1848 hungarian revolution

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D o m o k o s KT he H un g

of 1848 inEuropean

InsCOLLEGIUM BUDAPEST Institute for Advanced Study

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D o m o k o s K o s á r y , Ordinary Member and formerPresident of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, President of

Széchenyi István Art Academy. Born in 1913. M.A. EötvösLoránd University, Budapest. Ph.D. Sorbonne, Paris. 1938–39Institute of Historical Research, London. 1937–50 Professor of History, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest; Director of theInstitute of History (Teleki Institute). 1946–49 Founder andEditor-in-Chief of the French-languageRevue d’HistoireComparée, published in Budapest. 1949 divested of all hisoffices under the Stalinist regime. Autumn 1956, President of the Revolutionary Council of Historians. Sentenced to four yearsin prison, to be released in 1960. Employed as an archivist,later appointed scientific researcher then academic counsellorat the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy ofSciences. 1982 elected Corresponding Member, and in 1985Ordinary Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.1985–90 President of the National Committee of HungarianHistorians. 1990–96 President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences after the change of regime.

Recent Publications:Les ‘petits états’ face aux changements culturels, politiques

et économiques de 1750 à 1914. Lausanne: Université deLausanne, 1985.

The Press during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–49.Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1986.

Cultur and Society in Eighteenth Century Hungary. Budapest:

C i 1987



C i 1987

Domokos Kosáry

The Hungarian Revolution of 1848

in the Context of European History

Lecture given at Collegium Budapest: 8 October 1998

Public Lecture Series No. 22

September 2000



I look back with great pleasure on my conversations with oldG e o rge Macaulay Trevelyan at his home (Gar den Corner,Cambridge) in the spring of 1939, and I still keep, as a prizedsouvenir, his book on the English Revolution of 1688, which hepresented to me, signed, with the words "this is my weapon againstHitler!" I therefore regret having to begin my talk by refuting hiswell-known assertion that "1848 was the turning point at whichmodern history failed to turn". History cannot be regarded as aninattentive driver who misses the proper turn. Liberal,constitutional fr eedom, to which Trevelyan, wit h his Whig outlook,expected Europe to turn from autocracy in 1848, was only one ofthe forces in operation in contemporary Europe. And history

generally follows the resultant, the outcome of an intricate conflictof several different forces: that is, the line of greater probability.

This was what happened in 1848. However, Eur ope did notremain as unchanged as some historians have supposed. A. J. P.Taylor , a left-wing historian who char acter ised himself in his"P ersonal Diar y"-with a kind of self-irony-as a man of "str ong viewsweakly held", echoed Trevelyan in his own assertion that in 1848"G erman history reached its turning point and failed to tur n". Hisfriend Lewis Namier, bitterly attacking the German "Revolution ofIntellectuals", declared that 1848 left its imprint only in the realmof ideas. A little lat er, in 1952, the American histor ian P riscilla

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P u b l i c L e c t u r e S e r i e s

every respect. In his opinion, the Europe of which historians try todiscover evidence in the past is just an arbitrary notion projectedback onto earlier centuries by those endeavouring to justify theirpolitical programme of European integration.

Of course, this reasoning with a postmodern flair is notlikely to be popular among those who know from history that thisvery diversity within a greater entity has been one of Europe'sprincipal characteristics. We could cite a number of sources -including Hungarian ones - which bear witness to the fact thatpeople have long been aware both of this diversity and of theexistence of a common European culture and a coherent 'system ofstates', despite its inner conflicts.

Another significant characteristic of this Europe is that thesocial system based on feudal privileges came to be replaced, byvirt ue of sponta neous development, by a new-so-called bourgeois-system based on civil liberties, equality before the law,parliamentary constitutionalism, modern political institutions, andthe market economy. Fur thermore, it is from this Europe that t hesethings have spread all over the world.

We know that t he historical str ucture of Europe consisted ofdifferent zones char acter ised by unequal levels of development. Itsmore advanced epicentre or 'plateau' was surrounded by lessadvanced lateral and border zones. Being more or less closelyinterrelated, these components influenced one another. As a

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Robert son minimised the effects of the r evolutions of 1848, which -in her opinion - had no results anywhere.

After t he Second World War, under Soviet r ule, the easternzone of Central Europe - which began to be more and more

identified with Eastern Europe proper, that is, Russia -disappeared even further from the West's sphere of historicalinterest. In their turn, the small nations of this zone tended toadopt what one might call a 'Ruritanian' approach to history. Theyconsidered their own national rivalries and conflicts as the mainfeatur e and centr al pr oblem of 1848 in Eur ope, each of t hem beinginclined to ad opt a rat her nar row, ethnocentric view and to believethat only its own national and t erritorial claims had been right andjust. This, in principle, contradicted the seemingly international

char acter of their new regimes. In pract ice, however, the latt er weremore than r eady to make use of old slogans of romant ic nationa lismin order to sweeten the dr y and bitt er pills of Mar xism, with a view to making them easier t o swallow.

The nineteenth-century mechanical concept of humancultures all going inevitably through the same phases of the samepattern has lost its validity. But how can one analyse a historicalincident in its European context if there was, supposedly, no'Eur opean culture' to speak of?

A British historian, Alan Sked, has recently suggested thatwe cannot speak about 'a European culture' in the singular, sinceour continent has always been characterised by great diversity in

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consequence, the introduction of the modern social and politicalsystem - a fundamental change - was the result of a long historicalprocess, accompanied, in most cases, by r evolutions and war s. Theprocess started in the more advanced countries at the Westernepicentre, in the Netherlands and seventeenth-century England. Itcontinued, at the end of the eighteenth century, in France, amidstparticularly dramatic events which resounded mightily throughoutthe continent, although today they are r ather r egard ed as a Fr enchvariant - as Furet said, as an accident rather than as a model ofgeneral validity. This process then reached the eastern zone ofCentral Europe in the middle of the last century, with theHungar ian Revolution of 1848 as the main featur e. The P oles, aft erhaving bled to death in an earlier uprising - not yet of a liberalchar acter - were unable to strike a decisive blow, although P olish

émigrés lat er came to Hungar y's aid. The Czechs' feeble at tempt inP ra gue was rapid ly smashed by the Austria n army. The new political élite of the Romanians in Bucharest attempted in thesummer of 1848 to start a revolution, which was crushed byTurkish and Russian forces before atta ining real r esults. TheHungarian political élite, on the other hand, had successfully ledtheir country through this great transformation, in March-April1848.

I shall attempt to point out a number of lessons from thishistorical turn which had Europe-wide ramifications.

The first is that Hungary, although well prepared for the


change, could implement it only b ecause of external circumstanceswhich were the result of a cr isis in the internationa l political systemof 1815. From the early 1830s, it had had a national reformmovement led by liberal noblemen, since more and more membersof the privileged classes had come to recognise that the old systemwas untenable, har mful, and dangerous, and that they would ha veto follow the new model of the West. Hungary's new political élitehad a wide intellectual horizon and good political practice acquiredat autonomous county meetings and in the debates of the feudalDiet, not to mention a new political press. But in a countrysubordinated to Habsburg power, decisive action could commenceonly after the French revolution in February 1848 - together withthe international chain-reaction which it provoked - managed tooverthrow the current European political system. Metternich's fall,

on 13 Mar ch, was followed by a series of fur ther movements.

In Hungary, the events took place in two phases and in twopolitical centres. The first step was taken on 3 March, under thedirect impact of the French revolution, at the feudal Diet inP re s sb urg (Pozson y, now Br atislava). Kossuth, leader of theopposition, proposed an address which demanded, on the one hand,a constitution for Austria as well, thereby giving a strong push tothe coming revolution, and, on the other hand, the immediate

implementation of the reforms which had already been accepted.Although he did not - could not - yet demand a complete reform,nevertheless his address was blocked in the Upper House. Namely,the leaders of the old regime brandished the threat of Russian

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it feared the effects of the French revolution more than theAustrian ar my. At th e end of J uly, Radetzky defeated the It alians.A month later, t he Austrian Court , having regained its strength andconfidence, demanded that Hungar y give up the qua si-independentposition guara nteed b y the April laws and hand back the affa irs offinance and defence to the central authorities in Vienna. In April, aminister "by the person of the king" was appointed to deal with theaffairs of "common interest" between Hungary and the Empire.This was a compromise accepted by b oth par ties in the hope that itcould later be modified in accordance with their wishes. TheHungarians, who called this office their "foreign ministry", wishedfor mere personal union. Their hopes were based on the concepttha t German unity, if realised, would include the Au s t r i a nprovinces, as members of the German Bund of 1815, a body to

which Hungary had never belonged. In this case, Hungary wouldhave had a greater degree of sovereignty than Austria. For a time -in the summer of 1848 - the Hungar ians even hoped to t ra nsfer thecentre of the Habsburg Monarchy to Hungary, threatened asAustria was by political instability. The Court, however, regardedHungary's new position as a "forced" concession which it intendedto withdraw a t the first opportunity.

It was not in Hungary's interest to become involved in an

open confrontation. However, once events took such a turn, it wasbetter to choose armed self-defence than submission. Thegovernment was replaced by the National Defence Committeeunder t he leadership of Kossuth.


thir d phase, the left-wing - mostly t he workers - tried to r everse thisprocess with an uprising which was bloodily suppressed in June1848. Finally, in the fourth phase, autocracy r eturned to power andpushed aside also the liberals. At the end of the year, LouisBona par te - the futur e emperor Napoleon III - became president ofthe French Republic. British policy had played a significant role inthis process, having opposed the radical and revolutionary forcesin France. Another cha in-reaction followed, as one retr eat followedthe next.

A similar process could be observed in the less developedItaly and Germany. Their internal conflicts did not become assharp as in France, but the liberal bourgeois leaders becamefrightened by the French example, while the radicals did not get

from France the help they had been hoping for. Namier was wrongto assert that the cause of the German liberal collapse was neitherclass division nor the strength of the conservative forces, butnationalism, which would have threatened human rights even if ithad been victorious. Nationalism was, in this case, evidently auniting and not a dividing force. Human rights were no lessthreatened in France, as the French government crushed its ownworkers. The mistake is characteristic: Namier, in the guise of arather snobbish upper-class English historian, was in this instance

expressing the prejudices of a for mer refugee from the Czech lands.When P iedmont - as vanguard of the Ita lian nat ional movement -attacked the Austrians, it did not wish to seek assistance fromFrance because - according to a contemporary diplomatic report -

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intervened in Transylvania. Hungary, with its legally justifiableclaim to be acting in self-defence, was becoming popular inEngland. Now Palmerston was ready to have unofficial, privatetalks with Ferenc Pulszky, a friend of Kossuth who had fledHungary, and had been sent to London by Teleki to gain thesympathy of the press and public opinion.

The Hungarian military successes, however, had two moreconsequences. One was Russian intervention in Hungary withoverwhelming forces at the request of Austria on the basis of theHab sburg-Romanov tr eaty of 1833. The other consequence was theHungarian declaration of independence and the dethronement ofthe Habsburgs in April 1849. This step did not provoke Russianintervention, but it was still a political mistake to surrender the

principle of legal self-defence. "Finissez en vite" - said P almerstonto the Russian ambassador . Both Teleki and P ulszky warnedKossuth tha t the most they could expect from Pa lmerston wasmediation in t he interest of a peaceful compromise between Austr iaand Hungary.

On 21 July, in a debate held in the House of Commons,Pa lmerston gave the following reply to a group of MP s who hadpointed out the international dangers of Russian intervention:"Austria is a most important element in the balance of Europeanpower. Austria stands in the centre of Europe, a barrier againstencroachment on the one side and against invasion on the other.The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up,


In the first phase of this conflict, the case of Hungary, alittle known Habsburg province without internationally recognisedsovereignty in the eyes of the West, seemed without hope. Its'diplomatic' mission to Frankfurt, at first well received, togetherwith a project for a G erman-Hungarian a lliance against Russia, hadto cease its activities. Count László Teleki, a brilliant and radicalaristocrat, who had arr ived in P aris in September with the previousconsent of the French government, was not officially received andowed his influence only to his personal talents and socialconnections. As the representative of a country without adiplomatic network he could well co-operate with the Polishémigré, P rince Czar tory ski, head of a diplomatic network withouta country. As Hungary was more or less cut off from the West byAustria , Teleki, for a time, had to play the r ole of a f oreign minister

abroad. When László Szalay, one of the former Frankfurt envoys,arrived in London in December and sent his credentials toPalmerston, he received the following negative reply: "ViscountPa lmerston is sorry he cannot r eceive you. The Br itish Governmenthas no knowledge of Hungary except as one of the component par tsof the Austrian Empire; and any communication which you have tomake to Her Majesty's Government should therefore be madethrough . . . the Representative of the Emperor of Austria at thisCourt".

The situation changed somewhat in the spring of 1849, whenthe newly born Hungarian army drove out not only the Austrianarmy, but also the first Russian troops which had unofficially

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The great process of European transformation had animportant concomitant: the birth of modern nations. Of the longlist of authors dealing with this problem let me refer here only tofour histor ians - all fr iends of mine - who are unfor tuna tely alr eadydeceased: the Hungarians Jenõ Szûcs (for the origins) and Zoltán I.Tóth (for the conflicts in 1848), the Czech Ernest Gellner (for theconnection between nationalism and the needs of industrialsocieties), and t he Brit on Hugh Seton-Watson (for the positive,creative role of liberal nationalism and its traditions and for thedangers posed by pr esent-day extreme nationalisms).

The French nation-state served as a model for subsequentnat ional movements. A single nation was supposed to live within t heborders of the state: the French. There was also a single official

language: French. In reality, of course, there were in the Frenchstate other ethnic elements who barely spoke French. But, ascitizens, they too became, officially, F rench.

This example was followed a lso by the na tional movementsin East Central E urope. But here conditions were very different.

Nationalism was an integrating force in the case of thedivided I talians and G ermans. But it was a disintegrat ing force inmultinationa l dyna stic empires such as Turkey and Austr ia.

In 1848, old, historical Hungary had two differentfunctions. As the homeland of the Hungaria n nat ional movement, ittr ied to loosen the political framework of the Ha bsburg empire. On


in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as agreat power." But , he added, a peaceful settlement would serve alsothe interest of Austria. If Hungary "should by superior forces beentirely crushed, Austria in that battle will have crushed her ownright hand". Therefore, "not simply on the principle of generalhumanity, but on the principle of European policy, it is devoutly tobe wished that this great contest may be brought to a terminationby some amicable arrangement between the contending parties".The crushing of Hungary by superior forces was followed, however,by a bruta l, bloody r evenge.

Some historians believe that Hungarian policy had a littleoverreached itself. Nevertheless, this unequal fight made Hungary,despite its defeat, a better known and more respected factor in

international politics. Some years later, when Austria had to lookfor a partner to reorganise the weakening structure of theMonarchy, Vienna chose as the strongest of the rival candidatesH ungar y. The Compromise of 1867, the system of the Dua lMonarchy, gave Hungary the time and the position to find a way ofdealing with one of its greatest problems after 1848, the so-callednationality problem.

Our fourth - and probably the most important - lesson isthat the attempt by the Hungarians to transform their old,multinational country into a national state had to fail. The model ofan exclusive national state was - and still is - scarcely compatiblewith the ethnic conditions of the Danube region.


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In their strong position in 1848, the Hungarians - liberalsand radicals alike - believed and hoped that by abolishing feudalprivileges, liberating the peasants, and granting individual rightsand civil liberties to all, regardless of origin, they could win thehearts of the other ethnic elements, who would, in return, supporttheir cause and even join their r anks. In fact, only the Croats wererecognised by the Hungarians as a separate nation since they toohad a feudal élite and a political past.

Most of the German (and Jewish) urban elements wereattracted by this promised future. And at first most of the otherethnic groups welcomed the great reforms, except those who (likethe leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the TransylvanianSaxon Germans) had lost their old privileges. Soon, however, a

number of other nat ional movements star ted to formulate their owndemands, claiming recognition for their respective nations,collective rights, and separate territorial units. It was notsurprising that the Serbs asked for a Voivodina in which they madeup barely more than one-third of the population, the majority ofthe population being Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians. Smallnat ions can be just a s resolute and ambitious as big ones. As Viennahastened to utilise these nationalist movements against theHungarians, the latter sought to dismiss them as the product ofAustrian and Russian pan-Slav agitation. For a time, they wereunable to realise that these were spontaneous, rival nationalmovements. It is true that, due to the policy of Vienna, armedconflict could be hardly avoided with the Croats (although


the other hand, in the eyes of several other neighbouring nationalmovements, Hungary itself constituted a kind of empire, amultinational framework. Even if Hungary, in its historical pastand geographical structure, otherwise differed a great deal fromthe Habsburg Monar chy, it wa s still, in Széchenyi's words, a smallernetwork or texture ("szövedék") within a larger one. The countryhad had various other ethnic elements and foreign settlers as earlyas the Middle Ages. Owing to subsequent devastating wars, followedby immigration, Hungarians came to represent less than half -about 40 per cent - of the population, alt hough they still constitutedthe largest single ethnic group in their country, and the secondl a rgest in the whole Ha bsburg empire, after the Ger mans-Austrians. The majority of the country's population was thereforecomposed of other ethnic groups: Germans (dispersed in many

places), Romanians (in the south-east), Slovaks (mainly in thenorth), Ruthenians (Ukrainians, in the north-east), and Serbs (inthe south), as well as a number of minor ethnic groups confined tosingle areas (Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and so on). Theseethnic groups very oft en mixed with one another.

To these differences in ethnic pr oportions must be addedthe fact tha t, while in Fr ance the Bretons had the Atlantic Ocean attheir backs, here, beyond the Serbs in Southern Hungary, therewas a Serb principality under Turkish sovereignty, and behind theRomanians in Tra nsylvania there were two Romanian principa litiesof similar status. And with a slight effort the Slovaks could bepushed toward s the Czechs.


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against th e Austrians. László Teleki, who in P ar is met P olish,Romanian, and other émigrés, urged his government in the springof 1849, to come, by all means, to an understanding with theneighbouring nations and to reorganise Hungary "on the basis of aconfederation". On 15 May, he wrote to Kossuth: "The future ofHungar y depends, in my view, on our being as generous as possibletowards the diverse national groups in respect of granting themrights. Not only Austria has died, but also St. Stephen's Hungary."In Hungary, this view was supported only by a group of youngradicals. The government answered that it could not consent to thedismemberment of the country or the "creation of federal status".True, this would have been difficult in the middle of the war , butthe government had also tried to come to an under stand ing with theSerbs, and, par ticularly, with the R omanians. On the proposal of

Nicolae Balcescu former foreign secretary of the Bucharestrevolution, the Hungarian government managed, in spring 1849, a"projet de pacification". A little later, this served as a basis for theNationality Law - the first of it s kind - which was adopted in Szegedat the end of July. It guaranteed the free development of thenationalities, the use of their languages in dealings with theauthorities, and in local administration, autonomous organisations,and schools. The importance of this legislation should beacknowledged even in the knowledge that it came too late, it could

not be implemented and to determine the extent to which thesecultural concessions might have met the demands of the affectednat ional movements could not be determined.


Hungary belatedly offered them even secession), and with theSerbs, influenced also by irregular armed units from beyond thefrontier. There was, however, a civil branch of the Serb movementwhich, in the beginning, could probably have been persuaded by ahappier Hungarian policy to accept a political compromise. Therewas a - not particularly strong - Slovak nationalist movement aswell, but many thousands of Slovak soldiers joined the Hungarianarmy. In the Romanian-Hungarian relationship great commoninterests visibly mingled with highly antagonistic ones.Transylvania, which a little later was united with Hungary, was anasset against Austria, but also a grave legacy because of theextremely backward conditions in which the Romanian peasantryhad to live. It was hardly possible to avert an explosion. YoungHungarian radicals blamed the Transylvanian landlords - mostly

Hungarians - for their "past crimes", and declared that theRomanians had "mortal grievances against the infamousTransylvanian aristocracy".

The Hungarians were too slow to realise that theneighbouring nations wished to obtain for themselves what theHungarians - or so it seemed - had already obtained. They alsofeared for the integrity and independence of their country, which,taken t o pieces, could easily be swallowed by Russia. However, theOlmütz Manifesto, issued by the Austrian government in March1849, disabused t he leaders of t he differ ent na tional movements oftheir belief that Vienna would satisfy their claims. Negotiationswere started with the Hungarians, who began to gain ground


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become impossible, or thr ough bitter conflicts, or even, in case of aEuropean crisis, by way of an explosion in which the whole boilerwould burst into pieces, flying asunder in unknowable directions?Hungarian policy had - ought to have - to try, while it still had thetime - a whole generat ion - and t he appropr iate means and position,to avoid obstructing this inevitable process, and to channel it, togive it an outlet which would be more or less acceptable to all thepar ties concerned. P rime Minister Kálmán Tisza should not haveclosed three Slovak high-schools in 1875: he ought to have giventhem a university . It is possible - in fact, ad visable - to pursue one'sinterests in a reasonable way. Esteem for others is not a sign ofweakness, but rather one of strength and of intelligence.


Some historians maintain that the various nationaldemands could not have been neutralised even by more generousconcessions, mainly because of the irr econcilable char acter of theirterritorial claims. This opinion may be realistic in many respects,but it also serves to provide an easy excuse for those nationalistswho refused to give concessions for the wrong reasons. It wouldhave been more reasonable on the part of the Hungarians,regaining their leading position in 1867, not t o adher e to the fictionthat all citizens of Hungary belonged to the Hungarian 'politicalnation', as formulated in the Nationality Law of 1868, whichotherwise offered many concessions regarding the use of differentlanguages, but was never really put into practice. It would havebeen better to try to make a serious effort - even to take risks - tomake everybody feel more a t home in a common, civilised countr y,

than in some other state which may have come into being at a laterdate.

Considering the historical trend of national evolution, itseemed unavoidable that the peoples in this region should, oneafter the other, develop into separate nations, with an identity oftheir own and following their own paths. The answer to thequestion 'Where to?' was therefore given a s a mat ter of course.

It was not, however, determined from the outset how, inwhat way, and under what circumstances this separation wouldtake place. Would it happen in a relatively peaceful way, throughnegotiations, so that co-existence and co-operation would not


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Cleansing Star ts? No. 4 JensBrockmeier Translating Temporali ty? Narr ative

Schemes and Cult ur al Meanings of Ti me No. 5 Thomas Y. Levin Cinema as Symboli c Form. Panofsky’s

Film Theory No. 6 János Korna i Legfont osabb a ta r tós növekedés No. 7 János Kornai Lasting Growth as the Top Priori ty:

Macr oeconomic T ensions and Government Economic Policy in Hungary No. 8 T.K. Oommen Reconcili ng Equality and plur ali sm. An

Agenda for t he Developed Societi es No. 9 John M. Litwack Strat egic Compl ementar i-t ies and

Economic Transition No. 10 Rogers Brubaker Nati onal Minor iti es, Nationali zing States,and External Homelands in the New Europe No. 11 Leonhard SchmeiserZur K ontr over se zwischen Leibni z und Clarke über die Phi losophie Newtons No. 12 Anton Pelinka Leadership, Democrat ic Theory, and the 'Lesser Evi l' No. 13 Andrei PippidiAbout Graves as Landmark s of Nati onal Identity No. 14 Alessandro CavalliPatt erns of Coll ecti ve Memory No. 15 Jürgen Trabant Thun der, Gir ls and Sheep, and Oth er

Ori gins of L anguage No. 16 Iván Szelényi The Rise of Manageri ali sm: ‘The New

Class’ After t he Fal l of Communi sm No. 17 Thomas A. Sebeok Semi otics and the Bi ological Sciences:

Init ial Conditions C O L L EG I U M B U D A P ES T I n s t i t u t e f o r A d v a n c e d S t u d y

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No. 44 Claude Karnoouh Un logos sans ethos. Considérat ions sur les notions d’in tercultur ali sme et de mul ti cul tu r al isme appl iqu ée àla Transylvanie

No. 45 Benoît de TréglodéL’homme nouveau en républ ique démocr at ique du Viêt Nam. H istoi r e d’ une r éinventi on (1948–64)

No. 46 Robert Wokler The Enli ghtenment. The Nati on-Stat e and the Pri mal Patri cide of Moderni ty

No. 47 Diane Masson Le Mémor andu m de l’Acad émi e serbe des sciences et des ar ts de 1986. Tent at iv e de reconsti tuti on d’un pr odrome au conflit dans l’ ex-Yougoslavi e

No. 48 János Kornai The Bor derl ine between t he Spheres of Authori ty of the Citi zen and the State.Recommendati ons for th e H ungari an

Health Reform No. 49 Jerzy Hausner Securit y th rough Di versity. Condit ions for Successful Refor m of t he Pension System in Poland

No. 50 Assar Lindbeck Lessons fr om Sweden for Post-Social ist Countries

No. 51 Stephan Haggard, Poli ti cs, In sti tut ions and Macroeconoic Robert Kaufman, Adjustment. Hungari an Fi scal Policy-

Making in Matthew Shugart Comparat ive Perspecti ve

No. 52 Joan M. Nelson The Poli ti cs of Pension and Healt h Care Delivery Reforms in H ungary and Poland

No. 53 Vito Tanzi Essent ial Fiscal Insti tut ions in Selected Economies in Tr ansition

No. 54 Vladimir GimpelsonThe Polit ics of L abour Mar ket Ad j ustment

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No. 30 Julia Szalai Two Studi es on Changing Gender Relations in Post-1989 Hu ngary.

No. 31 Claude Schkolnyk L’utilisation du mythe en politique. Le centenai r e de Petõfi

No. 32 János Kornai The Citizen and the State: Reform of t he Welfa r e Stat e

No. 33 JánosKornai Ad j u s t m e n t wi th out Recession. A Case Study of Hungar ian Stabili sation

No. 34 Victor Neumann Mult icult ural I denti ti es in a Europe of Regions. The Case of B anat County

No. 35 Katalin Fábián Within Yet Without. Pr oblems of Women’s Powerlessness in Democrat ic H ungary

No. 36 Éva Hoós At th e Crossroads of Ancient and M odern .Reform Pr ojects in H ungary at the End of the Eighteenth Centur y

No. 37 László Csontos, Tax Awareness and the Reform of the

Welfare Já nos Kornai and State István György Tóth

No. 38 György Márkus Antinomies of Cultur e No. 39 Ion Ianoºi Leben al s Überl eben. E in ost-eur opäi sches

kul tur ell es Bekenntnis No. 40 Zsolt Enyedi, FerencAuthori tari anism and the Ideological

Spectrum Erõs, and Zoltán in Hungary Fábián

No. 41 GraΩ yna Ska pska The Paradigm Lost? The Consti tuti onal Process in Poland and t he Hope of a ‘Grassroots Consti tut ional ism’

No. 42 Marina Glamocak Les processus de la tr ansiti on No. 43 Pavel Campeanu Transit ion and Conflict

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Ungar n - 26. Oktober 1998 No. 7 Hans-Georg Institution Buildi ng in t he New

Democracies Heinrich (ed.) Studies in Post-Post-Communi sm

No. 8 Michael Gervers (ed.)Dati ng Undated Medieval Charters

OTHER PUBLI CATIONS (ART CATALOGUES)

Anna Wessely (ed.) Anke Dobera uer: Vierzehn Forscher–Four teen Scholar s–Ti zennégy tu dós .(1998–99)

Dóra Maurer (ed.) Kép és Képiség–Bild und Bi ldl ichke it .(1998–99)

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No. 55 Béla Greskovits Brothers-in-Arms or R ivals in Polit ics?Top Poli ti cians and Top Poli cy Makers in t he Hungarian Transformation

No. 56 Roland Habich Winners and Losers: Zsolt Spéder Transform ati onal Outcomes in a

Comparative Context No. 57. George Barany Lan desBaumeister Csicsinyi and

Hungari an Polit ical Cultur e: Observat ions about a Shift ing Concept and a Shifti ng Man

No. 58. János Kornai The System Para di gm No. 59. János Kornai Har dening t he Budget Constr aint:

The Experi ence of Post-Social ist Count ri es No. 60 János Kornai Hi dden in an Envelope: Grati tude

Payments to Medical Doctor s in H ungar y No. 61 Alois Rikl in Montesqui eu’s So Called ‘Separ ati on of

Powers’ in t he Context of t he Histor y of Ideas

WORKSHOP SERI ES No. 1 Hans-Henning El õad ások a mûfor dításról [Lectu res on

Literary Paetzke(ed.) Translation ]f

No. 2 Jürgen Trabant (ed.)Ori gins of L anguage No. 3 Ludwig Salgo (ed.)The Fami ly Justi ce System: Past and

Futur e, Experiences and Pr ospects No. 4 Les tensions du post-communi sme/Strai ns of Postcommunism No. 5 Confer ence on Cent r es of Excell ence No. 6 Buchpr äsentat ion - Hi stor ische deutschsprachige

Buchbestände i n

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1848 hungarian revolution

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