THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY October 13, 1962

MEXICO : The Janus Faces of 20th Century Bourgeois Revolution

A G Frank

"50 Years of Revolution — Political, Economic and Social" is the title of Mexico's serious three volume study of her 20th century experience. At the cost of a million lives, Mexico began her revolutionary break with her 19th century legacy of feudalism and imperialism in 1910. Many of the political, economic and social fruits of the Mexican revolution were slow in ripening and are being reaped only today and in the future.

From the V S point of view, Mexico set the worst kind of example for the first half of its 20th cen­tury revolution. Accordingly, first the US interfered economically and diplomatically, then she sent troops to capture Vera Cruz, and even in 1937 the US still labelled the Mexican government "bolshevik".

At the same time, Latin America, herself still beset by the alliance between feudalism and imperialism, came to view the Mexican revolution as her guiding star and shining example.

Yet today the U S is full of praise for Mexico's example of "economic progress with political stabi­lity"; and President Kennedy, indeed, is asking the Mexican government to become the pilot country in the Alliance for Progress. Latin America, in the meantime, has turned her eyes toward Cuba and asks if the ex­ample of Mexico's 50-year revolution is one to follow after all.

Let us, therefore, turn to the lessons that Mexico's experience bodes for Latin America and the world.

As we examine Mexico's domestic experience, i t w i l l be w e l l to

place it occasionally into the con­text of the flow of h is tory outside her borders. We m a y do so f r o m the perspective of L a t i n A m e r i c a n style feual ism, the ancien regime of Mexico a n d today's rea l i ty s t i l l fo r m a n y of her neighbours. Thus we m a y estimate where Mexico would s t i l l be today wi thout her revolu­t ion, how f a r she has come, and what lies before the peoples of Centra l A m e r i c a and the A n d e a n countries should they fo l low Mexico's path. Th i s is the perspective of European style bourgeois capi ta l ism. Transplanted to I n d i a n and Mestizo Mexico, i t has taken root at best on top of ra ther than w i t h i n the large body of peasant society. Only in Uruguay a n d Costa Rica, where European settlers found few or no indigenous Ind ians to exploit as elsewhere in Spanish Amer i ca , and to a lesser extent in Argen t ina and Cuba, where the indigenous popula­t ion was soon decimated, has any­th ing resembl ing European middle and w o r k i n g class society appeared — peopled almost ent irely by Euro­peans themselves. Th i s considera­t ion can a f fo rd perspective, not on ly to Mexico's h is tory as a whole, but also on the d i f f e r ing experiences of her densely populated Centre and South and her re la t ive ly sparsely populated N o r t h . There is also the perspective of social ism because i t points a w a y fo r the 20th century

revolut ions s t i l l to come a n d be­cause it contrasts to Mexico the experience of Russia in the past and Cuba at present. F i n a l l y , there is the perspective offered by A m e r i c a n imper ia l i sm, ca l l i t what you w i l l , B i g Stick, Good Neighbour Policy, o r A l l i ance fo r Progress ( an a l l i ­ance, to use Arevulo ' s words, be­tween a sha rk and twenty sardines); f o r it is a fact regardless of name a n d is inexorab ly in terwined in a l l of the above.

The Mex ican Revolut ion resulted in a tremendous release of popular energy wh ich , after the fighting ended, went into the construction of a new society. The destruction of feudal ism rad ica l ly changed the social relations of m a n to m a n . The peasant's accession to h u m a n d igni ty , when compared w i t h the conditions of servitude wh ich s t i l l persist in Guatemala fit exists today more or less as it d id in the time of the Conquest, suggests K S K a r o l of the Par is Express) and Peru, is perhaps the Revolution's most i m ­portant accomplishment. Tha t same energy was also released through i m ­proved health (the m o r t a l i t y rate has fa l len by 2/3 since 1910) and trans­formed into large increases of w o r k , education ( i l l i te racy rate reduced by 1/2) and ski l l s , w h i c h in tu rn , par t i ­c u l a r l y since 1940, have been trans­fo rmed into that product ion of goods a n d increase of purchasing power to buy them w h i c h spell Mexico's re­m a r k a b l e economic g rowth . On ly

the structure of a post-or non-feudal society permits and produces such l and r e fo rm (mi l l ions o f smal l land-holdings created), road (seven-fold Increase since 1940 so that now near­ly h a l f of a l l goods t ravel by t ruck a n d almost a l l passengers by bus), i r r i g a t i o n (an eleven-fold increase since 1940 so that a t h i r d of a l l crop-land is now i r r iga ted) u rban i ­sation (to near ly 50 per cent), indust r ia l i sa t ion (3.6-fold increase in 1940-59), ag r i cu l tu ra l output (3.4-fold increase In 1940-59), and more. Gross nat ional product t r ipled between 1940 a n d 1959; and, despite one of the wor lds highest rates o f population g rowth , G N P per capi ta doubled f r o m 150 to 300 dol lars a year. Acco rd ing to Ros-tow, Mexico has passed the threshold into self-sustained economic g r o w t h . Indeed, the annua l rates of g r o w t h d u r i n g the post-war years of both indus t r ia l and ag r i cu l t u r a l output r a n k Mexico among the f i rs t half-dozen countries in the w o r l d and fa r ahead of other countries in L a t i n Amer i ca . (Sources: Lewis 299. 311. 317; Yates 62; U r q u i d i 99-103).

Revolution's Other Face A n d yet Mexico's revolut ion has

had another face as wel l . He r crude death rate of 12.5 remains h igher than that of Bo l i v i a and Peru; her infant mor ta l i t y rote of 81 in a 1,000 is higher than that of Argen t ina . H e r 2,200 people per doctor is more than in Chile a n d

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over double that o f A rgen t i na . The 43 per cent i l l i te racy that remained in 1960 h a r d l y compares with the 19 per cent in Chi le and 13 per cent i n Argen t ina . The rat io o f w o r k -i ng populat ion engaged in manu ­fac tu r ing remains 12 per cent; and Mexico's per capita income of s t i l l less than 300 do l la rs r a n k s her be­h i nd Chi le, A rgen t ina , Uruguay , and Cuba, to say no th ing of o i l - r ich Venezuela. A f t e r the large-scale redist r ibut ion of lands, over a m i l l i on heads of r u r a l fami l ies re-mained wi thout l a n d o f their own, and w i t h populat ion g rowth the number m a y have r isen to nearer 2 m i l l i on (out of a total of m a y be 4 m i l l i on ) since then. The average Mexican diet has a calor ic deficit of -24.4 accord ing to the F A O ; and the 3 m i l l i on indigenous Ind ians out of today's populat ion of 30 m i l l i on r e m a i n economical ly as bad ly or m a y be worse off as the poorest of their fore fa thers at the time before the Conquest, four -and -one-half centuries ago. However large the social change, the economic bene­fits of the Mex ican Revolut ion have not reached, or have been w i thhe ld f r o m , large parts of the populat ion; about 50 per cent of the populat ion receives today on ly 15 per cent of the nat ional income; and i t has been estimated (a l though also chal lenged) that on ly 1 per cent of the populat ion disposes of 66 per cent of the money income a n d the inequal i ty of income dist r ibut ion is increasing, not decreasing, (Source: Casanova 8, U rqu id i 102, and per­sonal communicat ions) ,

The weal th and elegance of down-town Mexico Ci ty dazzles the vis i tor , and the heavy indust ry of Monterey impresses as another P i t t sburgh ; but equal ly do the mi les of Mexico City 's s lums — m a n y st i l l wi thout r u n n i n g water — depress, as does the poverty o f r u r a l T laxca la and Chiapas dumbfound . The question inev i tab ly advances itself, have Mexico's 50 years of revolut ion rea l ly been a success — or have they been a fa i lu re? Compared to the experience of her neighbours, especially in Centra l Amer ica , Andean South Amer i ca , a n d the Car ibbean, Mexico's 20th century has appeared as an obvious success, the more so as these countries are on ly in the present decade gett ing ready to break the bonds that

shackle them. Bu t has the Mex ican Revolut ion also been a fu i ture they sha l l seek to avoid? Economic pro­gress in Western Europe has been greater and its benefits more wide ly distr ibuted w i t h i n the society. Some of the countries, smal l and by nature i l l -endowed ones a m o n g them, have e l iminated poverty entirely. True, Western Europe has in general devoted longer to the task than has Mexico so fa r , but on the Continent not much longer — and the recent adverse change in Mexico's d is t r ibut ion of income raises serious doubts about her pro­spects of f o l l ow ing Europe in the foreseeable fu ture.

But the compar ison w i t h social ism spr ings to m i n d as wel l . The Soviet Un ion , w i th its revolut ion coming af ter that of Mexico, has broken a l l previous records by its rate of eco­nomic g row th , the more so i f we a l low fo r the 10-year period of W o r l d W a r I I and reconstruct ion. I t may be stretching comparisons too f a r to app ly Russia's indust r ia l ex­perience to Mexico. But the USSR also began w i th I l l i teracy at a rate of 90 per cent wh ich was greater even than that of Mexico's 80 per cent. In the meant ime, the USSR el iminated i l l i teracy and went on to chal lenge and in m a n y ways sur­pass the Uni ted States in higher and technical education — and prov id ing the same also to her indigenous and non-Russian-speaking peasant and nomadic peoples. A n d despite a l l her agr icu l tu ra l diff icult ies, the USSR displays a s im i la r record in the fields of nut r i t ion , heal th and medi­cine. More recently, China's rate of indust r ia l g row th du r i ng the past decade has been 2 times that achie­ved du r i ng the USSR's peak decade, a n d her agr icu l tu ra l output g row th rate in the 1950's has been higher than that of Mexico nonetheless. A n d now Cuba has el iminated her 30 per cent i l l i teracy in a single year a n d near ly doubled her school enrolment in on ly 2 years of her revolut ion. These comparisons are no less inevi table.

Beh ind the two Janus faces of the Mex ican Revolut ion, there is a single head, a single, and by now int r icate ly balanced and developing, mechanism. To learn Mexico's lesson f o r L a t i n Amer i ca and the wor ld , we must t ry to fa thom the development, current operat ion, and

future prospects of Mexico's revo lu­t ionary mechanism. The h is tory o f Mexico's 50-year revolut ion seems to f a l l convenient ly into the fo l low-ing periods : the 4 centuries f r o m the Conquest un t i l 1910; the near ly 15 years of violent revolut ion, coun­ter-revolut ion, and reconstruct ion, symbol ised by Madero, Huer ta , and Car ranza ; the 15 years of r e fo rm , car r ied th rough by Presidents Calles and Cardenas; the 15 years af ter 1040 of the beginning of indust r ia l i ­sat ion and the g row th of bourgeois power, symbol ised by President A le -m a n ; and the current consol idat ion of the 'Mexican System' under bourgeois leadership and the presi­dency of Lopez Mareos.

At the t ime of Conquest, the Spa­niards found 150 years of Aztec em­pire in Centra l Mexico, su rv i v ing M a y a culture in the South and Y u ­catan, and scattered senvnomadic t r i ba l Ind ians in the No r th , inc lud­ing today's South-Eastern Uni ted States. The populous Centre was soon colonised by Spaniards, the exist ing social system large ly des­troyed, the Ind ians ' labour and l and exploited, and their populat ion re­duced by hal f . The more a r i d and unpopulated a n d t r iba l No r th , on the other hand, was settled on ly g radua l l y and sparsely, as the ex­tension of l ivestock ranch ing and m i n i n g in that area required. Th is difference between the No r th and the populated Centre and South, as w i l l emerge later, st i l l d i rect ly deter­mines Mexico's social and economic experience In the last 20 years of our t ime.

In 1810 under the leadership of the priest H ida lgo , Mexico's peasants rebelled. Unmatched by peasant act iv i ty elsewhere in Spanish Ame­r ica, where peasants remained at best passive and of ten in support of the Spanish Crown , and un­supported by the L a t i n Amer ican-born Creole Spaniards, the rebel l ion came to noth ing. Not unt i l the land­own ing a n d par t i cu la r l y commerc ia l Creoles took up the f igh t themselves d id independence come to Mexico and the other Spaniph colonies in Amer ica , Aga in , in the 1850's, now under the leadership of the I nd ian Benito Juarez, d id Mexicans attempt r e f o r m in their feudal structure. But a f te r the French intervent ion and w i t h the 30 year re ign of Por-f i r lo Diaz, peonage returned in f u l l

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force a n d concentration of land-ownership became worse than ever. At the same time, fo re ign capital , increas ingly Amer i can , entered the country on most favoured terms un­t i l i t reached over 400 m i l l i o n dol­lars , concentrated in l and , mines a n d the t ranspor ta t ion and "public service" system required to ship their produce abroad. In the mean­time also, M e x i c a n pol i t ical power and organisa t ion had become i n ­creasingly centralised, i f on ly to counterbalance the power of the 'colossus of the N o r t h ' . But, alas, not centralised enough, fo r Mexico lost Texas t h rough secession a n d the r e m a i n i n g h a l f o f her t e r r i to ry th rough conquest anyway . Thus, i f p r io r popular pressure and revolu­t ionary experience has any bear ing on the future, it was no accident that Mexico made a revolut ion whi le her neighbours continued in feudal s lumber fo r another half-century.

Revolution : Product of Bourgeoisie — Peasants Alliance

The Mex ican Revolut ion was the product of al l iance between the bourgeoisie represented by Madero, and the peasants led by E m i l i a n o Zapata and Pancho V i l l a . They faced a common enemy, the feudal order a n d its support ing p i l la rs of Church, A r m y and fore ign capital . But their goals Inevi tably differed, freedom f r o m domestic and fore ign bonds and loosening of the economic structure for the bourgeoisie, and l and for the peasants. A l though Zapata continued to press the inter­ests of the peasants un t i l his death, the real leadership of the Revolu­t ion was never out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, except insofar at it was challenged by Huer t a reaction and A m e r i c a n intervent ion. A n d so, wh i l e the 1917 Const i tut ion was d r a w n up on the European m o d e l a bourgeois government emerged to dominate the l a rge ly peasant socie­ty under Car ranza and A l v a r o Ob-regon. Even today, on ly 23 per cent of the populat ion voted in the last election. The e l imina t ion of feudal social relations was, of course, in the interest of the emerg ing bour­geoisie as w e l l as of the pea­sants. Educat ion became secularised, Church and State more wide ly sepa­rated. Bu t h a n d i n g over the reins on ly so recently acquired by the bourgeoisie of economic power and leadership to the peasants, that was

another matter . Accession to power by the peasantry was never rea l ly in the cards.

None of the ea r ly Presidents were radicals in any sense of the w o r d , no r could they probably have been and retained their positions. D u r i n g the admin is t ra t ion of President Cailes in 1924-1928 began the pro­g r a m m e of public works , and to a lesser extent i r r i ga t ion , on the foun­dat ion of w h i c h m u c h of Mexico's subsequent economic development rests. Then too were wr i t t en the laws, pursuant to Ar t i c l e 27 of the Constitution, w h i c h were to guide the l and r e f o r m un t i l the 1940's. Tha t art icle provided for expropria­t ion of private lands in the public interest and fo r d is t r ibut ion of thai l and to ne ighbour ing "vil lages, r an ­ches a n d communit ies ' ' whose supp­ly of l and is insufficient for their needs, "a lways respecting sma l l pro­perty". T w o impor tant legal inter­pretations of that provis ion stand out : lands to be distr ibuted to par t icu lar communities were to be taken f r o m private properties ex­ceeding certain sizes w i t h i n a 7 k i lometre radius of these communi ­ties, and that propor t ion of private l a n d was to be expropriated as cor­responded to the increment in the land's value due to any i r r i g a t i o n and other improvements that m a y be undertaken by the State, thus prevent ing large landholders f r o m becoming the beneficiaries of invest­ments incurred at public expense.

Land Redistribution and the Ejidos Abroad , the Cardenas adminis t ra­

t ion f r o m 1934 to 1940 m a y be best k n o w n for its expropr ia t ion — la­belled "bolshevik" in the Uni ted States a l though the A m e r i c a n pro­perties were indemnified — of Mexico's pr ivately-owned petroleum, a step w h i c h was also provided for by the same Ar t i c l e 27 of the Con­stitution of 1917. But s t i l l more impor tant domestically, the adminis­t ra t ion of President Cardenas ex­propria ted and redistr ibuted more l a n d than a l l other adminis t ra t ions, before and since, put together. Pur-suant to the Constitution, and the laws of the Calles adminis t ra t ion , these lands were taken f r o m ter r i ­tories sur rounding par t icular vi l lages and were ceded to them commonly as ejidos, to be w o r k e d in some cases collectively and in most cases ind iv idua l ly . A n E j ido B a n k was

established to provide the new o w n -ers w i t h ag r i cu l tu ra l c r e d i t I r r i g a ­t ion and other capi tal investment in agricul ture was not, however, ex. funded at the same time. In fact, in retrospect, It is clear that, a l ­though he undoubtedly had his heart in the r igh t place, Cardenas, as head of a bourgeois government, did not provide Mexican peasant a g r i ­culture w i t h near ly enough resources to get It over the hump into self-sustained development.

F r o m a careful study of the Baj io region of Central Mexico a decade after Cardenas, the f o l l o w i n g find­ings, w h i c h are not unrepresentative fo r Mexico as a whole, emerge ab­out the relative resource endow­ments of ejido and s t i l l sma l l p r i ­vate agr icul ture , (I shal l tu rn to the discussion of large-scale agricul ture when I come to the post-war period) . Relat ive to private farmers , ej idam-rios have less l and (3.8 as against 16.5 hectares) per man ; more 3rd qual i ty and less 1st qual i ty l and ; less education (about 1|10 of their school-age chi ldren in p r i m a r y school as against ½ for the private f a rmer s ) ; more reliance on f a m i l y and female labour; female labour employed re la t ively more in cul t iva­tion and less in adminis t ra t ion ; less reliance on outside and on perma­nently h i red labour; more unemploy­ment; less investment in I r r i ga t i on (private farmers have 35 per cent more i r r iga ted surface and use 65 per cent more w a t e r ) ; less capital (40 per cent of the amount that p r i ­vate owners have, a l though there are 3 times as m a n y e j ldarar ios) ; more dependence on outside credit and capital supplies a n d yet almost exclusive dependence on public cre­dit wh i l e private fa rmers have ac­cess to a much la rger supply of private credit; labour marke t access on ly to each other and not to ag r i ­cu l tu ra l labour needs of the private owners who h i re their supplemental l abour f r o m among landless labour­ers. (Cast i l lo , passim).

W i t h such handicaps, it is perhaps no wonder that m a n y ejidazarios have been unable to provide them­selves w i t h a better and decent l i v i n g . Indeed, in several respects the si tuat ion is s t i l l worse than that described, and it appears that the pol i t ica l and economic structure that emerged f r o m the revolut ion was not real ly designed to, and does

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not, permi t the l a rge mass of pea­sants to share in the economic f ru i t s of the Revolu t ion. We should re­member that a m i l l i on , now approa­ch ing two m i l l i o n , r u r a l f a m i l y heads r e m a i n ent i re ly landless. Pub­l ic ag r i cu l tu ra l credit accounts f o r no more t han a t h i r d of a l l agr icu l ­tu ra l credit , a n d about h a l f o f that is suppl ied not by the E j i do B a n k but by the Ag r i cu l t u ra l B a n k w h i c h lends to large pr ivate landholders. Lewis (p 318-9) quoted the research director o f the E j i d o B a n k ; " W e lend to about one-th i rd of a l l e j ida-tar ios , those that have the r ichest and best lands. We prefer r isks that have fer t i le soi l and pre ferab ly i r r i ga t ion . We do not have enough money fo r loans to subsistence fa r ­mers most of w h o m have the poor­est l ands" . Bu t pr ivate credit reaches the e j ida tar io s t i l l less; and much of i t , l i ke the 2.5 b i l l i on pesos a n ­nua l l y lent to cotton growers by the A m e r i c a n concern Anderson and C lay ton (compared to the 1.5 b i l l i on pesos l e f t by the E j i do B a n k to a l l e j idatar ios combined) , is ea rmarked fo r special purposes. F o r lack of w o r k i n g capi ta l , m a n y e j ida tar los have found it necessary to lease their newly-won land to pr ivate holders in command of capi ta l and then tu rn a round and w o r k fo r these l i te ra l l y "cap i ta l is ts" as h i red labourers on their own land. Other e j ida tar los and landless peasants, as is we l l k n o w n , f ind i t necessary each year to migra te to the Uni ted States by the hundreds of thousands to w o r k as occasional agr i cu l tu ra l labourers there; or they emigrate to the g r o w i n g ci ty s lums in search of w o r k a l though " l i f e is better in the v i l lages" .

Development with Regional Imbalance

H o w then, we m a y we l l ask, has Mexico been able to show the in ­creases of ag r i cu l tu ra l and indust r ia l output that were cited previously, i f i t now appears that the economic condi t ion of the bu l k of her popu­la t ion has scarcely i m p r o v e d ? A f ­ter the exp i ra t ion of Cardenas' te rm in the Presidency, a n d par t i cu la r l y w i t h the accession to the presidency by Migue l A l e m a n between 1946 and 1952, the b u l k of investment went in to the N o r t h and the Federa l Dis­t r ic t , As we have a l ready noted, the seven N o r t h e r n States have t ra -d idona l l y h a d less of the total popu­

la t ion, less populat ion density, and a lower percentage of the labour force engaged in agr icu l ture than the heart of Mexico. Wh i l e per capita investment remained we l l less t han 1,000 pesos f o r the per iod 1946 to 1955 in the 10 least favoured States, it rose to we l l above 5,000 in the 7 Nor the rn States and the Federa l Distr ic t . The difference in funds devoted to i r r i ga t i on between the N o r t h and the rest of the coun­t r y became even more s t r i k i ng w i t h 60 per cent of a l l i r r i ga t i on invest­ment between 1947 a n d 1958 go ing to the three States B a j a Ca l i f o rn i a del Norte, Sonora, and Tamau l ipas alone (Yates 71). As a result, much of the increase in Mexico's sown area was concentrated In the rela­t ively less populated N o r t h as wel l . The same area also absorbed the bu lk of the increase of agr icu l tu ra l credit and of v i r t ua l l y a l l mechanis­ed f a r m equipment (an increase in the number of t ractors f r o m 4,620 in 1940 to 55.000 in 1955 — Lewis 318) that was not devoted to the product ion of sugar, another non-subsistence crop, in the South. Not one tractor was used on a n y of the m i l l i on smal l hold ings in 1950 (Lewis 318). Not surpr is ing ly , ag r i cu l tu ra l output rose in the N o r t h to State averages of 12,000, 20,000 and even 34.000 pesos per agr icu l ­tura l w o r k e r in 1960, whi le i t re­mained at between 2,000 and 3,000 pesos in the older States (12.5 pesos to the U S do l l a r ) .

This g rowth in agr icu l tu ra l out­put, however, was concentrated in indust r ia l crops, p r inc ipa l l y cotton, whose product ion between 1939 and 1954 rose 309 per cent, whi le that of food crops rose only 113 per cent (Lewis 314). Moreover, the bulk , in turn , of these crops, cotton, vege­tables, sugar (Centre a n d Yuca tan) , coffee (Chiapas) , and l ivestock, were destined fo r export to the N o r t h Amer i can market . The earn­ings f r o m these agr icu l tu ra l ex­ports were used var ious ly : some were ploughed back into the same export agr icu l ture ; some were invest­ed in indust ry ; some were con­sumed (we w i l l tu rn later to the resul t ing d is t r ibut ion o f i ncome) ; and some, unfor tunate ly , fo r Mexico as fo r other p r i m a r y goods exporters, were lef t in the impor t i ng count ry because of the decline, par t i cu la r l y af ter the Ko rean War , o f p r i m a r y

goods prices especially relat ive to those of indust r ia l goods.

Control of US Private Capital The exigencies o f W o r l d W a r I I

had g iven impetus to domestic ex­pansion of indust ry in Mexico as elsewhere in the under-developed wo r l d . Fur ther indust r ia l isat ion was promoted by A l e m a n a n d since then. That investment in indust ry and commerce has also been guided into the same 8 favoured States, w i t h par t icu lar concentrat ions, of course, in the Federa l Distr ict and Nuevo Leon, the sites of Mexico Ci ty and Monterey. The older, more popu­lated States were left la rge ly un­affected and f a r behind. A s igni­f icant por t ion of the investment funds, and par t i cu la r ly of the neces­sary fore ign exchange, undoubtedly was contr ibuted by the earnings f r o m agr i cu l tu ra l exports as we l l as f r o m the rap id increase of tour ism in Mexico and m ig ran t bracero labour to the Uni ted States. But s imultaneously direct invest­ment wh i ch had fa l len to the de­pression and post-petroleum na­t ional isat ion low of 267 mi l l i on dol lars in 1939 began again a rap id increase unt i l it surpassed the $ 1 b i l l ion m a r k , or about 1/10th of outstanding U S investment in La t i n Amer ica (Lewis 304),

Th is Amer i can investment has displayed a relat ive shif t away f r o m social overhead capi tal and into manu fac tu r i ng and trade so that in 1953, out of the 31 com­panies w i t h a gross annua l income exceeding 100 m i l l i on pesos, 19 were U S-owned or control led, 5 were in the hands of the Mex ican govern­ment, and on ly 7 were pr ivate domestic f i rms (Lewis 305). More­over, since the ownership certifi­cates of Mex ican enterprises are bearer and not name bonds and shares, and since af ter issuance these certificates typ ica l ly tend to grav i ta te into the hands where capital is a l ready concentrated, it is not a lways easy to determine where ownership, a n d par t i cu la r l y control lies. Thus. today U S control of Mex ican indust ry may wel l exceed 25 per cent. Thus it is no wonder to hear the Mex ican Chamber of Manu fac tu r i ng Industr ies say that "The economic power of these large fo re ign enterprises constitutes a serious threat to the Integr i ty of the nat ion and to the l iberty of the

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country to p l an i ts o w n economic development" (Cited in Lewis 306-7). F o r in Mex ican agr icul ture as wel l , A m e r i c a n capital plays a signi­f ican t role. A l t h o u g h Amer icans no longer own large tracts of land, as they s t i l l do in Central Amer ica , the A m e r i c a n cotton monopoly, Anderson and Clayton, as we a l ­ready noted distributes about 200 m i l l i o n dol lars of credit for the pro­duction of cotton f r o m sowing to shipping. Therewi th i t effectively determines the buyer and the price for the cotton and prevents Mexico f r o m disposing of a large part of its cotton crop where and when she wishes. A n d worse, as we shal l see below, this ar rangement contributes to the maintenance of monoculture and a plantat ion-hired labour econo­my in large parts of the N o r t h , The al l iance between A m e r i c a n and Mexican capital and Mexico's de­pendence on the A m e r i c a n marke t permits the U S to exert quite a conservative pol i t ical and economic force In Mexico. W i t h good reason, "Mexicans are beginning to wonder whether they are r e tu rn ing to the days o f Porf i r io Diaz . . . " (Cited in Lewls 307).

Organisation of Political and Economic Power

The gross relat ive effects of events since the W a r on the Mexican South and N o r t h have already emerged f r o m the foregoing dis­cussion. They are perhaps sum­marised by the indices of social welfare in columns 13-16 of the table. But to expose more of the detail of the emerg ing al locat ion of resources and dis t r ibut ion of income w h i c h remains hidden, i t w i l l be necessary to inquire Into the organi­sation of pol i t ical and economic power a n d how it developed since the days of Cardenas. When A l e m a n launched his campaign of large-scale i r r i ga t i on and indu­str ial isat ion, he also in t ro­duced some legal changes. Recall the two provisions of Ar t i c le 27 of the Consti tut ion that were al ready cited in connection w i t h the ad­minis t ra t ions of Presidents Calles and Cardenas. These provisions, r e fe r r ing to the d is t r ibut ion of l and to ejidos contiguous to the com-munities that are to receive them and expropr ia t ing on ly w i t h due re­spect to sma l l property, were under the guidance of A l e m a n to receive a significance quite con t ra ry to what

they had before and quite other, one migh t suspect, than had been the intent ion of the f ramers of the Constitution.

W i t h respect to the first provis ion, once N o r t h e r n lands were opened to cu l t iva t ion th rough i r r i g a t i o n w h i c h for a l ready discussed agro­nomic and his tor ical reasons, were not in the v i c in i ty of a l ready exist­i n g communa l centres of popula­t ion, this provis ion came to be interpreted as excluding or at least not r equ i r ing their d is t r ibut ion as e j idal lands! At the same time, the consti tutional provis ion for due re­ga rd to " smal l proper ty" now came, under a L a w of Inaffectabi l i ty , to be interpreted as excluding 100 hectares of i r r iga ted , 150 hectares of o rd inary , and more of g raz ing land f r o m expropria t ion by the State. Accord ing ly , exist ing private owners of large tracts of re la t ively wor th ­less l and in the N o r t h , on lea rn ing of prospective State i r r i ga t i on pro­jects in their areas, rushed to "se l l" the i r holdings in plots of the m i n i ­m u m inaffectable acreage to a l l avai lable members of their f a m i l y .

The result was two f o l d ; not on ly d id they retain effective control of much of their l and but they also reaped the benefit of the a lways large and of ten astronomical increase in value of their l and due to the State-financed i r r i ga t ion . Thus, they rendered inoperative the letter and intent of the earl ier Calles l aw wh ich meant to channel the benefits of publicly-financed i r r i ga ­t ion to the public at large; for un­der the A l e m a n l aw their lands had become inal ienable! The legal assessments to the private owners to syphon off the increase in l and values were and are more often than not essentially disregarded. As an example, the son of a revolu­t ionary general and President, h i m ­self now Governor of a Nor the rn State, is reputed to own 3.000 hec­tares of i r r iga ted l and in 3 estates. In this manner, accord ing to the 1950 Census, whi le e j idal holdings increased 21 per cent, and smal l private holdings increased 20 per cent, la rger pr ivate l and holdings rose by 48 per cent a n d the share of l and holdings la rger than 5 hectares in the total of a l l crop l a n d rose f r o m 39 per cent to 43 per cent (cited in Lewis , 315-6), The rea l amount of l and wh ich is effectively

in large holdings is, however, un­doubtedly larger and u n k n o w n be­cause the census classification can­not adequately d is t inguish between actual ly a n d f ic t i t iously separate l a n d holdings. The matter appears to be further complicated by the holdings of livestock g raz ing lands, and it is placed entirely beyond inspection if we refer to values, and their spectacular increase, of l and rather t h a n to mere acreage.

Growth of Capitalist Agriculture The foregoing events of the post­

w a r years have had their inevitable effect on the socio-polit ical and economic structure of the society and on the lives of the people w i t h i n i t . They have meant the g r o w t h of a neo-latifundia agricul ture , no longer organised under the feudal hacienda system w h i c h uses serfs to produce fo r home consumption but organised instead as latter-day plantations, r u n as capitalist enter­prises by c i ty-dwel l ing owners, h i r ­i ng ag r i cu l tu ra l wage labourers, and producing non subsistence and often single crops for export. The N o r t h e r n States have become mag­nets of in -migra t ion of ej idal or landless peasants who leave their vil lages in the Centre and South of Mexico. This mig ra t ion contr ibu­tes somewhat to redressing the balance of income dis t r ibut ion, for the ag r i cu l tu ra l workers of the N o r t h are economically somewhat better off than their ejido and land­less brothers in the South. An index of social welfare in terms of regions w i l l probably considerably overstate the Nor the rn advantage i f it is read not as a regional but a personal difference between the f a rmer N o r t h and South, for i t is l i ke ly to be heavi ly weighted also by the income different ia l between bourgeoisie and peasant. A l t h o u g h the percentage g r o w t h ra te of per capita G N P in constant 1950 pesos was over twice as h igh in the 10 poorest States between 1940 and 1960, the absolute difference between the r i c h and the poor States none­theless increased by half . The reason, of course, is that more than doubl ing f r o m a low 618 to 1,430 pesos in the poor States whi le the r i c h ones rise f r o m a much higher base of 5,170 to 7.950 pesos. leave the poor ones 6,500 pesos behind in 1960, a l though they were on ly 4, 552 pesos behind in 1940. But even the absolute and relative regional ga in

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of the poor States should not mis­lead us into reading it as the same ga in f o r poor people, f o r the regional f igures contain an u n k n o w n mix ture of r i ch people in poor regions and poor people in r ich regions as wel l .

The new private landowners, large and smal l , and some of the o ld ones as wel l are or are becom­ing bourgeois in every sense of the word . Even the smal ler landowners among them, i f they have any capi tal , have a posit ion and income wh ich af fords them a middle class style of l i fe , and often u r tan l i fe at that. The i r agr icu l tu ra l business of ten af fords them a handsome in­come, wh ich they dispose of some­times by real investment in Mexico, sometimes by investment abroad, sometimes by construct ing and speculating in u rban real estate, or by l uxu ry imports, and not neces­sar i l y in the best interests of the Mex ican economy. A n d they have power, economic a n d pol i t ical . They and their industr ia l , commerc ia l and sometimes professional brethren essential ly own and r u n the State, Beg inn ing par t icu lar ly du r ing the admin is t ra t ion of A leman , they have, as we have seen, in part been able to use that State to pul l them­selves up by their boot-straps, But it has not, so fa r , been to their inte­rest to pul l the peasantry up behind them. Is i t any wonder that, ac­cord ing to Mrs Navarrete 's recent study, the share of the total na­t ional income go ing to the richest 20 per cent of fami l ies rose f r o m 59.8 per cent in 1950 to 61,4 per cent in 1957, whi le that of the poor­est 50 per cent dropped f r o m 18.1 per cent to 15.6 per cent? (cited in Urqu id i 103).

W i l l t he "Mex ican Sys tem" W o r k ? It remains to ask how the "Mex i ­

can System" works today in the ad­min is t ra t ion of President Lopez Mateos and what are its prospects fo r the future. Mexico Is a social and economic py ramid , w i th a pol i ­t ical py ram id w i th in . At the bottom are the indigenous Ind ians , re­m a i n i n g where they a lways were. In the next layer are the landless r u r a l prople a n d the unemployed or on ly occasional ly employed u rban ones. The latter, par t icu lar ly are a ver i table lumpenpro le tar ia t , dispos­sessed by the ru ra l and unabsorbed by the u rban economy, l i v i ng on the m a r g i n of society, isolated and al ienated f r o m it, f r o m each other,

and of ten f r o m themselves. Next come the e j ldatar ioa and such p r i ­vate smal l holders as are poor enough to w o r k their l and by them­selves. A l though economical ly more secure, they stand social ly sometimes even below the m a r g i n a l u rban people, m a y be because the chances fo r social mobi l i ty are greater f o r the latter, Above them are the workers In the nar rower sense of the wo rd , par t icu lar ly the unionised ones, who in Mexico as in m a n y parts o f La t i n Amer ica , As ia and A f r i c a today comprise a s o n of "ar is tocracy of the pro letar ia t " . The next layer may be termed the middle class or petit bourgeoisie. I t comprises a large var iety of econo­mic wa lks of l i fe — smal l land­owner, professional, merchant, clergy, government a n d whi te col lar worker , smal l pol i t ic ian — but it a f fords considerable la tera l mobi ­l i ty w i th in it, f r o m one occupation to another or often among several simultaneously. The i r badge in Mexico is da rk glasses as it is a briefcase in Eastern Europe, how­ever d a r k i t m a y be outside or how­ever few papers there may be to car ry . A n d that badge is a counter­weight to the sometimes h igher income of the workers below them.

The bourgeois upper class, the pr inc ipa l manipulators and bene­f iciaries of the system, includes the large landholders, the effective directors of the f inancial, commer­c ia l , industr ia l , professional, govern­mental and m i l i t a ry appara tus , and by noblesse obl ige some Intellectuals. The viable economic base of the more ar istocrat ic upper class was destroyed by the revolut ion. But m a n y of Its members and their wealth surv ived. The i r money was invested in f inance, commerce, in ­dustry, and later aga in agr icu l ture; and the ex-aristocrats became the nucleus of the new bourgeoisie. The i r r anks were soon supplemented by their erstwhi le enemies, the ind iv idua l beneficiaries of the same revolut ion, m a n y pol i t ic ians and generals among them. As their economic posit ion became consoli­dated, so d id their pol i t ical power — exercised through the P R I , the a l l -power fu l Inst i tu t ional Revolut ionary Par t y th rough wh i ch they have managed Mexico's pol i t ica l , and thereby ind i rect ly economic, l i fe fo r the past generat ion. I t is the P R I wh i ch allocates the presidency and

other pr inc ipa l pol i t ica l offices (to its f a i t h f u l ) , and not the electoral mechan ism; a n d management and contro l o f the P R I , in tu rn , by no means extends down to the bottom of the social and economic py ram id .

Not a Static Pyramid But Mexico's p y r a m i d is not

static; it is not a caste system as that of Peru substant ial ly remains; there is mobi l i ty . There are econo­mic, pol i t ical and social paths wh ich a f f o r d opportunit ies, or m a y be better chances, f o r h igher r a n k to those who play accord ing to the rules of the game. There Is the m ig ra t i on f r o m Centre and South to the Nor th , i nvo l v ing as it does not on ly geographical movement but also economic improvement, coupled w i t h some severance of once communa l ties and part ic ipa­t ion in a looser society. There is the very substantial ru ra l -u rban mig ra t ion , especially to Mexico Ci ty wh i ch g rew f r o m 1,4 m i l l i on and 7 per cent of the populat ion in 1940 to over 4 m i l l i on and 13 per cent of the populat ion today (Lewis 288). Of course, such migra t ion offers no guarantee of social or economic success, but it increases the s t a t i ­st ical chances f o r the m ig ran t . There Is movement into a white or of f -whi te col lar j ob and var ious k inds of speculation among the loose ends of a g r o w i n g economy. A n d , of course, there is education and "sui table" mar r iage fo r those who can manage it. These two are perhaps the most impor tant vehicles f o r the social and economic m ig ran t h imsel f , and v i r tua l l y guarantee mob i l i t y to his ch i ldren.

Social mobi l i ty , however, is ind i ­v idua l by ind iv idua l . I n d i v i ­duals, some of them, are permit ted, indeed encouraged, to "better themselves", but w i t h i n the system and accord ing to its rules. In fact, the "Sys tem" a n d the P a r t y coopt people Into themselves to ob­viate that they rock the boot. Most symbol ic, perhaps, of this process Is the recent inv i ta t ion by President Lopez Mateos to the seven l i v i ng ex-Presidents, and their acceptance, to Join his admin is t ra t ion in semi­off ic ial , semi-honorary positions, a step that was taken to help stabi­lise the pol i t ical s i tuat ion in Mexico "a f te r Cuba" . In more pedestr ian ways , labour leaders, then popular­ly cal led "cha r ros " , are co-opted Into the business system a n d re-

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THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY October 13, 1962

warded to keep unions f r o m rock­i n g the best. Even young Marx is ts come to at ta in positions of responsi­b i l i ty in later years and tu rn to de­fend the system. Indeed, the Mexi ­can Communist par ty is sometimes cal led Mexico's leading school fo r conservatives. Most important, the social structure and its mythology have g iven the lower middle class, and even some people in their lower class, the feel ing that it is possible to rise up, par t ly in and par t ly w i th , the system.

Whi le mobi l i ty ind iv idua l by indi­v idua l is permitted, mobi l i ty by a group is not. I f group pressure begins to bui ld up anywhere in the pol i t ical and economic system, the first step as suggested above, is to co-opt or recruit away the leader­ship. Addi t ional ly , smal l conces­sions may be used to abate the pressure and take the wind out of the movement's sails. Thus, for instance, the price of corn (maize) and movies (!) is subsidised in the City of Mexico, some w i l l say to help the poor and others to wa rd off popular unrest. S imi lar ly , af ter substantial popular pressure had buil t up, President Lopez Mateos recently created some livestock ejidos in the N o r t h ; however, he has yet to grant a single-acre of i r r igated land to an i j ido. I f these measures are not successful, the government f ina l ly resorts to repre-ssion. Strikes, par t icu lar ly the one w i th pol i t ical overtones, such as those of the most mi l i tant among unions, the ra i l road workers ' three years ago, and the teachers' last year, have been severely dealt w i th . Par t i cu la r ly since the increase of l iveliness in pol i t ical l i fe and the fu l l scale introduct ion of the cold w a r af ter the Cuban revolut ion, left w i n g labour leaders and others have increasingly found themselves si t t ing in j a i l . To prove that no one, no matter what his status, is immune to that fate, Mexico's most famous l i v i ng painter, the 65 year o ld inter­nat iona l ly known Dav id A l f a r o Slquairos and his 73 year old f r iend, the noted journal is t F i lomcnto Mata, are in j a i l on 8 (!) sentences fo r al legedly hav ing caused the teachers union, of wh ich they are not even members, to s t r ike — on charges of threatening "social dis­solut ion" . R ight w i n g influence, even by the Church whose wings h a d been clipped 100 a n d again 50

years ago, has been g row ing and consol idat ing itself instead. The system, thus offers g lo ry to some indiv iduals in the mass, ample re­wards for re l inquish ing mi l i tan t mass leadership, some piecemeal economic — but no pol i t ical — con­cessions, where necessary, and occasional repression If a l l else fa i ls . Signif icant ly, Mexico devotes 8 per cent of her nat ional budget to the A r m y , compared to Columbia's 30 per cent or Hai t i 's 45 per cent, and only re lat ively middle class Costa Rica spends less. But a l l else usual ly works wel l enough, excepting only that the system wi th­holds real part ic ipat ion and bene­fits f r o m the bu lk of its people.

Road Before the Mexican Left What are the prospects for the

future? Industr ia l isat ion, rapid as it has been, education, capital isa­tion of agr icul ture, public works , and other "modern isa t ion" measures have not so far been sufficient real ly to absorb the population increase, never mind great ly to raise the economic level of the Pea­sant base. Moreover, the present government has reduced Aleman's annual 3 b i l l ion I r r igat ion expendi­tures by near ly ha l f ; and the spec­tacular 8-10 per cent of G N P in­crease of the mid 1950's has steadi­ly declined to an a l a rm ing 0 per cent last year (Persona] Communi ­cation and T ime, p 15).

Wi th the exist ing structure of eco­nomic organisat ion and bourgeois pol i t ical and economic power, and the relative increase of pr ivate over public investment in recent years, there is enough reason to doubt that the Mexican economy w i l l soon af­fo rd the bulk of its people a signi­f icant ly better standard of economic and cul tural l i fe. I t certa in ly does not promise the economic and cul­tural advances shown in this cen­tury, and par t icu lar ly since the W a r by the socialist countries. Yet. as we have seen, the System does lum­ber along, as that of Guatemala. Peru, yes of Venezuela and Colom­bia to say noth ing of several other La t in Amer ican countries, no longer does. A n d it makes adjustments here and there. As the economy proceeds by cooptation, so does the pol i t ical system and its pol i t ical par ty a l l the more so. No th ing seems to be possible wo rk i ng f r o m outside P R I, and everyth ing that is possi­

ble can be attained on ly by jo in ing and w o r k i n g th rough P R I. The office of the President is a l l power­fu l no mutter who f i l ls it. I t is more than a l i terary or journal is t ic qu i rk that Mexicans have t ransformed the names of their presidents into nouns and adjectives for use in re fe r r ing to their administrat ions, nay epochs. And an ex-president counts fo r no more than anyone else without pol i ­t ical access to the current incumbent in the Presidency. Thus, al though Cardenas, apparent ly spurred on by the Cuban revolut ion, recently emerged f r o m 20 years of pol i t ical retirement to jo in younger men In found ing the M L N (Nat ional Libe-rat ion Movement) wh ich is designed to mobil ise and un i f y Mexico's poli­t ical left, he nevertheless accepted the inv i tat ion to ex-presidents to jo in the Lopez Mareos administ rat ion along wi th his more conservative colIeages.

It is no wonder the left is dis­united, nay f ract ionated; and the b i r th of the M L N maybe more a sign of the need fo r uni ty on the left than of its achievement. At the l ame time, the current wave of governmental repression against the left need not show a permanent move to the r ight . As La t in Ame­r ica as a whole moves fur ther to the left in the coming years, the pres­sure on Mexico may become so great that the Mexican left w i l l aga in have its day (helped a long by U S repressive acts designed to prevent i t) but w o r k i n g w i th in

and through the P R I. Fablo Gon­zales Casanova, Dean of the a lways left w i n g school of pol i t ical and social sciences at the Nat iona l Un i ­versity and prominent member of the M L N suggests : " W e th ink that General Lazaro Cardenas has indi ­cated the r ight r o a d : Support the inst i tut ion and organise the people". (Casanova, 28),

It is easy to concur w i th this judgment. But organize the people fo r what ? Only to wrest the con­trol of their destinies away f r om the bourgeois and P R I. Whi le the Mexican people organize', other D i t i n Amer icans w i l l inevitably make revolutions fa r more radical than that of Mexico. As the Cuban one has already, these revolutions abroad w i l l just as inevi tably shar­pen the antagonisms between the left and r ight in Mexico itself. A n y

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short r u n moderate gains the M e x i ­can left can achieve w i t h i n the pre­sent system by r i d i n g on the wave of social revolut ion a m o n g her neighbours can on ly postpone the day when the Mexican left must r ad ica l ly break the power of the bourgeoisie and begin i tself to di ­rect Mexican destiny.

Sources Cized Cacunova, Pablo Gonzales : "Me­

xico : Ciclo de una R e v o l u t i o n A g r a r i a " , Cuadernos Amer icanos X X I , No 1, Jan-Feb 1962, pp 7-29.

Casti l lo, Carlos M a n u e l : " L a Eco­n o m y A g r i c o l a e l a Region del Ba j io" , Problemas Agr i cu l a s a I n -dustr ialas V I I I , N o 3-4, 1956.

Lewis , Osca r : "Mexico Since Car­denas" in R i c h a r d A d a m s et al , Social Change i n L a t i n A m e r i c a

Today , Vintage Books N e w Y o r k , 1961, pp 285-346.

Urqu id i , V i c o r L : "Froblemas Fundamenta ls de la Economia M e x i i -cana" Cuadernos Amer icanos X X , No 1, Jan-Feb 1961, pp 69403.

T i m e , L X X X I X , No 15, A p r i l 13, 1962.

Yates, Pau l L a m a r t i n e : " E l Se-sar ro l lo Regional de Mexico ," Banco de Mexico, Mexico, 1961, pp 271.