2005 yolles frieden metahistorical theory of change - theory

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Organisational Transformation and Social Change, 2005, 2(2) 103-136

A metahistorical information theory of social change: the theory

M.I. Yolles

B.R. Frieden

Abstract A new yin-yang metahistorical approach that we call sociohistory is created to explore

the possibilities of tracking and explaining social change. For this purpose, a frame of

reference is created using Social Viable Systems theory to harness Sorokin’s

sociocultural dynamics. Epistemological content is enhanced by Frieden’s new

constructivist information theory called Extreme Physical Information. Its aim is to

provide a scientific framework for the metahistory. The coupling of these theories has

the potential for explaining and possibly predicting long-term, large-scale or short-

term, small-scale sociocultural events. This new theory should be seen as emerging

from the convergence of the approaches by Sorokin, Yolles and Frieden.

Keywords

Yin-yangMetahistorySociohistorySocial Viable SystemsExtreme Physical InformationFisher information

Contributor details

M.I. Yolles

Maurice Yolles is a professor of Management Systems at Liverpool John MooresUniversity, based in the Business School. His doctorate, completed more than a decadeago, was in mathematical social theory, in particular the formal dynamics of peace andconflict. His research book on management systems was published in 1999, and hisnew book Organisations as Complex Systems is due out shortly. He has published more than140 papers in refereed journals, conferences and book chapters, mostly in managerialcybernetics and its development in social collectives, International Joint AllianceTheory, and Human Resource Management. He is editor of the international journal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change (OTSC). He is also the vice

president of the International Society of Systems Science. His main teaching area is inChange and Knowledge Management, and he heads the Centre for Creating CoherentChange and Knowledge. Within this context he has also been involved in, and run, anumber of international research and development projects for the EU under various programmes within countries experiencing transformational change, includinginvolvement in TEMPUS projects in Central and Eastern European Countries. He hasalso lectured and run organisational change programmes in China.

Affiliation and Contact details

Professor Maurice YollesSchool of Business Information

Liverpool John Moores UniversityLiverpool, L3 5UZ




E-mail: [email protected]

B.R. Frieden

B. Roy Frieden is a Professor Emeritus of Optical Sciences at the University of Arizona. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester, NY. He is known as

the father of laser-beam shaping techniques, which is extensively used nowadays inmicrolithography, stray-light suppression, and nuclear fusion-based energy research. Healso invented the use of the digital maximum entropy principle for purposes of restoringimages, and published the first digitally restored picture of a planetary moon(Ganymede) other than our own. This showed, contrary to expectations, that suchmoons are largely composed of huge, ice-encrusted craters. Over the past fifteen yearsor so he has been demonstrating that a variational principle, that of Extreme PhysicalInformation (EPI), is at the root of all known laws of physics. This has resulted in over twenty publications in journals such as Physical Review and Physics Letters, and in two books, Physics from Fisher Information (1998) and Science from Fisher Information

(2004), both published by Cambridge University Press.

Affiliation and Contact details

Emeritus Professor B. Roy FriedenOptical SciencesUniversity of ArizonaE-mail: [email protected]

1. Introduction

This article is concerned with the development of a metahistorical approach that is ableto track and explore the dynamics of social collectives. It develops an initial theoreticaldimension. A second article that explores some mathematical applications follows this.

Metahistory provides an approach through narrative and patterning that can examinesocial history from a place ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ the complex detail of its development.It can be thought of as being used to seek historical-scale patterns that might include patterns of social organization that explain phenomenal change through morphogenesisand new forms of complexity; patterns of long-term change; and patterns that are ableto explain particulars in the history of a social community. This is in contrast to anendohistorical approach (Yolles et al, 2005) that provides a detailed historical perspectivistic examination within the complexities of a situation. It creates a predisposition to acquire information from which social distinctions can be made for aviewer: to know a thing is to know the difference between it and other things.

The approach to metahistory that we adopt here is called sociohistory. It provides ageneral frame of reference that is able to take a metafocus for social collectives thatderives from Pitrim Sorokin’s (1962) theory of sociocultural dynamics, originally published in the late 1930s, but which is embedded in the Social Viable Systems (SVS)theory developed by Yolles (2005) While Sorokin used this to explore large-scalesocieties that have continuity over long-term periods, the approach can also be applied

to continuous smaller-scale social collectives over shorter time periods. In applying a particular systems theory, we extend the capacity provided by Sorokin to describe




social metahistorical processes, and by adding in the constructivist information theorycalled Extreme Physical Information (EPI) of Frieden (1998) we maintain thedevelopment of this extension.

The relationship between SVS and EPI is an interesting one. SVS allows for the

creation of a higher form of intellectual knowledge that, unlike endohistoricalknowledge, is non-local; cannot be immediately converted to information; and cannot be used in problem solving. Rather, it provides a frame of reference that definescontext. However, a complementary intellectualization is also needed that develops principles that enable us to track and indeed predict metahistorical social change. In thisregard, EPI has a predisposition that enables an inquirer to facilitate the thematicacquisition of information through which distinctions can be made for a viewer. Thissuggests that metahistory involves a coupling of higher intellectual knowledge withthematic knowledge that provides the basis for distinction and judgment. It is this thatconstitutes the sociohistorical approach that we adopt.

2. Creating metahistory

The metahistorical frame of reference that we have formulated establishes what Yolles(2005) refers to as cultural profile, which has been developed conceptually throughSVS theory.

The frame of reference adopted for this is the Chinese metaphysical concept, yin (陰 or 阴, pinyin: yī n) and yang (陽 or 阳 yáng ), which are two primal opposing forces indialectic interaction that can form a global whole which symbolizes Tao. All change inthe whole that it produces can be explained by the internal workings of yin and yang asthey either produce or overcome one another. Like the interaction of all opposites such

as male/female, and light/dark, true/not-true, being/not-being, they have a transcendentfunction that, following Jung1, comes from their dialectic. In other words they have thecapacity to produce each other. Yin and yang are two opposites that are individuallycalled enantiomers. This word is used in chemistry to mean that each of a pair of compounds that is a non-identical reverse/mirror image of the other. The original Greek form of the word “enantiodromia” was adopted as a key Jungian concept (Wilson 1984)for his notions about consciousness2, and like yin-yang has been defined3 as the process by which something becomes its opposite, and as the subsequent interaction of the two.Jung used it to describe the way a set or system of beliefs developed that were oppositeto those held at an earlier stage. Jung eventually dropped this difficult term when hedeveloped his theory of personality traits, just using yin-yang (Jung, 1920; Aveleira,2004).

Sorokin’s theory of sociocultural dynamics uses only what Yolles (2005) calls theidentifier cultural attribute, though two other attributes also exist. The identifier attribute has a yin-yang nature, the two dichotomous forces being ideational and

sensate enantiomers (Table 1).

Enantiomer Meaning

Ideationalism Connected with conceptual imaging and knowledge creation

Sensatism Connected with phenomena and their structures and processesTable 1. Identifier attribute of cultural profile in a yin-yang pairing




The yin-yang sensate-ideational pair maintains an interaction that enables a continuumof ‘mixed’ conditions to arise, like the idealistic condition that he refers to as ‘integral’.Integral cultural mentality does not appear to have much of a role in Sorokin’s theory,and is used principally to explain the rise of the Western industrial revolution. We shall,however, generalize on this concept by using joint alliance theory (Yolles 2000; Ilesand Yolles 2002, 2003), and illustrate how such joint alliances can emerge throughSocial Viable Systems (SVS) theory. Referring to the connection between yin andyang as an enantiomer alliance is not new. The nineteenth-century philosophy of Hegel proposed that alliance or synthesis developed from (enantiodromic) opposites, callingthis the doctrine of the ‘dialectic’.

In what follows in this article we shall begin with an exploration of the identifier attribute associated within cultural profile, since it is based on Sorokin’s well-developed theory that he supported with empirical evidence. Identifier orientationoccurs when the identifier attribute within the cultural profile is assigned values for agiven contextual situation towards either the ideational or the sensate. It also forms asolid basis for a metafocus creating the conceptual framework that we will put forwardto represent cultural profiles capable of describing social behavioural metahistory.

Brander (1998) explores the three major metahistorical works, all produced during thetwentieth century: Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West ; Arnold Toynbee’s A

Study of History; and Pitirim Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics. Sorokin’s theoryof history was originally published as a four-volume set between 1937 and 1941, and isconcerned with the rise of different cultural supersystems in the West. Sorokin,however, seems to be an implicit systems thinker, and his theory appears to be the only

one of the three that is suitable as a systemic enantiomer theory.Unlike Spengler and Toynbee who are interested in the decline and fall of societies,Sorokin’s (1962) work concentrates on historical transitions. While it has an empiricaldemonstration, it argues that social and cultural history can be represented as a dynamicsystem, the dynamics coming not from the external needs of society, but from withinthe attribute and between the enantiomer or yin-yang interaction. This is through whathe calls the ‘Principle of Immanent Change’.

Cultural yin-yang forces of are in continual interactive conflict, and where they find balance one or other emerges in a society with some degree of dominance to create a

cultural orientation that will determine the direction that a society takes. Another formof expression for cultural orientation is cultural mentality (Yolles 1980; Kemp 1997) or equivalently cultural mindset (Yolles 1999). Both cultural orientation and culturalmentality suggest a social collective with shared norms, and the terms can be usedinterchangeably. While the idea of the cultural mindset can be applied in the large, tolarge-scale social groups like societies, it also has the capacity to be applied in thesmall, to small-scale cultural groups like organizations. The theory that we shalldevelop here will also benefit from some of the conceptual facilities embedded inFrieden’s (1998) information theory called Extreme Physical Information (EPI), whichhas resulted in a mathematical formulation based on Sorokin’s theory and expressed byYolles (2005) through SVS. Relating EPI and SVS after some conceptual adjustment is

feasible since they are both constructivist in nature.




3. Social Viable Systems theory

Schwarz (1997, 2001) provides a modelling approach that can explain why chaotic

events should not just be seen as temporary accidental fluctuations that occur in our complex social systems, but are rather caused by the inadequacy of our world-view andour methods to manage complex situations. He argues that explicative frameworks likereligious or political ideologies are not pertinent tools to understand thesedevelopments, and that mono-disciplines like economic science, sociology, psychology,anthropology, etc. are unable to apprehend hybrid systems. A linguistic framework thatcomes from a suitable coherent model is needed that is able to describe and interpretcomplex situations that are part of more or less autonomous complex systems. Heargues that various theoretical developments have occurred to address such approaches,including general systems theory, non-linear dynamics (chaos theory), complexadaptive systems research, cellular autonomata, recursive and hyperincursive systems,

and artificial life. The frame of reference developed by Schwarz is intended to interpretcomplex systems with more or less autonomy or operational closure (like self-organization), and which possess other related facets such as self-regulation, self- production, and self-reference.

The approach adopted here is one that comes out of the ‘complexity systems’ stable for which cybernetic principles, as discussed for instance by Beer (1959, 1966), areimportant. In complex systems there is a special feature that Beer uses centrally to hiswork: recursion. Following Espejo (1997) autonomous organizations handle thecomplexity they create by establishing a social space within which social subsystemsexist autonomously and thrive. He refers to this as recursion, where an autonomous

organization may be expressed in terms of recursively embedded autonomousorganizations. However, this may equivalently4 be expressed in terms of fractal patterns: where a self-similar system looks approximately like itself at different levelsof inspection (Mandelbrot 1982). The organization then has the potential to fulfil the purposes of the whole system through those of its fractal parts, and this contributes tothe development of cohesion. Espejo goes on to explain that organizational complexitycannot be managed by assuming that there is a unitary purpose. Language andmethodology are required that enable people to understand how cohesion can be produced around the very different purposes existing among individuals and groupswithin the organization. These need to offer a means of creating structures within whichorganizational actors can self-construct behavioural processes that allow them to

perform their own actions, while at the same time creating cohesion betweenautonomous units in working towards an agreed purpose for the larger organization.

Recursion is a fundamental feature of both of the two formal theories that we shallintroduce here. SVS theory is a approach that is able to graphically explain howsystems survive and change. It is based on the theory of self-determining autonomoussystems devised by Schwarz (1997). He created a general form of Viable SystemsTheory (e.g. Yolles and Guo 2003).

In Yolles and Guo (2003) it was explained that the approach is metaphorical, but this inno way diminishes its usefulness, as indicated by Brown (2003). Basically the general

autonomous system that we are talking about has three interactive ontologicaldimensions, or domains, as shown in Figure 1. We shall briefly introduce the three




domains that can be related to ontological contexts. Normally, people talk only of existential and phenomenal context. A historical view of the existent comes from Kant,for whom knowledge was seen to arise through a dualism that derives from theinterrelationship between a knower and an object. While these are separated from eachother, a partial fusion or synthesis develops between them. When it arrived, the

supporters of phenomenology dropped the notion of knowledge fusion or synthesis.Rather, it was seen that the parts of knowledge come together through intentionality5 tocreate a whole. The whole is constituted within the field of shared human existence or

Dasein.6 It is also maintained in phenomenology that access to reality is mediatedthrough consciousness and its attendant capacity for understanding. For many,understanding comes from knowledge, and knowledge is acquired from the experienceof phenomenal reality. There is an inferred relationship between the existent and the phenomenal that has importance to modern systems. Consider that a global phenomenon is defined by a set of local objects of attention in durable interaction, and perceived through an existent conscious conceptualization. If the assembly can beassigned an existential identity that can also be associated with a global intentionality,

and that makes it distinct from the local objects that compose it, then the global phenomenon has been identified as an emergent whole.

Autopoiesis(self-production through anetwork of processes; e.g.

political or operative processes)

Phenomenal domain

Social structures and behaviours/operations

Noumenal

domain

Ideate(s),including mental

models

Autopoiesis: feedback adjusting network of

processes

Existential domain

Paradigm(s) andknowledge(s)

Autogenesis(self-production of

principles that derivefrom knowledge)

Autogenesis: feedback adjusting the guiding

principles for autopoiesis

Figure 1. An autonomous holon

In addition to the existential and phenomenal contexts that we have referred to, we canidentify another, the noumenal . Its antecedent is the notion that truth about reality can be deduced with absolute certainty from our innate ideas, a notion prevalent in theseventeenth century through thinkers like Frances Bacon and Réne Descartes. Kant inthe eighteenth century considered that these innate ideas were constructed by minds inwhat he called the noumenal realm. The content of the noumenon is defined at anepistemological horizon, and it is supposed to be consummate (or a ‘perfect’ expressionof a positivist material reality), maintaining universal and absolute truth. Since it is at ahorizon it is unknowable and indescribable. Within these contexts, the notion of thenoumenon can be seen as a visualization of reality. Such absolute idealism does provideentry into the constructivist frame of reference, and enables us here to propose thenotion of global (or as a logical subset of this, local ) noumena. Global noumena areconstituted by mental (and therefore virtual) ideates. Used as a verb, to ideate isdefined7 as the capacity to think and conceptualise mental images. It is also sometimes

used use the term as a noun, and we shall define an ideate as being constituted as avalued (and perhaps complex) system of thought expressible as logical or rational




structures that may be formulated as, or associated with, sets of often relatable but notnecessarily coordinated images. Ideates are formulated demiurgically by socialcollectives, which construct them with intention over time and through the influence of social factors (like culture, politics, ideology, ethics, social structures and economics),in an attempt to ‘overcome chaos’ and create conceptual order. Since each social

collective produces its own global noumenon which, like the collectives with their relatively distinct cultures and ways of thinking, they are necessarily inconsummate (or ‘imperfect’ in the sense of Kant, since they arise from different patterns of knowledgeand perspectives) and relative to each other.

The relative noumenon is composed of a set of more or less isolated inconsummateideates, these being systems of thought or images with cognitively defined structures.In a global situation they are normatively agreed upon as reflecting phenomenal reality.We adopt here the phenomenological proposition that our experiences of phenomenalreality are mediated by our relative noumena, the latter being manifested as anexpression of ideating consciousness. In other words, phenomenal reality is ultimately

consciousness mediated. In most cultures there is a noumenal axiom that phenomenalreality evolves continuously over time, so that people are continuously seeking patterns,connections and causal relationships in the phenomenal events that they perceive. This permits us to infer the existence of unknown ideate structures at noumenal horizons.One purpose of scientific inquiry is to identify, voyage to, explore and thus makeknown these horizons.

Each of the domains we have referred to in Figure 1 may host a unitary system or plurality of related type system. Behavioural systems are hosted in the phenomenaldomain, noumenal or virtual systems in the noumenal domain, and metasystems in theexistential domain. The three domains in their pattern of interaction are together

referred to as an autonomous holon that metaphorically describes social agents (Yollesand Guo 2003). The holon is recursive in nature, and where the phenomenal domainapplies to individual and social behaviour, the three domains can be assigned properties(Yolles and Guo 2003). Autopoiesis fundamentally enables images of a virtual domainto be manifested phenomenally through self-producing networks of processes.Autogenesis enables principles to be generated that guide the development of thesystem.

The formulation in Figure 1 is the ontological basis for Social Viable Systems (SVS)theory, and it can be used recursively. An illustration of this plurality can be created if we explore a constructivist approach to scientific enquiry (though there is no space to

show this here), using Frieden’s (1998, 2004) idea of the creative observer. This is theinquirer whose world-view influences the way that information is acquired. It can also be related to the notion of structural coupling that occurs for structure-determined/determining engagement in an interactive family of systems. According toMaturana and Varela (1987: 75) the engagement creates a history of recurrentinteractions that leads to the structural congruence between the systems, and leads to aspatio-temporal coincidence between the changes that occur (Maturana 1975: 321).

4. Sorokin’s social yin-yang dynamics




In this section we shall follow the arguments of Kemp (1997) who has explored anddeveloped the Sorokin’s theory of sociocultural dynamics based on his four volumework “Sociocultural Dynamics” originally published in the period 1937-1941.

Sorokin (1962, vol. 4: 590), through his Principle of Immanent Change, perceives that

social groups with coherent cultures function as autonomous bodies. The principlestates that change in a socioculture occurs by virtue of its own internal forces and properties. It cannot help changing, even if all external conditions are constant. Sorokin(1962, vol. 4: 600–01) tells us that any functional sociocultural system incessantlygenerates consequences that are not the results of the external factors to the system, butthe consequences of the existence of the system and of its activities. As such, we aretold, they are necessarily imputed to it, and this occurs without the benefit of consciousdecision. One of the specific forms of this immanent generation of consequences is anincessant change of the system itself, due to its existence and activity. The system is ina continual state of non-equilibrium.

Sociocultures are therefore dynamic systems that are constantly in a state of change;this is proprietary change that is generated from within. Change is not a condition thathuman cultures pass through, but they are always in a state of flux that has a pasthistory of continuous development, and a future history that will evolve. Thus culturesexist only as they are now because of their histories, inertia and futures.

One of the other key aspects of Sorokin’s work lies in its proposition that in a givenhuman society there appears a degree of logical reasoning that underpins many of itsartefacts, laws, institutions, and together with structures and the outcomes of behaviour,these may be termed the phenomenal manifestations of a given culture. Sorokin (1962,vol. 1: 5) states that culture should not be seen as ‘a simple mathematical addition of

individual parts’ but as a system of interactive components. His analysis draws him tothe conclusion that the nature of that interaction is essentially an integrative one.

Sorokin (1962, vol. 1: 55) also identifies what we might call collective culturalmentalities that derive from mind, value, and meaning. While they are based onindividual participants in a culture, the predominant statistical consequence defines adominating cultural (or sub-cultural) condition that itself defines the collective (or sub-collective like a class or sociocultural faction). It is normally the case that socioculturesmaintain a plurality of co-existing, if autonomous, cultures. Where there are commonelements that can be identified within that culture then this can be referred to as thedominant culture, often represented by a ruling class. Sorokin defines the cultural

mentalities as the elements of thought and meaning that lie at the base of any logicallyintegrated system of culture, belong to the realm of inner experience, and occur either ina coordinated form of non-integrated images, ideas, violations, feelings, and emotions,or in an organized form of systems of thought woven out of these elements of the inner experience. These cultural mentalities are orientations that ‘characterize’ phenomenalmanifestations, and provide constant internal forces of social dynamics. Thesedynamics are constituted by the enantiomer or yin-yang sensate and ideationalmentalities that oppose and may balance each other.

So, while a society can be perceived to be in a constant flow of change, shaped, directedor characterized by different cultural orientations, it can also be seen in terms of internal

social and cultural dynamics that are constituted by differing enantiomer cultural forms.The sociocultural dynamics that develop are a consequence of the shifting relationship




between the enantiomers or yin-yang forces, and in the case of the identifier attributethese are the sensate and ideational cultural macroscopic variables. Sorokin (1962, vol.3: 511–12) notes that the relationship between these two macroscopic variablescharacterizes the dominant culture and the character of the conduct of the persons thatlive in it. The relationship between the dominant culture and the behaviour of its bearers

is not always close, but it does exist.

Following Sorokin (1962, vol. 1: 70) the dynamics of human society derive from thecharacteristics of the polar variables, and these may be seen to include ontological andepistemological attributes. The ontological attribute is constituted by the culturalorientational perception (or at least those who constitute it) of the nature of reality.Ontologically, belief within sensate orientation allows realities to be deemed to existonly if they can be sensorally perceived. It does not seek or believe in a supersensoryreality, and it is agnostic towards the world beyond any current sensory capacity of perception. Its needs and aims are mainly physical, that is that which primarily satisfiesthe sense organs. The epistemological attributes include the nature of the needs and

ends to be satisfied, the degree of strength in pursuit of those needs, and the methods of satisfaction. The means of satisfaction occurs not through adaptation or modification of human beings, but through the exploitation of the external world. It is thus practicallyorientated, with an emphasis on human external needs. With reality as perceived fromsenses, it also views reality through what can be measured and observed rather thanreasoned. Sorokin identifies the degree of strength in pursuit of these needs as‘maximum’. This suggests the occurrence of a mathematical principle of extremization,such as that of Extreme Physical Information, and as is adopted below.

Ontologically, ideational orientation sees reality as non-sensate and non-material.Epistemological needs and ends are mainly spiritual, rather than practicable, and

internal rather than external. The method of fulfilment or realization is self-imposedminimization or elimination of most physical needs, to promote the greater development of the human being as a being. Spiritual needs are thus at the forefront of this orientation’s aims rather than human physical needs. As with sensate orientation,the degree of the strength in pursuit of these needs is also a ‘maximum’. The twomentalities are yin-yang contradictions that are antagonistic to each other and holddifferent priorities, aims and needs for human society. They also come to reflect thedidactic of the cultural evolutionary process that encourages social complexification.8

Since each has a maximum degree of desire to pursue their aims, world-view holdersthat maintain these polar mentalities do not compromise with each other, and engage in

conflict. Sorokin notes that in a society where they co-exist they create ‘latentantagonism’ that can flare ‘up into open war’ (Sorokin 1962, vol. 1: 75).

5. Formulating an SVS model for sociocultural dynamics

A yin-yang cultural orientation may be thought of as an individual and collectivedisembodied mental construct that operates as a social force influencing patterns of thought and behaviour. To be able to develop the theory here, we shall have tointroduce the notion of a dispersed system, which can be considered as an autonomous

social agent when it has self-defined purpose that directs its social interactions. Anautonomous dispersed9 social agent has the potential to operate as a viable system, and




therefore has durability. It is disembodied because it is not normally possible toassociate it with a single named structured social organization that constitutes thatconstruct, even though there may be individual organizations with a given orientationthat constitute it. This is because it is constituted as a dispersed collective agent , havingthe capability of spontaneously establishing local social organizations of that particular

cultural orientation, some of which may arise to bid for social power and the control of the social community. As such the dispersed agent is composed of a plurality of individuals, who may be interconnected by communication that is either indirect (e.g. books) or direct (e.g. interactive). It has an existential domain where beliefs (including beliefs about behavioural norms) and values exist. Behavioural norms are usually moreor less adhered to by members of a cultural orientation and due to a shared history, andfrom this we can conceive of an implicit social structure that limits the individual’s potential for behaviour. It may be expressed, for instance, as a moral code that may or may not be enforced by law. Orientational beliefs can also limit the ideate content of thenoumenal domain, this ideate being composed of images or systems or coherent patterns of thought (that may include its ideology, notions of morality, or forms of

rationality) that may be maintained by constructed information.

The dispersed agent therefore has at least three interconnected ontological domains. It isautopoietic because it is able to self-produce phenomenally its own components (like patterns of communications or behaviour) according to its own orientational principles(autogenesis) through a distributed network of processes. In effect this network of processes is likely to be able to phenomenally manifest the dispersed agent’s ownideate. The network may involve inherent political or operative processes that mayfunction at a personal level, and may become associated with ritual.

The orientational principles of governance that are embedded in cultural knowledge,

and that inform ideology and morality as well as behavioural conduct, are likely to beimplicit rather than explicit, and to which the membership of each dispersed agent moreor less adheres. This is because the principle emanates from knowledge that is anormative part of the orientation. Distinct ideational and sensate orientations maintain adifferent knowledge that has semantic value only to the enantiomer. The likelihood isthat the membership of a given dispersed agent will be unable to recognize the baseknowledge that defines its opposite enantiomer. For this very reason the principles thatwe have referred to are likely to be different in sensate and ideational culturalorientations.

The distinction between ideational and sensate dispersed agents can be formulated as

follows. Ideational dispersed agents have a cultural orientation with values that aregrounded in the ideate that exist in the noumenal domain, while sensate dispersedagents are grounded phenomenally through observables that are seen to exist in the phenomenal domain. Thus, sensate and ideational concepts derive from differentontological domains, and since we are referring to value systems, these constitute afractal of the existential domain. This difference is illustrated in Figure 2 using arecursion of SVS, embedded in the existential domain value system.




Existential domain

Valued conceptsand symbols

Noumenal domainIdeate: a valued system of

conceptual thought andimages that constructsworld-view knowledge

Residence of ideationality

Phenomenal domain

Valued phenomenaincluding objects

Residence of sensatism

Autogenesis and production of

meaningful principles

Autopoiesis and productionof processes to manifest the

ideate phenomenally

Autogenesis and creation of new knowledge

Autopoiesis and regeneration of the ideate

Existential DomainValue system

Figure 2. The basis that distinguishes ideational and sensate values

The nature of sensate orientation is to be concerned with survival. It is also connectedwith external relationships, and tends to be concerned with the pathologies of doing

(e.g. how can we improve the survivability of a particular organization). This is incontrast to ideational orientation, which is connected with the generation of ideasindependent of immediate needs, i.e. to internal condition. Ideational orientation isoften concerned with the pathologies of being (e.g. how can we improve the likelihood

of achieving enlightenment or nirvana

10

). Such pathologies are often expressed throughthe noumenal ideate that is normally intended to express higher knowledge (in theTaoist tradition). Such knowledge extends beyond the local thematic knowledgethrough which phenomenal distinctions are made, and hence provides a frame of reference or context that enables the noumenal ideate to be constructed.

We have said that the cultural agents with yin-yang orientations have a social behaviour and operate in a phenomenal world as a dispersed collective from which a distributionof social collectives may arise. We can explain the formation of such a socialcollective. Essentially we can think of a dispersed collective as maintaining a globalcultural potential within which a set of local cultural singular identities can bemanifested. We note that by the term singular identity we mean an identity that has aquality of being one of a kind, in which one entity is distinguishable from all others in agiven context, or the quality or state of being of that singular identity; some character or quality of a thing by which it is distinguished from all, or from most, others. Where asingular identity has duration, it has the capacity to spontaneously develop a behavioural system. When this occurs together with consciousness, the cultural singular identity has the capacity to both create a noumenal ideate, and to establish a concretemetasystem through which local primary knowledge can be created. The mechanismfor this to occur is explained by Schwarz (1997) and Yolles (1999, chapter 8), andrelates to the structural criticality. In fact it can be argued to occur as a structural patternof knowledge is manifested and becomes an attractor, from which the social collective

emerges. The global cultural potential that has a capacity to manifest local socialcollectives can more generally be referred to as a dispersed system.




These concepts may now be quantified through the agency of “information” in the principle of Extreme physical information.

When the dispersed enantiomer agents develop phenomenal manifestations and interact,they can be represented as in Figure 3. Here, it is possible for information from the

phenomenal world to be constructively acquired by creative observers with which anoumenal ideate can be supported and maintained. Since we are dealing with sensateand ideational dispersed agents, two classes of information consequently arise that weshall represent by I and J , and these are housed in the noumenal domain. Information I

represents the acquired information by sensate culture, and information J thetheoretical basis for the society. The information natures of both I and J mean that theyare part of the noumenal domain. Let us discuss the validity of this construction. Theargument will require that we create a special interpretation of the nature of ideationalcultural orientation.

Virtual system

sensate (perhapsuncoordinated non-

integrated) images or system of thought

information I

Metas ystem

sensate culture,social unconscious

(culturaldispositions)

Virtual system

ideational (perhapsuncoordinated and non-integrated) images or

system of thoughtinformation J

Autogenesis:ideational principles of governance or strategic

management

Autopoiesis: network of political process to produce autonomous patte rns of behaviour ; it

may involve the elaboration of contesteddifference between the agents, due todistinct images or systems of thought

Autogenesis:evolving principles of

governance or strategicmanagement

Autopoiesis and regeneration of networks of rational/

appreciative system processes

Ideationalagent

Sensateagent

Structuralcoupling withcommonconflictual behaviour

having past andfuture history.There may befacilitating or constrainingeffectsdepending onother agencies

Meta system

ideational culture,social unconscious

(culturaldispositions)

Phenomena l domai n

Socialinteraction between

ideational andsensate

mentalities

Exist entia l domai n

Noumen al doma in

Autogenesis:ideational principles of

governance

Figure 3. Interaction between distinct ideational and sensate mentalities and their social

interactions

The political dimension of dynamic sociocultural processes illustrated here is important.Political debate by members of a society constitutes an innate conflict on the value of these mentalities in its social and cultural development. The result is a pulling of societyin many directions, so that it may become chaotic and unstable.

One of the outcomes of the innate conflict (and therefore the political processes thataccompany them) is that it can become resolved into the emergence of a balancedcultural orientation as the agents establish an alliance and a new cultural agent isformed. By this we are referring to Sorokin’s integral notion, but in broadened form. Itcan now develop a variable cultural orientation that is determined not only by the stateof the enantiomers but also by the mix that results between them. This notion is




consistent with the development of Hegelian joint alliances in small-scale societies(Yolles 2001; Iles and Yolles 2002, 2003), and there is no apparent reason to argue thatit cannot also be valid for large-scale societies. The emergence of such a balance occursinitially through political or operative processes that enables the cultural agents to co-exist, and which may become stable if it develops its own noumenal or virtual system

and metasystem. It does not assume that the individual cultural orientation enantiomersdisappear, but rather that they each maintain their existence and interact with theemergent yin-yang balanced form, as illustrated in Figure 4.

It is supposed here that a balance is always maintained between information I

(measuring ‘survival ability’) and information J (measuring ‘degree of structure’relating to the internal conditions of a socioculture). This continuous maintenance of balance directly means that the theory is one of general non-equilibrium. Equilibrium, by comparison, is usually attained only after a relatively large amount of time has passed.

Metas ystem

bala nced cultu re,social unconscious

Virtual system

Perhaps non-integrateduncoordinated images

or system of thoughtinformation J

Autogenesis:individual principles

of governance

Autopoiesis: network of political process to produce autonomou s patte rns of be haviour; i t

may involve the elaboration of contesteddifference with other agents, due to distinct

images

Autogenesis:evolving principles of

governance

Autopoiesis and regeneration of networks of rational/

appreciative system processes

Ideationalagent

Sensate agentwith its ownfractal holon

Structuralcoupling withcommoninterests thatoverrideconflict behaviour,having past andfuture history.These interestmay facilitateor constrainconflicts

Metas ystem

ideational culture,social unconscious

Virtual system

Perhaps non-integrateduncoordinated imagesor system of thought

information K

Phenomenal domain

Interactivesuprasystem

Exist ential domai n

Noumena l domai n

Structural coupling between balanced culturalmentality and ideational mentality.

Structural coupling between common balancedcultural mentality and ideational culturalmentality.

Autogenesis: balanced prin ciples of

governance

Figure 4. Relationship between ideational and/or sensate cultural orientations and anemergent Hegelian ‘alliance’ or balanced culture

6. Frieden’s Extreme Physical Information

Figures 2 and 3 provide a basic ontological frame of reference of social dynamicscapable of hosting epistemological content. We can enhance any epistemologicalcontent through Frieden’s EPI theory. Before describing Frieden’s work, it will beuseful to explore its constructivist nature.




6.1 The constructive nature of EPI

Frieden’s approach to measurement is built on Wheeler’s (1994) conceptualizations, whichargues that ‘All things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatoryuniverse … Observer participancy gives rise to information; and information gives rise to

physics’ (Frieden 1998: 1). So how do we acquire information? A proposition that has itshistory in thermodynamics is that phenomenal events have ‘bound’ information that may or may not be acquired by an inquirer. Given that a phenomenal event is sufficiently wellknown that a pattern of meaning (Yolles, 2005) can be created, then information defines adifference in that pattern. This concept appears to conform to Bateson’s (1972) notion thatinformation is ‘difference which makes a difference’.

Frieden argues that the measuring process is a creator of the noumenally formed physicallaws that arise because of our participation in the measuring process, a process that he callscreative observation. Frieden (1998: 108) tell us that in logical positivism ‘all statementsother than those describing or predicting observations are meaningless’, but this can be

extended with a constructivist formulation to the notion of creative observation, whereobservations are themselves meaningless except in so far as they create local logicalstructures and processes that can be used to represent phenomenal dynamics. The latter isreferred to here as social physics. Making a measurement is a quantitative way of asking aquestion, and is responsible for defining the logical relationships between the phenomena being observed. In particular, the very act of measurement elicits a physical law (Frieden1998: 250) that constitutes part of locally defined physics. Indeed, true to the Heisenberguncertainty principle, this implies that the observer is part of the observed phenomena(Frieden 1998: 252). Reality, from this perspective, is perpetuated by requests for knowledge, and adds a new creative dimension to the normally passive act of observation(Frieden 1998: 108) that establishes a new phenomenal world (Frieden 1998: 109).

So each inquirer has the potential to create a particular dynamic system just by making aninquiry. Where two autonomous inquirers undertake independent inquiries that may or maynot be related to measurement taking, the dynamics that are created just through their participation will be in some way differentiable. This is a different proposition to the moreusual epistemological one that people adopt different perspectives that result in distinctmodels from which hypotheses about logical relational structures are generated, tested, andconclusions drawn. Rather, it presupposes a mental model that provides the basis for anevaluation of a set of measurements in the phenomenal domain.

These are then migrated back by inference to the noumenal domain, which becomes

manifest as a logical dynamic structure that is local to the creative observer. The dynamicstructure is manifest as a probability distribution. In this way a measuring process createsthe probability distribution whose outputs are the measurements. The probabilitydistribution describes the local physical reality of the noumenon behind the measurements.In this way the observer achieves the highest form of creativity that is possible, i.e. createshis/her own local reality. The notion of creative observation also has an implication for howone sees the future. Frieden holds that like physics, prediction is local, but it requires that people are prepared to constantly modify their views of their world, and consistentlyreassess the dynamics of the phenomena that they see around them and measure.

Frieden’s idea of the notion of creative observation provides a reversed perspective aboutthe connection between the logical dynamic relationships that underpin our conscious realityand the models that we create about them. The ontological representation of the creativeobservation process seen as an autonomous holon is represented in Figure 5. Here, the




ontological representation is symbolic, and the processes within each domain areepistemological in nature. It should be noted that the conceptualized process of observationis much more complex than that represented, involving recursive fractal patterns. Graphictotal representation of this topological pattern is too complex to represent in an integratedway in two dimensions. Indeed, the complexity develops further because Figure 6 is also a

fractal of the measuring process itself (as expressed in Figure 7). The mental model in thisfigure is developing through an iterative autopoietic process that enables an inquiry todevelop. It is part of the noumenal ideate that defines through consciousness the nature of the logical dynamical structure of the phenomena that will be acquired through thematicinquiry, that may be argued to exist as a theoretical pattern of reality. This logically formed pattern of reality, when adopted normatively by a social collective, is the basis for phenomenal events. As such this can have greater significance for the social collective thanthe experiences of phenomenal reality itself, because it provides an explanation that satisfiesrational, ideological or ethical needs, and also offers coherence as opposed to non-interpretable sporadic experiences. In other words, such a mental construction can developmore significance than the experiences of phenomenal reality. It may be noted that this

logical structure, if formally defined, is unlikely to be both internally consistent andcomplete (following Gödels theorem: Yolles 1999: 60-61). The nature of the logicalstructure is that it creates a potential for the acquisition of information. It may therefore bereferred to as ‘bound information’ in that it is bound to the noumenon. Information is‘migrated’ from the phenomenal to the noumenal domain, enabling the information model todevelop.

It should be noted that this qualitative information is the ‘acquired information’ thatconstitutes only a subset of the bound information available. The acquisition of informationis directed by purposes for inquiry that relate to the developing model of the creativeobserver, and the interests that emerge during the qualitative and quantitative inquiry process. These purposes and interests are normally a subset of the potential purposes andinterests that are possible, and therefore are defined within a frame of reference thatnaturally bounds what can be seen.




Information

Existential domain

Logical model fromthematic elaborating

knowledge about physical system

Phenomenal domain

Formal or informallogical dynamical

structure ofphenomena(e.g. formal laws of motionlike systems

dynamics or quantum physics)

Autogenesis and principlesofinquiry

Autopoiesis and production ofprobability

distributions thatmanifest dynamic

phenomenal (physical)systems

Autogenesis guidingadjustment to principles

Autopoiesis: regenerationof network that manifests

dynamicstructure

Mental model of creative observer

Structuralcoupling

withshared

past &futurehistory

Noumenal domain

Noumenal domain

Basis for logical coherence for phenomenal/physical experiences

Fractal derivingautogenesis principles

that underpin model fromelaboratingknowledge

Figure 5. Elaboration of Frieden’s proposition of creative observation in physics

Existential domainParadigm

Phenomenal domain

Qualitativeinquiring

observation

Autogenesis and principlesfrom knowledge Autopoiesis and

production of inquiry

Autogenesis feedback

Autopoiesis and network processes for the production of

qualitative information

Existential domainWorld-view of observer and

motivation for inquiry

Potential for structuralcoupling

Noumenal domainIteratively

developing mentalmodel of creative

observer

Figure 6. Nature of the qualitative inquiry process by a creative observer




Autopoiesis: productionof measuration process

Phenomenal domainMeasuration

Autopoiesis: datafeedback, creating datainformation through anetwork of processes

Existential domainFisherÕs theory of

information

Autogenesis: principles of

systemic

Autogenesis: feedback adjusting the guiding

principles

Noumenal domain

Logical dynamicof physical

Figure 7. Illustration of the measuration process and its connection with system dynamics asa fractal of the complex autonomous system.

6.2 The Nature of EPI

Extreme Physical Information (EPI) is a theory (Frieden and Soffer 1995; Frieden 1998,2004), whose aim is to construct the unknown laws of science, and in particular here in

phenomenal social physics. These laws are both statistical and deterministic in nature.Although originally developed and applied for use in physics, it has since been appliedto estimating probability laws of genetics and ecology (Frieden et al. 2001; Frieden2004), cancer growth (Gatenby and Frieden 2002) and econophysics (Hawkins andFrieden 2004). There are also various other potentials for its development in the socialsphere, like the growth in markets, or in the study of macro-economics with theattendant question of whether or not economic intervention should be utilized in order to foster beneficial economic movements. Areas such as growth and depletion are alsoof interest here, as well as capital and labour as forms of resource.

EPI has two forms of information, I and J , that as we shall see are indicators of complexity. The premise of EPI is a self-evident one – that data comprise information‘about’ an observed effect. The ideate information intrinsic to the noumenon is referredto as J (Figure 1), while the phenomenon being observed is represented by informationlevel I. As shown in Figure 2, informations I and J may also be regarded asenantiodromic opposites, in the sense defined by Sorokin as previously discussed.

We need to consider here that the noumenal ideate is not simply a model of phenomenalreality, but a representation of what is perceived to constitute phenomenal reality(Figure 5). The perception is on the level of information.




It therefore defines a mode that enables phenomenal reality to be addressed andinterpreted. Technically then, we can refer to ideate information as a source effect, and phenomenal information as being collectable as data.

To develop the basis for the EPI principle, consider that whenever information arises

out of collected data, the data are formed out of a flow of information

J I (1)

from the source effect to the data collectors. According to the second law of statistical physics, information is generally lost in transit from source to data collectors. Thereforethe received or ‘acquired’ information I is generally some fraction of J , as we shall seein a moment.

Let the unknown noumenon be sensed through its effects upon the measured versions of a parameter of value a. For example, the effect called ‘quantum mechanics’ can be

sensed by its effects upon the measured values of the position a of an electron.This sensate version of the noumenon is generally partial, and if a number of suchmeasurements y of a are made these will randomly differ. In general the measurementsy contain an amount I of Fisher information about a defined as

I = < [ d/da(log(p( y|a))) ]2 > . (2a)

The notation d/da means a mathematical derivative with respect to a, and brackets < >indicate an expectation, i.e. multiplication by the law p( y|a) and integration over all y

(these operations not shown).

Probability law p( y|a), called the ‘likelihood function’ in statistics, defines the probability of each possible vector y of measurements in the presence of the ideal parameter value a. Hence, in applications to physics, the law defines ‘the physics’ of themeasured effect or phenomenon. Interestingly, the spread in possible values y of the presence of the one value a actually quantifies the degree to which the phenomenondiffers from its corresponding noumenon.

Analogously, when the data and parameter are suitably defined below in terms of sociocultural effects, the probability law p( y|a) will take on the role of defining astatistical, sociocultural physics. Our aim will then be to estimate the probability lawand, therefore, aspects of the socioculture that gave rise to the data.

Evaluations of I for various probability laws via equation (2a) discloses that the broader and (by a normalization requirement) lower it is as a function of the y the smaller is I . A broad, low likelihood function indicates close to equal probability for all values of they, i.e. a maximally disordered system. Thus, a small value of I indicates a high level of disorder; similarly it can be shown that a large value of I indicates a small level of disorder.

As an example, if the probability law is normal with variance 2 then Thus,

if I is small it must be that 2 is larger, i.e. the probability law is very broad and low,

indicating high randomness or high disorder.




These effects allow us to address the famous second law of thermodynamics within thecontext of Fisher information (as opposed to the usual measure called ‘entropy’).

As another example, in the context of the sociocultural problem below where there arediscrete probabilities pn(t ), n=1,…,N , the general information equation (2a) becomes

The latter is the slope of the probability law at a given time. Thus, equation (2b) showsthat the information at each time analytically increases with the slopes (either upward or downward) of the probabilities at that time.

The second law of thermodynamics states that disorder must inevitably increase.Disorder can be measured in many different ways. The usual measure is ‘entropy’.Entropy increases when disorder increases, so the second law is usually expressed by

the statement that the rate of change of entropy with time is positive (i.e. it increases).

However, the state of disorder, as we discussed, may also be expressed in terms of Fisher information I . From the above, the appropriate statement is that its rate of changeis negative,

(Frieden 1990; Plastino and Plastino 1996). That is, with an increase in time thechange in information must be negative,

Or, Fisher information monotonically decreases with time. On the level of theobservables or data y this means that ever more randomness monotonically creeps intothem. The system defined by the y becomes ever more disordered.

The information transition (1) represents a change in information obeying

Combining equations (4) and (5) gives the result or equivalently,

This is one of the two equations comprising the EPI principle. It shows that the constantis a measure of the efficiency with which the information is transferred from the

effect to the observer. The efficiency parameter is always between 0 (0% efficiency)




and 1 (100% efficiency). Its value depends upon the quality of the detectors and the particular effect that is under observation.

For example, when observing quantum effects if the detectors are perfect then . No information is lost. Or, by comparison, classical effects such as gravitation or

electromagnetism are presumed to arise out of imperfect observation due to detectorsthat lose half the information, with The data are then too coarsely spaced inspace-time to sense the much finer, quantum gravitational fluctuations. In our sociocultural application the value of will vary from one sociocultural system toanother. Thus, they act as distinct phenomena, i.e. as if each sociocultural “system”really is fundamentally different.

Equation (6) states that the acquired information I has the ‘potential’ to equal the valueof J at most. In applications where I = J , all the information necessary to describe thenoumenon is now available in the observations. A result is that the noumenon, and notmerely the phenomenon, can be known. That is, the probability law p( y|a) that is the

output of EPI now describes the noumenon as well as the phenomenon. This happens,for example, for measurements that are on the quantum level as indicated above.

In comparison with the fixed form of equation (2) defining information I , information J

varies in form from problem to problem. It is always found by the use of an appropriateinvariance principle, i.e. an invariance that is appropriate in characterizing the

particular measured effect. This invariance principle must therefore be known . We willuse a very simple invariance principle in our problem below, that of unitarity(invariance of length).

The ‘physical information’ K is defined to be the change in the information that is

incurred during its transit (1) from source to data collector(s),

K = I – J. (7)

By equation (4), K is always zero or negative, indicating that it is generally aninformation loss. As we saw, this means that the state of disorder of the systemincreases. It also means that, in the ‘knowledge game’ (see below), where theobserver plays a ‘demon’ personifying nature for a prize of information, naturealways wins.

6.3 Principle of extreme physical information

An inevitable perturbation of the source event by the process of measuring or observing it causes its potential information J to likewise be perturbed. Then, by theconnection equation (6) between the two informations, I is perturbed as well. The perturbation may take place for an ideal scenario with indicating no loss of information. Then the two perturbations are equal, and their difference, taken as K , iszero. This is another way of saying that K is at some extreme value,

K = I – J = extremum. (8)

This is a principle of extreme physical information (EPI). The extreme value is

attained through variation of the likelihood law p( y|a) and subject to the relation (6)connecting I and J . In classical problems, such as this one, the extremum is a




minimum in particular. Also, the ideal parameter a is here the unknown time t atwhich a system of populations is randomly sampled, giving rise to some observed population type n. Hence the generic datum y is here n, and the likelihood function p( y|a) is a probability law P(n|t) on n if t , which is conventionally denoted as pn(t).This represents the ‘growth law’ for population component n. The totality of such

growth laws pn(t), n=1,…,N describes the overall system, which in our applications isa sociocultural one. Hence our aim will be to compute these laws.

Note that since the time t is general , we are not limited in this approach to seekingequilibrium states of these probability laws. Equilibrium states are defined at the particular limiting time Instead, the EPI solutions will be expressed asfunctions pn(t) of a general time value. Thus, they represent in general non-

equilibrium solutions. Such functions of the time are also termed ‘dynamical’solutions, as in problems of Newtonian mechanics. EPI is eminently suited to findingsuch non-equilibrium solutions, having already done so in problems of statisticalmechanics (Flego et al. 2003; Frieden 1998; Frieden et al. 1999; Frieden et al. 2002),

econophysics (Hawkins and Frieden 2003), and cancer growth (Gatenby and Frieden2002).

Shortly we will show how the information concepts I and J can be used insociocultural dynamics to formulate an entry into the formation of a sociocultural physics. In particular these informations will be seen to naturally interpret as,respectively, sensate and ideational dispositions of a culture. After this the principle(8) will be applied to the sociocultural problem.

6.4 EPI as a knowledge acquisition game; I and J as enantiomers

The EPI principle equation (8) has a useful interpretation. The solution pn(t) thataccomplishes the extremum can represent the payoff of a mathematical game. Thegame is played between the recipient of information I – the observer – and the‘constructor’ of the source effect of level J – which can only be nature. The latter is personified as an ‘information demon’, in analogy to the famous ‘Maxwell demon’ of thermodynamics. The basis for the game is supplied by the working hypothesis of EPI, that the aim of observation is to learn. Then the aim of both players is tomaintain a maximum level of information. However, the amount I of information thatthe observer receives is purely at the expense of the demon’s information level J

(called a ‘zero-sum’ game). As a result the observer tries to gain a maximum amountof information ( I ) while the demon tries to pay out a minimum amount ( J ). Hence

information measures I and J act in opposition, that is, they are enantiomers. Thisforms a bridge between EPI theory and aspects of Sorokin’s theory.

It should be mentioned that the association of EPI with the particular descriptive word‘enantiomer’ is not necessary to EPI theory in general. The informations I and J arewell-defined anyway (see below). Rather, the description is a helpful device for learning and ‘picturing’ this particular sociocultural application of EPI. As a matter of fact, the ‘knowledge game’ that was previously described is another such didacticdevice.

7. Developing a metahistorical frame of reference




Earlier in Figures 3 and 4 we provided an ontological representation for socioculturaldynamics. We can now try to apply principles of EPI to this in order to create a means by which epistemological content can be generated.

First, we must assess the degree to which we accurately see reality. We adopt the principle that phenomenal reality exists but cannot be seen in its entirety or necessarilyin the same way as others would see it. This is because it is mediated by consciousness.As such the phenomenal world is not universally the same to all of the actors involved,and there are thus at least as many views of the phenomenal world as there are perceiving actors. Second, we differentiate between acquired and bound information.We have already referred to bound information, and note that it can be defined in termsof a potential for phenomenal structural variety, and more structural variety (and itsassociated processes of interconnectivity) is indicative of a potential for the acquisitionof ever more information. If the perception of disorder increases then this is manifestedas a perception of decreasing structural variety, and the potential for recognizingdifferentiated structures become reduced. In a well-ordered system there is more

structural variety and an increased differentiation. In a complex system this may beexpressed in terms of distinct microstructures (that is, microscopically distinctstructures).

We are aware that the informations I and J relate to real effects, since all real things are‘capable of observation’ by at least someone. This still rules out as ‘real’ themathematical statements that describe effects. These are statements of the theoreticalstructure of the observed effect, and these statements trace from the ideational or ‘source’ laws. This is in fact why informations I and J are relatable. I is a phenomenally based epistemological view of the complexity of a reality, which is represented by J asa noumenal source structure, fully since it is theoretical. Both I and J describe the same

thing , the only difference being that J is an idealized representation of it, while I

generally describes it inconsummately (imperfectly).

To review, noumena exist as entities of information level J , and obey intrinsic structuralrelations. They also provide a potential for epistemological content through a flow or transformation of information from the ideate information source to a space of observables. The received information I , consequently, is a reflection of theepistemological content of J. As a reflection, it may be used to infer the structure of theideational noumenon, via EPI. Since J results from particular structural relationshipsthat vary from noumenon to noumenon, J is defined by EPI theory in a variable way. Inthe case of sociocultural dynamics we are able to define the entities in terms of variablesets of ideate values. We shall define I , however, to be the acquired information that is patterned by all sensatists, regardless of society. This is because the sensatist ismodelled by EPI as an ideal observer, one who has a maximal (and therefore unique)capacity to learn. Therefore, I has a fixed form in the theory.

We have argued that the measures of information I and J for sensate and ideationalcultural disposition constitute part of a single, virtual domain, necessarily so sinceaccording to SVS theory it is only here that information can reside. Sensatism andideationality cannot exist one without the other, and this is shown by their proportionality =I/J where is finite. These informations are universal measures of structure and order (or the lack thereof). Ideationality only includes all theoretical or ideational aspects. It does not include sensate. Sensate arises out of it, and as an

expression of it.




There is therefore a relationship between ideationality and sensatism. Ideational culturaldisposition is everything that defines ideal rules of being and activity for human kind.As such there are two obverse ways of expressing this assignment. First, as the socialcollective through its cultural disposition attempts to carry through these rules, it canonly do so inconsummately, and the attempted carry-through is called sensate activity.

Second but equivalently, as seen from a different perspective, sensate cultural disposition represents an inconsummate attempt to carry through ideational rules.

These dispositions are, however, disembodied. They are manifested through agents of cultural disposition as illustrated in Figure 3. These manifestations are expressed as a phenomenal social conflict process. Within the context of EPI, J represents the totallevel of structural information in the given system, with complete accuracy. Thisstructural information exists as ideals and laws. People act in response to culturallytransmitted ideas that are embedded in symbolic representations of structuralinformation.

Ideational and sensate cultural dispositions are enantiodromic or yin-yang distinctions,and differentiate between what people might aspire to (ideationality) and what theyactually achieve (sensatism). There is in a sense a ‘conflict’ between the two, in thatthey do not completely agree. Also, perhaps more to the point, people purposely do notcarry through the ideational most of the time. This purposefulness might indicate the‘conflict’ that they seek. This is also sometimes termed ‘pragmatic’ activity, as in a‘white lie’ which we ‘should not’ do (ideational) but do anyway, on the grounds of a‘better good’ for everyone concerned. A white lie is an example of a small difference between the ideational and the sensate. When the difference becomes large enough,according to some interpretations this would indicate a kind of conflict often called a

‘sin’.

The degree to which the sensate aspect of a society agrees with its ideational foundationvaries from one society to another. By equation (6), the agreement is measured by thesize of the efficiency constant . The size of is determined by the attitudes and practices of the members of the society toward its laws and ideals. Thus, the value of

varies from one society to another. A ‘traditionalist’ or ‘law abiding’ society has aclose to 1, while a society that ignores its ideational foundations has a close to 0.

The former may normally be considered to be ‘conservative’ and the latter to be‘liberal’ in the usual sense of the words.

The nature of the sensate and ideational dispositions can vary absolutely or relatively.

Let us consider the absolute first. The enantiomer dispositions change in their levels of complexity, and the interest is to identify the nature of that complexity, because this hasan impact on the way the society behaves. Since I and J are measures of thesedispositions, we wish to evaluate their change relative only to themselves (we refer tothis as absolute change). A low value of I implies a simple sensate society, and a highvalue of J implies a complex ideational society. We shall refer to these conditions as

primitive, since sensate primitiveness suggests a low technological level and hence an

inability to cope well with complex change; and ideational primitiveness suggests asociety that is so bound up by complex ritual that it dominates peoples’ lives, either byits conspicuous absence (in atheists or agnostics) or its conspicuous presence (in priestsor zealots). Also, with I<<J the high complexity of the ideational rules are not being

practised on the sensate level.




We offer a caveat here, which is to emphasize that these are only qualitatively expectedtrends that appear reasonable at this time. These arguments, those given below, andindeed the entire theory to be developed, are as yet largely untested. We do not regardany of the results or interpretations as decisive. The aim is to initiate the theory, withthe hope that it is reasonable and self-consistent, and will stimulate further inquiry into

the subject along these lines.

It is possible to make these trends more transparent by rescaling I and J as follows.Let us define ‘coefficients of information’ I and J that are scaled versions of I and J,

as I = 2I/(I+J) and J = (J-I)/(I+J).

By the use of equation (6), these may be expressed in terms of the informationefficiency constant as I = 2 /( +1) and J = (1- )/(1+ ). Note that, ascoefficients, or ratios of informations, I and J have no units. Also, since lies on theinterval (0,1), both I and J likewise are positive numbers that lie in the interval (0,1).These values of I and J are also complementary to each other in that I + J = 1, this

complementarity highlighting their enantiodromic or yin-yang relationship.

It may be noted that when I and J take their primitive values, I and J become close totheir extreme values 0 and 1 respectively. Further, since I and J have units, their values are always relative to a choice of units. By comparison, the coefficients I and J

are unitless and, hence, have absolute values, i.e. values that are independent of choice of units. This allows I and J to be compared across different socioculturalsystems.11 This includes absolute comparisons of small-scale variations, or even periodic oscillations, away from primitive conditions in I and J. Such a potential for oscillation occurs, for instance, while larger-scale enantiomer conflict progresses, or where one enantiomer succeeds in dominating and in so doing marginalizing the

other.Relative variation may also occur, and can be expressed in terms of an efficiencycoefficient. The value of the efficiency coefficient determines the degree to whichsensate or ideational aspects of a society dominate. Since =I/J , if is close to zerothis means that J much exceeds I so that the ideational aspect is dominant; and vice-versa, if is close to unity (its largest possible value) then the sensate level is largeenough to meet that of the ideational aspect. Ramifications of these cases arediscussed in a moment. Before we do this, we should note that the use of I and Jintroduced above also permits a

unitless coefficient of difference K = I – J to be defined. Now K relates to as K =

(3 -1)/( + 1), it and lies on the interval (-1, 1). While the unitless informationcoefficients I, J, K will be useful in the future, to keep notation to a minimum in thisintroductory article they will not be used further. While their construction does provide general transparency, it will perhaps be clearer to revert to the more basicabsolute information quantities I, J and K that we have already set up.

Let us now consider changes in . First consider where is close to unity, so that I

is very close to J. Here, in essence every sensory experience fully agrees with anexisting ideational law or principle. Indeed the agreement is so good that theexperience is merely a re-expression of an existing law or principle.12 Thus, there areno fundamentally ‘new’ experiences or ideas. The society stagnates and, ultimately,runs out of ideas.




Second, consider the other extreme when I < < J . This is an ideational-dominatedsociety, where is close to zero. The received information I is now very low,describing a noisy, chaotic system. Here sensory experience randomly and widelydiverges from the social norms of the ideational aspect. This might be manifest in a breakdown of morality, a high crime rate, etc. The society cannot function in

accordance with its own rules. Consequently it will be too impractical to exist.

Thus:

A society in which is close to zero or, alternatively, close to unity is

dominated either by sensate or ideational disposition respectively. With a

sensate disposition, the society will run out of ideas, and likely will be

unable to viably respond to new challenges and may even have difficulty

conceptualizing them. At the other extreme, an ideationally dominated

society will become more and more impractical, and likely will centre on

ritual rather than be responsive to internal or environmental pressures.

In either case the society will start to stagnate and will become ‘structurally critical’,increasingly unable to cope with problems and crises that it will face (e.g. famine,external war, inflation). In this increasing critical state even small perturbations in thesystem may affect it in a major way.

An example of the shifting relative values of I and J can be suggested throughconjecture. In early Greek society the slave and merchant classes took care of theculture’s operational and external needs, while the ruling class pursued its ideationalneeds. The conjecture is that as more slaves were acquired the ruling class had moretime for building up its ideology. Thus, the ideational level J of information went up.

But also, since the slaves added degrees of freedom to the system, this increased thesensate level of Fisher information. Thus, both J and I went up in value. This is quite inagreement with the EPI equation (6), which states that I maintains proportionality to J

over time. Taking an autopoietic view, ambient political or operative processes wereconsequently dominated by ideational disposition and benefited those pursuing anideational future. In the above explanation, we have not commented on the value of .

In summary, ideational- or sensate-dominated cultural disposition will fail to meet theneeds of its members. This will lead to a loss of confidence by society in the directionthat cultural disposition takes it. The debate and conflict will reopen, other mentalitieswill reassert themselves, and the chaotic state will return. This period maybe described

as chaotic in the sense that it appears to have no direction, and conflict has a greater likelihood of becoming phenomenally manifested. Since the chaos results from theinabilities of one disposition to meet that crisis, one would expect the alternativedisposition to gain adherence and ascendancy within that chaotic period. This may nothappen, and an existing dominant cultural disposition may simply reassert itself, but indoing so, society will still remain structurally critical. Inevitably, it will change itsdisposition or the society will simply fail.

It may be noted that an output of EPI holds at a general time, and represents a balance between information I (measuring ‘survival ability’) and information J (measuring‘degree of structure’ relating to the internal conditions of a socioculture) at each time.

This continuous maintenance of balance over time means that the theory is one of




general non-equilibrium. Equilibrium, by comparison, is usually attained only after arelatively large amount of time has passed.

8. Exploring the dynamic of cultural disposition

Let us consider the population dynamics introduced in equation (2b). We should notethat in general the word ‘population’ has a generic meaning that may include volumesor densities of resources as well as populations of people. These are lumped together and arbitrarily called population types n=1,…,N . The populations themselves aredescribed by the relative frequencies pn(t ).

These evolve over time according to various non-equilibrium distributions. Thesedistributions may change rapidly enough to more aptly be called ‘states’. These statesare characterized by attaining, at each instant of time, a total information I that ismaximally close to information level J . The states are, by construction, stationary, but

not, however, stable, since their total information level I , which changes with time andgenerally decreases according to the second law equation (4), is in general not at its

absolute minimum value. The latter is only approached as time increases. The absoluteminimum would describe the long-term stable state toward which the society is moving.The latter state is, then, characterized by two conditions:

1. Information level I is maximally close to information level J (true at alltimes).

2. Information levels I and J are both at their absolute minimum values(true at large time).

The first condition describes a level of sensate experiences that, at each time, are

maximally close to satisfying the requirements set by the ideational principles of theruling hierarchy. However, although the difference I – J is minimized it is not yetnecessarily small in absolute terms. In fact, there are multiple solutions to the problem I

– J = extremum, which are characterized by different respective values of the attainedextremum. The situation is very much like that of ecological evolution, which obeys thesame dynamical equations (Frieden 2004). Thus, some differences I – J are larger thanothers. Since each such solution represents a stationary solution, it also represents alocally stable (metastable) state in the evolution of the system. The system evolves fromone such metastable state to another. It must be emphasized that, as in ecologicalevolution, this is not necessarily through ever smaller minima. There could from time totime be a random transition to a state of larger minimum (Vincent 2004). It is only thesolution for the absolute minimum difference that is the absolute most stable state.

These trends suggest that knowledge of the curve | K(t)| = |I(t)-J(t)| of informationdifference as a function of time, might be useful as an indicator of future cataclysm for a society. Sudden rises in K(t) would indicate changes toward non-alliance (andtherefore toward instability). We later use the curve of K(t) for this purpose in a simpleexample. In our application it turns out that K(t) = – I(t) so that |K(t)|=I(t). Predictiveuse of the curve I(t ) has previously been advanced for predicting environmentalcatastrophes (Fath et al. 2003).

We can interpret these mathematical effects in sociocultural terms. Merely stationary

solutions do not represent states of absolute stability since the information difference I – J is not yet at its absolute minimum value. Also, as time progresses both information




levels I and J tend to decrease, meaning that the complexities of both the ideational andsensate phenomena (structures and related behaviours) tend to decrease. This may occur gradually through the process of structural changes (since structure constrains andfacilitates certain types of behaviour), or morphogenically through emergence. Thelatter occurs, for instance, either when one culture suddenly dominates, or when

ideational and sensate cultures establish themselves into a new balance through a ‘jointalliance’ that enables the formation of a new frame of reference that simplifies the waythey are both seen (we shall see such a shift as Figure 4 ‘emerges’ from Figure 3through transformation with the emergence of a new shared paradigm).

Also, randomly, transitions may be made to less stable systems, whereby the shared paradigm becomes less acceptable to the competing parties.

When sensate and ideational dispositions are each primitive (as discussed above) theytake their simplest form, and therefore have minimum I and J values. The secondcondition describes the time at which both information levels have individually

decreased to their minimal levels. They now describe a system that is both stationaryand stable. The ‘simplest’ form of living becomes dominant. This situation has adramatic parallel in the growth of in situ cancers. Cancer is a life form with a minimallevel of complexity, since it has lost the ability to function normally while maintainingthe ability to reproduce. Hence its information level I is at an absolute minimum valuefor a living thing. As a verification, using this in an EPI approach to defining cancer growth gives the clinically correct law of growth (Gatenby and Frieden 2002).

The potential for open warfare between different adherents remains a recognized andfeared potential. To use Sorokin’s words, such a society is eclectic, self-contradictory,and poorly integrated logically. Their ideational and sensate elements remain adjacent

and mechanically co-exist, without achieving genuine inner synthesis (Sorokin 1962,vol. 1: 75). Quantitatively, the sensate information level I departs appreciably from theideational level J .

The formation of a dominant cultural disposition provides a normative value system anda perception of the future for its participants. Cultural stability arises as a statistical process (as above), but there will be factions of participants of society that maintain adifferent cultural disposition, but do not have access to the politics of power that shapesit and its future history. Cultural mentalities evolve, and as they do this they alwaysinherit the historically created phenomenal structures and modes of behaviour. However they will be seen constructively, in a way that is consistent with the world-view of the

cultural disposition. Part of this involves a revaluing of manifestations.

One of the consequences of the dichotomy between these enantiomer or yin-yangentities is that society moves in either an ideational or sensate direction. In other words,one side or the other gains political power, and seeks to create stability and order byintegrating the whole of society’s external manifestations to its owns aims, goals andvalues. It is this that constitutes Sorokin’s conceptualization that the logical reasoningthat underpins culture is integrative, and it represents an active dynamic force thatcreates dynamic stability as it achieves its purposes and goals. Ultimately, a state of dynamic stability can follow from particular structural phenomenal processes andrelationships that can exist in the society.




In structurally stable societies the ever existent potential for enantiomer conflict issuppressed by denying the debate between the cultural mentalities, thereby giving theimpression of order and coherence. In this way the overt manifestation of violentconflict is inhibited. However, such a society may appear to be stable at the expense of becoming increasingly structurally unstable.

As a dominant cultural disposition evolves it continues to redefine, revalue and reorder social structures and ideas by its world-view holders, but stable structures have to meetthe needs of the society that they serve, otherwise they become unstable. Since culturaldisposition reflects the didactic nature of human evolution, then the promotion of oneenantiomer over the other will be, in the end, detrimental to the development of societyand its needs. In such situations cultural disposition marginalization occurs (Yolles2001). Where this is elaborated one enantiomer faction or other may find ways of expressing its distress phenomenally through violence.

In terms of EPI, the possible balance that can occur in a sociocultural situation in which

an ideational/sensate cultural disposition arises is defined by K = min( abs(I – J)) =min|I – J|, where K is K at its positive extreme minimum value. K indicates the current

condition of balance of the culture, and when K does not attain value K the conflict between the enantiomers is maintained and no balance emerges.

We may now say that: when the minimum value K of K is attained, the indication is that

either one cultural disposition has achieved complete domination over the other, or they

have formed a Hegelian ‘alliance’ (balanced) cultural disposition.

We have already considered the former case when one enantiomer dispositiondominates, and we have noted that the socioculture may not be durable because of itsinherent inability to deal with either change or because of its impracticability. Let usnow briefly discuss the latter alternative. Sorokin talks of a third cultural disposition,idealistic. This can be seen as a balance of the two other dispositions working together.It is called idealistic because society requires a new political power base that is able todrive autopoietic processes that can manifest virtual images and logical processes phenomenally. The only way in which this new cultural disposition can arise, however,is as an emergent third cultural group. This is difficult to achieve because it involvesnew forms of proprietary enantiomer governance and involves mutual political processes across the two cultural dispositions. Thus it requires the dominant culturaldispositions to relinquish their existing power. In corporate alliance theory this is anessential component if joint alliances are to have a chance of surviving. As an

illustration of this in a small-scale situation, the break-up of the US telecommunicationsgroup ATT (American Telegraph and Telephone) and the privatization of BT (BritishTelecom) stimulated an alliance process (Musso 1998) that proved itself unstable. The joint alliance that formed was called ‘Concert’ and resulted in failure after two years of operation at a cost of US$800 million annually before it shut down in 2001. One wouldtypically associate this failure with the alliance’s inability to develop an autonomousthird culture with a proprietary disposition. The cause of this failure is likely to beattributable to the idea that the companies did not understand that the only way that thealliance could survive was to develop a new autonomous ‘alliance’ culture that was notdominated by the culture of either company. This would also need to develop its ownform of governance and internal and relational (to ATT and BT) political processes:

‘the third way’.




Let us now also explore the cultural disposition alliance in terms of informations J

and I . Now I and J can take positions respectively in sensate and ideational culturaldispositions, while in the alliance formulation that represents a balance between thetwo, I and J is manifested in terms of the absolute value of I – J, in particular as K .When this loss gets extremized at a minimum value of K it can be an assignation of

current balanced cultural disposition. This minimizes the discrepancy between idealsand actions, or ideationality and sensatism. In other words, as with most real things, acompromise is struck. In electromagnetism this compromise exists between electricalenergy and magnetic energy. In classical mechanics it occurs between kinetic energyand potential energy. All these things are found by minimizing a difference of measures of the system. There is great precedent in the physical sciences for what weare doing.

Since K can represent any balance that materializes, information J may be thought of as a referencing variable in that it provides a basis for learning the ‘representation of the current state of the culture’. By the usual EPI model, the data are acquired by an

observer who has no prior knowledge about the unknown structure. All he has to goon are the data and an idea about an invariance principle that the structureobeys. Using these in the epistemological mechanism provided by EPI allows one tosolve for the unknown structure. Thus, EPI is epistemological in nature, learning as itdoes about the ideational aspects of a sociocultural group.

9. Summary

In this article we have for the first time linked the physical theory of EPI with thesociocultural theory of SVS.

This has led to a new, sociocultural physics whose aim is to provide a capability for the

explanation and prediction of sociocultural systems. Another aim has been to exploreaspects of the sociocultural dynamics of Sorokin, and to elaborate on the theory byintroducing SVS theory. This theory enables us to use principles of joint alliance theoryto explain the dynamics of yin-yang balance (between cultural enantiomers). It also provides a capacity to explore the politics of sociocultural situations. The result leadsnaturally to its expression by EPI theory within what we have referred to associohistory.

This expression has been manifest as a formulation of sociocultural dynamics. The threevariables I , J and K representing sensate, ideational and balanced cultural dispositionsfall naturally into the dynamic stochastic processes already established in EPI.

However, EPI has produced some further results here, including the simultaneousdescription of both the evolutionary growth and dynamical motions of interacting populations.

The populations can consist of a general mixture of peoples and their needed resources.The analysis gave rise to some self-evident propositions regarding societies. Thesedemonstrate the capacity of EPI to produce sensible results from a set of basic propositions. It also shows the promise of the approach for its future development asnew forms of problem are tackled. This will be a learning process.

The importance of EPI within this context is not simply that it can produce self-evident

propositions. It has also enabled us to more deeply question certain propositions in our understanding of Sorokin’s sociocultural dynamics. It has shown in this regard that EPI




provides a framework for measuring the nature of a culture under investigation. Oneelementary result, for instance, is in the examination of the emergence of a balancedculture when K = K . Measurements could show whether this has emerged andcomplexity thereby reduced. This can be important not only within the context of large-scale sociocultures, but in small-scale ones too. Thus for instance, we referred to the

British Telecom joint alliance venture with ATT earlier: the use of EPI might well have been used in an attempt to quickly indicate whether a balanced or dominant culture had been formed, thereby determining the likelihood of imminent collapse. Other resultsfrom EPI allow one to quantify the level of complexity of the sociocultural system.

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Notes

1 In a letter on 3 May 1939 that discusses Psychological Types.2 e.g. http://www.endless-knot.us/feature.html3 According to the on-line Oxford English Dictionary.4 By this we are recognizing that the concepts of recursion and fractal structures are closely

related.5 Husserl is responsible for this. See for instance http://www.husserlpage.com.6 This is Heidegger philosophy. See for instance http://www.webcom.com/paf/ereignis.html.7 American Heritage Dictionary, 2004.8 As a point of information, since Fisher I measures the degree of complexity of a system, the

Fisher I of the overall sociocultural system would rise at this point of increased ‘socialcomplexification’.

9 This dispersed agent, once it is conceptualized, is deemed to exist either (1) in an ideationalworld because it is an essence that can be manifested in its ideate, and (2) in a sensate worldif it can be identified phenomenally and measured.

10 Any place of complete mental bliss and delight and peace.11 This is similar to the way that the Shannon information capacities of different kinds of

systems may be compared.12 It may be noted that when this occurs in physical applications of EPI it expresses a situation

of ‘quantum entanglement’ of realities.

2005 yolles frieden metahistorical theory of change - theory

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