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' A cadamr ol Management Review. 1990, Vol. 15, No. 2, 286-310.

Applicant Attraction Strategies:An Organizational PerspectiveSARA L. RYNES

Cornell UniversityALISON E. BARBERUniversity of WisconsinLabor shortages, which are predicted to last into the next century, areexpected to increase the importance of applicant attraction for orga-nizations. Unfortunately, previous research has provided little uni-fied theory or operational guidance for organizations that are con-fronted with such difficulties. In part, this is because much researchhas been framed from the applicant's, rather than the organization's,perspective. In addition, attraction-related theories and researc h arescattered across a variety of literatures, and often are identified withother topics (e.g., wage, motivation, or discrimination theories).Draw ing on multiple literatures, this article develops a model of ap-plicant attraction from the organization's perspective, which (a) out-lines three strategies for enhancing applicant attraction, (b) proposescategories of contingency factors that are expected to affect thechoice (and potential effectiveness) of alternative strategies, (c) sug-gests probable interrelationships a mon g the strategies, (d) links ap-plicant attraction strategies to other human resource practices, (e)outlines dimensions of attraction outcomes, and (f) discusses impli-cations for future research. , : - - i: V-'.

Organizat ions have always been concernedwith attracting and selecting the right types ofem plo ye es (e.g., Sch neide r, 1976, 1987). How-ever, the attention they pay to attracting, versusscreening, new employees depends on manyfactors such as the relative attractiveness of thevacancy and the general state of the labor mar-ket (Guion, 1976; Rynes, in press).In the latter regard, demographic develop-me nts such a s the bab y bust an d the leveling offof female labor force participation rates suggestthat widespread labor shoriages will developa n d pe rsist well into the 21st centu ry. A long with

these t rends , demographers p red ic t an increased emphasis on attracting labor (lohnsto& Packer, 1987). Inde ed, in cre ase d co nc emabout at t ract ing applicants are already appaent in the popular press (e.g., Bernstein, 1987Finney, 1989; Hamlet, 1989; Hanigan, 1987; Merill, 1987).To date, the m ana gem ent and organizationbehavior li teratures have focused on recruiment as the dominant tool for attracting applcan t s (Rynes, He nem an , & Sc hw ab , 1980Sc hw ab , 1982; W an ou s, 1980). How ever, prioeconomic research into the functioning of labo

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markets suggests that improved recruitment isoften an inadequate response to attraction diffi-culties, particularly when vacancies are unat-tractive or when labor shoriages persist (e.g.,Kerr & Fish er, 1950; Malm, 1955; Doerin ger &Piore, 1971). In such situations, more aggressivestrategies are generally necessary.In light of these considerations, this ariicledraws from multiple literatures (economics, hu-man resource management, industrial psychol-ogy, organizational behavior, and sociology) todevelop an interdisciplinary model of applicantattraction. Moreover, unlike most psychologicaltreatments of applicant attraction (e.g., Rynes etal., 1980; W an ou s, 1977), this mo del is dev el-oped from the organization's, rather than theapplicant 's, perspective.Anticipated benefits of adopting an interdisci-plinary organizational perspective include (a)discussion of a broader range of strategies forattracting applicants, (b) delineation of contin-ge nc y factors affecting strateg ic choice s, (c) con-sideration of potential interrelationships amongal tern at iv e s t ra teg ies , (d) em ph asi s on in-cre ase d a w ar en es s of potential differences in or-ganizational responses to diverse environmen-tal conditions, (e) description of testable propo-sitions regarding the conditions under whichvarious strategies or combinations of strategieswil l be employed, (f) discussion of greaterawareness of the interrelationships between at-traction strategies and other human resourcepractices, (g) cons ideration of a br oa de r ran geof attraction-related outcomes, and (h) sugges-tions for making future research more relevantto organizational decision m akers.

Domain and BoundariesAt the outset, it is helpful to delineate theboundaries of the present discussion. First, themodel focuses primarily on applicant attraction,as distinct from screening or selection. Althoughattraction and selection are inherently intercon-nected in the process of filling vacancies (e.g.,Boudreau & Rynes, 1985; Schwab, 1982), the fo-

cus here is on activities designed either to increase the number or to change the characteristics of individuals who are willing to consideapplying for or accepting a job.Second, the model distinguishes between attraction and recruitment. Although recruitmentheories often treat recruitment as synonymouwith attraction (e.g., Rynes et al., 1980; Schwab1982), this ariicle views recruitment as a meanof attracting the applicant. Thus, improved recruitment is regarded as one potential strategfor enhancing attraction, but so are decisions tmodify employment inducements or to targedifferent kinds of applicants.Third, the model is concerned primarily witstrategic choices in novel or changed situation(e.g., precipitous decline in labor supply, newjob creation). Under normal conditions, organzational decision makers follow largely automatic scripts involving little conscious decisiomaking or strategic choice (e.g., Klein, 1989; Oterm an, 1987). How ever, wh en co nve ntionascripts fail to produce satisfactory results, decsion makers begin to consciously seek more efective strategies. In shori, it is assumed that saisficing (rather than maximizing) decision processes are applied in most attraction situation(e.g., March & Simon, 1958), although the fochere is on nonroutine searches for better solutions (presumably the best solutions, given perceived constraints) w hen traditional pro cedu reprove unsatisfactory.Fourih, there are many ways to deal with labor shoriages other than through labor attraction strategies. These range from closely relatehuman resource act ivi t ies (e.g. , redesigninjobs, retraining employees for nontraditionajobs) to decisions that go right to the core of thbusiness strategy (e.g., decisions to relocatoverseas or decisions to curiail franchise expansion). However, consideration of these broades t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s e s w o u l d c o n s i d e r a b llengthen a nd com plicate the presen t discussionas such, the focus here is restricted to attractiostrategies per se. The reader should bear imind, however, that under extremely advers

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conditions (e.g., widespread labor shoriages,very low ability to pay), there may be no com-bination of attraction strategies that, by itself, iscapable of bringing about desired results.Finally, the present discussion is confined toextemal staffing procedures. Although genericstrategic options in any attraction scen ario (e.g.,improving recruitment, targeting different appb-cants) are basically the same for both internaland extemal staffing, there are sufficient differ-ences in the relevant contingency variables af-fecting strategy formulation to wa rran t se pa rat estudy of attraction practices in internal laborma rkets (e.g ., A nderso n, Milkovich, & Tsui,1981).

The ModelThe present model outlines three distinct strat-egies for attracting applicants: (a) altering re-cruitment practices, (b) targeting nontraditionalapplicants, and (c) modifying employment in-duc em ents (Figure 1). Although psychologicalresearch has primarily emphasized recruitmentstrategies, economic and sociological field re-search have demonstrated that inducement andapplicant-targeting strategies also play an inte-gral role in organizations' attempts to attractmore, better, or more cost-effective applicants.As shown in Figure 1, a num ber of contingen-cies are hypothesized to influence the mix of thethree strategies. These include labor marketconditions (e.g., expected duration of laborshoriages), vacancy characteristics (e.g., rela-tive attractiveness), organizational characteris-tics (e.g., ability to pay), phase of the attractionprocess (e.g., job application versus job accep-tance stage), and legal considerations.Additionally, the model suggests that whenconscious decision pro cesse s come into play, a l-ternative strategies usually ar e considered inter-actively, rather than independently (e.g., Doer-inge r & Piore, 1971). Thus, for exam ple, deci-sions about applicant pools and recruitmentme ssag es are b ase d at least in pari on decisionsabout employment inducements.

The model also suggests several ways iwhich attraction strategies interact with othehu m an reso urce (HR) prac tices . More specifcally, attraction strategies both affect and araffected by HR prac tices. For exam ple, thadoption of new inducement strategies is frequently constrained by current compensatiopractices. Conversely, decisions to target newapplicant pools often precipitate changes in selection meth ods (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Ostem an, 1987), a s well as p osthire practices su ch asocialization an d trainin g (Fisher, 1986; SuttonLouis, 1987).The model also emphasizes the multidimensionality of attraction outcomes. For examplethere are both short-term (related to attractioper se) and long-term (postjob acceptance) implicat ions of at tract ion practices. Moreovethere are both quantitative and qualitative dmensions within each time frame (e.g., percenjob acc ep ta nce s and s igna led p roduct iv i tcharacteristics in the shori term, retention rateand revealed productivity in the longer termFinally, there can be significant spillover effecfrom attraction activities, both to applicants' decisions other than job choice (e.g., whether tbuy the organization's products) and to individuals other than current applicants (e.g., potential applicants, current employees).

With one exception, the model is elaboratein subsequ ent sections in the order represen teby the flow diagram in Figure 1. However, decision was made to discuss attraction oucom es (i.e., dep en de nt variables ) first inste ad olast, based on the logic that it is difficult to discuss strategic alternatives and factors affectinchoices among them without some notion owhat one is attempting to achieve.

Attraction Outcomes:What Is at Stake?From an organizational perspective, the mosfundamental objective of attraction activities to fill vacancies (e.g., Hanssens & Levien, 198Krett & Stright, 1985; M au rer & Ho we , 198

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ContingenciesLabor market conditionsVacancy characteristicsOrganizational characteristicsPhase oi attraction processLegal considerations

Attraction Strategies

RecruitmentOrganizcrtionalrepresentativesMessagesSources ,Timing

InducementsPecuniaryNonpecuniary

Applicant PoolsNontraditionalapplicantsLess-qualifiedapplicants

OtherHuman ResourcePractices

Attraction OutcomesPreemploymentQuantityOualitySpilloverPostemploymentQuantityQualitySpillover

Figure I. Model oi the attraction process.Stoops, 1984). Not surprisingly, then, most pre-scriptive evaluation models recommend includ-ing multiple me asu res that reflect the quantity ofapplicants (e.g. , number of applications re-ceived, percent unfilled vacancies) (Cascio,1987; Ryn es & Bo udre au, 1986). How ever, m ostprescriptions also advocate the imporiance ofassessing efficiency, in terms of both time andmoney. For example, Cascio (1987) recom-

mended such measures as cost-per-hire, acceptance-to-offer ratios, and time elapsed betweevarious attraction stages. In practice, howevem an ag ers a pp ea r to be far more likely to attento vacancy rates per se than to more refinemeasures involving costs, yield ratios, or timlapses (e.g., Laitamaki, 1989; Miner, 1979; Ryn& Bo udr eau , 1986).In addition, practicing managers as well a289


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academics agree that the quality, as well asquantity, of applicants and job acceptors is acrucial outcome of the attraction process (e.g.,Bo udre au & Ryn es, 1985; Ca scio, 1987; Schn ei-der , 1976; Sch w ab , 1982). Inde ed, ther e are bo thconceptual and empirical reasons for believingthat most vacancies are eventually filled withsomeone (e. g. , L aita m aki, 1989; Ry nes &Bo udre au, 1986; Thurow , 1975). As suc h, themost interesting questions often involve not thenumbers, but the characteristics, of those at-tracted.Unforiunately, the true quality or productivityof an applicant cannot be known with ceriaintyduring the attraction process. Although someproductivity-related characteristics of job appli-cants are directly observable or testable (e.g.,word-processing skills, computer-programmingskills), others (e.g., aptitude for future learning,motivation) only can be inferred via imperfectsignals (e.g., Spen ce, 1973; Thurow, 1975). Nev-eriheless, a variety of applicant characteristicshave become accepted, accurately or not, assignals of actual quality or productivity. Theseinclude education, experience, predictor scoreson selection devices, and demographic charac-teristics (e.g.. Arrow, 1972; Konrad & Pfeffer, inpress; Spence, 1973).Finally, a few models emphasize that the ef-fects of attraction strategies may spill over be-yond the job choice decisions of current appli-cants (e.g., Rynes et al., 1980). One example ofsuch spillover is that organization-applicant in-teractions ma y influence app licants' subseq uentconsumption decisions (e.g., "I won't buy any-thing from a company that asks those kind ofquestions!"). In addition, the impressions cre-ated during the attraction process may be trans-mitted from current to potential applicants, thusaffecting the organization's general image orreputation. However, these spillover effects, al-though frequently acknowledged anecdotally,have not been incorporated into formal pre-scriptive or eva luative mod els (e.g., Boud reau &Rynes, 1985; Ca scio , 1987; W an ou s, 1980).The preceding discussion periains only to at-

traction pe r se, th at is, to effects that oc cur e itheprior to or at the point of job acceptance. However, both theoretical an d em pirical works h avsuggested that variations in attraction practicecan have imporiant effects on long-term (i.epostacceptance) outcomes as well. Moreovesimilar to prehire effects, posthire outcomes alshave quanti tat ive, quali tat ive, and spil lovcomponents.For example, regarding the quantitative dmension, variat ions in recruitment practice(choice of recruitmen t s ource, pres entatio n of ralistic recruitment messages) are sometimes asociated with differences in number of retainenew hires over various periods of time (e.gG ann on , 1971; Prem ack & W ano us, 1985; Uman, 1966). Similarly, decisions to enhance atraction inducements (e.g., housing assistanchigher starting salaries) have been shown tlead to reduced turnover (e.g., Hamlet, 1989; Lkhani, 1988).In terms of quality, validation research suggests that de cisions to target attraction activititowa rd different a pplic ant pools (e.g., those widifferent credentials or higher/lower predictoscores) are likely to be associated with diffeence s in posthire periormanc e evaluations, p rmotion rates, salaries, and other quality-relateindices (e.g., Gaugler, Rosenthal, Thornton, Bentson , 1987; How ard , 1986; Tenop yr, 1981Similarly, efficiency wage theory (e.g., Weis1980; Yellen, 1984) sug ge sts tha t decis ions to enhance attraction inducements have a positivimpact on the quality, as well as quantity, othose attracted to and retained by organizations.Finally, psychologists, sociologists, and ecoomists ha ve docum ented how c ha ng es in attration practices can have spillover effects on curent employees. For example, attraction of nontraditional applicants may increase long-terorganizational viability by impxiriing new skillmethods, and viewpoints that are critical to ogaruzational adaptability (e.g., Schneider, 198Sutton & Louis, 1987). O n the othe r ha nd , recining new types is frequently resisted by organ

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zational insiders and can result in both negativeand posi t ive outcomes, par t icular ly in theshorier term. For example, Granovetter (1986)argued that the hiring of nontraditional appli-cants sometimes results in the refusal of currentemployees to engage in the kinds of socializa-tion and training behaviors necessary for newemployees to become successful performers.Additionally, the hiring of nontraditional em-ployees can result in reduced solidarity amongworkers, the eme rgen ce of sep ara te enc laves ofdemographically distinct workers, and the re-drawing of conventional career lines and inter-nal labor market patterns (e.g., Gordon, Ed-wards, & Reich , 1982; Kante r, 1977).The fact that va riations in attraction strategiescan have diverse outcomes affecting many indi-viduals over multiple time periods raises thequestion of how these potentially conflicting out-comes are weighted by organizational decisionmakers when they choose among alternative at-traction strategies. Prescriptively, Cascio (1987)sugg ested 24 types of cost an d quality ana lysesthat "should be performed regularly" so that"critical trade-offs between cost and quality canbe made intelligently on the basis of empiricaldata, not haphazardly on the basis of hunch orintuition" (p. 252). Unforiunately, the reader isleft with little guidance as to how to translatesuch widely varying criteria as cost per hire bysou rce, offer/interview ratios, an d ana lysis ofreasons for acceptance and termination into acommon metric so that such decisions can trulyproceed beyond intuitive processing.Altematively, Bou dreau an d R ynes (1985) pro-posed a model for evaluating combined recruit-ment and selection utility according to a mone-tary metric. However, to date no research hasapplied this model to actual attraction situa-tions, most likely because of the complexity ofthe model and the problems (e.g., reliability,validity, credibility) associated with providingthe requisite monetary estimates. Moreover, themodel does not incorporate all potential out-comes of attraction strategies (e.g., spillovereffects).

Turning to descriptive rather th an prescriptiveresearch, there is also little hard evidence as tohow various potential outcomes are actuallyweighted in practice. Early institutional studiesof local labor markets, based on employersself-reporis of recruitment and selection criteriasuggested that (presumed) applicant quali tydominates the choice of attraction strategies(Schwab, 1982). However, other studies suggesthat organizations rarely collect evaluative databeyond the number of vacancies filled or, lessfrequently, costs per hire (e.g., Drake, Kaplan& Stone, 1973; Miner, 1979; Ry nes & Bou drea u1986). This, in tum , su gg est s that attra ction strategies may be driven more by shori-term andcost considerations than managers are willingto adm it. (See Tsui a n d Gom ez-Mejia, 1988, fosimilar evidence concerning HR evaluation ingeneral.) Although evidence concerning formadata-keeping procedures is hardly sufficient torule out long-term quality considerations as important decision criteria, it does suggest that tothe extent such factors figure into strategy formulation, they do so largely on an ad hoc, subjective basis.

General Attraction StrategiesUnder any given set of market conditions

there are at least three distinct strategies for increasing attraction success: (a) improving recruitment practices, (b) altering employment inducem ents, a nd (c) targeting nontraditional a pplicants. Each is discussed in tum.Recruitment Practices

Of the proposed attraction strategies, recruitment practices hav e received the most attentionin the management and organizational behavior literatures. This ariicle briefly summarizefour dimensions of recruitment that have beehypothesized to influence applicant attraction.O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Representatives. S e v e r acharacteristics of organizational representative(e.g. , personali ty, informedness, credibil i tyhave been hypothesized to affect applicants' im

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pressions and decisions about organizations. If,in fact, organizational representatives have im-poriant effects on job applicants, it would makesense to train or select recruiters to ensure thatthey possess the right characteristics for favor-ably influencing applicants (Rynes & Boudreau,1986).Unforiunately, the research on organizationalrepresentatives, though voluminous, is of lim-ited usefulness to organizations in several im-poriant respects. First, with few exceptions (e.g..Fisher, Ilgen, & Hoyer, 1979; li d en & Pars ons,1986), this research has concentrated almost ex-clusively on campus recruiters. As such, its re-sults are of questionable generalizability to ap-plicant pools other than graduating college stu-dents.Moreover, even among this highly restrictedapplicant sample, campus recruiters are lesslikely to figure significantly in applicants' job-choice decisions than are other organizationalrepresentatives (e.g., hiring managers, poten-tial co-workers). For example, potential co-workers are viewed as more credible sources ofinformation than are campus recruiters (Fisheret a l , 1979), parily b ec au se of their proximity tothe vacancy and partly because co-workers areless likely to be seen as professional job sellers.An additional limitation of this research is thatalthough the fundamental objectives of organi-zational-attraction activities are behavioral innature (e.g., job acceptances), research on or-ganizational representatives has focused almostexclusively on attitudes, rather than behaviors.Moreover, this focus has been narrowed still fur-ther to attitudes held only at very ea rly stag es ofthe attraction pro cess (i.e., imm ediately after theinitial campus interview). As such, there is al-most no empirical evidence concerning the ex-tent to which organizational representatives,pariicularly those other than the campus re-cruiter, influence a ctu al job choices. (For an ex-ception, see Taylor and Bergmann, 1987.) Fur-therm ore, th e interiemporal reliabilities of m an ycommonly used dependent variables are ques-tionable, d ue to mism atching betw een ph as e of

the attraction process (e.g., campus interviewand the applicant judgment required (probabiity of accepting the job, if offered).Finally, even the existing evidence on poscampus-interview attitudes (the stage at whicrecruiters are hypothesized to have the greatesimpact) is not very supportive of the hypothesithat campus recruiters are likely to have important effects on ultimate job choices. For example, a recent review of the literature observethat recrui ter characterist ics explained morvariance in attitudes that are far removed fromjob choice (e.g., impre ssions of recruiters pe r sethan in attitudes closer to choice (e.g., likelihooof accepting a job offer) (Rynes, in press). Additionally, recruiter characteristics typically explained less (and, most commonly, nonsignificant) variance in studies that controlled for vacancy characteristics, relative to those that dinot. Because the former type of study morclosely mirrors actu al attraction situations, studies that ignore vacancy characteristics are likelto suffer from serious omitted variable biase(James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982) that inflate the apparent role of organizat ional representat ive(Rynes, in press; Rynes & Miller, 1983).

Thus, the employer that wishes to attract moror better applicants will not find much supporfor the notion that im proving th e perform ance oorganizational representatives enhances job acceptance rates. It should be noted, howeverthat prior research has not directly tested thpotential benefits of more careful selection andtraining programs for organizational representatives. Rather, recruiters have been studied ana tu ra l ly occu r r ing phenomena in campuplacement offices. Second, the one-shot, crosssectional designs that typify research on recruiters are inca pab le of detecting subtle, but potentially impioriant, indirect effects of recruiters onbehavioral objectives (e.g., effective recruitebehaviors may cause interviewees to conveypositive m essa ges to potential applicants, whichma y increase the num ber of individuals who actually apply, which in tum m ay influence ev entual recruitment yields).

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Recruitment Messages. A second recruitmentdimension that may affect attraction is the na-ture of the message transmitted to prospectiveemployees. Although vacancies are ostensiblycomposed of a given set of characteristics, dis-cretion is possible re gard ing the wa ys in whichthe content, favorability, and details of the va-cancies are described. Room for discret ionarises from such factors as imperiect informationof the job seeker, inherent subjectivity in de-scribing and evaluating vacancy characteristics(e.g., career prospects), and the flexibility builtinto many job descriptions (Schwab, Rynes, &Aldag, 1987).

To date, the vast majority of research has fo-cused on message favorability (usually calledrealism), rather than on content or level of de-tail. (For exceptions, see B arber, 1989; Giannan-tonio, 1989; Rynes & Miller, 1983.) Interest in thisproblem arose from concerns that employersfrequently take advantage of job seekers' uncer-tainty by overselling vacancies (e.g., Schneider,1976), pe rh ap s at the exp ens e of subseq uen t em -ployee satisfaction and turnover.Empirical evidence is mixed as to whether ornot more realistic (i.e., usually less favorable)messages reduce job acceptance rates. For ex-am ple, a me ta-analysis of 10 studies showed noeffect (d = .00) until a large "outlier" study con-taining more than one fourth of the total samplew as e liminated from the an alys is (Premack &W ano us, 1985). Additionally, con sidera ble workremains to identify the psychological processesinvolved in the processing of message content,the generalizability of effects across a wide va-riety of jobs and applicants, and the productiv-ity-related characteristics of accep tors ve rsus re-jectors under more (less) favorable messages(Rynes, in press).Beyond favorability, however, other poten-tially imporiant m ess age dimensions rem ain al-most completely unstudied. These include (a)the effects of emphasizing ceriain kinds of con-tent over others, (b) the effects of revealing var-ious kinds of information at early versus latesta ge s of the p roce ss, (c) the most effective w ay s

to present credible information about nonverifiab le attributes, (d) the extent to which strategiefor designing effective recruitment messagegeneralize across "good" and "bad" jobs (provided that "good" and "bad" jobs can be identified), and (e) whether different kinds of information (e.g., verifiable and nonverifiable) arequally effectively communicated across different media (e.g., recruiters versus com pany brochures).Recruifmenf Sources. Success in attractindesirable employees also may depend on thsource(s) that are used to locate applicants. Presumably, sources differ in the extent to whicthey provide detailed and accurate informatio(to applicants and to employers), as well as ithe productivity-related charac teristics of the applicants reac he d (e.g., S chw ab, 1982; UUman1966).To date, research on recruitment sources hafocused exclusively on selectees, ra ther th an joapplicants, and posthire, rather than prehireou tco m es ( e .g . , B rea ug h , 1981; Tay lo r &Schm idt, 1983). Unforiunately, suc h r es ea rcdesigns inherently confound employer selection, applicant self-selection, and posthire employer-employee interactions as possible explanations for observed source-outcome relationships (Rynes, in press). As such, extant rese archas little to say about the effects of sources oeither the quantity or quality of the initial applcants from which selectees are obtained (ansubseque ntly studied).Recruitment Timing. Two hypotheses havbe en offered as to how recruitment timing mighbe modified to an employer's advantage. Thfirst suggests that by avoiding delays betweerecruitment stag es, em ployers can minimize thchances of discouraging applicants, which malea d to their accep ting other offers (Rynes et al1980). To date, this hypothesis has received littempirical attention and only mixed suppori (cArvey, G ordon , M asseng ill, & Mussio, 197Taylor & Bergmann, 1987).The second hypothesis suggests that the employer who extends the first offer to a candida

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may have an advantage over those who extendsu bs eq ue nt offers. Acc ording to So elberg (1967),the costs, anxieties, and unceriainties of search-in g for a job cause many applicants to favoractual offers over uncertain ones, provided theydo not contain an y m inimally un acce ptable fea-tures (e.g., insufficient salary). If this is true, em-ployers who practice early recruitment mayh a v e a competitive advantage in attracting ap-plicants. However, this strategy may work onlyfor employers who are competitively above av-e ra g e b e c a u s e the best applicants may notjump at early offers, unless those who makethem are highly desi rab le employers (e .g . ,Weiss, 1980; Yellen, 1984).In sum, despite the fact that the timing of re-cruitment activities has b een hypothesized to af-fect both the quantity and quality of attractedapplicants, no firm conclusions can be drawnabout the effects of timing.Employment Indu cements

A second strategy for enh anc ing applicant at-traction is to improve the nature of the induce-ments offered. For example , employers canraise sa laries, improve benefits, implem ent flex-time, provide child- or eldercare , de velop inter-nal career paths, or make any number of otherimprovements in working co nditions.Before discussing previous research in thisare a, it m ay be useful to desc ribe wh at is mea ntby the term employment inducements. Al-thoug h pr evious studies (pariicularly in psychol-ogy) typically have used the term job attributesin discussing the role of vacancy characteristicsin job choice, we use the term inducements toconvey the notion of deliberately modifying at-tributes for the explicit pu rpo se of en ha nc ing theattractiveness of a job to potential applicants.Although viriually all job attributes could be

regarded as inducements, in practice, some at-tributes are more likely to be deliberately usedas attraction tools than others. For example ,changes in salarie s, benefits, and hours of workare more likely to be implemented explicitly forattraction purpo ses than, say, c han ge s in super-

vision. This is because supervisors have othemore central roles than that of an applicant atraction device, and also because many supevisory characteristics cannot be known by applcants prior to accepting the job (e.g., Sc hw ab eal., 1987).However, because previous research has nmade these distinctions, it is impossible to se

arate attribute from inducement effects in prioresearc h. As such, w e use the term inducemenbecause it better conveys the strategic possibiity of viewing a wide range of job and organzational characteristics as potential attractiodevices. Occasionally, however, we do distinguish between p ecuniary and nonpec uniary inducements.Turning now to previous research , it is fair tsay that most inducement studies, similar tmost recruitment researc h, a re of limited usefuness to organizations. For example , the vasnumber of rating or ranking studies that havexamined the relat ive imporiance of induceme nts (e.g., Jurgensen, 1978) sh ar e a num ber oserious flaws that threaten both their intemaan d e xtem al validity (Lawler, 1971; O ps ahl &Dunnette, 1966; Rynes, Schwab, & Henema1983). Although policy-capturing experimentad dr es s som e of thes e difficulties (e.g., red ucinsocial desirability tendencies and providingconcrete decision context), they introduce limitat ions of their own. For example , po l icycapturing experiments involve hypothet icalrather than real, job choices; they cannot bgeneral ized beyond the inducements and inducement levels presented, and they presummarket characteristics that are not realistic fomost job seekers (e.g., periect information, simultaneous alternatives) (Schwab et al., 1987).

Nevertheless , p revious research has suggested that inducements are the major determinants of applica nts' atti tudes an d behav iors. Foexample, in the few psychological studies thahave simultaneously examined recruiters andinducements, both laboratory experiments andfield surveys have suggested that inducementdominate applicants' atti tudes, pariicularly a294


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later s tag es of the attraction proc ess. In fact, re-cruiter effects have typically faded to nonsignif-icance, once job attributes are taken into ac-cou nt (e.g ., P ow ell, 1984; Rynes & Miller, 1983;Taylor & Be rgm ann , 1987). (For an exception,see Harris and Fink, 1987.)Moreover, inducement research occasionallyhas moved beyond attitudinal surveys or labo-ratory inv estigatio ns to field e xpe rime nts that ex-amine actual applicant behaviors. For example,exper imenta l inducement p rograms in theArmed Services have suggested that both thequantity and quality (as measured by aptitudetest scores) of Army recruits are highly sensitiveto ch an ge s in extrinsic inducem ents such as sal-aries, recruitment and retention bonuses, andeducational incentives (e.g. , Lakhani, 1988;Tannen, 1987). Similar results were obtained ina cross-sectional examination of Navy enlist-ment rates by region, where enlistments weremodeled as a function of alternative employ-ment opporiunities, regional office expenditureson recruitment, and Naval salaries, relative tolocal wage levels (Hanssens & Levien, 1983).

Unfortunately, a variety of difficulties prohibitfirm conclusions as to precisely which induce-ments are most strongly related to applicant at-traction (Schwab et al., 1987). For example, itappears that when given the opporiunity to di-rectly report the factors influencing their jobchoices, applicants tend to give self-flatteringdescriptions of their motivations. In particular,intrinsic outcomes tend to dominate over extrin-sic concerns such as pay or job security. How-ever, reversed preference orderings generallyre revealed by more subtle methodologiese.g., policy capturing) that bypass direct self-

mo ld & Feld m an, 1981; Rynes et al.,1983).An additional difficulty is that the relative im-

1971; Ryn es & Law ler, 1983) an d differences in1951; Rynes et1983). Still, theore tical a rg um en ts (e.g ., Rot-

tenberg, 1956; Schwab et al., 1987) and limitedem pirical eviden ce (e .g., Lakha ni, 1988; Ryneet al. , 1983; Ta nn en , 1987) h av e su gg est ed thaverifiable inducements with calculable pecuniary value are likely to be pariiculariy effectivmotivators of job application and job acceptance decisions.Applicant Pools

A third w ay to increase the ability to attraclabor is to direct recruitment efforts toward individuals who are, for one reason or another, lesmarketable than either traditional applicants othe applicants sought by competi tors (e.g.Finney, 1989). In general, organizations are assumed to target initial recruitment activities toward the most desirable individuals they thinkthey ca n attract (e.g., Doe ringer & Piore, 1971Kerr & Fish er, 1950; Malm, 1955). How ever, ifsuch efforis fail, it is hypothesized that organizations progressively relax their stan da rds until alvacancies are filled (Thurow, 1975).Considerable empir ical evidence suppor tthese assumptions. For example, during WorldWar n, employers sought women and handicapped applicants for jobs formerly filled onlyby able-bodied men (Kerr & Fisher, 1950). In th1980s, employers turned to intemal, untrainedclerical employees to fill entry-level computerprogramming jobs when extemal programmersbecame scarce or too expensive (Osterman1987). Similar substitutions of foreign for native-born applicants have become increasingly com-mon at both ends of the occupational spectrum(e.g.. Central Americans at unskilled levelsEast Asians in professional jobs).Although targeting nontraditional applicantsmight, at first glance, be assumed to lead tolower quality applicants and subsequent lowerproductivity, it should be noted that some em-ployer preferences (and, hence, factors deter-mining applicant marketability) may not be pro-ductivity-related (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971Thurow, 1975). Low marketability may be theresult of various forms of discrimination, ratherthan true productivity-related differences (Ar-

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row, 1972; Kon rad & Pfeffer, in pres s; S pe nce ,1973). For exam ple, occup ational crowd ing (i.e.,the restriction of applicants with pariicular de-mographic characteristics to a narrow range ofoccupations) may ariificially create an excesssupply of applicants (and, hence, lower wages)in these occupations.Thus, it is not clear that all marketability-related characteristics (e.g., age, sex, prior ex-perience, country of origin) are associated withtrue differences in productivity, length of ser-vice, or other determinants of overall utility. In-deed, it is possible that pursuit of nontraditionalapplicants will sometimes lead to improved costeffectiveness because these individuals may beequally productive, yet will work for lowerwages than conventional applicants (Doeringer& Piore, 1971; Konrad & Pfeffer, in pr es s; Major &Konar, 1984). (In subsequent sections, we usethe term nontraditional applicants when refer-ring to situations in whic h th e productivity effectsof changing pools are undocumented and ,hence, unceriain. In contrast, we use the termlower qualified when discussing shifts to appli-cants with lower scores on validated selectioninstruments, for example, dipping lower into apool based on aptitude or ability test scores.)

In any event, because pursuit of nontradi-tional applican ts app ea rs to be a comm on orga-nizational adaptation to attraction difficulties,additional research in this area is warranted.Moreover, this strategy is likely to increase inimporiance, given widespread projections thatthe vast majority of new entrants to the U.S. la-bor force over the next decade are likely to bewomen, minorities, or immigrants (e.g., Fuller-ton, 1987; Johnston & Pa cker , 1987; Sch wartz,1989).

Contingencies Affecting Choiceof StrategyAs mentioned previously, any attraction strat-egy is likely to have complex and varied out-comes. Therefore, the three attraction strategiesdiscussed in the preceding section are not per-fect subst i tutes for one another. Relat ively

speaking, for example, changes in recruitmepractices are low-cost, low-risk strategies thar e likely to ha ve few co nseq uen ces b eyon d tattitudes and behaviors of the attracted appcants. However, their impact on attraction malso be limited, particularly in tight labor makets (Doerin ger & Piore, 1971). In co ntra schanges in applicant pools and inducemencan be far more extrem e in that they entail eithhigher costs (e.g., salary spillover to other jobor greater risks (greater unceriainty regardinfuture productivity). However, these strategialso are likely to yield greater improvements attraction per se (Rynes, in press).

Because al ternat ive strategies are not pefectly interchangeable, it becomes imporiant understand how attraction strategies are actally chosen Under various conditions. Althougchoices undoubtedly will de pen d to some exteon an organization's unique situation and idiosyncratic practices, we believe that some general contingencies affecting these choices cabe proposed. Five such factors (labor markconditions, vacancy characteristics, organiztional characteristics, phase of the attractioprocess, and legal considerations), intended be illustrative rather than all-inclusive, are dicussed in the following sections.Before proc ee din g, it is importa nt to clarify thintent and assumptions behind the propositionthat follow. First, the propositions are primaridescriptive, rather than prescriptive, in naturAlthough the ultimate objective of our modmight be to derive a series of valid prescriptionfor organizations confronting diverse situationextant theory and research are simply too underdev eloped to justify such recom me ndationat present. However, in many cases thereenough empi r i ca l ev idence , anecdo ta l evdence, or theoretical speculation to make prdictions about what organizations actually dunder various situations.Second, although we do not assume that oganizations' strategic choices are inherently utiity-maximizing, we do assume that attractiostrategies are selected on the basis of ration

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criteria (albeit perhaps subjectively rational).Further, as indicated previously, we suspectthat in the typical labor-shortage situation,quantitative short-term criteria are weightedmore heavily than long-term or qualitative cri-teria. Our logic is that the former outcomes are(a) more immediate and directly observable(hence, more salient), (b) more easily and reli-ably measured, and (c) more clearly attribut-able to prehire strategies than long-term andqualitative outcomes.Still, relative em ph ase s on long- versu s shori-term or quan titative versus qualitative outcom esare likely to vary considerably across condi-tions. For example, long-term quality criteriaare probably weighted more heavily for vacan-cies at high er en ds of the occupa tional spectrumor when labor scarcities are less severe. Al-though we speculate about such nuan ces wherewe feel there is sufficient evidence, in general,we derive our propositions from the assumptionthat short-term, satisficing objectivesthat is,the ability to fill vacancies with at least mini-mally qualified people at acceptable costs arethe primary determinants of strategic choicesamong alternatives.Finally, each of the following propositionsshould be interpreted in an "all else equal,"rather than "under all conditions," sense. Aswill become apparent in subsequent sections,probable interactions among attraction strate-gies and betw een attraction strategies an d otherHR pra ctice s ar e likely to call into question ea chof the following propositions under at least somecombinations of backgroun d circumstances.Labor Market Conditions

The supply of available workers, relative todemand, determines the severity of an organi-zation's attraction problem. As the magnitude,duration, or anticipated duration of shoriagesincrease, organizations become increasinglywilling to employ more costly attraction strate-gies. For examp le, evidence suggests that whenshoriages first develop, organizations typicallyrespond by altering recruitment practices, in

pariicular by using more (and more expensiverecruitment methods and sources (e.g., Doering er & Piore, 1971; Malm, 1954). However, organizations move on to applicant pool and inducement strategies as shortages deepen opersist (Kerr & Fisher , 1950; Malm, 1955; Osterman, 1987). Thus:Proposition 1: All else being equal, in the initialstages of a labor shortage, recruitment strate-gies will be tried before turning to inducementor applicant-pool strategies.Proposition 2: The greater the shortfall betweensupply versus deman d or the longer the ex-pected duration of a labor shortage, the greaterthe likelihood of employing inducement or non-traditional applicant-pool strategies.

Vacancy CharacteristicsSeveral v acan cy characteristics also ar e likel

to ha ve a n impact on cho ice of strategy. For thsake of illustration, five are considered: positiolevel, embeddedness, number of incumbentsattractiveness relative to competitors, a nd rigidity of skill req uire m ent s.Level. Vacancies at higher levels are believeto entail greater potential risks to an organization; they also require higher levels of aptitudin response to greater unceriainty, complexityand rapidly changing environmenta l conditions. As a result, cha ng es in app licant pools arlikely to be more strongly resisted at high leveldue to the greater risks involved in hiring individuals with less certain, or lower, productivitysignaling characteristics (e.g., Kanter, 1977Konrad & Pfeffer, in press).At the same time, as any basic utility modeind icates (e.g ., Bo udr eau & Rynes, 1985), improved attraction outcomes also hold the promise of greater potential payoffs (i.e., servicvalue) where high-level positions are involvedHence , inducement s t ra tegies may be morreadily employed, as well as made more lucrative, in these positions due to the greater expected payoffs from attracting and retaininhigh-quality applicants. Thus:

Proposition 3: Organizations are less likely topursue applicants w ith uncertain or lower pro-297


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ductivity-signaling characteristics (i.e., to targetalternative applicant pools) for positions athigher organizational levels.Proposition 4: Both the use and the magnitudeof enhanced inducement strategies increase athigher position levels.Embeddedness. Attract ion strategies alsomay d epend on the degree to which vacanciesare embedded in well-established career pro-gressions. Because positions that are stronglyem bedde d in career ladders are observed withgreat interest by intemal employees, changesei ther in inducements or in applicant poolswould be expected to entail greater potentialrisk to employers (e.g., salary or productivityspillover to other positions; demotivation of in-tern al can did ates ) (D oeringer & Piore, 1971;Gran ov ette r, 1986; Lew in, 1987). As such , th e

embeddedness of a vacancy is expected to leadto conservative attraction strategies. Hence:Proposition 5: Because of the potential costs as-sociated with spillover effects, inducement andapplicant-pool strategies are less likely to beemployed in jobs that are strongly embed ded ininternal career progressions.

Num ber of Incumbents. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h enumber of incumbents in a position may affectattraction strategies. For example, inducementstrategies are less expensive if they do not haveto be extended to a la rge n um ber of peers. Sim-ilarly, the hiring of nontraditional applicantsmay be more feasible for jobs that have few in-cum ben ts b ec au se it is less likely that these jobswill be stereotyped by sex, race, and so forth(Kanter, 1977). Therefore, we predict:

Proposition 6: Because of the potential costs as-sociated with spillover effects, organizationswill be less likely to use inducement strategieswhen the numbe r of present incumb ents islarge.Proposition 7: All else being equal, large num-bers of homoge neous incumbents will decreasethe propensity to seek nontraditional applicantsdue to the greater likelihood of strong stereotyp-ing about "appropriate" applicant characteris-tics.

Relative Attractiveness. The a t t r ac t iveness oa vaca ncy (comp ared to s imi la r v aca nc ieam on g competitors) is also likely to ha ve an efect on strategic choices. For exam ple, wh en vacancies are attractive, there is less need to employ costly or risky attraction strategies. Addtionally, the content of recruitment messagemay change according to the attractiveness othe vacancy. For example, al though many employers appear to avoid realistic recruitmenstrageties because of anticipated negative efects on attraction (Sc hne ider, 1976; Stoops1984) , th i s tendency may be considerablabated when vacancy characterist ics comparfavorably with com petitors'. Thus: ... ..Proposition 8: The mo re attractive a vacancy isrelative to the competition, the less likely areemployers to need or use enhanced induce-ment or nontraditional a pplicant strategies to fillvacancies. , . , , , . . . . -.- : . Proposition 9: The more attractive the vacancy, the more realistic the recruitment message.Rigidity of Skill Requirements. If the positioincludes very specific skill requirements, organizations may be constrained from shifting tapplicants with unknown (or lower) productivity-signaling characteristics, pariiculariy if thnee ded skills cannot be acq uired on the job during a re aso nab le time period. In such situationspursuing nontraditional or less-qualified applicants may not be a viable option. In fact, it imes of gen era l labor shortages, a combinatioof improved recruitment and inducement strategies may be the only feasible alternative fopositions with rigid skill requirements. Thus:Proposition 10: Organizations are less likely topursue nontraditional applicants w hen skill re-quirements are inflexible.

Organizational CharacteristicsA variety of organizat ional characterist icalso are likely to influence the choice of attraction strategies. We focus here on four: ability tpay, business strategy, culture and values, andorganizat ional d em ographics.Ability to Pay. O ne imporiant consideration in

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choosing among attraction strategies is the ex-tent to which an organization is constrained byits ability to pay. Inducement strategies, pariic-ularly salary and benefits-related ch ang es, ma yentail su bstan tial direct costs for employers, es-pecially if there are many vacancies or if en-hancements cannot be confined to new hires.As such, pecuniary inducement strategies areless likely to be emp loyed by organ izations thathave a low ability to pay.In contrast, alternative inducements that in-clude lower direct costs (e.g., flexible hours, op-portunities to work at home) may be used to at-tract applicants (Rynes, 1987). Additionally, or-ganizations that have a low ability to pxry maybe more inclined to pursue nontraditional ap-plicants , partly because such applicants areusually willing to work for lower wages (e.g.,Konrad & Pfeffer, in pr ess; Lew in, 1987; Major&Konar, 1984; Oste rm an , 1987). Thus: .-^.:,:-.>::.:

Proposition 11: Organizations that have a lowability to pay are less likely to use pecuniaryinducement strategies, but they may be moreinclined to modify nonpecuniary inducements.Proposition 12: Organizations that have a lowability to pay are more likely to (or may beforced to) seek nontraditional applicants or ap-plicants with lower productivity-signaling char-acteristics.

Business Strategy. The strategy l i terature(e.g .. Miles & Snow, 1978; Porter, 1985) positsthat there are multiple ways to succeed in anybusiness. However, regardless of the businessstrategy employed, it is hypothesized that suc-cessful implementation depends in pari on thecompatibility of business strategies and func-tional strategies such as human resources (e.g.,Olian & Rynes, 1984; Snow & Miles, 1986).One example is provided by Schuler andJackson (1987), who argued that there are atleast three viable business strategies (cost re-duct ion, qual i ty improvement , innovat ion) ,each of which has different implications for ap-propriate HR practices. More specifically, in thecase of applicant attraction, each strategy im-plies ceriain desirable applicant-pool character-

istics. For example, businesses that pursue inovation strategies are characterized by rapidchanging, highly unceriain environments threquire workers to be autonomous and flexiblAs such:Proposition 13: Because of the im portance ofhigh aptitude in innovative environments, inno-vators will be less likely to pursue applicantsthat have unjrnown or lower productivity-signaling characteristics. At the same time, theywill be more likely to offer high inducements toattract applicants of the necessary caliber.

In contrast, businesses that adopt a cost reduction strategy are characterized by morhighly routinized, controlled environments, anthey will have concomitantly lower requirements for workers. Thus:Propos i t ion 14: Organizations with cost-reduction strategies are more likely to pursuenontraditional applicants. This is because ofboth the applicants' presumed willingness towork for lower inducements, and the more rou-tine and tightly controlled nature of the work.

Culture and Values. The nature of an organzation's culture and values (e.g., strong versuweak emphasis on product quality or customeservice, employee identification with the company ) ma y also influence the choice of attractiostrategies. Although the full range of possibilties is too extensive to be addressed here, aillustrative example is provided. Specifically, tthe extent that organizational norm s em phasizstrong internal labor markets, intemal pay equity, and long-term organizational careers, onwould expect more limited use of nontraditionapool and inducement strategies to attract external candidates. This is due to the greater likelihood of spillover effects to othe r jobs an d incumbents in intemally focused environments. ThuProposition 15: Organizations that have a stronginternal labor market focus w ill be less inclinedto use inducem ent or nontraditional applicant-pool strategies to attract external candidates.Organizational Demographics. In their studof hiring pat tem s for top administrato rs in high eeducation, Konrad and Pfeffer (in press) con

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elude d that "segreg ation of the past is one of themost pervasive influences on the hiring pattemsof the present." More specifically, they foundthat the higher the proporiion of wome n an d mi-norities in all positions in an organization, thegreater the likelihood of finding women and mi-norities in top positions. Moreover, this effectwas not due entirely to enhanced internal pro-motion opporiunities for nontraditional internalcandidates; organizations that were not domi-nated by white males were more likely to hirewomen and minorities through extemal chan-nels as w ell. Additionally, the cha nce s of hiringwomen or minorities for positions traditionallyheld by white males (based on national statis-tics) were also enhanced if the previous organi-zational incumbent was a woman or a minority.Simi lar phenomena have been reported byKanter (1977) and Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987).By extension, w e prop ose that: :

Proposition 16: Pursuit of nontraditional appli-cants, particularly for high-level positions, willbe least likely in organizations that are mostheavily dominated by white males.Phase of the Attraction Process

In order to ultimately fill vaca ncie s, organ iza-t ions must succeed in at t ract ing applicantsthrough a series of stages (e.g., submitting anapplicat ion, undergoing mult iple interviewsand other screening procedures, and, some-times, forgoing alternative offers). A shoriage ofwilling or qualified applicants at any one ofthese stages creates a potential need to modifyattraction practices. Therefore, the appropriatemodifications may be a function of the stage inwhich the shoriage occurs.For example, improved recruitment activitiesmay be effective in encouraging an increase ininitial applications. However, evidence sug-gests that recruitment practices per se becomeless influential as candidates move closer tomaking a job choice (Rynes, in press; Taylor 8iB erg m an n, 1987). Therefore, shorifalls oc curringat later stages of the process (e.g., low job ac-

ceptance ratios) are likely to be ineffectually addressed by recruitment strategies. Thus:Proposition 17: Attraction difficulties at earlystages of the process are most likely to be ad-dressed through enhanced recruitment tech-niques. In contrast, inducement strategies are(relatively) more likely to be used to address dif-ficulties at later stages.

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mental emphasis on class-action prosecutionsincreased the vulnerability of large organiza-tions and job categories with large numbers ofdemographica l ly homogeneous incumbents .However, administrative guidelines and legalrulings made in the late 1980s suggest a trendtoward less emphasis on numbers per se andmore em pha sis on ma nag erial intent (e.g., PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins, 1989; Wards Cove Pack-ing V. Atonio, 1989). Therefore, although legalconsiderations undoubtedly affect attractionand selection behaviors (e.g., Leonard, 1985;Tenopyr, 1981), specific propositions related toEEO are not offered here because of the uncer-tainties created by these couri decisions.InterrelationshipsAmong Alternative Strategies

Although various contingencies may lead or-ganiza tions to focus primarily on on e strategy infilling a pariicular vacancy, organizations arenot restricted to using a single approach. In fact,interdependencies be tween the a l te rna t ivesmake reliance on a single strategy unlikely. Acomplete discussion of all possible interdepen-dencies is beyond the scope of this paper; how-eve r, in the following sections selected situationsare discussed in which decisions and outcomesinvolving one attraction strategy appear to beintegrally related to choices concerning otherstrategies (Schwab, 1982).Applicant Pools and Inducements

Efficiency wage and segmented market theo-ries sugg est that both th e quantity a nd quality ofavailable workers are functions of the level ofind uce m ent s (e.g ., Thurow , 1975; W eiss, 1980;Yellen, 1984). Simply put, better applicants areexpe cted to be attracted to an d to remain in bet-ter vacancies. Thus, if all else is equal, organi-zations that seek app licants w ith high productiv-ity-signaling characterist ics must either en-hance inducements or accept lower levels ofattraction success. Therefore, we propose that:

Proposition 18: Applicant pool choices are de-termined partly by the level of inducements of-fered. Conversely, the choice of a particularpool may dictate changes in inducements.Decisions about applicant pools also appeato interact with the type of inducements offeredFor example, employer-subsidized childcarhas been used to attract parents of young chil

dren; educational benefits to attract collegeoriented youth; language and housing assistance to attract the foreign-born; and pari-timor flexible sche dule s to attract students, pare ntsan d retire es (e.g ., Ham let, 1989; Merrill, 1987Tan nen , 1987). Thus, orga nizatio ns tha t wish ttarget a specific applicant pool may find thatailoring inducements is a cost-effective strategy:Proposition 19: Inducem ent strategies, particu-larly those involving optional benefits or flexiblescheduling, may be designed to complementthe characteristics of an applicant pool. Con-versely, the choice of an applicant pool is atleast partly constrained by the organization'sability or willingness to modify particular in-ducements.

Applicant Pools and RecruitmentAn organization's decision to seek nontraditional applicants may bring about changes irecruitment practices. For example, becaus

different kinds of applicants use differensources (Schwab, 1982; Taylor & Schmidt, 1983decisions about applicant pools and recruitmens our c e s a r e c lo s e ly c onne c t e d . H ow e ve rsources are ch osen for a v ariety of reaso ns o thethan targeting a particular pool (e.g., cost, prescreening services), and any given pool usuallcan be accessed through mult iple source(Olian & Rynes, 1984). Thus, although a decisioto target non traditional app lican ts doe s not completely dictate the cho ice of source(s), it a p p ea rthat there are considerable interdependenciebetwee n the two decisions:Proposition 20: Decisions to target nontradi-tional applicants w ill be accom panied by shiftsin recruitment sources, ln particular, walk-insand employee referrals are less likely to beused because these sources are most likely to

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produce applicants that are similar to currentemployees.The choice of organizational representativesalso m ay b e affected by decisions to target n on-traditional applicants. Although there is littlereason to believe that organizational represen-tatives have much effect on job choices, limitedevidence su ggests that applicants ha ve m ore fa-vorable attitudes toward representatives whoare demographically similar (although some-what older and higher in status) to themselves(Rynes, in press). Also, even though the issuehas not received explicit research attention, it ispossible that because of the imporiance (andscarcity) of role models for on-the-job successam ong nontradit ional em ployees (Konrad &Pfeffer, in press), perceived similarity may bemo re imporiant for attracting no ntraditional ver-

sus traditional applicants. Thus, we speculatethat:Proposition 21: Decisions to target nontradi-tional applicants will be accom panied by in-creased use of nontraditional organizationalrepresentatives.Finally, decisions to pu rsue nontraditional ap -plicants may lead to modifications of recruit-ment me ssag es. For example, focusing on char-acteristics that are highly salient to applicants

will probably have a greater impact (either pos-itive or nega tive) on attraction than em phas izingless imporiant factors. Although we have onlylimited information about the salience of variousjob characteristics for different kinds of appli-cants, there is some evidence that relative im-portance is associated with both individual(e.g., age, sex, education) and occupational dif-ferences (e.g., Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechho-fer, & Platt, 1969; Ju rge nse n, 1978; Rynes et al. ,1983). If such differences can be reliably deter-mined, the content of the recruitment messageca n b e tailored to any a pplica nt pool (e.g., Krett& Stright, 1985). Thus, w e expe ct th at:Proposition 22: Decisions to pursue nontradi-tional applicants are accompanied by changesin recruitment messages that are designed to

reflect the perceived salience of various induce-ments to the newly targeted audience.Attraction and Other

Human Resource PracticesAttraction strategies do not operate in isolation from other human resource policies an

practices. Although a full elaboration of attraction-HR interactions is beyond the scope of thariicle, we propose that attraction strategies interact with other HR activities in two ba sic w ayFirst, as implied in previous sections, currenHR practices act as con straints that influence threlative viability of altemative attraction strategies. For example, changes in monetary inducem ents m ay b e less feasible in organizationthat usually place a strong emph asis on inte m aequity (Doeringer 8f Piore, 1971) or in organizations in which the centralization of HR decisiomaking places constraints on local inducemenpractices. Similarly, shifts to more flexible worhours may be more difficult in organizations iwhich union contracts or other work rules strictlregulate work scheduling (Pierce, NewstromDu nha m , & Barb er, 1989). Thus:Proposition 23: An organization's choice of at-traction strategies is determined in part by ex-isting H R p ractices.Second, changes in attraction strategies oftecannot be operationalized without simultaneouor subsequent changes in other HR practicesFor example, shifts to nontraditional applicanpools may be resisted unless accompanied bmore rigorous selection and validation procedure s to counteract the increase d unceriainty ohiring unkn owns (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971Similarly, although nontraditional applicantma y be easier or less expensive to attract, a ddi

tional investments may be necessary for theisocialization a n d tra inin g (e.g., Kan ter, 1977) ofor managing potentially negative spillover effects to other employees (e.g., Schneider, 1987Sutton & Louis, 1987).Strategies for attracting nontraditional applicants also may require changes in job design302


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For exa m ple, law firms faced with a shor iage ofaffordable top-tier law graduates have facili-tated the shift to second-tier applicants by creat-ing less-ch allenging, entry-level positions whichare segmented from the conventional pariner-ship career path (Lewin, 1987). Conversely, at-tempts to attract mo re highly qualified applica ntpoo l s m ay requ i re j ob en la rgem en t (e .g . ,Law ler, 1986). Thus:

Proposition 24: Implementation of changes inattraction strategies often necessitates chang esin other HR practices.Implications for Future Research

Additional research on applicant attraction isnee ded in many are as. For example, organiza-tions would clearly benefit from further develop-m ent of both interna l- an d external-staffingm ode ls (A nders on, Milkovich, & Tsui, 1981;Olia n & Ryn es, 1984). M oreover, much of thepreviously rev iewed appl icant -centered re-search, pariicularly recruitment research, couldbe m ad e m ore useful to organ izations with a fewbasic modifications. Among the most imporiantwould be to study applicants longitudinally atmultiple phases of the attraction process, to in-clude a wider variety of substantive and controlva riab les in single investigations, an d to supple-ment the vast number of applicant perceptionstudies with either objective or behavioral out-comes (Rynes, in press; Schwab, 1982; SchwabetaL, 1987).Despite these and many other content issuesthat merit future investigation, we focus here onresearch that would be most useful in testing,revising, and extending the present model. In sodoing, we segment our discussion into two cat-egories: descriptive and prescriptive. Althoughprescriptive research is likely to benefit organi-zations most, our basic understanding of whatorganizations actually do to attract applicants(and why) is not sufficiently developed to justifystrong statements about what they should be do-ing. As such, we begin with a discussion ofneeded descriptive research.

Descriptive ResearchAccording to the large number of recent anecdotal reports about labor shoriages, it is cleathat organizations are adopting a wide varietof tactics to attract a pplic ants. These include import ing foreign workers, relocat ing worker(even unskilled) to different a re a s of the coun tryproviding house-finding and rental assistanceintegrating pari-time work with formal remediaeducation programs, allowing semiretired employees to earn educational scholarships fotheir grandchildren, tying salary increase programs to increases in the cost of housing, andso on.What is lacking, however, is systematic information abo ut the use of attraction strategies . Foexample, l i t t le is known about (a) how fre

quently each strategy is pursued, (b) whacauses different organizations to pursue different strategies, (c) whether or not strategy adoption follows a consistent pattern across organizations (e.g., recruitment first, inducements as last resori), (d) whether discussions of pariiculaattraction strateg ies inevitably involve consideration of ceriain other strategic alternatives, and(e) whether the practical importance of proposed contingency variables is largely universal, or highly situation -dep end ent (e.g ., arEEO concems more critical for public than foprivate organizations?).Even tho ug h so me of the most fruitful a r e a s fofuture research concem the strategic optionscontingency variables, and proposed interactions outlined in the preceding model, there areother potentially important content areas thamight make a difference to whether a strategy iadopted and whether or not it is successful.One such topic involves the question of whomakes the critical decisions concerning attraction policy. For example, what are the contributions of top m an age rs, low-level ma na ge rs, l inm anag ers, a nd HR m an age rs to strategy formulation? Following the logic of our model, wwould expect considerable variability in locus o

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decision making across firms, depending on anumber of contingencies. For example, wewould expect organizations with diversifiedbusiness units that require substantially differ-ent types of employees to place increased deci-sion-making au thority at the business-unit level.Acco rding to the sam e logic, we would ex pectvariability in decision-making practices withinorganizations, but across job levels. For exam-ple, attraction strategies might be formulated atthe local level for jobs filled entirely from thesurrounding community, but formulated at thecorp orate level for vaca nc ies filled from reg iona lor national labor markets.Another content area worthy of investigationconcems the emphasis that various outcomes(e.g., filling vacancies within ceriain time peri-ods, quality an d retention of new hires) ha ve onformulating attraction strategies. Because theseobjectives frequently work at cross purposes toone another, strategy selection ultimately maybe a function of the relative weights assigned toindividual outcomes. Thus, research is neededthat examines how outcomes are weighted invarious situations.However, in order to be useful, such researchmust take into consideration the potential b iasesinheren t in alternative method ologies for assess-ing the imporiance of specific factors in decisionmaking. This is pariicularly imporiant becausemanagers' self-reports of attraction priorities(Sch wa b, 1982) do not correspo nd with evi-dence about the outcomes that are most fre-quently me asu red an d recorded (e.g., Rynes 8fBoudreau, 1986). (Because many of the relevantmethodological issues are highly similar tothose encoun tered wh en applicants are asked todescribe factors that are imporiant to their jobchoices, the interested reader is encouraged toconsult Lawler, 1971, Op sah l an d D unnette,1966, Ryn es et al., 1983, or Sc hw ab et al., 1987.)As the preceding paragraph implies, would-be descriptive researchers confront a variety ofmethodological, as well as content, issues. Atpresent, most of the little we know about orga-

nizational attraction strategies comes from anecdotal accounts in practitioner journals (e.gHa m let, 1989; H an ig an , 1987; M errill, 1987qualitative interpretations of small-sample casinvestigations (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971), dated institutional economic studies of the opeation of local labor markets (e.g., Reynold1951).In the late 1980s, a few attempts have beem ad e to investigate attraction practices througfield s urv eys (e.g ., Fin ney , 1989; Na tional Association of M anu facture rs, 1989). Ho wev er, t he sstudies typically hav e exam ined only a subset opotential attraction strategies, and they havprovided limited information (if any) about varables associated with differential adoption ovarious strategies (i.e., contingencies).Thus, there is a pressing need to apply mor

diverse methodologies in order to gain a betteunderstanding of what kinds of employers aradopting which attraction strategies, and whyOne potentially valuable approach would be tconduct intensive interview-based case studieof strategy formulation across a range of carefully selected organizations (e.g., different levelof the same organization, different businesunits of the same corporation, or different companies in the same industry that confront different levels of labor shoriages or have widelyvarying abilities to pay). The practice of intensinformation gathering in organizations that varywidely in terms of one or more hypothesizedcontingency variables might prove very usefuin assessing (a) the completeness of the propose d m odel in terms of its va riab les a nd (b) thaccuracy of its contingency propositions.A second app roa ch for assessing the ra ng e oattraction practices and their association withvarious contingencies is the large-sample fieldsurvey. Although field surveys have a tendencyto lose some of the richness of the data, theyhave advantages in terms of sample size, standardization, potential for quantitative assessment of conting ency relationships, an d likely external generalizability. Again, such research

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should be conducted on multiple samples (e.g.,companies that have different types of short-ag es , va rying abilities to pay , or different dem o-graphic compositions).A third (and dram atically underutilized) meth-odology for examining contingencies in the for-mulation of attraction strategies is laboratory ex-perimentation. Of pariicular use would be pol-i c y -c a p t u r i n g o r p ro c e s s - t r a c i n g s t u d i e s ,whereby individuals responsible for developingattraction strategies are asked what actions theywould undertake across a range of backgroundconditions. These methods would complementother research strategies by (a) providing tightcontrols over theoretically relevant substantiveand control variables and (b) permitting exami-nation of multiple judgments of a single decisionmaker under various conditions, thus control-ling for individual differences as well. On thenegative side, such methods rely on hypotheti-cal, rather than real, decisions. As such, theyraise questions about whether intentions trans-late into actual behaviors or whether preferredor ideal strategies are applied in real, con-strained organizations. (See Olson, DeH'Omo,and Jarley, 1987, for some reassuring evidenceon these issues in a different decision context.)Prescriptive Research

In general, prescriptive attraction researchtries to discover what organizations ought to bedoing to achieve desired outcomes. In thissense, the vast majority of attraction-related re-search has had a prescriptive, rather than de-scriptive, orientation. For example, attribute im-portance studies purpori to determine which in-ducements should be enhanced for the optimalattraction of applicants, just as recruitmentsour ce studies attemp t to discover which sou rcesshould be used to maximally retain them.However, the proposed model of applicant at-traction suggests that evaluation of the effective-nes s of attraction strategies is both complex an dmultidimensional. For example, the impact of

any single strategy is hypothesized to dependon both external and intemal contingencies, awell as on other attraction strategies and HRpractices. Moreover, a complete assessment oeffectiveness would require evaluation of broad range of both prehire and posthire outcomes.Although th ere is a gre at d ea l of variability inthe quality of previous attraction-related research, in most cases existing studies are extremely simplistic when evaluated against realworld attraction complexities. In particular, mosstudies have examined single strategies andlimited depe nde nt v ariables at single pha se s othe attraction proce ss. For exam ple, recruiter research has been dominated by applicant impressions at the campus interview stage, whilerea l i s t ic preview research has emphasizedposthire selectee retention.As a result, we know very little about the relative effectiveness of one strategy versus another under various conditions. Worse yet, beca us e of the failure to test for variatio ns in effect iveness across wide ranges of potent ia l lyimporiant contingencies, prior research mayhave produced misleading resultsin pariicular, apparent homogeneity of effects where truecontingencies may exist (Breaugh, 1983; Rynesin press). For example, although the attractiveness of a particular vacancy (relative to thesame kind of position in competing organizations) might be expected to affect the results ofpresenting realistic recruiting information, previous inattention to this variable precludes examination (meta-analytic or otherwise) of prioresearch on this basis. These types of considerations limit our ability to make prescriptions thaare likely to hold up across the wide range ofsituations encountered in real-world attraction.

Admittedly, the proposed model is sufficientlycomplex so that no single study can begin toincorporate all relevant factors. However, regardless of the primary content issue or methodology employed, researchers can become moreattentive to real-world complexities by (a) in

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eluding several (versus one) of the most impor-tant substant ive independent and dependentvariables and (b) at least discussing (preferablymeasuring) the levels and likely effects of poten-tially imporiant contingency variables.In addition, similar to descriptive research,there is a pressing need to apply multiple meth-odologies to prescriptive attraction re sea rch . Al-though a wide variety of methods have beenapplied across the three strategies, individualstrategies have tended to become heavily asso-ciated w ith only one or two methodologies (e.g.,recruiter research with field surveys; RJPs withfield experiments; inducement strategies withrating/ranking surveys or policy-capturing ex-periments).As such, o ne of the most useful g en era l direc-tions for future re sea rch would b e to supp lem entcurrently dominant methods in pariicular strate-gic areas with nontraditional methodologies.For example, because prior inducement re-sea rch has been domina ted by app l i can t -or iented ra t ing/ raking surveys and pol icy-capturing experiments, future inducement re-search might shift toward organizational fieldexperiments (e.g., Lakhani, 1988; Tannen, 1987)an d field surve ys of organization-level practicesan d outcom es (e.g., Ha nssen s & Levien, 1983).Because statistically significant effects can beobtained for virtually any laboratory investiga-tion if eno ugh altema tive ex planations ar e con-trolled or omitted, supplementation with field re-search is essential for determining the practicalsignificance of prescriptive conclusions basedon laboratory results.Similarly, because information about appli-cant pool strategies has come primarily fromfield interviews and case studies, researchersmight consider altemative methods such a s pol-icy-capturing or process-tracing simulations. Al-though field experiments are useful in this re-ga rd , the typical organization is unlikely to pur-sue nontraditional applicant strategies "just tosee what happens." However, researchers whohappen to be in the right place at the right time

(e.g. , when managers deem that circumstancbeyond their control dictate a change in applcant pools) could capitalize on pend ing ch an geb y a t t e m p t i n g to g e t r e a s o n a b l e b e fo rand-after measures and credible comparisogroups.Analogous recommendat ions can be madconcerning the choice of dependent variableunits of analysis, and the like. For example, because prior research on organizational reprsentatives has assessed applicant perceptions the individual level of analysis, future researcshould move toward behavioral outcomes at oganizational levels.Additionally, as researchers move toward more equitable bala nce betw een organizationand applicant attraction perspectives, certaikinds of organizational sampling strategies ar

likely to produce the most useful results. For examp le, given the almost overwhelming num beof variables that might affect attraction strategies an d ou tcomes, it wou ld see m w ise to restricorganizational samples on at least some important contingency variables (e.g., product or labor markets) as a way of narrowing down thpotential altem ative explanations. For exam plethe sampling of multiple business units within single corporation would control for several imporiant contingencies and would add the possible advantage of greater standardization ancontrol over measurement and evaluation procedures .Finally, although there is ceriainly a place foprescriptive studies in attraction research, wstrongly believe that organizationally orienteresearch will prove more useful if it is first precede d by careful descriptive resear ch. The complexities of the attraction process dictate that inorder to be useful, prescriptive studies must focus primarily on practices that are most frequently adopted by employers, and outcomethat are of the greatest consequence to themWith few exceptions, our present knowledge oactual practices is insufficient to provide muchguida nce in this are a. A s such, we recomm end

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that would-be prescriptive researchers begin bybecoming more "informed" by solid descriptivefindings.Conclusion

Prior research on applicant at tract ion hasbeen conducted primarily from the applicant'sperspective. Moreover, attraction-related re-search has evolved across a variety of litera-tures, each of which has developed its ownun iqu e perspe ctive of the attraction process. Forexample, industrial psychologists have focusedon recruitment practices and applicant at t i -tudes; economists have studied employment in-ducements and applicant behaviors; and soci-

ologists have researched the social aspects ofrecruitment, job search, and early socializationprocedures.An integration of these perspectives is particularly desirable in light of widespread anticipated labor shortages as well as shifts in demo-graphic and productivity-related characteristicof avail ab le a pplic ants (Johnston & Packer1987). These developments will force more andmore organizations to shift from scripted attrac-tion behaviors to conscious strategic deliberation. The present article provides a tentativeframework for organizational decision makerswho are confronted with attraction challengesand for researchers who wish to increase ourunderstanding of the overall attraction process

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