16 - projects ethical case studies iii (2)

Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014

Engineering & Society:Projects & Ethical Case Studies III

Dr. Gershon Weltman

Engineering 183EW, UCLA SEAS

Lecture 16

2Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014

Engineering Projects are Difficult

Problems are not completely solvable Conflicting requirements and motivations of stakeholders Limitations of technology and physics Data that are incomplete, contradictory, or non-existent

There are a large number of interrelated tasks Many different disciplines are involved

Technical Non-technical

Diverse teams of people are required Organizing them and their work is difficult Being simultaneously efficient and effective is difficult

But yet we are able to define, perform and complete successful projects!We do so through a combination of organization and management.

But yet we are able to define, perform and complete successful projects!We do so through a combination of organization and management.


Project Definition

Technical Activity with Specific Objectives Research, Technology Development, Design, Prototype, Production, Operation, Maintenance

Bounded in Several Dimensions Inputs - Requirements, Constraints Outputs - Deliverable Products, Data, Reports, Services Budget - Financial Resources, Funding Profile Schedule - A Beginning, an End Resources – Personnel, Facilities, Equipment, ...

Staffed with Dedicated Personnel Scientific & Technical Management Administration and Support


Project Components

SystemRequirements

SystemRequirements OrganizationOrganization

Systems EngineeringSystems Engineering

System Design Concept -Subsystem Definitions-Subsystem Requirements


Project PlansTasks, Milestones,

Logic, Phases, Schedules, Budgets,

Responsibilities



Responsibilities


System Requirements

Customers

Users

Marketplace

Corporate

Personnel

Legal

Nature

Sources

Customers

Users

Marketplace

Corporate

Personnel

Legal

Nature

Sources

Performance

Financial

Schedule

Interfaces

Background Technology

Existing Facilities, Equipment

Laws of Physics

Operational

Reporting

Character

Performance

Financial

Schedule

Interfaces

Background Technology

Existing Facilities, Equipment

Laws of Physics

Operational

Reporting

Character

Requirements are frequently in conflict with one another!Requirements are frequently in conflict with one another!


Project Components: System Engineering

SystemRequirements

SystemRequirements OrganizationOrganization

Systems EngineeringSystems Engineering





Responsibilities



Responsibilities


System Engineering

Establishes a system concept and defines the subsystems.

Documents system requirements; uses TBDs where necessary.

Structures the system requirements as a complete set of subsystem requirements and/or subsystem specifications.

Quantifies all system and subsystem specifications.

Constructs a system model including trade-offs among technical and operational parameters.

Acquires data by analysis, experimentation or prior sources.

Verifies that each requirement and/or specification is achievable

System Engineering is a critical engineering function; it is generally not now taught as a discipline in universities, but must be learned on the job.

System Engineering is a critical engineering function; it is generally not now taught as a discipline in universities, but must be learned on the job.


Example: Laser Cloth Cutting System

Laser Subsystem

Optics Subsystem

Work TableSubsystem

Controls Subsystem

Assemblies:Laser Beam GeneratorLaser OpticsElectrical SupplyReactant SupplyCoolant SupplyExhaust/RecirculationElectrical I&C

AssembliesOptical ElementsBeam ConditioningAlignment SystemProjection Optic Pattern Tracking

and Focussing

Mechanical StructureSubsystem

Programmable Pattern ControlsOperational Controls for Laser,

Optics, and Work Table Diagnostics and Displays

AssembliesFabric Feed & RemovalPattern Registrationand Motion (if any)

Golden Laser Equipments, Ltd., http://www.goldenlasers.com/products.htm


Project OrganizationManagement

Project ManagerAssistant PM

MarketingMarket RequirementsCompetitor Analysis

SupportProject ControlFinanceSubcontractsPurchasingLegal

Systems Engineering

LaserSubsystem

OpticsSubsystem

-System Engineer -Beam Generator-Laser Optics-Electrical Supply-Reactant Supply-Coolant Supply-Exhaust/Recirculation

-Electrical I&C

-Requirements-InterfaceControl

-System ModelTrade Studies

-System Testand

Evaluation-DesignValidation

Electronics& Controls

Structures

-Pattern Controls-OperationalControls for Laser, Optics, and WorkTable

-Automated Safety -Diagnostics-Displays

-SupportStructures-AlignmentActuators

-Work Table, Fabric Feed, andPattern Mechanisms

-System Engineer-Optics -Beam Transfer-Alignment System-Projection Optic -Pointing,Pattern Trackingand Focussing

Test Facilities &Operations

-Laser-Optics-Test Bed-Planning-I&C-Operations

Organization is a combination of project subsystems and functional elementsOrganization is a combination of project subsystems and functional elements


Project Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Laser Cutter

Work Breakdown Structure

Program Management

10000

LaserSubsystem

12000

SystemsEngineering

11000

Optics Subsystem

13000

Structures14000

Electronics& Controls

15000Subscale

Experiments16000

PDRPreparation& Conduct

17000These areas will also have task and budget breakdowns

These tasks will break down to greater levels of detail

12100-Laser SystemsEngineering

12200-Laser Cavity12300-Fluid System12400-Power System12500-Laser Optics12600-Laser Controls

and Instrumentation12700-Reactant Supply12800-Laser Thermal

Control

11100-SystemRequirements

11200-SystemModelling

11300-TradeStudies

11400-Exp’t Des11500-Subsystem

Requirements11600-Interface

Control

10100-Management10200-Chief Engr.10300-Proj. Control10400-Contracts10500-Purchasing10600-Legal10700-Marketing10800-Plans and

Reports10900-Reserve

WBS is an accounting of all the cost categories and associated tasksWBS is an accounting of all the cost categories and associated tasks


Project Phases

Conceptual - Design Concept, Feasibility Analysis, Requirements Documentation (with TBDs), Total Program Cost Estimates, Plans for Preliminary Design.

Design - Experiments, Analyses, and Studies resulting in Completion and Verification of Requirements (all TBDs resolved). Revised total program estimates. Plans for Initial Design

Prototype - Initial Design, Procedures, Software, Prototyping and Qualification (Verification of Design), Manufacturing Plans, Production Cost Estimates. Plans for Final Design.

Production, Delivery, Operations – Final Design, Manufacturing, Assembly, Installation, Support, Maintenance.

Completion of each phase is a Major Milestone. A Formal Review certifies completion and provides the basis for Go/No-Go Program Decisions

Completion of each phase is a Major Milestone. A Formal Review certifies completion and provides the basis for Go/No-Go Program Decisions


Management Tools: Sample Task Schedule


Management Tools: Sample Headcount


Management Tools: Sample Cost Graph


Management Tools: Sample Review Cycle


Project Management Is…..

An end in itself or a means to an end?

Stifling creativity or freeing technical expression?

Enabling or restricting?

Boring or fascinating?

Both Inspirational Leadership and Responsible Management are required for complete success of minor and major

projects.

Both Inspirational Leadership and Responsible Management are required for complete success of minor and major

projects.


Ethical Case Study: A Project Gone Bad

The Engineering Project The Company The Teams The Main Ethical Issues The Results

Explorer Rollovers Litigation Damaged Reputations

The Ethical Implication

The 1991 Explorer SUV

The Ford Motor Company

Management, Engineering, Marketing

Safety vs. Schedule & Cost

Deaths and Injuries

Sample Lawsuit

Automotive Press, Books, Articles, etc.

The ‘Bright Line’ Between Ethical and Unethical Engineering Practice


Ford Explorer SUV Background 1989 Timeframe Off-road SUVs migrating to “Town & Country”

Rugged off-road looks Tame suburban performance Average family loads Affordable family pricing

Ford’s goal: Rapid entry into growing market Main decision options:

Develop a totally new ‘Urban SUV’ product Re-engineer an existing product

Main decision factors: Time to market – Want to make as short as possible Production facilities – Want to use what’s available Production cost – Want to make as low as possible


System Requirements

Customers Users Marketplace Corporate Personnel Legal Nature

Size & Appearance Performance Pricing & Cost Marketing Schedule SUV Technology Production Facilities Laws of Physics Operational Characteristics Reporting Advertising

Sources Character


Ford Explorer Family Tree

1972-82 Courier LT

1983 Ranger LT

1984-90 Bronco II SUV1989-96 Explorer SUV

For the Explorer, Ford used the same light pickup platform used before for the Ranger and Bronco II

Made by Mazda

Made by Ford


Bronco and Explorer Comparison

Bronco II

(1989)

Explorer

UN-46

(1990 Design)

Front Suspension1 Twin I-beam independent

Twin I-beam independent

Rear Suspension1 Hotchkiss underslung leaf

spring

Hotchkiss underslung leaf

spring

Steering1 Recirculating ball Recirculating ball

Wheel base (in) 94.0 111.9

Average track (in) 56.9 58.1

Curb weight (lb) 3371 3800

C.G. height (in) 26.7 27.6

SSF 1.07 1.07

Narrow track, poorly sprung Bronco II has a well known history of excessive rollover

Narrow track, poorly sprung Bronco II has a well known history of excessive rollover

“NHTSA Investigates Bronco II Rollovers,” Automotive News, 3/20/89

“Magazine Gives Ford’s Bronco II ‘Avoid’ Rating,” Wall Street Journal 5/8/89

“Bronco Performance Criticized,” New York Times, 5/18/89

“Consumer Reports Criticizes Ford Bronco II’s Handling,” Washington Post, 5/18/89

“Explorer: Ford’s Bronco II Will be Renamed When Model Debuts Next Spring,” Automotive News, 8/14/89

“NHTSA Investigates Bronco II Rollovers,” Automotive News, 3/20/89

“Magazine Gives Ford’s Bronco II ‘Avoid’ Rating,” Wall Street Journal 5/8/89

“Bronco Performance Criticized,” New York Times, 5/18/89

“Consumer Reports Criticizes Ford Bronco II’s Handling,” Washington Post, 5/18/89

“Explorer: Ford’s Bronco II Will be Renamed When Model Debuts Next Spring,” Automotive News, 8/14/89


Bronco and Explorer Comparison

Bronco II

(1989)

Explorer

UN-46

(1990 Design)

Front Suspension1 Twin I-beam independent

Twin I-beam independent

Rear Suspension1 Hotchkiss underslung leaf

spring

Hotchkiss underslung leaf

spring

Steering1 Recirculating ball Recirculating ball

Wheel base (in) 94.0 111.9

Average track (in) 56.9 58.1

Curb weight (lb) 3371 3800

C.G. height (in) 26.7 27.6

SSF 1.07 1.07

Early engineering tests show that the narrow track, larger and heavier Explorer has the same type of rollover problem due to its identically low Static Stability Factor

Early engineering tests show that the narrow track, larger and heavier Explorer has the same type of rollover problem due to its identically low Static Stability Factor


Static Stability Factor (SSF)

67.5”

70”

27.1”

58.1”

29”

CG = Height of Center of Gravity

T= Track of Wheels

SSF = ½ (T/CG) = ½ (58.1/27.6) = 1.07

SSF = ½ (T/CG) = ½ (58.1/27.6) = 1.07

Ford Explorer


V1

V2

Rollover Forces & Moments

r

Centrifugal Force Momentum Force

V

FW

MC = FCCG MM = FMCG

FC or FM

MW = FW½T

FC = W x V/32 x r FM = W x ∆V/32 x ∆t

FC

FM

CG

½T


Effect of SSF on Probability of Rollover Probability of Rollover in Single Vehicle Incident

Static Stability Factor (SSF)

Ford Explorer

Ford Explorer

NHTSA graph based on data from six states adjusted to national average road use

Off the Market

Off the Market


Ford’s Response to Rollover Problem

1. Lower the engine & CG No. Too expensive and time consuming

2. Widen the Track No. Would require new production line

3. Use smaller tires No. Contrary to “rugged” SUV look

4. Stiffen the springs Yes, but. Partially implemented

5. Lower the tire pressure Yes. Recommend to service groups

6. Degrade performance No. Contrary to marketing publicity

Engineers recommend: Management responds:

Management chooses Time and Cost over known Safety Fixes!Management chooses Time and Cost over known Safety Fixes!


Ford’s Earlier Case of Cost vs. Safety

1971 Ford Pinto

The Pinto problem: Rear end collision causes gas tank to move forward into differential bolts, causing frequent gas leak, explosions, injuries and deaths


Pinto Engineering Solutions

1. Protective Shield in Front of Bolts

2. Puncture-Proof Tank Material

3. Baffles in Tank

1971 Ford Pinto

Ford Motor Company was reluctant to apply any solution whatsoever before

being required by new safety standards, and because of the cost of the solutions.

Ford Motor Company was reluctant to apply any solution whatsoever before

being required by new safety standards, and because of the cost of the solutions.


Smoking Gun: Ford’s Internal Memo Shows Clearly the Factors Affecting Its Decisions

“Fatalities Associated With Crash-Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires”

“Fatalities Associated With Crash-Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires”


Ford Memo Method and Conclusion


Ford’s Benefit–Cost Analysis


In Terms of a Decision Tree

Fix Defect

Benefits

Costs Production = - $137M

- $137M

Benefits

Costs Litigation = - $49.5M

- $49.5MIgnore Defect

Net Value

Financials = $0

DecisionPoint

<Injury/Death = $0


In Terms of a Decision Tree

Fix Defect

Benefits


- $137M

Benefits

Costs Litigation = - $49.5M

- $49.5MIgnore Defect

Net Value

Financials = $0

DecisionPoint

No Injury/Death = $0

Ford’s Decision Path


Other Decision Factors

Fix Defect

Benefits


?

Benefits

Costs Litigation = - $49.5M Reputation = $? Unanticipated = $?

?Ignore Defect

Net Value

Financials = $0

DecisionPoint

<Injury/Death = $0>Safety PR = $?>Ethics Climate = $?


“Pinto Madness,” Mother Jones, September/October 1977

“News: Mother Jones has obtained secret documents showing that for seven years the Ford Motor Company sold cars in which it knew hundreds of people would needlessly burn to death.”

“News: Mother Jones has obtained secret documents showing that for seven years the Ford Motor Company sold cars in which it knew hundreds of people would needlessly burn to death.”

Public Discovery


Lasting Repercussions

“Biggest Business Decisions of the 20th Century,” Fortune, June 27, 2005, p.77


Ford Explorer Play-Out Explorer becomes best selling SUV in 1990s Thousands of death- and injury-causing rollover incidents 1996 partial redesign

Does not address fundamental Track and CG problems Does not change SSF Does not reduce the rate of rollovers

2000 Firestone tire problem exacerbates rollover problems Production defects at Firestone plants Lowered tire pressure increases rate of blowout and rollover Firestone defense highlights low SSF and oversteer response

Thousands of new ‘Explorer Rollover’ lawsuits Damage judgments against Ford as high as $22 million each

2002 Ford finally makes basic changes Improves Track and Suspension Raises SSF to 1.14


Typical “Explorer Rollover” Lawsuit

Initial Positions of the Parties Plaintiff claims simple fender-bender turned into a rollover

with life-changing injury because of Explorer’s fundamental and previously known but unpublicized product defects

Ford claims that Explorer is safe vehicle, rollover was plaintiff’s fault or due to unique accident characteristics


Rollover Reconstruction

No

rth-

So

uth

Ave

East-West St

Bush

26’

17’

9’

35 mph = 51.3 fps

t = 0

t = -0.7

t = -1.2

20 mph = 29.3 fps

0 mph = 0 fps

t = 0 t = -3.1t = -1.27

Ford Taurus

Ford Explorer

N


Urban Intersection Incident Site


Damage to Explorer


3D Simulation

- 3.10

Explorer at Stop Sign

Clinton St

Edinburgh Ave

Blocked Visibility

Explorer

Taurus


3D Animation


Typical Rollover Lawsuit

Initial Positions of the Parties Plaintiff claims simple fender-bender turned into a rollover

with life-changing injury because of Explorer’s fundamental and previously known but unpublicized product defects

Ford claims that Explorer is safe vehicle, rollover was plaintiff’s fault or due to unique accident characteristics

Litigation Proceeds First judge-ordered arbitration fails due to “low-ball” offer Plaintiff submits pretrial motion to allow full presentation of

Ford Bronco and Explorer safety history – Ford opposes Judge rules against Ford on relevance of product history;

allows full development history of Explorer and Bronco II Ford requests new arbitration, which makes progress

Ford and Plaintiff finally settle out of court in compromise between initial offer and potential jury award


Subsequent Results

Ford agrees to settle 'rollover' suit 2 hours, 35 minutes ago

US auto giant Ford Motor Co said Wednesday it had reached a settlement in a class-action lawsuit lodged by people claiming the company's popular Explorer vehicle was prone to rollovers.A spokeswoman for Ford refused to give details of the settlement in an emailed statement to AFP, saying more information would be revealed when the deal is presented before a judge in Sacramento on Monday.

"For the reasons that will be presented in court on Monday, we believe this settlement is fair and reasonable and is in the best interests of our customers and our shareholders," the spokeswoman said.Around one million people in four states -- California, Connecticut, Illinois and Texas -- had filed suit asserting that Explorers made between 1991 and 2001 were liable to rollover.

Ford has battled a wave of wrongful death and injury lawsuits following accidents involving older models of the Explorer, regarded as Ford's flagship sports utility vehicle.A federal investigation was launched in 2000 following concerns about the Bridgestone/Firestone tires fitted on the vehicle, leading to a legal feud between Ford and the tire manufacturer.

In 2005 Bridgestone Firestone agreed to pay 240 million dollars to Ford to settle liability over the recall of defective tires in 2000 and 2001 linked to numerous deaths.• US auto giant Ford Motor Co said Wednesday it had reached a settlement in a class-action lawsuit lodged by people claiming the company's popular Explorer vehicle was prone to rollovers.• A spokeswoman for Ford refused to give details of the settlement in an emailed statement to AFP, saying more information would be revealed when the deal is presented before a judge in Sacramento on Monday.• "For the reasons that will be presented in court on Monday, we believe this settlement is fair and reasonable and is in the best interests of our customers and our shareholders," the spokeswoman said.• Around one million people in four states -- California, Connecticut, Illinois and Texas -- had filed suit asserting that Explorers made between 1991 and 2001 were liable to rollover.• Ford has battled a wave of wrongful death and injury lawsuits following accidents involving older models of the Explorer, regarded as Ford's flagship sports utility vehicle.

November 29, 2007


So Who’s at Fault in the Explorer Case?

Nobody: Just a Mistake Ford’s Management Ford’s Engineers Ford’s Customers

Does society’s willing acceptance of risk affect the analysis? Does society’s willing acceptance of risk affect the analysis?


Society’s Levels of Acceptable Risk

Generally not the result of deep knowledge

Choices involved are often hidden or obscure

Actual risk tolerance often differs from stated positions

Statistics may best reflect the “real” societal priorities


U.S. Death Rates, Year 2010

Statistics from National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2012

1Base population = 275.3 million, rate is per 100,000308.7

CAUSE DEATHS RATE1

All Injuries 175,835 53.84

Unintentional Injuries 120,800 39.15

Violence Related Injuries 55,035 17.83

Unintentional Injuries

Motor Vehicle 35,332 11.44

Poisoning 33,041 10.70

Falls 26,009 8.42

Drowning 3,782 1.22

Motorcycles 2,704 0.98

Natural/Environmental 1,643 0.60

Machinery 676 0.25

Violence Related Injuries

Firearms 30,814 9.98

Non-Firearms 24,221 7.84


U.S. Deaths: Automobiles

Population

Deaths/100K PeopleDeaths/100K Miles

Miles/year

Annual Deaths

20081954


U.S. Deaths: Terrorist vs. Gunfire


The Conclusion

As in the case of “illness cause of death” estimates, small numbers with compelling stories carry more weight

than larger numbers about “routine” deadly accidents.

“The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic.”

Attributed in various forms to:

Eric Maria RemarqueGerman WWI veteran and author, Der Schwartze Obelisk, 1956

Joseph StalinRussian dictator, to US ambassador Averill Harriman, ~1947

Kurt Tucholsky,German journalist in Franzosischer Witz, 1932

“The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic.”

Attributed in various forms to:

Eric Maria RemarqueGerman WWI veteran and author, Der Schwartze Obelisk, 1956

Joseph StalinRussian dictator, to US ambassador Averill Harriman, ~1947

Kurt Tucholsky,German journalist in Franzosischer Witz, 1932


Some Relevant Ethical Questions

Can we put a dollar value on death and injury? Do we now?

Can we ethically ignore some safety problems? Do we now?

Can we ensure that all relevant factors are included in safety-related engineering decisions? Do we now?

Can the public be properly informed of decisions that affect its safety? Can the public understand and evaluate such decisions?

Is there a “Bright Shining Line” between “legitimate” engineering failures and unethical engineering conduct?


Example Engineering Failure

Photo © Poppyseed Bandits on Flickr

Los Angeles TimesBy P.J. Huffstutter November 14, 2008

“Federal investigators on Thursday placed the blame for last year's deadly Minnesota bridge collapse on engineering design flaws that led steel plates to buckle under the weight of construction equipment and supplies, rather than on corrosion or a lack of upkeep.”

Design errors are blamed in Minnesota bridge collapse


The Bright Line Concept

EthicalUnethicalLegal Criteria for

Punitive Damages

Ford Pinto

Ford Explorer

Minnesota Bridge


Legal Criteria for Punitive Damages

Malicious Prior knowledge Harmful intent

Fraudulent False representation Suppression of true facts

Oppressive Imposition of power Denial of basic rights


In the Ford Explorer Case Malicious

Ford Introduced a product that the Company knew was defective and unsafe due its propensity to roll over, and refused to correct the built-in defects of this product prior to its introduction and during most of its life purely to maintain the highest possible profit margins

Fraudulent

Ford represented and sold the Explorer as safe for its intended purpose when Ford knew the case to be otherwise, while actively suppressing the true results of its testing and the full facts of the defective nature of the product and of the fundamental changes necessary to make it safe

Oppressive

Ford used its great power in the market place and with its agents to deny its customers their basic rights to life and safety by foisting on them a product Ford knew to be defective and dangerous.

Ford’s managing agents were clearly on the wrong side of the line!Ford’s managing agents were clearly on the wrong side of the line!


Example Engineering & Ethical Failure

Japan Nuclear MeltdownTOKYO (AP) – Just four hours after a tsunami swept into the Fukushima nuclear power plant, Japan's leaders knew the damage was so severe that the reactors could melt down, but they kept their knowledge secret for months.

Larger than expected tsunami floods reactors


Bright Line Reexamined: Bright Zone?

Ethical

Unethical

Ford Explorer

Minnesota Bridge

Fukushima Reactor

Bright Z

one: Utilit

arian & Pragmatic Issues & Values