DRURY'S DRAMATIC DIATRIBE AGAINST CHRISTIANITY IN POLITICS

By Michael Wagner

Since conservative Christians in North America have become more serious about political activism beginning in the mid-1970s or so, a plethora of books has been written about the supposed threat posed by the Christian Right. And with many Christians still politically active, it's no surprise that books continue to appear warning of the peril that such Christians pose to government and society. They tend to be books "exposing" the allegedly sinister political activities of groups such as Moral Majority or the Christian Coalition. Recently, however, a more sophisticated attack on conservative Christian politics has appeared, Terror and Civilization: Christianity, Politics, and the Western Psyche (N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) by Shadia Drury. This book is more philosophical than the mn-of-the-mill variety. It attempts to deal with more foundational issues than whether certain Republican politicians have ties to "fundamentalist" organizations.

Shadia Drmy is a professor of political science at the University of Regina in Canada. Now, the University of Regina is not commonly recognized as a particularly prestigious university, even in Canada. So it may appear at first that Drmy's work is obscure and easily dismissed. But this is not so. Drmy, in fact, has a substantial international reputation, largely due to her books attacldng the influential conservative political theorist Leo Strauss, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (St. Martin's Press, 1988), and Leo Strauss and the American Right (St. Martin's Press, 1999). In conservative academic circles in the United States, Dmry is recognized as a noteworthy opponent. Her stature alone makes her recent book more worthy of critical attention.

A thorough and detailed critique of the entire book would be a massive undertaldng. Thus it makes more sense to focus on the specific points she makes against Christianity in politics.

First of all, and this is typical ofleft-wing critiques of Christian politics, Dnlly is not opposed to all Christian political activity, just conservative Christian political activity. Those who were involved in the Social Gospel movement, such as Walter Rauschenbusch, and the

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Civil Rights Movement, notably Martin Luther King, are okay in her view. These left-wing activists are "Christian democrats" and "Christians with a social conscience." However, according to Drmy, 'The most vocal Christians of our time are members of the Religious Right. Far from underplaying the harshest features of Christianity, the "Religious Right" highlights them. It is not equality before God that inspires their political principles; it is not the message oflove and forgiveness that guides their policies. On the contrary, it is the harsh, vengeful, mthless, and merciless features of the faith that attract them" (p. 73). So in Drmy's world there's the good-guy Christians and the bad-guy Christians. The former are all on the Left, and the latter are all on the Right. And, of course, it is only the latter she opposes. It is not Christianity per se that is bad, just the conservative variety. Although she doesn't make this qualification so explicit throughout the book, it is safe for the reader to keep it in mind.

Drury is most particular about her reasons for opposing Christian politics in a section appropriately titled "Against Christianity in Politics" on pages 69-74. Among these reasons are that "Christianity has a profoundly singular conception of the good that encourages a militant and cmsading spirit, while discouraging tolerance, plurality, and diversity" (pp. 69-70). As an example of this she points to a Vatican directive admonishing Roman Catholic politicians to oppose abortion, same-sex marriage and euthanasia. She then states that "If Catholic politicians have a loyalty to the Vatican which supersedes their loyalty to the constitutions and values of their own countries, then they cannot be tmsted with public office in democratic societies" (p. 70)' Now, I'm not one to defend the Vatican, but look at the principle at work here: in order to protect "tolerance, plurality, and diversity," conscientious Catholic politicians "cannot be tmsted with public office." So Drmy's "tolerance" does not extend to conservative Catholic politicians, and by extension, conservative Catholic political activists. Nor is her "plurality and diversity" wide enough to include conservative Catholic political views. And make no

mistake; this would not just apply to Catholics, but to all conselvative Christians.

It is quite clear that there are severe limitations to Drmy's "tolerance, plurality, and diversity." In this respect her secular liberal perspective is just as "intolerant" as Christianity. The difference between the two perspectives lies primarily in what is tolerated and not tolerated. Christianity is certainly intolerant towards abortion and same-sex marriage, and secular liberalism is intolerant of conselvative Christian views. But DrUlY is not conscious of this contradiction and she continues to sing the praise of what she calls "tolerance." In her view, it is one of the two most important political virtues. "The supreme political virtues are moderation and a certain degree of tolerance," not "tolerance of tyranny and gross injustice" but tolerance of the plurality of the good, tolerance of a plurality of beliefs about ultimate reality, tolerance of the many roads to righteousness, and tolerance of private vice (p. 70). Wait a minute. DnllY has now told us we should not tolerate "tyranny" and "gross injustice." What do "tyranny" and "gross injustice" consistof? How do we know when we see them? Well, the answer to those questions depends upon your worldview. In Dmry's view, Geneva in the time of Calvin and England under the mle of the Puritans were "theocratic tyrannies" (p. 191). Reformed Christians would disagree. Christians certainly see abortion as a gross injustice, whereas it seems Dmry does not. This problem of definition points to the inherently religious nature of these political issues. While DrUlY thinks she is advocating a neutral position against Christianity, she is actually defending a particular religious perspective or worldview.

This becomes even more apparent a little further on. After noting .Jesus' "intransigence" and His "intolerance of competing views," DrUlY says that certain characteristics are necessary for tolerance: "tolerance and diversity presuppose a certain skepticism regarding the human ability to grasp the nanlre of ultimate reality, coupled with recognition that there is a plurality of competing goods" (p. 70). Biblical Christianity is unable to indulge in this sort of skepticism and thus it once again fails Dnny"s standards for tolerance. But this "skepticism" is itself part of a particular religious view. For Dmly to call for "a certain skepticism regarding the human ability to grasp the nature of ultimate reality" is to advocate a religious perspective. She herself is promoting a view about the degree to which humans can understand "ultimate reality." I submit that this represents a particular religious view or worldview.

More clearly yet, she offers an explicit alternative to Christianity as the basis oflaw and politics that she calls "natural justice." As she puts it, "natural justice, not Christian love, must be the guide to law and politics" (p. 71). However, she does not state what natural justice is or how we can determine what is "nann'al justice" and how do we determine which political positions accord with it? Does natural justice favor same-sex marriage, for example? Drmy seems to support same-sex marriage. Presumably, then, natural justice would also be open to, if not outright favorable to, same-sex marriage. If so, then through millennia of human histOlY no one noticed this aspect of "natural justice" until the homose:A.'Ual rights movement became powerful in Western countries. That being the case, "natural justice" is a velY elusive concept indeed. It easily becomes a convenient term under which to advance the entire agenda of the social Left. In other words, it does not provide an objective basis for politics. It can be filled with whatever meaning is fashionable at the moment.

In her discussion of natural justice, Dnny states that "Politics is primarily about resisting evil" (p. 71). But how do we know what "evil" is so that we can resist it? At the risk of sounding like a broken record, this again demonstrates the religious nature of DmlY"s entire case. The question of the definition of evil is a fundamentally religious question. Christians believe that abortion is one of the worst evils in the world today, and that accounts for the great lengths to which many courageous Christians have gone to resist it. But Drmy would not share this view of abortion as a great evil. She just does not seem to be conscious of the inescapably religious basis of politics. Yet she makes such statements as this: "The distinction between good and evil, justice and injustice is fundamental to politics" (p. 148). How can those distinctions be made without reference to a religion or worldview? They cannot.

In the concluding chapter of her book Drmy advocates what she calls the "liberal state." It is this kind of government that most closely resembles the ideal she supports. 'The liberal state is intended to be a minimalist state. It insists on its neutrality vis-a-vis the good. It makes a valiant effort to be neutral with regard to the plurality of "goods" vying for its attention and protection" (p. 145). She also refers to the "cool neutrality of the liberal state" as "the tme legacy of the Enlightenment" (p. 144). But while she seems to argue that the liberal state is neutral, she also says that "the liberal aspiration to a totally neutral public space is both impossible and disingenuous. It is impossible

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because no society can resist the allure of ideals, and disingenuous because liberal society espouses particular ideals" (p. 143). Nevertheless, she still seems to advocate the "neutral" liberal state as the ideal.

Such neutrality, however, is impossible. Every state enforces a certain law code. That law code defines which activities are prohibited and which are permitted. The distinction betvveen what is prohibited and what is permitted is a reflection of the state's worldview, or if you will, religion. To say that a certain behavior is bad and must be forbidden requires a "value judgment." That is, the behavior must be judged according to some standard, a standard of right and wrong, a conception of morality. That morality itself reflects a view about the naUlre of ultimate reality. And that view about the naUlre of ultimate reality can best be termed a worldview or religion.

Among the Reformed segment of Christianity, R.J. Rushdoony has been a key figure articulating the impossibility of neutrality in politics and government. He states this vety clearly in his book The Foundations of Social Order (Thoburn Press, 1978). As Rushdoony puts it, "evety law order rests on and is the legal codification of a system of morality, and evety morality presupposes a religion, some form of'ultimate concern'" (p. 220). N aUlrally, the state is a central feature of this system. 'The state is the social organization of the creed, the legal strucUlring of the moral system of a society. The state cannot be amoral, because its evety law is the codification of its basic morality. The state cannot be religiously neutral, because it is the religious organization of society in terms oflaw" (p. 220). Neutrality in the political sphere is impossible. The state is never neutral. It always enforces a particular conception of right and wrong.

With this in mind it is clear that DnllY, in arguing for a "neutral" liberal state, is aCUlally arguing for what amounts to the establishment of her own preferred religion as the basis of society. Granted, she does not see it this way and is likely unconscious of the religious nature of her position. In arguing against Christianity in politics she is arguing for a different religion to be the basis of politics. This explains why her conception of "tolerance" does not include tolerating conservative Christianity. Her religion (secular liberalism) and Christianity are competing religions, and secular liberalism must exclude its rival.

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Christianity is not the sinister force that Drury alleges itto be. Invas because of Christianity that the West attained the greatest degree ofliberty and prosperity that the world has known. Without any historical evidence whatsoever, Dnuy denies this, stating that "the triumph offreedom and egalitarianism in the West was won in spite of Christianity and not because of it" (p. 69). And she misconstrues the goal of the Christian Right as being an "effort to re-empower the Churches," that is, to bestow the churches with political power (p. 69). The goal, in fact, has never been to grant churches political power, but to have the state enact policies following the guidelines of biblical morality. All states enforce a conception of morality, so it should not be considered strange that conservative Christians advocate biblical morality. Again, the choice is not between biblical morality and "neutrality," it is between biblical morality and some other religion's conception of morality.

In attacking the role of Christianity in politics Shadia Dnuy bit off more than she could chew. Not being self-conscious of the inescapably religious nature of government and politics, she advocates a "neutral" liberal state. But the remaining positive aspects of the Western world are the fruits of its Christian history and original Christian foundation. As the Western countries continue to turn away from their Christian foundation and replace it with liberal secularism, they also lose the philosophical justification for a limited state that Christianity historically provided. Far from being a sinister threat to society as Dnlly believes, biblical Christianity is the only hope for genuine liberty. As Rushdoony puts it, ''VVestern liberty began when the claim of the state to be man"s savior was denied" (p. 82). Only Christianity can convincingly maintain this denial, and thus only Christianity can provide the foundation for genuine liberty Michael "Vagner is Executive Director for Northwestern Research Consultants, Edmonton, AB, Canada, and is a regular contributor to Reformed Perspective, ViTWW. reformedperspective.ca.