferred

position, which was considered the best option for the protection and

promotion of human rights, and marked with a , , or in the

accompanying table on page 12-13.

During this years debates, governments continued to speak on

behalf of regional, cross-regional, or geopolitical groupings of

states. In these cases, members of groups were assumed to support

the group opinion unless they specifically expressed an alternative

view. In cases of special sessions, governments were credited for

supporting a session only if they did so individually. Similarly the

positions of observer states were tracked only in cases where they

spoke out individually on an issue; unlike members, observers were

not automatically credited with the positions of groups to which

they belong.4It should also be noted that many consultations were

conducted behind closed doors; in these circumstances, it was difficul

to ascertain the role played by many states. Analyzing the public

statements and votes of governments was judged to be the most

accurate way to hold governments accountable in a uniform manner.

THEMATIC ISSUESFREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION

The Human Rights Council addressed a variety of thematic issues

during the second cycle. Among them was a dramatic debate during

the Seventh session on the renewal of the mandate of the Special

Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Opinion and

Expression. Originally intended to be a procedural resolution, the

debate became divisive when some states favored altering the scope of

the mandate to include reporting on abuses of freedom of expression

as well as violations of this right.

Citing recent caricatures and documentaries insulting Islam, Pakistan

on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)5

introduced an amendment calling for the mandate holder toreport on instances in which the abuse of the right of freedom of

expression constitutes an act of racial or religious discrimination.

A cross-regional group of states opposed the amendment, arguing

that the issue of religious and racial discrimination belonged under

other special procedures and that the mandate on freedom of

expression was intended to protect and promote that specific right,

not police it. Nonetheless, the amendment was approved by 27 votes

in favor, 17 against, and three abstentions.6

1 Thirty-two of the 54 country-specific resolutions and decisions were UPR outcomes.

2 The indicators are highlighted in bold in this analysis.

3 DCPs analysis does not include a substantive discussion of the first 32 reviews of states under theUPR. A separate assessment of the performance of governments in the UPR working groups is needed,but was considered beyond the scope of this study.

4 Observer states can actively participate in the Council through oral statements, interventions, andsponsoring resolutions; but observers cannot vote.5 Pakistan was supported by Egypt (on behalf of the African Group) and Palestine (on behalf of theGroup of Arab States).6 Its core support came from the OIC and the African Group, as well as Russia, Cuba, the Philippines,

Sri Lanka, China, and Nicaragua. The European Union (EU), Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, Brazil,Guatemala, Canada, Mexico, Switzerland, Peru, Ukraine, and Uruguay opposed the amendment.


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This event caused the majority of the co-sponsors of the original

resolution to withdraw their co-sponsorship, after which Cuba offered

to sponsor the resolution and introduced a second oral amendment.

The amendment cited the importance for all forms of media to

report and to deliver information in a fair and impartial manner.

Despite protests by Canada on procedural grounds,7the amendment

was adopted by a vote of 29 in favor, 15 against, and three abstentions

with only a handful of governments taking different positions on the

two amendments.8 Subsequent attempts by Slovenia (on behalf of

the EU) to suspend the meeting were rejected by Council President

Doru Romulus Costea. The amended resolution was finally adopted

by a vote of 32 in favor and 15 abstentions.9Many of the original co-

sponsors abstained from the vote, but stated that they supported themandate on freedom of opinion and expression in principle.

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION ANDDEFAMATION OF RELIGION

The issue of religion and religious discrimination, featured in three

additional resolutions during this cycle, led to a clear divide among

member states and raised growing concerns in the human rights

community about the concept of defamation of religion used by

members of the OIC. The fundamental differences among states

on this issue were reflected in debates during the Sixth and Seventh

sessions on the EU-sponsored resolution on the Elimination of

all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion orbelief,10the OIC-sponsored resolution on Combating defamation

of religion,11and the African Group-sponsored12resolution on the

Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of

racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.13

The divergence was based on the desire of OIC states to see specific

references to defamation, discrimination, incitement to hatred, and

stereotyping based on religion - specifically Islamophobia - in the

aforementioned resolutions. In all of these debates, the OIC called

for dialogue among cultures and respect for religions and beliefs

while the EU emphasized its support for tolerance, freedom of

expression, and freedom of religion and belief. In addition, the EU

pointed to the fact that international law protects freedom of religion

or belief, not religions or beliefs,per se, and therefore the concept

of defamation of religion was inconsistent with human rights

discourse. The OIC, on the other hand, refused to endorse language

that would guarantee the fundamental right to change ones religion

or belief, preferring language that urged respect for norms about the

right to change ones religion. This fundamental point caused the

OIC to abstain from the final resolution, Elimination of all forms of

intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief.

The issue continues to be hotly debated at the Council. At the start

of the third cycle, many stakeholders called for a shift in the debate

from the problematic framework of defamation of religion to a

discussion of the legal limitations of freedom of expression under

Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR).

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Also during the Seventh session of the Council, a resolution on

The role of good governance in the promotion and protection

of human rightswas introduced by Poland on behalf of 60 co-

sponsors representing all regions. The resolution underscored the

importance of the promotion of good governance in the advancement

of human rights. It highlighted the positive role of the Community

of Democracies and the UN sponsored International Conference

of New or Restored Democracies and requested the Office of the

High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to prepare a

report on anti-corruption. Cuba and Russia objected to references to

the Community of Democracies in two sections of the resolution,

describing the organization as politicized and imposed by the United

States. The Council overwhelmingly rejected a package vote called

7 Canada objected citing rule 120 of the Councils rules of procedure that all amendments must betabled 24 hours in advance, but the President of the Council decided to accept the Cuban amendment.8 Only a few governments took different positions on the second amendment on media reporting. Indiavoted in favor; Japan and the Republic of Korea voted against; Guatemala, the Philippines and Peruabstained.9 Abstaining on the vote on A/HRC/RES/7/36 were the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada,Guatemala, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Ukraine.10 The resolution, A/HRC/RES/6/37, renewing the mandate was adopted during the Sixth session by29 votes in favor and 18 abstentions a departure from past years when the mandate was adopted byconsensus. All OIC states, as well as China, South Africa, and Sri Lanka abstained.11 The resolution, A/HRC/RES/7/19, was adopted during the Seventh session by a vote of 21 in favor,10 against and 14 abstentions. All OIC states (with the exception of Gabon), China, Cuba, Nicaragua,the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka voted in favor. All EU states voted against theresolution. Latin American member states (with the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua), Gabon, Ghana,India, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea, and Zambia abstained. Angola and Bosniaand Herzegovina were absent.12

This resolution was also co-sponsored by Bolivia and Cuba.13 The resolution, A/HRC/RES/7/35, renewing the mandate was adopted during the Seventh sessionwithout a vote.


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by Cuba to remove these references14; the subsequent vote on the

original resolution was adopted by 41 in favor and six abstentions.15

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

The mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on

human rights defenders16was renewed by consensus during the Seventh

session. The consensus reached, however, was not without earlier

significant disagreement among states regarding the strength and

scope of the mandate. During the negotiations, Egypt proposed that

the mandate should elaborate on a definition for the term human

rights defender, examine the trends and concerns in relation to

defenders work, and promote the independence and impartiality ofdefenders from undue influence, including as a result of funding.17

These proposals were strongly opposed by many states,18as well as

the human rights community, which were concerned that this would

weaken the mandate and contradict Article 13 of theDeclaration on

Human Rights Defenders19that protects the right to access funding.

Ireland, on the other hand, proposed to expand the mandate to

report on the situation of defenders at particular risk, including those

working in areas of conflict.20A related issue debated by states was

whether the title of the mandate on human rights defenders should

remain Special Representative to the Secretary-General or whether

it should be changed to Special Rapporteur. Some states such as

Russia, China, and India favored changing the title, arguing that it

was in line with streamlining and rationalizing the special procedures

under the new appointment procedure. States opposing the change

in the title the EU, members of the Western European and Others

Group (WEOG), Mexico and Ecuador - argued that it ensured access

to relevant parts of the UN system, reflected the cross-cutting nature

of the mandate, and helped protect human rights defenders. In the

end, a compromise was reached to replace the original text with

Special Rapporteur and discard with the remaining proposals.

BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Some of the same states,21which favored weakening the mandate

on the situation of human rights defenders, argued in favor of

strengthening the mandate on the Special Representative of the Secretary

General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations

and other business enterprises. The mandate, which was renewed byconsensus during the Eighth session,22expanded the scope of the

original mandate toward the elaboration of an international legal

framework.

In his annual report, the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General, Mr. John Ruggie, identified a three-pillar conceptual

framework that included the States duty to protect against human

rights abuses by third parties, including businesses; the corporate

responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for more

effective access to remedies. The ensuing debate divided states into

three categories based on their views on the pace and character

by which the work of the mandate should be expanded. The five

cross-regional co-sponsors, Argentina, India, Nigeria, Russia, and

Norway23favored expanding the scope of the mandate toward

elaborating and operationalizing a normative framework through

14 Only five states voted in favor of removing the references: China, Cuba, Russia, Nicaragua and SriLanka.15 Resolution A/HRC/RES/7/11 was supported by all of the member states of the EU, the AfricanGroup, and the OIC, in addition to Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Guatemala,India, Japan, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Uruguay. Russia, Bolivia,Cuba, Nicaragua, China, and Sri Lanka abstained from the vote.16 A/HRC/RES/7/817 The following states supported one or more of these proposals: Iran, Algeria, Bhutan, China, SouthAfrica, Russia, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Sri Lanka.18 The following states opposed one or more of these proposals: Ireland, Australia, Belgium, UnitedStates, United Kingdom, Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Mexico, and France.19 Formally known as theDeclaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs ofSociety to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.20 Irelands proposal was supported by Liechtenstein, Australia, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, andopposed by Russia, China, and Iran.

21 Nigeria, India, Russia, and Egypt supported proposals to limit the scope of the mandate on humanrights defenders and expanded the scope of the mandate on transnational corporations and otherbusiness enterprises.22 A/HRC/RES/8/723 Norway replaced the United Kingdom as an original co-sponsor of the mandate due to the UnitedKingdoms lack of support for the development of a legal framework on corporate responsibility withregard to human rights.


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concrete recommendations. On the other hand, the United Kingdom

and Slovenia (on behalf of the EU) argued that there should be

no rapid move to operationalize the conceptual framework and no

fundamental shift in international law from the duty of states to

protect against human rights abuses. Other states, including Cuba,

South Africa, Belgium, Pakistan, and Egypt, took an even more

progressive position than the co-sponsors of the mandate; they

favored the expansion of the mandate toward the establishment of

a normative and enforceable framework that is specifically inclusive

of corporate responsibilities. Human rights, development, and

environmental organizations called for the mandate to provide for an

explicit capacity to examine situations of corporate abuse as a way

to help identify policy solutions. The final resolution renewing themandate was adopted by consensus and reflected the middle-ground

position held by the co-sponsors. After the adoption, the EU restated

its firm view that only states have obligations under international

law. South Africa, which had argued for the need for a complaints

mechanism, disassociated itself from the final consensus stating that

the resolution did not go far enough.

OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONALCOVENANT ON ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURALRIGHTS

During the Eighth session, the Council also adopted by consensus

a resolution on the Optional Protocol to theInternational Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR),24recommending

that the General Assembly adopt and open for signature and

ratification the Optional Protocol in March 2009. The Optional

Protocol provides for a complaint procedure for individuals or groups

claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the economic, social

and cultural rights in the ICESCR. Prior to its adoption, states were

bitterly divided over whether Part I of the ICESCR dealing with

self-determination should be included in the Optional Protocol.

In particular, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, and Palestine objected

to the Working Group text that excluded Part I, arguing that self-

determination was well entrenched in international law and must be

included as a basis for complaints. Other states, including the United

Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, and Australia argued that the text

should not be reopened as it reflected a delicate compromise resulting

from years of negotiations.

The United Kingdom argued that common Article 1 of the ICESCR

dealt with rights conferred upon peoples, as such rather than a

right conferred upon individuals; consequently, individuals could not

claim to be the victim of a violation of the right to self-determination.

The United Kingdom further argued that the progressively realizable

nature of economic, social and cultural rights do not lend themselves

to third party adjudication in the same way as civil and political

rights. Many other states countered that the Optional Protocol

should not draw a distinction between rights.25The resolution was

eventually amended to cover all sections of the ICESCR. After its

adoption, Canada and the United Kingdom alluded to the possibility

of not becoming parties to the Protocol. Several states stressed

that their interpretation of the Protocol did not include the right to

self-determination under a future complaints mechanism.26High

Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour and many human

rights organizations praised the passing of the Optional Protocol as a

historic moment.

THE RIGHT TO FOOD

On May 22, 2008, the Council held its first special session on a

thematic issue, The negative impact on the realization of the

right to food for the worsening of the world food crisis, caused

inter alia by the soaring food prices. The groundbreaking session,

sponsored by Cuba (on behalf of NAM)27drew broad cross-regional

support from 41 of 47 members of the Council, as well as 41 observer

states. The only Council members that did not sign the letter calling

for the session were Azerbaijan, Canada, Cameroon, Madagascar,

the Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea. The final resolution,

co-sponsored by 28 members of the Council and 50 observer states,was adopted by consensus. The resolution called for the broad

participation of stakeholders in theHigh-level Meeting on World Food

Security and the Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergyheld by the

Food and Agriculture Organization in June 2008. It emphasized

that it was the primary obligation of states to make their best efforts

to meet the vital food needs of their population while also calling

for international cooperation. While the practical elements of the

sessions outcome were limited, the broad support for it among states

reflected an increased focus by the Council on economic, social, and

cultural rights.

ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS

DARFUR AND SUDAN

Lengthy negotiations between the EU and the African Group during

the Sixth session of the Council in September and December led to

a compromise to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the

human rights situation in the Sudan, but allowed the mandate on the

Group of Experts on the situation of human rights in Darfurto expire.28

The resolution on the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the

24 A/HRC/RES/8/2 25 Pakistan, Brazil, Bangladesh.26 The United Kingdom, Turkey, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland.27 Cuba was supported by Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), Pakistan (on behalf of the OIC), anPalestine (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).28 The Group of Experts on the situation of human rights in Darfur, comprised of six thematic experts

and presided over by the Special Rapporteur on the Sudan, Sima Samar, was established by the Councilin March 2007 to foster the implementation of the body of recommendations by UN human rightsinstitutions and mechanisms.


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consensus resolution33which strongly deplores the continued violent

repression of peaceful demonstrations and dispatched the Special

Rapporteur to visit the country and report back to the Council.

Notably, the resolution also called for the release of all political

detainees in Myanmar, including pro-democracy leader Aung San

Suu Kyi. During the special session, Myanmar, as the concerned

country, stressed that the Council must not repeat the

mistakes of the Human Rights Commission in naming

and shaming weak countries.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Negotiations on the mandate of the Independent Experton the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic

of the Congobegan during the Sixth session in September

but action on the review was deferred at the request of

Egypt (on behalf of the African Group). During the

Seventh session in March, the Council finally decided

against extending the mandate despite protests from the

human rights community. Egypt led the negotiations

based on the African Groups position of principle that country

mandates that do not enjoy the support of the government in question

should not be renewed. The government of the Democratic Republic

of the Congo (DRC) echoed the Egyptian-led group position that the

mandate could no longer contribute to improvements of the human

rights situation on the ground. Instead, a resolution, Technicalcooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of

the Congo,34providing for technical assistance and cooperation

between the DRC, OHCHR, and special procedures, was adopted

by consensus. While the EU, Canada and Switzerland supported the

consensus, they stated that the mandate should have been renewed

to assure follow-up and to address ongoing human rights violations.

This episode, along with another weak consensus resolution on

Darfur adopted during the same session,35raised serious concerns

within the human rights community that the Council was choosing

consensus at the expense of victims of human rights violations.

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

The human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

(OPT) continued to be a focus of the Councils work, especially

during the last half of the second cycle in 2008.36The Sixth special

session, on Human rights violations emanating from Israeli

military attacks and incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including the recent ones in occupied Gaza and West Bank town

of Nablus, was held on January 23-24 in response to a flaring up

situation in the Sudan,29submitted by Egypt (on behalf of the African

Group) and adopted by consensus, instructed the Special Rapporteur

to continue to work along the terms of reference established in

2005 and to ensure effective follow up to the recommendations of

the Group of Experts on the situation in Darfur. This outcome was

opposed by the human rights community, which argued the need

for both mandates to be extended, specifically so that the Group

of Experts could finish its assessment through June 2008. Only 12

Council members supported the position taken by the human rights

community, including the EU, Canada, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Ukraine, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. The African Group

and the OIC opposed renewing the Group of Experts mandate;Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba, took no

position.30 The conditions of the final compromise were believed by

many close to the negotiations as the price for retaining the mandate

on the Sudan given the opposition of the African Group to country

mandates; however, the outcome raised questions about the merits of

a consensual approach to the Councils work.31

MYANMAR

On October 2, 2007, the Human Rights Council convened a special

session in response to the human rights crisis in Myanmarafter

authorities responded with violence toward Buddhist monks and

Burmese citizens protesting high fuel prices. Portugal (on behalf of

the EU) sponsored the session, which received cross-regional support

from 17 member and 36 observer states. In addition to the EU, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Guatemala, Mexico,

Peru, the Republic of Korea, and Uruguay supported the special

session. Brazil signed on in support only after the session was called.32

Conspicuously, no African or OIC member of the Council supported

the session. Nonetheless, the robust debate led to the adoption of a

29 A/HRC/RES/6/3430 Cuba aligned itself with the statement made by the African Group.31 The mandates of Liberia and Somalia were renewed because of the governments support for theirextension.32 For this reason, Brazil was given a yellow mark for this indicator in the accompanying chart.

33 A/HRC/RES/S-5/134 A/HRC/RES/7/2035 A consensus resolution, Situation of human rights in the Sudan (A/HRC/RES/7/16), adoptedby the Council on March 27, was so shockingly watered down as a result of negotiations between theEU and the African Group that it failed to hold the government of the Sudan accountable for ignoring

Security Council resolutions and its role in continued human rights violations.36 The issue of human rights in the OPT is addressed through a permanent agenda item on the CouncilagendaItem 7: Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab Territories.


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to include violations by

both sides in the conflict.

It has yet to be seen if

this proposal will attract

support among member

states of the Council.

DEMOCRATICPEOPLES REPUBLICOF KOREA

During the Seventh session,

the Council adopted aresolution, Situation

of human rights in the

Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea,42

submitted by Slovenia (on

behalf of the EU) and

Japan, which extended the

mandate of the Special

Rapporteur for one year.

The largely procedural resolution drew the usual sharp criticism

from the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

(DPRK). Several states, including Cuba, Indonesia, the Philippines,

and China argued that the mandate was politicized and ineffectiveand that the UPR is the more appropriate mechanism for considering

the human rights situation in the DPRK. Nevertheless, the mandate

was adopted by a vote of 22 in favor, seven against, and 18

abstentions. The high number of abstentions reflects the uncertainty

of the Council about the future of country mandates, primarily

those that do not enjoy the support of the state in question. The EU,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, the

Republic of Korea, and the majority of Latin American states, with

the exception of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Guatemala, supported the

extension of the mandate. The majority of African and OIC countries

abstained from the vote; notable exceptions were Ghana, Madagascar,

Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, which supported the resolution. The seven

states that voted against the extension of the mandate were China,

Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nicaragua, and the Russian

Federation. Egypt was the only African country to stand by the African

groups stated position against country mandates when it voted against

the resolution.

of the conflict and resulting human rights and humanitarian crisis

in the OPT. The session, sponsored by Pakistan (on behalf of

the OIC) and Syria (on behalf of the Group of Arab States), was

supported by 21 countries.37The final resolution,38adopted by a vote

of 30 in favor, one vote against, and 15 abstentions, called for

urgent international action to put an immediate end to the grave

violations committed by the occupying Power, Israel, in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory and urgedall parties concerned to respect

the rules of human rights law and international humanitarian law

and to refrain from violence against the civilian population. The

EU abstained from the vote citing concerns that the text failed

to encompass the full spectrum of human rights violations and

responsibilities by both sides in the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina,Cameroon, Ghana, Guatemala, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland,

Japan, and Ukraine also abstained from the vote. Canada was the

only country to vote against the resolution.

In March, renewed military incursions and rocket attacks by Israelis

and Palestinians led to another resolution during the Seventh session,

Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks

and incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly

the recent ones in the occupied Gaza Strip,39which condemned

Israeli military attacks against Palestinian civilians, and called for

the immediate cessation of all Israeli military attacks throughout

the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the firing of crude rockets by

Palestinian combatants. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 33 infavor, one against and 13 abstentions,40was significant because of its

more specific reference to Palestinian, as well as Israeli violations.

The language, which was the result of negotiations between the

EU, Palestinian representatives, and the OIC, did not go far enough

in satisfying the concerns of the EU, which called for a vote but

ultimately abstained.

A second resolution during the Seventh session, Israeli settlements

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,

and in the occupied Syrian Golan41was approved by all Council

members with the sole exception of Canada. The resolution

expressed grave concern at the continuing construction of the wall

inside the OPT in contravention of international law, recalled both

parties obligations under the roadmap to a permanent two-State

solution to the conflict, urged full implementation of theAccess and

Movement Agreementof November 15, 2005 and implementation of

the recommendations of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Continued criticisms of the Council for an unbalanced and extensive

focus on the situation in the OPT led the new Special Rapportuer

on the OPT, Richard Falk, to call for an expansion of the mandate

37 Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan,Sri Lanka, Cuba, Djibouti, China, Nicaragua, Russia, South Africa, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, and India.38 A/HRC/RES/S-6/139 A/HRC/RES/7/140 The OIC and the majority of Asian, African, and Latin American members supported the resolution.

The EU abstained and was joined by Cameroon, Guatemala, Japan, the Republic of Korea, andUkraine. Canada was the sole vote against.41 A/HRC/RES/7/18

42 A/HRC/RES/7/15


9/16

At a May 19, 2008 organizational meeting held ahead of the Eighth

session, Pakistan (on behalf of the OIC) and Bangladesh argued to

limit the participation of NGOs during the consideration of the UPR

Working Group reports to only 10 minutes out of the 60 minutes

allocated for each state under review. Slovenia (on behalf of the EU),

along with Switzerland and Canada, proposed 30 minutes, arguing

that NGO participation was essential to the work of the Council and

the UPR. A late compromise was eventually reached to allocate 20

minutes to NGO participation.

During the Eighth sessions review of the UPR working group

reports, a group of states attempted to censor NGO discussion of

the human rights situation in countries that had undergone review.Egypt, supported by Algeria and Pakistan, argued that the guidelines

for NGO participation in this phase of the UPR did not provide for

re-opening discussions of the human rights situation that had already

taken place in the working groups, but that NGO comments must

be limited to the content of the outcome documents. Other member

states, including Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, Slovenia,

and the United Kingdom challenged this narrow interpretation of

the UPR modalities. Interestingly, the objections by Egypt and its

allies were mainly limited to the reviews of OIC states, including

Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. After the first

intervention of this kind during the review of Bahrain, President

Costea clarified that Resolution 5/1 setting out the institutional

modalities of the Human Rights Council stated that NGOswere permitted to make general comments. Unfortunately, the

Presidents clarification did not settle the debate and NGOs continued

to be interrupted by states, in particular Egypt. Despite Egypts

repeated attempts to censor the NGOs, many States under review

welcomed NGO comments and responded accordingly to them.45

During the same sessions general debate on the Follow-up and

implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of

Action,46the statement of an NGO was interrupted by a point

of order from Egypt, which argued that the subject of Sharia law

could not be discussed at the Council. After Slovenia challenged

this position, stating that the issue was under the purview of the

agenda item, Egypt threatened to call for a vote before the statement

could be read. After suspending the meeting for consultations, the

President stated that the Council was not prepared to discuss religiou

matters in depth. The President then gave the floor back to the NGO

instructing it to refrain from passing judgment on a particular set of

legislation.

At the Seventh session of the Council, both states and NGOs alike,

having failed to garner support for a special session on the human

WORKING METHODS ANDPROCEDURESCOUNTRY SCRUTINY

During this cycle, several alarming trends

with regard to the Councils working

methods and procedures were evident.

They included efforts to undermine

country scrutiny, restrict and censor NGOs,

and infringe upon the independence of the

special procedures and the Office of the

High Commissioner for Human Rights. By

the end of the first cycle, the Council had

reaffirmed the decision to maintain country

mandates despite opposition from many

states. However, in the second cycle, states

remained divided on the issue of country

scrutiny. Members of the EU and WEOG

remained vocal that the Council must

address human rights violations wherever

they may occur, while members of the

Asian Group, members of the African

Group, and Cuba argued that the general debate on Human rights

situations that require the Councils attention was politicized and

used for naming and shaming.

In practice, few states other than those within the EU and WEOG43

raised country specific situations during the general debate leading

to concerns that silence by opposing groups and the resulting

imbalance in participation could be aimed at reinforcing the claims

of politicization. Interestingly, Iran appeared to have switched its

position on country scrutiny, stating in the Sixth session that member

states should not submit to the selectivity and politicization exercised

by the so-called champions of human rights; then, in the Seventh

session, Iran spoke under the general debate on the human rights

situations in many EU countries, Canada, and the United States.

PARTICIPATION OF NONGOVERNMENTALORGANIZATIONS

An additional area of concern at the Council was the upward trend

towards limiting the participation of NGOs by member states

through restrictive interpretations of the Councils modalities.44This

became apparent during discussions surrounding the UPR as well as

discussions under the Follow-up and implementation of the Vienna

Declaration and Programme of Action.

43 Exceptions to this were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Iran, Macedonia,and Pakistan.44 The indicator titledFavored a broad interpretation of t he participation of NGOs in the UPR outcome debatereflects government positions expressed during the review of the UPR outcome reports at the Eighthsession in June. A country was given a green mark if they argued for a broader interpretation of NGO

participation. Countries receiving a red mark argued for a narrower interpretation of NGO participation.Countries given a yellow mark were silent during this debate.

45 Ecuador urged other governments to learn from its review and prepare reports with more lead time inorder to increase the participation of civil society.46 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) was adopted by consensus at the WorldConference on Human Rights in 1993. The VDPA reaffirms human rights principles and seeks tostrengthen implementation of human rights around the world.


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INDEPENDENCE OF THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES

Several states also took the opportunity of the ongoing review,

rationalization, and improvement of special procedure mandates

to question the working methods of mandate holders and their

compliance with the Code of Conduct.52In particular, the reviews

of the mandates of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or

arbitrary executionsand the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmentwere used by several

states to disapprove of the working methods of the two current

rapporteurs, Philip Alston and Manfred Nowak. Alston was sharply

criticized by several states, which called into question his sources of

information, presentation style, and understanding of the terms ofreference of his mandate.53Nowak experienced similar treatment

by the Council when states accused the rapporteur of violating the

Code of Conduct.54India and Russia suggested the Council consider

replacing the mandate holders. Both mandates were eventually

renewed without reference to the mandate holders, but the difficult

negotiations resulted in a Presidential Statement, which for the first

time links the re-appointment of mandate holders to their conduct.55

The statement alters a long-standing practice of the Commission on

Human Rights that automatically re-appoints mandate holders to a

second term. The human rights community argued against the move

raising concerns that such a link would undermine the independence

of the special procedures by exposing them to political pressures.

CONCLUSION

The Human Rights Councils transition from institution building

to addressing human rights situations got off to a rocky start in the

second cycle. After delays in the Sixth session caused by uncertainty

on how to move forward with the task of reviewing mandates, the

Council eventually began this work in December and also started

addressing human rights situations. While the Council considered

numerous country situations throughout the year, it acted only

on a few. It failed to effectively address several unfolding human

rights crises, such as Zimbabwe and Tibet, or speak forcefully on

ongoing situations as urgent as Darfur. The Council discontinued

the mandates on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Group

of Experts on Darfur, two areas of the world where gross and

systematic human rights violations continue to take place. On the

issue of country scrutiny, the Council split almost evenly between

members of the EU and WEOG that support the principle of country

scrutiny and the African Group, which under the leadership of

Egypt, conditions such attention only at the request of a government.

rights crisis in Tibet, raised the issue during the general debate

under discussion on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

China supported by several states moved aggressively to silence

the discussion by raising 12 points of order and arguing that country

specific situations belonged under the agenda item Human rights

situations that require the Councils attention.47Slovenia (on

behalf of the EU) and Switzerland stressed that it was necessary

to cite progress made in implementing commitments, which could

include references to specific situations. President Costea clarified

that implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of

Actiontakes place on the ground and not in a vacuum; therefore,

references to specific country situations can be made as they relate to

implementation of the Declaration, but country situations should notbe the primary focus of the statement.

INDEPENDENCE OF OHCHR

A recurring issue from the first cycle of the Council related to the

strengthening of OHCHR and its relationship to the Council.

A resolution submitted during the Seventh session by Cuba,48

Composition of the staff of the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights,49raised concerns within the

human rights community that states may be working to undermine

the independence of OHCHR. The resolution, adopted by a vote of

34 in favor, 10 against, and three abstentions, encouraged the General

Assembly to consider additional measures for the promotion ofgeographical balance representing national and regional specificities,

various historic, cultural, and religious backgrounds, as well as the

diversity of political, economic and legal systems. Slovenia (on

behalf of the EU) and Canada opposed the resolution stating that

the Council was not the appropriate body to address these issues

and was duplicating efforts already underway by the OHCHR and

other bodies.50The Republic of Korea and Switzerland noted that

the resolution had a negative tone and impact and interfered with the

work of OHCHR; therefore, both abstained from the vote along with

Japan. All members of the African Group, the OIC, and GRULAC

supported the resolution, as well as Asian states with the exception

of the Republic of Korea and Japan. The issue re-emerged during

the Eighth session when several states called for a formal discussion

of OHCHRs 2009-2010 strategic framework.51The Netherlands and

Ireland rejected the view that the Council should have any oversight

over OHCHR. By the start of the third cycle, states remained split on

this issue leading the new President of the Council Martin Ihoeghian

Uhomoibhi to appoint Moroccan Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki

to facilitate further consultations.

47 Interestingly, during the Sixth session, China stated that there were too many human rights situationsrequiring the Councils attention to be covered under Human rights situations that require the Councilsattention,, so they urged states to address broad situations such as children dying of curable diseases,rights of indigenous people, and poverty in the global south.48 The following countries joined Cuba in sponsoring the resolution: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, DemocraticRepublic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahariya, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Syrian ArabRepublic, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.49 A/HRC/RES/7/250

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine also opposed the resolution.51 Malaysia, Philippines, Algeria, and Uzbekistan.

52 A Code of Conduct for special procedures mandate holders contained in Resolution 5/2 was adopteby the Council, despite opposition from the human rights community.53 Alston was criticized by Nigeria, the Philippines, India, Algeria, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, andPakistan (on behalf of the OIC). Alston had recently visited the Philippines, Sri Lanka and voicedcriticism of them in his report. He also noted that India had not responded to a request for visit.54 Russia and Indonesia criticized Nowaks working methods, including unannounced visits and privateinterviews. Nowak responded that these methods were necessary for fact-finding missions.55 The Presidential Statement, A/HRC/8/PRST/2, provides that the terms of office of the mandate

holder shall be extended for a second three year term by the Council, only if no information onpersistent non-compliance by a mandate holder with the provisions of the [Code of Conduct] is broughto the attention of the Council.


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special procedures and OHCHR. While these efforts were usually

led by specific member states such as Egypt, Cuba, India, or China,

the majority of states in their regional or cross-regional groups either

supported these positions or remained silent. With few exceptions, theEU and WEOG states were the only countries that spoke to protect

the strength and integrity of the Councils working methods; Mexico

should be noted for its role in defending NGO participation.

These issues will continue to be debated in the third year of the

Council as governments grapple with differing views on how the

body should work to protect and promote human rights. The current

style of bloc politics at the Council has led to negotiations among

regional and cross-regional groups that are increasingly conducted

behind closed doors and pursue consensual outcomes. In many cases

this has prevented states from speaking independently and clearly on

serious human rights concerns. It will be important to observe the dy

namics of these groups moving forward, particularly the performance

of GRULAC and whether it will evolve into a more proactive player

commensurate with its current position as a swing region, as well

as the direction and unity of the African Group, which is currently

driving the effort to eliminate expert country mandates on its own

continent.

The OIC generally supported the African line on opposing country

scrutiny with one major exception, the Occupied Palestinian

Territory. Select countries in GRULAC and non-OIC states in Africa

and Asia were consistently the swing votes on country-specific issues.

The subject of discrimination based on religion, specifically Islam,

was an increasingly controversial subject. Muslim-majority states

favored a conceptual framework of combating defamation of

religion and the inclusion of references to Islamophobia and

incitement to hatred in various resolutions, prompting a reaction by

the EU, WEOG states, and other non-Muslim majority countries

that such a concept was incompatible with human rights discourse,

endangered freedom of expression, and or was overly focused on

one religion. Again, the EU and WEOG states found themselves on

the opposite side of the OIC and the majority of African countries.

GRULAC and non-OIC African and Asian states were once again

the deciding vote in many of these debates.

Throughout the year, member states attempted to re-open the terms

and modalities of the Councils working methods established in

the institution-building package with the aim, in most cases, of

weakening them. These included restricting NGO participation and

exerting the Councils control on expert mechanisms, such as the

2007-2008 CYCLE AT A GLANCE

The Council passed 128 resolutions and decisions, and 4presidential statements.Of those resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements, 54(including 32 UPR outcome decisions) dealt with country specificsituations such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, SomaliMyanmar, Haiti, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, DemocraticPeoples Republic of Korea, Sudan, Liberia, and Burundi.76% of the Councils resolutions were passed by consensus.The Council extended the mandates of 33 Special Proceduresand created two new Special Procedures mandates the SpecialRapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery and the IndependeExpert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access safe drinking water and sanitation.The Council extended the country mandates of Myanmar, NorthKorea, Liberia, Haiti, and Somalia, and discontinued the Experts

Group on Darfur and the Independent Expert on the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo.13 new Special Procedures mandate holders were appointed.32 countries were reviewed during the first two sessions of theUniversal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism, a process by whichthe human rights situation of all UN member states is reviewedduring a four-year cycle.18 members were elected to the Human Rights Councils AdvisorCommittee, a think tank of the Council that works at its discretio


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INDICATOR

A

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nReport

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nAbuseso

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Human

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thepart

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tion

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inthe

UPRou

tcome

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ionon

Myanmar

Mandateonthe

Democra

tic

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Korea

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Man

da

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tic

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Con

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Man

da

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the

Groupo

f

Expertson

Darfur

resolutiononIsraeli

se

ttlemen

tsinthe

Occup

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Pa

les

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Terr

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Amendmentonthe

"importanceo

fthe

me

diatoreportan

d

de

liver

informa

tion

in

afairan

dimpart

ial

manner"

Angola

Azerba

ijan

Bangladesh

Bolivia

Bosnia

andHerzegovina

Brazil

Cameroon

Canada

China

Cuba

Djibouti

Egypt

France

Gabon

Germany

Ghana

Guatem

ala

India

Indone

sia

Italy

Japan

Jordan

Madagascar

Malays

ia

Mali

Mauritius

Mexico

Netherlands

Nicaragua

Nigeria

Pakista

n

Peru

Philipp

ines

Qatar

RepublicofKorea

Roman

ia

Russia

SaudiA

rabia

Senegal

Slovenia

SouthAfrica

SriLan

ka

Switzerland

Ukraine

United

Kingdom

Uruguay

Zambia

Albania

MEMBE

RSTATES

OBSERVERSTATES


13/16Austria

Bahrain

Belarus

Belgium

Bhutan

Bulgaria

Chile

Congo

Coted'Ivoire

Croatia

Cyprus

CzechRepublic

Democ

raticPeople'sRepublicofKorea

Democ

raticRepublicoftheCongo

Denma

rk

Domin

icanRepublic

Ecuado

r

Estonia

Finland

Greece

Guinea

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

IranIreland

Laos

Latvia

Lesotho

Libya

Liechte

nstein

Lithuania

Luxem

bourg

Maldiv

es

Malta

Monaco

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozam

bique

NewZealand

Norway

Palestine

Panama

Poland

Portugal

Serbia

Singapore

Slovakia

Spain

Sudan

Sweden

Tanzan

ia

TheFo

rmerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia

Tunisia

Turkey

United

StatesofAmerica

Venezu

ela


14/16


15/16

ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT

The Democracy Coalition Project is a nongovernmental organization that conducts research and advocacy relating to the advancement of

democracy and human rights internationally, particularly through the UN Human Rights Council and other multilateral organs. Begun in

June 2001 as an initiative of the Open Society Institute, the Democracy Coalition Project (DCP) focuses its work on advocacy, research, and

coalition-building toward the goal of democratic development as an essential element of international peace and human development.

DCP plays a leadership role in building an international coalition of organizations to monitor the foreign policies of governments as they

relate to human rights and democracy promotion. DCP also works to encourage a more transparent and active Community of Democracies

and an active Democracy Caucus at the United Nations.

DCPS POLICY AGENDA INCLUDES: Strengthening the work of the United Nations in the area of human rights and democratic development

Monitoring the foreign policies of governments as they relate to human rights and democracy promotion

Promoting reform and strengthening of the United Nations through civil society participation and coalition-building

Improving international responses to democratic crises

CONTACT US

Democracy Coalition Project

1120 19th Street, NW, 8th Floor

Washington, DC 20036, U.S.A.

Ph. +1 202.721.5630

Fax +1 202.721.5658

[email protected]

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: PROJECT ASSISTANT:

Dokhi Fassihian Busi Langa

PROGRAM ASSOCIATE: RESEARCH ASSISTANT:

Sarah Rivard Payal Patel

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

Morton H. Halperin, President and Chairman

Theodore Piccone

Dokhi Fassihian

Robert Herman

Report released in October 2008


16/16

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL REPORT CARD: GOVERNMENTPOSITIONSONKEYISSUES2007 2008

www.demcoalition.org

2007-2008 human rights council report card

Documents