1878-83 armenian reforms and germany's response to britain-matthew fitzpatrick

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Ideal and Ornamental Endeavours:

The Armenian Reforms and Germany's

Response to Britain's Imperial

Humanitarianism in the OttomanEmpire, 187883Matthew P. Fitzpatrick

Published online: 03 Aug 2012.

To cite this article:MatthewP. Fitzpatrick (2012): Ideal and Ornamental Endeavours: The

Armenian Reforms and Germany's Response to Britain's Imperial Humanitarianism in the Ottoman

Empire, 187883, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40:2, 183-206

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Ideal and Ornamental Endeavours:The Armenian Reforms andGermanys Response to BritainsImperial Humanitarianism in theOttoman Empire, 187883

Matthew P. Fitzpatrick

Diplomatic correspondence during the period 187883 offers a unique insight into the

tension between humanitarian and geostrategic considerations in German and British

foreign policy in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin. During this period, Germany fol-

lowed the lead of Britain in adhering to an Eastern policy that favoured the introduction

of reforms in the Ottoman Empire that would alleviate the position of the Armenian min-

ority. The more strident Gladstonian stance towards the Ottoman Empire initiated in the

early 1880s, however, led to the perception that the intransigence of British liberals on the

Armenian issue was in fact a means by which Britain sought to recalibrate its position in

Anatolia, even at the expense of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the concomi-

tant threat of a general European war.

At the height of the massacres of the Armenians in the mid-1890s, Kaiser Wilhelm IIwrote of the preceding decades of British intervention that the underlying cause of

this calamity lies entirely with Britain and the loathsome campaign of Westminster,

Argyll and Gladstone to try to favour the Armenians. Their blood lies on the hands

of the leaders of England.1 For the Kaiser, Britains ostensibly humanitarian stance

towards the Ottoman Empire had done nothing but heighten the awareness of the

Porte that the Armenians were a troublesome minority that might cost the Sultan

his empire if they were not pacified. As with the Bulgarians before them, the Arme-

nians were massacred, the Kaiser reasoned, because of the threat that British humani-

tarianism posed to the unity of the Ottoman Empire.

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Vol. 40, No. 2, June 2012, pp. 183206

Correspondence to: Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, Discipline of History, School of International Studies, Flinders

University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, South Australia, 5001, Australia. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0308-6534 print/1743-9329 online/12/02018324http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2012.697610# 2012 Taylor & Francis


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The Kaiser was not alone in this sense that it was the failed pro-Armenian policies of

the preceding decades that had brought about the Armenian massacres. Just as the

Kaiser fulminated against the murderous effects of British humanitarianism during

the period of the Armenian massacres in the 1890s, influential German liberals such

as Friedrich Naumann argued that a position friendly to Armenians. . .

means inreality, supportinghowever little one might intend itEnglands expansionist pol-

icies, while a number of German ministers, including Chancellor Chlodwig zu Hohen-

lohe-Schillingsfurst, sought to dampen down press reports of the massacres for fear of

anti-Ottoman sentiment. Germanys own government, Margaret Anderson argues,

had done their best behind the decent draperies of the Rechtsstaatto smother the

movement for Armenian human rights.2

In an era of renewed humanitarian intervention, the Kaisers and other German

condemnations of Britains nineteenth-century humanitarianism raise important

questions about its effects upon those it seeks to assist. In particular, his rebuke ofGladstone and British interventionism more generally is at odds with the more gener-

ally positive picture of British humanitarianism offered by many standard works,

including recent studies such as Gary J. Basss Freedoms Battle, which argued that

under Gladstone Britain sought to prosecute a humanitarian foreign policy. Bass

refutes the notion that humanitarian interventions were really just veiled imperial-

ism arguing instead that a broader humanitarianism was actually at work.3 On the

other hand, the Kaisers scepticism about the humanitarian nature of Gladstonian

foreign policy was reflected in an early review of Basss book written by Samuel

Moyn, who contested Basss central contention that humanitarian intervention was

based upon a concern for universal values rather than the pragmatic grounds ofReal-politik.4 Moyn offered a critique of Bass that in essence suggested that there is the dis-

quieting possibility that humanitarianism, while universal in its rhetoric, has always

turned out to be a specific political project in practice.5 Moyns review accords with

Mark Mazowers reading of the Victorian era as not a time of European humanitarian-

ism but a world of a concert of powers telling everybody else what to do in the name of

humanity.6 Although primarily concerned with the issue of Jewish minorities in the

Balkans, Carole Fink too has suggested that Europes 1878 commitment to protect

Ottoman and ex-Ottoman minorities more generally was marked by a slippage

between a publically posited humanitarianism and the more generally practisedReal-politik that saw humanitarian treaty obligations largely ignored.7 With the Kaisers

later condemnation of the history of British intervention on behalf of the Armenians

in mind, it is worth investigating precisely how Germany saw and responded to British

foreign policy changes regarding the Armenians under Gladstone. More concretely, by

scrutinising German policy towards the Armenian question in light of Britains self-

appointed leadership on the issue, a preliminary answer might emerge to the question

of whether Germany and Britain took their humanitarian duties seriously after the

Congress of Berlin or whether they had sought domestic or geostrategic imperial

advantage by appearing to do so. With attempts to uphold the rights of the Armenians

in the Ottoman Empire according to the terms of the Treaty of Berlin a potentiallyimportant early example of pan-European humanitarianism, precisely how the

184 M. P. Fitzpatrick


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balance between national self-interest and altruism was struck in British and German

diplomacy after the Congress of Berlin illustrates the tension between humanitarian

intervention and imperialism in the late nineteenth century.

Locating the Armenians

The Armenian question was in many respects a successor to earlier Ottoman min-

orities questions such as the Bulgarian, Balkan and Greek questions: episodes that

had seen the status of non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman Empire become a

stated cause for Western intervention in the Ottoman Empire since the eighteenth

century.8 All of these interventions were ostensibly grounded in the political and

humanitarian complications that arose from the discrimination and periodic violence

committed against Ottoman Christians in a decaying Muslim empire.9 As Katherine

Fleming has made clear, these Ottoman Christians were far from oriental strangers,and were, for a variety of reasons, increasingly claimed for Christendom by the com-

peting empires of Europe as self-evidently requiring liberation from Muslim rule.10

Yet, prior to the emergence of the Armenian cause, European interventions were

more consistently contained to Ottoman Europe, particularly Bulgaria and the

Balkans, notwithstanding the role of Jerusalem in the lead up to the Crimean War,

Frances brief intervention on behalf of the Maronite Christians of the Lebanon and

Russias declared (but not recognised) right to intervene in Constantinople under

the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca.11 Initially at least, Europes humanitarianism and

imperial considerations pertaining to the Ottoman Empire seemed to be restricted

to a geographical zone that was conceived of as de factoEuropean.The prospect of similar intervention outside this Christo-European imaginary, and

inside the Ottoman Empires Eastern Anatolian heartland was a significant new devel-

opment. Although it had generally been assumed by the powers that changes to the

political arrangements of Ottoman Europe would not fundamentally threaten the

integrity of the Ottoman Empire in toto, no such assumption could be made about

a broadening of the Eastern question to Anatolia. Nevertheless, there was a certain

geostrategic logic to the expansion of this concern with humanitarian issues into

Eastern Anatolia, given that the major territories within which the Armenian question

was situated bordered on territories that (like the Balkans and Bulgaria) had been thesubject of imperial disputes and proxy wars, particularly between Britain and Russia,

for around 100 years.12

In fact, the geostrategic or imperial dimension of the Armenian question makes best

sense if the Armenian provinces of Eastern Anatolia are seen in terms of their proxi-

mity to the lines of demarcation established between Russia, Britain and Persia in the

Treaty of Gulistan (1813), the Treaty of Turkmanchay (1828) and the Anglo-Persian

War (185657). Indeed, the Russian undertaking to formalise the Persian border

with Ottoman Anatolia in conjunction with the British under Article 60 of the

Treaty of Berlin makes clear the extent to which Britain and Russian frontier friction

in Persia was linked to their respective positions on the easternmost vilayetsof EasternAnatolia inhabited by the Armenians.13 Alongside Britains and Russias geostrategic

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 185


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concern for the Persian frontier was that for the Afghan frontier, later made obvious by

the Panjdeh scare of 1885, but admitted to by Granville as early as 1878, when he wrote

to Gladstone that the justification of Russia [in Afghanistan] appears to me to be our

threatening attitude in Turkey.14 Both Persia and Afghanistan were, of course,

wrapped up in British anxieties regarding Russian access to the Mesopotamian/Persian Gulf route to India, and the British press periodically employed the spectre

of the loss of India as a central motif in their debates about Russias south-western

expansionism (particularly under Disraeli and after Russia renounced the terms of

the Treaty of Paris in 1871)offering a domino theory of geopolitics which argued

that, if the Russians were not stopped in Armenia, they would drive on to the

subcontinent.15

Immediately prior to the Congress of Berlin and in the wake of Russian gains under

the Treaty of San Stefano, Salisbury too was keen to make the same point:

The great problem which the Turk will have to solve, as soon as he has got rid of theRussian army off his soil ishow to keep his Asiatic Empire together. Sooner orlater the greater part of his European Empire mustgo. Bosnia and Bulgaria are asgood as gone . . . The question is how is he to maintain himself in Asia . . . TheTurks only chance is to obtain the alliance of a great power: and the only poweravailable is England. Is it possible for England to give that alliance? I cannotspeak yet with confidence but I think so. For England the question of Turkey inAsia is very different from that of Turkey in Europe . . .And while Russian influenceover the provinces of European Turkey would be a comparatively distant and indir-ect evil, her influence over Syria and Mesopotamia would be a very serious embar-rassment, and would certainly through the connection of Baghdad with Bombay

make our hold over India more difficult. I do not, therefore, despair of Englandcoming to the conclusion that she can undertake such a defensive alliance. Butfor that purpose it is, as I said before, absolutely and indispensably necessary thatshe should be nearer at hand than Malta. 16

Salisburys comments, as well as making manifest the Conservatives fervent wish to

preserve the Ottoman Empire as an anti-Russian bulwark and the justification for

the Cyprus Convention, foreshadow the incongruity of British and German geostrate-

gic priorities, which would eventually hamper long-term joint action on the Armenian

question. For Britain, a Russian Empire that stretched into the Balkans was preferable

to a Russian Empire that stretched into Anatolia and thereafter potentially into Meso-potamia, whereas for Germany, a Russian Empire in Eastern Anatolia was a distant

threat in comparison to Russian expansion into the Balkans which would not only

threaten Austria, but also see pressure for diplomatic and potentially military action

against Russia from the Reichstags pro-Austrian majority.17

As is well known, in the wake of San Stefano, Disraelis concerns regarding potential

Russian penetration of Anatolia, Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean led to the nego-

tiation of the Cyprus Convention, a push to internationalise the Christian minorities

question as well as the introduction of the consul system into Eastern Anatolia. Britain

committed itself to defend Eastern Anatolia from the Russians via a military guarantee

and a naval base in Cyprus, in exchange for reforms designed to benefit the Armeniansin the region. Furthermore, the British, on behalf of Europe, would oversee these



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reforms, thereby cementing British primacy in Asia Minor.18 This 1878 marriage of

humanitarian intervention and geopolitics was a neat solution to the twin British con-

cerns that domestic humanitarian sentiment might pressure the British Conservatives

into an undesirable anti-Ottoman position (as it had with the Bulgarian Massacres)

and that Russia, using the minorities question as a pretext, would simply assimilatethe frontier Armenian regions at the earliest possible convenience as a stage in the

movement towards Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, unless these territories were

guaranteed by a power strong enough to stay Russias hand.19 At the very least, the

Cyprus Convention and the Anatolian consul system made it clear precisely where

Britain felt the limits of Russian primacy and the borders of British hegemony lay.

Where this left Ottoman sovereignty is also clear, with the Sultan moved to protest

whenever possible against what he perceived as an attempt by the British to create

animperium in imperio.20

Culturally, Eastern Anatolia was also the site for significant and catalysing mission-ary activity that heightened the expectations, educational standards, collective identity

and Western orientation of the Armeniansenergising intellectual life in the region in

such a way as to facilitate an Armenian national Renaissance.21 Although there was no

straightforward relationship between the role played by the (often American) missions

and the foreign policies of the European states in the region,22 the growing awareness

among Europeans of the status of Armenians as fellow Christians was one result of this

missionary activity, with the appeal to Christian solidarity with the Armenians becom-

ing increasingly crucial to civil society efforts at justifying a British presence in the

region.23 The soft power of the Western Christian missions, that is, offered a

popular moral undergirding for British military power projection. Britains liberalhumanitarian activists had long understood this and made much of it.24 Article 61

of the Treaty of Berlin, negotiated by Disraeli and Salisbury, which demanded the

Ottoman Empire substantially reform its political arrangements with the Armenians

under British supervision, bolstered Britains capacity to preserve the Eastern border

of the Ottoman Empire with Russia but was explicitly presented as a policy of Chris-

tian solidarity and pan-European humanitarianism.

Germanys Eastern Question

Conventionally, the collocation of Bismarck and humanitarianism is a strange one

and his advice to the Kaiser to refuse Alexander Gorchakov of Russias 1876 request

that Germany join with them as defenders of the Christians in a war against the

Ottoman Empire certainly points to a pragmatic reluctance to trade regional stability

for ostensibly humanitarian military intervention.25 For Vakahn Dadrian, Bismarcks

Ottoman policy simply represented new levels of amorality, ie a value-free stance.26

Albeit more subtly, Friedrich Scherer endorses this portrait in his careful examination

of GermanOttoman relations in the late nineteenth century, arguing that, in com-

parison to the other powers, Germany had something of a tradition of disregard for

the welfare of minorities, which informed their approach to the Armenian issue andwhich subsequently assisted the Porte in the systematic oppression of the Armenians.



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Illustrating for Scherer the apparent hard-heartedness of Bismarck towards the Arme-

nians was his 1883 comment that British endeavours to mobilise vigorous support for

the Armenians were wrongheaded, given that the political reforms favouring the

Armenians referred to in Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin were meant to be ideal

and theoretical endeavours which received a nice position in the ornamental sectionof the Congress negotiations in deference to parliamentary considerations.27 In con-

trast to many politicians of his time, Scherer concludes (perhaps with GladstonesBul-

garian Horrorsand Midlothian speeches in mind), the notion of a politics of Christian

solidarity in the Orient remained alien to Bismarck.28

Scherers study presents a view of the German response to Britains Armenian

endeavours which takes for granted a sharp British humanitarian/GermanRealpolitikdichotomy, but which does not offer an understanding of precisely how and why the

British and German attitudes to the Armenian question had come to differ so mark-

edly, given their apparent congruence in 1878. The following pre-history of the Arme-nian massacres of the 1890s, however, shows just how and why the German response

changed over time as a result of important changes in British foreign policy, so that by

1883 the German position was indeed critical of the destabilising effects of British

imperial strategy in the Ottoman Empire.

To trace the origins of the emergence of the Armenian issue, it is necessary to under-

stand the initial political (and indeed geographical) parameters of Germanys Eastern

Question. Although the Eastern Question is usually framed as the contest between

Britain, France, Austria and Russia in the Ottoman and ex-Ottoman East,29 as a

nascent continental hegemon and the host power and co-guarantor of the Berlin

Treaty, Germany also played a considerable role, both as interlocutor and as a self-declared honest broker. This was not entirely selfless, given that Germanys September

1872Dreikaiserzusammenkunftalignment with Russia and Austria against a revanchist

France was at its most fragile when it came to the Ottoman Balkans.30 Correspond-

ingly, the German foreign policy position on the Eastern question was largely con-

cerned with the zero sum game in the Balkans between Russia and Austria, with the

Ottoman Armenian appearing to be a distant consideration unencumbered by a

vital national interest.

This limited, Eurocentric understanding of the Eastern question in a global age was

not merely Bismarcks. While the Congress of Berlin was an example of summit diplo-macy, with the German position articulated by Bismarck, he did not formulate the

German negotiating position in a political vacuum. With the overwhelming majority

of the Reichstag expressing firm views on which direction German diplomacy should

take, Bismarcks capacity to support Russia was constrained by the overwhelmingly

pro-Austrian position of the National Liberals, the Progressive Party and the Centre

Party, which accounted for around 65 per cent of Reichstag deputies, and which

was reflected in the national press, notably the Kolnische Zeitung, the Frankfurter

Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt, which condemned Russias expansion into the

Balkans at the expense of Austria.31 Nonetheless, Bismarck had some room for

manoeuvre. Despite Helmuth von Moltke and prominent liberal imperialists suchas Friedrich List and Wilhelm Roscher having provoked some interest in a German



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empire in Anatolia,32 the precise nature of Ottoman rule in Asia Minor remained

obscure to most German politicians and, prior to the Russo-Turkish War and the Con-

gress of Berlin, the status of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire simply did not

register in German political circles as being an integral part of the Eastern Question.33

This was neatly reflected in the Kaisers speech opening the first session of proceedingsfor the third Reichstag on 22 February 1877. Kaiser Wilhelm I dedicated roughly a

third of his speech to the increasingly unstable situation in the Ottoman East

without mentioning anything outside the Balkans. Quite effectively, his speech trans-

mitted both the centrality of Christianity to political discourse regarding the Ottoman

Empire and the Reichstags view of the primary strategic objectives for a settlement in

the East just before the April 1877 Russo-Turkish war rendered all such discussions

mootnamely that the European (or Christian) powers should act in accord, so

as to avert any general European conflict that would reprise the Crimean War and

destroy the Concert of Europe.

34

Despite a lack of direct interest in the materialoutcome of the peace negotiations, the Kaiser professed a dual concern with the fate

of the Ottoman Christians (linked here to the Balkans question, rather than

Armenia) and the maintenance of the general peace of Europe.

In February of 1878 too, the Eastern question was revisited by the Reichstag days

before the treaty of San Stefano was signed but when its general contours were

known, including the extent of Russian gains in Ottoman Asia. It is here that Bis-

marcks domestic difficulties with Ottoman policy were made evident. National

Liberal leader Rudolf von Bennigsen reminded Bismarck that, as the strongest conti-

nental power, Germany had a responsibility to ensure that the outcome of the Russo-

Turkish War was one in the greater interests of European peace, as the Kaiser hadpromised in his address a year earlier. Bennigsens conditions for peace, however,

were in fact quite bellicose, including a policy of open support for the position of

Austria, the curbing of Russian power in the Balkans, the demonstration of German

military preparedness in the case that war should spread to become a general European

war, as well as protection for the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire guaran-

teed by the European powers. This was a vigorous and openly anti-Russian stance but

once again confined to Balkan affairs.35

Bismarcks response was cautious. The tenuous ceasefire between Russia and the

Ottoman Empire had already seen the emergence of a number of provisions thatwould shape San Stefano, namely the creation of Bulgaria, the limiting of Ottoman

power in the region (to be decided by the signatories of Treaty of Paris from 1856),

the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and reforms in Bosnia and Herze-

govina. Also of importance was the question of the Dardanelles and Bosporus and in

particular the question of Russian influence over shipping in the Turkish Straits

which interested Germany at this stage only as the gateway to the Danube. There

were limits, of course, to how concerned Germany should be about this, Bismarck

argued. The question of whether warships may travel through the Straits in times

of peace is not something I consider unimportant, he argued, but not important

enough that one can throw all of Europe into the fire on its account.36 The questionof the quality of rule over the Ottoman Empires Balkan Christians was dealt with by



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Bismarck rather perfunctorily as something that would be covered by the peace agree-

ment.37 Much of Bismarcks address thereafter was addressed more to Russia and

Austria than to the Reichstag, with him mounting the case that some painful conces-

sions of Ottoman territories occupied by Russia and Austria during the recent war

might stave off the spectre of a larger European war later. It was also in this speechthat Bismarck offered up his services as an honest broker between the powers on

the Eastern question and Berlin as a neutral venue for a conference to decide the out-

standing issues. Bismarck then ended by restating that, although Germany was indeed

among the strongest military powers in continental Europe, it should fight wars only

to defend its territorial integrity and not for Oriental territory.38 The Eastern question

was, for Bismarck, one of collective security for the powers and the maintenance of a

balance of power between Austria and Russia in the Balkans and on the shores of the

Black Sea, with humanitarian assistance and Christian solidarity in the Balkansdesi-

derata, but not of foremost importance given the overarching fragility of the Europeanpeace. As Bismarck saw it, the interest which we have in the better government of the

Christian nation, its protection from acts of violence which have unfortunately

occurred under Turkish rule . . . is a second and indirect but humanitarian interest

that Germany has in the matter.39

Responding to Bismarck, the progressive liberal Albert Hanel offered general

support for Bismarcks position, but, like Bennigsen, insisted on the primacy of the

rights of Austria in the coming negotiations.40 From the Catholic Centre Party,

Ludwig Windthorst even more strongly identified German interests with Vienna

and, less predictably, saw in the Orient question the chance to answer definitively

the question whether the German or the Slavic element should be that which rulesthe world.41 Bismarck answered Windthorst by informing him that it was simply

not in Germanys interests to join with Austria to wage war against Russia over Bul-

garia.42 The Social Democrat Wilhelm Liebknecht also made it clear with whom the

blame for the Eastern crisis lay in his eyes. Who is it, that has made the Balkan penin-

sular into a hotbed of revolutionary movements? he asked. Not the Turks. It is

demonstrable and has been demonstrated that at present the Russian government,

with whom we are advised to walk happily hand in hand, it is they who have called

forth this discontent. Liebknecht continued, How can the state and the emperor,

whose soldiers have downtrodden and savaged Poland, how can Russia, which hascommitted genocide (Volkermord) in Poland, how can this man, this country act in

the name of the principle of nationality and say I want to free the Slavic peoples.

There is an old English sayingCharity begins at home.43

Prior to San Stefano, the internal dividing lines within Germany were clearthe

Conservatives were keen not to alienate Russia, but both major liberal parties and

the Catholic Centre party were intent on ensuring that the interests of Austria were

protected and that Russian expansion into the Balkans was halted, even if that

should mean war. The Social Democrats too were having none of the Russians

appeals to Christian solidarity, but instead saw an orchestrated attempt by the Tsar

to ensure that the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire would enable Russia toswallow and then oppress the Balkans just as they had Poland. The National and



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Progressive Liberal press, as well as that of the Centre Party and the Social Democrats

followed the Reichstags lead in supporting Austria and indeed the Ottoman Empire

against Russia, convinced that the Portes resistance to the Tsarist Empire was a

defence not only of its own interests, but also of those of all Europe.44 This anti-

Russian tone of the German press only grew over the course of the Berlin Congress.While the Kolnische Zeitunghoped obliquely that the Berlin Congress would end all

predatory and annexationist desires, the Frankfurter Zeitungbluntly demanded that

the Berlin Congress expresses that which ought to be expressed: the will of the

Great European Powers, the condemnation of Russian arrogance and the Russian

lust for conquest.45 With the overwhelming majority of domestic public and political

opinion urging a pro-Austrian, anti-Russian stance, and the Conservatives in a weak

position in the Reichstag, Bismarck put aside his own pro-Russian inclinations so as

to shield the Austrian position in negotiations.46 As he later wrote to Bulow,

Austria is the safer choice, because the people are for it.

47

Pro-Austrian domestic sentiment also enabled Bismarck to avail himself of an

opportunity that had presented itself courtesy of Austria-Hungarys foreign minister,

Andrassy, who had approached Berlin for support against Russia in the Balkans. With

domestic support assured, Bismarck was amenable to Andrassys suggestion, but

German support against Russia was made conditional upon Austrias agreement to

delete Article V of the 1866 Peace of Prague that compelled Germany and Austria to

allow a plebiscite in North Schleswig to decide whether it would remain Prussian or

be returned to Denmark. This clause had been a cause of domestic conflict in

Germany, not only because it had hardened Danish revanchist tendencies in Ger-

manys north, but because it had been inserted into the Peace of Prague by FrancesNapoleon III as an outstanding grievance that might at some future time offer a

casus belli for the French, British, Russian or Austrians on the behalf of Schleswigs

Danes in a manner not too dissimilar to Bulgaria or the Balkans in the Ottoman

Empire. With the Congress of Berlin weeks away, a deal was struck on 13 April

1878 to the effect that Austria would throw away the weapon that Article V gave

them.48 As a result, Andrassy attended the Berlin Conference knowing that Bismarck

would support Austria in the Balkans, while Bismarck attended knowing that he had

secured domestic peace regarding support for Austria and territorial security in the

Danish north. Without a deducible trace of irony, Bismarck suppressed the nationalistambitions of one of Germanys own minorities, before hosting a Congress which

would accuse the Ottoman Empire of precisely the same conduct.49

The Intersection of English and German Foreign Policy

Although the 1878 discussions in Berlin regarding the Ottoman Empires minorities

dealt mainly with the Balkans, Article 61 dealt with the Armenian question, formalis-

ing but internationalising (that is, taking out of direct Russian supervision) the com-

mitments made in Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano,50 which demanded that the

Porte carry out improvements and reforms designed to protect the Armenians fromKurds and Circassians.51 The negotiations over this article were revealing in their



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brevityonly Russia and Britain felt the need to co-ordinate their position on the

question, as the two powers whose interests most obviously met in the lands of the

Armenians. At the 14th sitting of the Congress on 6 July 1878, Salisbury insisted

that the Porte report back to the powers on the progress of future reforms that

would better the position of the Armenians. Alexander Caratheodory Pasha, onbehalf of the Porte, replied that:

the rebellious nationalities in the recent war had caused serious unrest. As all havebeen informed, the Porte has introduced measures to bring this to an end. Therequest of Lord Salisbury appears to refer to future measures. I wish to bring theprovisions of the Porte into consideration and to include the following sentencein the paragraph: The Porte will notify the six powers of the results of the measuresthat have already been undertaken to this end. The addition meets the sense of theBritish suggestion and would satisfy the Ottoman government.52

Clearly, the Porte wished to draw a line under the Armenian issue, as somethingalready dealt with, to be reported on in an historical sense, rather than as an

ongoing process. Thereafter, Schuvalov of Russia protested that the British version

was preferable, as the process of reforms in the Armenian regions were surely still

ongoing.

At this point, a bemused Bismarck entered the debate to dampen down enthusiasm

for the article altogether by questioning the efficacy of treaty-mandated humanitarian

reforms. According to the minutes, the president remarked that it is perhaps difficult

to apply repressive measures against independent peoples and that he has doubts

about the practical use of Lord Salisburys suggested article.53 Thereafter further infor-

mal discussions to narrow the distance between the Porte on one side and Russia andBritain on the other took place, after which the issue was raised again, much to the

chagrin of Bismarck who (according to Caratheodory Pasha) loudly exclaimed

Again?! in frustration that this obscure and seemingly distant issue was being dealt

with by the Congress.54 Dubious of the politics and the practical humanitarian

effects of Article 61 before it had been agreed upon, Bismarck nonetheless acquiesced,

seeing no real harm if the two interested parties, namely Britain and Russia, had

resolved upon a common course of action in far off Eastern Anatolia. After some

behind-the-scenes negotiations, the text for Article 61, as it became, was agreed

upon at the 15th Congress sitting on 8 July, in a format that accorded with thisjoint Anglo-Russian position on geostrategic matters in a region that abutted the

hotly disputed Persia.

Despite Bismarcks initial misgivings regarding the enforceability of Article 61,

German foreign policy remained broadly supportive of Britains lead on the Armenian

guarantees for a number of years. Initially this was not difficult, given that until 1880

no attempt was made by the powers to follow up on Article 61, outside sporadic

British diplomatic pressure on the Porte.55 Even thereafter, however, when Germany

was called upon by the new Gladstone government (which had campaigned vigorously

on its humanitarian credentials) to take concrete diplomatic measures to make clear to

the Porte its commitment to the Armenians, Germany continued to support a



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pan-European Armenian policy between 1880 and 1883 through support for Britains

military consul system and by taking part in public joint diplomatic remonstrances

against the Porte for its inaction in the Armenian East.

Some of this can be explained through the burgeoning popular agitation on behalf

of the Armenians that was beginning to appear in the German press in the wake ofGermanys 1878 commitment. Reports of atrocities from Eastern Anatolia began to

emerge, such as that in the Free Conservative newspaper, Die Post, on 1 April 1879

which stated that:

according to reports coming to us from Constantinople, the Armenians in Zetiun,Marash and Aleppo have been exposed to outrageous oppression by Turkish offi-cials. Innumerable Christians have been arrested without grounds and languish inprison, because the governors of Aleppo and Marash want to claim to have over-thrown a rebellion. . .the molestations of the Kurds and Circassians have reachedsuch an extent that the Christians dare not leave their houses. It is to be feared

that the Christian element in every region of Asia Minor will be completely annihi-lated, if the activity of the officials in the region is not forbidden byConstantinople.56

The influential National-Liberal Kolnische Zeitung struck a similar tone in February

1880, appealing to the Christian powers to discharge their responsibilities vis-a-vis

the Armenians irrespective of the wishes of the Porteeffectively calling for the over-

ruling of the suzerainty of the Sultan in the region and an embrace of a foreign policy

of humanitarian imperialism in the Ottoman Empire based on the principle of Chris-

tian solidarity.57

Not all periodicals were blind to the important geostrategic aspects of Article 61,however, with thePreuische Jahrbucheroffering perhaps the most blunt and positive

appraisal of Disraelis motives for inserting it, warning against any deviation from its

principles:

The English government carried out the correct plan, given that there is nothing inEurope for the Ottoman Empire to salvage, only a little more to lose, by stabilisingand reorganising Turkish rule in Asia as a capable bulwark against the advance ofRussia via Armenia. The Armenian Alps are to offer a limit to the expansionistimpulses of Russia while defending the English Mediterranean.58

That important segments of the German press were supportive of a more vigorousattempt to assist the Armenians made it easier for Bismarck to support pan-European

calls to support the Armenians. With the exception of the Social Democratic press,

German newspapers of various political hues had praised the Berlin Congress as

having secured the peace of Europe by re-establishing the correct balance of power

in the East at the expense of Russia.59 To immediately renege on one of Germanys

humanitarian commitments stemming from the Treaty of Berlin would have been dif-

ficult without sound cause.

Apart from this growing domestic awareness of the Armenian cause, however, the

primary factor driving the hardening European stance towards the Portes treatment

of the Armenians was the election of Gladstones Liberals in April of 1880. Having



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heavily criticised Disraeli for his foreign policy pragmatism, Gladstone immediately

moved towards a harder-line approach in dealings with the Porte. As a German

foreign office official noted in his diary, there again seemed to be a desire for interven-

tion abroad in the world, only, unlike in 1877, it was being urged by the British rather

than the Russians.60 This observation was not exactly meant as praise, given thatRussian intervention had in fact meant a war that had proved difficult to localise

and a subsequent estrangement from the rest of Europe.

Nonetheless, when Gladstone approached the powers in May 1880 arguing for a

concerted diplomatic push pressuring the Porte on the Armenian question, Bismarck

and the leaders of the other powers reacted favourably. Identical diplomatic notes rep-

rimanding the Sultan for his recalcitrance and outlining in severe terms Europes

humanitarian expectations were sent to the Porte on 11 June 1880, with follow-up

statements issued in August of 1880.61 Under the weight of this combined pressure,

the Porte informally promised to resolve the Armenian reforms issue within threemonths.62 For the rest of 1880 and 1881, Germany co-operated with Britains desire

to pressure the Porte to act in the Armenian regions, with further simultaneous dip-

lomaticdemarches sent by the powers in September of 1881.63 This pressure on the

Porte regarding the Armenians was combined with renewed pressure on the Porte

to come to terms with the Greek government on the demarcation of their shared

border and to offer no further resistance on the question of the Albanian/Montenegrinborder. The alternatives set before the Porte were that they must either fulfil all their

obligations under the Treaty of Berlin or face a united European naval force, to which

Germany dutifully contributed a naval vessel,64 even though Bismarck suspected that

Gladstones new robust Eastern policy was strengthening Russian power in the Balkansto the detriment of Austria-Hungary.65

After the Greek and Montenegrin issues eventually subsided in early 1881, Bismarck

continued to support pan-European humanitarian moves on behalf of the Armenians,

on the understanding that these were suitably remote from Germanys immediate

interests in the Ottoman Empire, namely the line of demarcation between Austria

and Russia in Ottoman Europe, and that as such they would not jeopardise the

uneasy diplomatic truce on the question of the Balkans between GermanysDreikaiser-

bundallies, as he made known in a letter to the Kaiser on 21 September 1881, where he

advised:Now that the clauses of the congress in all substantial points have beenimplemented, the English ambassador in Constantinople has reminded his col-leagues and the Porte of the Armenian question. For Your Majestys government,which apart from its position as signatory to the Berlin Treaty has no direct politicalinterests at stake, it appears harmless enough to agree with them, given the othercabinets, particularly the Austrian and Russian have agreed.66

The apparent harmlessness of following Britains pro-Armenian foreign policy was,

however, reasonably short-lived. In 1882, Bismarck began to worry that Gladstones

insistence on Armenian reforms would weaken the Sultans hold over his empire

and Britains hold over Asia Minor, and therefore over the Mediterranean. This



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weakening of British influence engendered both foreign and domestic policy problems

for Germany. In terms of foreign policy, British weakness in the Mediterranean might,

first, embolden the French particularly in Egypt and, second, embolden the Russians in

the Balkans, thereby menacing Austria-Hungary.67 Domestically, any renewed conflict

between Russia and Austria-Hungary would be greeted with demands to supportAustria-Hungary militarily, potentially leading to both Franco-Russian rapproche-

ment and German isolation in the face of a general European conflagration. The

best way to ensure that no difficulties emerged in the Balkans between Germanys

two allies was to ensure that British primacy in the Mediterranean and in the

Ottoman Empire was maintained, which meant regaining the trust of the Sultan by

respecting his domestic sovereignty with regard to the Armenian question.

During 1883, however, the break with British foreign policy in the Ottoman Empire

came, as Bismarck reviewed Britains increasingly public, almost theatrical protesta-

tions to the Porte regarding the Armenians, contrary to Gladstones undertaking inMarch of 1882 that Britain would be more circumspect in its representations to the

Porte.68 Bismarck now returned to his earlier scepticism regarding Article 61 of the

Treaty of Berlin. This time, his impatience with Gladstones new policy direction

stemmed not from an incomprehension of the utility of the symbolic politics of huma-

nitarian Christian solidarity or a misreading of Anglo-Russian geostrategic interests,

but from a realisation that the humanitarian invocation of a clash of civilisations

in the Ottoman Empire, centred on the plight of the Armenians, was coming to

figure within growing political tensions between the Russians, the Porte and the

British. Against the background of earlier press reports of ostensible Russian agitation

in the Armenian regions,69 The Timesprinted an article on 26 April 1883 that broughtthe Armenian question and the roles of Britain and Russia to a frightening head. In a

report on the return of ambassador Dufferin to Constantinople, The Times reported

that:

Lord Dufferin has been instructed to lay before the Sultan a very strongremonstrance on the subject of the misgovernment of Armenia . . . The Consularreports . . . furnish ample, though indirect, confirmation of the fact . . . thatTurkish government misgovernment is forcing the inhabitants of the Armenianprovincesincluding many Mahomedans as well as Christiansto turn theireyes to Russia as the only quarter from which practical help is likely to come. Theobject with which [Article 61] was inserted in the Treaty of Berlin is plain. It wasintended to offer an alternative to the pretensions and the intrigues of Russia onthe Asiatic frontier of Turkey. But the promises of the Powers have born no fruitfor the people of Armenia . . . In these circumstances it is not surprising thatRussia should be suspected of a design to turn the shortcomings of the Porte toher own account. Her garrisons occupy commanding positions . . . No otherpower is in contact with Turkey in the Eastern Regions of Asia Minor, and bothTurks and Christians are aware that it would be most difficult for any otherpower to put forth its strength in that quarter. At the same time, Russia is check-mated in Europe. The alliance of Germany and Austria, strengthened by the acces-sion of Italy, and still more by the continuing paralysis of France, has practically put

an end to the projects of the Panslavists for the Russification of the Balkan Penin-sular. It is believed by many diplomatists, foreign as well as English, that Russia will



15/25

be tempted to indemnify herself in some new field of ambition for this enforcedinaction. . .It will be Lord Dufferins duty to lay bare the painful realities of the situ-ation in his interview with the Sultan.70

On 28 April, Germanys ambassador in London, Munster, wrote to Bismarck, attempt-

ing to reassure him about the nature of the newspaper report and Dufferins commentsby stating that it was a mere gesture towards humanitarianism for public opinions

sake, enabling Gladstone and Granville to answer pointed questions regarding the

Armenians in parliament. For his part, Munster ventured, Granville considered the

article to be an unfortunate leak because the Russians might seek to use it, to

which Bismarck acerbically commented in the reports margin, Naturally!71

Dufferin did indeed strike the intransigent pose regarding the Armenian territories

that The Times had foreshadowed when he came before the Sultan, as Germanys

ambassador to Constantinople, Joseph Radowitz, reported in early May.72 Dufferin

confronted the Sultan with reports that the situation in the East had deterioratedrather than improved and that the reforms required under Article 61 were overdue.

This, Radowitz argued in his memoirs, heightened Abdul Hamids already acute dis-

trust of British designs and fed his paranoid delusions regarding Armenia and the

Armenians. The Porte pleaded for German support against the British push which

they duly gave, with Bismarck commenting that Dufferins confrontational raising

of the issue was both unwise and unnecessary.73

With the British press all but declaring that a division of the Ottoman Empire

potentially involving Britain, Russia and the Ottoman Empire was brewing and that

the British government tacitly accepted Russian claims to Armenia, a pointed corre-

spondence with London was initiated by Berlin. On 4 May 1883, Munster relayed Bis-

marcks message that Gladstones high stakes show of humanitarianism was

endangering the viability of the Ottoman Empire:

Prince Bismarck assumes that it is not in the interests of British policy to worktowards a loosening of the bonds that bind the Armenians to the Porte. Itappears also to be of no use to the general interest of peace if it caused the Sultanto be weakened in the area of domestic governance, or lessens his ability to with-stand external threats or weakens the stability of the Turkish Empire. Another con-sequence is that the introduction of reforms in Armenia under pressure fromexternal complaints would be difficult to achieve.74

Advising the Kaiser of the issue in a letter of 18 May, Bismarck repeated remarks he had

made on 17 May to his ambassador in London, stressing his view that the British show

of strident humanitarianism for the sake of domestic politics was a dangerously desta-

bilising new development:

Although it is obvious that the current meddling in the authority of the Sultanendangers the viability of all of Turkey and thereby threatens the peace of Europe,this is the direction that the cabinet of Gladstone has moved throughout the yearwith lodging several petitions with the Sultan . . .No success can come from this.Whilst the life and property of the Armenians are particularly vulnerable against

the attacks of the Kurds, these cannot be alleviated by governmental reforms. Theso-called Armenian reforms are ideal and theoretical endeavours, which are an



16/25

ornament to the Congress protocols offered in deference to the parliamentaryrequirements of England. . .In the interests of the European peace as well as stabilityin the Orient it appears necessary to keep the Sultans authority intact, insofar asit is.75

Clearly, a British invitation to Russia to begin dismantling the Ottoman Empire inAnatolia spelt broader trouble for theDreikaiserbund, yet this was not all Realpolitik.

Germanys own intelligence in the Armenian areas contradicted the somewhat dire

picture of the condition of the Armenians alluded to by Dufferin, with the yearly

report of the German vice-consul to Asia Minor arguing that:

the general security in our region is presently quite good, and as far as my knowledgeand information goes, nowhere can complain about the security position at present.The Circassians who had aroused so much horror earlier are today quiet and goodfarmers. All of these reports that one reads in newspapers about relations in Anatolia

are always very tendentious and in every case exaggerated.

76

As far as Bismarck was informed, the Armenian question had moved out of the realms

of humanitarian Christian solidarity and become a question of the disintegration of

the Ottoman Empire. Such a development, seemingly precipitated by Gladstones

humanitarianism, meant the destabilisation of south-eastern Europe and potentially

a Continental war.

The British were made acutely aware of Germanys alarm, but Gladstone did not act

on their concerns, with Munster reporting to Bismarck:

Lord Granville said to me youre preaching to a convert as I am equally of the view

of Prince Bismarck that it looks like we drive Turkey into the arms of the Russianswhen we do something that alienates the Sultan or weakens the Sultans authority.On the other side, he added, it is very dangerous for the Sultan if the conditions inArmenia became a pretext for Russian intervention.77

Gladstones position was also made clear to Chancellor Bismarck by his son Herbert

Bismarck, who relayed internal British correspondence from Gladstone to Ampthill

at the British Foreign Office a fortnight later, in which the scope and humanitarian

rationale of the change to British foreign policy was made explicit:

The proximity of the Russian frontier to the provinces inhabited by the Armenianpopulation, coupled with the existence of maladministration and discontent inthose provinces, constitutes a permanent menace to the integrity and security ofthe Ottoman Empire. There is always a danger that the condition of affairs mayoffer an inducement and excuse for foreign aggression, or that it may give rise tointernal disorders and insurrection with the hope of foreign support . . . TheSultan is bound towards all the Powers by Article LXI of the Treaty of Berlin to intro-duce the necessary reforms and improvements in his Armenian provinces and tocommunicate to the Powers the steps taken for the purpose. In the Convention ofthe 4th of June 1878 between Her Majesty and the Sultan the engagement ofEngland to join in the defence of the Asiatic territories of Turkey is made conditionalon the introduction in to those territories of reforms to be agreed upon between the

two Powers and it is not to be expected that this country should hold herself boundto perform her part of the compact while the Porte neglects the other part. 78



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To the dismay of Bismarck, the British appeared to be informing the Porte that they no

longer felt compelled to guarantee the present borders of the Ottoman Empire, under

the cover of Article 61. German diplomacy now saw that the implications of Glad-

stones new Ottoman policy agenda were that the new British stance might be seen

in St Petersburg as a potential green light for Russia to move into Ottoman EasternAnatolia and begin the division of the Ottoman Empire. In all probability, this

would lead to a major war in continental Europe in which Britain under Gladstone

might remain neutral until such time as it was felt that critical imperial interests

were directly threatened. This interpretation was lent credibility by Gladstone and

the Tsars chance meeting in Copenhagen in September 1883.79 To German eyes, Glad-

stone was seeking to have his cake and eat it too, by bolstering his domestic humani-

tarian credentials and extricating Britain from the precarious geostrategic position on

the Russian frontier of the Ottoman East bequeathed to him by Disraeli.80 Gladstones

clear signals to both the Ottoman Empire and Russia that Britain had reversed itsdefence of a sacrosanct Russo-Ottoman frontier were for Germany a dangerous new

development that threatened to undermine the European balance of power.

The Germans were essentially correct in these assumptions, with Granville and

Gladstone having in fact sought for a way to extricate Britain from its iron-clad

promise to defend Asia Minor against Russia as early as 1880, when a proposal was

presented to Cabinet (and a horrified Queen Victoria)81 which sought to weaken

Britains humanitarian presence in Eastern Anatolia. The need to disengage from

the Armenian problem was becoming increasingly urgent, according to Gladstones

government, as Russias pre-eminence in the region became self-evident and the

Armenians claims to independence were becoming increasingly inflated and destabi-lising.82 In May of 1880, Gladstone had coolly informed the Ottoman envoy Musurus

Pasha that he did not feel aware of the existence of a separate and vital British interest

in the maintenance of Turkey and that he thought Turkey had been, unhappily for

herself, led to rely upon the notion that the British nation recognised such an interest

and might be depended upon to support her in the last resort.83 As the British occu-

pied Egypt in 1882, the military consuls in Anatolia (who had been monitoring both

the reforms and Russian power in the region)84 were quietly withdrawn, their reform

tasks left unfulfilled.85 By 1883, Gladstone seems to have found the means by which

disengagement might be possible while preserving the letter if not the spirit ofArticle 61. In making brusque demands of the Sultan, which required refusal from

the Porte simply on the grounds of sovereignty and diplomatic propriety, Britain

could claim that the Ottoman refusal to honour Article 61 was grounds for any

British refusal to defend Anatolia from the Russians, leaving Britain free to decline

to intervene, or alternatively, as Gladstone had wished since 1880, to intervene only

if interests were imperilled which she thought it right or necessary to defend.86

Upon reading Dufferins report of what had occurred in Constantinople in October

1883, Gladstone expressed his relief that Britain would be able to wash its hands of

the Ottoman Empire should Russia intervene in Eastern Anatolia while keeping its

humanitarian credentials intact. When the crisis comes. . .

, he wrote, we, or theBritish government of the day, may be able, unequivocably able, to show the world



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that it is freed from all obligations to assist the Sultan in maintaining his vile and

shameful rule over Armenia.87 Like Disraeli before him, Gladstone had found that

humanitarianism could be made congruent with other less idealistic endeavours.

Conclusion

After 1883, the Armenian question was understood by the German Foreign Office as

an attempt to build an Asian Bulgaria88an adjacent Christian satellite province that

might furnish Russia with a casus belli and scope for broader territorial expansion,

which might trigger a war with Austria and subsequently, given German public

opinion, Germany. Instead of defending the stability of Europe by guaranteeing the

borders of the Ottoman Empire, as Disraeli had envisaged, Gladstonian Britain

could remain aloof should war come, declaring that the Sultan had brought it on

himself. Having come to the conclusion that Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty was notmerely a harmless and ornamental clause championed largely for domestic political

purposes, but rather was a destabilising fulcrum used by Britain to lever the powers

into a scramble for Ottoman territory that might degenerate into a general European

war, Bismarck parted ways with Britains lead on the Armenian question. Instead,

German foreign policy advocated that the Sultan undertake a course of friendly

passive resistance in the face of any British pressure for reforms in the Armenian pro-

vinces, perhaps by insisting that Russia and Persia also needed to be included in any

Armenian reform programme.89 This was not so much an anti-humanitarian or

pro-Turkish stance as a return to the German policy of non-interference in

Ottoman domestic affairs, which had marked Bismarcks approach to Austro-Russian tensions in the Balkans in 1878. The grounds for this were neither anti-

British sentiment nor a cynical disregard for the Armenians, nor even a desire to

insinuate German interests into the Ottoman Empire through a policy of apparent

appeasement, as Dufferin had suspected.90 Rather, German diplomacy continued to

focus on halting the progress towards the general European war for Ottoman terri-

tories that would conceivably accompany its disintegration. Whereas in 1878 this

policy had dictated favouring Austria-Hungary over Russia at the Congress of

Berlin, in 1883 it meant rejecting the calculated, high-stakes championing of the

Armenians that had enabled Britain to disengage itself from the frontier frictionbetween Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

If Bismarck had not followed a strictly humanitarian foreign policy then neither had

Gladstone once his party came to power. Having forged his humanitarian credentials

as a fearless advocate of the rights of Ottoman Christians in 1876, Gladstone operated

within the letter of Article 61, as negotiated by Disraeli, but with precisely the opposite

intention, namely the abandonment of the Conservative policy of supporting the

Ottoman Empire against Russian predations. With Cabinet deeply reluctant to align

itself militarily with the Ottoman Empire in any coming war against Russia,91 but

with the British military firmly tied to Eastern Anatolia courtesy of Article 61,

Gladstone tussled not merely with the plight of the Armenians but also with thedesire to relieve Britain of its onerous treaty obligations in the East. When the break



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with the Concert of Europe approach came in 1883, it was on the basis not merely of a

zealous humanitarian push, but rather a desire to force the issue so as to be rid of

Ottoman entanglements, in particular responsibility for the Armenians. The gambit

worked and, having effected a break with the Porte, the question of the Armenian

reforms was no longer raised by the British and thereafter remained dormant, asthe German envoy Radowitz reported.92 The cost of this recalibration of British

foreign policy was, however, the heightening of the Sultans already deep hostility

towards the Armenians.

In 1981, Keith Sandiford wrote of Gladstone that there survives a vivid picture of

the Grand Old Man fighting to the end to save the hapless Armenians from the butch-

ery of the Turks. This image of an unusually devout Christian striving against over-

whelming odds to promote the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity is still an

integral part of the Victorian mythology. This portrait of Gladstone as champion of

the oppressed nationalities, Sandiford noted, was first established by that statesmanhimself.93 Some seventy years ago, Medlicott too had argued that the plain truth is

that after 1881 the Gladstone government had allowed the fear of Russia to determine

its Turkish policy very much as the Conservatives had done, and had shown less readi-

ness to recognize that England had any moral obligation to persist in politically unpro-

fitable efforts to ameliorate the condition of the sultans subjects.94 Gary Basss recent

study notwithstanding, Gladstones humanitarian credentials may indeed require revi-

sion in line with these judgements. As the German response to Gladstones attempt to

disengage from the Armenian cause seems to indicate, another portrait of Gladstone is

possible, that of a risk taker, willing to gamble with the peace of continental Europe in

order that he might rid British foreign policy of its humanitarian strictures in EasternAnatolia. If this German portrait is plausible, then the notion that Gladstones foreign

policy was guided by an overarching commitment to human rights might well be part

of this myth of Gladstone.95

In the wake of the Russo-Turkish War, Europes Armenian question was publicly

marked by a humanitarian concern with the fate of fellow Christians within a decay-

ing Muslim empire. It was also, however, characterised by its underlying geostrategic

dimension. It was this dimension which underpinned the calculations of not merely

Bismarck and Disraeli but also Gladstone. For five years, Wilhelmstrasse followed Brit-

ains lead on the Armenian issue; however, upon coming to understand in 1883 thatthe decades-long frontier friction between Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire

in Eastern Anatolia and Persia was just as dangerous for the peace of Europe as the

frontier friction between Austria and Russia in the Balkans had been in 1878,

German diplomacy quickly abandoned its accommodation with Britains Ottoman

policy. The German concern over Britains manipulation of the Armenians and the

German fear of a European war stemming from the dissolution of the Ottoman

Empire still prevailed in the 1890s when the Armenian massacres of the mid-1890s

prompted Kaiser Wilhelm II to declare that the blood of the Armenians was on the

hands of Britains humanitarian politicians.96 By then, German foreign policy had

moved towards a refusal to use the suffering of the Armenians as a pawn in a larger



20/25

imperial game, and focused instead on the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a

means of staving off a general European war.

AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Richard Scully, Andrekos Varnava and this journals two anon-

ymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

[1] Margin note on report from Marschall, 9 Oct. 1895 in Lepsiuset al.,Die Grosse Politik X, 71.

It should be noted that Lepsius was far from an impartial editor of this collection of documents,

but the Kaisers margin note is nonetheless authentic.

[2] Anderson, Down in Turkey Far Away, Journal of Modern History. For Naumann, see 87;

on government responses to the massacres, see 103.[3] Bass,Freedoms Battle, 89.

[4] Moyn, Spectacular Wrongs.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Mazower, Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 396.

[7] Fink,Defending the Rights of Others, 338. Fink is incorrect in suggesting that the Treaty of San

Stefano had been silent over minority rights (5), with Article 16 of San Stefano offering an

arguably stronger vehicle for further Russian intervention on behalf of the Armenians than

Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. For a corrective see Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 43;

Weitz, From the Vienna to the Paris System, 1317.

[8] On the status of religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire from a Russian perspective, see

Komsalova, Bulgarians and Greeks.[9] For a more nuanced picture of domestic developments inside the Ottoman Empire, see

Anscombe, Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform.

[10] Fleming, Orientalism, the Balkans and Balkan Historiography.

[11] For the role of Jerusalem prior to the Crimean War, see Gooch, A Century of Historiography on

the Origins of the Crimean War. On Frances humanitarian role in Syria, see Pogany, Huma-

nitarian Intervention in International Law. For Russians inflated imperial claims stemming

from its intervention on behalf of Christian minorities, see Davison. Russian Skill and

Turkish Imbecility, The Dosografa Church in the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca.

[12] Anderson, Great Britain and the Russo-Turkish War of 1768 74.

[13] See Geiss,Der Berliner Kongre 1878, 404.

[14] Granville to Gladstone, 18 Sept. 1878 in Ramm, ed.,Political Correspondence of Mr Gladstoneand Lord Granville, vol. 1, 78.

[15] Mosse, End of the Crimean System, 171 75.

[16] Salisbury to Layard in Constantinople, 9 May 1878 in Anderson, ed.,The Great Powers and the

Near East, 100.

[17] Over 65 per cent of the Reichstag deputies were pro-Austrian (or at the least anti-Russian).

See below.

[18] Marsh, Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres, 71; Zeidner, Britain and the Launching of

the Armenian Question.

[19] Lee,Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 , 4487. See also Gillard, ed.,British

Documents on Foreign Affairs, 389 90; Mosse, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 38 58.

[20] Medlicott, The Gladstone Government and the Cyprus Convention, 1880 85, 207.

[21] Kieser,Der Verpasste Friede, 24 25, 79 85.

[22] Ibid., 25.



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[23] Salt, Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 22ff.; Zeidner, Britain and the

Launching of the Armenian Question, 47172.

[24] Zeidner, ibid., 473 74.

[25] Pflanze,Bismarck, 15253.

[26] Vakahn N Dadrian,History of the Armenian Genocide, 65. See too 8597.

[27] Scherer,Adler und Halbmond, 178. Bismarcks fit of pique was no one off. The next day, Bismarck

did not merely repeat the remark almost word for word in a report to the Kaiser, but gave a

full elaboration on it. For the article in question, see Geiss, Der Berliner Kongre 1878, 405.

[28] Ibid., 526.

[29] As per Anderson, The Eastern Question.

[30] Schroder, Die Stellung der Nationalliberalen und Sozialdemokraten, 12.

[31] Wolfframm,Die deutsche Auenpolitik, 3953.

[32] Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 3 4; Geyikdagi, Foreign Investment in the

Ottoman, 65.

[33] Kaiser,Imperialism, Racism and Development Theories, 2.

[34] Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags, III, Legislaturperiode, Erste Session, 1877, 13.

[35] Bennigsen to Bismarck, Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags, III, Legislaturperiode,6.Sitzung, 19 Feb. 1878, 9295. For another National Liberal voice around this time, see Hein-

rich Treitschkes comments that, although Russia represents the cause of Christendom, culture

and humanity in the Orient. . .neither Germany nor Austria can admit Russias conquests in

Europe. Instead, Treitschke recommended the Eastern territories around Kars and Batum

with which Russia might satisfy itself. Treitschke, Die europaische Lage am Jahresschlusse.

[36] Bismarck to the Reichstag, Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags, III, Legislaturperiode,

6.Sitzung, 19 Feb.1878, 96.

[37] Ibid., 96.

[38] Ibid., 99.

[39] Ibid., 96.

[40] Hanel to Reichstag, ibid., 99101.[41] Windthorst to Reichstag, ibid., 102: ob das germanische Element oder das slavische Element

das die Welt beherrschende sein soll.

[42] He also ridiculed Windthorsts claim that whoever controlled the Dardanelles held the key to

global power, stating that Windthorst would teach us that the Sultan has hitherto ruled the

world. Bismarck to the Reichstag, ibid., 105.

[43] Liebknecht to Reichstag, ibid., 111 12.

[44] Mohrke, 328.

[45] Wolfframm.Die deutsche Auenpolitik, 4546.

[46] Contra Wolfframms view that public opinion had no influence on German foreign policy.

Wolfframm,Die deutsche Auenpolitik, 53. Bismarcks weakness in the Reichstag was famously

illustrated just months later in May 1878 when he was unable to push through an anti-Socialistlaw in the wake of Max Hodels assassination attempt on the Kaiser and was forced to elections

in order to try to create a working majority. On the importance of domestic politics, see too

Canis, Bismarcks Aussenpolitik 1870 bis 1890, 12833. While not conceding precisely how

limited his domestic political choices were, Lothar Gall too argues that, in the face of Conser-

vative disagreement, Bismarck came to agree with his domestic political rivals, even including

Liebknecht that the power of Russia needed to be curtailed. See Gall. Bismarck, 52324.

[47] Hildebrand. Das vergangene Reich, 60. On the effects of public opinion, see too Mommsen,

Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik, 4344; Pflanze,Bismarck, 230.

[48] Friis. Die Aufhebung des Artikels V des Prager Friedens, 56.

[49] Ibid., 4562 (esp. 5455), MB Winckler. Die Aufhebung des Artikels V des Prager Friedens,

471509.[50] Suny.Looking toward Ararat, 43.



22/25

[51] Gillard, ed.,British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 387.

[52] Geiss, ed.,Der Berliner Kongre 1878, 31516.

[53] Ibid., 316.

[54] DeVore, British Military Consuls in Asia Minor, 12.

[55] Scherer.Adler und Halbmond, 99.

[56] Die Post(90), 1 April 1879, R13064 Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Berlin (PAAA).

[57] Der Orient,Kolnische Zeitung, 17 Feb 1880, R 13064 PAAA.

[58] Aus Turkisch-Asien.

[59] Mohrke. Deutsche Presse und Offentliches Meinen, 27981.

[60] Scherer.Adler und Halbmond, 105.

[61] Hatzfeldt, 11 June, R13065 PAAA (unnumbered).

[62] Granville to Gladstone, 3 Oct. 1880, in Ramm, ed.,Political Correspondence, 192.

[63] R13066, R13067, PAAA.

[64] This naval force, which included one German naval vessel, was disbanded on 4 December after

the Porte agreed to honour its Greek and Balkan commitments despite Gladstones hope of

keeping it in place until all reforms agreed to in Berlin were carried out. See Gladstone to

Granville, 15 Oct. 1880, in Ramm, ed., Political Correspondence, 201.[65] Scherer,Adler und Halbmond, 10206.

[66] Bismarck to Wilhelm I. 21 Sept. 1881, R 13067 PAAA. The main concern for the Porte was that

Britain and Russia were now acting in unison in a fashion that they considered to be highly

destabilising. See Hirschfeld to Bismarck, 25 Nov, 1881, R 13067 PAAA.

[67] Holborn,Deutschland und die Turkei, 3538.

[68] Ibid., 35.

[69] See, for example, the articles in theSt Jamess Gazette, 3 Jan. 1883 and The Times, 4 Jan. 1883,

both in R13068 PAAA (unnumbered).

[70] The Times, 26 April 1883, in R13068 PAAA.

[71] Munster to Bismarck, 28 April 1883, R13068 PAAA.

[72] Radowitz to Bismarck, 10 May and 12 May 1883, R13068 PAAA.[73] Holborn, ed., Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria

von Radowitz, 23132.

[74] Hatzfeld to Munster, 4 May 1883, R13068 PAAA.

[75] Bismarck to Wilhelm I, 18 May 1883, R13068 PAAA.

[76] Jahresbericht Anasia31 March 1883 (received 15 May 1883), R13068 PAAA.

[77] Munster to Bismarck, 30 May 1883, R 13069. PAAA.

[78] Gladstone to Ampthill, 14 June 1883, R13068 PAAA.

[79] Bismarck to Radowitz, 12 Oct. 1883, as reproduced in Holborn.Deutschland und die Turkei,

111; see also 4142.

[80] For their part, the Russians were rapidly moving towards a Russification policy that sought to

contain the Armenian question in light of their own difficulties with this minority. Russia wasfast becoming a defender of Ottoman integrity in Asia, despite the persistence of their Balkan

ambitions, just as Britain was moving away from this commitment. Suny, Looking towards

Ararat, 44ff.; Zeidner, Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question, 475.

[81] This reversal of Conservative foreign policy so alarmed Queen Victoria that she sent a letter

rebuking Gladstone for it. Granville to Gladstone, 19 Sept. 1880, in Ramm, ed., Political

Correspondence, 17879.

[82] On the Gladstone Cabinets desire to move away from any Anglo-Ottoman alliance against

Russia, see Granville to Gladstone, 4 June 1880, in Ramm, ed., Political Correspondence, 132.

Medlicott, The Gladstone Government and the Cyprus Convention, 19394. On the stum-

bling block presented by Article 61, see Gladstone to Granville, 9 June 1880, in Ramm, ed.,

Political Correspondence 13334. For the extent of and limits to Armenian agency in thesematters, see Bloxham, Terrorism and Imperial Decline, 30124.



23/25

[83] Gladstone diary entry, 14 May 1880, in Matthew, ed.,The Gladstone Diaries, 524.

[84] Dadrian,History of the Armenian Genocide, 73.

[85] Knaplund,Gladstones Foreign Policy, 152.

[86] Granville to Goschen, very confidential, 10 June, FO 78/3074, No. 71. Medlicott. TheGladstone Government and the Cyprus Convention, 192.

[87] Gladstone papers, as cited in Knaplund,Gladstones Foreign Policy, 15455. By 1886, Gladstone

was advocating the idea of simply allowing Russia to take Constantinople and the Straitsan

action which would have precipitated war with Russia under Disraeli and spelt the end of the

Ottoman Empire, and a European scramble for its territories. Knaplund, Gladstones Foreign

Policy, 159.

[88] Newspaper report, Politische Korrespondenz, R13068 PAAA: ein asiatisches Bulgarien zu

schaffen.

[89] Bismarck to Radowitz, 13 Oct. 1883, 112. This harked back to the now abandoned plan of

Russias Loris Melikof to create a unified Armenian polity. In suggesting a transnational

approach, Bismarck hoped to bury the issue, understanding that it was in the interests of

neither Britain nor Russia to embrace it. On Melikof, see Zeidner, Britain and the Launching

of the Armenian Question, 47475.[90] Knaplund,Gladstones Foreign Policy, 157.

[91] Granville to Gladstone, 4 June 1880, in Ramm, ed.,Political Correspondence, 132.

[92] Halborn, ed.,Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, 232.

[93] Sandiford, WE Gladstone and Liberal-Nationalist Movements, 27 30.

[94] Medlicott. The Gladstone Government and the Cyprus Convention, 208.

[95] Contra Bass.Freedoms Battle, 89. Similar conclusions have recently been reached regarding

Gladstones stance on slavery by Roland Quinault. See Quinault Gladstone and Slavery,

36383.

[96] Margin note on report from Marschall, 9 Oct. 1895 in Lepsius et al., Die Grosse Politik

X, 71.

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