20 years after the fall - the us and russia in the post-soviet world

8/3/2019 20 Years After the Fall - The US and Russia in the Post-Soviet World

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p a m p h l e t

www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC

20 Yars Afr h Fall:T U.S. ad Russia i h Ps-Svi WrldT Aria Suriy Pr

in Conjunction with T Alai

Dbr 2011

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Tis pamphlet is a collection o essays rom our ellows, board members, and adjunct ellows analyzing the evolution o U.S. oreign policy in the 20 years ater the collapse o theUSSR. Published in partnership with Te Atlantic Monthly, these essays examine the last

two decades o change in nuclear security, energy policy, the deense industry, regional andbilateral politics, and U.S. posture and geostrategy.

Contents

Gary Hart: Russia and the United States in the 21st Century

Andrew Holland: Te Race Around the World - the 20 year Contest or Oil

August Cole: Te Uncertain Future o the Mil it ray Industrial Complex

Michael Cohen: Peace in the Post-Cold War World

Joshua Foust: No Great Game - Te Story o Post-Cold War Powers in Central Asia

Carolyn Deady: How the Fall o the Soviet Union Changed the News Media

Eric Auner: Te Cold War Is Long Gone, but the Nuclear Treat Is Still Here

John Adams: A Changing NAO or a Changing World

Randall Law: Soviet Nationalism Is Still Driving Russian Politics

Nick Lockwood: How the Soviet Union ransormed errorism

Peter Charles Choharis: Te Cold War and How We Tink About Private Property

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AmeRIcAn SecURItY PRoject

or American and Western products and services, an opportunity more appreciated by European enterprisesthan American ones. Further, Russia can be o considerable help to us and our allies in venues as disparate asIran, North Korea, and the Middle East. In each o these cases, they stand to lose at least as much as we do, i not more, rom war in these regions. We should treat the Russians as partners, not subordinates, and appealto these and other common interests.

Te American Security Project oers a series o essays concerning the U.S.-Russian relationship post-Cold War and post-Soviet empire. It is timed to coincide with the 20th anniversary o the all o the Soviet Union, which ormally dissolved on December 25, 1991. We consider here Russia’s energy picture, our mutual armscontrol eorts, our role in NAO and NAO’s relationship to Russia, and a number o other topics ad-dressed by qualied experts some o whom have studied these issues or years. Eorts such as this very muchcharacterize the charter and purpose o the American Security Project -- to explore new and productive wayso pursuing American interests, especially those that increasingly coincide with old and new allies, that willenhance the security o Americans and others.

For mysel, it is sucient to prophesy, even with little tangible evidence, that sometime in this century, soonerrather than later, the United States and Russia will identiy a common destiny that requires a degree o mutual

understanding and cooperation seen only by de oqueville almost two centuries ago. We spent a hal-century army-to-army and missile-to-missile. Te time will come, and none too soon, when it will be benecial toboth o us to stand shoulder to shoulder.

Gary Hart, Chairman o the American Security Project, represented Colorado in the U.S. Senate rom 1975 to1987. He is a proessor at the University o Colorado at Denver and was co-chairman o the U.S. Commission on

National Security or the 21st Century.



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Race Around the World: Te 20-Year Contest for

OilBy Andrew Holland

Te global oil market opened up, ending an 80-year period when the biggest concern was diversity o sources. Now,we ace a new challenge: cost.

wo events made 1991 an unusually important year or global oil production and energy security. TePersian Gul War, started when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait in August, 1990, ended onFebruary 28, 1991. In late December, the Soviet Union, whose territory held the largest proven oil

reserves outside o the Middle East, collapsed.

U.S. dependence on imported oil had been growing or 30 years when the Soviet Union ell. Te U.S. im-ported 40% o its oil in 1991; 54% o oil imports came rom OPEC members and 24% rom the PersianGul. Te oil crises o 1973 and 1979, and the hardship they

caused in the U.S., were still in American memories.. Energy dependence was viewed, much like today, as a vulnerability.

Since then, American energy security policy has ocused oneorts to extricate U.S. energy dependence rom the politicalvolatility o the Middle East. As Winston Churchill had saidin 1913, “Saety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.” In practice, this has meant importing rom riendly nations, increasing global supplies, and integrating oil into asingle global market.

In the two decades since the all o the Soviet Union, globaloil production has increased rom 66 million barrels per day to almost 87 million; much o that increase romRussia and the ormer Soviet Republics. Tis almost certainly wouldn’t have happened without the all o theSoviet Union. For example, enormous new oil elds o Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were only developed onceoreign investors and technology were allowed in to make it happen.

Political and economic changes also brought new oil to market. Te Baku-blisi-Ceyhan (BC) pipelinebrings crude oil drilled in the Caspian Sea to market through Azerbaijan, Georgia -- two ormer Soviet Re-publics -- and urkey. Te BC pipeline, which opened in 2006, would have been impossible 20 years beore.

Te expansion o global oil production has been accompanied by oil market consolidation. Mergers o oilcompanies like Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-exaco, BP-Amoco, along with signicant inrastructure investmentscreated the rst truly global oil market. Oil contracts are traded in liquid commodity markets that create uni-orm oil prices around the world. Due to these changes, price dierences in oil only refect actual substantivedierences in quality or transportation costs.

Tese developments were supposed to alleviate the energy security concerns that the U.S. aced ater the1970s. America would no longer be held hostage to supply shocks that could cut o our access to oil. Ameri-can soldiers would no longer have to ght to protect sources o oil.

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Tat has not proved to be the case. Te U.S. today produces over 50% o the oil that it consumes, and a ur-ther 20% comes rom our riendly neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Imports rom the Persian Gul have allento 9% o our consumption. In spite o these trends we still ace concerns about energy security.

We no longer worry that our supply will be cut o, but we ace an even more vexing problem -- price. Itdoesn’t matter to the American consumer that the supply o oil that goes into his or her tank is diversied:gasoline is the same whether it comes rom Canada, Venezuela, Nigeria, or Saudi Arabia. Te integrated, glo-balized market that we have created means that the price o oil is set globally.

Tis past May, as civil war was spreading in Libya, global oil prices shot up to $113 per barrel. Te U.S. only imported about 70,000 barrels per day o oil rom Libya (about 0.6% o total consumption), but the domesticprice o oil, and the gasoline that American consumers depend on, shot up equally ast.

It is global demand -- not supply diversity -- that determines energy security in the modern world.

American policy is beginning to address demand, but too many policy-makers still believe that we can ensure energy security just by producing

more here at home or by importing more rom Canada. Te truth is thatonly by reducing American dependence on oil -- oreign and domestic-- can policymakers break the oil market’s choke-hold on the economy.

Only in 2007 did Congress pass legislation that increased uel economy standards. Te Obama Administration has continued on this path by proposing a rule that will double ueleconomy standards to 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. Another option, perpetually proposed and just as otenrejected, is to reduce demand over the long term by increasing gasoline taxes -- as European and Japanesegovernments did in response to the 1970s oil crises.

Te best way to ensure that oil is no longer strategically important to the United States may be to promote

alternative orms o transportation. A suciently large feet o electric or biouel-based cars would reduce theinfuence oil has on American transportation. Such changes could enhance energy security ar more eec-tively, though less dramatically, than even the collapse o the Soviet Union.

Andrew Holland is a Senior Fellow or Energy and Climate at the American Security Project.



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Te Uncertain Future of the Military-Industrial

Complex By August Cole

Te U.S. deense industry, ush since September 2001, may once again be acing a period o decline

he 1990s might not have been a decade o peace, but they were or big, U.S. deense rms. Aterdecades o working or a Deense Department oriented toward the deeat o the Soviet Union, they struggled to adjust. During the 1980s the Pentagon had spent billions o dollars on developing and

improving expensive hardware -- tanks, submarines, ghter jets -- but, in the post-Soviet ‘90s, their appetiteshrank.

In 1995, U.S. Deense Department procurement spendingdropped below $50 billion or the rst time since1982.

Tis changed with the attacks o September 11, 2001, which began an historic period o prosperity or theU.S. deense industry. Now, much like the period that ollowed the collapse o the Soviet Union, the industry aces a decade, or more, o adversity and sotening political support or weapons spending. Te deense indus-try is back at another crossroads, and the stakes or them are just as high.

Deense cuts during the early 1990s had a proound impact on not just the de-ense industry, but on America itsel. ens o thousands o well-paying jobs werelost when deense rms shut down entire lines o business. Te spiritual homeo the American aerospace industry, southern Caliornia, aced a debilitatingeconomic downturn, crashing real estate prices and scattering aerospace workers

throughout the country. More than 100,000 jobs were lost in the Los Angelesarea between 1988 and 1994, according to one estimate.

Some companies decided they didn’t need the deense business anymore andsimply got out o the market, selling o their deense divisions. exas Instru-ments sold its deense business to Raytheon in 1997 or $2.95 billion. At thetime, Raytheon executives said the exas Instruments deal would bring theirannual sales up to $15 billion. By, 2010, Raytheon reported annual revenue o more than $25 billion.

Te largest contractors today eclipse Raytheon. Tese so-called “super primes”, Lockheed Martin, Northrop

Grumman, and Boeing, dominate the global deense market. Teir size is a direct result o the corporate con-solidation o the 1990s. Martin Marietta Chie Executive Norman Augustine once remarked that the Pentagonheld a “last supper” in 1993, when it gathered more than a dozen o the industry’s top executives to inormthem that the deense landscape was changing in ways nobody would have expected a ew years earlier. Augus-tine later oversaw a merger between Martin Marietta and Lockheed Corp.

Lockheed Martin, currently the Deense Department’s biggest contractor by sales, grew its revenue rom $23

Lockheed Martin

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billion in 1995 to $46 billion in 2010. Lockheed Martin even tried to buy Northrop Grumman, but regula-tors threw up so many roadblocks that Lockheed Martin dropped the bid in 1998, proving there were limitsto how big and powerul deense companies could become. Even so, a look at the sprawling Fort Worth,exas acilities where Lockheed builds the Joint Strike Fighter is a testament to how enormous the rms havebecome. Lockheed bought the campus rom General Dynamics in 1993, two years beore Lockheed merged

with Martin Marietta. Te Joint Strike Fighter, the most lucrative Pentagon contract in history, gives Lock-heed Martin a practical monopoly on the U.S. ghter market or the oreseeable uture.

Tere were other changes in the 1990s that aected deense companies. Firms working on exotic nuclear weapons programs or secret satellite communications systems no longer attracted the country’s most talentedengineers. echnology and Internet companies did. Stock options and paradigm shits in corporate and per-sonal technologies, not the challenge o outdoing a now deunct adversary, drove innovation. Caliornia-basedinvestors and bearded guys tinkering in their garages -- not the deense industry -- became the source o thecountry’s cutting edge technologies.

In the decade ollowing September 2001, military spending soaredand so did the ortunes o deense rms, which booked record prots,

revenues, and stock prices. Procurement spending rose to more than$147 billion in 2010, nearly three times the amount or 1995.

Now, the cycle is shiting again. With the U.S. winding-down in Iraqand Aghanistan, and its domestic politics increasingly concerned withthe country’s debt, severe declines may be ahead or military budgets.

It’s not yet clear how ar deense spending will all. Te uncertainty alone is already putting enormous pressure on U.S. deense compa-nies. Te biggest are simply too large to try to merge with their peers, as they did during the 1990s, withoutalling aoul o regulators or investors.

Te deense industry is once again at a crossroads, and the stakes are the highest they’ve been. Large deensecontractors are interwoven into not just every layer o the national security apparatus, but also o civilian gov-ernment. Tey are involved in everything rom smart bombs to military interrogations to the most recent U.S.census. ens o thousands o jobs are again on the line during a time o economic trouble. Whatever the levelo military spending alls to, the deense industry’s economic, strategic, and political actions well into the 21stcentury will continue to be heavily infuenced by its period o decline ollowing the all o the Soviet Union.

August Cole is a writer ocusing on national security issues and an Adjunct Fellow at

the American Security Project.



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Peace In the Post-Cold War WorldBy Michael Cohen

Te world is a much saer place than it was 20 years ago -- here’s why, how it happened, and what it means or our uture

wenty years ater the all o the Soviet Union, the world is a reer and more open place. From theormer Soviet republics and the buer countries o Central and Eastern Europe to Latin America,sub-Saharan Arica, and the Far East, the all o the Soviet Union has led to a cascade o political and

economic advances rarely beore seen in human history.

According to Freedom House, there were 69 electoral democracies in 1990; today there are 115 -- an increaseo more than 60 percent. In dozens o countries, centrally planned economies stifed innovation and entrepre-neurship. oday, economic liberalization has, albeit imperectly, created new opportunities and rising incomesthat would have seemed unimaginable more than two decades ago. Yet beyond these advances, perhaps themost important development that came with the all o the Soviet Union is requently orgotten -- the world

is today a demonstrably saer place.o many observers, that might sound like heresy. Te post-Soviet

world, ater all, has been marred by seemingly constant civil andglobal confict -- the Gul War in 1991, the ethnic cleansing andbloody civil war in the ormer Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda,the unending ghting in the Congo, Sudan, and Somalia, the ter-rorist attacks on September 11 and the ongoing American wars inIraq and Aghanistan. American politicians repeatedly warn o thedangerous and unsae world that we inhabit.

Moreover, didn’t the Cold War prevent large-scale wars between greatpowers and keep ethnic and national tension suppressed? Te threato nuclear confict certainly helped to prevent World War III, but it hardly stopped dozens o countries rom

waging horribly violent wars. On the Korean peninsula, in South-East Asia, across the Middle East, on theIndian subcontinent, and across sub-Saharan Arica, confict was a relatively common state o aairs duringthe Cold War. Many o these conficts were exacerbated by the machinations o the competing super powers.

Would millions have died in Korea, Vietnam, and Aghanistan i these three countries had not been consideredthe rontlines in the confict between Cold War rivals?

1982 to 1984 was “the least sae time to live on earth”In act, the Soviet Union’s demise sped up rather thanslowed down the global movement toward a saer and more secure world. Te reality is that today, wars are

rarer than ever beore. According to the 2009/2010 Human Security Report, state-based armed confict de-clined by 40 percent rom 1992 to 2003. And when wars occur, they are less deadly or both combatants andcivilians. Te average war so ar in the 21st century kills 90 percent ewer people than the average confict inthe 1950s. Te last ten years have seen ewer war deaths than any decade o the past century.

Te world has not seen a major power confict in more than six decades -- the longest period o sustained peacebetween great powers in centuries. Finally, insurgent groups, rather than governments, are the greatest cause o

Courtesy Ronald Reagan Librar

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civilian deaths today -- a worrisome trend or sure, but one that stands in sharp contrast to much o the 20thcentury, in which nations devised new and ingenious methods or slaughtering millions o their own citizens.

But there is a larger reality o the post-Cold War world -- the threat o nuclear confict has declined dramati-cally. From the late 1940s to the all o the Berlin Wall in 1989, the potential or a devastating nuclear ex-

change that would destroy the globe and wipe out mankind was a distinct and real possibility. As Micah Zenko, a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me, the period rom roughly 1982 to1984 was “the least sae time to live on earth. Te number o deployed nuclear weapons was obscene over-kill, and potential fashpoints or a U.S.-Soviet confict were many.” Nuclear weapons were ar more widely-dispersed across the Soviet Union than they are today, and launch authority remained at shockingly lowlevels even into the 1980s. While the threat o nuclear war may have always been a low possibility, it was stillreal; distorting and disrupting international aairs or much o the 20th century. While there remains theextremely slim risk o accidental launches or nuclear terrorism, ridding ourselves o this existential burden hasbeen a boon rather than a detriment to the conduct o international aairs.

For all the challenges to global security we ace today, they pale in comparison to the threat o superpower warand the proxy battles that dened the our decades o ideological and geopolitical confict between East and West. Te all o Soviet Russia, or all o its many positive ramications, helped to end the constant dangero a war that would truly and catastrophically “end all wars.” A more complex but decidedly more secure andsaer world has replaced it.

Michael Cohen is a ormer Senior Fellow at the American Security Project. He is currently writing a book on the 1968 presidential election.



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No Great Game: Te Story of Post-Cold War

Powers in Central Asia By Joshua Foust

Te U.S. has been increasingly active in these ormer Soviet satellites, but Russian inuence is still a major orce

On December 16, 2011, Kazakhstan will celebrate the 20th anniversary o its independence rom theSoviet Union. It was the last country to politically separate itsel rom Russia in 1991, the nal nailin the con o the seven-decade Soviet experiment. Te year saw a wave o Soviet states pulling away

rom the Soviet Union, like the skins o an onion, until only Russia was let in the center.

Central Asia, a part o the world that has long been the subject o speculation, romantic adventure antasies,and misinormation, suddenly ound itsel in the global spotlight. Kazakhstan possessed the world’s largestnuclear testing site in Semipalatinsk, dozens o nuclear weapons, a biological weapons research acility onVozrozhdeniye Island in the dried-up Aral Sea, and huge reserves o oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea.

urkmenistan, too, had some o the world’s largest reserves o natural gas.

But despite a small gold rush o sorts to capture the region’s energy re-sources, Central Asia mostly remained an underdeveloped backwater.Uzbekistan struggled with the Islamic Movement o Uzbekistan, a terrorgroup that continues to plague parts o Aghanistan. ajikistan endureda brutal civil war that, in many ways, denes the West’s perception o it.

Ater a brie paroxysm o ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan,both countries settled into a sort o comortable anonymity. Tere was abrie interest in exporting urkmenistan’s natural gas through a pipelinecrossing Aghanistan and Pakistan, but the aliban’s war in Aghanistan

prevented the plan rom moving o the drawing table.

oward the end o the 1990s, interest in the region picked up: Chevron signed a major deal to develop one o Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil elds and construction began on the Baku-blisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the rst non-Russian export route out o the region. Te U.S. deepened its military ties with the governments o Kazakh-stan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, sending small numbers o U.S. military trainers and bringing local ocersto U.S. service academies. It seemed Russia was not only diminished but soundly deeated, and America wasascendant.

Te terror attacks o September 11 and subsequent invasion o Aghanistan seemed at rst to cement the riseo America in Central Asia. Secretary o Deense Donald Rumseld negotiated the use o military bases in Uz-

bekistan and Kyrgyzstan, even while the State Department grew less and less comortable with human rightsabuses in those countries. By the time the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, American policy in the area seemed seton autopilot, dominant and victorious.

Ten, something changed. In March o 2005, the “ulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan unseated Askar Akayev, who had ruled the country since 1990, throwing the U.S. into panic that it might lose access to the airbase atManas. Also that year, in May, Uzbek security orces massacred hundreds o protesters in the city o Andijon,

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and in the ensuing outcry the U.S. lost access to the Uzbek airbase it relied on to supply the troops in A-ghanistan. While the Americans later managed to secure expanded access to Manas, it came at an increasingly high cost.

Te mid-2000s also saw Russia emerge rom its slumber. Under Presidents Vladimir Putin and then Dmitri

Medvedev, Russia slowly revived its campaign or infuence in the region, gaining concessions rom the Cen-tral Asian rulers and sometimes challenging the U.S. or access and resources. As o 2011, Russia and the U.S.could best be called renemies in Central Asia, with Russia chang at the continued American presence even

while its ocials worryabout the consequences o an American withdrawal rom Aghanistan.

Te U.S., though, seems destined to diminish in the region, even as Central Asia nally firts with economicviability. Kazakhstan’s economy is thriving, Kyrgyzstan joined the WO well beore Russia, and urkmeni-stan’s gas pipeline to China has brought it much-needed cash. Both urkey and China are spending increasingamounts o money and energy to gain social, economic, and political ootholds in the region, and Russia islooking or new ways to extend its “security umbrella” southward. Te U.S. is trying to cement its position

with the New Silk Road, a concept or regional trade that Secretary o State Hillary Clinton is mentioning in

speeches, but that project’s success seems ar rom certain.

Politically, however, Central Asia remains painully close to what it was in 1991, with the exception o Kyrgyz-stan (which still struggles or stable political leadership). Te tyrant o urkmenistan may have died in 2007,but his replacement has continued to rule in much the same way. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and ajikistan arenow entering their second decade with the same autocrats in charge. In many ways the region exists in a sorto time warp, with a dismaying lack o political or social progress on many ronts.

Viewing Central Asia as a competition or infuence, however, misses the point; that is a contest that Americacould probably never win. Instead, what’s emerging is a tenuous collaboration: Russia and America workingtogether to support and develop the region. Unthinkable 20 years ago, this new alignment o interests has the

potential to be ar more transormative than the all o communism ever was.

Joshua Foust is a ellow at the American Security Project and the author o Aghanistan Journal: Selections romRegistan.net.



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How the Fall of the Soviet Union Changed the

News Media By Carolyn Deady

V would never cover breaking news the same way again

International media coverage o the historic events in Moscow on December 25, 1991, was a rst or worldbroadcast news. Earlier in the year, ed urner’s Cable News Network had a television news victory. A decade ater its ounding, CNN, surpassed the “Big Tree” American networks -- ABC, CBS, and NBC

-- in ratings with its coverage rom inside Iraq during the Gul War. Te 24-hour news network had come intoits own. Tat Christmas Day, CNN got its next major scoop in Moscow.

With the exception o a small ABC crew lming in Moscow or a documentary, CNN had exclusive accessthat day to both Boris Yeltsin, set to become the rst-ever Russian president, and Soviet Premier MikhailGorbachev. Ater carrying Gorbachev’s resignation speech live, CNN broadcast a sit-down interview with the

ormer Soviet leader. CNN aired the speech at 11 am ES, whetheron its own channel or through other networks that had bought theright to show it, in over 150 countries; history-making news broad-cast around the world instantaneously. It was the rst time that anews organization had broadcast, live, an interview with a worldleader the same night he had resigned.

Cameras rolled as the Soviet fag, which had fown over the Kremlinor decades, was taken down and replaced with the new Russianstandard. Te fag was not supposed to be replaced until ater theNew Year, but Kremlin workers made the switch shortly ater Gor-

bachev’s resignation. Russian News, the only outlet aware o thechangeover in advance, was the sole organization to capture it on video.

While handing over the nuclear suitcase would also have made or an iconic image, it never happened, at leastdirectly. Gorbachev’s transer o control o the Soviet Union’s nuclear missiles to now-President Boris Yeltsin,a metaphor or the end o the Cold War, was an act o paperwork. Te two leaders never made the directexchange, but A wire service got a photo o Gorbachev signing the document handing over control o the

weapons. Te image appeared on the ront page o newspapers around the world the next day.

At 9 pm that night -- Christmas day -- President George H.W. Bush addressed the nation rom the Oval O-ce. His address was carried live by most V networks in the United States and picked up around the world.

Other world leaders also made statements regarding the events o the day, all o which was covered in bothbroadcast and print media. Most Western leaders praised Mikhail Gorbachev, recognized the creation o theCommonwealth o Independent States -- the successor organization to the Soviet Union -- and expressed theiraith in the security o nuclear weapons with the transer o power.

For media around the world, the end o the Soviet Union was perhaps the biggest story o 1991. Coveragerom Moscow on Christmas Day prompted much discussion: analysis o Gorbachev’s resignation speech,

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what the end o the Cold War meant, the ate o the Russian economy and that o the other republics in theCommonwealth o Independent States, energy reserves, nuclear weapons, and the economic impact on othercommunist nations (like Cuba and North Korea).

In the days beore the Internet, cell phones, social media, texting, and tweeting, the world got its news romtelevision networks, newspapers, and magazines, oten with a lag time o at least a day. But, on Christmas day 1991, people could watch history happen, right in ront o them on their V screens.

Carolyn Deady is a reelance journalist and ormer international producer at C-SPAN in Washington, DC.She is an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project.



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Te Cold War Is Long Gone, but the Nuclear

Treat Is Still HereBy Eric Auner

America’s nuclear strategy hasn’t changed much since the Soviet Union ell, but the world’s nuclear dangers have

In the two decades since the all o the Soviet Union and the end o the Cold War, the nuclear challengesacing the United States have changed radically. American nuclear strategy has not.

American nuclear orces are largely designed to deter a superpower that no longer exists. Meanwhile,nuclear and missile technology is more widely available than ever to outlier states like Iran and North Korea,and Americans continue to worry about a nuclear weapon winding up in the hands o a terrorist.

American nuclear strategy has three main goals in the 21st century. First, ensure that nuclear weapons arenot used against the United States or its allies. Nuclear deterrence still plays a key role in the modern world.Second, convince or compel other states not to acquire nuclear weapons. Tird, secure nuclear weapons anddangerous nuclear materials against thet or diversion to terrorist groups.

Current strategy is heavily geared towards the rst goal o deterring nuclear weapons, a legacy o the Cold Wararms race. Eorts towards the second and third goals have been incomplete.

During the Cold War, the rival superpowers threatened one another with large numbers o nuclear weapons.Most were ar more powerul than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tese weapons helped tomaintain a shaky peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many o the weapons on both sides

were available or almost immediate use to deter a massive surprise at-tack, potentially involving thousands o nuclear weapons, rom the other.

Tis basic posture, with large numbers o weapons capable o destroyingan entire city available or rapid use, continues today, even though theU.S. military no longer ears a large-scale Russian attack. No other na-tion in the world has sucient nuclear orces to even attempt a disablingnuclear rst strike on the United States.

Te size o the American nuclear arsenal has shrunk considerably, andboth Republican and Democratic presidents have recognized that the United States can eectively protectitsel and deter attack with ewer nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world. reaties mandating parallel U.S.and Russian nuclear arsenal cuts have enabled these necessary reductions to take place.

Tese reductions went hand in hand with a bilateral verication regime that gave U.S. inspectors on-site accessto the Russian nuclear arsenal. Te New Strategic Arms Reduction (New SAR) treaty, ratied with biparti-san support in December 2010, continues this process and helps to maintain strategic stability.

Te large and capable nuclear arsenal that the United States retains under New SAR continues to play arole in protecting the United States and reassuring allies that depend on the American nuclear umbrella. Tearsenal cannot, however, help the United States to accomplish the vast majority o its other national security

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goals, including the struggle against terrorism.

America’s nuclear arsenal is only one aspect o American nuclear strategy in the 21st century. Te UnitedStates has taken the lead in creating institutions and agreements, including the Nuclear Nonprolierationreaty, under which the vast majority o nations have agreed to orgo nuclear weapons.

Many observers ear that the global nonprolieration regime is raying. Iran is a member o the NuclearNonprolieration reaty but the country’s activities, which include a uraniumenrichment program, have led to ears that the country is on the verge o a nu-clear weapons capability. Institutions like the Nonprolieration reaty clearly must be strengthened and updated.

Investments in technologies such as ballistic missile deense also have a role toplay in managing nuclear threats. Ballistic missiles, a traditional delivery meth-od or nuclear weapons, have continued to prolierate in some o the world’smost unstable regions. Ballistic missile deense is increasingly being developed

and deployed on a cooperative basis, including with Russia, a country that hasprotested American missile deense plans or decades.

Te salience o eorts to prevent nuclear terrorism has greatly increased since the end o the Cold War, andespecially ater the terrorist attacks o September 11, 2001. Cooperative Treat Reduction programs to pro-tect nuclear weapons and materials in ormer Soviet states have been a major post-Cold War American oreignpolicy success.

Te United States has had other successes in this area, including the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Buildingrelationships to secure nuclear materials with countries in unstable regions has proven dicult, however, andconcerns about nuclear terrorism persist.

Te United States has choices to make about its nuclear strategy. In a constrained budget environment, theUnited States will need to make the investments to combat today’s nuclear threats, rather than the threats o past decades.

Eric Auner is a ormer Policy Analyst at the American Security Project

U.S. Department o Deense



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A Changing NAO for a Changing WorldBy John Adams

NAO can expect success i its goals and eorts reect NAO nations’ common purpose, as they did during the Cold War, and ailure i they do not

wenty years ater the all o the Soviet Union, NAO can point with pride to its history. But can itpoint with condence to its uture? NAO’s viability in the 21st century depends on applying the les-sons o the past, but it also depends on seeing the present clearly.

NAO’s nest achievement is its contribution to the peaceul resolution o the Cold War. Allies bonded to-gether in unity o purpose with a common strategy, projecting credible orce to preserve trans-Atlantic security.Te all o the Soviet Union cemented NAO’s record o ensuring peace and prosperity or its members with-out becoming their political master. Because NAO allies trusted NAO as an institution, NAO harnessedallies’ common purpose and displayed credibility to potential oes.

oday, the most important issue or NAO is whether allies will continue to trust it to address trans-Atlantic

security issues.

Since the all o the Soviet Union, NAO’s record has raised many doubtsabout its relevance. On the positive side, NAO’s eorts restored peace tothe Balkans and Southeast Europe and brought a strong measure o politicalstability to the ormer Soviet space. Enjoying the widespread support o allies,these eorts ollow logically rom NAO’s original purpose as articulated inthe opening paragraphs o the 1949 North Atlantic reaty, “to promote stabil-ity and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”

However, the adventure in Aghanistan is casting a long shadow on NAO’s

attempt to harness its members’ resources to common purpose. Americanobservers commonly criticize their European NAO Allies or ailing theircommitments in Aghanistan; however, many Allied commitments were cave-ated in the rst place, limiting their involvement.

Having served in NAO assignments over the course o three decades, it ismy experience that NAO’s common purpose suers most when Alliance de-cisions are unwisely leveraged despite obvious lack o Allied enthusiasm, evenin the ace o genuine opposition.

I NAO is to survive as an Alliance, its eorts must refect Allied political and strategic consensus. Te United

States, as a leader within the Alliance, should encourage rather than hinder this process. Lack o political will,lack o participation in Allied operations, lack o deense spending - these incur American criticism o Allies’political will, but they refect a undamental lack o common purpose in the goals’ conception. Americaneorts to infuence NAO decision-making has ostered “ready, shoot, aim” decision-making applied at thehighest levels, and has sparked questions about the alliance.

NAO





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Recently, at Wilton Park in the UK, deense and oreign policy experts rom NAO nations convened to dis-cuss the upcoming Chicago Summit in 2012. A number o productive ideas emerged rom the Wilton Park meeting to address the problem o restoring NAO’s viability in the 21st Century, chie among these scrap-ping the alliance’s archaic metric o 2% deense spending as a measure o Allies’ commitment. Toughtul ob-servers realize that a narrow ocus on deense spending is as poor a measure o 21st Century national security,

as was measuring national security by the number o battleships in the 1920s. Rather, the metric o commit-ment to common purpose must be ocused on allies’ and NAO programs that produce useul capabilitiesagainst commonly perceived threats, rather than merely increasing the size o Allied deense establishments.

Certainly, U.S. leadership remains critical to NAO success, because o both America’s capabilities as wellas America’s global view. For example, the United States plays the pivotal role in building the trans-Atlanticmissile deense architecture and deending the trans-Atlantic space against developing ballistic missile threats.Geographically and technologically, NAO and Russia are essential participants in an eective architecture.Only strong U.S. leadership can help NAO orge this important capability.

America’s long-term strategic interest requires eective participation in institutions that saeguard trans-At-

lantic peace and prosperity. NAO continues to be the best vehicle or that eort, but whether it will remainviable depends on tough American and NAO choices. wenty years ater the all o the Soviet Union, asuccessul strategy to preserve trans-Atlantic peace and prosperity relies upon encouraging the ullest partici-pation o NAO allies in setting the alliance’s strategic course and restoring the legitimacy o the institutionitsel. NAO can expect success i its goals and eorts refect NAO nations’ common purpose, as they didduring the Cold War, and ailure when they do not.

Brigadier General (ret.) John Adams retired rom the U.S. Army in 2007 and is an independent deense consultant and is a member o the Consensus or American Security



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barely reormed – Bolsheviks. And or the rst time, Russians could lap up all the oreign consumer goodsthey wanted. Blue jeans and bootlegged western rock were passé; in the 1990s, Russians were deluged withoreign-made pornography, electronics, plastic goods, and a mind-boggling selection o booze. Tese de-velopments thrilled many, but others were horried by the sense o chaos, moral decline, and internationalhumiliation. Tat horror – that is, the urther degradation o the basis o post-war Soviet identity – helpedpave the way or authoritarianism to return.

Enter Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin. Much is made o the act that he was a KGB ocer,but he absorbed ar more Soviet nationalism than communism. “I was a pure and utterly successul producto Soviet patriotic education,” he told an interviewer in early 2000. Putin’s nationalism is not the cartoonishchauvinism o European or Russian nativists; it is Soviet at heart, ocused on the state’s role as the main vehicleo modernization and guarantor o stability.

During his brie stint as prime minister in the all o 1999, Putin renewed the war in Chechnya, calling it nec-essary to preserve Russia’s sovereignty and protect its citizens against terrorists. Ater he became president lessthan a year later, his statist nationalism and emphasis on law and order undermined the legitimacy o anyone

who spoke out against his increasingly authoritarian practices, especially journalists and democracy activists.

Putin ound the way to a new social contract in the country’s oil elds, which helped satisy rising globalenergy demand. On the one hand, the country’s oligarchs were put on notice: they could play ball with thenew boss and continue to reap extraordinary prots, or they would be destroyed. Not surprisingly, the energy

sector has produced the clearest winners and losers in Russia’s pay-to-play business world. Sibnet owner and Putin pal Roman Abramovich has thrived, while Yukosowner Mikhail Khodorkovsky – once the richest Russian – was singled out over taxevasion charges. Energy revenue has also allowed Putin to revive some Soviet-stylepaternalism by encouraging greater domestic production o consumer goods andproviding larger subsidies or those Russians let behind by the boom.

Putin’s own term or the new phenomenon is “managed democracy.” Nearly allRussian media outlets are controlled by the Kremlin’s allies, who guide voters toPutin, his ally/underling Dmitri Medvedev, and his party, United Russia. Provin-cial governors are now appointed by the state, and representatives to the lowerhouse o parliament are elected rom party lists. Government candidates andUnited Russia have never achieved embarrassingly one-sided majorities, but they have comortably dominated. In the wake o United Russia’s comparatively poor

electoral showing this month, Putin and his party might have to depend more on other pro-governmentgroups, but the outcome will likely be the same.

Putin still has at his disposal the state’s robust and eective machinery o intimidation. Security and police

services routinely target opponents, scores o journalists who have investigated political corruption and warcrimes in Chechnya have been murdered, and a subservient judiciary harasses potential rivals and invalidatestheir runs or oce.

Cracks have certainly emerged in the oundation o Putin’s authoritarianism. His relationship with the en-ergy and media barons is weakening, while the broader population is eager or national respect and materialcomort, something that depends on growing oil revenue. And activists have become increasingly bold in

Te Kremlin



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denouncing the corruption, sham democracy, and police intimidation o the new Russia. But Putin’s systemhas also shown its ability to deliver enough o the goods and deny the means by which an opposition can co-alesce around a rival. It seems that Soviet nationalism still has some staying power.

Randall D. Law is an Associate Proessor o History at Birmingham-Southern College, where he chairs the

Department o History, and is an adjunct ellow at the American Security Project.

An edited version o this essay can be ound at Te Atlantic Online

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/soviet-nationalism-is-still-driving-russian-poli-tics/250391/

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/soviet-nationalism-is-still-driving-russian-politics/250391/

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/soviet-nationalism-is-still-driving-russian-politics/250391/



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How the Soviet Union ransformed errorismBy Nick Lockwood

Te USSR developed two tools that changed the world: airplane hijackings and state-sponsorship o terror

In the 1960s and 70s, the Soviet Union sponsored waves o political violence against the West. Te RedBrigades in Italy and the German Red Army Faction both terrorized Europe through bank robberies,kidnapping, and acts o sabotage. Te Soviets wanted to use these let-wing terror groups to destabilize

Italy and Germany to break up NAO. State-sponsored terrorism was a deeply Soviet phenomenon, but itspractice did not stop when the Soviet Union ended. While state sponsorship continues, terrorism has mutatedinto something even harder or us to understand and respond to. But some o the roots o today’s terrorismgo back to the Soviet Union.

Russia is the birthplace o modern terrorism. Te Russian nihilists o the 19th century combined politicalpowerlessness with a propensity or gruesome violence, but their attacks were aimed at the sarist state andruling classes. Later, the Soviet Union and its allies actively supported terrorism as a means to politically in-

convenience and undermine its opponents. Te East German Stasi and the KGB provided unds, equipment,and “networking” opportunities to the myriad o letist German terrorist cells in the 1960s, 70s and 80s.Te Red Army Faction and the 2nd June Movement in Germany, as well as the Red Brigades in Italy, sharedMarxist philosophies, a hatred o America, solidarity with the Palestinians, and opposition to the generation,some o its members still in power, that had supported the Nazis and ascists. Tey were good oundations ora Cold War th column. It was not just Europe, either: Soviet equipment, unding, training and guidancefowed across the globe, either directly rom the KGB or through the agencies o key allies, like the Rumanian

Securitate, the Cuban General Intelligence Directorate.

Palestinian groups were enthusiastic participants in Soviet terror lar-gesse. General Alexander Sakharovsky, head o the KGB’s First Chie

Directorate, amously said in 1971, “Airplane hijacking is my owninvention,” reerring to the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s hijackings. In the 1950s and 60s there was, on average, ve hijackings ayear; in 1969, Palestinian terrorists hijacked 82 aircrat. George Ha-bash’s Popular Front or the Liberation o Palestine was crucial. Tesecular, let-wing Habash boasted, “Killing one Jew ar away romthe eld o battle is more eective than killing a hundred Jews on theeld o battle, because it attracts more attention.”

When the Soviet Union ended, so did much o the secular, let-wingterrorism it had sponsored. Logistical support, unding, and advice

all stopped. But, just as importantly, the intellectual, spiritual, and philosophical engine o letist terror hadbecome broken and powerless. Communism did not work; liberal democracy and capitalism had won. Marx-ism lost its inspirational impact without a superpower cheerleader and beneactor. Te potential terrorists

were no longer motivated by Marxism and, crucially, neither were their supporters.

errorism has always been about more than the terrorists themselves. Te perpetrators need a motivatingideology to justiy their crimes, as well as committed enablers around them. Te enablers themselves require a





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broader base o political supporters and advocates -- “the useul idiots” (an expression credited to Lenin). In theearly 1970s, one poll reported that a tenth o Germans under the age o 40 said they would shelter memberso terrorist group Baader-Meinho; a quarter expressed their broad support, even ater Baader-Meinho hadmurdered over 30 people, including police ocers, newspaper workers, and businessmen. With the all o theSoviet Union and the collapse o communism, extreme letism lost its inspiration and the terrorists lost their

support. Baader-Meinho announced its own disbandment in 1998, ve years ater its last terrorist attack andseven years ater the Soviet Union disbanded.

errorism, however, did not go away.

Many o the next generation o terrorists ound inspiration in the ounding narrative o Islam, o Mohammedand his ew but dedicated supporters aecting massive political change against impossible odds. While this isperverse to the vast majority o Muslims, some genuine grievances helped broaden political support or thatagenda among a wider population. Cheap and easy air travel, fuid nancial systems, and especially the fow o inormation over the Internet enabled a greater reach than in the 70s.

Whatever else it is, al-Qaeda was an inspiration, with an agenda easily adopted by willing “ranchisees.” Statesupport still continues. Elements o the Pakistani military continue to assist terrorist organizations in IndianKashmir and in Aghanistan. Iran and Syria continued in a similar ashion, sponsoring operations in supporto oreign policy objectives within their neighbors’ territories.

Te lesson o Soviet-sponsored terror and its end is that, i the world is to deeat Islamist terrorism, it will haveto deeat the motivating narrative. In the same way that communism became a bankrupt ideology, the politicalphilosophy underpinning terrorism needs to be challenged, exposed, and ridiculed.

Nick Lockwood is a British post-conict expert, specializing in population engagement and stability operations,and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project.



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Te Cold War and How We Tink About Private

Property By Peter Charles Choharis

A less-discussed aspect o the conict, one still ongoing today, is over the laws governing property and investment

Seventeen months ater the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in an opinion, “Tereare ew i any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limita-tions on a state’s power to expropriate the property o aliens.” Te Court was considering a case involv-

ing the Fidel Castro government’s nationalization o American-owned private property. But based in part onthis uncertainty about international legal protections or oreign investments, the Court held that U.S. courtsshould not judge the legality o a oreign government’s ocial acts and did not reach the merits o the case.

Troughout the Cold War, even non-communist post-colonial countries oten asserted the legal right to seizeoreign investments as part o land redistribution and controlling natural resources. Oten, there was no rem-

edy available to those who had lost their property.

wenty years ater the all o the Soviet Union, the world’s largest communist country, China, attracted $215billion in oreign direct investment over the last our quarters, according to the Organization or EconomicCooperation and Development. Te United States attracted $226 billion during the same period. And whileglobal oreign direct investment is down substantially rom its pre-nancial crisis high in 2007, total globaloreign direct investment (infows and outfows) was nearly $2.7 trillion or the last our quarters. Withoutthis access to oreign investment capital, the global recession and worldwide unemployment would be armore severe than they currently are.

Many technological, nancial, and political developments help account or the growth in private interna-

tional investment. But it could not have happened without a worldwide revolution in how we think aboutinternational law and private property.

In the United States, or more than two decades Democratic and Repub-lican administrations alike have promoted bilateral investment treaties,or “BIs,” which provide substantive protections or oreign investmentsagainst unlawul government intererence. Tese protections cover allkinds o investor property, including intellectual property; intangible as-sets like contracts, stocks, and bonds; and hard assets like actories andoce buildings. o enorce these protections and resolve investment dis-putes, these treaties provide or international arbitration.

oday, 176 countries throughout the world have also adopted BIs. Al-though they were around during the Cold War, in the last two decadesthe number o BIs worldwide exploded rom 385 in 1989 to 2,750 by the end o 2009, according to theUnited Nations Conerence on rade and Development (UNCAD).

http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/the-cold-war-and-how-we-think-about-private-property/250464/






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While the specics oten dier, many BI provisions protecting oreign investments have become near univer-sal. Both the urkey-urkmenistan and U.S.-El Salvador agreements protect oreign investments rom director indirect expropriation, nationalization, or similar measures “except or a public purpose, in a non-discrim-inatory manner, upon payment o prompt, adequate and eective compensation, and in accordance with dueprocess o law.” Some countries’ more recent BIs also contain provisions designed to protect environment,labor, public health, and other public policy concerns in addition to the property rights o oreign investors.

Although the pace o BI ormation has slowed in the last ew years, many regional trade agreements such asNAFA and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free rade Agreement now include investment protec-tion provisions. In act, as o 2009 at least 295 ree trade agreements throughout the world have protectionsor oreign investments, according to UNCAD.

reaties do not mean that oreign investments are immune rom government intererence. For example, or-eign-owned oil companies have become embroiled in high-prole disputes with the Russian and Venezuelangovernments over the past ew years. But these only reinorce the need or robust legal protections and enorce-ment.

Te international legal and economic rameworks that have promoted and protected oreign investments over

the last two decades are not destined to continue. At a 2002 meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, 171 countries a-rmed the so-called Washington Consensus when they agreed on the need to “attract and enhance infows o productive capital” by creating “a transparent, stable and predictable investment climate, with proper contractenorcement and respect or property rights” -- even ater the Argentine debt and East Asian scal crises. Butthose were viewed as regional problems that were contained. I the current global nancial crisis worsens orspreads, there may be ar less interest in promoting the ree-fow o capital and protecting oreign nancialinterests.

Ironically, the courts o the world’s largest economy have done little to help. Despite the act that there areew issues in international law on which opinion is so unied today, U.S. courts are still mired in Cold Wardoctrines that prevent them rom hearing claims about injuries to oreign investments by state actors. And anincreasing number o American judges are openly skeptical about the relevance o international law to U.S.

jurisprudence.

Still, there is hope. For the rst time since La Revolución, Cuba announced in November that it would permitits citizens to buy and sell their own homes. Te revolution continues.

Peter Charles Choharis is a principal in Choharis Global Solutions, a law and consulting frm that represents U.S.investors and oreign governments, a visiting scholar at George Washington Law School and is an Adjunct Fellow

at the American Security Project.



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Further Reading

American Security Quarterly A collection o essays rom our ellows, board members, and adjunct ellows published over the last quarteron all our issues: national security strategy, energy & climate, terrorism & asymmetric warare, AmericanCompetitiveness, and nuclear security. American Security Quarterly will be published on the ASP websiteon 4 January 2012.

ASP Major Reports:

Climate and Energy Security America’s Energy Choices

Nuclear Security Initiative Nuclear Security Index

Climate and Energy Security Fusion Energy: An Opportunity or American Leadership and Security

errorism Measuring Success: Are We Winning? 10 Years in Aghanistan

ASP Fact sheets and Perspectives

Nuclear Security Initiative American Security Enhanced: Te Benets o the New SAR reaty

Nuclear Security Initiative Ballistic Missiles: A Serious and Growing Treat

Climate and Energy Security Fusion Fact Sheet

American Competitiveness CRADA’s - Cooperative Research Development Agreements

c ASPWb: www.ariassuriypr.

twir: @aspr

Fabk : www.abk./ariasuriypr

eail: [email protected]

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Americas-Energy-Choices-ASP-Andrew-Holland-FINAL-.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/NuclearSecurityIndex2011.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fusion-2020-White-Paper-FINAL2.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Measuring-Success-Are-We-Winning-10-Years-in-Afghanistan-FINAL.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/FACT-SHEET-The-Benefits-of-the-New-START-Treaty.pdf

http://www.scribd.com/doc/69304676/Ballistic-Missiles-A-Serious-and-Growing-Threat

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fusion-fact-sheet-final.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CRADAs-FINAL.pdf

http://www.americanssecurityproject.com/

http://www.facebook.com/americansecurityproject

http://www.facebook.com/americansecurityproject

http://www.americanssecurityproject.com/

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CRADAs-FINAL.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fusion-fact-sheet-final.pdf

http://www.scribd.com/doc/69304676/Ballistic-Missiles-A-Serious-and-Growing-Threat

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/FACT-SHEET-The-Benefits-of-the-New-START-Treaty.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Measuring-Success-Are-We-Winning-10-Years-in-Afghanistan-FINAL.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fusion-2020-White-Paper-FINAL2.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/NuclearSecurityIndex2011.pdf

http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Americas-Energy-Choices-ASP-Andrew-Holland-FINAL-.pdf



Buildig a nw Aria Arsal

Te American Security Project (ASP) is a non-partisan initiative to educate

the American public about the changing nature o national security in the

21st century.

Gone are the days when a nation’s strength could be measured by bombers

and battleships. Security in this new era requires a New American Arsenal

harnessing all o America’s strengths: the orce o our diplomacy; the might o

our military; the vigor o our economy; and the power o our ideals.

We believe that America must lead other nations in the pursuit o our

common goals and shared security. We must conront international

challenges with all the tools at our disposal. We must address emerging

problems beore they become security crises. And to do this, we must orge a

new bipartisan consensus at home.

ASP brings together prominent American leaders, current and ormer

members o Congress, retired military ocers, and ormer government

ocials. Sta direct research on a broad range o issues and engages and

empowers the American public by taking its fndings directly to them.

We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex and diverse

as terrorism, the spread o weapons o mass destruction, climate change,ailed and ailing states, disease, and pandemics. Te same-old solutions

and partisan bickering won’t do. America needs an honest dialogue about

security that is as robust as it is realistic.

ASP exists to promote that dialogue, to orge consensus, and to spur

constructive action so that America meets the challenges to its security while

seizing the opportunities the new century oers.

www.ariasuriypr.rg

20 years after the fall - the us and russia in the post-soviet world

Documents