2000 jaffrelot. rise of obcs in the hindi belt, jas jaffrelot. rise of... · in the hindi belt...

TheRiseOftheOtherBackwardClassesintheHindiBelt

TheJournalofAsianStudies,Vol59,No.1(Feb2000),pp.86-108 Page1of21


CHRISTOPHEJAFFRELOT

THERISEOFTHEOTHERBACKWARDCLASSES(OBCs)iscertainlyoneofthemaindevelopmentsintheHindi-beltpoliticsoverthelasttenyears.TheOBCsarecastesintheIndiansocialsystemthataresituatedabovetheUntouchablesbutbelowtheforwardcastes(the"twiceborn,"Brahmins,Kshatriyas[warriors]andVaishyas [merchants]) and the intermediate castes (mostly peasant proprietorsandevendominantcastes).TheyformthebulkoftheShudras-thefourthcategory(varna)of theclassicalHindusocialarrangement.TheOBCs,whoseprofessionalactivity is often as field-workers or artisans, represent about half of the Indianpopulation,buttheyhaveoccupiedasubalternpositionso far.Theirrise forthefirsttimeseriouslyquestionsupper-castedominationofthepublicsphere.

Theover-representationof theseelitegroups in thepoliticalspherehasalwaysbeenmorepronouncedintheHindi-speakingstatesthananywhereelse.Inthe South, and even in the West, the upper castes lost ground early, largelybecausetheyweresmallerinnumber---inTamilNaduBrahminsaccountforonly3 percent of the populationwhereas they constitute almost 10 percent inUttarPradesh(astatewheretheuppercastesaltogetherrepresentone-fifthofsociety).ButtheuppercastesremainedpoliticallydominantintheHindibeltalsobecauseof the pattern of land ownership that enabled them, especially the Rajputs, toconsolidatetheirgraspoverthecountrysideaszamindars,jagirdars,ortaluqdarsunder the British and to retain some of their influence in spite of the effortstowardlandreformafter1947.

In fact, these notables were the backbone of the Congress Party'snetwork,and fordecades thesocialdeficitofdemocracy inNorth Indiaresultedfrom the clientelistic politics of this party. The Congress co-opted vote-bank'owners,'whowereoftenupper-castelandlords,andUntouchableleaders,whoserallying around the ruling party deprived their group of some importantspokesmen. There were even fewer lower-caste leaders within the CongressParty, the lower castes being closer to the opposition parties, especially theSocialists, or the "independents" (Brass1980); they remainedmarginalizedalsofor this reason. Until the early 1970s, the upper-caste Members of Parliament(MPs)representedmorethan50percentoftheNorthIndianMPsasagainstlessthan5percent for intermediate castes and, at themaximum,10percent for theOtherBackwardClasses.

Christophe Jaffrelot is a Research Fellow at CERI (Centre d'Etudes et de RecherchesInternationales) and Editor-in-Chief of Critique internationale. I would like to acknowledge thecommentsoftheparticipantstotheAASconferenceofwhichthispaperhasemerged,especiallythoseofthetwodiscussants,PaulBrassandAshutoshVarshney.



Historically, in North India two kinds of approaches have prevailed amongthosewho attempted to dislodge the upper-caste, urban establishment from itspositionsofpower.The firstoneconcentratedon theirmobilizationaspeasants(kisans).ItwasinitiatedbymembersofcultivatingcastessuchasChhotuRam(aJat) in Punjab between the 1920s and the 1940s (Gopal 1977), and SwamiSahajanand(aBhumihar)whobecamealeadingfigureoftheBiharKisanSabhainthe 1930s.1 The second one reliedmore on caste identities andwas primarilyarticulatedbysocialistleaderssuchasRammanoharLohia,whoregardedcasteasthe main obstacle towards an egalitarian society. While the 'kisan school'endeavoredtogathertogetherallthoseengagedincultivatingworkonthebasisof socioeconomic demands, the caste-oriented Socialists attempted to form analliance of the non-elite groups mainly on the basis of affirmative actiontechniques: they asked for caste-based quotas, especially in the administration.Thesocialgroupsrepresentedbythesetwoapproacheshadmuchincommonbutdidnotcoincide.Theproponentsof"kisanpolitics"cameprimarilyfromtherankof peasant-proprietors who tried to mobilize "the peasants" - as if that were asocial category without internal differentiation - to promote their own interestandmaintain lower castesunder their influence.The caste-based approachwasratherconceivedfordefendingthelatter.

Overthelastdecades,thesetwostrategieshavecontributedtotheriseoffirstthemiddle-caste peasants and then the OBCs in North Indian politics. The firstsignificantchangesoccurredinthe1960swhentheyenteredtheBiharandUttarPradesh legislative assemblies in massive numbers under the auspices of thesocialistpartiesandCharanSingh.Kisanpoliticsasserteditself inthe1970sand1980s, thanks to Charan Singh and his lieutenants. But in the late 1980s and1990s, the anti-establishment agendawas taken over, on the political scene, byheirs of the socialist movement within the Janata Dal, whose quota politicsculminated in the implementation of the recommendations of the MandalCommissionreport.Asaresult,thekisanfrontbrokedownalongcastelines,thepeasantproprietorsfromtheintermediatecastesdistancingthemselvesfromtheOBCs.Butdothelatterhavemorecoherenceandcantheyresistthenewupper-castedominated,BJP-ledrulingcoalition?

QuotaPoliticsandKisanPolitics

Fewmen andpolitical parties inNorth India have tried to promote the

causeofthelowercastessinceIndependence.TheCongressPartywasdominated,at the Center, by progressive leaders a la Nehruwho did not regard caste as arelevant category for state-sponsored social change, and it relied anyway on anetwork of conservative notables. None of them was truly interested inacknowledging the needs of the Other Backward Classes even though thisexpression was originally used by Nehru in his first speech, on his ObjectivesResolution, on December 13, 1946, before the Constituent Assembly. Heannounced that special measures were to be taken in favor of "minorities,backward and tribal areas and depressed and other backward classes"(Constituent Assembly Debates 1989, 1:59) but did not elaborate further and,interestingly, senior congressmen such as K. M. Munshi resisted any effort toclarifywhotheseOBCswere(1:697).Article340oftheIndianConstitutionvotedonJanuary26,1950,merelystated:

The President [of the Republic) can by decree nominate a Commission formed bypersonsheconsiderstobecompetentto investigate,withintheIndianterritory,ontheconditionofclassessufferingofbackwardnessaswellinsocialasineducationalterms,andontheproblemstheymeet,thewayofproposingmeasureswhichcouldbetakenbytheCentraloraStateGovernmentinordertoeliminatedifficultiesandimprovetheircondition.

(GovernmentofIndian.d.,178)

1SeehisbookKhetMazdoorinHauser1994.



The first Backward Classes Commissionwas appointed on January 29, 1953underthechairmanshipofaformerdiscipleofGandhi,KakaKalelkar(Governmentof India 1955). Its report relied heavily on the concept of caste for defining theOtherBackwardClasses.Castewasnottheonlycriterionbutitwasakeyelementand the Commission, therefore, established a list of 2,399 castes, representingabout32percentoftheIndianpopulation,asformingthebulkofthe"sociallyandeducationallybackwardclasses"thatneededaffirmativeactionprograms.

ThereportwasrejectedbyNehru'sgovernment.G.B.Pant,theHomeMinister,objected that "With the establishment of our society on the socialist pattern ...,social and other distinctions will disappear as we advance towards that goal"(Memorandum,{n.d.},2.)Secondly,hedisapprovedoftheuseofcasteasthemostprominentcriterionforidentifyingthebackwardclasses.Heconsideredthat"therecognitionof thespecifiedcastesasbackwardmayserve tomaintainandevenperpetuatetheexistingdistinctionsonthebasisofcaste"(ibid.).Thereportwastabled before the Parliament accompanied by a Memorandum by Pant onSeptember3,1956,butwasnotevendiscussed(GovernmentofIndia1980,2).InMay1961,theNehrugovernmenteventuallydecidedthattherewasnoneedforan all-India list of the OBCs---and that, consequently, there would be noreservation policy at the Center. Even though theywere responsible for Article340 of the Constitution, Congressmen were obviously reluctant to cater to theneedsofthelowercastes,eitherbecauseofsheerconservatismorsocialistideas.

So far as the Communistswere concerned, theywere very reluctant to takecaste into account, holding the view that this social category was bound to besubmergedby thatof class. Fora long time theSocialistswere theonlyones toconsiderthelowercastesasapertinentsocialandpoliticalentity.

TheSocialistsandAffirmativeActionfor

theLowerCastesThe first to recognize the importance of the lower casteswas probably

Rammanohar Lohia. Although he was from a merchant caste and had beeninfluencedbyMarxism,Lohiadecidedtofightforthecauseofthelowercastes.Tothosewhofavoredananalysisintermsofclass,heobjectedthat"casteisthemostoverwhelmingfactorinIndianlife"(Lohia1979,79):

Manysocialistshonestlybutwronglythinkthatitissufficienttostriveforeconomicequality and caste inequality will vanish of itself as a consequence. They fail tocomprehendeconomic inequalityandcaste inequalityas twindemons,whichhavebothtobekilled. (20)

Lohia therefore became one of the staunchest supporters of positivediscrimination---what he called "unequal opportunities' not only in favor of theScheduledCastesbutalsoofthebackwardcastes:

Wheneverybodyhasanequalopportunity,casteswiththe fivethousandyearsoldtraditions of liberal educationwouldbe on top.Only the exceptionally gifted fromthe lower-castes would be able to break through this tradition. [....] Tomake thisbattle a somewhat equal encounter, unequal opportunities would have to beextended,tothosewhohavesofarbeensuppressed.

(1979,96)According to him, the Marxist views about revolution or Nehru's policy ofnationalizing private properties amount to "vested-interest socialism" becausenoneofthesethingswouldchangeIndiansociety:

WorkerswiththebrainareafixedcasteinIndiansociety;togetherwiththesoldiercaste, they are the high-caste. Even after the completed economic and politicalrevolution, theywould continue to supply themanagers of the state and industry.Themass of thepeoplewouldbe kept in a state of perpetual physical andmentallowliness, at least comparatively. But thepositionof thehigh-castewould thenbejustifiedongroundsofabilityandineconomictermsasitisnowongroundsofbirth



or talent.That iswhy the intelligentsiaof Indiawhich isoverwhelmingly thehigh-caste,abhorsalltalkofamentalandsocialrevolutionofaradicalchangeinrespectof language or caste or the bases of thought. It talks generally and in principleagainst caste. In fact, it can bemost vociferous in its theoretical condemnation ofcaste,so longas itcanbeallowedtobeequallyvociferous inraisingthebannerofmerit and equal opportunity.What it loses in respect of caste by birth, it gains inrespectofcastebymerit. Itsmeritconcerningspeech,grammar,manners,capacitytoadjust,routineefficiency isundisputed.Fivethousandsyearshavegone intothebuildingofthisundisputedmerit.

(1979,96-97)

LohiadidnotentertainanyromanticideaoftheIndianplebe-"theShudratoo

hashisshortcomings.Hehasanevennarrowersectarianoutlook"(1979,13)-butinspiteofthisforLohia,theShudradeservedspecialtreatment,especiallyinonedirection:heshouldbe"pushedtopositionsofpowerandleadership"(13).Hedidnot regard affirmative action in the education system as desirable2 butemphasized the need for quotas in the administration and for the electioncandidates.Obviously,reservationswereintendedtogiveashareofpowertothelower castes; it was an empowerment scheme. In 1959, the third nationalconferenceoftheSocialistPartyexpressedthewishthatatleast60percentoftheposts in the administration be reserved forOtherBackwardClasses (135). Thisrecommendationwas reiteratedat the fifth annual sessionof theparty, inApril1961, a fewmonths before the third general elections (142). Subsequently, theprogram or election manifestos of Lohia's party promoted the notion of"preferential opportunities," which was justified by the special nature of castesociety, as in the program adopted by the first Conference of the SamyuktaSocialistParty(SSP)heldinApril1966:

Itshouldberememberedthatequalityandequalopportunityarenotsynonymous.In a society characterised by a hierarchical structure based on birth, the principle ofequal opportunity cannot produce an equal society. The established, conventionalnotionsaboutmeritandabilitymustresultindenialofopportunitiesinactualpracticefor backward castes, harijans [ScheduledCastes), adibasis [ScheduledTribes] etc. Theprincipleofpreferentialopportunitiesalonewillensurethatthebackwardsectionswillcatchupwiththeadvancedonesinareasonableperiodoftime.

(Mohanetal.1997,258-59)

This document again recommended a quota of 60 percent for thebackward sections of society-comprising then the Scheduled Castes, ScheduledTribes, OBCs, and women---but extended it to "all spheres," not only theadministration,butalsotheeducationsystemandtheassemblies.Theweaknessof the "people's movement," according to the document, resulted from itsdivisions, and also from "the preponderance of upper-caste leadership in [the]major political parties" (Mohan et al. 1997, 260). To show the way, the SSPnominatedalargenumberofcandidatesfromnon-elitegroups,andthesocialistshad a larger number of OBCMembers of LegislativeAssemblies (MLAs) electedthanotherpoliticalpartiesinthestateswheretheyachievedtheirbestscores,inUttar Pradesh and Bihar. In the latter state, in the 1967 elections, the SSP hadalmost40percentofitsMLAscomingfromthelowercastes(asagainst22percentontheCongressside)(Mitra1992,120).

2Hetriedtojustifythisstandin1958bysaying:"Letthebackwardcastesaskfortwoor three shifts in schools and colleges, if necessary, but let them never ask for theexclusionofanychildofIndiafromtheportalsofaneducationalinstitution"(1979,104)



Obviously,Lohia'sstrategyboreitsmostsignificantelectoralfruitsinBihar,thebirthplaceandcradleofsocialisminIndiasincethefoundationoftheCongressSocialistPartyinthestatecapitalin1934.In1967,Lohia'sparty,theSamyuktaSocialistParty(SSP),theCommunists,andtheJanaSanghformedamajoritycoalitioncalledtheSamyuktaVidhayakDal(SVD,theunitedparliamentariangroup).However,thesocialistleaderswere,inaway,victimsoftheirownstrategyofpromotionandmobilizationofthelowercastes.Whilethispolicylargelyexplainedtheirsuccessandtheelectionofalargenumberoflower-casteMLAs,especiallyYadavswhosenumberhadincreasedsomuchastobejustbehindtheRajputs(14.8percentasagainst24.1percent)(Blair1980,68),thisgroupdidnotshowmuchcommitmenttotheSSP.Soonaftertheelections,BindeshwariPrasadMandal,aYadavwhowastopresideoverthesecondBackwardClassesCommissionin1979,defectedandformedtheShoshitDal,"thepartyoftheoppressed"withfortylower-casteMLAdissidentsfromdifferentsides,includingtheSSP.MadhuLimaye,oneofLohia'slieutenants,lamentedthat"assoonaspowercame,SSPmenbrokeupintocastegroups.Theyequated....[Lohia's]policywithcasteism!...Ministersdevelopedaffinitiesoncastelines.Castemenbelongingtootherpartieswerefelttobecloserthanone'sownPartycomradesbelongingtoothercastes"(Limaye1988,155-56).

Infact,thesedevelopmentshadsomepositiveaspects.Castes,eventually,gottransformedintointerestgroups,whichmeantthatlower-castepeoplecouldnot be integrated in vertical linkages as easily as during the heyday of theCongress Party domination. The lower castes may have lent themselves tomanipulations by political entrepreneurs like B. P. Mandal, but greater casteconsciousness also implied a stronger rejection of vertical arrangements and agrowing solidarity between lower-caste MLAs from different parties. Thesephenomena had become so pronounced that to topple the SVD government theCongresshadnootherchoicebuttosupportoneoftheShoshitDalleaders;thusinFebruary1968B.P.Mandalbecame the firstOBCChiefMinisterofBihar.Hewastobefollowedbyothernon-eliteleaders.OutofthenineChiefMinisterswhogovernedthestatefromMarch1967toDecember1971,onlytwobelongedtothehighercastes.

CharanSinghandtheMobilizationof

theFarmers

Besidesthesocialistapproachrecognizingcasteasaleverofsocialdominationandthecorollarycaste-basedmobilizationandaffirmativeaction,NorthIndiasawin the late 1960s the shaping of an alternative strategy by Charan Singhwhichaimedatempoweringthepeasantry.Thefactthat"theChaudhuri,"atitleheldbyJatleaders,becameinfluentialinthelate1960sislargelyexplainedbytherelativeeconomicgrowthwhich,atthattime,benefitedthemiddle-classfarmersofNorthIndia. This growth resulted from two cumulative phenomena. First, the landreform, even though it had remained incomplete, enabled many tenants tobecomepeasant-proprietors.Secondly,theGreenRevolutionservedtheinterestsof those among these landowners who had some investment capacity. This"revolution"stemmedfromtheintroductionofhigh-yieldingseedsbetween1965and 1966, but also from the development of irrigation and the use of chemicalfertilizers.

Charan Singh always identified himselfwith the interests of the peasants. In1939,beforetheexecutivecommitteeoftheCongressparliamentarygroupintheUttarPradeshassembly,wherehehadbeenelectedforthefirsttimein1937,heproposed a 50 percent quota in public administration in favor of the sons offarmers.Heframedhisprojectintermsofalatent"urbanIndiaversusruralIndia"conflict:

Inourcountrytheclasseswhosescionsdominatethepublicservicesareeitherthosewhich have been 'raised to unexampled prominence and importance' by theBritisher, e.g. the money-lender, the big zamindar or taluqdar, the arhatia or thetrader, or thosewhich have been, so to say, actually called into being by him--the



vakil [advocate], the doctor, the contractor. These classes have, in subordinatecooperationwith the foreigner,exploited themasses inallkindsofmannerduringtheselasttwohundredyears.Theviewsandinterestsoftheseclasses,onthewhole,are,therefore,manifestlyopposedtothoseofthemasses.Thesocialphilosophyofamember of the non-agricultural, urban classes is entirely different from that of apersonbelongingtotheagriculturalruralclasses.

(Singh1986,203)TheAll-IndiaJatMahasabhasupportedhisproposal,butCharanSinghdid

notvaluecasteaffiliationsverymuch.Hetried,rather,tosubsumecasteidentitiesintoa feelingofclassorat least intooneofapeasantmovement.Thisapproachwas partly dictated by his own caste background, since the Jats occupy anintermediary position: though technically they have to be classified as Shudras,theirdominantcastestatusisoftentheroot-causeofconflictswithlowercastes.Inaddition,theirnumberiscomparativelysmallinUttarPradesh(1.2percentofthe population). Therefore Charan Singh had good reasons for forging a kisaninterest group that the Jats would be leading, and for promoting an identityopposing thepeasants to the town-dwellers inorder tosubsumecastedivisionsintoanewgroupfeeling.EventhoughOBCleadersralliedaroundtheChaudhuri,hisschemewasnotdesignedforemancipatingtheirgroupbutforpromotingtheinterestsofthosewhoownedsomelandandcouldselltheirsurpluscrops.Infact,itwaslikelytoreinforcetheJats'hegemonyoverthelowercastes.

As Revenue Minister in charge of land reform in Uttar Pradesh afterIndependence,CharanSinghpromotedtheinterestsofwhathecalledthemiddlepeasantrybyabolishingthezamindarisystem.3Thebulkofthisclasswastocomefrom the intermediary castes, including his own, the Jats. This approach largelyexplainstheselectivecharacterofUttarPradeshlandreformandhislaterconflictwith Nehru. In 1959 he vigorously opposed the project of agricultural co-operatives announced by the Prime Minister in the Nagpur session of theCongress. He immediately published a book called Joint Farming X-Rayed: TheProblemandItsSolution,inwhichheproposedastrategyofglobaldevelopmentradically opposed to that of Nehru. 4 Questioning the need for a rapid, state-sponsored industrialization as advocated by Nehru, Charan Singh proposed togiveprioritytoagricultureandtopromoteitbydevelopingsmallfarmerholdings,the only way to generate the surpluses that were needed for industrialinvestment.5 For him, agricultural cooperatives would annul the productivitygainsresultingfromtheeliminationofthezamindar-likeintermediariesbecausetheywouldjeopardizetheindependenceofthefarmers:

Thethoughtthatlandhasbecomehis[thepeasant's]andhischildren'sinperpetuity,lightensandcheershislabourandexpandshishorizon.Thefeelingthatheishisownmaster,subjecttonooutsidecontrol,andhasfree,exclusiveanduntrammelleduseofhislanddriveshimtogreaterandgreatereffort.[...]Likewiseanysystemoflarge-scalefarminginwhichhisholdingsarepooledmustaffectthefarmer,butinthereversedirection.Nolongerwillhebehisownmaster;hewillbecomeoneofthemany;hisinterestwillbesubordinatedtothegroupinterest.

(Singh1959,v-vi)

3Thissystem,whichhadbeenestablishedbytheBritish,combinedpropertyrightsandfiscal aspects: thezamindars, like the taluqdars and the jagirdars,wereboth landownersandtaxagentssincetheycollectedthelandrevenue.

4CharanSinghwrotethisbookwhilehewasoutoftheUttarPradeshgovernment.HehadresignedinApril1959becauseofseveraldisagreementswithSampurnanand,theChiefMinister.(Johnson1975,145).

5CharanSinghspellsoutthispointratherlateinthebookbutitishisbasicargument:"Industrializationcannotprecedebutwillfollowagriculturalprosperity.Surplusesoffoodproduction above farmers' consumption must be available before non-agriculturalresourcescanbedeveloped"(Singh1959,251).



Obviously,economicrationalityisnottheonlyreasonforrejectingagriculturalcooperatives. Charan Singh admits that "Ultimately it is not a question ofeconomic efficiency or of form of organisation, but whether individualism orcollectivism should prevail" (1959, 107). Indeed, he argues, "The peasant is anincorrigible individualist; for his avocation, season in and season out, can becarriedonwithapairofbullocksinthesolitudeofNaturewithoutthenecessityofhavingtogiveordersto,or,takeordersfromanybody"(104).CharanSinghspellsoutaveryromanticviewofthekisan,evenamystiqueofthepeasant,asthemanincommunionwithNature(awordthathewriteswithacapitaln)andtheonlyoneabletosustainits"nutritionalcycle"(266).

On landless agricultural labor, Charan Singh's views are worth noting, too.Referring,enpassant,tothelaborers'condition,henotesthat"Ifwageshaveatalltobepaid, inviewof the fact thata largesupplyof idle labour isalmostalwaysavailable,thewagespaidneedonlybesubsistencewages"(1959,168).Indifferentto the condition of the landless laborers, Charan Singh was against too low aceiling in the land reformprogramwhich could have benefited thembecause itwould multiply the noneconomic exploitations and weaken the peasant-proprietorpattern.

Inspiteofthisselectivedefenseoftheruralfolk,CharanSinghsystematicallyattemptedtoprojecthimselfasthespokesmanforvillageIndia.Hepresentedthevillage community as forming a harmonious whole and claimed that it "wasalways a strongermoral unit than a factory.The senseof the communitywas avitalthingamongthepeasantry,providinganaturalfoundationforcollaborationorco-operativeaction"(Singh1959,270).Hecompletelyignoredthedeepsocialcontradictions and class antagonisms between landowners, tenants,sharecroppers,andlaborers.WhileCharanSinghisofcoursetherepresentativeofpeasant-proprietors, his whole strategy consists in forging a kisan identity inwhichallthepeopleworkinginthefieldsmaybeabletorecognizethemselves.Heinsisted on the dichotomy between the cities and the countryside in this veryperspective.

There has always been lack of equilibrium, rather a sort of antagonism betweencities and the countryside. This is particularly so in our land where the gulf ofinequalitybetweenthecapitalistclassandtheworkingclasspalesintoinsignificancebeforethatwhichexistsbetweenthepeasantfarmerinourvillageandthemiddle-class town dweller. India is really two worlds-rural and urban. The relationshipbetweenthecountrysideandthecitiesis,therefore,avitalproblemtous.

(Singh1984,212)

CharanSingh'skisanpoliticswassuccessfultoacertainextent,sincehewasable to gradually evolve a coalition of cultivating castes from different socialranks.ThiscoalitioncametobeknownasAJGAR,anacronymwhereAstoodforAhir (or Yadav), J for Jat, G for Gujar and R for Rajput. While there was norepresentative of the (often landless laborers) untouchable castes in thisgrouping, itcoveredawiderangeofstatus fromOBCto intermediateanduppercastes.Forinstance,MulayamSinghYadavwasamongthefollowersCharanSinghattracted in the 1960s. Yadav was elected MLA for the first time in 1967 on aticket of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal, Charan Singh's party. Interestingly, he wasintroduced to theChaudhuribyanotherOBC, JairamVerma (Lal andNair1998,32),whowasaKurmi,asignthatCharanSinghattractedcultivatingcastesevenbeyondtheAJGARcoalition.



TheJanataPartyattheConfluenceofQuotaandKisanPolitics

Thefactthatbothstrategies,quotapoliticsandkisanpolitics,persistedduring

the"JPmovement"andthesubsequentJanataphaseisevidentfromthediscoursethenpromotedbyMadhuLimayeandCharanSingh,whobecameDeputyPrimeMinisterandHomeMinisterin1977.Theformer,asconveneroftheJPMovementProgramme Committee in 1975, drafted a document where one could read thefollowingstatements:

Caste hierarchy based on birth is the biggest obstacle in the path of achievingsocialequality.Inanunequalsociety,thedoctrineofjudicialequalityandequalopportunity cannot by itself remove caste disabilities. The doctrine ofpreferential opportunity, therefore, had to be invoked in order to enable thebackwardsectionstocomeuptotheleveloftheupper-castes.Reservationintheservicesthatwehavetodayhadnotenabledustoovercomethedisabilitiesfromwhich our suppressed communities suffer [. . . ] This must change, and thesepeople and other backward classes should be enabled to secure, throughpreferentialopportunitiesandreservation,thesubstanceofpower.

(Limaye1997,314)MadhuLimayeemphasizedtheempowermentdimensionofaffirmativeaction

schemesthesamewayashismentor,Lohia,did.CharanSinghregardedthe"threedecades of Congress rule in post-Independence India as essentially elitist andurbanoriented" and argued that the JanataParty had tomaintain "its live linkswith the villages, with agriculture, with cottage and village industries, andgenerally with the uplift of our Kisans" (Singh 1997, 325, 327). Two majorcomponents of the Janata, the former Congress (O) of Prime Minister MorarjiDesaiandtheHindunationalistJanaSangh"wereunwillingtoconcedeprimacy"to Charan Singh (Varshney 1995, 104). Dismissed by Desai on the ground ofindiscipline, he organized a huge peasant rally of about one million people inDecember 1978 and then rejoined the Government as Senior Deputy PrimeMinisterinchargeofFinance.His"kulakbudget,"tousethepressmen'swordsin1979,reducedseveralindirecttaxesonmechanicaltillers,dieselforelectricwaterpumps, and chemical fertilizers, by 50 percent for some of them; it "loweredinterest rates for rural loans; increased subsidy of minor irrigation; andearmarked funds for rural electrification and grain-storage facilities" (105). TheJanatadidnotlastlongenoughtoimplementallthesemeasures,butCharanSinghhad raised the peasants' issues in such away that they arrived center-stage; somuchsothattheyweretakenupbyfarmers'movementsinmostofthestates(T.Brass1995),amongstwhichtheBharatiyaKisanUnionofTikaitandtheShetkariSangathana of Sharad Joshi inMaharashtra were especially noticeable for theirattemptatprojectingtheirapoliticalcharacter.

TheJanatagovernmentwastooheterogeneousacoalitiontohaveaconsistentaffirmative action policy. The Jana Sangh, representative primarily of the urbananduppercastemiddleclass,wasreluctanttomoveinthedirectionofaffirmativeaction. The differences showed clearly at the subnational level, when KarpooriThakur,thesocialistChiefMinisterofBihar,andRamNareshYadav,hissocialistcounterpart in Uttar Pradesh, tried to introduce quotas in the stateadministration. Yet Desai yielded to OBC pressures and appointed the secondBackward Classes Commission, whose principal terms of reference were "todetermine the criteria for defining the socially and educationally backwardclasses"and"toexaminethedesirabilityorotherwiseofmakingprovisionforthereservations of appointments or posts in favour of such backward classes ofcitizenswhicharenotadequately represented inpublic services (GovernmentofIndia19801:vii).TheCommission,whosechairmanwasB.P.Mandal,concludedfromitssurveythattheOBCswerecoterminouswithlowcastes,representing52percent of the population, and that their backwardness justified a quota of 27percent of the posts being reserved for them in the bureaucracy and the publicsector.TheMandalCommissionreportwassubmitted in late1980,more thanayearafterthefalloftheJanatagovernment.IndiraGandhiandthenRajivGandhi



werenot interested in implementingmeasures thatmightaffect theupper-castesupportersoftheCongressor,atleast,damageitsimageofa"catch-allparty."Thereport was finallymade public by the Janata Dal when it took power from theCongressin1989.

TheJanataDalandtheEmpowermentofthe

LowerCastesTheJanataDal,whichwasofficiallyfoundedon11October1988,amalgamated

thelegaciesofLohiaandCharanSingh,asevidentfromtheidentityofthepartiesit incorporated. On the one hand, the Lok Dal (A) of Ajit Singh, son of CharanSingh,andtheLokDal(B)ofDeviLal,anotherJatleaderfromHaryana,mergedintheJanataDal.Ontheotherhand,manysocialistold-timersfromtheJanataParty,suchasMadhuDandavate(whowas tobecomeFinanceMinister inV.P.Singh'sgovernment),GeorgeFernandes(whowastoholdtheportfolioofRailways),andSurendraMohan (amemberof the JanataDalExecutiveCommitteewhoshapedits election manifesto), took an active part in it. This amalgamation had innerproblems,asthecontroversyoverthenamingofthepartyquicklydemonstrated.Until the lastminute the partywas to be called Samajwadi JanataDal (SocialistPeople'sParty),butDeviLalstronglyobjectedtothetermsocialistandithadtoberemoved(Mustafa1995,110).

Yet the party's discourse on social justice remained heavily loaded withsocialist references, and its affirmative action program drew most of itsinspirationfromLohia'smodusoperandi.Theparty'spresident,V.P.Singh,wasalate convert to this brand of socialism.Descending fromaRajput lineagewhichhadbeen the ruling familyof a smallprincely statenearAllahabad, the "RajaofManda",ashecametobecalledratherironically,hadshownsomeearlyinterestintheSarvodayamovement,buthadthenbeenco-optedbytheCongressPartytobecome,asMLAand thenMP,onemore"notable" in thevote-bankpyramid.Hewas expelled from the Congress in July 1987 because of his accusation thatCongress Party leaders were corrupt. The party he founded then with otherCongressdissidents,theJanMorcha,wassmall,butitplayedapivotalroleinthefoundation of the Janata Dal and became the rallying point of other oppositionpartieswithwhichitformedtheNationalFront.ThedayafterhewassworninasPrime Minister, on 3 December 1989, in his First Address to the Nation,RammanoharLohiaandJayaPrakashNarayanweretheonlynameshementionedashisguides(V.P.Singh1997,357).ThisshiftfromCongresstoamixedbrandofSocialistpoliticsreflectedV.P.Singh'soldcommitmenttoSarvodayabutalsohisdependenceuponsocialistleaders.

TheJanataDalindeedtendedtoadoptthesocialistprogramforsocialjustice:it concentrated its attention less on class than on ascriptive groups and turnedtowardsaffirmativeactionasthemainremedy.Theprogramadoptedbythepartyduring its inauguralsessionpromisedthat"Keeping inviewspecialneedsof thesocially and educationally backward classes, the party [if voted to power] shallimplement forthwith the recommendations of the Mandal Commission" (V. P.Singh1997,343).

Thepartywaspreparedtoshowthewayandpromisedtoallot60percentoftheticketsinthegeneralelectionsto"theweakersectionsofsociety."Beforethat,V. P. Singh had promised to apply this 60 percent reservation to the partyapparatus. The 60 percent quota was an old socialist idea that Lohia hadpropagated in the 1960s. It could not be implemented allegedly because of theoppositionofDeviLal(Mustafa1995,115).Onceagain,thesocialistapproachwasopposedbyaJatwhotriedtoappearastheheirofCharanSingh.

TheJD,indeed,representedtheaspirationsoftheproponentsofkisanpoliticsas well. Devi Lal, the then Chief Minister of Haryana, had won the 1987 stateelectionlargelybecausehehadpromisedtowaivethecooperativeloansuptoRs20,000(Varshney1995,141).The1989electionmanifestooftheNationalFrontpromised to do the same with "Loans upto Rs 10,000 of small, marginal andlandless cultivators and artisans" (143).Most of the items regroupedunder theheadline"RuralEconomy"wereinfavorofthepeasant-proprietors:



Not less than 50 percent of the investible resources will be deployed for thedevelopmentofruraleconomy.Farmerswillbeassuredofguaranteedremunerativeprices for their produce, a countrywide network of godowns and warehouses,remissionofdebts,provisionof cheapcredit, removalofunreasonable restrictionsonmovementofagriculturalproduce, crop insurance, security in landholdingandstrictimplementationoflandreformsandimprovedaccesstowaterresources.

(26)Theonlypromisewhichdirectlyconcerned theagricultural laborerswas the

oneaboutthelandreform,whichwasnotimplemented.Ontheotherhand,DeviLal,whobecameDeputyPrimeMinisterwiththeAgricultureportfolio,andSharadJoshi,oneofhisadvisors,withacabinetrank,waived"allagriculturalloansundercentraljurisdictionuptoRs10,000"(Varshney1995,143).

Yet,kisanpoliticswasnotasresolutelypursuedbytheV.P.Singhgovernmentasthe"quotapolitics,"probablyfortworeasons.Fromapragmaticpointofview,V.P.Singhwasmoreeagertocatertotheneedsofthelowercastesthantothoseofthemiddlepeasants.ThelatterconstituencywasalreadywonoverbyAjitSinghandDeviLal.V.P.Singhwasmore interested inbroadeninghisbaseamong theOBCs.Fromamoreideologicalpointofview,likemostoftheoldsocialistleaders,V.P.Singhbelieved less ineconomicandfinancialsupport than inthereformofthe power structurewithin society, forwhich affirmative action appeared to bethemostrelevantmethod.The1989NationalFrontelectionmanifestounderlinedthat"Implementationofreservationpolicywillbemadeeffectiveingovernment,public and private sector industrial undertakings, banking institutions, etc., byresorting to special recruitment drives so as to fulfill their quotas within theshortest possible time" (National Front Manifesto 1989, 26) and that "TherecommendationsoftheMandalCommissionwillbeimplementedexpeditiously"(27).Whilethegovernmentdidnotdaretoextendthereservationsystemtotheprivatesector,itdidimplementtheMandalreportrecommendations.

V. P. Singh announced this decision in a one-and-a-half page suo motostatement in bothHouses of Parliament on7August 1990.He justified it in hisIndependenceDayAddresson15Augustbytheneedtogive"asharetothepoorinrunningtheGovernment"(Mohanetal.1997,360):

Webelievethatnosectioncanbeupliftedmerelybymoney.Theycandeveloponlyiftheyhaveashareinpowerandwearepreparedtoprovidethisshare.Inthisyearofjustice, inmemoryofDr.BhimraoAmbedkar theGovernmenthas recently takenadecisiontogivereservationtothebackwardclassesinthejobsinGovernmentandpublicsector.Itisbeingdebatedastohowmanypersonswouldgetbenefitoutofit.Inasense, taking intoaccountthepopulationofthiscountry, theGovernment jobsaccountforonlyonepercent[ofthetotal]andoutofthisonepercentifonefourthisgiven to anyone, it cannot be a course for his economic betterment though itmayhavesomeeffect.Butouroutlookisclear.Bureaucracyisanimportantorganofthepower structure. It has a decisive role in decision-making. We want to give aneffectiveshareinthepowerstructureandrunningofthecountrytothedepressed,downtroddenandbackwardpeople.

(361)

Asitwasformostsocialistsbeforehim,thecastesystemwasalsoatargetforV. P. Singh, and he analyzed the caste system based on power relations. Thisapproach could not please the proponents of kisan politics. Devi Lal had beenappointedbyV.P.SinghaschairmanofacommitteefortheimplementationoftheMandalreportrecommendations,but,accordingtothePrimeMinister,he"didnottake much interest" (cited in Mustafa 1995, 171). He had strong reservationsconcerning the report because the Jats had not been included among the OBCs(interview with Ajay Singh, Jat minister in V. P. Singh's cabinet, New Delhi, 28October 1997). Devi Lal tried to have the Jat's inclusion accepted by thegovernment, but in vain.6 Finally, V. P. Singh decided to ask Minister of SocialWelfareRamVilasPaswan,aDalitleader,todothejob.



ThePrimeMinisterannouncedtheimplementationoftheMandalCommissionreport recommendations only a few days after Devi Lal resigned from hisgovernment. Though there were other issues also leading to the rupture, theviews and interests of V. P. Singh and Devi Lal could not coincide. Indeed, thesocial potential of V. P. Singh's reformswas perceived as posing a threat to Jatinterestsinsofarasitcouldpromotetheassertivenessoftenantsandagriculturallaborersfromthelowercastes.

DeviLal'sresignationsignaledthebreakdownofCharanSingh'scoalition.Forpartisansof"quotapolitics,"suchabreakdownwasforthebetterbecausekisanpolitics, in their view, merely served the economic interest of the peasant-proprietors and maintained the social status quo in the countryside. The oldsocialist and Ambedkarite approach based on an anti-caste discourse andaffirmativeactionwasconsideredmorepromising.

CastePolarizationaroundMandal

The main achievement of V. P. Singh was to make a broad range of castes

coalesceundertheOBClabel.Infact,hemadeitarelevantcategoryforthelowercastes,asperthequotasrecommendedbytheMandalCommissionreport.Manyof those who were earlier known as "Shudras" internalized this administrativedefinitionoftheir identity intheearly1990s.TheOBCcategoryalsocrystallizedforawhilebecause theuppercastesmilitantly resistedsuchreservations in theadministration. The cleavage between upper castes and lower castes wassuddenlyreinforcedbyacollective,openhostilityonthepartoftheformerandbytheunleashingofviolence.

Soon after V. P. Singh announced the implementation of the MandalCommissionreportrecommendations,upper-castestudentsformedorganizationssuch as the Arakshan Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti and the Mandal Ayog VirodhiSangharshSamitiinUttarPradesh.Studentswhowerefromtheuppercastesbutfrom the lowermiddle class protested against a new quota thatwould deprivethem of some posts in the administration. They wanted to "abolish allreservationsincludingreservationsfortheScheduledCastes"(Hasan1998,155),a demand that brought the Dalit and OBC leaders closer. At the same time, thestudents"fearedthattheirhopesofgovernmentpatronagewouldbethwartedbyacoalitionoflower-castes"(155),whichtheywerelargelyshapingthemselvesbyprovoking a new cleavage between forward castes (including Jats) 7 and lowercastes.

Immediately, leaders from the Janata Dal organized a counter mobilization.SharadYadav,oneoftheMinistersofV.P.Singh,launchedthemovementinDelhi."Wewill,"hesaid,"showthemwithin15dayshowmanypeoplearebehindusifthey don't come back to their sense. . . " (cited in The Hindustan Times, 3September1990).V.P.SinghwenttoPatnaforananti-upper-casterally.Thus,theearly 1990s were marked by an exacerbation of the cleavage between uppercastesandlowercastes,anatmospherewhichexplainsatthattimetheemotionalvalueoftheOBCasasocialcategory.

Theirnewunityhelped theOBC toorganize themselvesasan interestgroupoutside the vertical, clientelistic Congress-like patterns. The aimwas to benefitfromitsmainasset,itsmassivenumbers(52percentoftheIndianpopulation),atthetimeofelections.Indeed,theshareoftheOBCMPsincreasedintheHindibeltbecause lower-caste people becamemore aware of their common interests anddecided no longer to vote for upper-caste candidates. In South andWest Indiasuchasilentrevolutionhadalreadystartedbeforeindependenceandborefruitssoonafter.

6InterviewwithP.S.Krishnan,NewDelhi,4April1998.P.S.KrishnanwasSecretarytothe Ministry of Social Welfare who prepared the implementation of the Mandal reportrecommendationsforR.V.Paswan.

7 The Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) was explicitly against caste-based quotas andfavored,liketheBJP,aneconomiccriterionforjobreservations.



By contrast, in the states of the Hindi belt-Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, MadhyaPradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, and Chandigarh-politicswasstillalmostmonopolizedbytheuppercastesuntilthe1980s,assuggestedbythecastebackgroundof theMPsreturned to theLokSabha (the lowerhouseofParliament).

AsTable1shows,theshareofintermediate-casteandOBCMPsreallystartedto increase in1977, thanksto the JanataParty'svictory,whentheproportionoftheupper-casteMPsfellbelow50percentforthefirsttime.Butthedeclineoftheuppercastesbenefitedmoretheupperlayerofthepeasantry,especiallytheJats,andthereturnoftheCongressPartyinthe1980sbroughtbackalargenumberofupper-casteMPs,especiallyin1984.ThepercentageofOBCMPsincreasedagainaftertheCongresslostpowerin1989,doublingfrom11.1percentin1984to20.9percentin1989,whentheshareofupper-casteMPsfellbelow40percentforthefirsttime,largelybecausetheJanataDal,thewinneroftheninthgeneralelections,had given tickets to a considerable number of OBC candidates. Interestinglyenough,theproportionoftheOBCMPscontinuedtogrowin1991,inspiteoftheCongressparty'scomebackin1996,whentheBJPbecamethelargestpartyintheLok Sabha and in 1998when the coalition it was leadingwas able to form thegovernment.Thisevolutionwascontinuouslypursuedattheexpenseoftheuppercastes.Mostpoliticalparties,itwouldappear,hadstartedgivingalargernumberofticketstoOBCcandidates.

However,theriseoftheOBCshasbeenratheruneveninthestatesoftheHindibelt. In Rajasthan the share of OBCs among theMPs has remained stable at 12percentbetween1984and1998,whereasoverthesameperiodithas increasedfrom11 percent to 20.8 percent in Uttar Pradesh and from7.5 percent to 20.5percentinMadhyaPradesh.InBihar,theshareofOBCMPsrosefrom17percentto43percentbetween1984and1996.ThefiguresconcerningtheVidhanSabhasconfirmthesetrends.InUttarPradesh,theshareofupper-casteMLAsdecreasedfrom58percentin1962to37.7percentin1996,whereastheproportionofOBCsgrewfrom9percentto30percentin1993-beforedecliningto24percentin1996due to the BJP's success (Jaffrelot and Zerinini-Brotel 1999, 80). In MadhyaPradesh,theshareofupper-casteMLAsdecreasedfrom52percentin1957to33percentin1998,whiletheproportionofOBCsrosefrom7to21percent(ibid.).InBihar, the share of the upper castes in the state assembly decreased from 42percent in 1967 to 33 percent in 1990, while that of the OBCs rose from 26percentto35percentinthesameperiod.8

The OBCs' rise to power, in conjunction with the increasing electoralparticipationof the lowercastes,hasbeencalleda"seconddemocraticupsurge"by Yogendra Yadav, who further considers that "The expression 'OBC' has ...traveled a long way from a rather careless bureaucratic nomenclature in thedocumentof theConstitution to a vibrant and subjectively experiencedpoliticalcommunity" (Yadav1996, 96, 102).While the "Mandalisation"of Indianpoliticshas certainly contributed to the democratization of a traditionally conservativedemocracy, the capacity of OBCs to sustain the kind of unity that is needed informinga"politicalcommunity"isverydoubtful.

AretheOBCsaCommunity?

In 1996, one member of the Uttar Pradesh Backward Classes Commission

observed that "Political change is now leading to social change. TheOBCwhichwasaconstitutionalcategoryhasnowbecomeasocialcategory"(citedinHasan1998, 164). This comment, which reflects a widely held view, is questionable.While lower-caste solidarity increased during the Mandal affair, when castepolarizationwasatanextreme,suchsolidarityhasbeendecliningsincethemid-1990s.

8IammostgratefultoAnandKumar(CSSS/JNU)forprovidingmewiththesedata.



GrassrootMobilizationorYadavManipulation?TheriseoftheOBCsisfirstofalltheriseoftheYadavsandtheKurmis,astheir

shareamongtheMPstestifies.Together,theyrepresentabout15percentofNorthIndianMPs in the1990s, asmuch as theBrahminor theRajputMPs. Certainly,table 1 shows almost graphically that, while the Yadavs and Kurmis alone hadrepresentatives in theLokSabhauntil the1970s,newcastes joined thepoliticalarenainthe1980s(Lodhis,Koeris,Gujars,Malis)and1990s(suchastheJaiswals,the Telis, and the Kacchis - I have classified the latter two castes among the'others'inTable1).However,theshareoftheYadavsandtheKurmishasgrowntoo, somuch so that each one of these castes represents about one-third of theOBCMPsofNorthIndiasince1989.

EventhoughtheKurmisorganizedthemselvesasearlyastheYadavsthroughcasteassociations,9theYadavshavebeenattheforefrontoftheOBCmobilizationsincetheverybeginning.TheleaderoftheAll-IndiaBackwardCasteFederationinthe 1960s and 1970s, Brahm Prakash Chaudhury, was a Yadav. B. P. MandalhimselfwasaYadav,andYadavleadershaveconsistentlypaidgreaterinteresttohis report. After the Janata Dal took over in 1989, they mobilized in favor ofimplementing the Mandal Commission Report. Sharad Yadav, the Minister forTextile and Food Processing in V. P. Singh's government, was among the mostvocal. After the anti- Mandal agitation started, he was at the forefront of thecounter-mobilizationinDelhiandelsewhereinthecountry,untilhelaunchedhisMandalRathYatrainlate1992andearly1993inreactiontotheSupremeCourt'sdecision regarding theexclusionof the "creamy layer"ofOBCs from thequotas.TheCourtusedthisexpressiontodesignatetheeliteamongtheOBCswhodidnotneedanyhelpfromtheStateand,therefore,shouldnotbeentitledtoanyquotas.TheJanataDal,withLalooPrasadYadavasPresidentandSharadYadavasleaderof the legislativegroup in theLokSabha, then lobbied forexcluding thewell-offpeasantsfromthe"creamylayer."TheywereobviouslydefendingtheinterestsoftheircastesincemanyYadavshadbecomerelativelyrich.Eventually,thepressureexerted by the Yadavs-and other OBC leaders-proved to be effective, and the"creamy layer" was defined in a rather loose way. It comprises only the OBCapplicants from establishment families, or those whose fathers owned landbeyond85percentoftheacreagepermittedbyceilinglaws.

When the 27 percent reservationwas eventually implemented at the Centerafter the Supreme Court decision of November 1992, the upper castes did notresist it anymore. They resigned themselves to the rule of numbers.Moreover,theliberalizationoftheeconomyalsobegantomakecareersintheprivatesector,towhich affirmative action laws did not apply,more attractive. Simultaneously,havingwonthebattleoverquotas,thelowercastesdidnotfeelanacuteneedforsolidarity any more. The very notion of the OBCs started to lose its edge. Thegeneral OBC category was, in fact, often used by a Yadav elite to promote itsinterests. Such an elite manipulation was not uncommon in the past since thekisan identity promoted by Charan Singhwas also perceived bymany Jats as ameans tomobilize a large social base and Lohia had deplored it already in the1960s: "Ever and even again, the revolt of the down-graded castes has beenmisused to up-grade one or another caste . . . " (Lohia 1979, 90). Lohia hadalreadyseentheYadavsasthemainprotagonistsforsuchastrategy(103).

9OntheKurmisearlyentryintothepublicsphere,seeVerma1979andontheYadavs,

Rao1987.



YadavPoliticsinBiharandUttarPradesh

ThewayYadav leadersused the JanataDal reservationpolicy forpromoting

their caste interests is evident from the strategies ofMulayamSinghYadav andLaloo Prasad Yadav after they became Chief Ministers, in November 1989 andMarch1990, respectively, ofUttarPradeshandBihar.M. S.Yadav lostpower in1991butgovernedthestateagainbetween1993and1995.L.P.Yadavwonboththe 1990 and the1995 state elections, and is still at the helm throughhiswife,RabriDevi,whotookoverfromhimin1997,whenhewasindictedforcorruptionintheinfamous"fodderscam”.

Even before V. P. Singh's reservation policywas announced,Mulayam SinghYadav, the new Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, had promulgated an ordinanceprovidingtheOBCswithaquotaof15percentinthestateadministration(Hasan,149). Though he came from the Lok Dal, Charan Singh's party, Mulayam SinghYadav decided "to place a far greater emphasis on the collective identity of thebackwardclassesthantheLokDalhadeverdone"(Duncan1997,262).ThatwaswellintunewithwhatLohiahadtaughthiminhisearlycareer.Infact,YadavwasinitiatedintopoliticsbyLohiawhenthelattercametohisvillagefora"j'attodo"(breakcaste)meeting(LalandNair1998,32).HethentookpartinthecanalrateagitationlaunchedbyLohiain1954.

TheSamajwadiParty(SocialistParty)-whichMulayamSinghYadavfoundedafter severing his links with the Janata Dal in 1990 - contested the 1993 stateelectioninassociationwiththeBahujanSamajParty(BSP),aDalit-ledparty,andhighlighted the cleavage between the upper castes and the lower castes. Itselection manifesto promised a quota of 27 percent for the OBCs in the stateadministration,and it implementedthequotaonceYadavbecameChiefMinisterfor the second time through the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation forScheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act of 1994.This new measure, while it was under discussion, was strongly resented inUttarakhandwhere theOBCs represent only 2 percent of thepopulation. Yadavseverelyrepressedthisprotestmovement.Hisgovernmentatthatpointhadonlythree"representatives"oftheuppercastesbutasmanyastwentymembersoftheOBCs and Dalits (and two Muslims) (Duncan 1997). Upper-caste bureaucratswere transferred to nonessential posts. The number of Additional DistrictMagistratesfromtheuppercastesdecreasedfromforty-three(outofsixty-three)toonlythirteeninonlysixmonths.TheChiefSecretary,aBrahmin,wasreplacedby a Kayasth. These decisions, which were publicized on purpose, were partlymadeunder the pressure of theBSP. But they accordedwellwithM. S. Yadav'sstrategy.Table2.Distribution,accordingtoCaste,ofDMsandDDCsinBiharin1995 DistrictMagistrates DeputyDivisionalCommissionersOBCs 26 30Minorities 4 4ForwardCastes 20 16Total 50 50Source:IndiaToday,28February,1995,100-7.

A similar scenario unfolded in Bihar. Already during the 1990 electioncampaign, the JD assured voters that itwas the only party prepared to reserveposts for theOBCs in the State administration and at the Center. Once voted topower, it increasedthequotafortheOBCsupto27percent. InAugust1993thePatnaUniversityandtheBiharUniversityAmendmentBillwaspassed,accordingto which 50 percent of the seats would be reserved for the OBCs in theuniversities'senateandsyndicate(Chaudhary1999,193). In1993,amemberofthe Indian Administration Service (IAS) from the Scheduled Castes replaced aBrahminasChiefSecretaryandanOBCtookoverthechargeasDirectorGeneralof Police from another Brahmin. A large number of OBC bureaucrats weretransferred from the sidelines to the main department, and the number of theDistrictMagistrate(DM)andDeputyDivisionalCommissioners(DDC)positions-



two strategic positions - belonging to the OBCs increased. The number of OBCDMsandDDCsexceededthosefromtheupper-castes(seetable2).

In 1993 the Bihar Vidhan Sabha passed the Panchayati Raj Bill according towhich"thePanchayatswithmajorityofthepeoplebelongingtobackwardclasseswill be reserved for them only and in these Panchayats upper-castes will bedebarred from even contesting elections" (Chaudhary 1999, 226). This bill wasunanimouslypassedbybothhousesofthestatelegislature.

The Yadavs benefited more than any other lower-caste groups from thepoliciesfollowedinUttarPradeshandBihar,thetwostatesinwhichtheyformthelargestcomponentof theOBCswithrespectively8.7and11percentof thestatepopulation (according to the 1931 census). InBihar, the largest caste (after theChamars)theyhadone-fifthoftheMLAsin1990andmorethanone-fourthoftheMPs in1996. InUttarPradesh,where they formthe third largestcasteafter theBrahminsand theChamarswith8.7percentof thepopulation (according to the1931 census), they representedmore than one-fourth of theMLAs in 1993 (asmuch as the Rajputs and more than the Brahmins). 10 The governments ofMulayam Singh Yadav and Laloo Prasad Yadav weremore andmore identifiedwith theYadavs, somuchso that itbecameobvious that thenotionof theOBCshadbeenusedbythiscastetoitsownadvantagerightfromthebeginning.

Of course, the Yadavs were likely to be among the first beneficiaries of thequotasbecause they aremorenumerous and relativelymore educated than theotherOBCs.ButtheywerealsofavoredbythegovernmentsofMulayamSinghandLaloo Prasad Yadav. In Uttar Pradesh, out of 900 teachers appointed by M. S.Yadav's secondgovernment,720wereYadavs. In thepolice forces, outof3,151newly selected candidates, 1,223were Yadavs (Indian Today, 15October 1999,37).SuchapolicyalienatedtheBSP,theSP'sally,butalsotheKurmis,thesecondlargestOBC caste of the state,whichwaswell represented in theBSP. Sone LalPatel, the Secretary General of the party, who presided over the Uttar Pradeshbranch of the All-India Kurmi Mahasabha, organized a Kurmi Rajnitik ChetnaMahaRally inLucknowtoprotestagainst theYadavisationof theStateoneyearafter the formation of Mulayam Singh Yadav's government (India Today, 15December1994).

TheSPdoeshaveKurmileaders,butithasnotbeenabletoprojectitselfasapartyrepresentingthesecondlargestOBCcasteofUttarPradesh.In1993,morethan one-third of its MLAs were Yadavs (as against 8 percent Kurmis) and in1996,almostone-fourth(asagainst lessthan3percentKurmis)wereYadavs(J.Zerinini-Brotel database). In 1996, a preassembly election opinion poll by theCentrefortheStudyofDevelopingSocietiesshowedtheextenttowhichtheOBCswere politically divided in Uttar Pradesh. While 75 percent of the YadavsremainedstronglybehindtheSP,theLodhissupportedtheBJPofKalyanSingh,aLodhi himself, and the Kurmis divided their votes chiefly between the BJP (37percent) and the BSP (27 percent). 11 A summa divisio took shape within theOBCs, with the Lower OBCs (or Most Backward Castes) expressing a strongpreference for the BJP and a more limited inclination in favor of the SP (25percent)andtheBSP(19percent).

101ammostgratefultoJasmineZerinini-Brotelforthesefigures.11 India Today, 31 August 1996, 53; A. Mishra, "Uttar Pradesh-Politics in flux," Economic and

PoliticalWeekly,1June1996,1300,and"UttarPradesh-KurmisandKoeris:Emerging'Third'Factor,"op.cit.,4January1997,22-23.



The BSP has thus become a strong contender for the vote of a substantialsection of the OBC. In contrast with its Dalit image, in Uttar Pradesh and inMadhya Pradesh the party has gained some following among the OBCs, andespecially theMostBackwardCastes (MBCs) (Jaffrelot 1998a). Thepoll showedthat,while only 4 percent of the Yadavswere prepared to vote for the BSP, 27percent of the Kurmis and 19 percent of the "lower backward" supported thisparty inUttarPradesh. Indeed,BSP's leader,KanshiRam, regarded theMBCsashismaintargetin1996:"Thereare78MostBackwardCastesinUttarPradesh.26percentoftheUPpopulationarefromtheMBCsandthemaximumticketsIhavegiventotheMBCs"(interviewwithKanshiRam,NewDelhi,12November1996).Thisstrategy iswell illustratedbythesocialprofileof theBSPcandidates in the1996Assemblyelections:30percentofthecandidateswereOBCs(morethanhalfofthemMBCs),whereas29percentwereScheduledCastes,16percentfromtheuppercastes,and16percentMuslims.12

Thepoliticaldivisionof theOBCs isalsomostobvious inBiharwhere,again,themain cleavage is betweenKurmis and Yadavs. In this state, too, theKurmisresentedthebiasofLalooPrasadYadavinfavorofhiscastefellows.Forinstance,Yadavs were appointed as heads of important boards such as the Bihar PublicService Commission, the Bihar Secondary Education Service Commission, theBiharStateElectricityBoard,andtheBiharIndustrialDevelopmentCorporation.Kurmi leaders felt sidelined, and one of the most prominent of them, NitishKumar, lefttheJanataDal in1994andsponsoredthecreationoftheSamataDalalongwithGeorgeFernandes.ThispartymadeanalliancewiththeBJPinthemid-1990sandcashedinontheKurmivoteinallsubsequentelections.

Obviously, theverynotionof theOBCsas 'apoliticalcommunity'needstobequalified because of the rivalry between major castes such as the Yadavs, theKurmis, and the Lodhis. Castes classified as OBCs might have coalesced in theearly 1990s because of the Mandal affair, but this cementing force declinedsubsequently. The internal divisions, however, do notmean that the rise of thelowercastescanbetakenlightly.Theymaynotformasocial-orevenapolitical-category, and the jatis classified as OBCs may be divided themselves in theirpolitical choices, but themembers of these castes have acquired a newpoliticalconsciousnessthatleadsthemtovotemorethanbeforeforcandidatesfromtheirownmilieu.ThishasforcedpoliticalpartiestopaymoreattentiontotheOBCsinselecting their candidates, instead of relying on rather old clientelistic andpaternalist vertical linkages. The growing importance of the lower castes in thepublic sphere shows that they have gained a new influence. Even though heregretted the 'casteist' attitudeofB.P.Mandal in1967-68,MadhuLimayedrewsimilarconclusionsfromthisepisode:

Ifthe[socialist)castepolicyhadnotbeenthere,thefactionalabusewouldhavetakensome other form. But this does not prove that the general policy was wrong.Throughout the zig zag and tortuous course of this policy, the rising consciousnessamongtheScheduledCastes,ScheduledTribesandOBCshadbeenafactoflife.ItwasstillnotwhatLohiacalleda'resurrectionofIndia-thedestructionofcaste'.Stillitwasastepforwardofsortstowardsequality.

(Limaye1998,163-64)

TheBJP'sReluctantMandalization

WhileLimaye'scommentabovemaysoundrelevantevenfortoday,onemustfinallyconsidertheimplicationsoftheriseofHindunationalismforOBCpolitics.There is a kindof dialectic betweenbothphenomena.Manyupper-caste peopleandnon-OBCShudras,liketheJats,becamesupportersoftheBJPandtookpartinthe Ayodhya movement because that was the only party that initially showedsome reluctance towards caste-based reservations,while trying to subsume thelower castes versus upper castes cleavage by resorting to ethnoreligiouspropaganda.

12 These data have been compiled on the basis of lists published in Bahujan Sangathak, 11November1996.



TheHindunationalistmovementhasalwaysbeenknown for itsupper-caste,evenbrahminical character. TheHindutva ideology relies on an organic viewofsocietywherecastesareseenastheharmoniouslimbsofthesamebody(Jaffrelot1996,ch.1).Since itscreation in1925, theRashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh(RSS)has concentrated on attracting to its local branches (the shakhas) Hindus whovaluedthisethos,eitherbecausetheybelongtotheuppercastesorbecausetheywant to emulate them. The technique of "conversion" of lower-caste people toHindutva relieson the same logicaswhatM.N. Srinivas called "sanskritisation"(Srinivas1995,7).

However, the upper-caste character of Hindu nationalism has graduallybecomealiabilityfortheBJPbecauseofthegrowingpoliticalconsciousnessofthelowercastes.The1993electionresults,whentheBJPlostbothUttarPradeshandMadhyaPradeshpartlybecauseoftheOBCandDalitvoters,ledthepartyleadersto promote a larger number of lower-caste people in the party apparatus. K.N.Govindacharya,oneoftheBJPGeneralSecretaries,wasthemainadvocateofthispolicy, which he called "social engineering." Murli Manohar Joshi, a formerpresidentoftheBJP,opposedthismoveandevenimplicitlyquestionedthenotionof"socialengineering"ingeneralbyasking"whatsocialjusticehasbeenbroughtin thenameof social engineering?Rural poverty has increased andmost of theruralpoorcontinuetobeDalits"(interviewinSunday,26January1997,13).

As the 1996 election approached, the party evolved a compromise betweenthese conflicting views. Theparty'smanifestoput a stress on social harmony 13butalsoadmittedthattheexistingquotasinfavoroftheScheduledCastesandtheOBCs could not be questioned "till they are socially and educational [sic]integratedwiththerestofsociety."ThiscompromisereflectedthedebatewithintheBJPbetween theadvocatesof "socialengineering"and thosewhowanted toabstainfromacknowledgingcasteconflicts.

Up to the late 1990s, the BJP opted for what I have called "indirectmandalisation" (Jaffrelot 1998b), that is, the making of alliances with partiesrepresenting lowercastes(suchastheSamataParty inBiharoreventheBSPinUttarPradesh).However,itsleadersseemnowpreparedtoresignthemselvestoamoredirectbrandofmandalization, inductingagrowingnumberof lower-castecadres in the party executive committees and the nomination of more OBCcandidatesat the timeofelections.While theshareofOBCsamong theBJPMPsreturned in the Hindi belt - the party's stronghold - is lower than among theCongressandJanataDal'sMPs,itincreasedfrom16percentin1989to20percentin1998,whiletheproportionofitsupper-casteMPsdroppedfrom52.3percentin1991to43.4percentin1998(Jaffrelot2000).ThestateunitsoftheBJPshowtheway. InUttar Pradesh, even though the share of theOBCs among theBJPMLAsmarginallyincreasedfrom18percentto22percentfrom1991to1996,theshareoftheOBCsinthegovernmentsofKalyanSingh-himselfaLodhi- jumpedfrom22 percent in 1991 to almost 32 percent in 1999 (Jaffrelot, Zerinini, andChaturvediforthcoming).

True, OBC candidates from the BJP are not projected as Backward Casteleaders, which is largely due to the Hindu nationalist ideology: the RSS and itsoffshootsinsistontheneedtoputtheemphasisontheHindusenseofbelongingto an organic community, the "Hindu nation," rather than to particular castes.According toUmaBharti, a prominentOBC leader of the BJP, the acceptance ofsuchanoutlookhasgivenlower-casteleadersoftheBJPa"Brahmin'smentality."Sheevencomplainsthatthe"BJPOBCcandidateshaveanupper-castementality.They do not show their caste" (interview with Uma Bharti, New Delhi, 12February1994).

13Themanifestosaid:"Thetaskisnothingshortofrekindlingthelampofoureternal'Dharma,' thatSanatan thoughtwhichoursagesbequeathedtomankind-asocialsystembased on compassion, cooperation, justice, freedom, equality and tolerance" (BharatiyaJanataParty,ForastrongandprosperousIndia-Electionmanifesto1996,NewDelhi,1996,p.5).



However,theBJPhasbeenledtoco-optanever-increasingnumberofOBCandScheduledCastes leaders fromotherparties, including theSamajwadiPartyandtheBSP,inordertocopewiththeneedfor"mandalising"itselfandinviewoftheriseoflower-casteparties.ManyofitscadresandelectioncandidatesdonothaveanyRSSbackgroundtoday.Onthecontrary,theyimport"subversive"references:forexample,aBJPScheduledCasteMLAfromAgraWestoriginallyfromtheBSPadoptsAmbedkar'sdiscourse(interviewwithRamBabuHarit,Agra,3November1998), and an OBCMLA from Bhopal, even though trained in the RSS shakhas,displaysthephotographofLohiainhisofficeandforcefullyarticulatesegalitarianarguments(interviewwithBabulalGaur,Bhopal,23October1998).Thisdilutionofthesanskritisationethosmaywellaccentuatethe"mandalisation"oftheBJPinthenearfuture.

Conclusion

Traditionally, political mobilization against the urban, upper-casteestablishment has followed two routes in North India. One route-that of quotapolitics-came from Lohia, who attributedmost of social inequality to caste andfavoredaffirmativeactionprograms.Theotherroute-thatofkisanpolitics-camefromCharan Singh,whopromotedpeasants' solidarity against urban India. Theformerstrategyeventuallyprevailedoverthelatterinthepoliticalarenawhenitwas adopted by the Janata Dal. It proved to be doubly effective since, first, itemancipated the OBCs from the hegemonic strategy of the proponents of kisanpolitics -mainly the Jatswhose interests did not fully coincidewith that of theOBCsand,secondly, itcontributedtogettinganOBCvotebankcrystallizedafterthe implementation of the recommendations of theMandal Commission report,themost importantdecisionevermadeintheframeworkofthe"quotapolitics."For the first time, lower-caste people have started to vote enmasse for leadersbelongingtotheirownmilieu.Itmeansthatthepoliticalclassischangingwiththereplacementofanupper-casteoligarchybyratherplebiannewcomers.ThissilentrevolutionhasprobablyopenedthesecondageofIndiandemocracyasYogendraYadavconvincinglyargued.

But the OBC phenomenon is also something of a myth because the OtherBackward Classes do not represent a cohesive social category. Therewas unitywhen the battle lines were drawn over the Mandal Commission'srecommendations, when the castes classified as OBCs had to mobilize toovercometheresistancefromtheuppercastes.Butthissolidaritydeclinedwhenthebattlewaswon-partlybecausetheuppercastesgaveup,allthemoreeasilyasthe1991 liberal turnopened for thembetteropportunities in theprivatesectorthan in thebureaucracy-and it soonappeared that theOBCswere stratified, thelessbackwardofthesecastegroups,theYadavsespecially,instrumentalizingthiscategorytopromotetheirowninterests.ThepoliciesofMulayamSinghYadavandLalooPrasadYadav,aswellasthefragmentationof theso-calledOBCvote,beartestimonyofthecleavagesbetweenthecastesclassifiedasOBCs.

Theriseof theOBCshasmetanotheradversary inHindunationalism,whichremains upper-caste dominated and whose OBC politicians have little affinitieswith the value system of lower-caste movements. The Hindu nationalistmovement,however,isexperiencingatensionbetweensanskritisationand"socialengineering,"astrategywhichisleadingtheBJPtoco-optalargernumberofOBCleaderswithoutanyRSSbackgroundamong its election candidates; at the sametime, those who have one, like Kalyan Singh or Babulal Gaur, are assertingthemselvesandtendtoprojectthemselvesaslower-casteleaders.

Obviously, the rise of the lower castes in North Indian politics, thoughsubstantial, will have a more transformative effect if two conditions can befulfilledinthefuture:(1)ifOBCleadersoftheBJPtakeoverthepartyapparatusonbehalfofmoreegalitarianvalues,and(2)iftheMostBackwardCastes(MBCs)uniteandgaintheirshareofpoweragainstthedominantOBCs.Theformermoveis very likely to be resisted by the RSS and, were it to happen, likely also tounderminetheideologicalcohesionoftheSanghparivar.Thelatterpossibilityisoneofthechallengesbeforethelower-casteparties.



They will have to overcome many more difficulties than their southerncounterpartswhichhavebeenpursuingthisstrategyfordecades.InTamilNadu,for instance, the Dravida Kazhagam and its successors, the DMK and then theAIADMK, could rely on the Dravidian identity as a cementing force, since theBrahmins,whoweresmaller innumberthan intheNorthanyway,wereseenastheAryaninvaders.Byfightingthem,thelowercasteswerepromotingaregionalidentity transcendingcastecleavages.Suchan ideologicalbasis ismissing in theNorth, where the notion that the lower castes are descendants of the originalinhabitantsof Indiacanneverprevail in thesameway. In theHindibelt, lower-caste discourse has always been influenced by the categories of sanskritisation.Forinstance,theAhirs(whocallthemselves"Yadavs")andtheKachhis(whohaveadopted thenameof anotherRajputdynasty, theKushwahas) claimaKshatriyaancestry. Instead of developing horizontal solidarities, they are engaged incompetitionbasedonthecriterionofstatus.Deprivedofacommonidentity, theOBCsmay join hands because of their growing awareness of common interestsregardingthereservationpolicy,butthisrouteisboundtobelongerthantheoneusedbytheDravidianparties.

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