1962 oct 2 supply of missiles to israel and arab countries

8/3/2019 1962 Oct 2 Supply of missiles to Israel and arab countries

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Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/110 Image Reference:0050


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Primed for the Cabinet. October 1962

Th e c i rcula t io n of th is pa pe r has been s t r ic t ly l im ited. I t i s i s suedfor the personal use of

C op y N o . ****C. (62) 1502nd October, 1962

C A B I N E T

S U P P L Y O F D E F E N S I V E M I S S I L E S T O I S R A E L A N D A R A B C O U N T R I E S

N O T E B Y T H E M I N I S T E R O F S TA T E FO R FO R E I G N A FF A I R S

On 20 th Sep tember the Cab ine t , be fo re dec id ing whe the r we shou ld expres sa read ines s to supp ly any coun t ry in the Midd le Eas t wi th g round- to -a i r mis s i l e s ,a sked the Fore ign Sec re ta ry to a r range , in consu l ta t ion wi th the Min i s te r o fDefence and the Minis ter of Avia t ion, for a review of the present s ta te of miss i leequipment of the countr ies of the Middle Eas t , of the scope for increas ing i t andof the pol i t ica l and economic impl ica t ions of so doing; and to cons ider in thel igh t o f th i s rev iew the t e rms in which the Uni ted Kingdom Government migh tannounce the i r read ines s to supp ly mis s i l e s to Midd le Eas t coun t r i e s , once theterms of the Uni ted Sta tes offer to supply miss i les to Is rae l had become known.( C . C . (62) 57th Conclus ions , Minute 3 . )2. T h e a t t a c h e d m e m o r a n d u m h a s a c c o r d i n g l y b e e n p r e p a r e d i n c o n s u l t a t i o nwit h off ic ia ls of the M ini s t r y of De fence a nd the M inis t ry of Av ia t io n. I t hasno t ye t be en seen by. th e Fo re ig n Sec re tary , the Min is ter of Defe nce o r the Mi nis terof Av ia t i on , bu t is be i ng c i rcula ted in view of th e urgenc y of the m at t er .

D U N D E E .

Foreign Office, S.W.1, 2nd October, 1962.

1491 A


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2 T O P S E C R E T

A N N E X

T H E S U P P L Y O F D E F E N S I V E M I S S I L E S T O I S R A E L A N D A R A BC O U N T R I E S

M E M O R A N D U M B Y O F FIC IA LS

r Existing. OffersTh is pa pe r deals with gro und - to-a ir miss iles . De tai ls abou t a l l types ofmiss iles bein g supp lied to the M idd le Ea st are a t A pp en di x A. Secret repo r tshave reached us that Soviet ground- to-air miss i les wil l be supplied to I raq andthe Un ite d Ar ab R ep ub lic in 1963 or 1964; we believe th at Syr ia may also receivethem in due cou r se . Th e Is r ae l is w ho have ma de enqu i r ies o f the Un i ted S ta tesand ourselves about the supply of such weapons f rom t ime to t ime were informedin Au gus t by the Un i ted S ta tes Gov ern m en t o f the i r r ead iness to m ake themavai lab le and th i s has now becom e pub l ic knowledge . Del ivery cou ld no t t akeplace unt i l the end of 1963 and tra in in g requ ires 65 we eks . F o r pol i t ical re aso nsthe Israel is are v ir tual ly cer ta in to want to buy f rom the United States ra ther thanus . The Un i ted S ta tes Governmen t w i l l a l so say tha t they a re r eady to cons iderapp l ica t ions f rom Arab coun t r ies .2. No Bri t ish ground- to-air miss i les have been supplied to any countr ies inthe area and there seems to be no quest ion of the supply by the French or anyothers for the foreseeable fu ture .

Po ten t ia l Demand and Avai lab i l i ty o f Br i t i sh Miss i les3. The scope fo r increas ing Midd le Eas t coun t r ies ' ho ld ing o f these weaponsis d if ficu lt to determ ine . I t is pro ba bl e that A ra b count r ies wil l no t wish to ha vethe sam e w ea po n as Israel . If, as seem s l ikely , I s rael pur cha ses H aw k, then theAra bs migh t wa n t Blo odho und o r Th un de rb i rd . Sa les of such missi les migh tbe m ad e to Ku wa i t and Jo rd an , and a l so mo re doub t fu l ly to Le ban on , Saud iAra b ia and Sy r ia , and even conce ivab ly to Egy p t . Poss ib ly more p romis ing sa lesprospects a lso ex is t for smaller cheaper miss i les such as the naval Seacat and i tsland -based ver s ion T igerca t . Br ie f no tes on po te n t ia l de m an d coun t ry by coun t ryare a t Append ix B.4. Ha ving r egard to the impa c t o f Un i te d S ta tes ( and Sov ie t ) comp et i t ion ,and also to the ab i l i ty of potent ia l cus tomers to pay , the volume of business accru ingto - the Un i ted Kingdom is no t l ike ly to be wor th more than , say , 10 mi l l ion .5. T h e p r o d u c t io n o f B lo o d h o u n d I a n d T h u n d e r b i r d I h a s a l r e a d y l a p s e d .Supply of Mark I miss i les would have to come f rom the Serv ices as re-equipment

wi th M ar k I I miss iles r ender s them su rp lus to Serv ice r equ i r em en ts . Bl ood hou nd Icou ld no t be supp l ied befo re 1963 o r 1964. Su rp lus Th un de rb i rd M ark I f romthe a rmy cou ld no t be m ad e ava i lab le befo re 1966 -67 , thou gh some Th und erb i rdsf rom new p roduc t ion migh t become ava i lab le befo re tha t da te .6 . T he secur i ty posi t io n is com plex but it is poss ib le tha t som e eq uip m en tscould not be relea sed to the Ar abs as ear ly as to the Israel is . Seac at and T ige rcatcou ld p ro ba b ly be mad e ava i lab le abo u t tw o year s from rece ip t of a f irm o rder .

Implicat ions of a Br i t ish Offer to Supply7 . W e hav e been very conce rned a t the r epercuss io ns in Ar ab coun t r ies o fou r supp ly ing to the Is r ae l i s . Ou r pos i t ion in the Midd l e Eas t is mu ch m oreexposed than tha t o f the Un i ted S ta tes and , i f the Arab coun t r ies shou ld un i teagains t us on th is issue, they could do us a great deal of harm in a number ofwa ys. In par t icu lar the Chiefs of Staff are especial ly con cern ed tha t the supplyo f Un i te d "Kin gdom miss iles to the a rea shou ld n o t h ave r epercuss ions wh ichprejudice the s tag ing and overf ly ing faci l i t ies we enjoy with the Sudan and Libyao r ou r r e la t ions wi th Kuwai t .8. If we offer to sup ply the Ara bs as well as th e Israe lis this m ay m itig atethe Ar ab reac t ion bu t the Ara bs are l ikely to regar d our offer as a cover for ou r


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sup ply ing Is rael . In add i t ion the sup ply of miss i les to A ra b cou ntr i es ra ises thefo l lowing prob lem s :(a) I t i s im po rta nt pol i t ica l ly to avoid discr im inat io n in the del ivery date soffered to the Is rael is and Arabs .(b) I t may be pol i t ica l ly di ff icul t for us to supply to cer ta in Arab countr ies ,e.g., I r aq and Saud i Ar ab ia . Th e mi l i t a ry conseq uences of supply ingIraq are acceptable but this would be di ff icul t to expla in to publ icop i n i on i n t he U n i t e d K i ngdom , a nd t o t he K uw a i t G ove r nm e n t , s olong as the th rea t to K uw ai t rem ains . In prac t i ce the I raq i s a re un l ike lyto ap pro ach us . Th e mi l i t a ry consequ ences of supply in g to SaudiArabia are equal ly acceptable but i f we did supply this might have abad effect on the Pers ian Gulf rulers .(c ) We cannot d i sc r imina te be tween Arab count r i e s in the supply of mis s i l e swi thout running the r isk of being accused of taking s ides in Arabquarre ls or of expos ing those we supply to fur ther accusat ions of beingBr i t i sh s tooges (e.g., K u w a i t o r J o r da n ) . A l t hou gh t he U n i t e d A r a b

Republ i c would be l ike ly to re fuse Uni ted Kingdom miss i l e s , a s shei s a l ready to rece ive them f rom the Russ ians , we should have to inc ludeher in any offer , as to discr iminate agains t her , whatever excuse weused, would produce a very bad effect .(d) Most of the o the r po ten t i a l cus tomers , e.g., L e b a non , S y r i a, J o r d a n , L i byaand the Sudan , probably could not a f ford the b igger sys tem such asB l o odh oun d . J o r da n i n pa r t i c u l a r a l r e a dy de pe nd s on U n i t e d S t at e sa nd U n i t e d K i ngdom a i d t o ba l a nc e t he budge t .(e) From a mi l i t a ry poin t o r v iew the re would be an opera t iona l advantageand some deterrent effect i f Kuwai t possessed surface- to-a i r miss i les .But f rom a pol i t ica l point of view this would increase the r isk ofinc ident s wi th I raq (e.g., t h r ough t he K uw a i t i s p r e c i p i t a t e l y s hoo t i ng

do wn I ra q i a i rc ra ft ne a r the f ron t ie r ) an d it wo uld d ive r t funds whichcould be be t t e r used on o the r de fence measures and on buying thef r i e nds h ip of o t he r A r a b S t a t e s . K u w a i t , m o r e ove r , c ou l d p r oba b l yonly ope ra te l es s soph i s t i ca ted eq uipm ent such as T ige rca t , whichwould i t se l f be less l ikely to cause incidents .9. Genera l ly , we mus t avoid any ac t ion which s t imula tes the a rms race int he M i d d l e E a s t . T h i s is a po i n t t o w h i c h Co m m on w e a l t h G ove r nm e n t s i npa r t i c u l a r a t t a c h i m por t a nc e .10 . On the o the r hand , the fo l lowing fac tors we igh in favour of supply ingto the Arabs and the I s rae l i s :(a) In the present s t a t e of the ba lance of payments even a smal l expor t o rde r

i s i m por t a n t .(b) A dec i s ion not to supply wo uld be a s evere b lo w to th e hope s of th eU n i t e d K i ngdom m a nuf a c t u r e r s o f m i s s i l e s y s t e m s w ho ha ve a l r e a dybeen severe ly a f fec ted by the i r exc lus ion f rom the Nor th At lan t i cAl l i ance marke t and the cance l l a t ion of s evera l ma jor pro jec t sno t a b l y B l ue Wa t e r .(c) If U ni t e d K i ngdom e qu i pm e n t i s e xc l ude d t o t he a dva n t a ge o f t heAmer icans and Russ ians the Arabs may not look to us so much fort ra ining or purchases in the f ie ld of e lect ronics and avia t ion.(d) I f g round- to-a i r mis s i l e s a re to be suppl i ed to the Middle Eas t the re wouldbe some mi l i t a ry advantage i f these were of Uni ted Kingdom. . m an ufa c tu re s ince we wo uld be be t t e r in form ed ab ou t the i rpoten t i a l i t i e s and could t ake them in to account in our mi l i t a ryp l a n n i n g .(e) Only defens ive weapons would be involved and i t wi l l be di ff icul t for usto re fuse to supply now tha t the Ru ss ians and Am er ican s a re rea dy to

do SO. - 11. W e ha ve c ons u l t e d H e r M a j e s t y 's Re p r e s e n t a t i ve s in t he a r e a a b ou t :id) The repercussions of the United States offer.-The U ni ted Sta te s offer tothe I s rae l i s which was made publ i c l a s t week has drawn a good dea l ,o f f i re f rom the Arabs which we have escaped thanks to our dec i s iont o s t a nd ba c k .

T O P S E C R E T1491 A 2


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4 T O P S E C R E T(b) The advisability of our expressing our readiness to supply missiles to theArabs and Israelis.The cons ensu s of op in ion am ong H er Majes ty 'sRepresen tat ives i s that i t would be bet ter for us no t to supply anymissi les to the area, since this wil l run counter to our policy of noninvolvement , and that the next bes t th ing i s to express pr ivately to theA rab s and Israel is a read in ess to supply . Th is offer should if poss ib lebe made wi th a l i t t le delay in order to avoid any appearance that wewere par t i es t o t he Un i t ed S ta t es deci s ion . Ho we ver p rese n ted ou r ac t ionwou ld p rom pt doub t s abou t t he s incer i ty o f ou r s t a t em en t s abou t no t

; con t r ibu t ing to an a rm s race in the a rea . Fu r the rm ore , i t wi ll d iver tr esou rces f rom econom ic de ve lopm en t .12. The repo r t s f rom pos t s sugges t t ha t p rov ided tha t we do no t d i sc r im ina teagainst them as regards ei ther the offer to sel l or the supply of missi les the Arabs'react ions should no t be such as would endanger our s t ra teg ic in teres ts : v iz . ou t s tag ing and overf ly ing r igh ts o r our re la t ions wi th Kuwai t ( see paragraph 7 above) .We suggest therefore that what we have to weigh are the economic advantages ofmiss i le sales in the Middle East , together wi th the domest ic po l i t ical impl icat ionsof leav ing the f ie ld to the Russians and Americans , against the po l i t ical repercuss ions

in the area.C o u r s e s O p e n

13. There a re two b road cou rses open to u s :(a) To refuse to supply .(b) T o ind icate to a ll cou ntr ies in the area that we ar e read y to exa min eind iv idua l r eques t s on the i r m er i t s .14. I f course (b) i s adop ted we sugges t t he fo l lowing p rocedu re :(a) The f i rs t s tep should be to in form the Uni ted States and FrenchG o v e r n m e n t s , w i t h w h o m w e h a v e a l w a y s c o n c e r t e d o u r M i d d l e E a s ta rm s po l i cy and who were par tner s wi th u s in the Tr ipar t i t e Dec la ra t ion

of 1950. I t i s par t ic u lar ly im po r ta n t to w ar n the U ni te d States s incewe t ry to fo l low a co m m on pol icy towa rds the d if feren t A ra b co untr ie s ,and in the case of Jordan share responsibil i ty for i ts f inancial viabil i ty .Shou ld the Am er icans r a i se ob jec t ions based on ou r secu r i tyag reem en t s wi th them , we shou ld r em ind them tha t we had r ese rvedou r r igh t to offer our missi les if they offered H aw k.(b) W e shou ld then in s t ruc t H er Majes ty ' s Am bas sad o rs i n t he Midd le Eas tcap i t a l s t o m ak e a com m u n ica t ion o n the fo l lowing l i nes : " Ou r po l i cyrem ains tha t o f con t r ibu t ing to peace and s t ab i l i t y i n t he Midd le Eas t ,bu t t he s i t ua t ion has been changed by the ind ica t ions tha t som ecoun tr ies in the area hav e or are l ikely soon to acqui re m od er nsoph i s t i ca t ed weap ons . In th i s new s itua t ion we can no longer r egard

: gro und - to-a i r defensive miss i les as in pr incip le di f feren t f rom w eap onsp rev ious ly supp l i ed . Shou ld the re be r eques t s f rom coun t r i es i n t hearea for the supply of Uni ted Kingdom miss i les , to meet thei r genuinedefensive needs we sho uld now consider each case on i ts m er i t s . " Thiswou ld be done in I s r ae l , t he Un i t ed Arab Repub l i c , t he Lebanon .Sy r i a , Jo rdan , I r aq , Kuwai t , L ibya and the Sudan and Her Majes ty ' sAm bas sad o rs i n o ther su r ro und ing coun t r i es such as I r an , Tu rke y andthe Nor th Af r i can coun t r i es shou ld have d i sc re t ion to com m un ica t e i ta l so . Com m onweal th coun t r i es wou ld be in fo rm ed as necessa ry .(c) W e sugges t t ha t th i s com m u n ica t ion shou ld no t be fo l lowed au tom a t i ca l lyby any pub l i c s t a t em en t , wh ich m igh t be m is in t e rp re t ed as i nd ica t ing ad i s regard of t he r i sk s a t t ached to the supp ly o f m o der n wea pons to anarea wh ich is show ing it sel f as uns tab le as ever . If how eve r we are

pressed for a publ ic s ta tement in due course, we should clear ly havet o r e s p o n d .(d) Final ly we suggest that we should avoid any in i t ia t ives (e.g., s t im u la t ingde m an d f rom Jor da n) wh ich a re l iab le to involve us in a f inancial lossra th er t han a com m er c ia l benef it . W he re they appear l ike ly anapp roach f rom the coun t ry concerned shou ld be hand led in i t i a l l y ona G o v e r n m e n t - t o - G o v e r n m e n t b a s is .2nd October, 1962.


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A P P E N D I X ASupplies of Guided Missi les to Arab StatesI t has not been possible to confi rm that any Arab country of the Middle Eastyet possesses any op era t ion al defensive guid ed missi les . Ho w eve r , the re i s onerep or t of the s ight ing of 19 missiles in Eg ypt , the descr ipt ion of wh ich confo rmsclosely to tha t of Gu idel i ne (Soviet type SA-2 surface- to-a i r missi le) . Th ere ha vealso been reports tha t de l ivery to Egypt has begun of Atol l a i r - to-a i r missi les forM iG -21 je t f ighters, abo ut 20 of wh ich are a l ready held by the U ni ted A ra bR e p u b l i c A i r Fo r c e .

2. There i s abundant evidence of the present Sovie t in tent ion to supply tot h e Un i t e d A r a b R e p u b l i c an d I r a q :Surface- to-a i r missi les (Guidel ine) .Air- to-a i r missi les (Atol l ) .Air- to-surface missi les (Kennel) . Missi le-carrying fast pa t rol boats (probably not to I raq) .

3. There are indica t ions tha t the supply of s imi lar missi les to Syr ia in duecou rse i s a lso pr ob ab le . T h e fac t tha t de l iver ies of missi les ha ve been ma de toIndonesia and Cuba suggests tha t the Sovie t Union are a t least not inhibi ted ongrounds of secur i ty f rom the export of th is type of equipment .4. I ran has received Sidewinder a i r - to-a i r missi les f rom America .

Supplies of Guided Missi les to Israel'5. Israe l has received 20-24 Mirage I I I a i rcraf t (a tota l of 60 ordered) f romFrance , but there i s no evidence to suggest tha t a i r - to-a i r missi les (Matra) for themhave yet been del ivered, but i t i s assumed that they are on order .

Suppl ies of Anti - tank Weapons6 . I s rae l has Fre nch SS-10 and -11 wi re -gu ided an t i - t ank wea pon s and K uw ai twi l l ha ve the Bri t i sh Vigi lant weap on by the en d of 1962. I ra q may hav e receiveda Ru ss ia n equ iva len t . Th i s cl ass o f we apo n is no w cons ide red a s conven t iona l .

A P P E N D I X BPotential Demand for Bri t i sh Ground-to-Air Missi les in the Middle East Countries

Israelis l ike ly to bu y the U ni t ed Sta tes H aw k M issi le .Kuwaitmay w an t to bu y and cou ld f ind the mon ey.Lebanonis no t l ike ly to wa nt to b uy ; cou ld pay .Jordanwill w ant to b uy ; has no mo ney to spa re .Syriais m ore l ike ly to buy f rom the Ru ss i an s ; wo uld need long c red i t .U.A.R.is unl ikely to want to buy but could f ind the money.Libyanot l ikely to w ant to bu y ; has no m one y .Sudannot l ike ly to w an t to b u y ; ha s no m on ey.Iraqnot l ike ly to w an t to bu y.Saudi Arabiamight w an t to bu y; w oul d w an t long credi t .Iranmay w an t missi les bu t i s l ike ly to exp ect them as f ree a id f rom theA m e r i c a n s .The assessment above re la tes pr imari ly to the c lass of bigger ground-to-a i rwe apo ns , such as Blo od ho und . Th ere migh t be mo re scope fo r sma l lg r o u n d - t o - a i r we a p o n s su c h a s Se a c a t / T i g e r c a t .October 1962.

1962 oct 2 supply of missiles to israel and arab countries

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