2000 what is the polity_a roundtable

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What Is the Polity? A RoundtableAuthor(s): Yale H. Ferguson, Richard W. Mansbach, Robert A. Denemark, Hendrik Spruyt,Barry Buzan, Richard Little, Janice Gross Stein and Michael MannReviewed work(s):Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 3-31

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W h a t I s t h e P o l i t y ?

ARoundtable

YaleH. Ferguson,RichardW.Mansbach,RobertA. Denemark,HendrikSpruyt,

BarryBuzan, RichardLittle,Janice GrossStein,and Michael Mann

INTRODUCTION

YALE H. FERGUSON and RICHARD W. MANSBACH

T h e sovereign tate riumphedn a temporal ndspatial ontextbecause t

proved its superiorcapacityto allocate materialandpsychological val-ues and to subordinatecompeting political forms. Westphalianstates

established theirauthority n Europeover segmentaryauthoritiesandkept rel-

ative peace at home, helped markets to flourish, collected taxes, providedfor

the common defense, and made war effectively.Afterward,Europeanempires

imposed state institutionsatop older political forms in the New World,Asia,and Africa. Earlierpolities and identities and loyalties associated with them

rarelyvanishedentirelybut nested in modified ways within successorpolities.

Today,contemporarytatesfaceincreasedchallengesfrom economicandcul-

tural trends and institutionsthat transcendandpermeatetheirlegal boundaries,as well as fromnationalistandmanyothersubgroupswithin.Civil warsand ter-

rorism seem far morefrequentandimportant han nterstateviolence. Improved

transportation, ommunications,and informationhavediminishedphysicaland

psychological distanceamongindividuals.Better-educated itizens are becom-

ing morecriticalconsumersof thepublic goods statespresumeto deliver.

A global crisis of authority ooms. Transnational orporations, inancial in-

stitutions,and criminalnetworksaremajorallocatorsof economic security.Re-

ligious,ethnic,andtribal dentitiesareon therise. Numerousdevelopingcountries

are little more thanquasi-or failed states.Internationalegimes,nongovernmen-talorganizations NGOs), regions,and cities areincreasingly significantactors.

? 2000 InternationalStudies Association

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.







4 Fergusonet al.

The sovereignstateis certainlynot likely to disappearanytime soon. Some

states acting individuallyor in concert may improvetheircapacity to deliver

certain services, encourageentrepreneurship,mproveeconomic competitive-

ness, or create new rules to curb marketabuses and instability.But the stateappearsto be evolving into a much less dominantpolitical form,only one of a

growing number and variety of polities that engage in governance-that is,

substantially influence or control value outcomes. Human identities and

loyalties-multiple andcompeting throughouthistory-now appear ess surelywedded to the sovereign state form.1 Distinctionsbetween public and private

authorityare ever harder o maintain.Mininationalismsare more of a threatto

the state than a testamentto its continuedviability.There is an urgentneed for

innovations in political institutionbuildingandideology throughout he global

system.The centralquestionsforpresent-day heoristsof globalpolitics are:"Ifyou

were free to redrawthe 'map'of global political space better to capturewhat

you perceive to be contemporary reality,'what sorts of polities, boundaries,andidentities wouldyou highlight-and why?Whatmajorchangesin thatmapwouldyou foresee in the nextcenturyor so?" Weaskedsix distinguishedsocial

scientists,whose own workhas stressedhistoricalperspective,to addressthese

key questions in a short statement.

Our contributorsapproachedour questions in distinctive ways. Diversity,

even among like-mindedscholars, emerges as one theme of this round table.Yet all recognizethe need to remap global politics in a world far morecomplexthan that enshrinedby Westphalia.Thereis also a need to rethink he natureof

boundariesand the relationshipbetween territoryand space. RobertA. Dene-

markand HendrikSpruyteach choose to concentrateon requiredapproaches.

They argue for the development of new forms of system(s) theory that can

accommodatechange, andthey make macrohistoricalcomparisonsacross dis-

ciplinaryboundaries.Denemark ooks forfurtherdevelopmentof worldsystem

history, while Spruyt, taking issue with Kenneth Waltz's reading of Emile

Durkheim and the static natureof the Waltzianmodel, seizes on ideas thathebelieves are implicit in structuralrealism to advocate historical sociological

understandings f international ystems. Spruyttries to salvage structural eal-

ism by addinga dose of constructivism to the mix. Fromthis perspective,he

reassesses the essential meaningof anarchyandhierarchy.

BarryBuzan and RichardLittle also take structural ealismas theirpointof

departure,althoughwe shouldkeep in mindthatthey have previouslyurgedus

to go beyond any "thin"or static conceptualizationof "international ystem"

' Fora fullerdiscussionof identitypolitics,seeYaleH. Ferguson ndRichardW.Mansbach,Global oliticsattheTurn f theMillennium: hangingBasesof 'Us' and'Them,'" InternationalStudies Review 1, No. 2 (1999).







WhatIs the Polity? 5

and searchas well for "deep structure" volving across world history.2Their

brandof structural ealism can accommodatemanyactorsthat,we submit,are

like our "polities."3 The model they advancehere is of a worlddivided into a

center andperiphery.The centeris a "coresecurity community"of "postmod-ern"statesthat no longer conduct their relations "on realistprinciples"and, in

fact, arenegotiating "permeableboundaries." nternational overnmentalorga-nizations (IGOs) like the EuropeanUnion (EU) and transnationalNGOs are

prominent n the mix. The periphery s a "realistzone of conflict"wheremanystates are literally strugglingto survive. Even in that zone, some of the same

influences that affectpostmodernstates arebeginningto be felt.4

Janice Gross Stein insists that our traditionalconceptualizationof "secu-

rity"needs to be far broaderand that,by any definition, the capacityof most

states to deliverit has been on the decline for decades.5 Her term"privatizationof security"bears some resemblance to Michael Mann'sdescriptionof medi-

eval Europe.It ranges from a shift in the state's role to that of an ineffective

umpireof the rules of the game because it worksmainly for the owners of the

clubs-in the global marketplace-to thecollapse of internalorderand the rise

of privatearmies and securityforces. The result, she maintains,can only be "a

diminished state as the focal point of political identity."

By contrast,althoughMann acknowledges that trends differ among states

andregions,he does "not see a large global decline in the role of states."States

for him arepartof a "continuing ncreasein national,inter-nationalandtrans-nationalregulationalike"; hey"regulate ncreasinglydiverseactivities,onbehalf

of increasinglydiverse constituencies."Mann'sassessmentis perhapsexpectedfor one whose work tracedtherise of "theautonomouspowerof the state," yet

2 BarryBuzan,CharlesJones, and RichardLittle,TheLogic of Anarchy:Neoreal-ism to StructuralRealism NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993).

3

YaleH. Ferguson nd RichardW.Mansbach, olities:Authority,dentities, ndChange Columbia, .C.:University f SouthCarolinaPress,1996).4 Otheranalystsmightsuggest hata tumultuousmeetingof premodern,modern,

andpostmoderns a better haracterizationf theconflictzone.

5 Providing ecurityhasbeena leading unction f thesovereign tate.Someschol-ars, ike realisthistorianWilliamMcNeill,areoptimistic bout he futureof the statebecause"nopromising lternativeo the territorialrganizationf armed orce hasevenbegun oemerge." eeWilliamH.McNeill,"TerritorialtatesBuriedTooSoon,"MershonInternationalStudiesReview41, Supplement2 (1997), p. 274. In part,sucha view ignores he decline n interstatewarsand thereorganizationf military orce

today n alliancesandpeacekeeping.6 See Michael Mann: TheSources of Social Power, vol. 1:From the Beginningto1760AD (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1986);The Sourcesof Social Power,vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993);and"TheAutonomous owerof theState; tsOrigins,Mech-







6 Fergusonet al.

his analysis is anythingbut a reaffirmationof the traditionalrealist vision. He

arguesthatstates"crystallize n multipleform"-that is, "arepolymorphous"-andare so incoherentthat"'they' do not really exist as singularactors at all."

Mann-like Buzan andLittle, Stein, andourselves-recognizes that the is-sue is not whetherstateswill continue to exist but rather heways in whichtheywill increasinglydivergefromtheWestphalianmodel.ForMann,othersocialac-

tors have power,butonly states exercise "political"power.That seems to us to

suggest,misleadingly,that the controlorinfluenceoverthe allocation of values

exercisedbynonstateactors s separateorinherentlydifferent romthatof states.7

Also, thoughMann'sconceptionof politics is restrictive,his notion of "state"s

sobroadastoembraceancientpolitieslikeGreekcities,bureaucratic ctorswithin

states thatare acting for "diverseconstituencies,"and internationalorganiza-

tions thatarepresumed nstrumentsof states. We are indeed titillatingly "pro-miscuous"(his term)in our use of "polity"andstraitlacedn ourconceptionof

"state."Weprefer o reserve "state"ortheWestphalian tateform,distinguished

only by its legal status as independentandsovereign.Mann andwe recognizethe need for a long historicalperspective;the mul-

tiple, overlapping, ntersectingnetworksaspectof societies; the broadrangeof

influentialandrule-makingactorsin worldaffairs;and the diverse,nonunified,and changing nature of states in the contemporaryworld. For us, the state's

glass is more than half empty,while Mann sees it as possibly more than half

full, althoughwe would all surelyagreewith Buzanand Little that some statesare far more substantial han others.We do see the nation-state deal challengedrather han strengthened n the proliferationof mininationalisms.Manngives

priorityto "centralized-territorial"ules. By contrast,we stress both the terri-

torial"reach"of nonstatepolities and the degreeto which political influenceor

control, dentities,and oyalties typically ie withinortranscendegalboundaries.

A GLOBAL POLITY PERSPECTIVE

ROBERT A. DENEMARK

The question of what sorts of polities, boundaries,and identities we should

highlightto help apprehend he futureof global politics, posed here by Fergu-son and Mansbach,is partof a protracteddebateover the shape of the disci-

anisms, and Results," in John A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford, U.K.: Basil

Blackwell,1986).7 See,forexample,A.ClaireCutler,VirginiaHaufler, ndTonyPorter, ds.,Private

Authorityand InternationalAffairs(Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1999).Also A. ClaireCutler,"Locating'Authority' n the Global Political Economy,"Inter-national Studies Quarterly 43, No. 1 (1999).








pline.The fieldhas beenlongdominatedby thosedefiningthemselvesas students

of states as they interactwith one another and cope with forces in their envi-

ronment.Extantnorms andinstitutions,distributionsof power,ormodalitiesof

decisionmakingform the core of the discipline. Changesoutside the politicalsphereare importantonly insofar as they impinge uponthose concerns.

It was by no means foolish to focus on states.AfterWestphalia,Europeanstatesnot only captured erritoryandthe majorinstrumentsof force, but dom-

inatedfinance, culture,andreligious practiceas well. This state-centricsocial

orderwas thenexportedas bullion-richandlabor-poor hence moretechnolog-

ically inclined) Europeansslowly conqueredthe planet.8

Placing states at the core of the discipline has its advantages.A focus on

state behaviorprovidesa unified sense of the outcomes that need to be under-

stood. Yet costs are inherentin any discipline that decides a priori upon theappropriateunit of its study.Units may be less durableor salientthan students

think, as Spruyt'streatmentof the historically contingentnature of the state

eloquently demonstrates.9A focus on states alone robs us of the insights that

comparativeanalysis might provide.The real shortcomingdeals with the apprehensionof change. Only some of

the variablesdriving fundamentalalterationsin the state system derive from

within that system. When it comes to explaining such change, the field falls

apart, going to war with itself over what constitutes an appropriatestarting

point and being quickly overtakenby the events it is supposedto apprehend.The end of the Cold War, or example,broughtmass confusion.As if to under-

score ourignorance,scholarsholdingbroadlysimilarviews engagedin a frenzyof contradiction.We were cautioned that we would one day miss the ColdWar

(by John J. Mearsheimer)and thathistoryhad now happilyended (by Francis

Fukuyama).10Both were wrong. The focus on state relations proves self-

limiting. The kinds of changes that are most interestingto leaders of states are

exactly the ones we cannotapprehend n this manner.

There s anotherwayto look at these issues. We can abandonaprioriassump-tions aboutwhat unit to focus upon and chronicle the developmentof the var-ious mechanisms by which we have organizedourselves over time. The map

Fergusonand Mansbachsuggest we createis actuallyan historicalatlas. Flip-

ping throughthe pages creates an animated version of relevantchange. Such

8 Andre GunderFrank,ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley,Calif.:University f California ress,1998).

9

HendrikSpruyt,TheSovereignStateand Its Competitors:AnAnalysis of SystemsChange Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994).10 JohnJ.Mearsheimer,WhyWeShallSoonMisstheColdWar," tlanticMonthly

226, No. 2 (1990); FrancisFukuyama,The End of History and the Last Man (NewYork:FreePress,1992).







8 Fergusonet al.

explicitly historical analysis recognizes not just transitions from some early

organizationalform to that of states, but both earlier changes and systemic

continuityas well. Before we thinkabout whatconstitutesfundamental hange,

we must have a graspof what we arecomparing.How farback must ouranalyses go? It would be dangerousto select some

arbitrary tartingpoint before which we could learn nothing about changing

patterns.A decadeago, few scholarsthought t important o study global poli-tics before the Cold War.Today,mostevery introductorynternational elations

textbook begins with an analysis of the last several hundredyears. The only

satisfactoryoptionis to pushourstudyof issues of contemporary oncern back

as faras we can. Thehistoricalrecord s richerandmoreilluminating han most

would imagine, as recent analyses by ChristopherChase-Dunnand Thomas

Hall (10,000 years),Andre GunderFrankandBarryK. Gills (5,000 years),andGeorgeModelski andWilliamR. Thompson(1,000 years) demonstrate.11

The state should not be allowed to occlude ourvision, so "politics"may be

too narrow a concept. Ferguson and Mansbach offer a broad definition of

"polity"-the abilityto mobilize personsand theirresourcesfor value satisfac-

tion, generally requiringa degree of institutionalizationand hierarchy.From

this perspective, polity is made up of mechanisms to create and spreadbelief

systems andprovidesinstitutions to serve as focal points for those belief sys-tems. These belief systems must be consistent with the creation of a viable

social order that allows for the creationand use of materialgoods with whichthe society supportsandreproduces tself.

Stepsareclearlymissing. Once belief systems arecreated,spread,andpro-vided with a focal point, individuals must choose to identifywith them;once a

conducive social orderis in place, actualproductionof goods must proceed.

Fergusonand Mansbach llustratethe interrelationshipwhen they suggest that

Themore nclusivepolities ncorporateutdonotcompletely verwhelm ld

loyaltiesand dentities;heirverysuccess n creating entralized owermay

set off a struggleorcontrol.And centralization ayresult n anideologicalrevolution,conomic ake-off,and/or oreignadventureshathaveanimpactuponsocialgroupsand oyalties.'2

Fromthis perspectivewe see that threeprocessesare at work here:identity,

organization,andproduction.These processescannot be successfully compart-

1 ChristopherChase-DunnandThomasHall, Rise and Demise: ComparingWorld-

SystemsBoulder,Colo.:Westview,1997);AndreGunderFrankandBarryK. Gills,

eds.,TheWorld

System:Five HundredYearsor Five Thousand?

London:Routledge,1993);GeorgeModelski ndWilliamR.Thompson, eadingSectorsand World ow-ers: TheCoevolutionof Global Politics andEconomics(Columbia,S.C.:UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress,1996).

12 Ferguson andMansbach,Polities, p. 53.








mentalized,yet we fail to studythem together.One is cultural,the purviewof

sociologists; one is political, thepurviewof political scientists;and one is eco-

nomic, where economists have theirway. Why have we divided ourselves so?

The quest to understandourworld is hardlynew, but its division into vari-ous bits is no more than two centuries old. The disciplines as we know them

emergedas a result of attemptsto derive objective knowledge from empiricalevidence. The problemwas thatsociety was too largeto apprehendall at once.

Historiansand their ideographictechniquescould offer little in terms of sys-tematicknowledge suitable for informingpolicy.Theparcelingout of theprob-lem to "multipledisciplineswas premisedon the belief thatsystematicresearch

requiredskilled concentrationon the multipleseparatearenas of reality,which

was partitionedrationally nto distinctgroupingsof knowledge."13 These divi-

sions becamefixed in the organizationof universitydepartmentswith indepen-dent budgetsand standards or tenure.

But this division of labor, although productive, creates high transaction

costs. Students n the variousdisciplines find themselves separatedby different

definitions of the same concepts, thickprofessionaljargon,and failure to com-

municate aboutproblemsof mutual interest.Specialists in some areaspossessevidence that allows themto accept positions thatremainproblematicfor oth-

ers who lack access to the specialized materials. The quest for information

about ourworld led us to divide up the problem,butour successful use of that

strategynow stands n the way of thereintegrationof thatknowledgeinto somemore coherent form. Whateverdefinitionwe adoptfor the globalpolity, it must

be understoodprimarilyas partof a broaderglobal system, whichwe must seek

to apprehendas a unit if we areto make much sense of it.

The searchbackthroughime andacrossdisciplinary oundariesmustbejoined

byanother lement aswell. Thestudyof Europeannstitutions,althoughnowcru-

cial, is insufficient.No argument boutanyuniquelyEuropeanprocesscan be dis-

cernedfromthe studyof Europeansocial processes alone, norcan any unique

qualitiesbe deduced from Europeandominance.Forhistorical and transdisci-

plinarystudies to be successful, they must be truly global. This means the inte-

grationof the rest of the world into ourmap,but notjust as places that need to

"develop"oras zones of (temporarily?)unsuccessfulorganizationalmodes. We

needa worldsystem historythatrecognizesexploitationand thatviews relations

built aroundwinnersandlosers, not in ideological termsof superiorityor infe-

riority,but as one of the continuous andimportantprocessesof theglobalorder.

Many scholarswill be displeasedwith this plan for creatinga new map of

the global order.It is a far largertask than those traditionallyundertakenby

13 ImmanuelWallersteinet al., OpentheSocial Sciences: Reportof the GulbenkianCommission on the Restructuringof the Social Sciences (Stanford,Calif.: Stanford

UniversityPress,1996),p. 7.







10 Fergusonet al.

individualdisciplines andmay be perceivedas too greata challenge. But it is

necessarybecausetheprevailingmodel of parcelingmay prove inherently nca-

pable of allowing for a greaterunderstandingof the global system. Efforts

towardtransdisciplinarity re still in theirinfancybut offer morehope of cop-ing withcomplex phenomena hanthedisparateanalysesof thetraditional ocial

sciences.14 Least pleased will be those who take various"post"positions and

who fear thereturn o a metanarrative f global relations. Such metanarratives

areproneto bias, imperialism,andintellectualcorruption.This may be so, but

a metanarrative asedon a truly global, long-termhistorical andtransdisciplin-

ary studyof the global social ordermightbe less domineeringandcorrupt han

either local narrativeswithout those inclusive qualitiesor the current deolog-ical synthesis that we see trumpeting ts dominancein transhistorical erms.

Intelligentscholarswill still offerinsightfulanalysesaboutwhatthe nextsev-eral decadesmightlook like. But,until we gainsomeperspectiveon the natureof

continuity andchange in ourpast, until we can begin a transdisciplinarydia-

logue, and until we beginto see in moreglobalterms,we areunlikelyto generatethesystematicknowledgenecessary ohelpussuccessfullymapthis nextcentury.

MACROHISTORICAL COMPARISONS AND

THE WESTPHALIAN MOMENT

HENDRIK SPRUYT

Structuralrealism, despite being one of the preeminentapproachesto inter-

national studies today, has also served as the foil against which alternative

approacheshave defined themselves. Constructivists have arguedthat struc-

tural realism treatsinterestsexogenously rather han endogenously. Althoughstructural nalysishasvalue, the realist view has failed to recognizehow agentsand structure mutually constitute each other.15 Epistemologically, post-

structuralistshave abandonedstructural ealism altogether.They repudiate tsempiricistbias andsubmitthatarchaeologicalandgenealogical tracingof struc-

tures and units more accuratelyreveals the constraints and opportunities,as

well as the hiddenpowerrelations, n the international ystem.16 A third ine of

14 RobertA. Denemark,onathan riedman, arryK.Gills,andGeorgeModelski,eds., WorldSystem History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change (London: Rou-

tledge, orthcoming).15 AlexanderWendt,"The

Agent-Structureroblem n International elations

Theory,"InternationalOrganization41, No. 3 (1987), pp. 335-370.16 Theliteratures voluminousby now. For one prominentritique, ee Richard

Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and ItsCritics NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986).








critiquesuggests that even if structural ealismpresentsa plausibleaccountof

unit behavior in a Westphaliansystem of sovereign, territorialstates, it is ill

equippedto deal with other types of internationalsystems or units or to lend

insights into how the Westphalianmomentmightbe coming to an end."7All three strandsof critique question the ahistoricityof structural ealism.

At the same time, many have recognized the benefits of startingfrom the rel-

atively parsimoniousassumptionsof thatapproach.The deductive model offers

potentially useful explanationsof empirical reality. Structuralrealists submit

that rich historical analysis would challenge such parsimoniousdeductivism,even questionwhetheranytypeof structure an be ascertaineda priori,and cast

doubt on the value of systems analysis as a whole.

Criticismof the historicalturnin international tudies has also come from

anothercomer. Historiansproperhave challengedthe macrohistoricalcompar-isons tradeby political scientists. They debate the sources cited, accuracyof

interpretations, nd the use of appropriate rimarymaterials.Politicalscientists

should be concerned but not overly worried. The issues are ultimatelyresolv-

able, even if the historical discipline itself is rife with such dissension. More

disconcertingand more damningis the claim thatall macrohistoricalcompar-ison is inevitablyflawed.

This essay aims to refuteboth lines of critiqueof the historicalapproach o

international tudies.Contrary o the claim that historicalanalysisof the inter-

national tructures reductionist, suggestthatabroadening f the deductiveprop-ositions would do morejustice to the historical record but still lack a simple

extrapolation f observedbehaviors.Structural ealismstillprovidesa useful start-

ing pointforexaminingbehavior n theinternational ystem.To be morefruitful,

systems theorists need to reexamine several elements that have informed struc-

turalrealism but have been neglectedin the currentstrandsof the theory.Nor do I believe thatpolitical scientists should relinquishthe field to his-

torians. Whereas historical studiesmay challenge the feasibility of broad com-

parative studies, certainly in the postmodern narratives that dominate the

historicaldiscipline today, they also relinquishthe abilityto providemoregen-eralized theoreticalunderstandingsof the world aroundus. Infinite micronar-

ratives,however illuminating,remain at thatlevel. Macrocomparative nalysts

might apologize for particularreadingsof the historical recordor theirchoice

of particulardata,but they can refuse admonishment or venturing nto a terri-

tory thatmanyhistorianstoday seem to have abandonedaltogether.In this essay, I first highlight Kenneth Waltz's interpretationof Emile

Durkheim'swork,andI arguethat withinDurkheim ies a moredynamicinter-

pretationof the relation between unit and structure. then discuss how histor-

17 JohnRuggie,"ContinuityndTransformationn theWorldPolity,"n Keohane,ed., Neorealism and Its Critics;Spruyt,SovereignState and Its Competitors.







12 Ferguson et al.

ically informedcomparativeanalysesmay informsystems analysis beyond the

Westphalian ramework mplied in structural ealism.

Reinjecting Durkheim's Dynamic Variables n Systems Theory

Thecontemporaryormulationof structural ealism is well known.18 The struc-

tureof the international ystemis characterizedby the absence of hierarchy,he

lack of functionaldifferentiation,and the relativedistributionof power.Given

thatanarchyhas dominatedthroughouthistory,differentiationamong politieshas always been low, andthe key variable for classifying various architectures

of international ystemsmust thereforebe thepolarityof the system.The latter

is analogousto classifying some as price setters and others as price takersin a

marketsystem.Waltz partially derives this characterizationof structure,and the conse-

quences of hierarchyand anarchy,from his reading of Durkheim's work on

comparativesocial systems. In premodernsocieties, Durkheimargued,human

associationsshowed few signs of formallyinstitutionalizedhierarchy,andindi-

vidualsexhibitedonly marginaldifferentiationntheknowledgeand skillrequiredto performeconomic tasks. Modernsocieties, by contrast,manifested formal-

ized administrativemachineries and a highly advanced division of labor.Pre-

modern societies were organizedaround mechanical solidarity.Modern ones

evinced organicsolidarity.19WaltztransposesDurkheim'sclassification of mechanical andorganicsol-

idarity from the societal level to the internationalsystem. The international

system, analogousto premodernsociety, lacks hierarchyand division of labor.

Waltz takes the correlationbetween the lack of formallyinstitutionalizedhier-

archyandthe lack of division of labor as causal. The lack of hierarchycauses

the absenceof functionaldifferentiation.Given thecontinuedabsence of world

government,the levels of functionaldifferentiationwill continue to be low.

John Ruggie has been one of the most vocal critics of this reading of

Durkheim'swork, andjustly so.20 In Waltz'sformulation,anarchycauses thelack of a division of labor. Consequently,without hierarchy,the division of

laborcannotchange, and, hence, the international ystem is doomedto perpet-uate itself. But Durkheim'scomparativesociology is concernedwith the very

opposite: heforcesthat eadto theemergenceof organicsolidarity.Thisdynamic

18 Ibid., pp. 131-157; Spruyt,SovereignState and Its Competitors.19"Theres, then,asocialstructure... o whichmechanicalolidarity orresponds.

What haracterizest is asystem

ofsegments omogeneous

nd imilaroeachother....Whereorganic solidarityis preponderanthey are constituted.. . by a system of dif-

ferentorganseach of which has a specialrole."EmileDurkheim,The DivisionofLabor in Society (New York:Free Press, 1964), p. 180. Firstpublishedin 1893.

20Ruggie, "Continuity," pp. 148-152.








element thattypifies Durkheim'swork is missing in the Waltzianformulation.

How mightthestructure f theinternationalystem changeovertime?Durkheim

argues hatthe level of dynamicdensityis thekey. Increasing nteractionsamong

members of the original society, or with members of other societies, lead togreaterdivision of labor,aggregationsof scale, and formalauthoritystructures.

This readingof Durkheimsuggests no particularprimacyfor governancestructuresor interactiondynamics.It is equally plausiblethatincreasinginter-

actions precipitatethe changes in governancestructures.Underlyingenviron-

mentalchanges(developmentsn communications,ransformationsntechnologyand modes of transportation,demographicshifts, and new militarytechnolo-

gies) may influence the intensity of interaction and precipitatea search for

governancestructureso meet thechallengesandopportunitiesof thesechanges.

In the parlance of internationalrelations, the interactionsamong states andnonstateactorsmay bringaboutalternative overnance orms.Interaction ffects,criticized as reductionist,may (butneed not) alter the structureof the systemin

which the elements of that system are embedded.They cannot be discarded a

priorias having no causal effect on the architectureof the system.The point is not whetherDurkheimconcernedhimself primarilywith the

relation of governance and division of labor. Nor is it pertinentthat he was

unconcernedwith international tudies.The issue is thatthis particularreadingof his analysisof structurehas been interpretedn a static manner.Structurehas

been segregatedfromprocess.The second way to openup contemporary eadingsof structural ealism to a

morehistorical-sociological understanding f the international ystemis to rec-

ognizehow anothercomponentof Durkheim'scomparisonof mechanicalandor-

ganic societies has gone unnoticed. This component is his emphasis on the

normative structures hat socialize individualbehavior in premodernassocia-

tions andtheconverse nmodem societies(anomie).Toremain aithful o the anal-

ogybetweenpremodernocietyand he anarchicalnternationalystem,one would

have to addresswhether, ike premodern ocieties, anarchicalsystems may also

demonstrate ociallyconstitutedpatternsof behavior nwhich the individual(the

state)is embedded andthatthe individual mustlargelytake for granted.Inpre-modernsocieties, the social rulesmay substitute orformallyarticulatedgover-nance structures. Ostracismor social prestige may performsimilarfunctions-

andperhapseven moreeffectively-as governance tructuresnmodemsociety.)

Conversely,the absenceof hierarchy ogically fails to precludesocietalrules.21

In otherwords, structural ealismadvancesananalytic postulate.Given the

absence of hierarchy,actors,however conceived, face a rational choice prob-

21 Fora briefdiscussionof Durkheim n thisissue,see Bertrand adieandPierreBirnbaum,TheSociologyof the State(Chicago:University f ChicagoPress,1983),pp. 11-17.







14 Fergusonet al.

lem. (In this sense, neoliberalism and neorealism can both be groupedas ratio-

nalisttheories.)Underuncertainty, ne does well to choose behaviors hatpursueone's self-interest. As an analyticstatement,the claim is uncontestable.

But if one perceives the structuralrealist argumentas a set of syntheticstatements-that is, as a set of statementsabout the empiricalworld-the argu-ment becomes questionable.As noted,there is no reason to assume thatanarchyis the more importantcausal determinantof behavior,rather than the level

of interactiondynamics. Consequently,one need not assume that the absence

of formalizedgovernancestructuresnecessarilycorrelateswith the absence of

social rules within the system. Systems with high levels of interactionmayconstruct alternatives o hierarchy.

Two reactions arepossible. One is to arguethatthe Durkheimian ead is a

redherringand misleadsus in ourunderstanding f international ystems. Pre-modernsocieties and international ystemsarefundamentallydissimilar.Struc-

tural realism would have been better off advancingits deductive argument-that s, the rational hoiceelements nthetheory-without reference o Durkheim.

That answer would seem unsatisfactory,given that the particular nterpretationof his work allows Waltz and other structuralrealists to advance argumentsaboutthe relativeprimacyof orderingprincipleover interaction,to differenti-

ate structure rom process, and to critiquea varietyof alternativetheories as

reductionist.

A second approach, akenhere, explores how sociological understandingsof systems and societies might aid our understandingof behaviors. For our

purposesin this shortessay, we have taken the lead fromDurkheim(butother

sociological literaturesmight be even more fruitful).A closer readingof his

work suggests an emphasison the dynamicfactorsbehindchanges in ordering

principlesandfunctionaldifferentiation. talso suggeststhat interactioneffects

cannot be relegated analyticallyto secondarystatus.

One could then explore the consequencesof the claim that social ordering

mightbe presentin the face of anarchy.In international ystems analysis, this

couldmean thatelementsthatinteracton aregularbasis andconstitutea system

might show few signs of formal institutionalhierarchybut demonstrateregu-larizedpatternsof behavioramongthemselves which differ from the patternsof behavior of actors considered outside the system. Some historical cases,

discussedby FergusonandMansbach,mightbe of thistype.22The Greekpoleis,

city states, lacked a formal hierarchy-at least until their incorporationunder

Macedonia. Yet there were clearly rules thatgovernedinteractions(functional

regimes, diplomatic practices,modes of alliances,religious affinities) that dif-

ferentiatedinteractionswithin the system of Greek poleis from interactions

between the poleis andnon-Greekactors,such as the barbaroi,the non-Greek-

22 Ferguson ndMansbach, olities.








speaking peoples. Different types of systems would at least seem to coexist:

systems with high interactionamongits membersand certain sharedrules (theGreekinternational ystemof independentpoleis) and othersystemswith actors

that demonstratedneither(the Greekpoleis and the actorsoutside).It is impossible in this shortessay to proceedwith this argument n depth.I

suggest that startingwith a closer look at the apparentheritage of structural

realism,andemphasizing implicit but unexamineddimensions within that her-

itage, revealsavenuesof entryfor historical andsociological understandings f

internationalsystems.

Is ComparativeMacrohistoricalAnalysis Valid?

Despite theapparentntellectualaffinitybetweenpoliticalscientists who engagein historicalanalysis of international ystems with sociologists andhistorians,the variousrepresentativeshave sometimesdisagreed.The differences,I argue,follow from various motives informing their respective research, as well as

from differences within the subfields with which political science sharescom-

mon ground.In therestof thisessay,I attempt o distinguishvariousapproachesto history andpolitics, while arguingthat macrolevel comparisonsin politicalscience deserve greateremphasis.

Some historiansengage in macrohistorical esearch,but theiranalyses sel-

dom take a comparativestance.23Cases are considered unique;causal argu-ments are implicit rather than explicit; and theoretical knowledge is not

considered cumulative. Narrativespertainto the individual case alone. Indeed,the very conceptualizationof histories as "cases" is often anathemato histor-

ians.Causalarguments ail to indicatepatternsand to provideprospective ever-

age on more recent empirical events. Macrohistoricalanalysis in this vein

emphasizesthe complexities of polities and their interrelations.Alter (counter-

factually) any event, and the historicaltape plays out differently.Moreover,within the historicaldiscipline itself macrohistory s decidedly

on the retreat.24Epistemological concerns about the biases in macrohistoryhave led to greater prominencefor postmodernanalyses, gender studies, and

critical histories. Microhistoryand the deconstructionof previously acceptedcanons of historiographyhave replaced grand theorizing. Even the French

Annales school, originallyknownfor emphasizingthe deep structural lements

of history and the longue duree-that is, the long-termview-has turned to

23 Twoprominentxamplesof thisgenreareCarloCipollaandWilliamMcNeill,

but their nterestn social andeconomichistoryhas faded nthe historicaldiscipline.Carlo Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution (New York:W. W. Norton, 1980);WilliamMcNeill,ThePursuit fPower Chicago:University fChicagoPress,1982).

24 A cursory urveyof theleadinghistoricalournals,uchas theAmericanHistor-icalReview,will bring hepointhome.







16 Fergusonet al.

exploringthevicissitudes of everyday ife. Historicalstudyhasbecome a highlyinductiveenterprise,andthesuggestionthatdeeperunderlying orcesmayinflu-ence andstructuremicrolevel actionsno longerinformsthe predominantmode

of historicalanalysis.Historical sociology comes closer to the historical school of political sci-

ence.25 Forexample,Michael Mann's workemphasizes how societies andpol-ities emergeas the resultof variouscombinationsof powerresources(military,

political,economic,and deological).26Theanalysisof thehistoricalrecordyieldsataxonomyof specificconfigurationsof these fourdimensionsof power,buttheyare notcomparativecases. Thereis no testingof rival theories orcomparisonof

causaldynamicsacrosspolities.While thedimensionsof powermaybe derived

deductively,thehistoricalconfigurationsof how suchdimensionsareamalgam-

ated andappliedin given polities can only be presented nductively.Like Rein-hardBendix'swork,thelogic of particularhistoricaltrajectoriesmaybe evident

but withoutcategorizationsalong specific causalpaths.27Politicalscience, in its attempts o create a historically nformedunderstand-

ing of how variousinternational ystems emergeand how the structureof such

systems might affect behavior,differs from contemporaryhistoriographyand

some versionsof historicalsociology. It seeks to discernregularizedpatternsof

behavior and aims to delineatekey variables thatdeterminesuchpatterns.Sys-tems theorizing,withoutcollapsing into endless inductive narratives whether

informative or not), should specify the finite parameters hat structurevariousinternational ystemsandpresenta taxonomyof behaviorswithin suchsystems.

This work should be informedby deductiveassumptions,such as how sys-tems may differaccordingto governingprinciple(anarchyandhierarchy orm

only oppositeendsof aspectrumhatencapsulates onfederalandfederalarrange-ments);28the numberof actors in a system; the level of interaction between

membersconsidered to be within a system;andthose outside of thatsystem.29

25 Foradescriptionf various trandswithin his iterature,eeThedaSkocpol, d.,Visionand Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge,U.K.: CambridgeUniversityPress,1984).Clearly, ome historical ociologists ngage n explicitcausalargumen-tationand seek to discernhistorical egularities. addresshereonly thatstrand nhistorical ociologythatrepudiateshepossibilityof establishingausalregularitiesacrosscases.

26 Michael Mann: Sourcesof Social Power, vols. 1 and2.27 DietrichRueschemeyer,Theoretical eneralizationndHistorical articularity

intheComparativeociologyofReinhard endix,"nSkocpol, d.,Vision ndMethod.28 See

particularlyaniel

Deudney,The

Philadelphianystem:Sovereignty,rms

Control, ndBalance f Power ntheAmerican tates-Union, irca1787-1861"Inter-national Organization49, No. 2 (1995).

29 Forexample,Buzan,Jones,andLittleattempto introducehe notionof inter-actioncapacityo theirsystemsanalysis.Buzan,Jones,andLittle,Logic of Anarchy.








Macrohistoricalanalysiscan serve as a proving groundfor deductivelyderived

hypotheses,butit also serves as a catalystforgeneratingnew hypotheses.These

latter criteria evaluate the validity of comparativemacrohistorical work for

political scientists. Thequestionis not whethercomparativecase analysismeetsepistemological sensibilities in otherfields or whetherpolitical scientists must

concede a priorithat the historical record fails to indicatecausal regularities.

ONE WORLDORTWO?30

BARRY BUZAN AND RICHARD LITTLE

To investigate the future or the past of contemporarystates, it is essential to

locate them within the broader rameworkof an evolving international ystem.States are partly constituted by the system within which they interact.The

Westphalianmodel of the internationalsystem, for example, presupposesthat

the stateis constitutedby both internaland externalsovereignty.Whereas nter-

nal sovereigntyis definedby the hierarchical tructuresormed withinthe state,a state's autonomy and equal status, with respect to other states, constitute

externalsovereignty in the system. The anarchicstructureof the international

system andthe autonomyof the state are, in theory, mutuallyconstituted.The idea of the international ystem being constitutedby a set of sovereign

and equal states has always representedan aspirationratherthan a reality-auseful fiction againstwhich to measurethe actual conditions in the world.Dur-

ing the ColdWar, or example, the fiction had to be set againsta bipolarrealitywith the two superpowersbothclaiminga legitimaterightof interventionwithin

theirrespective spheresof influence. Instead of viewing the internationalsys-tem as an anarchyof independentstates, it is more accurate,but still an over-

simplification,to depict it as two interactinghierarchies.31 With the collapse of

communism n EasternEurope,andthe laterdemiseof theSovietUnion,bipolar-

30 Thefollowingdiscussiondrawson the sectionon internationalrocessesn "APost Modern nternationalystem," h. 16 in BarryBuzanandRichardLittle,Inter-national Systems in WorldHistory: Remakingthe Study of InternationalRelations

(Oxford,U.K.:OxfordUniversityPress,2000).31 There s growing upportorthe idea that heinternationalystemcan be char-

acterizedn hierarchicalerms.See AdamWatson,TheLimitsof Independence: ela-tionsbetweenStatesin the ModernWorldLondon:Routledge,1997);G.JohnIkenberry

andCharlesA. Kupchan, SocializationndHegemonicPower,"nternationalOrga-nization47, No. 3 (1990),pp.79-91;AlexanderWendt ndDanielFriedheim, Hier-

archyna World fAnarchy:nformalEmpire nd he EastGerman tate,"nThomasJ. Biersteker and CynthiaWeber,eds., The Social Constructionof State Sovereignty(Cambridge, .K.:Cambridge niversityPress,1996).







18 Ferguson et al.

ity was almost immediately erased as a defining feature of the international

system.

Despite the presenceof nuclearweapons in the newly constitutedRussian

Federation,no one considersthat the international ystem is still constituted nbipolarterms.The states within the systemare now boundtogetherby a new setof processes.Butthereis considerabledisagreementanduncertaintyabouthow

the internationalystemnow shouldbe characterized.32eorealistshavedepictedthe world, at least temporarily,n unipolarterms,with the United States as the

last global hegemon. Whether or not unipolarityin the contemporaryworld

generateshierarchy or the neorealistsis unclear.33Few theoristsfind this for-

mulationentirely satisfactory.It underestimates he extent and significance of

the changes thathave takenplace before and afterthe end of the Cold War.A

second, more complex model of states and system has emerged,providingamore radicalreassessment.Accordingto this model, the uneven levels of eco-

nomic and political development across the globe are seen to be pulling the

international ystem apart o form two distinct worlds.34The geopolitical spacethatencompassedthe globe duringthe Cold Warand ran on realist rules of the

game now is seen reconstituted nto two distinct zones or worlds, one at the

core of the international ystem andthe other at the periphery.These two zones

areperceivedas occupiedby differenttypesof units, interactingon the basis of

very differentprocesses.

A securitycommunityof powerfuladvanced ndustrialdemocraciesdefinesthe world at the core, where international elations are no longerconductedon

realistprinciples.States in this world, it is argued,do not expect or prepare or

war againsteach other, and, since the zone contains most of the great powers,this development is significant for the internationalsystem as a whole. The

economies and societies of the states that make up this zone are open and

interdependent, ransnationalplayers are numerous and strong, and the inter-

national society within which the states and transnationalplayers interactis

32 Theproblempartlyarisesfromthevery"thin" onceptualizationf the inter-nationalystem hatprevailsnthediscipline.Foranattempto enrich heconcept, eeBuzan andLittle, InternationalSystemsin WorldHistory.

33 See CharlesKrauthammer, TheUnipolarMoment,"Foreign Affairs 70 (1990/91), pp. 23-33, and KennethWaltz,"TheEmergingStructure f International oli-tics,"InternationalSecurity18(1993), pp.44-79. Theauthorsassumea sharpdistinctionbetween unipolarityandhierarchy,whereas RobertGilpin, Warand Change in WorldPolitics(Cambridge,U.K.:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981),linksunipolarityo

hierarchyn world

historybefore1500 A.D.

34 SeeJamesM.Goldgeier ndMichaelMcFaul,"ATaleof TwoWorlds:Coreand

Peripheryin the Post-Cold WarEra,"InternationalOrganization46, No. 2 (1992),pp. 467-491; Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones ofPeace, Zones of Turmoil Chatham,N.J.: ChathamHouse Publishers, 1993).








well developed. This is not to suggest that conflict andcompetitionhave been

eliminated from the system. One can assume that economic and political pro-cesses arenow privilegedover military processes in the international ystem, a

transformation f millennial significance.Yet at the periphery,realist rules still apply in relationsamong states, and

war continues to be a usable and used instrumentof policy. States expect and

preparefor the possibility of serious tension with theirneighbors.Deterrence

(in a few placesnucleardeterrence)providessomerestraint,buteconomic inter-

dependencebetween neighborsis generally low, andpopulationsoften can be

easily mobilized for war.35Political power in many of the newly emergingstatesis still frequentlycontestedby force, so civil waris not uncommon.Even

in themodernizingstatesof EastAsia, whereeconomic interdependenceamong

neighbors is growing, states are still fragile and highly protective of sover-eignty, and use of force among some of them cannot be ruledout.

Underpinning his model is the assumptionthat the units at the center and

the peripheryof the internationalsystem, althoughstill identified as nation-

states, take different forms. The states at the peripheryare still strugglingto

establish and maintaintheirsovereign independence.Thereis also little scopefor the developmentof democracyand civil society. Conversely, the states at

the center seem to be changingin a way thatsuggestswe maybe witnessingthe

formationof anentirelynew type of unit.The traditionaldesireforhardbound-

aries and strong sovereignty is being replaced by a willingness to negotiate

permeableboundaries,ayeredsovereignty,and commoninternational ndtrans-

national"spaces,"such as cyberspace,civic space,commercialspace,andlegal

space.Formanypurposes,such as tradeandfinance,communications ndmedia,

tourism,andsome aspectsof law, boundarieshave become notjust permeable,but also shot throughwith largeholes. If hardboundariesand hardsovereigntyare being politically abandonedin importantways, then perhaps we are no

longer looking at nationalstatesbut at somethingelse: the postmodernstate.

This development is most obvious within the subsystem of the EuropeanUnion (EU), where thequestionof unittransformation risesin relationboth tothe EU itself as a new type of entity with actorqualityand to its effect on its

member states.The EU seems unlikely to become simply another argefederal

state.Instead,it is experimentingwith a new form of unit andsubsystemstruc-

ture,where the sharpinside/outside featuresof the modernistera areblurringinto a mixture of the domestic andthe international.States still exist, but theyare embeddedin a layered sovereignty,and, for many purposes, their bound-

35 There s emerging riticismof attemptso apply securityconceptsandtheoryformulatedn the contextof Europeo thecontemporaryhirdWorld.See StephanieG. Neumann,ed.,InternationalRelations Theoryand the ThirdWorld Basingstoke,U.K.:Macmillan, 998).







20 Fergusonet al.

aries arehighly porous.Civil society is highly developed,andit has taken on an

importantinternationaldimension. Internationalnongovernmentalorganiza-tions (INGOs), such as Amnesty International,are startingto play an increas-

ingly importantrole in internationalgovernmentalorganizations(IGOs), suchas the United Nations.

Althoughanoversimplificationof a morecomplex reality,how these diver-

gent worlds will relateto each otheris one of the greatunansweredquestionsfor the twenty-firstcentury.Will the weaker,butperhapsmoreaggressive,con-

flict zone begin to penetrateand impinge uponthe peace zone throughthreats

of terrorism, ong-rangeweaponsof mass destruction,migration,disease, debt

repudiation?Will the illegal drugs produced n the conflict zone andfor sale in

the peace zone undermine he economic institutionsthat have guaranteedpros-

perity in the peace zone for the past forty years? Will the United States bewilling or able to lead the unquestionablymore powerful peace zone to pen-etrate andinfluence the conflict zone by using geoeconomic levers, and occa-

sionally more robust forms of intervention?Will the postmodernworld try to

insulateitself by constructingbufferzones in Mexico, CentralEurope,Turkey,and NorthAfrica, and try to stay out of the more chaotic parts of the conflict

zone? Or will it try to engage with the whole, pushing towarda new world

orderin its own image? We can only guess at the answers to these questions,but it is clear thatcomplete,or even substantial,separationof the two zones is

highly unlikely.The most optimisticscenariosuggests that it is only a matterof time before

a growing and synergistic link between global communications and incipientcivil societies within the conflict zone begins to transform hedominantunitsin

this region into postmodernstates.36From this perspective,states in the peacezone can forego putting direct pressureon states like China, for example, to

democratize.The process could prove to be self-generatingonce it has been

kick-started.The Chinese governmenthas certainlyfound it difficult to resist

the growinginvasionof globalcommunications.37Even the inhabitantsof non-

existent states, like Kurdistan,have been able to establishlinks among them-selves across the globe, throughthe Internet,andpromotea sense of common

identityby establishingtheir own satellitebroadcasting tation.38The disparitybetween the postmodernstates at the center of the international ystem andthe

premodernstates on the peripherycould remainenormousfor many years in

36 Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communication Revolution

WillChange OurLives (Boston: HarvardBusiness School Press, 1997).

37 Henry S. Rowen, "Off-Centeron the Middle Kingdom,"National Interest48

(1997), pp. 101-104.

38 TimHodlin,"TheE-mailRevolution,"ndNickRyan,"KurdistansAlive andWell on TV,"TheIndependent,February21, 1999, p. 17.








the future.Only if, orwhen, the unitson theperipherybegin to takethe form of

those at the center is there any possibility that the two worlds will transform

into one.

THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY IN GLOBAL

POLITICAL SPACE

JANICE GROSS STEIN

The dominantplayer in the Westphalianorderhas been the state.Although it

does muchmore,the baseline functionof the state hasbeen to providesecurityfor its citizens. More so than in any othercentury,in the last hundredyears,states have assumed the exclusive responsibilityfor securing theircitizens.39

The capacity of the state to secure its citizenry and, for larger states, their

abilityto contribute o securityas a collective global good arethecriticalbarom-

eters of their relative importancein emergentmaps of global political space.

Globally,as statecapacityto providesecuritydeclines, andinternational nsti-

tutionsretreat romthe challenge,privatesuppliersof securityincreasinglyfill

the gap.The privatizationof securityhas profound mplicationsfor the impor-

tance of the state as a focal point of political identity.The capacityto provide securityas a public good to citizens has been both

constitutive and defining for the modernstate. It has been constitutive insofar

as war-making by the state directly and indirectly expanded its capacity to

provideotherpublic goods at home to its citizenry,andit has been definingin

creatingcitizens' loyalty to the state, becoming theirmost importantshield.40

States as security providers as a public good are the hard case and the

critical test for those who argue that fundamental shifts are occurringin the

tectoniclandscapesof globalpoliticalspace.Individuals,nongovernmental rga-

nizations,multinationalcorporations,and international nstitutionscan play inglobal marketsor push the frontiersof global humanitarian pace, but their

actions miss the core function of states.

I argue that, at home and abroad,the role of the state as a providerof

securityas a public good hasbegunto changein subtle butimportantways. The

process of change has been both uneven and erratic across time and space but

should not obscureits transformativempact.The process began at least forty

39 Janice E.Thompson,Mercenaries,Pirates, and Sovereigns:State BuildingandExtraterritorialViolence in Early ModernEurope(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniver-

sityPress,1994).40 CharlesTilly, The Formationof National States in WesternEurope (Princeton,

N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1975).







22 Ferguson et al.

years ago. In the nuclear age, the modern state could no longer defend its

citizens against attackby a nuclearpower.41At best, the state could hope to

deter an attackagainst its citizens by threateningpunitive retaliation,but the

capacityto retaliate failed to mask the fundamental ransformation reatedbyweapons of mass destruction: he securityof the citizenry was hostage to the

reason of other state leaders. Boundaries were no longer barriersas securityfrom attackrested on a gossamernet of interdependenceandinterlockingrea-

son. The state stood one step removed from the securityof its citizens, even if

its citizens did not fully appreciate he distance.

Thelast decade has witnessed even more dramaticchangesinthecapacityof

the state to secure its citizens and to provide securityas a collective public goodabroad.At least threeimportantchangeshave occurred.As vestiges of the great

ideological strugglesof the twentiethcentury disappearedandintegrationcre-atedanelaborate et of supranationalnstitutions nEurope, heprospectof acat-

astrophic xchangeofnuclearweaponshas declinedand hethreat fa conventional

attack has almost disappeared.In the postindustrializedworld, states have be-

come lessnecessary o theircitizenryassecurityprovidersromattackromabroad.

Citizens,no longerseized by the fear of nuclearwar,beganto thinkbeyond

physical securityandto shift theiragendasfrom thepublicto theprivate.Inthe

postindustrialAnglo-Americanworld, for example, citizen values are increas-

ingly postmaterialistand private.42New apolitical identities are growing in

importanceas the stateprovidesand demands ess fromits citizens. As securityfrom outside attack becomes less of a preoccupationthan it has been at anytime in recent historicalmemory,the frequencyof situationaltriggersthat tra-

ditionally activate and affirm identificationwith the statecould decline.

Underthe exactingdisciplineof globalmarkets,while the statebecameless

relevant as a shield from abroad,it also began to disengage as a providerof

otherpublic goods. States in the postindustrializedworld increasinglydefine

themselves as regulatorsof therules of thegame.It is farmore difficult to cheer

for or identify with an umpirethan for a team. Shifts in political identities are

unlikely to lag long behindtransforming hifts in the functionsof states in the

postindustrialworld. It is also unlikely that the political identity of citizenryandloyalty to the statewill disappearoreven decline dramatically; ather hese

identitieswill be triggered ess often and less intensely as threatdeclines with

the capacityto secure andprovidein the postindustrialworld.

41 John Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the TerritorialState," WorldPolitics 9

(1957).See also his International Politics in the Atomic

Age(New York: Columbia

UniversityPress,1959)andhis modificationf hisargumentn "TheTerritorialtateRevisited,"Polity 1 (1968).

42 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic,and Political Change n 43 Societies(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1997).








The capacityof the state to protectits citizens at home has also declined. It

has declined in differentregional spaces for differentreasons. In thepostindus-trial United States, for example, the rise of "gated"communitieswith private

security systems behind walls is remarkable.Many large institutions-banks,schools, hospitals,universities-now use privatesecurityforces to secure their

local populations.Even public security providersare being contractedto the

privatesector to augment budgets.In the extreme,in Moscow, for example, public suppliersof securityserve

organizedcrime, even as the capacityof the state to protectits citizens crum-

bles. Overthe long term,privatemarkets or securitycanhelp only the affluent

anddiminishidentificationwith the stateacross social boundaries.While state

bordersbecome less important,divisions within society maydeepenif markets

rather han statesprovidesecurity.Politicalidentitiesarereshapedover timebythedecliningimportanceof statebordersandthegrowingimportanceof bound-

aries for private securitymarkets.

Theprivatizationof securityis not restricted o the emergenceof markets o

supply the needs of the affluent within postindustrialized ocieties. Followingthe Cold War and the decline of empire, the majorpowers have disengagedfrom regions they no longer considerstrategically important.Only key strate-

gic areas,like the Gulf, partsof Asia, andEurope,remainthe concertedobjectsof global collective security.

Thelargestatesare ncreasinglyess willingtosupplysecurityasapublicgoodin therestof globalpolitical space.They rarelywerewilling suppliers,buttheex-

tension of theCold War hroughout heglobal systemexpanded he definition of

securityand demanded heirengagement.Thispresencehasdisappearedwiththe

Cold Warrivalryand hasbeenreplacedby a strongreluctance o supply securityas a collective good, along with an unprecedentedfear of the political conse-

quences of militarycasualties thatflow fromengagementabroad.43

Sucked into this new securityvacuum,weak states have fragmented.In the

extreme, some have collapsed, and a few have been capturedby strong paro-chial interestswithin the broadercommunity.Such interests then use the stateto perpetuate iolenceandevengenocideagainstrivalpoliticalandethnicgroups.

Fragmentingstates arean especially acuteproblemin partsof Africabut occur

in the formerSoviet Union and Latin Americaas well. In Colombia,for exam-

ple, the statemilitary,private paramilitary orces, and several guerrillaorgani-zationscompeteto providecontractedprotectionto multinationalcorporations.Some of these fragmentingstatesno longerare able to provide securityfor their

43 For an analysisthat tracesthis fear of casualties o the demographicsf the

postindustrializedorld,see EdwardLuttwak: Toward ost-HeroicWarfare,"or-

eignAffairs74,No. 3 (1995),and"APost-HeroicMilitaryPolicy,"ForeignAffairs75,No. 4 (1996).







24 Fergusonet al.

populations;on the contrary,competingmilitias thatsupplant he forces of the

statedeliberately targetcivilian populations.Privateprovidersof securityareenjoying growing markets.At times, they

arecontractedby internationalnstitutions;at othertimes, by weak states whoseek to augmenttheir capacity to coerce their own populationsor rivals who

challenge their authority.SierraLeone contractedthe now defunct Executive

Outcomes,a privatesecurityprovider, o reinforceandexpand ts militarycapa-

bility. Occasionally,nongovernmental rganizations,which seek access to inse-

cure and vulnerablepopulationsthat are being systematically victimized by

predatorymilitias,have turned n desperation o privatesecurityforces. Private

securitymarketsareexpandingin the shadow of fragmentingstates andby the

unwillingnessof themajorpowersand internationalnstitutions o supplysecu-

rity as a collective good anywherebut in core areas of strategic nterest.44The privatizationof security, f it continuesto expand,will reshapethe role

of the state and shift political identitiesin global political space. The state,no

longer the exclusive supplier of security,becomes one among several focal

pointsof political identity.Borders,no longerthe only or even the most impor-tant shieldagainstattack,will becomeincreasingly ess important, ave asjurid-ical divide betweenstates,whileboundaries-cultural and social divisionsamong

spaces-drawn by private security markets become more important.These

boundarieswill not be as stable as stateborderswere in the twentiethcentury,

nor will private purveyorsof securitybe the focus of the kind of political loy-alty that states were able to command.

Analysis of the core function of the state, its capacityto secure its popula-tion and to provide securityas a public good, confirmsimportant ransforma-

tionsin globalpoliticalspaceon thehardestpossibleissue.Itsuggestsa decliningrole for the state, the fragmentationof political space as borders lose their

defining importance, and the privatizationof public functions. These three

together,otherthings being equal, could intensify a shift away from a dimin-

ished state as the focal point of political identityin the next century.To where

political identitywill shift is far less clear.

STATES AND OTHER RULE MAKERS IN THE MODERN WORLD

MICHAEL MANN

Fergusonand Mansbachadvancethe proposition n theirrecentbook, Polities,

Authority, Identities, and Change, that states are not the only polities, defined

44 MichaelBryans,BruceJones,andJaniceGrossStein,"MeanTimes:Humani-tarianActionin ComplexPoliticalEmergencies-StarkChoices,CruelDilemmas,"Comingto Terms1, No. 3 (1999).








as any value-orientedmobilization of personsand resources that is institution-

alized and hierarchized.Families, villages, voluntaryand business organiza-tions, as well as states, can be consideredpolities.

The book takes us on a fascinatingtourthroughvarioushistoricalperiods,showing that states are politically less hegemonic thanmost scholars (or per-

haps most political scientists) have thoughtthem to be. The antirealistdrift of

the authors'argumentcontinuesin the finalpages into the contemporaryworld,where the state is now declining before the influence of various other "poli-ties," some more local, others more transnational.Since I cannot address all

these issues here (andhave published extensively on the earlierhistoricalperi-

ods), I will focus on the contemporary ituation.

First, both parallels and differences exist between this approachand my

own. In The Sourcesof Social Power, I make a parallel "anti-unitary"rgumentand focus on societies ratherthanpolities: societies have always consisted of

multiple, overlapping, ntersectingnetworks of interaction.45 distinguishfour

primarypowernetworks:culturalandideological,economic,military,andpolit-ical. Since the entwiningof these four forms of societies, they have never been

unitarybut multiplybound.

Inparticular, hey must not be identifiedsimplywith statesor nation-states,as has been commonsociological practice.On theotherhand,my conceptionof

political power appearsto be exactly what Fergusonand Mansbachreject. Of

course, terminologydoes not mattermuch (thoughI doubt theirpromiscuoususe of "polity"will catchon). We may define politics narrowly n terms of the

state orbroadly n terms of anycollective mobilization. Each will have its blind

spots. They preferthe broad;I preferthe narrow.By political power, I mean

only control of the state,which I see as a distinctive source of power,since the

state is a differentiatedset of institutionsoccupying the center of a territoriallydefined unit over which it commandssome authoritativerule making,usuallylaws. States also jointly provide much of the very limited regulation of the

space that exists between states-that is, they practice geopolitics as well as

politics.

Though not only the state makes rules, "centralized-territorial"nes are

distinctive.Only the state has the capacityto make its rules stick for the inhab-

itants of a particularterritorialarea: if you live here, you must do this. For

modernstates, this rule making overlapsconsiderablywith the deploymentof

militaryforce, yet I preferto separatepolitical frommilitarypower."Bodies of

armedmen"have always been important n humanaffairs(as William McNeill

argues).Butthey mayormaynotbe controlledby the state,even in ourcentury.Is "centralized-territorial"ule making by states now declining? At one

extreme,it is difficult to imagine a world totallywithoutstates. It is also diffi-

45 Mann,Sources of Social Power, vols. I and2.







26 Fergusonet al.

cult to imaginea world with only a single state-or at least to imagineone with

any degree of sensitivity to the needs of the six billion people who are spreadover Earth's variedcontinents.Yet it is easy to perceive greatvariations n the

density of rules and how much those rules are set by states. In early medievalEurope,much of social life was regulatedby custom,as embodiedin very local

institutions ike the village, the manor,and the family.Broaderregulationcon-

sisted not only of the prince'slaws, but also of the rule-makingpowers of the

Church(ideological power), tradingguilds andleagues (economic power),and

bodies of armedmen (decentralizing eudalretinues-military power).None of

these three were centralized-territorial.

The overall combinationwas particularistic,but then the modernsovereignstate (increasingly takinga nation-stateform) aroseto centralize and territori-

alize some of these rules. But not the statealone:duringthe same periodtrans-national regulation also increased-as capitalist marketsexpanded overseas

and as the values of Europeancivilization (religious, scientific, racist, etc.)were also carried to the corners of the Earth. Local regulationwas declining,and several sources of long-distanceregulationweregrowing.Is the worldnow

beginningto reversedirection,now needingless centralizedand territorial ule

making than it used to? Can other social organizations ("polities") provide

many of the rules that states used to provide?I have discussed elsewhere how muchstatestodayarebeingunderminedby

global capitalism, global environmental ssues, the new social movementsof atransnationalcivil society, and postnuclear(even postmilitary)geopolitics.46

Globalizing capitalism and demilitarizationwithin the North (especially in

Europe)have greatlyweakened the traditionalbackbone of many older states.

Yet most of these states are also acquiringnew rule-makingpowers, especiallyover "softgeopolitics"(internationalnegotiationsby states over issues relatingto the global economy,environment,population,etc.) and new areasof moral-

political regulationconsideredlocal and "private" principally family, gender,and sexual matters).States are losing some rule-making powers and gaining

others. Some nation-states are happily losing powers (as in WesternEurope),others are doing so most unhappily(as in collapsing African countries where

rule makingof any kind is diminishing), while others are still acquiringnew

powers (as in successfully developing countries).Some of this variation s explicable if we note threedisparate ypes of state

decline involving varyingtime and space locations: (1) the leveling off of the

four-century-long"riseandrise" of the Northernnation-states,probably nvolv-

ing some decline in rule-making power in Europe, though not in the United

States;(2) thecollapse of more "nation-statist" retensionsamongsome North-

46MichaelMann,"Has GlobalizationEndedthe Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?"Review of InternationalPolitical Economy4, No. 3 (1997).








ernsocial movementsand statesduring he firsthalf of thiscentury-communismand fascism seem dead, social democracyis stagnant; 3) the suddencollapseof the two-century global domination by European empires in mid-century,

followed after a few years by the decay of some of the postcolonial states.These are varied patternsof state declines, not easily reducible to a single

process-of globalizationor anythingelse.

If states are declining, we are unlikely to recreate medieval forms of rule

making:the more complex and differentiated he society, the more its need for

formal rules rather than custom. Over several centuries, this factor led to a

massive increasein the numberof laws provided by states.47 The world'speo-

ple arenow constrainedby immense bodies of state laws. The legislative flow

is not currentlydeclining, butlet us see whetherregulationby economic, ideo-

logical, and military power organizations might in the future replace stateregulation.

Couldglobal capitalismprovide ts own transnationalegulation?Thatwould

involve propertyrightsand marketexchange being enforcedby sanctionsfrom

within the market tself-whereas capital leaves countriesattemptingto devi-

ate fromcurrentcapitalistnorms.Undoubtedly, here is a trend n thisdirection.

Yet the marketappearsto need continuous"soft geopolitical"regulationfrom

interstatebodies like the GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade(GATT) or

the InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF). The states involved agree to legislate

andpolice economic rules over theirterritoriesprovidedthat the otherstatesdothe samein theirs.Capitalism s backedby diplomaticcoordinationof multiplesites of centralized-territorialegulation.This is still intermittentlybackedup

by "hardgeopolitics,"primarilymilitarythreatandforce applied by the United

States and its allies againstdeviants-for example, to enforce propertynorms

in Kuwait. Thus transnational conomic activities still seem to need both hard

and soft interstateregulation.Transnationalcapital requirescompetent states to enforce law and order

withineach countrybefore it can even penetrate here.If statescannotprovideterritorial aw and order,capital flees from them. For example, countries likeZaireor Russia cannot be broughtto heel (thoughthey would probably ike to

be). The consequenceis to narrow he global scope of capitalismandits norms,for the capitalistmarketcontinues to be dominatedby the same Northerncoun-

tries that have now constitutedits core for a century.Parts of East Asia have

been added, but Russia and other easterly countries of the Soviet bloc have

been lost for the foreseeable future. In these cases, the successful developers

possessed effective states,while thecollapsingeconomieshadjettisonedtheirs.If there is a slight secular growth trend in the effective worldwide reach of

capitalism,it is one substantiallydependenton a web of effective states.

47 DonaldJ.Black,TheBehaviorof Law(NewYork:AcademicPress,1976).







28 Fergusonet al.

Second,ideologicalpower might providetransnationalegulation.Is a more

globalcultureemerging,bearingnormsof cooperation hatmightfunctionauton-

omously of states,as religion did in medievalEurope?Mass consumer culture

is becoming more homogenous throughout he world. Yet it is difficult to seeglobal regulationemergingthroughthe trivial leisure pursuitson which "cul-

turalist"scholars write so prolifically. Is the global watching of MTV or the

global wearingof bluejeans, t-shirts,andleather acketsof muchsignificance?After all, Serbianparamilitariesand off-duty Wall Street stockbrokersshare

these leisure tastes, but not much else. New ideological movements like femi-

nism or environmentalism differ because they generate significant transna-

tional identities. In this respect,they resemblethe past ideologies of liberalism

and socialism, though they areequippedwith far better communications ech-

nology. But these movements are compelled to focus most of their mobiliza-tions on states, since they want legislative change and states still monopolizelaw (the EU is a partial exception).

It is true that recent years have seen the increased transnational low of

neoliberal ideology, overlapping somewhat with thin conceptions of human

rights and formal conceptions of liberal democracy.U.S.-trainedeconomists

from Southerncountries have returnedhome to wield ideological power over

their home economies. Of course, neoliberalism also reflects the economic-

cum-geopolitical power of Westerncapitalists. It is unlikely to remaindomi-

nantfor long, as its trail of visible economic disastersfrom Russia to Mexicogrows. Since we do not live in the same world, we cannot all share the same

ideologies.Some contemporary lobalculturedivides rather hanregulates-especially

ideologies of ethnicity and religion. This is no recent reversal of direction.

Fromabout 1860, Europehas seen the rise and fall of monoethnicstates, with

only a pausebetween 1945 and 1989. In the South,ethnicityandreligionwere

cultivatedduringthe same periodby the colonial powers andthen maskedfor

a while by postcolonial settlements and "ThirdWorld socialism."They resur-

faced from the 1970s. In certainrespects, cultureis becoming transnationallydenser than in the past, though culturehas never been much constrainedbystates.Inotherrespects,and oftenin differentpartsof theworld,cultureremains

divided by religion, ethnicity,and nationalism.

Third,this affects greatlythe possibilities of singularmilitary regulation n

the contemporaryworld. The obvious candidateis that the military power of

the United States,flankedby its manyallies, might providesome regulationto

the worldwhile undermining he powerof otherstates. To some extent it does.

Yet most of the world's conflicts, especially the many smaller ethnic and reli-

gious ones, may be more out of reachof the GreatPower(s) thanthey were inthe past. Military expenditure figures also reveal that though most Northern

states'militarybackbonesareweakening, many Southernones arestrengthen-

ing. Of course, some of the most chronic regional conflicts go further and








undermineeven their own states.They degenerate nto conflicts between armed

bodies of men, such as paramilitarieseffectively outside the control of their

state, and weaken its capacity for law and order. Yet most armed ethnic-

religious rebels no longer want mere communalrights or regional autonomywithin a confederalstate.They want their own nation-state.Where theirrebel-

lions are solved, the result is now less likely to be confederalismthan either

"cleansed"or new nation-states.The nation-state deal has virtually hegemon-ized the world. Even militant Islamor Hinduismthat has traditionallyundercut

regulation by the state is now demandinga tighter,purer,cleansed state. The

nation-state lives-sometimes as reality, sometimes as a peaceful ideal, andsometimes as a very violent ideal!

Thereareseveraltypesof competingrule-bearing ower organizations"pol-

ities" if you prefer) in the world today. If asked to generalize about overalltrends duringthe last century or two, I see more continuity than reversal:a

greaterdensity of overall social regulation, nvolving a decline at the local and

customarylevel, and continuingincrease in national,international,and trans-

nationalregulation.Yet the trendsvarybetween statesandregionsof the world.I do not see a large global decline underway n the role of states.My deviationfromrealisttheoryis different.Statesincreasinglyregulatediverse activities on

behalf of increasinglydiverseconstituencies.Theycrystallize n multiple orms-

theyare"polymorphous."8 Inanygiven year,diverseimportant ssues surface

in U.S. politics. Some remain,others come andgo, but there are few structuredrelations between them. Be they abortion,gay rights, social security,the envi-

ronment,racediscrimination, he NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement,Kos-

ovo, orChina-these issues (andtheirdiverse obbyingconstituencies)allrequirestateattention.Statesremain mportant,butthey are not very cohesive. In fact,

"they"do not really exist as singularactorsat all.

CONCLUSION: THE PAST AND GROWING COMPLEXITY

OF GLOBAL POLITICS

YALE H. FERGUSON AND RICHARD W. MANSBACH

Tryingto avoid what JohnAgnew and StuartCorbridgerefer to as "theterri-

torial trap," 9 We conceive of political space in which a vast arrayof politiesoverlap, layer, nest, and interact-coexist, cooperate,and conflict in the con-text of particular ssues that often overlap.Polities regularlysharesome or all

48 Mann,Sources of Social Power, vol. 2, ch. 3.

49 JohnAgnew and StuartCorbridge,MasteringSpace. Hegemony,TerritoryandInternational Political Economy(London:Routledge, 1995).







30 Fergusonet al.

of the samepolitical space.The domain of eachpolity consists of thosepersonswho identify with it, the resources it can command, the "reach" t has with

respectto adherents ocated in "space" n the broadest sense (for example, for

firmsand markets-even cyberspace),and issues. All polities are"authorities"and"govern"withintheirrespectivedomain.50 Authorityor governance n our

definition is effective control or significant influence within a domain. Such

authorityneed not be exclusive (it can be and often is shared),nor need it be

regardedas legitimate, although legitimacy is an asset. "Nested"polities are

those that lie partiallyorwholly withinthe domain of anotherpolity. They maybe completelydominatedby the host polity, share some functions with it, or be

completely autonomous.

Much of our concern is the subjectivedimension of global politics. "Real-

ity"is socially constructed,buttheobjectivedimensionsof realitythatmanyormost persons perceivealso inevitablyshapethat construction.Individualshave

multiple identities, which themselves vary as they are constructed.Althoughcoercion often plays a role in governanceand some identitiescan be imposed,most arewillingly accepted n exchangeforpsychologicaland materialrewards.

Ideology plays an importantrole in justifying a polity to its adherents.Over-

emphasizing coercion, as does McNeill, misses most of what makes politiescohere.5'Loyaltiesdiffer from identitiesandare also variable,flowing only to

those polities and identities thatprovidesatisfaction.Many identities andloy-

alties coexist withoutconflict for long periodsof time, but periodicallyissuesarise that force individuals to choose among competingidentities andloyalties.When one polity incorporatesanother, dentities and domains associated with

the formerpolity arerarelyobliteratedentirelyand often maybe resurrected o

"haunt" he successor polity.Like HendrikSpruyt,we regarda focus on the sources of global change as

essential. Polities arealways "becoming."Althoughthe evolution of polities is

occasionally so slow as to be almost imperceptible,the processes arecontinu-

ous by which boundariesbecome more or less porousand the domains of some

polities diminish while others grow. Sometimes a polity evolves into another

polity type, but change is not unilinear,and fragmentationof polities is as

common as their integration.As James Rosenau's term "fragmegration" ug-

gests, the processes of fission and fusion are closely related.52 More encom-

50 JamesRosenauimilarly escribes heworldas "acongeries f spheres f author-

ity (SOAs) hataresubjecto considerablelux andnotnecessarily oterminous iththe division of territorial pace."James N. Rosenau,Along theDomestic-ForeignFron-

tier: Exploring Governancein a TurbulentWorld New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),p. 39.

51 McNeill,"TerritorialtatesBuriedTooSoon."52

Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, p. 38.








passing polities like the EU or globalizing financial marketsappearto offer

breakawaypolitiesnew affiliatedoptions,while alienation romMcWorldmakes

the nearand familiar all the more dear.

We arecurrently n a periodso turbulentas to be virtuallychaotic,andverylittle is predictable.The tired debate about whether statesaregainingor losingmisses the sheer flux of the contemporaryera. The tunnel vision of realists,

neorealists, institutionalists,neoidealists, and state-centricconstructivistssim-

ply cannotencompassa political realitythatdoes-and will increasinglyhave

to-accommodate an ever wider varietyof political forms,horizontaland ver-

tical relationships,identities, ideologies, and loyalties. A range of polities at

numerous evels will be engaged in most major ssues of global politics, and it

is unlikely thatany single polity type will dominatein the future as the West-

phalianstate did in the past.In sum, politics will go on much as it has since the dawn of civilization,

only with a scope, pace, and degree of complexity that has vastly increased

over the millennia. Ourcrystalballs at the turn of the millennium are all per-force clouded. But one thing is certain: we have left the Westphalian andfall

far behind and arenavigatingunchartedseas.

2000 what is the polity_a roundtable

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