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“STEVNS POWER” ACCIDENT

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1. GENERAL

2. BRIEF ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

3. SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS

4. SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS

5. ACTIONS

6. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

7. CONCLUSIONS

8. IMPLEMENTATIONS

SUMMARY

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GENERAL

Type of incident: Sinking of subcontracted Anchor Handling tug

Date: October, 19th 2003

Time: 17:15

Consequences: Total loss of the Vessel and her crew (11 fatalities)

Activity performed: anchors handling Castoro Otto during the execution of the Okono Okpoho field development Project in Nigeria.

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BRIEF ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION On 19th of October 2003, at about 17.15 hrs local time, the Anchor Handling Tug “Stevns Power” owned by Stevns Multiship C/o Nordane AS Shipping (Denmark) sunk offshore Nigeria in the Okpoho field in 75 m. water depth.

None of 11 crew members (3 Danish, 6 Filipino and 2 Congolese) survived.

During the incident, the sea was calm (14 knts wind, wave height 0.5 m, swell height 1 m.

The “Stevns Power” was assisting the Castoro Otto during the pipe lay operations of the 8” pipeline.

STM Inspector was sent to the scene of the incident and launched the ROV to verify whether it was possible to rescue any life.

Castoro Otto immediately launched the rescue boat to assist the salvage operations.

The Castoro Otto immediately stopped the operations and abandoned the 8” pipeline on the sea bottom to participate in emergency salvage operations.

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SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS

At 16.45 hrs, Castoro 8 Chief Mate, instructed the ‘Stevns Power’ to pick up anchor No 10 (located on the ports/stern corner of Castoro 8) at a distance of approx. 1300 meters from Castoro 8 in order to recover and relocate the anchor in accordance to the pipe laying sequence and direction.

At 17.10 hrs, approx., after having spooled in the pennant wire and picked up the Anchor No. 10 from the seabed, the ‘Stevns Power’ in reverse, started top move towards the Castoro 8 port/stern, while the Castoro 8 winch operator

recovered the anchor wire.

At 17.15 hrs., when the ‘Stevns Power’ was at distance of approximately 600 meters from the Castoro 8, without apparent reason, the vessel listed towards her port/stern side. The list to the port side increased rapidly to 80 degrees and then rotated very quickly to the vertical, bow upwards.

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SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS (contd.)

The list and rotation to vertical occurred in matter of seconds, certainly less than a minute. The ‘Stevns Power’ started to sink at 17.15 hrs.

Approx. 30 min. elapsed between that time when the ‘Stevns Power’ became bow upwards, and final sinking to seabed. The survey vessel STM Inspector had relocated near to the capsized ‘Stevns Power’ and launched its ROV in a search for possible survivors. There were none found. At 17.45 hrs. approx. the ‘Stevns Power’ sank to the sea bottom.

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SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS

Personnel who have been directly or indirectly involved in the event (i.e. Castoro Otto and supporting crafts) were requested to provide their personal

accounts of the facts.

All parties interviewed agreed that the list, the almost total rotation of the ‘Stevns Power’ with the bow upwards happened in a very short time, in a matter of seconds.

No essential contradictions and main disagreements resulted from the various statements provided.

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ACTIONS

IMMEDIATEImmediately after having stopped the wire pulling and visually assessed the situation:

The pipe laying operations were stopped in order to participate in emergency salvage operations.

The rescue boat of the Castoro Otto, which was already in water, was sent to the scene of the incident.

The AHT Maersk Terrier was instructed to locate to the place of the incident and remained at 70 to 80 m from the ‘Stevns Power’.

The survey vessel STM Inspector was instructed to recover the ROV and go the ‘Stevns Power’.

One ROV dive was made by Sonsub while the ‘Stevns Power’ was remaining with the bow load.

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ACTIONS (contd.)

IMMEDIATE

Further ROV dives have been made later on the seabed.

There were still no signs of survivors.

The Saipem’s shore base in Port Harcourt was promptly informed of the incident.

At the same time Saipem, Saibos’s Nordane, Client Management were informed, along with local authorities.

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ACTIONS (contd.)Under Water SurveyUnder Water Survey

Several ROV surveys were performed on the sunken ‘Stevns Power’ .

A side scan sonar survey has been carried out in order to locate the anchor No. 10 on board.

All the relevant ROV diving reports have been recorded and details are included within the ROV diving log.

FURTHER

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REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

A third Party has been involved to perform an overall investigation of the event.

It is not possible to make a complete analysis of the accident without having available fundamental information concerning the stability capacity and the structural strength of the vessel.

Documents review, various stamentes shown that the vessel maintenance status appeared good.

Investigations and statements from the interviews revealed that there were perhaps recent possible indications of some potential stability problems

with the ‘Stevns Power’. (These indications had not been signaled by ‘Stevns Power’ and were not considered relevant at that time.

One finding from the ROV survey performed of the wreckage, which may be of significance, is that engine room hatch on the deck does not appear to be closed in a water tight manner.

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REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (contd.)

Another findings from the ROV survey is that the two safety pins located at stern, which are used for keeping the anchor’s pennant wire centered on deck, were found not fully extended.

The two above findings could have been a contributory factor for the sudden loss of stability.

However, apart from the comments referenced above regarding possible indications of stability problems, no unusual vessel attitude and / or anomalies were signaled by either the Captain or any member of the Stevns Power’s crew during the previous weeks/months of operations with Castoro Otto.

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CONLUSIONS

Further investigations and information are still required regarding the accident.

The information should include the result of further detailed survey of the wreckage, its structure, tanks, equipment, systems etc. along with recent reports regarding the conditions of the vessel.

The 3rd part investigation’s opinion is that the catastrophe was initiated by an exceptional lack of stability of the vessel itself.

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CONLUSIONS (contd.)

Possible causes may include unusual ballast conditions, a crack on the side shell causing leakage into the port stern area of the hull, loss of sealing bulkhead of the propeller etc.

No final conclusion can be given pending a detailed analysis on the stability and the structural strength of the ‘Stevns Power’ is carried out.

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IMPLEMENTATIONS

1. Establish a baseline competency profile key crew positions of vessel, especially for tugs and

implement compatible assessment to ensure proficiency.

2. Encourage culture to STOP unsafe work on vessels and continue to reinforce the hazard awareness practice.

3. Require vessels to periodically advise any anomalies regarding their own vessels, or other vessels involved in operations, and to confirm that they are not aware of any anomalies that could affect the operations for which they have been contracted.

4. Establish clear HSE hiring requirements for AHT and ensure that they are implemented prior to

mobilization.

Pending full investigation and final conclusions, we advise the implementation of the following actions:

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IMPLEMENTATIONS (contd.)

5. Implement a vessel Seaworthiness Checklist that shall be completed by the Master of each vessel of t

he construction spread every 24 hrs.

6. Institute routine daily, and formal monthly, AHT performance reviews with an overall assessment carried out at the end of each project/assignment to

the main vessel.

7. Ensure that an appropriate ‘Monthly Vessel Spread Report’ is performed and distributed every month.

8. Reinforce attention of personnel on the Standard Marine Procedures, in particular for Anchor Handling operations and further clarify roles and responsibilities between Main Vessel and tugs.

Pending full investigation and final conclusions, we advise the implementation of the following actions:

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IMPLEMENTATIONS (contd.)

9. Establish proactive daily radio contact between Main vessel and tugs spread to discuss any safety related issues.

10. Ensure that a safety coordination meetings is held with Masters of each vessel of the construction spread addressing all the risks of the operations at the beginning if each project activity.

11. Feedback outcomes of current investigation to the marine crew

Pending full investigation and final conclusions, we advise the implementation of the following actions: