3. PARTICULARITY OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS TO BE SEIZEDPLACE TO BE SEARCHED:

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION,petitioners,vs.BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin HoaliasFrank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit1stating:1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code.2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned sardines processed by UNIFISH;(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted (sic);(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn from the corporation;3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to other food processing companies.5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "A",7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the disputed search warrants. The first2is docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253" ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU7th Judicial RegionBranch 28Mandaue CityTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,- versus -UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,Unifish Packing CorporationHernan Cortes St., Cebu CitySEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x(with sketch)SEARCH WARRANTTO ANY PEACE OFFICER:G R E E T I N G S:It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the following:1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank Statements/Cancelled ChecksYou are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.WITNESS MY HAND this1stday of October, 1993.(sgd.)MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLEJudgeThe second warrant3is similarly docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253" ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one page.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU7th Judicial RegionBranch 28Mandaue CityTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,- versus -UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, andUnifish Packing CorporationHernan Cortes St.,MandaueCitySEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /(with sketch)SEARCH WARRANTTO ANY PEACE OFFICER:G R E E T I N G S:It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin HoaliasFrank Uy andUnifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the following:1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank Statements/Cancelled ChecksYou are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.WITNESS MY HAND this1stday of October, 1993.(sgd.)MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLEJudgeJudge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,4which was docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263" (hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.The CA also held thatcertiorariwas not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying the motion to quash.In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case ofLaivs. Intermediate220SCRA149and the pronouncement, thus:Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D. 911); 3.iftheirpetitionforreviewdoesnotprosper,theycanfileamotiontoquashtheinformationinthetrialcourt. (Rule 117, Rules of Court). 4.Ifthemotionisdenied,theycanappealthejudgmentofthecourtafterthecaseshallhavebeentriedonthemerits.x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held thatwhenamotiontoquashacriminalcaseisdenied,theremedyisnotcertioraributtogototrialwithoutprejudicetoreiteratingthespecialdefensesinvolvedinsaidMotion. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits,anappealtherefrom should be the next legal step.xxxIn this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.5In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for review.Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An examination of the CARollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case,6we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true copy of "material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto" along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated.7The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail ofcertiorarito question the resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of "Lai vs. Intermediate," cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in "220 SCRA149." The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners,8appears to have been taken from the case ofYap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA245(1993).Yap, however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash acomplaintfor qualified theft, not a motion to quash asearch warrant.The applicable case isMarcelo vs. De Guzman,9where we held that the issuing judges disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be remedied bycertiorari:Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions "has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement inSilva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,10which also involved a special civil action forcertiorari:11Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared inMarcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion".In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.We now proceed to the merits of the case.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 3.Requisite for issuing search warrant.- A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.SEC. 4.Examination of complainant; record.- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.12The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants.13The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.14Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.15Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searchedPetitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St.,CebuCity" while the body of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St.,MandaueCity." Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St.,MandaueCity."The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized."16The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended17and distinguish it from other places in the community.18Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.19Thus, inCastro vs. Pabalan,20where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as BarrioPadasilinstead of the adjoining BarrioMariaCristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrantsPetitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issuedsolelyagainst "Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy." Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against "UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,andUnifish Packing Corporation."These discrepancies are hardly relevant.InMiller v. Sigler,21it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.22Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.23Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one placeIn any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same crime (violation of "SEC. 253" of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.The alleged absence of probable causePetitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search warrants.Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.24In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine orpro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.25Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.26The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.27Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.28It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?A. No.Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?A.I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?A.Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.Q. From where did you get that information?A.From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.29The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search warrants.30The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:Q Do you know Frank Uy?A Yes.Q Why do you know him?A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?A Hernan Cortes St.Q What is it being engaged of?A It is engaged in canning of fish.Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?A Yes.Q How is it done?A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he does not issue any invoices.Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?A Thru delivery receipts.Q Is the delivery receipt official?A No. It is unregistered.Q For how long has this been going on?A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?A August, 1993, last month.Q How did you happen to know about this last month?A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods that he sold.Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?A White Gold and Gaisano.Q How did you know this fact?A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last three years. I was the Operating Chief.Q Until now?A No. I was separated already.Q When?A August, 1993.Q How does he do this manipulation?A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever?A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction.1wphi1It is not for the public, not for the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. It is not made to be shown to the BIR.Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain supermarkets?A Yes.Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.Q Based on what?A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts, sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which are only for the consumption of the company?A Yes, not for the BIR.Q Where are they kept now?A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and notebooks.Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are stored in this place which is marked as "C".Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?A Yes.Q But how can you enter the bodega?A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by Gina?A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.Q Where are they now?A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of January, February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?A As far as I know, it did not appear.Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January, what does it show?A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers.Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?A As far as I know, it does not reflect.Q What are these xerox copies of checks?A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another company.Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but instead they are selling it locally?A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic) it?A Yes, at a profit.Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms.Q Do you have proof to that effect?A No, but we can get it there.Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?A Yes. I have received information.COURT: Alright.31Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seizedPetitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject warrants and those inStonehill vs. Diokno,32Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,33andAsian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.34InStonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by the Constitution since:x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining toall business transactionsof petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions werelegalorillegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure ofallrecords of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized beparticularlydescribed - as well as tending to defeat its major object: the elimination ofgeneralwarrants.InBache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those inStonehill:The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.x x xIn Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant shouldparticularly describethe place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities."The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos,J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.InAsian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e., "Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc." was held to be "an omnibus description" and, therefore, invalid:x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank Statements/Cancelled ChecksWe agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.35The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices," however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are unregistered.36Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.37Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. InUnited States v. Cook,38the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following pronouncement:x x x. The leading decision isAday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961). InAday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described books and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles.x x xx x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster.See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. As the leading commentator has observed, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by the enforcing officers:1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,5. One (1) bound gate pass,6. Surety Agreement.39In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder.40InTambasen vs. People,41it was held:Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumptionjuris tantumof regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso,supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it inBagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.42WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices.SO ORDEREDPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI,respondents.NARVASA,C.J.:In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.1Said judgment dismissed the People's petition forcertiorarito invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996.2as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for reconsideration.3Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,42) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged;**" and on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;5. **According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on petition forcertiorari**): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the order dated January 30.1996**to wit:1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is correspondingly called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for ingress and egress.There being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be reduced on the records.SO ORDERED.6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge**issued its order duly granting the motion to quash search warrant**;57. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss**;8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration**;10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge**issued its order denying the motion for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action ofcertiorariin the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:61. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing, wasApartment No.1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to,Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead**directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207**in the Order**dated December 15, 1995" this, too, being the address given "in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the People's admission, during the hearing of its petition forcertiorariin the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not attached to the application for search warrant**(but) merely attached to the motion for reconsideration."7Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996,viz.:8d) ** **it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid."**.3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.94. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.105. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down inNolasco vs.Pao (139 SCRA 152)which overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court inTemplo vs.de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of "Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil action ofcertiorari.The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched;"2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence**to the contrary;"3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;"5) hastily applying "the general rule thatcertioraricannot be made a substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof."The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "AbigailVariety Store" was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described."Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned byBurgos, Sr.v.Chief of Staff,AFP,11allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.Burgosis inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file.12The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as inBurgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. InBurgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requiresinter aliathe search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla.13In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing.It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:14The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized.it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched,15the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation**(inter aliaof the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.16In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units the place to be searched being plainly marked was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive "evidence which**(the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the special civil action ofcertiorariin the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a search warrant has been "issued by a courtotherthan the one trying the main criminal case," the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.17In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this Court inMalaloan v. Court of Appeals18concerning "possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second guideline reads:192. When the latter court (referring to the court which doesnottry the main criminal case) issues the search warrant,a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 which dismissed the Peoples petition forcertiorariseeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO,Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004, affirming the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498, that found Andy Quelnan y Quino3(petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.The accusatory portion of the Information against petitioner reads:That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.Contrary to law.4During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.Witnesses5for the prosecution testified as to the following set of facts:On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo Lectura,6was formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on 26 August 1996.7At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway, Makati. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek assistance in serving the warrant. Security Officer Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and they proceeded to Unit 615.At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door.8He was later identified as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to petitioner.9Upon entry, the police operatives searched the unit, which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider separating the sala from the bedroom.10In the presence of petitioner and Punsaran, the group started searching the place and eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic sachets.11Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of the properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their presence and that of Punsaran.12Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant and search the place. The police operatives did not find any occupant in the room.Petitioner was then brought to the PARAC office for investigation. The pieces of evidence gathered by the police operatives were brought to the NBI for examination. That same day, NBI Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a certification stating that upon examination, the specimen submitted yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.13The following day, the Arrest Report and Joint Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police operatives leading to the arrest and charging of petitioner for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.In his defense, petitioner testified that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300, 2600 Roxas Boulevard, Manila.14He also happens to be the registered owner of Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium in Makati City, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee (Lee) beginning May 1996.15On 27 August 1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to Unit 615 to collect payment of rental from Lee. Upon knocking at the door, petitioner was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait for Lee inside the room while she went out to buy some refreshments. After a while, petitioner heard somebodyknocking at the door and he opened it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who suddenly barged into the room. The officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim and petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium unit. The police operatives then proceeded to search the house for the next half hour while petitioner was waiting in the sala. Petitioner was also forced to sign some documents at gunpoint. Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office. Two days later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest and a case was subsequently filed against him.16In behalf of petitioner, Luis Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium, testified that Lee was the actual occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was arrested.17Celso Fiesta, petitioners driver, also stated in court that petitioner resides at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August 1996, he dropped petitioner off at Cityland Condominium between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Two and a half hours later, he went back to pick him up. As he was about to park the car, somebody poked a gun at him and introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the car and the PARAC team searched the vehicle. They found a gun and brought Fiesta to the DILG. He was released the following day.18After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.19In convicting petitioner, the trial court relied heavily on the clear, straightforward, and candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses:They were all present when the search warrant was implemented at Unit 615 Cityland Condominium. No infirmity or flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further, the Court considered that they are public officers and there was no showing that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies or bad faith to falsely testify against the accused. There was no evidence of intent to harass the accused. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions can be fairly applied.20On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling, modifying however the penalty to be imposed on petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum.21Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the validity of the warrantless arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the subject shabu justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises, that of the validity of the enforcement of the search warrant as basis for the presence of the police operatives in the Cityland Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters may be summarized into two issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was properly enforced and whether petitioner was validly arrested without warrant.The issue as to whether the search warrant was validly implemented necessitates a review of the tenor of the search warrant, vis--vis the conduct of the police operatives enforcing such warrant. Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURTNATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGIONPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff- versus -BERNARD LIM22Room 615 Cityland CondominiumSouth Superhighway, Makati CityRespondent.SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425(Dangerous Drug Act 1972)

SEARCH WARRANTTO ANY PEACE OFFICER:GREETINGS:It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP SPO4 ISAGANI J. ILAS and his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to believe that VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 6425 has been committed or is about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that still undetermined Quantity of Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) has [sic] in his possession and control.You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises abovementioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the abovementioned MET[H]AMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of the offense and bring to this Court said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. You are further directed to submit return within ten (10) days from today.GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 26[th] day of August 1996 in Manila, Philippines.HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHONExecutive Judge, RTCBranch XXIII, ManilaNOTE: This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue.23Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search warrant in that despite the knowledge that petitioner was not the subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway with the search and his resulting arrest. According to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises and not of a person, the omission of the name of the owner or occupant of such property in the warrant does not invalidate the same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine applies only if the search warrant does not indicate with all certainty the owner or occupant of the premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the subject search warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject thereof is Kim.This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oat