17 asmgcs human factors plan asmgcs levels 1 2

8/8/2019 17 Asmgcs Human Factors Plan Asmgcs Levels 1 2

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Human Factors Plan for A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Document Title

Human Factor Plan for A-SMGCS level 1 & 2

EDITION: 2.0

EDITION DATE: 06 Jan 2004

Abstract

This document describes the Human Factors Plan in support of the study of the A-SMGCSproject. It identifies a series of recommendations to ensure that A-SMGCS can deliver thedesired performance improvements.

Keywords

Human Factors, A-SMGCS

AUTHORS :

M. Woldring

JP. Lesueur

L. Moulin

TEL: ++ 31 433661554 DIVISION:

EATMP/DAS/HUM

EATMP/DAT/APT

SOFREAVIA

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

STATUS CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION

Working Draft Executive Task General Public

Draft Specialist Task Restricted

Proposed Issue Lower Layer Task Internal Use

Released Issue

ELECTRONIC BACK-UP

INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME :

HOST SYSTEM MEDIA SOFTWARE(S)

Microsoft Windows Type: Hard disk Name: MS Word

Media Identification: Text processor Version: 97


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DOCUMENT APPROVAL

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

Authors of theDocument

M. Woldring

JP. Lesueur

L. Moulin

MANAGEMENT APPROVAL

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

Human FactorsExpert M. Woldring

Operational Expert,A-SMGCS Expert J.P. Lesueur

A-SMGCS ProjectManager P. Adamson


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DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORDThe following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the present document.

EDITION DATE REASON FOR CHANGE

SECTIONS OR

PAGESAFFECTED

0.1 07 January2004

Inclusion of conclusions and recommendations All

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

N TITLE DATE

1 The Human Factors Case: Guidance for HF Integration Draft doc.

2 A-SMGCS Project Management Plan APR/PMP1/A-SMGCS

Edition 2.13 A-SMGCS Safety Policy Edition V0.1

4 EATMP Safety Policy SAF.ET1.ST01.1000-POL-01-00,

edition 2.0

5 EATMP Safety Plan Edition 2.0

6 EATMP Safety Assessment Methodology, Part I SAF.ET1.ST03.10.00-MAN-01-00,

edition 1.2

7 EATMP Safety Assessment Methodology, Part II SAF.ET1.ST03.1000-MAN-02-00,

edition 1.0

8 EATMP Safety Assessment Methodology, Part III SAF.ET1.ST03.1000-MAN-03-00,

edition 0.2

9 EUROCONTROL Safety regulatory Requirement) RiskAssessment & Mitigation in ATM

ESARR 4, edition

1.00

10 ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Control and GuidanceSystems (SMGCS)

DOC 9476,

11 ICAO European Manual on Advanced Surface MovementControl and Guidance Systems (A-SMGCS)

AOPG, Final Draft,

Nov 2001

12 Manual on Advanced Surface Movement Guidance andControl System (A-SMGCS)

Air Navigation

Conference 11,

Information Paper 4


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13 ECAC Surveillance Strategy for ECAC Jan 1998

14 A-SMGCS Project Strategy D1

15 Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels D2

16 A-SMGCS Level I Operational Concept and Requirements D3

17 A-SMGCS Level II Operational Concept and Requirements D4

18 Functional Specification for A-SMGCS ImplementationLevel I

D5

19 Functional Specification for A-SMGCS ImplementationLevel II

D6

20 Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation LevelI

VMP I

21 Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation Level

II

VMP II

22 ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 8 Annex 14

23 Concept Justification and User Requirements, workingpaper

(AOT/10 / 10-12

June 2002)

WP/3

24 EUROCAE WG-41, MASPS for A-SMGCS, Edition ED-87A,January 2001

ED-87A

25 MAEVE Validation Guideline Handbook MAEVE

26 ECAC Ground and Taxi Accidents Rates

Conformance with A-SMGCS Target Level of Safety

Version 01

27 JAR-OPS

Low Visibility Procedures (LVP)

-

ABBREVIATIONS

AO Airport Operations

ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATC Air Traffic Control

A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider

APR Airport Operations Program

APT Airport Throughput Business Division

EATMP European Air Traffic Management Program

HF Human Factors

HFIA Human Factors Issue Analysis

HFICs Human Factors Issue Components


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HMI Human Machine Interface

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

SHAPE Solutions for Human Automation Partnerships in European ATM

SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control System

SMR Surface Movement Radar

TRM Team Resource Management


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DOCUMENT APPROVAL _______________________________________________________________ 4MANAGEMENT APPROVAL ____________________________________________________________ 4DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD_________________________________________________________ 5REFERENCE DOCUMENTS_____________________________________________________________ 5ABBREVIATIONS _____________________________________________________________________ 6TABLE OF CONTENTS ________________________________________________________________ 81 INTRODUCTION __________________________________________________________________ 91.1 GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE PROJECT___________________________________________________ 91.2 SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF THE PROJECT ___________________________________________________ 92 APPROACH_____________________________________________________________________ 112.1 METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES ______________________________________________________ 112.2 PARTICIPANTS __________________________________________________________________ 113 DEVELOPMENT OF THE A-SMGCS HUMAN FACTOR PLAN ____________________________ 123.1 1ST STEP:FACT FINDING ___________________________________________________________ 123.2 2ND STEP:HUMAN FACTOR ANALYSIS __________________________________________________ 15

3.2.1 Check list items ____________________________________________________________ 153.2.2 Human Factors issue components _____________________________________________ 173.2.3 Determine likely impact ______________________________________________________ 173.2.4 Identify current and planned initiatives __________________________________________ 173.2.5 Rated Recommendations_____________________________________________________ 18

4 CONCLUSION___________________________________________________________________ 185 APPENDIX 1: HUMAN FACTORS ISSUE COMPONENTS (HFICS) FOR THE A-SMGCS _______ 206 APPENDIX 2: LIKELY IMPACT, SAFEGUARDS (ACTION ALREADY CARRIED OUT, ACTIONSTO BE DONE AND URGENCY RATING __________________________________________________ 247 APPENDIX 3: CHECK-LIST FOR SIMULATION TRIALS,_________________________________ 29


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1 Introduction

1.1 General context of the project

The Airport Operations Programme (APR) has been developed by the AirportThroughput Business Division (APT) in consultation with the Airport OperationsTeam (AOT). While the overall EATMP aim is harmonisation and integration ofEuropean ATM, the APR will, in full recognition of the complex interdependenciesof ATM and Airport Operations (AO), generate activities focused on their jointoptimisation at airports in the ECAC area. This will be achieved through bestexploitation of available technical and operational solutions for the short term (upto 2006). The planning and implementation of the programme is undertaken withinthe strategic framework and the specific requirements laid down in agreed AirportOperations ATM Concept and Strategy documents.

The APR comprises the four following activities:

a. Improved traffic management on the movement area, improving safety and theefficiency of surface operations, in particular during reduced visibility conditions,through the phased development and implementation of the Advanced SurfaceMovement, Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) functionality, i.e. improvedsurface movement surveillance, conflict detection & alert, development of runwaysafety nets based on A-SMGCS;

b. Information sharing & capacity management, ensuring that relevant stakeholderswill be provided with timely information that is essential for their operations in orderto efficiently utilise the en-route and airport capacity in an integrated fashion,through the application of Collaborative Decision Making between ATC, ATFM,Aircraft and Airport Operators;

c. Airport airside capacity enhancement practices and initiatives, establishing andrecommending best practices that enhance runway capacity and achieveharmonisation of Ground Control, ATC and aircrew operating procedures foroperations on the movement area, with the goal to reduce runway occupancy andtaxi times to the minimum safely practicable. Studying the possibility to safelylower the present separation minima for arriving and departing aircraft in view ofimproved knowledge of the wake vortex phenomenon and its unambiguousdetection by means of ground and/or airborne means.

d. Runway safety, ensuring the harmonised implementation of the European ActionPlan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions.

This document has been developed in the frame of the Human Factors support toImproved traffic management on the movement area.

1.2 Specific context of the project

Today, the ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems(SMGCS) (Doc.9476) describes how traffic should be controlled on the surface ofan airport, based upon the principle of see and be seen. However, it is recognised

that the current SMGCS is not capable of delivering the required capacity,particularly on complex airports and under conditions of reduced visibility.


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Therefore, work has commenced on developing the concept of Advanced SurfaceMovement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS). To date a considerableamount of work has been performed by ICAO (AOPG PT/2), EUROCAE (WG.41)and the European Commission (DGTREN).

The need for A-SMGCS is also recognised through the ATM Strategy for the Years

2000+. This Strategy contains a number of Directions for Change andcomplementary Operational Improvements, which contribute towards a realisationof the overall concept for the ATM Network within ECAC.

The Direction for Change applicable to A-SMGCS is entitled Improved TrafficManagement on the Movement Area and the associated OperationalImprovements are:

1. Improvement of Aerodrome Control Service on the Manoeuvring Area;2. Improvement of Conflict Detection and Alert for all Traffic on the Movement

Area;3. Improvement of Planning and Routing on the Movement Area;

4. Improvement of Guidance and Control on the Movement Area.

These Operational Improvements are to be met through the A-SMGCS Project ofthe EATMP Airport Operations Programme (APR), which aims to facilitate the earlyimplementation of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels 1 & 2 through thedevelopment of appropriate operational concepts, requirements and procedures. Italso aims at addressing related operational issues such as human factors andlicensing of controllers.

The first phase of the project has involved the development of agreedrequirements for A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2, namely:

Agreed User Requirements; A Concept of Operations;

Operational Requirements;

Functional Requirements.

In parallel, work has progressed on the identification and development of theprocedures supporting the implementation of A-SMGCS. These procedures focusupon enabling the controller, when appropriate, to issue ATC instructions andclearances to aerodrome traffic on the basis of surveillance data alone.

The second phase of the project will involve the validation of the concept,

requirements and procedures for Implementation Levels 1 & 2. Validation willinvolve the use of simulations (both fast time and real time) and pre-operationaltrials at one (or more) representative airports through which the benefits andfeasibility of A-SMGCS (Implementation Levels 1 & 2) shall be assessed,demonstrated and confirmed.

A principle aim of the validation process is to assess the Human Factors impact ofA-SMGCS Level 1 and/or 2 implementation, with data obtained during thevalidation process being used to develop appropriate Human Factor Cases (i.e.Human Factor Cases for Implementation Levels 1 & 2).

To help identify and ensure that the appropriate data is available for the validation

a Human Factor Plan has to be developed.

Sofreavia has been required to develop the Human Factor Plan for the APR A-SMGCS Project. This plan shall define the Human Factor activities to be


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undertaken within the A-SMGCS project (particularly during the validation process)following EUROCONTROLs guidelines for Human Factors Integration.

2 Approach

2.1 Methodological principles

As a working basis, the Human Factors case process has been used.

The Human Factors Case approach has been developed by EurocontrolDAS/HUM to provide a comprehensive and integrated approach to ensure that thedesign of a technical, human, and/or procedural system can deliver desiredperformance improvements. The Human Factors Case is designed to be simple,practical and effective, with four key stages:

Stage 1 Fact finding and Human Factors Issues Analysis (HFIA)

Stage 2 Human Factors Integration

Stage 3 Monitoring

Stage 4 Human Factors Case Assessment

The Human Factors Plan development consisted in the application of the firststage of the Human Factors Case Approach.

2.2 Participants

Participants met together four times using the standard group-based brainstorming

technique. The work done by the group consisted in following different workingsteps:

1. Fact findings

2. Human Factors analysis

Each of the corresponding outputs are presented in the paragraph 3 and theappendix 1 and 2.

Table 1 shows the participants profiles.

Table 1

Person Attendance Group HFIA Role

Human Factors Expert Eurocontrol (MW) Contributor / Facilitator

Project Manager Eurocontrol (PA) Contributor

Users (e.g. controllers) Eurocontrol (JPL) Contributor

Training Expert Sofravia (LM) Contributor

Other Human Factors Expert Sofravia (LM) Contributor / Facilitator


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3 Development of the A-SMGCS Human Factor Plan

3.1 1st

step: Fact Finding

Following the Human Factors Case: Guidance for HF Integration (EurocontrolDraft document in document reference list), the first part of the Human Factorscase should set the scene and provide the necessary background informationabout the proposed system or design change.

In order to simplify this process, a standard form has been used to produce theminimum necessary factual information.

HUMAN FACTORS CASE

PART 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION

Date 07/01/04

Project Name A-SMGCS

Project Manager Paul Adamson Tel 32 2 7293308 E-mail [email protected]

HF Coach Michiel Woldring Tel 32 2 729 35 66 E-mail [email protected]

Type of Project Traffic / SituationDisplay

Controller Tool Communication Navigation

Surveillance

System Control &

Monitoring Other (state)

High-Level ProjectObjectives

The strategic objectives of the A-SMGCS are to optimise the airport capacity(throughput) in maintaining or even increasing safety of operations, minimising thecosts and impact on environment.

Safety means to minimise the air navigation services contribution to the risk of an

aircraft accident as far as is reasonably practicable.

Capacity (throughput) results will be achieved through a better use of traffic

surveillance especially in bad weather and with connection with others airportsystems.

Cost effectiveness will be achieved through the ability to provide an agreed level

of service at the least cost with different level of A-SMGCS

Environment will be also impacted by A-SMGCS: By smoothing ground flow of

traffic in all weather conditions and avoiding ground delays to engines runningaircraft, the noise and gaseous emissions at and around airport will be reduced.


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HUMAN FACTORS CASE


Project Background Despite implementation of SMGCS in the ECAC area, some European airportshave faced severe runway incursions lately, which ended up as major incidents oraccidents. The progressive growth in traffic, the complexity of aerodrome layouts

and the increasing number of operations, which take place in low visibilityconditions, are amongst the contributing factors in the increasing of delays andnumber of ground incidents. The existing systems demonstrate weaknesses incoping with the present situation and the future systems should tackle thefollowing concerns and needs.

The Airport Operations Strategy derived from ATM 2000+ Strategy has beendeveloped to perform in priority the task of improving traffic management on themovement area.

-Improvement of Aerodrome and ground control service,-Improvement of conflict detection and alert for the movement area-Improvement of Planning and routing on the movement area-Improvement of guidance and control on the movement area

System Description The A-SMGCS is a system resulting in a technical chronological improvement ofexisting tools (including an alert system) associated with updated procedures:

Surface Movement Radar (SMR), come first which gives only a non identified targetof mobiles moving on the ground. the low level of integrity, the ATC workload tokeep the individual identification lead ICAO to accept it only to "assist andaugment" the visual and procedural ATC service (It will remain to detectunidentified targets and to help to provide contingency procedures)

Improvements to SMR updated the initial tool into an integrated system, using ornot using (depending on traffic level) connection with automated lighting system,magnetic loop and radar tracking (SMGCS concept) but without connection withonboard system, that kept the integrity of the information at a non acceptable levelfor all weather operations.

The A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2 (mainly the ATC surveillance display and associatedalarm system) introduces the concept of "co-operative targets" that provide a highlevel integrity link between aircraft and vehicles and the ground tracking system. Itis initially based mainly upon Mode "S" transponder transmissions for aircraft andsome other different systems for vehicles.

With the resulting integrity and accuracy in positioning mobiles, an alarm systemcan be set up, providing acoustic and visual alert to the controller in case ofpotential conflict on the runway and it's vicinity.

System Lifecycle Stage Early Phases Middle Phases Late Phases

Initiation Planning Feasibility Develop-

ment

Pre-

operational

Implement-

ation

Local

Implement-ation

Operations

Human Factors Case Version

Preliminary Human Factors Case Interim Human Factors Case Operational Human Factors Case

Related or Similar Existing / Predecessor Systems (inc. Operational Experience and Data)

SMRSMGCS


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HUMAN FACTORS CASE


Key Safety Documentation (e.g. Previous FHA Documentation, Safety Case/Assessments)

Local documents linked to individual airports.

See attached file.

Key Design and Testing Documentation (e.g. Design Documentation, Trial/Simulation Data)

Design: Doc numbered 2,10 to 19 and 22 in the reference documents list page 6.

Testing (Validating): Doc numbered 20,21 and 24 in the reference documents list page 6.

Human Centred Automation Principles ?Rate the principles below in terms of whether the subject system adheres to these principles.

1. The human must be in command. 2. To command effectively, the human must be involved. 3. To be involved, the human must be informed. 4. Functions must be automated only if there is good reason for doing so. 5. The human must be able to monitor the automated system. 6. Automated systems must, therefore, be predictable. 7. Automated systems must be able to monitor the human operator. 8. Each element of the system must have knowledge of the others intent. 9. Automation must be designed to be simple to learn and operate. Number Notes

Key Stakeholders

Name Role Tel Email

ANSP, ATC guild

Airports Operators

Industry, National Researchcentres

Airlines, Pilots guilds


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3.2 2nd

step: Human Factor Analysis

3.2.1 Check list items

Because the task context is so critical in HF, it is often necessary to research thearea prior to conducting the HFIA study.

A default checklist is shown in Table 2, developed by Eurocontrol DIS/Hum(Human Factors Case: Guidance for HF Integration).

Table 2: Checklist items.

Human Factors Area Item

1. Human-Machine Interface

and Working Environment

Input devices, visual displays, information requirements,

alarm handling, console/working area, HMI usability, userrequirements, health risks, fatigue, distraction andconcentration, noise, lighting, temperature/humidity/airquality, workplace arrangement, workplace accommodation.

2. Organisation and Staffing Staff requirements, manpower availabil ity, ATCOprofile/selection criteria, job attractiveness, ageing, shiftorganisation.

3. Training and Development Training needs, performance/competence standards, trainingcontent, training methods and media, negative transfer oftraining, trainer role/responsibilities/competency, transitionfrom classroom to OJT, emergency/unusual situation training,testing of training effectiveness, negative effects onoperational task performance.

4. Procedures, Roles andResponsibilities

Allocation of function, involvement, workload,trust/confidence, skill degradation, procedure format andpositioning, procedure structure, procedure content,procedure realism.

5.Teams and Communication Team structures/dynamics/relations, (inter-) team co-ordination, position handover processes, communicationworkload, phraseology, national language differences,changes in communication methods, interference effects andinformation content.

6. Recovery from Failures Human error potential, error prevention/detection/recovery,detection of and recovery from system failures.

From this by default list, the following was selected during a brainstorming session of theworking group, in order to specifically address the A-SMGCS issue:

Procedures, Roles and Responsibilities

Trust and confidence, important for acceptance, link to reliability

Continuous involvement of operational people, inclusion of non ATC population(e.g. APRON management)

Workload (hypothesis: workload decrease)

Skill diversification increased use of surveillance data, head down / head uptime?


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Procedure format and structure should reflect the way people act or try to acttoday. Current/existing and new procedures.

ATC procedure applicability and relevance. Safe, useful, up to date.

Human Machine Interaction

Generic advice for HMI and workplace accommodation such as input devices,visual displays / lay-out, and console area,

a default setting intuitive interface limited settings for colours/ fonts/ number of windows etc. consoles/displays shouldnt obstruct controllers view ergonomics (distances, size of screens)

Local requirements may add specifics

(False) alarm handling

Integration with other systems (electronic flight strips, runway incursionmonitoring)

Use A-SMGCS procedures group as user group

Specifics of tower lighting,

Health/fatigue: head up/down and eye-muscle (colours, brightness)

Impacts of new displays etc. on temperature/humidity/air quality

Training and Development

Identification of additional training needs, content and methods - includingrecurrent training - for Aerodrome Control Surveillance Ratings or qualification.(Skill diversification, Head up Head down issue, understanding of howmultilateration works)

Definition of additional competence standards

Negative transfer of training

Trainer role and competency, as for all new tools/developments

Transition - changes to pilot and driver communications, procedures incl.Transponders

Recovery and contingency training

Teams and Communication

Team structures/dynamics, better shared SA (e.g. CDG: monitors for the TMAcontroller) will reduce need for co-ordination

Hand over, (new) tool specific, visual support will make hand over easier

Communication workload will decrease, to what extend?

Changes in communication methods, e.g. silent hand over, less need for co-ordination, changing feedback loops

Decreasing or increasing interference effects

Team differences (e.g. in use of tools) and transfer of individuals, different fromcurrent?


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This list has been used as a working basis to carry out the next steps.

3.2.2 Human Factors issue components

Human Factors Issue Components (HFICs) are aspects of the HF Issue specific tothe system that need to be considered, that is to say the A-SMGCS. The HFICsmaybe expressed as a question. For instance, they may be pertinent questionsabout deviations from expectations or intentions (users, designers, managers,etc.). All the HF items were analysed.

Following the checklist item, several questions have been identified for each of theitems (see appendix 1: Human Factors issues list).

3.2.3 Determine likely impact

Once all of the HF Issue Components for a particular category have beenanswered, the likely impacts are detailed for each HF Issue Component. These are

generated using the question: What if the HF Issue Component is not

addressed adequately? Group HFIA requires the input of the project teamexperts to evaluate the likely impact or the consequences of not addressing eachissue appropriately. Impacts may be concrete or abstract.

The list below present the more frequently likely impacts identified when using theA-SMGCS:

Increased likelihood of errors No use of part of the system functions by the controllers

Under-skilled controllers

3.2.4 Identify current and planned initiatives

Once the impacts have been detailed, current or planned initiatives that shouldhelp to address (e.g. prevent, control or mitigate) the HF Issue Component, or itsimpact, were examined.

Initiatives must be currently under development OR formally planned and

documented within the overall project plan.

When the initiative identified was not a concrete under process project, it had beenrecorded under the Recommendations/Comments column. It is important thatcommon-sense safeguards are recorded to make sure they are not forgotten.

The main current and planned initiatives identified in response to the listed impactsare:

Safety assessment study

Group working on procedure design

Ergonomic design of the HMI display TRM


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3.2.5 Rated Recommendations

All the Human Factors issues (components, impacts and actions) had been ratedby the working group thanks to different criteria provided by the Human FactorCase Guidance for FH Integration approach:

The Importance of the issue: taking into account the severity of the impact andthe probability (likelihood) of the impact in light of the current or plannedinitiatives.

The Urgency of the issue: degree to which the FH issue component requiresspeedy attention and/or action.

Priority: using a scale going from 1 (Low), 2 (Medium), to 3 (High) to rateImportance and Urgency. Priority was calculated by the summing of theImportance and Urgency ratings.

The priority ratings help to plan the level of effort that should be spent onimplementing recommendations.

Appendix 2 shows all the ratings for each Human Factors Issues.

4 Conclusion

The output of the Human Factor Plan for A-SMGCS level 1 & 2 study is a list ofrecommendations. A first expert overlook let to an importance scale of 2 (low) to 6(high) indicating recommendation for priority (see appendix 2).From those recommendations a proposal for checklists that can be used insimulation trials, validation process, training design, and preparation or installationof A-SMGCS in order to guide the work to be carry out, is presented in appendix 3.

This checklist has to be adapted according to specific objectives.


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HumanFactorsPlanforA-SMGCSLevels1&2

5

App

endix1:HumanFacto

rsIssuecomponents(

HFICs)fortheA-SMGC

S

1.Procedures/roleandresponsibilities.

a.Trustandconfidence,importantforacceptance,linktoreliability

i.Whatiffrequenttechnicalfailuresoccur(unreliableprovideddata)?

ii.Howtoinsureuse

rconfidenceinthesystem?

iii.Couldbepossible

thatthe(different)useofthesystemimpactconfidencewithintheteam?

b.Continuousinvolvementofoperationalactors(inclusion

ofnonATCpopulation)

i.Whatiftheinvolvementofthedifferentactorsis

notcontinuousorunbalanced?

ii.WhatifOperationalactorssampleisnotreprese

ntative?

c.Workload(hypothesis:workloadisdecreased)

i.Whatifworkloadisincreasing?

ii.Whatifworkloadisthesame?

iii.Whatifworkloadisdecreasing?

iv.Whatiftheinform

ationdiscriminationrequireah

ighattentiondemand?

d.Skilldiversificationincrea

seduseofsurveillancedata,h

eaddown/headuptime.

i.Whatifheaddowntimeisincreased?

ii.Whatifskillsnece

ssarytouseA-SMGCSaresp

ecific?

e.Procedureformatandstructureshouldreflectthewaypeopleactortrytoacttoday.Current/existingandnewprocedures.

i.Whatiftheuseof

thesystemcreatestheneedo

fnewprocedure?

ii.Whatiftheneede

dnewproceduresarefarfrom

thecurrentpractices?

iii.Whatiftheneede

dnewproceduresareclosefro

mthecurrentpractices?

iv.Whatiftheprocedurecontentisnotspecifieden

ough?

f.

ATCprocedureapplicabilityandrelevance.Safe,useful,uptodate.

i.Couldtheactual(

current)proceduresbesufficie

nttousethesystem?

ii.Howtodesignrelevantprocedures?

iii.Howtodesignala

rmmanagementprocedurein

ordertoguarantysafety?

g.Skilldegradation

i.Whatiftheuseof

thesysteminducesriskofskilldegradation


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ii.Howtoidentifyskilldegradationrisks?

2.HumanMachineInteraction

a.GenericadviceforHMIandworkplaceaccommodationsuchasinputdevices,visuald

isplays/layout,andconsolearea

i.WhatifHMIhave

adefaultsetting?

ii.WhatifHMIprese

ntanewvisualdisplay?

b.Localrequirementsmayaddspecifics

i.Howtomatchthe

localspecifics?

ii.Whatifinsufficien

tconsiderationhasbeengiven

totheaccommodationofloca

lequipment(spaceorganisatio

nandfurniture)?

c.Falsealarmhandling

i.Whatiffalsealarm

sarefrequent(linktoreliability,trustandconfidence)?

ii.Whatiffalsealarm

saredifficult/impossibletodiscriminatefromrightones?

iii.Whatiftheobject

ofthealarmisdifficulttoidentify?

iv.Whatifthealarm

isveryloudandimpossibletoacknowledgeduringseveralm

inutes(noisedistraction)?

v.Whatifthecontro

llercaneasilyacknowledgethealarm?

d.Integrationwithothersystems

i.Whatifprocedure

sarenotcompatible?

ii.WhatifHMIused

differentorcontradictoryvisua

lcodes?

e.Specificsoftowerlighting

i.Whatiftherearenolocalmeanstolimitthesun

lightinthetower?

f.

Health/fatigue:headup/headdownandeye-muscle(co

lourandbrightness)

i.Whatifuserscom

plainaboutmorefatigue?

ii.Whatifuserscom

plainabouteyefatigue?

3.Tr

ainingandDevelopment

a.Identificationofadditionaltrainingneeds,contentsandmethodsincludingrecurrenttrainingforaerodromecontro

lsurveillance

ratingsorqualification(sk

illdiversification,headupheaddownissue,understandingo

fhowmultilaterationworks)

i.Whatifneedsfor

newknowledgeandskillareid

entify?

ii.Whatifnothingex

istinthecurrentsyllabustoad

dressthenewknowledgeneeds?


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b.Definitionofadditionalco

mpetencestandards

i.Whatifthesystem

requiresthedefinitionofadditionalcompetencestandards?

c.Negativetransferoftraining

i.Whatifnegativetransferoftrainingareidentified

?

ii.Whatifalltherequiredskillsorknowledgeareallnew?

d.Trainerroleandcompete

ncy,asforallnewtools/develo

pments

i.Itispossiblethatthesysteminducespecifictrainercompetency?

e.Transitionchangestop

ilotanddrivercommunications

,proceduresincludingtranspo

nder.

i.Whatifpilotordriverarenotawareofthesystem

specifics

ii.See1.b

f.

Recoveryandcontingenc

ytraining

i.Couldtheuseoft

hesysteminducearecoverya

ndcontingencytraining?

ii.Howtotrainthecontrollertoreacttoalarm?

4.Te

amsandcommunication

a.Teamstructures/dynamic

s,bettersharedSA(monitorsfortheTMAcontroller)willreduceneedforco-ordination

i.Whatifco-ordinationneedsisnotreduced?

ii.Whatiftheteamdynamicsislesscomplex?

iii.Whatifco-ordinationneedsdecreasedbutappe

armorecriticalinsomeprecisesituation(scenariosorconfiguration)?

iv.Whatifthesystem

failedordowngraded?

b.Handover,toolspecific,visualsupportwillmakehandovereasier

i.Whatiflackoftraininginducesdifferentusesan

dunderstandingamongusers?

ii.Whatifsystemdo

wngraded?

c.Communicationworkload

willdecrease,towhatextend?

i.Whatifverbalcom

municationdisappeared?

ii.Howdropincomm

unicationwillimpactteambuilding?

d.Changesincommunicationmethods,e.g.silenthandover,lessneedforco-ordination

,changingfeedbackloops


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i.Whatiffeedbackloopschange?

e.Decreasingorincreasing

interferenceeffects

i.Whatifthesystem

inducesincreasedinterferenceeffects(alarm)?

f.

Teamdifferences(e.g.in

useoftools)andtransferofin

dividuals,differentfromcurrent?

i.Whatifdifferentp

racticesarepossiblewiththeu

seofthesystem?

g.Phraseology

i.Whatifthecurren

tphraseologyisnotapplicable

orsufficient?

ii.Whatiftheuseof

thesysteminducedtheneedofaspecificphraseology?

5.Recoveryfromfailure(Managing

systemdisturbances)

a.Systemfailuremanagement

i.Whatifthesystem

failedordowngraded?

b.Errormanagement

i.Howtofacilitatee

rrordetectionwhenusingthes

ystem?

ii.Whatifrecoverytimeisshort?

c.Humanerrorpotential

i.Whatiftheuseofth

esystemmakesthehumanm

orevulnerable,createsignifica

nterrorrisk?(Errorresistance

ortolerance)

6.Organisationandstaffing

a.Staffrequirement

i.Whatifthestaffrequirementsaredifferentthanthelocalonesbecauseofthes

ystem?

b.ATCOprofile/selectioncr

iteria

i.Whatifthesystem

inducesspecificskillsoraptitude?

c.Ageingi.Whatifsomeaptitu

deorskillrequirementsareag

esensitive?


24/31


6

App

endix2:Likelyimpact,safeguards(actionalreadycarriedout,ActionstobedoneandUrgencyrating

HFISSUE

HFissue

s

compone

ntLikelyimpact

S

afeguards(currentor

p

lanned)

Importance

Urgency

Priority

Reco

mmendations

1.a.i

Pooruserconfidence

2

2

4

Simula

tiontrials

2

1

3

Check

ifthecontinuousinvolvementofalloperational

actors

ismentionedinthesafetyassessment/

1.a.ii

Nouseofthesystem(orpart

ofthesystem)bythe

controller

2

1

3

Trainin

gonthesystem

1.a.iii

Poorconfidencewithinthe

team

2

2

4

Trainin

gonthesystem

Noconsiderationforsome

aspectsofthesystemuse

S

afetyassessmentstudy

3

2

5

Check


actors

ismentionedinthesafetyassessment

1.b.i

Noconsiderationforthe

systemimpactonnon-ATC

operators

S


1

1

2

Check


actors

ismentionedinthesafetyassessment

1.b.ii

Noidentificationofpotential

criticalaspects

3

3

6

Methodtoselectrepresentativesampleofn

onATC

people

3

3

6

Trainin

gonthenewworkingmethod

3

3

6

Workin

gmethodoptimisationstudy

1.c.i

Increasedlikelihoodoferrors

andpossiblerisksforsafety

3

3

6

Worklo

adassessment

3

3

6

Trainin

gonthenewworkingmethod

3

3

6

Workin

gmethodoptimisationstudy

1.c.ii

Nobenefitinthemental

resourcemanagementfor

thecontroller

3

3

6

Worklo

adassessment/

1.c.iii

Morementalresourcesare

available(+)

3

3

6

Worklo

adassessment

1.c.iv

Riskofincreasedworkload

becauseofattention

demands

3

3

6

Worklo

adassessment(taskanalysis)

1.d.i

Controllerlessdependenton

externalconditions(+)

S


3

3

6

Head

up/headdownissuesStudy

1.d.ii

Controllersunderskilled

1

1

2

Skillch

angeprediction(SHAPEToolkit)

Postim

plementationtrainingneedsassessm

ent

1.e.i

Currentproceduresnot

adapted

G

roupworkingonproceduredesign

2

2

4

Advice

theexistingWorkingGroupstotake

thefollowing

issue(s)intoaccount:

Needs

toDefinenewprocedures.


25/31


1.e.ii

Trainingneedstolearnthe

requirednewprocedures

2

2

4

Advice


thefollowing


Trainin

gonnewprocedures/

Jobaids(newproceduresmemo)

1.e.iii

Riskofnegativetransferof

knowledge

2

2

4

Advice


thefollowing


Contro

llertaskanalysistoidentifythepoten

tialnegative

transfe

rrisks/

Trainin

gontheidentifiednegativetransferr

isks/

Jobaids(listoftraps)

Riskofviolation

G

roupworkingonproceduredesign

3

3

6

Advice


thefollowing


Jointtrainingonnewprocedures/

Simula

tiontrials(proceduresandtraining)

1.e.iv

individualisationofthe

practices

3

3

6

Jointtrainingonnewprocedures

Noneedforadditional

training(+)

1

3

4

Simula

tiontrials

1.f.i

Needforproceduredesign

3

3

6

Simula

tiontrials

1.f.ii

Needsforgroupworking

1

3

4

Workin

ggrouponprocedureswithOpspeo

ple

1.f.iii

Creationofhazards

Workin

ggrouponprocedureswithOpspeo

ple

1.g.i

Inthelongterm,,riskofhigh

controllerdependenceon

thesystem

2

2

4

Trainin

gonUnusualsituation(downgrade

dsystem)

SHAPEskillchangespredictions

1.g.ii

Findoutthecontrollers

workingstrategyinthe

currentconditions

2

2

4

Contro

llertaskanalysisasabasisforthee

mergencyor

unusualsituationtraining.

SHAPESkillchangespredictions

Increasedworkload

E

rgonomicdesignoftheHMIdisplay

3

3

6

HMIev

aluation(usertest)

IncreasedlikelihoodoferrorsE


3

3

6

HMIev

aluation(usertest)

2.a.i

Riskoflimiteduseofthe

system

E


3

3

6

HMIev

aluation(usertest)

2.a.ii

Riskofincoherenceofthe

newvisualdisplaywiththe

currentones(colorcode,

airportgraphical

representation).

E


3

3

6

HMIev

aluation


26/31


2.b.i

TheHMIwillnotbeadapted

tolocalspecifics

2

1

3

Adapta

bleHMIwithshoppinglistofdifferen

tdisplay

modes

2.b.ii

Installationdifficulties,use

difficultiesofthematerial

2

1

3

Materialinstallationaccompaniedbyapprop

riate

introdu

ction

Riskoflossofconfidencein

thesystemreliability

S


3

3

6

2.c.i

Riskoflimiteduseofthe

systembythecontrollers

1

1

2

Technicalissue:Advicethetechnicaldesig

nersonthis

issue.

2.c.ii

Riskforsafety

S


3

3

6

2.d.i

Workcomplexity

W

orkinggrouponproceduresdesign

3

3

6

2.d.ii

Riskofconfusion

E


basedoncurrentvisualdisplay

3

1

4

2.d.iii

Safetyimpact

S


3

3

6

Check

ifithasbeentakenintoconsiderationifthe

safety

assessment

2.d.iv

Riskofinterference

(attentionprocess)

S


3

3

6

Check

ifithasbeentakenintoconsiderationifthe

safety

assessment

2.d.v

Riskofproceduredeviation

3

3

6

Contro

llertaskanalysis

2.ei

Visualdifficulties

1

1

2

Screen

sunglasses

2.f.i

Fatigue/Increased

likelihoodoferror

2

1

3

Workin

ggrouponprocedures/workingmethoddesing

2.f.ii

Fatigue/Increasedlikelihood

oferror

2

1

3

Adapta

bleHMIwithshoppinglistofdifferen

tdisplay

modes

3.a.i

Pooruserperformance

(comparedtothecurrent

wayofworking)

3

3

6

Advice


thefollowing


Trainin

gdevelopmentonnewrequiredskills

ApplytheSkillChangepredictionmethodology(SHAPE

toolkit)

3.a.ii

Pooruserperformance

3

3

6

Define

aTrainingManual

3.b.i

Underskilledusers

2

3

5

Advice


thefollowing


-Integratenewrequiredskillstraininginab-initio

syllabu

s

-Integratenewrequiredskillsintheselectionprocess

-Postimplementationtrainingneedsassess

ment

3.c.i

Increasedlikelihoodoferror

3

3

6

Advice


thefollowing


Trainin

gontheidentifiednegativetransferr

isks/

Jobaids(listoftraps)

3.c.ii

Learningdifficulties/poor

usersperformanceduring

learningcurve

2

3

5

Advice


thefollowing


Trainin

gdevelopmentonnewrequiredskills


27/31


3.d.i

Underskilledtrainer

2

2

4

Workin

ggroupontrainingneedsanddevelopment

3.e.i

Poorsystem/users

performance

1

1

2

Advice


thefollowing


System

usetraining/

Jobaids(memo)/

Information,awarenesscampaign

3.e.ii

See1.b.

1.b

2

2

4

Advice

theexistingworkinggroupsonthefo

llowing

issues:

Continuousinvolvementoftheoperationala

ctors

(inclus

ionofnonATCpopulation).

Aerodr

omeResourceManagement(ARM)

3.f.i

Pooruserperformance/

underskilleduser

3

2

5

ContingencyTraining

3.f.ii

Poorreactionperformance

3

2

5

ContingencyTraining

4.a.i

Workloadwillnotbereduced

2

2

4

Trainin

gonnewco-ordinationmethods

4.a.ii

Worksimplification/

decreasedworkload(+)

N

A

Increasedlikelihoodofco-

ordinationsurprises

2

3

5

Simula

tiontrials(validation)toidentifycriticalscenarios

ofuse

4.a.iii

Lossofpotentialrecovery

loops

TRMmoduledealingwithSituation

A

warenessandteamwork

3

1

4

Simula

tiontrialstoanalysetheteamworkingimpactof

theA-S

MGCS

4.a.iv

Lossofco-ordination

skills/proceduresamongthe

team

2

2

4

ContingencyplanintheProcedureWorking

Groups

(initiated)

4.b.i

Increasedlikelihoodof

misunderstandingduring

handover

TRMmoduledealingwithhandover

processandcommunication

3

1

4

Analys

etheimpactofA-SMGCSontheefficiency

(safety

)onhandoverprocess

4.b.ii

Needforexhaustivehand

over(workload)

1

1

2

Jobaids(handoverchekclist)

4.c.i

Lossofarecoveryloop/

Lossofcommunicationskills

(phraseology)

TRMtrainingoncommunication

3

1

4

TRMtrainingoncommunication

3

1

4

Worka

nalysisofsimilarsituations(working

positions

usingsamekindofgroundcontrolsystem)

4.c.ii

Difficultiestobuildan

efficientteam

1

1

2

Trainin

gonnewworkingmethods

4.d.i

Nouseofthenewfeedback

andsafetyloops

3

3

6

Trainin

gonnewworkingmethods

4.e.i

Increasedmonitoring

workload/increased

likelihoodoferror

3

3

6

Ergono

micdesignofalarmsdisplay


28/31


4.f.i

Increasedlikelihoodof

misunderstandingamong

teams

3

3

6

Jointtraining

4.g.i

Needsforanew

phraseology

S

tudyonphraseologyneedsmadeby

th

eEUROASMGCSproject.

3

3

6

Workin

ggrouponnewphraseologydesign(initiated)

4.g.ii

Poorusersperformance

duringlearningcurve

3

3

6

Workin

ggrouponnewphraseologydesign(initiated)

5.a.i

Needstoreturntopast

procedures/Lossofskill

level

D

onebytheEUROA-SMGCSproject

2

3

5

Advice

EUROASMGCSprojectGroupwork

ingon

Contingencyplantotakeintoaccountthecontingency

workingmethods

5.b.i

Undetectedcriticalerror,

increasedlikelihoodofsafety

issues

3

3

6

Advice

theContingencyplanWorkingGrouptotakeinto

accoun

tthefollowingissues:

HMIer

gonomicdesign/

Trainin

gontheHMI

TRMo

nErrorManagement

5.b.ii

Training/emergency

procedureneeds

3

3

6

Advice


accoun


Needs

todesignEmergencyprocedures

5.c.i

IncreasedlikelihoodoferrorH

umanFactorcases

3

3

6

Advice


accoun


OperationalrequirementswithHFconsidera

tion/

ValidationMasterplanincludingHFconside

ration

2

2

4

System

integrationaccompaniedbyappropriate

introdu

ction

Difficultchangeinthestaff

organisation/difficult

acceptability

2

2

4

Feasib

ilitystudy

6.a.i

nouseofthesystem

2

2

4

Feasib

ilitystudy

6.b.i

Underskilledusers

2

1

3

Simula

tiontrialstoidentifydifficultiesofuse

(HFexpert

analysis)/Skillchangespredictionstudy(Shape)

6.c.i

Underskilledusers

2

1

3

Simula

tiontrialstoidentifydifficultiesofuse

(HFexpert

analysis)/Skillchangespredictionstudy(Shape)


29/31


7

App

endix3:Check-listfor

simulationtrials,

Simulationtrials

Check-list

Priority

Ref.HFICs

Comments

1

Stu

dytheneedsfornewproceduresandprocedure

design

6

1.f.ii

-

2

Stu

dytheriskofViolation/individ

ualisationof

pra

ctice

6

1.e.iv

-

3

Stu

dytheneedsofadditionaltraining

4

1.f.i

Seenextite

m:Trainingdesignandevalua

tion

4

Stu

dytheUserconfidencemeasu

res

4

1.a.i

-

5

Sim

ulatecriticalscenarioofusetostudyco-

ord

inationandteamrecoveryloops

4

4.a.iii

-

6

Stu

dytheskilllevelrequestedtousethesystem

3

6.b.i/6.c.iSeeitem:skillchangespredictionstudy

Training

needsanddesign

Check-list

Priority

Ref

Comments

1

Tra

iningonHMIspecificity

6

5.b.i

Seeitem:H

MIdesignandevaluation

2

Tra

iningonnewrequiredskills

6

3.a.i/3.c.iiSeeitem:s

killchangespredictionstudy

3

(Jo

int)trainingonnewprocedures(toavoid

ind

ividualisationofpracticeandteam

misunderstanding)

4to6

1.e.iv/4.f.i

/1.e.ii

-

4

Tra

iningoferrormanagement

6

1.c.i/1.c.ii-


30/31


5

Tra

iningonnewworkingmethods

6

1.c.i/1.c.ii

/4.c.ii/

4.d.i

-

6

Postimplementationtrainingneedsassessment

5

3.b.i

-

7

Co

ntingencytraining(unusualsituation,downgraded

sys

tem)

4to5

3.f.i/1.g.i/

1.g.ii

-

8

Tra

iningonriskofnegativetransferofknowledge

4

1.e.iii

-

9

Tra

iningonnewco-ordinationme

thodrequiredbythe

sys

tem

4

4.a.i

-

10

Tra

iningofallthefunctionofthe

systemtoavoidthe

sys

temtobeunderused.

3

1.a.ii/3.e.i-

11

Tra

ining

should

enhance

the

confidence

in

the

sys

tem

3

1.a.ii

-

Workloadassessment

Check-list

Priority

Ref

Comments

1

Wo

rkloadassessmentinthefram

eoftheerror

ma

nagement(likelihoodoferrora

nderrorrecovery)

6

1.c.i

-

2

Wo


eofthemental

res

ourcemanagement

6

1.c.ii/

1.c.iii

-

3

Wo


eoftheattention

demand

6

1.c.iv

-


31/31


lyof

theSkillChangesPrediction

method(Shape)

Check-list

Priority

Ref

Comments

To

avoidpooruserperformanceanddesigntraining

2to6

1.d.ii/3.a.i

/6.b.i/6.c.i

-

Pre

viouslytocontingencytraining

6

1.g.i

desi

gnandevaluation

Check-list

Priority

Ref

Comments

ImpactoftheHMIonworkload

6

2.a.i

-

ImpactoftheHMIonerrormanag

ement

6

2.a.i/5.b.i-

ImpactofHMIontheuseofthesystem

6

2.a.i

-

AssesstheneedforaHMIwithseveraldisplay

mo

des

3

2.b.i/2.f.ii

Co

herencewithcurrentsystemHMI(colour,codes,

ico

ns)

3

2.b.ii

17 asmgcs human factors plan asmgcs levels 1 2

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