1st iaa latin american symposium on small satellites ... iaa latin american symposium on small...
TRANSCRIPT
1st IAA Latin American Symposium on
Small Satellites: Advanced Technologies
and Distributed Systems
Novel Methodology for using Latest Technology
Electronic Components in Space
“The person who says it cannot be done should not interrupt the person doing it” Chinese Proverb
Eng. Roberto M. CIBILS [email protected] INVAP
PARTS SELECTION USUAL
PRACTICES
Use “as is”
Maximum risk of mission failure
Very cheap and fast supply
Upscreening
Risk of failing qualification
More expensive than “space qualified”
The more demanding environmental requirements, the lower the size of the accepted batch; if any
RISK MANAGEMENT
BASED SELECTION
Risk analysis
Risk mitigation
Risk assessment
RISK ANALYSIS
Vulnerabilities in Design
Reliability Paradox
Vulnerabilities in Design
Reliability paradox
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Pro
bab
ilit
y
Time [years]MTTF
Pf=1-e-t/MTTF ; r=e-tmission/MTTF
Vulnerabilities in Design
Reliability paradox
Metalic Strip Cross-Section
Electromigration
Blacks Equation
Mathematical Model for Lifetime
A: Cross-section area dependent constant
J: Current Density
N: Scaling factor, usually set to 2
Ea: Activation Energy for electromigration
K: Boltzmann constant
T: Temperature
Pay attention to the EXPONENTIAL dependence with
temperature
Tk
E
J
ALifetime
a
Nexp
Oxide Thickness
Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB)
Negative Bias Thermal Instability (NBTI)
Hot Carrier Injection (HCI)
In ALL of them Lifetime depends EXPONENTIALLY with temperature
Solder Contacts
BGA and CCGA Packages
Coffin-Manson
Vulnerabilities & Failures
Phases
Vulnerabilities generation: Ground
Failure occurrence: Space
Vulnerabilities Generation
During design
Metalic strips size
Oxide thickness
Solder contacts
During manufacturing
Die
Bonding
Contacts
Packages
During other phases
Transport
Storage
Handling
Assembly & Tests
Vulnerabilities Generated in other
Phases
Permeability, Delamination, Ionic contamination, Corrosion
Electrostatic Discharge
RISK MITIGATION
Preemtive (delay) strategy
Failure mitigation strategy
FAULT PREEMPTION
Wear Out by Ground Induced
Vulnerabilities
SPECIAL PROCEDURES
For procurement
For reception
For storage
For assembly
For test
Wear Out by the Space Environment
TOTAL IONIZING DOSE (TID)
WEAR OUT MITIGATION:
Spot Shielding
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.00E+01
1.00E+02
1.00E+03
1.00E+04
1.00E+05
1.00E+06
1.00E+07
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
TID
(rad
)
mm de aluminio
DDC- Multi-misión
Electrones atrapadosProtones atrapadosProtones solares
Protones Oct-89
Fotones
Total
Wear Out by
TEMPERATURE Board Level
High Thermal Conductivity Coating
Heat flowing through the thermal coating compensates the lack of convection in space.
Box Level
Phase Change Materials
Paraffin Heat Switches
System Level
Variable Surface Radiators
Loop Heat Pipes
Wear Out by
THERMAL CYCLES Lifetime extension techniques for BGA and CCGA packages
(use of fillers ó micro-coil springs)
FAULT MITIGATION
Radiation induced failure modes of
random occurrence
Latch Up
SEU/SEFI
LATCH UP MITIGATION
SEL-triggered Power Switchs
Use of fast-acting over-current sensing power switches to give a degree of protection against damage from SEL.
SEL susceptibility depends on silicon junction temperature. Reducing the operating temperature range reduces the latch up risk,
SEU MITIGATION by SW
EDAC and TTMR
Repetition codes
Parity bits
Checksums
Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRCs)
Cryptographic hash functions
Error-correcting codes
Time Triple Modular Redundancy
SEFI MITIGATION
WATCH DOG Lockstep Checkpointing
Roll back
Example: TI TMS570 series
RISK
ASSESSMENT
Risk Assessment
By
pro
cess
By
anal
ysis
By
de
sign
(p
art)
By
de
sign
(b
oar
d)
By
de
sign
(Sy
ste
m)
By
test
Re
curr
ing
cost
[U
$S]
Re
curr
ing
tim
e
[mo
nth
s]
Occ
urr
en
ce
pro
bab
ility
(be
fore
mit
igat
ion
)O
curr
en
ce
pro
bab
ility
(aft
er
mit
igat
ion
)
Seve
rity
Ris
k
(be
fore
mit
igat
ion
)
Ris
k
(aft
er
mit
igat
ion
)
Delamination
Cracks in the passivation layer
Cracks in the die
Ionic contamination
Moisture condensation
Corrosion
Outgassing
Popcorning
Intermetalic compound in the bonding
Tin wiskers
Overheating
Infant mortality
Degraded ball bonds
Wire sweep
Shorts, floating nodes
Fatigue of solder joints
Electromigration
Mitigation Figures of Merit
IC Code Number
Re
leva
nce
Failure mode
CONCLUSIONS
The use of “space qualified” electronic components produce systems with higher mass-volume, higher power consumption, and lower performance than those produced using mass market driven commercial quality electronic components.
The “use as is” strategy for using electronic components of commercial quality level is risky
The use of “up-screening” for qualifying COTS for space missions is expensive and produce the risk of failing in satisfying the mission requirements.
A better strategy can be applied by analyzing and mitigating the vulnerabilities of electronic parts.
For this, it is necessary to develop a “toolbox” of specific mitigation techniques for the critical failure modes of the components of interest. The development of this toolbox has to be a project itself an not be embedded at the shadow of one particular space mission.
QUESTIONS?
References
[1] D. Cadbury, "Space Race: The Epic Battle Between America and the Soviet Union for Dominion of Space", Ed. HarperCollins (2005)
[2] L. Hamiter, "The History of Space Quality EEE Parts in the United States", ESA Electronic Components Conference, ESTEC, Noordwijk, The Netherlands (12 - 16 November, 1990)
[3] F. Chiavassa, "MIL System Overview - EEE Parts", CCT Composants Conference (Nov 2004).
[4] "Small Satellites: A Revolution in Space Science", Final Report, Keck Institute for Space Studies California Institute of Technology Pasadena, CA (July 2014)
[5] https://terrabella.google.com/
[6] D. Sinclair, J. Dyer, "Radiation Efects and COTS Parts in SmallSats ", 27th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, (August 10-15, 2013)
[7] A. Shao, E. Koltz, J. Wertz, "Quantifying the Cost Reduction Potential for Earth Observation Satellites", 12th Reinventing Space Conference, London - UK (18-20 November, 2014)
[8] NASA, EEE-INST-002: Instructions for EEE Parts Selection, Screening, Qualification, and Derating.
References
[9] J. Plante, M. Sampson, Cost Impacts of Upgrading Electronic Parts for Use in NASA Space Flight Systems, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Available in web: https://nepp.nasa.gov/ DocUploads/3F0EA425-5267-4A18-8E99EAEF6BF3A1B7/Cost%20Impacts%20of%20Upgradi ng%20Electronic%20Parts%20for%20Use%20in%20NASA%20Space%20Flight%20Systems.pdf
[10] ESA, ECSS-Q-ST-60C, Electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) components.
[11] R.L. de Orio, H. Ceric, S. Selberherr, "Physically based models of electromigration: From Black’s equation to modern TCAD models", Microelectronics Reliability, Vol. 50, pp. 775–789 (2010)
[12] S. Salemi, L. Yang, J. Dai, J. Qin, J. Bernstein, "Physics-of-Failure Based Handbook of Microelectronic Systems", RiAC, University of Maryland.
[13] R. Cibils, "Radiation Tolerance Evolution of CMOS Integrated Circuits", 1st IAA Latin American Symposium on Small Satellites: Advanced Technologies and Distributed Systems (Feb 7-10, 2017)
[14] R. Cibils, "Small Satellites Hardened by Design for the use of Non-Space Qualified EEE Parts", 2014 NEPP EEE Parts for Small Missions Workshop, GSFC (Sep 10-11, 2014)
BACK UP
INTRODUCTION
SPACE ACTIVITY
ORIGIN:
Objectives: strategic, military
Budget: Unlimited
Quality of EEE parts: Space
TODAY: Universities
Objetive : human resource
Budget: Very low
Quality of EEE parts: COTS
Spin offs
Objetive : profit
Budget: Very low
Quality of EEE parts: SPACE/COTS
WHY USING COTS?
WHY USING COTS?
WHY USING COTS?
SPACE QUALIFIED COTS
TRANSCEIVER A full PCB is required to fulfill
this function
ANALOG DEVICES
AD9361
CMOS - 65 nm
Single chip 10 x 10 mm
PROCESSOR
AEROFLEX
LEON 3 - DUAL CORE
CMOS - 180 nm
134 DMIPS
NXP
SoC Processors i.MX7
CMOS 28 nm FD-SOI
1570 DMIPS
MEMORY
3DPLUS
3DFN064G08VB1388
CMOS NAND FLASH
Stack 8 x 8 (64) Gbits
MICRON
MT29F512G08AUEBBH8-12
CMOS 3D NAND FLASH
512 Gbits
CCD SENSOR CONTROLLER
CIRRUS LOGIC
LM98640
CMOS
10 chips are needed
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
WM8235
CMOS
Only 3 chips are enough
FUNCTIONIMPLEMENTATION
PERFORMANCE?
PROCESSORS
INT
ER
SIL
HS
1-8
0C
86
RH
-8
AT
ME
L T
SC
21
02
0
AT
ME
L T
SC
69
5 (E
RC
32
)
IBM
RA
D 6
00
0
AR
M C
OR
TE
X M
1 (
AR
M V
6-M
)
AT
ME
L A
T6
97
F (
LE
ON
3)
INT
EL i8
04
86
AE
RO
FL
EX
DU
AL
CO
RE
LE
ON
3 F
T
INT
EL S
TR
ON
GA
RM
SA
-111
0
BA
E S
YS
TE
MS
RA
D-7
50
IBM
PP
C 6
03
IBM
PP
C 7
50
IBM
PP
C 7
50
FX
IBM
PP
C 7
50
GX
FR
EE
SC
AL
E M
PC
86
10
FR
EE
SC
AL
E M
PC
74
48
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
CA
PAC
IDA
D D
E P
RO
CES
AM
IEN
TO [
MIP
S]
- RAD TOLERANT COTS- RAD HARD- RAD HARD BY DESIGN- CORE
DATA STORAGE DENSITY?
2- La memoria de mayor densidad de Micron (MT29F512G08AUEBBH8-12) es de 512 Gbit.
MEMORIES 1- Las memorias NAND FLASH de mayor densidad de 3D-Plus (3DFN64G16VS8710) son
de 64 Gbit que, por ejemplo, espacializa ocho dies de 8Gbits de Micron .
MASS?
TRANSCEIVERS
-- AD9361
SIZE?
CCD Controllers
LM98640
WM8235
TECHNOLOGY PHASE SHIFT
Technology
10
μm
3 μ
m
1.5
μm
1 μ
m
80
0 n
m
60
0 n
m
35
0 n
m
25
0 n
m
18
0 n
m
13
0 n
m
90
nm
65
nm
45
nm
32
nm
28
nm
22
nm
FIN
FET
14
nm
FD-S
OI
28
/22
nm
10
nm
7 n
m
5 n
m
Year
19
71
19
75
19
82
19
85
19
89
19
94
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
20
TOD
AY
LEO
N 3
DU
AL
CO
RE
TEC
HN
OLO
GY
FPG
A R
TG4
TEC
HN
OLO
GY
SAC
-D L
AU
NC
HIN
G
CM
OS
TEC
HN
OLO
GY
USE
D IN
SA
C-C
CM
OS
TEC
HN
OLO
GY
USE
D IN
SAC
-D, S
AO
CO
M,
AR
SAT-
1,2
SAC
-C L
AU
NC
HIN
G
AR
SAT
1 L
AU
NC
HIN
G
AR
SAT
2 L
AU
NC
HIN
G
SAO
CO
M
LAU
NC
HIN
G
20 years
21 years
24 years
17 years
between 15 and 25 years
SELECTION CRITERIA
Use COTS only if they provide a considerable improvement of
technology
Focus on CMOS Integrated Circuits