1987 democracy and national strategy in the periphery

8/22/2019 1987 Democracy and National Strategy in the Periphery

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Third World Quarterly

Democracy and National Strategy in the PeripheryAuthor(s): Samir AminReviewed work(s):Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 1129-1156Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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SAMIR AMIN

Democracy a n d nat ional

strategy i n t h e periphery*

It is well-known hat the ThirdWorld s a heterogeneousgroupingandthatgeneralisationsarethereforeusually mpossible. It can be agreed,however, that social inequalitiesare unfortunatelyall too often quite

blatant, in fact scandalous,andthat even the most primitiveform ofdemocracy s the exceptionrather han the rule. The lack of solidaritybetween ThirdWorldstates n international conomicnegotiations s asmarkedas the animositywhich frequentlycharacterises heirpoliticalrelationships.

Is there a connection to be discernedamong these three aspects:social inequality, lack of democracy, lack of solidarity? Doubtless,everyonewillreadilyacknowledge hat one exists. Butthe natureof theconnection and its underlyingcauses is the focus of diametrically

opposedtheoreticalandideologicalpointsof view. There arein effecttwo perspectiveson the globalevolution of modernsocietieswhich,onthis questionas on others,radicallycontradictone another.

In the dominant 'linear' perspective, social inequality and theabsence of democracyare the price of poverty.The accumulationofcapital is necessarily accompanied, in its initial stages, by theimpoverishment f the peasantryandthe penuryof the working-class,described by Engels in the case of England in the middle of thenineteenthcentury.Lateron, when the ruralsurpluspopulationhad

been absorbed,the labourmovementmanagedprogressivelyo imposeboth better material conditionsand political democracy.Sir ArthurLewis's amiliar hesisconcerning he 'dualism'of societies'intransitiontowardsdevelopment', ikethat of the Latin-American esarrollismo fthe 1950s,makes the samepoint:economicdevelopmentwouldcreatetheobjectiveconditions or abetter socialdistribution f income as wellas providing the basis for a democraticpolitical life.1 This thesispresupposes that the external factor (integration into the worldeconomicsystem) s basically favourable',n the sense that it offersthe

* Translated for Third World Quarterly by Thomas Clegg.

For furtherreadingsee also variousworks of CEPAL, publishedunder the directionof RaulPrebisch,during he 1950sand 1960s.

TWQ 9(4) October 1987/ISSN 0143-6597/87. $1.25 1129







THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

opportunity or 'development'.Developmentin thiscontextproceedsat a rate whichis governedby the internalconditions hatcharacterisedifferentThirdWorldsocieties. Theseconditionsarethusthought o bedecisive in thisprocess.

In the context of a linearperspective,today's developedcountriesform the imageof the 'developing'countriesas theywill be tomorrow.A formalisticnationalismwould also characterise ariousThirdWorldsocieties duringthe firstperiodof 'development'.The constructionofthe nationstate woulddemand t. Thisnationstatewouldassert tselfby

opposingothers, notably tsneighbours.As theEuropeannationswereconstituted through an uninterrupted series of wars from theseventeenth to the mid-twentiethcenturies, a similar confrontationamongcontemporaryThirdWorld states would not be surprising.

The thesis advanced in this article takes the opposite view. Wecontend that the emergenceof capitalistexpansionon a world scaleentails an inherent inequality, which prevents the 'delayedreproduction'of the same evolutionary cheme. Socialinequalityandthe absenceof democracyare thus, in the periphery,the productof

capitalistdevelopment.I would like to illustrate histhesis, in whatfollows, by insistingon

two aspectsof the worldwideexpansionof capitalism:

i) that this expansionis accompaniedby a growing nequality n thesocialdistribution f incomein the periphery,whileat the system'score, it effectivelycreatesthe conditions ora lesserdegreeof socialinequality (and greater stability n the distributionof income, thefoundationof a democraticconsensus);

ii) that the bourgeoisieof the periphery s incapableof mastering helocalprocessof accumulation,whichtherebyremains n aperpetualprocessof 'adjustment'o the constraints osedby accumulation na world scale. In these conditions, the project of constructingabourgeois national state is not merelyhandicappedby a basicallyunfavourable external factor, but is rendered completelyimpossible.Theperipheral tate is thennecessarilydespoticbecauseit is weak. In order to 'survive',it has to avoid conflictwith thedominant imperialist forces and attempts rather to improve itsinternational position at the expense of its more vulnerableperipheralpartners.

This twofoldobservation trongly uggests he conclusion hatpoliticaland socialdemocracyas well as international olidarityamongpeoples

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DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE PERIPHERY

require he abandonment f themythof the 'nationalbourgeoisie',andthe replacement of the 'bourgeois national' project by a 'popularnational' project. This is the priceto be paid for democracy.

Inequalities in the distribution of income at the core and at theperiphery of the world capitalist system

Although empiricalresearchconcerning he distributionof income isrelativelyrecent, there arefiguresavailable oday for a greatnumberof

countries, both developed and underdeveloped, which measurethedegreeof inequalitynincomedistribution ymeansof Ginicoefficientsand Lorenz curves.

In general, this researchshowsthat inequality n the distributionofincome is more pronounced n the peripheryof the systemthan in itsadvancedcore.Thisinequalityarises ora numberof reasons, ncludingthe following:

Firstly,labourproductivity ariesfrom unit to unit, and fromsectorto sector. Productivity would only become equalised given the

theoreticalhypothesisof an economyconstitutedby productionunitswhichwereallequippedwiththe mostefficientmeans(andthus a stateof competitionwould no longer continue between them!). The mostdeveloped capitalist countries approach this model, while theunderdeveloped ormationsdivergefrom it in anextremeway. This iswhythedistribution f value addedper jobfromone sectorto another sgroupedrelativelycloselyaround tsaverage n the OECDcountries,butis very unevenly spread n the ThirdWorldcountries.2The fact that acomparisongivesresultsof this kindproves,inouropinion,thatthelaw

of value operates at the levelof theworldcapitalist ystem,rather hanat the level of its nationalcomponents.3

Secondly, the differential n salaries and paymentfor work in theThirdWorld,howeversmall, sneverasreducedas it would be if itweredetermined olely bythe socialcosts of training.Thespreadhere resultsfrom the strategyof those in powerand of capital,fromits historyandfromthosepoliticalrequirements ompatiblewiththeexerciseofpowerby the hegemonicsocialbloc at the system'score.

Thirdly, the distribution of industrial, commercial, real estate,

2 Samir Amin, 'Niveau de salaires, choix des techniques de production et repartition de revenu',in A D Smith (ed), Cahiers de l'IIES (Geneva, 1969).

3 See the argument concerning the content of the law of value operating at the world scale in SamirAmin, L'avenir du maoisme, Paris: Minuit, 1981, pp 7-28; trans. The Future of Maoism, NewYork: Monthly Review Press, 1982.

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agricultural, inancialand other property s itself the outcome of thehistoryof the social formationand of local capitalistdevelopment.Ifone admitsthat there existsno 'ideal model' of capitalism,butonly itsconcretehistorical orms,there s no reasonwhythis mportant lementin determiningthe structureof the distributionof income shouldoperatein the sameway everywhere.

Whatever he causes,it is possibleto comparethe currentempiricaldistributionsn the world.It is striking o see that the spreadof Lorenzcurves is by no means accidental.As a matterof fact, the.curves of all

the OECDdeveloped capitalist ountriesaregrouped n a tightbunch.Incontrast, income distribution n all the contemporaryThird Worldcountries is considerablymore unequal. Two clear medians placedwithineachof the twogroupings orrespondwith thefollowingvalues:4* 25 percentof the populationdisposesof 10percent of totalincome

in the core, and 5 per centin the periphery;* 50 per centof thepopulationdisposesof 25percentof income in the

core, and 10per cent in the periphery;* 75per centof thepopulationdisposesof 50percent of income n the

core and33 per cent in the periphery.The bunchingof Lorenzcurvesfor the developed countries mplies

that Western societies have obviously similar income distributioncharacteristics.The position of different countries within the coregroupingof Lorenzcurvesalsoimpliesthat the improvement n incomedistribution s linked to the existence of powerful social democraticforces, but that the real extent of this improvement s very limited. Themost advanced social-democratic ountries,in Northern Europe, aresituated close to the minimum nequalitycurve; the most liberal (the

USA) and the leastdeveloped(MediterraneanEurope) are close to themaximum nequalitycurve.

The spreadof curvesforthe ThirdWorldmay seem disconcerting tfirst sight. There is no visible correlation between the degree ofinequalityon the one hand, and the rankingof these countries n termsof factorssuch as per capitaGDP, the degree of urbanisation, he level ofindustrialisation, nd so on. But, as we will show later, a more attentiveexaminationcan provide a basisfor an interpretation f this spreadofresults.

4 We will refrain romprovidinghere the technicalargumentswhichpermittedus to elaboratethese statisticsbasedon the workof theWorldBank(HollisChenery,Ahluwalia, tc., GrowthwithRedistribution)ndof the ILO (WEB programme,he workdirectedby DharamGhaiandothers). Foran explanation f the Ginicoefficients ndLorenz urvesused nourmodel,see ourarticle n Review cited in note 5).

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We can now proceed to the more interesting questions in thefollowingsection: ) is it possible to move fromthe crudeempiricalevelto a higher plane, to explain the essential reasons for the relativepositions of different countries?; and ii) is there a direction to themovementobserved(towardsmore or less equality)and how is it to beaccountedfor?

We will not go back over the details of the theoreticalreconstructionof these curves, which havebeen expoundedelsewhere.5 We will onlyset out the broad outlines here.

Regarding the distributionof income in the capitalist core, threesuccessive theoreticalhypotheses sufficeto account for the medianofthe tightgroupingof Lorenz curvesrepresenting he OECDcountries.

First hypothesis:if the social formation were reduced to a purecapitalistmode of production,the structureof income distributionwould bedeterminedbythe rate of extractionof surplusvalue.Ifitwerethe case that the entire population were proletarianisedand allproletarianswere to sell their labourpower at the same price,which isthe value of labour power, and if we retain the complementary

assumption hat the numberof capitalistswasnegligible,the model ofincomedistribution ouldbe shownbyastraightinewhoseslopewouldbe determinedby the rateof extractionof surplusvalue within a socialformation.

Secondhypothesis:wesupposethatthepricespaidto the labour orceare distributedunequallyaround its average value, so that the ratiobetween the quartileswas 1 to 4.

Thirdhypothesis:we introducewithinthis schemethe existenceof acertainnumberof small and medium-size irmsand various activities

(similarto those of the liberal professions), the salariedpopulationcomprising80 per cent of the total population,and we suppose thatindividualrevenuesof membersof these social groupsare situatedinthe middle andhigh-incomebracketswithin the total distribution.

In this way, a curve is finallyobtained which is very close to onerepresenting the empirical reality of the contemporarydevelopedcapitalistworld.

Withregard o the peripheral apitalist ocieties,we haveproceededin two steps. In the first instance, we looked at the case of a rural,

5Samir Amin, 'Income distribution in the capitalist system', Review, Summer 1984; SamirAmin,Classe et nation dans l'histoire et la crise contemporaine, Paris: Minuit, 1979, pp 157-67; trans.Class and Nation: Historically and in the CurrentCrisis, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980,pp 149-72.

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'pre-capitalist' ociety in which 90 per cent of the population, alsopredominantly ural, ssubject o exploitationof an'egalitarian' indbya state-classof rentiers who receive a tributeequal to half the totalagricultural utput.At the sametime, the peasantcommunitieshaverelatively ittle internaldifferentiation,but benefit to differentextentsfrom favourablenaturalconditions, resultingin per capita outputsranging rom 1 for the poorest quartile o 2 for the richest.

Next, one supposesthatan agrarian ociety originallyof thistype isintegrated nto the global capitalistdevelopmentof a 'semi-colony'.A

smallclassof latifundists ndrichpeasant andowners10 percent of therural population) appropriatesributein the form of land rent. Withdemographicpressuresactingovera periodof fiftyto a hundredyears,and in the absenceof industrialoutlets, a thirdof the populationfallsinto absolute poverty. This third of the rural population (landlesspeasantsandminifundists) isposesof an incomebarelyequalto thatofthe lowest quarterof the peasant farmers. Agrarianreforms haveeventuallytakenplacein mostregionsof thistype. If one excludes thesocialist countries (China, North Korea, Vietnam), these reforms,

more or less radical n nature,have redistributedand in favourof themiddle strata, to the detrimentof the richest latifundists,withoutalteringthe fate of the pooresthalfof the peasantry.

In the end, the curve which best fits these hypotheses in factcorrespondswith a median representingreal situations existing inSouthernandSoutheastAsia, as well as in the Arab worldtoday.

It is interestingto see that this structure,associatedin the currentphase of capitalist development with the hegemony of the localbourgeoisie (agrarian eformsandindustrialisation),anbe explained

byfour essential actors: ) thepriorhistoryof a ruralclasssociety whichonly allows the peasantry o keep roughlyhalf itsoutput; i) the privateappropriationof surplus n the form of land rent by latifundistsand,following agrarian eform,byrichpeasants; ii) a 'natural' nequality nthe productivity f agriculturaland ranging rom1 to 2; iv) an increasein ruralpopulation densityand the formationof a reserve of surpluslabourconsistingabout a third of the ruralworkforce.

The 'model' n questionalso corresponds,t seems, with the situationin LatinAmerica, at least in the case of the bigger countries such as

Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil. It fits less well the situation incertainCentralAmericanregions,of whichNicaragua nderSomozaorGuatemalaare prime examples. In contrast, the 'model' is certainlydifferent nSub-Saharan fricawherethe priorexperienceof local class

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societies is weaker, the availabilityof landgreater,and so on. In theseareas the distributionof income is no doubt less unequal, althoughpreciseinformation s unobtainable.Nevertheless, even here the trendis towards the appearance of greater differentiations, as all theempiricalstudieshave shown.

In our secondstep, we introduce he concept of the urbaneconomyinto our model. In this instance we find a capitalistsector (whichemploysat most half of the urbanworkingpopulation),for which theconclusions reached above remain valid, given the following

assumptions: ) a higherrateof surplusvalueresulting n awage-profitsratioof 40:60 nsteadof60:40;and i) asteeperwagescale(1to 6 insteadof 1 to 4). Moreover,the 'informal' ector,whichmanagessomehowtoemploy half the urbanworkingpopulation,earns incomes of roughlythe same size as those of the poorest quartileof the capitalistsector.

In order to combine both curves, rural and urban, two principalfactors must be kept in mind: i) the proportionof rural to urbanpopulation,whichdiffers rom one country o another;andii) the largegap betweennet per capita outputin ruraland urbanareas,when this

output is measuredin currentprices and income, as it is in currentstatistics.This gap is always roughlyabout 1 to 3, that is, per capitaoutput s threetimesgreater n the urbaneconomythan nthe rural.Theendresultobtained, .e. the curveconstructedbycombininghesimplerelements, is an interestingone. The resultingcurve is, as we havealreadyseen, a medianof the actual ncome distributions hat occur inthe contemporaryThirdWorld.

Thequestionarisesas to whether hissituation s'transitory'rnot,i.e.whether the correspondingncome distributionand thatdescribedare

evolvingtowardsthe model outlinedabove. In otherwords,is there a'tendential aw'of themovementof incomedistribution,nconjunctionwith the movementof capital?On this difficulttopic, the followingthreetypesof responsecan be identified:

i) That there is no tendential awgoverning his movement. In otherwords,income distribution sonlythe empiricaloutcome of diverseeconomic and social factors whose movements, convergent ordivergent, have their own autonomy. This proposition may be

restated in 'Marxist'terms by noting that income distributiondepends on class strugglesin all their complexity, both national(such as bourgeois-peasant alliance, social-democracy) andinternational(imperialismand the position occupied within the

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internationaldivisionof labour,andso on). Thecapitalist ystem scapableof adapting tself to all these differentsituations.

ii) Thatthere is a tendential awworking o bringabouta progressivereductionof inequalities.The situationin the peripherytoday issimply one of an unfinished transition towards capitalistdevelopment.

iii) That there is a tendential law of progressivepauperisationandgrowing nequality.It remains o be seenwhypauperisationhouldtake place, and by meansof whichpreponderant orce (one thatcannot be counteredby opposingforces?), and on whatscale theprocess occurs (at the level of each capitaliststate, of all thedeveloped countries, of all the underdevelopedcountries, orthroughout he worldwidecore-peripheryystem?).

The Marxist thesis of progressive pauperisationis an abstractformulationof a concrete issue: does capitalistexpansioneventuallybenefitthemajorityofpeopleintermsofrelativestandards f living,or,on the contrary,does it tend to polarisesociety?

The actual history of accumulation n the developed centres ofcapitalism s fairlywellknown.Disregardingocalvariants,a plausiblegeneralisation ouldbe constructedon thefollowing ines.Thepeasantrevolutions,whichoften introduced he capitalistera in these centres,reducedthe degree of inequality n the countryside,at leastwhentheyadopted a radical orm.Thisreductionof inequality ook place at theexpense of the feudal aristocracy,but at the same time led to theimpoverishment f a minorityof poorerpeasantswhowereexpelledtothe cities. The working-classwage was fixed fromthe outset at a low

level determinedby the income of these poorerpeasants.It tendedtoincreaseafterstagnatingoraperiodatthislevel (orevendiminishing),when the expulsionof landlesspeasantsfrom the countryside inallyslowed down. Fromthispointonwards(about1860?)workers'wagesand the real incomesof the 'middle'strataof the peasantry endedtoincreasetogether,in conjunctionwitha risein productivity.Therewaseven a tendency for a rough parity to be establishedbetween theaveragewageofworkersandpeasant ncomes,although histendency snot observable at each stage of accumulation it depended on the

structureof alliancesbetweenthe hegemonicclasses). In the stage oflate capitalism, here is perhapsa 'social-democratic'endency owardsthe reductionof inequalities.But this operates in conjunctionwithimperialism:a favourablepositionwithinthe internationaldivisionof

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labour avourssocial redistribution.Butitwould be wrong o generalisehere, as comparablecases of evolution, for example Sweden and theUSA, divergein thisrespect.

It is necessary o move beyondan examinationof the capitalistcoreconsideredon its own, and takeinto account he evolutionof the worldsystem as a whole. Our thesis here is that the stability of incomedistribution n the core duringthe present presupposesrather thanexcludes a far more unequal distributionof income in the periphery.The realisationof valueatthescale of thesystemas a wholerequires his

complementaryopposition of structures.One is thus led to an unavoidablequestion: what is the overall

tendency of the changesin income distributionwithin the periphery?Although precise information n this domain is fragmentary, t seemsthat the most pronouncedtrend has been towards the worseningofinequalities, certainlyduring he last hundredyears (1880-1980).

A thesisoften advanced o explainthis factis thatinequality n theseregions s the priceof accumulation, nd once the firstphase of the latteris completed (withthe reductionof the labourreserveprovidedby the

peasantry), hesystemwill tend to reduce hisinequality.Thisthesis hasrenewed ts appeal amonga widevarietyof circles,fromthe traditionalRight to certain Anglo-Saxon Marxists. The work of the late BillWarren and variouscritiqueswhich have been directed at our ownstance are situatedon this terrain.6This thesisappears o us to replacethe concrete analysisof the worldwideexpansionof capitalism,whichdiversifieswhile at the same timeunifying,withthe abstractvisionof acapitalism educed o itstendency owardsunification.Theargumentowhich the supportersof this thesis turn as a last resort is that the

worsening of inequalities is only 'provisional'.This abuse of theargumentconcerning ime removesany political significance rom thethesisin question.To saythatcapitalismaggravates he situationfor acenturyor two, but that it will improvematters thereafter is not ananswerto the problemsof our society, but a way of sweepingthemunder the carpet. This line of reasoningsuffers in general from analmost complete lack of any political analysis concerning thediversificationof capitalist formations,and a consequent refusal tomake any qualitative distinction between core and peripheral

formations.6 Bill Warren, Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism, London: Verso, 1980. See our commentaries

in Samir Amin, La deconnexion, Paris:La Decouverte, 1986, Ch. 4; Samir Amin, 'Expansion orcrisis of capitalism?', Third World Quarterly 5(2) April 1983.

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Without going into the details of this debate, let us say that our thesishere is that even the most radical bourgeois national projects in theThird World are probably destined to failure and will in the end submitto the demands of transnationalisation. As a corollary to this thesisregarding the transformation of the peripheral bourgeoisie into acomprador class, we believe that there is no discernible tendencytowards diminishing inequality in income distribution in the ThirdWorld. If any movement can be observed, it is rather in the oppositedirection: towards growing inequality. The idea of progress by stages

which could be repeated after a given time-lag is obviously a powerfulconcept in its simplicity, but one which is obviously false. However, thebelief that developed countries provide the model for the futuredevelopment of the underdeveloped countries remains firmlyentrenched, despite its refutation by four centuries of capitalistdevelopment, and particularly by the experience of the last hundredyears.

According to the logic of the 'stagist' perspective described above,the issue of inequalities in the distribution of income is seen merely as a

question of relative quantity, without any qualitative significance. But itis not just a matter of greater inequality: inequality itself determines thecreation and development of a productive system in the periphery,which is qualitatively different from that which exists in the capitalistcore.

If in fact the various resources (unskilled and skilled labour, capital)are allocated to the types of final consumption (of the different strata ofpopulation according to their income) which directly or indirectlycommand them, one finds:

* that in the core the various resources are allocated to theconsumption of each stratum in proportions similar to the share ofeach of these stratum in consumption. For example, if necessaryconsumption (meaning necessary for the reproduction of labourpower) represents 50 per cent of total consumption and surplusconsumption 50 per cent, the shares of capital and of labour powerwith different skills (low, medium, high) allocated to necessary andsurplus consumption respectively are 50 per cent-50 per cent foreach category of resource (capital, unskilled workforce, skilled

workforce).* that in the periphery, on the other hand, the scarcer resources are

allocated to the consumption of the wealthier strata in greaterproportions than their share of total consumption. This 'distortion'

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in favour of the upper strata withinincome distribution s all thestrongerwhen distributions moreunequal.Forexample, accordingto our calculations concerningthe employment of medium andhighlyskilled abour(withsecondary, echnicalor highereducation)in the Arab world, surplusconsumptionconstitutes 50 per cent oftotal consumption,but absorbs75 per cent of these scarceresources(as against50 per cent in France).

In addition, one observes a tendency both for a deepening ofinequalities n income distributionn the Arab world(before and after

1974)and foraworseningof thisdistortion nthe employmentof scarceresources.It is also noticeablethat inequalitiesare more marked n theArab world(where per capitaGDP is higherthan in otherregionsof theThird World, such as Asia and Sub-SaharanAfrica) and that thedistortion nthe useof resources s at the same time morepronounced.7

The productive apparatusof the peripheralcountries is thus not amere copy of that of the core at an earlierstageof evolution. It differsqualitatively,and therein resides thevery purposeof the internationaldivisionof labour. These differencesexplainwhy,whenin the core the

Lorenzcurve s stable(orisevenmoving owards essinequality), ntheperiphery t is shifting n the oppositedirection,towardseven greaterinequality. The distortion in income distributionis a condition ofexpanded reproduction,of accumulation n a worldscale.

On this point, Marx's hesisconcerningprogressivepauperisationsperfectlyvisible on a world scale. If income distribution ends to bemoreand moreunequal ntheperiphery,whichconstitutes hemajorityof the worldsystem'spopulation,and is stablein the core, then at theglobal level it is movingtowardsgreater nequality.The veryfact that

pauperisationmanifests tself at the worldlevel but not at the core issurely proof of the fact that the law of value acts at the global level,rather than at the level of individual capitalist formation.Marginalisationand impoverishmentin the periphery, however,operate not only by meansof an increasein the rate of extraction ofsurplusvalue, but alsothrough he indirectextractionof surplus abourin non-capitalist orms,both traditionalandnewly-invented.

7 Samir Amin, L'economie arabe contemporaine, Paris: Minuit, 1980; trans. The Arab EconomyToday, London: Zed, 1982.

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From the bourgeois national project to the bourgeoiscomprador project

If in the nineteenthcenturythe imperialistsystem is seen as havingvirtually extended colonial and semi-colonial regimes throughoutAfrica andAsia, national iberationmovements n the aftermathof theSecondWorldWarreconstituted hem ntoindependent tates.Has thismajortransformation f the worldcapitalistsystem put an end to thecore/peripherydichotomy?The prevailingopinionin the West is that

independence effectively opened the way for the creation of newbourgeoisstateswiththecapacity o advancealongthepathof capitalistdevelopment. This process would depend essentially on internalconditions within each state. Thus the pace and the orientationsofeconomicgrowth,of socialdevelopmentsand of political organisation(thelatter'sdespoticordemocratic haracter)wouldbe determined, orthe most part, by internalclass struggles.This thesis therefore deniesthat there is a qualitativedifferencebetweenbourgeoisnationalstatesin the core and intheperipheryof thesystem.Inotherwords, t accepts

the hypothesisthat a bourgeoisnationalproject is capable of beingcarriedout. I think, for my part, that this thesis is mistaken and isrefutedbywhat I call the failureof thebourgeoisnationaloptionin thecontemporaryThird World.8

Of course, the Afro-Asianstates, nations and peoples understoodthatthe reconquestof political ndependencewasonlythe means to anend, the finalgoal beingthe conquestof economic,social andculturalindependence. But here the forces of national liberation were splitbetween two visions:there was the opinion, sharedby a substantial

majority,that 'development'was possiblethrough 'interdependence'withintheworldeconomy;andthat of the socialist eaderswhothoughtthat abandoning he capitalistbloc would lead to the reconstruction,withthe USSR, if not under ts leadership,of a worldsocialist bloc.

The leadersof thecapitalistThirdWorlddid not envisage delinking'fromthe capitalistsystem,but nor did they share a commonstrategicandtacticalview of 'development'.Whilethis is not the place to expandon our concept of 'delinking' see La d&onnexion)we shouldmakeclear that thisconcept is not to be confusedwith 'autarky'. t referstothe need to submitforeign relations o the logic of an internalpopularstrategy of development, as opposed to the strategy of 'adjusting'

8 Samir Amin, La deconnexion, Chs. 1 and 4. See also 'Bandung 30 years later', a paperpresented at the UN conference in Cairo, 1985, unpublished.

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DEMOCRACYAND NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE PERIPHERY

internal development to the constraintsof the global expansion ofcapitalism.Delinkingthereforeassumesoptingfor an internalpriceandincome system autonomousfrom the global system. This nationalsystem would therefore constitute the yardstick for measuring arationalitywhich reflects popular nterests, while the global system ofso-called economic rationality,on the basis of which 'comparativeadvantage' and 'competitivity'are measures, actually reflects theinterestsof international apitaland its subordinate ocal transmissionbelt classes. To varying degrees, however, they believed that the

buildingof a independentdeveloped economyandsociety (evenwithina frameworkof global interdependence)would entail a certainamountof 'conflict'with the dominantWest (the radicalwing reckoningthatwould putan end to thecontrolof thenationaleconomybythecapitalofforeign monopolies).Moreover,careful o preserve heirrecently-wonindependence, theyrefusedto enterinto the global militarygameor toprovide supportfor the encirclementof the socialist countries whichAmerican hegemonism had tried to impose. However, they alsobelievedthatto refusetojointheAtlanticmilitarybloc did notimply he

necessityof placingthemselvesunder the protectionof its adversary,the USSR. From this stanceemerged'neutralism' r 'non-alignment'.

Thecomingtogetherof theAfro-Asianstateshadalreadybegunwiththe constitution,within the UN, of the Arab-Asiangroup, aimed atdefendingthe cause of the colonies still engaged in the struggle forindependence. Bandungin 1955 reinforced this rapprochementandgalvanisedthe struggle.From summitto summitduringthe 1960sandthe 1970s, 'non-alignment' raduallyhiftedfroma platformof politicalsolidaritybased on supportfor nationalliberationstrugglesand the

rejectionof militarypacts, to that of a 'trade associationof economicdemands vis-ac-visthe North'. The battle for a 'New InternationalEconomic Order' (NIEO) commenced in 1975, following the Israeli-Arab war of October1973and the subsequentupwardrevision of oilprices.

Neither on the political nor the economic planewas the Westreadyto acceptthe spiritof Bandung.Was it really only a coincidencethat,one year later, France, Britain and Israel tried to overthrowNasserthroughtheir aggression n Egyptin 1956? The genuinehatredwhich

the West maintainedtowards the radical eadersof the Third Worldin the 1960s (Nasser, Sukarno, Modibo Keita, almost all of themoverthrownin the same period, 1965-68, duringwhich the Israeliaggressionof June1967 alsooccurred) hows thatthe politicalvisionof

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Bandungwas notacceptedby imperialist apital.It was thus apoliticallyweakenednon-alignedbloc whichconfronted heglobaleconomiccrisisfrom1970-71onwards.Thefirmoppositionof the West to the idea of aNIEO demonstratesconverselythattherewas a veryreal logic at worklinking the political and economic demandsof the Afro-Asian blocfollowing Bandung.

Thirty-twoyearsafterthathistoricconference,we have the factuallessons and thenecessaryhindsight o take stock of the situation.Whatwere the real objectives of the Bandung project? Has it simply

exhausted its force, havingattained ts goals?Or did it fail to attain itsgoals because theywere objectively mpossible?Of course,what withhindsightappearsas an'ideologyof development'wasnever thesubjectof a consensus of interpretation. Having enjoyed its 'golden age'between 1955 and 1975, it has now, as we will later show, entered aperhapsfatal crisis.

The traditional socialist bloc was not prepared to accept theobjectiveswhichemerged romBandung. n 1948,Zhdanovproclaimedthe division of the world into two camps, capitalist and socialist,

preemptively ondemning sillusoryanyattempt oplaceoneselfoutsidethem, in other words to seek to be 'non-aligned'.In this spirit, thesocialistsdid not foresee the possibilityof the conquestof independenceby a national iberationmovementwhichtheythemselvesdidnot lead.It was only followingthe first 'stabilisation' f 1950-55(the victoryinChina, the armistice and division of Korea and Vietnam, theacknowledgeddefeat of guerrillaselsewhere in SoutheastAsia); thedemonstrationof the viabilityof the new 'bourgeois'regimes of theThirdWorld; heinceptionof these states'conflictwiththe West, albeit

undera 'bourgeois' eadership;andthe deathof Stalin(1953)and theideologicalopportunities fferedby Khruschchev,hat thepossibilityofa 'viable'thirdbloc and of a 'thirdpathto development'began to beperceived.

On theotherhand,the radicalnon-socialistnationalist eadersof theThird World certainlybelieved in the possibilityof a 'thirdpath todevelopment'whichwould be neither 'capitalist'nor inspired by thesocialistmodels of the USSR and China. Theirrejectionof Marxismcombineda numberof considerations:hey occasionallyperceivedin

Marxisman avatar of Europeancultureincompatiblewith their ownpeoples' value systems;they sometimessimplyfeared the loss of theirindependence, particularlygiven the Soviet domination of EasternEurope (whichwas then beingdenouncedby Yugoslaviaand China);

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they were also drawntowards the Westernmodel of efficiency andconsumption, even of freedom (though perhapsthis was a value towhich they attached essweight), rather han to the Soviet and Chinesemodels, which seemed less efficient and moreaustere. It was perhapsfrom this ambivalencethat the ideologies of 'particularsocialisms'(African, Arab) progressively merged.

A 'Bandungproject'did, therefore, exist, in our opinion, although twas implicitandimprecise n nature.I will not shrink rom labelling tour era's bourgeoisnational project of the Third World. Beyond the

various concrete manifestations and specificities of its nationalexpressions, heprojectcan be definedbythe followingelements: ) thedesire to develop the productive orces,to diversifyoutputs(notablybyindustrialising); i) the desire to reinforcethe nation-state'sdirectionand control over this process; iii) the belief that the process did notimplyin the first instance popular nitiativesbutonly popularsupportfor state actions; iv) the belief that the processdid not fundamentallycontradictparticipationn the internationaldivisionof laboureven if itdidentailmomentaryconflictswith the developed capitalistcountries.

The realisationof thisbourgeoisnationalproject mpliedcontrolovera seriesof processesby a hegemonicnationalbourgeoisclass, throughits state, includingat least the following: ) controlof the reproductionof labour power, which entails a relatively complete and balanceddevelopmentso thatlocalagriculture, mongothereconomicactivities,is able to provide the essential elements for this reproductioninsufficientquantityand at suitablepricesto assure the valorisationofcapital; i) controlof nationalresources; ii)controlof local marketsandthe capacityto penetratethe world market n competitiveconditions;

iv) control of the financialcircuitspermittingthe centralisation ofsurplusvalueand the orientationof itsproductiveuses; v) controlof thetechnologies in use at the level of development reached by theproductive orces.9

Seen from this angle, the developmentexperiences of the ThirdWorld can be classed into two categoriesof objectives:that of thosecountries which have simply attempted to accelerate their growthwithout worryingabout achievingthe conditions listed above (IvoryCoast, Kenya,Pakistan,SaudiArabia . . . the list is long); andthat of

the countrieswhich have tried to realise the conditionsin question(EgyptunderNasser, Algeria, Tanzania,India, Brazil,SouthKorea).

9 Samir Amin, La deconnexion, Chs. 1 and 2.

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As can be seen, this classification does not necessarilymatch thedivisionbetween thoseregimesanxious o promotea certaindegree ofsocial justiceandbringaboutreforms,notablyagrarian suchas Egyptunder Nasser,or SouthKorea)and those whichdid nothesitatebeforeacceptinga worseningof social inequalities Brazilfor example). Nordoes it correspondto the divisioncreatedby their attitudesvis-a-vistransnational apital(BrazilandKenyabothwelcome suchcapital,butthe former ries to integrate t within ts own nationalpolicies,while thelatter is content to adjustto its demands),nor to the divide over the

issue of maintainingpoliticalrelationsof conflict or alliancewithEastand West. Correlationsdo exist, but the nuancesof the combinationsformed to meet concretecircumstancesmake eachThirdWorldcountrya specialcase.

It is now no longer possibleto ignorethe inadequaciesof allattemptsat development,whichhave not withstoodthe reversalof favourableconjunctures.The food and agriculturecrisis, the external financialdebt, the increased echnologicaldependency, hefragilityof capacitiesto resisteventualmilitaryaggression, he wasteproducedby capitalist

modelsof consumptionandtheir deologicalandcultural mpact,pointto the historical limits of this option. Even before the currentcrisisoffered the opportunity or the 'offensive of the West'whichmanagedto reverse the previous rends,these deficiencieshad in manycases ledto an impasse. I do not claim that these experiencesin principlehadnecessarily to end where they did, and that consequently their'bankruptcy'was predestined. I can only contend that, to go anyfurther,a genuine 'revolution'was required,capableof puttingan endto the twinillusionconcerninghepossibilityof a nationaldevelopment

without this being the product of a truly popular force, and thepossibility of this development without 'delinking'from the worldsystem.It is notcertainwhethersome movements n thisdirectioncouldnot have beenpossible (andI amthinkingnotablyof the case of Egypt).Yet significantly,popularrevolutiondid notoccur,andbecauseof this,the historicpagewas turned.

In view of the experienceoutlinedabove,we cansaythat theprojectin question deserves to be called a bourgeois national projectand assuch was demonstrably mpossible o achieve. In thisway, historyhas

shown that the national bourgeoisie within the Third World is notcapable,in ourera,of achievingwhat t achievedelsewhere, n Europe,North America and Japan n the nineteenthcentury. There is nothingnew in thisthesis,andthe failureof the bourgeosisnationalprojecthas

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been repeatedmanytimesin the past. One such failure s thatof Egypt.The historyof Egypt sinceMohamedAli is that of a series of challengesby the nationalbourgeoisie, broken each time by the conjunction oftheir internalfragilityandimperialistaggression.

A detailed examinationof the historyof other countriesandregionsof theThirdWorldwould llustrate, n ouropinion,thesamethesis:thatof a uninterrupteduccessionof bourgeoisnationalbids, theirrepeatedmiscarriage nd the submission othedemands orsubordinationwhichfollowed each time. This has occurredin Latin America since the

nineteenth century(we cite here only the most recentexamples of theMexican Revolution of the period 1910-1920 and thatof Peronism nArgentina),in India(whoseevolution fromNehru's'FirstPlan' to thereturnof the Right to government ollowing Congress's irstdefeat iseloquent), andin numerousArab and Africancountries.

The favourableconjunctureof the post-war period was due to anexceptionalcombinationof circumstances.On the economicside, thestrong growthof the 'North'facilitated he 'adjustment'of the South.On the politicalside, peacefulcoexistencewasaccompaniedbythe rise

of Soviet militaryand industrialmight (fromthe first Sputnikto theachievementof strategic parity'during he 1960sand1970s),combinedwiththe decline of the ageing BritishandFrenchcolonialempiresandthespreadof Afro-Asian ndependence truggles.Thisconjuncture entrealweightto the conceptof non-alignment.

But successmay bringdelusionswith it. One suchdelusionis plainlyencapsulated in the theory of a so-called 'non-capitalist path',concerninga 'gradual'evolution towards socialism. Of course, thetheory in question did not convince everyone. In the 1960s it was

violentlyattackedby Chinaas an opiatemeantto lull the peoples anddouse the firesof the 'zoneof storms'.

Thepageof historyhastodaybeen turned.Since thebeginningof the1970s, the economic boomof the Westhadfadedto makewayfor thecurrent structural risis,while the competition amongEurope, Japanand the United States has replaced reconstructionunder Americanprotection.Inthe SovietUnion, Khrushchev's romises o overtake heAmericanstandardof living by 1980 and the expectationsof a rapiddemocratisationollowingthe 20thParty Congress(1956) gave wayto

immobilismunderBrezhnev(whichnowappears o be underchallengefromGorbachev).In China,the revisionswhichfollowed Mao's deathrevealed that neither the questionof economicefficiency,nor that ofdemocracy,had yet found their 'definitive' answer.Throughoutthe

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ThirdWorld, the hunger crisis,that of external debt and the impassecreated by imported echnologyhave ledto a series of surrenders othediktatof transnational apital,reorganisedaroundthe IMF, the WorldBankandthe consortiumof bigWesternbanks.In the countrieswitharadicalorientation, he coupsd'e'tat nd acts ofmilitaryaggression the1967war wasnot an accident)greatlycontributed o puttingan end tothe experimentation f the post-SecondWorldWarperiod.

Thebasisof the new worldconjunctures formedbytheaggressionofthe capitalistWestagainst hepeoplesand nationsof the ThirdWorld.

The objectivesof the capitalistWest is to subordinate he subsequentevolutionof the ThirdWorld o the requirements f the redeploymentof transnational apital.10

But is this situationreally only a conjuncture, fleeting in naturethough painful,which will perforcebe followedby a new hatchingofadvanced 'national bourgeoisies'? Or does it involve a historicalturning-pointwhichwillno longerpermit he pursuitof successivebidsbythe bourgeoisnationalproject,aprojectwhichhascharacterisedhehistoryof capitalism or at leasta century?The real debateconcerning

the natureof future challengesand options is focused on these twoconsiderations.

The hypothesis which we are putting forward is that thecontemporarycrisis marks the end of an era, an era whichfor Asia,Africa and Latin America mightbe termed the centuryof nationalbourgeoisies,in the sense thatit has been characterisedby successiveattemptsat bourgeoisnationalconstruction.To note simplythat theseexperimentshave not producedresultsis hardlynew. What is new,according o thishypothesis, s the affirmationhat suchattemptswill no

longertake placein the future.In otherwords,the bourgeoisieof theThird World has now finallyaccepted the pursuitof its developmentthrougheconomic subordinationo the core. This is a projectimposeduponit by the expansionof transnational apital,whichhasforced thenew bourgeoisieto becomecomprador ubordinates.

Many reasons militate in favour of this hypothesis.The depth ofsubordinationof the periphery to the core and the globalisationofcapital in the contemporaryworldindicate the existence of a politicaland economic situation which has little in common with the

10 SamirAmin, 'A proposduNOEI et desrelations conomiquesnternationales',ocialismn theWorld 29) 1982; rans. After heNIEO, thefutureof internationalconomicrelations', ournalof Contemporary sia (12-14) 1982.See also SamirAmin, 'Lacrise, le TiersMondeet lesrelationsNord-Sudet Est-Ouest',NouvelleRevueSocialiste,Paris:September-October, 983.

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DEMOCRACYAND NATIONAL STRATEGYIN THE PERIPHERY

circumstancesxistingat the end of the SecondWorldWar. A thousandindicators illustratethis point overwhelmingly,not only in terms ofnationaleconomicplanning, inancesandtechnology,but also in termsof consumption,cultureand the ideology of everydaylife. The socialstructures formed and deformed by these phenomena draw ourattentionto the fact thatthe presentchallengehas little to do with thatwhich once confronted he SovietandChinese people.

The alternative: popular national development, political andsocial democracy, and the ending of dependence

The worldwideexpansionof capitalism s thus of a polarisingnature.Since the originsof capitalism, our centuriesago, the core/peripheryopposition hasremained nherentwithin thissystem.Thisopposition,whichconstitutesthe principalaspectof capitalism's ontradictions,sunsurmountablewithin the frameworkof the worldsystem. Inclusionwithinthis worldsystem, the 'externalfactor', is not only in itself anunfavourableinfluence, but I would go so far as to say that it is

becomingincreasingly o. It only took nineteenth-centuryGermanyafew decades to 'catchup and overtake'England.How longwill Brazilrequireto 'catchup andovertake'the USA? Laterattemptsto createbourgeois national states thus, as ever, remain doomed to failure,condemned,throughcompradorisation,o perpetuatepolarisation nrenewed formscorresponding o the developmentof the system as awhole.11

It is thispolarisationwhich s in factresponsible ortheappearance fsocially and politicallyunacceptableregimes in the peripheryof the

system. They are socially unacceptablebecause they are foundedonimpoverishment nd the exclusionof thegreatmassof thepeople. Theywere politically unacceptable n the past in the sense that the settingup of the system required colonial domination; and they remainunacceptablebecause the pursuit of a form of local developmentintegratedwithinthe systemdemandsthat the new independentstateremainsdespotic.Thus,democracys not the 'rule',butthe exception,produced romtimeto timebythe impassesof capitalistdevelopment,but always vulnerable. Contrary to the 'optimistic' thesis of

See Samir Amin, La deconnexion, and three other forthcoming studies: Samir Amin, 'L'Etat etle developpement' ('State and Development'); 'L'accumulation 30 ans plus tard' (Accumulationon a World Scale, 30 Years Later); and 'A propos "The Third World Revolt"'.

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developmentby stages,accordingo whichsocialmiseryanddespotismwill be progressively vercome by capitalistexpansion,thatexpansionwill continuallyreproduce hese conditions.

Given these conditions,capitalismhas raisedthe spectreof its beingoverthrown through a 'revolt of the periphery'. In this sense the'socialist revolutions', all of them emerging in the periphery orsemi-periphery f the system (TsaristRussia, China, etc.), constitute,along with the genericallysimilarnational iberationmovements,themost essential change in our contemporaryworld. These struggles,

effectivelyor potentially,usherin the 'post-capitalist'ra.I would contendthat 'delinking'on the basisof a popularnational

socialalliance as opposedto thebourgeoisnationalproject)constitutesthe only positive prospect for avoiding capitalist relegation to theperiphery.By 'delinking', meanin precisetermsthe subordination fexternalrelationsto internaldemands or popular ransformation nddevelopment, as against the bourgeois strategy of adjustment ofinternalgrowth o the constraints f the worldwide xpansionofcapital.

The unequal characterof capitalist expansion, which cannot be

overcomefromwithin tsownframework,husobjectivelydemands hereconstructionof the worldon the basisof anothersocialsystem.Thepeoples of the peripheryare obligedto become aware of thisdemandand to imposethenewsystem, f theyareto avoidtheworst,whichmayextend to genocide, as the historyof thisexpansionshows.

These challengesto the capitalistorderin the form of revoltsin theperipheryforce one seriouslyto rethink the questionof the 'socialisttransition' towards the abolition of classes. However carefullyformulated, the Marxist raditioncontinues to be handicappedby its

initial theoreticalview of 'workers' evolutions'pavingthe way,on thebasisof advancedproductiveorces,atleastinrelative erms,forafairlyrapid ransition haracterised ydemocratic uleof thepopularmasses.While termed a 'dictatorshipover the bourgeoisie' (by means of aproletarian tateof anewtypewhichwillsoon 'witheraway'),thisrule sneverthelessconsiderablymore democratic hanthe most democratic fbourgeoisiestates. Obviously,realityhas not turnedout like this. Allrevolutionsof an anti-capitalistbent have so far taken place in theperipheryof the system;all have been confrontedby the problemsof

the development of the productive forces and the hostility of thecapitalistworld; none has yet been able to establish anyreal form ofadvanceddemocracy;all have ended up reinforcing he state system.They have reacheda pointwheredoubtsare ncreasingly astupon their

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DEMOCRACYAND NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE PERIPHERY

'socialist'characterand on the prospects oreffecting, at whatever imein the future, the definitive abolition of classes. For some people (ofwhom we are not a part and whose theses we have criticised n the past)these systems are nothing more than specific forms of capitalistexpansion tself.12

The crucial task is not of course to 'label' these systems, but tounderstandtheir origins, problems and specific contradictions, thedynamicswhich hey allowor exclude. We have arrivedat the thesis thatin cases of popularnationalstates and societies; we stress that they are

popular, and neither bourgeois nor socialist. In the same way, wereachedthe conclusion hat this popularnational phase'was inevitablyimposed by the unequal characterof capitalistdevelopment.

These systems are, because of this, effectivelyfaced with the task ofdevelopment of the productive forces and are founded upon socialforces that refuse to accept the argumentthat development can beachieved by meansof a simple 'adjustment'within the frameworkofcapitalist expansion on a world scale. They are the product ofrevolutionsled and supported by progressivesocial forces in revolt

against he effectsof theunequaldevelopmentof capitalism.Thereforesuch systemsare contradictoryand conflictingcombinationsof threedifferentforces.

The first of these, socialist or at least potentially so, translatestheaspirationsof the popularsocial forces which gave birth to the newstate.The second, capitalistnnature, expresses he factthat, giventheactualstateof developmentof theproductive orces, capitalist elationsof productionarestillnecessary,and hencerequirereal socialforcestomaintain hem.This swhyeach time an extensionof marketrelations s

toleratedwithin a countryof the Easternbloc, the situation mproves.But the existence of capitalistrelations should not be confused withintegrationwithinthe capitalistworldsystem. Manyof the criticismsdirected at China, Yugoslavia,and Hungaryhave founderedon thisslippery errain,wronglyobjectingthat these countriesareundergoing'reintegration' nto the capitalistworld system. On the contrary,thestate is presentto isolate these relationsfromthe effects of inclusionwithin the systemdominatedby the capitalof the core monopolies.

The thirdseriesof realsocial forcesoperating n theseregimes,which

we term 'statist', have an autonomyof their own. They are neither

12 Samir Amin, La d6connexion ... Ch. 4; Samir Amin, 'Expansion or crisis of capitalism',

Contemporary Marxism (9) 1984.

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reducible to a disguised form of capitalist relations (as statismeffectively s in thecapitalistThirdWorld),nor toa 'degenerate' ormofsocialism. Statismrepresentsreal and potentialsocial forces in theirown right.

The problems acedbythe capitalistThirdWorldwith the adventofpolitical liberation were similar in nature. But the ambiguityof thestrategies it adopted was more pronounced because, even whereradicalisationhad occurredduringthe struggle or independence,theoptionin favour of a programme f popularcontent anddelinkingwas

hamperedby bourgeois aspirationsand the illusory promise of thebourgeoisienationalproject.Whydidthe 'ThirdWorld' hennotset offon the pathto constructing bourgeoisnationalstatebycopyingthoseof thecapitalist ore?To besure,the outcomedid notsimplyresult rom'ideas' without any reference to the social base; it was rather theexpressionof certainsocial classesand strataof abourgeois nclination,which dominated the 'national liberationmovement'(i.e. the revoltagainst the effects of the unequal development of capitalism)andcontinue to dominate he stateswhichemerged rom t. History eaches

us that the bourgeoisiesof the peripheryhave attemptedthis task ofconstructingthe state at each stage of world capitalist expansion,althoughof course n formsappropriateo theirrespective imes.It alsoteaches us that in the end such attemptswere alwaysblockedby theconjunction of external aggressionand the internal limits of theseattempts.

The question of democracy,both in the socialistcountries and inthose of the ThirdWorld,must be placedwithinthiscontext.

Let us be clear on this point: the critiquewhichMarxdirected at

bourgeoisdemocracy,.e. of itslimitedandformalcharacter, emains, omy mind, whollycorrect.All the same,thisdemocracywas not offeredbythebourgeoisie o itspeoplebutconquered,relativelyateinthe day,by working-classstruggles. For the capitalistmode itself does notrequiredemocracy.Thespringbehind tssocialdynamism s located onanother evel, that of thecompetitionamongcapitalistsand ndividuals.Moreover, capitalismseparates economic and social management,ruled by fundamentally undemocratic principles, from politicalmanagement, run today according to the democratic principle of

election. We would add that this form of democracyonly functionswhen its socialimpacthas been annihilatedby the exploitationcarriedoutbythe dominant orcesof the corepowerswithin he capitalistworldsystem,thatis to sayonce thelabourmovementhas renounced ts own

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project for a classlesssociety and acceptedthe capitalist rulesof thegame'.

In the periphery,democracy,even morerestricted n nature, s barelymore than the expressionof the crisisof despotismwhich s herea formof the capitalistsystem.Countries n LatinAmerica, South Koreaandothers, currentlyfurnish blatant examples of the violent politicalcontradictions fflictinga ThirdWorld n crisis.I mentionedearlier hatLatin American desarrollismohad claimedthat 'industrialisation' nd'modernisation'alongbourgeois ines andwithin he contextof an even

greater ntegrationntotheworldsystem)would automaticallyead to ademocratic volution. The 'dictatorship'was looked uponasthevestigeof a supposedly pre-capitalistpast. The facts have demonstrated hatmodernisationwithinthe frameworkof thisbourgeoisprojecthas only'moderniseddictatorship'and substitutedan 'efficient'and 'modern'violence of a fascistic type for the old oligarchic,patriarchal ystems.The bourgeoisproject,however,hasnotdelivered hepromisedresults:the crisis has revealed the vulnerabilityof this constructionand theimpossibilityof the 'independence'whichlegitimateddictatorship or

some. But were not the democraticsystems,whichwere imposed inthese circumstances,acedwith a formidabledilemma?There areonlytwo choices available: Either the democraticpolitical system acceptssubmission o the demandsof 'adjustment'o the worldsystem, andisthereafter ncapableof effectingsocialreformsof any importance, oonprecipitating crisis ordemocracy tself;orelse popular orces,seizingthe meansprovidedby democracy, mposethese reforms.The systemthenenters ntoconflictwithdominantworldcapitalism,moving romabourgeoisnationalprojectto a popularnationalone.13The dilemmaof

Brazil and the Philippinesderivesentirelyfrom this conflict.The popular option requires democracy. This is so because

democracyis a necessaryinternal condition of socialism. Once thespring of competition amongst capitalistsis broken, social relationsbased on cooperation among workers instead of submission toexploitation are unthinkablewithout the complete expression ofdemocracy.

In the socialistcountriescomplexreasonsof aparticular aturewhichrelate to the history of Marxism, and which we have analysed

13 Is not the doctrine of the Brazilian PMBD, which believes in the possibility of reconciling liberal

political democracy and a dependent economic development, a return to the illusions of

desarrollismo?

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elsewhere,14 have theirshare of responsibility or the deadlockcreatedby the refusal of politicaldemocracy.Despite the nationaland socialachievementswhich have broughtwith them eventualsupportof thepopular masses, the denial of political democracy attests to thepreponderance of statist forces to the detriment of the socialisttendenciespresent.

This situation s graverstillregarding he radicalexperimentswithinthe Third World.There the absence of political democracyworks infavour of capitalism,either of the privateor state form, and causes

the system to degenerate towards a bureaucraticcapitalismwhichultimatelyrisksbecominga formof compradorisation.n the socialistcountries, this risk is unlikelyto materialise,as the popularnationalstate (althoughundemocratic)has sufficientsolid historicalgroundingto allow the continuationof relativestagnationwithinthe confines ofstatism, or the renewalby society of its move forward.In contrast,examples aboundof completefailureamongthe radical states of theThirdWorld and theirsubsequent recompradorisation'.

In every case democracys the onlymeansof reinforcing he chance

for socialism withinpopularnationalsociety, of isolatingthe internalcapitalist relations of production from the influence of theircompradorised nsertioninto the capitalistworld system, and hencereducingthe degreeof their externalvulnerability.

Whatkindof democracyarewe talkingabout?No doubt theheritageof Westernbourgeoisdemocracys notmerely o be scorned,bestowingas itdoesarespect orrightsandforlegality, reedomof expression or adiversityof opinions, the institutionalisation f electoral proceduresand the separation of powers, the organisation of countervailing

powers, and so on. But nor is this legacy the last word. Westerndemocracy s lacking nanysocial dimension.5 The populardemocracyof the moments of revolutionarysocial transformation such as theUSSR in the 1920s,MaoistChina)also teachesus a greatdeal about thenatureof any 'popularparticipation',o use a tiredexpression,which sto have realmeaning. To conserveWesterndemocratic ormswithouttakinginto consideration he socialtransformations emandedby the14 Samir Amin, La deconnexion ... Chs. 1, 2 and 4; see also SamirAmin, L'avenir du

maoisme ...15 There is no formof socialphenomenonwhichdoes not allow for the occasional

exception.Swedish ocialdemocracys byno means nferior o thebestachievements f theEasternbloc.This s surelyattributableo thepeculiarhistoryof Swedenandto itslabourmovement,withoutparallelelsewhere n theWest. But it mustalsobe conceded hattheprivileged ositionwhichSwedenoccupieswithin the international ivision of labourhas facilitated his exceptionalevolution.

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anti-capitalist revolt of the periphery is to become trapped within atravesty of bourgeois democracy, which will remain alien to the peopleand consequently extremely vulnerable. In order to take root,democracy should above all inscribe itself within a perspective whichmoves beyond capitalism. This domain, like others, must be governedby the law of unequal development.16

Obviously, it is this prospect which imperialism finds intolerable. Forthis reason, the campaign concerning 'democracy', orchestrated by theWest, stresses only certain aspects of the problem and neglects others.

For example, it identifies multiparty political systems with democracy.No doubt the 'single party' has more often than not, become, theexpression of statist dominance. 7 But equally, it is often the product ofthe effective achievement of popular national unity: this is true in thecase of the Chinese Communist Party and some other organisationswhich emerged from the liberation struggle. In these instances, thecreation of 'other parties' might be an artificialoperation, not an urgentitem on the agenda of popular struggles. The democratisation of theParty, its separation from the state, the clear distinction between state

and civil society, the opening up to debate of the party and socialorganisations (truly independent trade unions, peasant cooperatives)are the essential reforms here which false Western friends of the peoplesof the Third World refuse to acknowledge as democratic advances.

The question of the divergence of interests and of conflicts betweenThird World countries should also be situated within this context.

The illusions fostered by the bourgeois national project lead thestates of the periphery to emphasise the divergent interests dividingthem, on account of their different functions within the world system.

Thus producers of energy or raw materials and semi-industrialisedcountries, countries liable to become indebted to the world financialmarket and those lacking resources, countries with food deficits andthose with food surpluses, will find it difficult to form a united frontagainst the North. This front could only be established on the basis ofthe common denominator linking these countries; namely, their statusas peripheral entities. On this basis the popular national regimesengaged in a strategy of 'delinking' could strengthen their national

16 See my general thesis regardingthe significance of unequal development in SamirAmin, Classe etnation ...

7 For the sake of argument one could cite numerous cases of 'one party'regimes or even regimes of'no parties allowed at all' which do not provoke Western ire, simply because these states accept theneo-colonial submission. Similarly, there are manywell-known examples of 'multi-partysystems'which are in practice hardly democratic!

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options by a form of regionalcooperation, itself delinked from theworld capitalist system. At present South-South cooperation iscomplementary o unequalNorth-South relations.'8As long as ThirdWorldcountriescontinue o attempt o achieveacapitalistdevelopmentintegrated n the global expansionof capitalism, hese countrieswill bebound to compete among themselves and therefore conflict amongthem will be the rule. Of course, the matter of intra-ThirdWorldconflicts s vastandcomplex,and couldbyitself constitutea subjectforstudy, for which this is not the place. So to make this long storyshort,

and recognisingthat the political (and sometimes military)conflictsbetweenThirdWorldcountriesarecertainlynot all of the samekind,Ipropose hereto distinguish our differentgroupsof such conflicts:

i) Certain conflicts are merely the continuationof the struggleforliberationof the peripheralpeoples against mperialism,due to thefact that certain radicalregimeshave constitutedor constitute atarget for the West to destroy, with the latter mobilising neo-colonial regimes to fight on its behalf. The actions of the

accomplices of the permanent aggression of Israel and SouthAfrica against Egypt and the SouthernAfrican front-line statesrespectivelyprovideevidenceof thistype of conflict;

ii) The illusions fosteredby the bourgeoisnationalproject mayhavestimulated sub-imperialist'mbitions,aboutwhichmuchhasbeenwritten nthe past. Experiencehas shown hat,farfromestablishingthemselves as new imperialisms,even second class ones, theseattemptshave finallyendedwith the absorptionof localsurrogateswithinthe sphereof influenceof the real imperialistcentres. The

conflicts that occur within regional groupings, conceived as'commonmarkets'betweenlocal surrogatesn whichthe activitiesof monopoly capitalconcentrate,and the other secondrank statesof the periphery e.g. Kenyavs. Tanzania;NigeriaandIvoryCoastvs. the ECOWASpartners),are one outcomeof this problematic.'9TheIran-Iraqconflict s theresultof excessiveregionalhegemonistambitionsof the leadershipof boththese countries;

iii) Without doubt conflicts of a purely local origin exist, both within

18 Fayqal Yachir, 'La cooperation Sud-Sud, une alternative?' Bulletin du Forum du TiersMonde(2) October 1983; Samir Amin, 'Afro-Arab co-operation, the record and the prospects', AfricaDevelopment (1987).

1 Samir Amin, Imperialisme et developpement inegal, Paris: Minuit, 1976, Ch. 5; trans.Imperialism and Unequal Development, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, Ch. 5.

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the frontiersof a single stateand betweenneighbouring tates. Theheterogeneous and even artificialcharacterof many Third Worldstatesisoften responsible orthese conflicts.Itremains he case thatthese conflictsarefrequentlycausedby strugglesbetween differentsegmentsof thecomprador ulingclass. Thesesegmentsmobilise ntheir support orces which the mere fact of social diversity ethnic,religious, regional)would not alone have caused to confront oneanother,eitherspontaneouslyor underthe force of necessity;20

iv) Nor do the conflicts between socialist countries stem from an

inevitable clash of nationalisms traversing social classes andregimes. In some cases, they involve profound differencesconcerning international politics (for example the refusal ofYugoslavia and China to submit to the strategy of the Sovietsuperpower).In others, the conflict is ratherthe expressionof theexpansionistambitions of powers aspiringto regional hegemony(such as that of Vietnam vis-a-vis Laos and Kampuchea).Hereagain democratisation s the only response capableof disarmingadventuristeadershipsandpreventing heirgoing astray.21

In all these cases the conflicts of minor or secondarypowers in thecontemporaryworld are, at some point, bound to conform with thestrategies of the superpowers.It can thus be perceived that theseconflictsdo not simplyreplicate he confrontationswhichaccompaniedthe formationof the core capitalistnations. On the contrary, hey arethemselves either the result of the polarisationbetween core andperiphery,or a vectorof its reproduction.

In conclusion I do believe that the issues of 'social justice' (a betterdistribution f

income), politicaldemocracyand nternational

olidarity(rather hanintra-ThirdWorldconflicts) n the ThirdWorldare indeedconnected, so that it is impossibleto 'cure'any of these evils withoutconsideringthe whole problemof their interlinkage.Our thesis hasbeen that the global expansionof capitalisms responsible or growingsocial inequality, political despotismand growingintra-ThirdWorldconflicts. Therefore, opting for 'another development'-based onpopular nterestsanddemocracy-and buildingnternational olidarityon thebasisof thisoption necessarilynvolves'delinking' rom the logicof global capitalism.The dramaof ThirdWorldnationalism s that it has20 Samir Amin, 'Etat, nation, ethnie et minorites dans la crise', Bulletin du Forum du TiersMonde

(6) 1986.21 Samir Amin, Classe et nation . .. Ch. 7; Samir Amin, Imperialisme et developpement inegal,

Ch. 8.

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continuouslyhoped that the global systemcould adjustto additionalnational bourgeoisprojects.Historyhas provedthat these projects areultimately doomed to failure and are followed by compradorsubalternisation,with allits negativesocial andpoliticalconsequences.

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1987 democracy and national strategy in the periphery

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