14la-lagoon fire may 21, 2014€¦ · tankers were diverted from another fire to action the lagoon...
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14LA-Lagoon FireMay 21, 2014Case Study:How fuel treatment areas affect wildland urban interface �res
saskatchewan.ca/fire
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Acknowledgements
This case study was compiled of information and data collected by Camille Harris, Wildfire
Prevention and Mitigation Specialist, Wildfire Management Branch, Saskatchewan Ministry of
Environment. Thank you to all of those who contributed including:
Larry Fremont, Education and Prevention Coordinator, Wildfire Management Branch,
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan.
Owen Price, Wildfire Prevention and Mitigation Specialist, Wildfire Management Branch,
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan.
Wes Boehr, Forest Protection Officer, La Ronge Fire Base.
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Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................ i
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................ ii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................. ii
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1
Fire History .................................................................................................................................................... 3
Weather Observations .................................................................................................................................. 5
Fuel Treatment Background ......................................................................................................................... 5
Wildfire Behaviour Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 6
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 11
List of Figures FIGURE 1 - MAP OF 14LA-LAGOON FIRE NEAR THE COMMUNITY OF STANLEY MISSION ................................................ 1
FIGURE 2 - CL215T DROPPING FOAM ALONG ROAD NEAR THE GAS STATION. .............................................................. 2
FIGURE 3 - HELICOPTER BUCKETING ON HOTSPOTS. ................................................................................................. 2
FIGURE 4 - FIRE ORIGIN ALONG TRAIL. ................................................................................................................... 3
FIGURE 5 – AIR TANKER ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PHOTOS. ..................................................................................... 4
FIGURE 6 - AERIAL PHOTO OF BURNT AREA AND INITIAL ATTACK CREW MEMBER WALKING WITHIN TREATED AREA. ............ 4
FIGURE 7 - THINNED AREA OF FUEL TREATMENT PROJECT ........................................................................................ 5
FIGURE 8 - MAP SHOWING LOCATION OF SPOT FIRES ............................................................................................... 6
FIGURE 9 - LAGOON FIRE NEARS THE COMMUNITY .................................................................................................. 7
FIGURE 10 - PEGASUS FIRE GROWTH PROJECTION 6 HOURS. .................................................................................... 7
FIGURE 11- SPOT FIRES UP TO 85.3 METRES IN FRONT OF FIRE. ................................................................................. 8
FIGURE 12 - SCORCH HEIGHTS WITHIN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE TREATED AREA ................................................. 8
FIGURE 13 – BURNT AREA WITHIN FUEL BREAK. ..................................................................................................... 9
FIGURE 14 - SAMPLE PLOTS TREATED VS UNTREATED ............................................................................................ 10
FIGURE 15 - AERIAL VIEW OF THE LAGOON AND STANLEY FIRES. ............................................................................. 10
FIGURE 16 - LAGOON AND STANLEY FIRE MAP ..................................................................................................... 11
FIGURE 17 - BURNT PILES THAT WERE LEFT WITHIN THE THINNING PROJECT. ............................................................. 12
FIGURE 18 - LAGOON FIRE, UNDER CONTROL. ...................................................................................................... 13
List of Tables TABLE 1 - OBSERVED WEATHER THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 21ST 2014. ...................................................................... 5
TABLE 2 - UNTREATED PLOT INFORMATION ........................................................................................................... 9
TABLE 3 - TREATED PLOT INFORMATION ............................................................................................................. 10
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Introduction The Lagoon Fire (14LA-Lagoon) was reported
May 21, 2014 at 14:31 hours and was within 1
kilometer of the First Nation community of
Stanley Mission. The fire originated southwest
of the community, ran approximately 700
metres towards the community and grew to
21.4 hectares. This fire was within the Full
Response Community Zone and burnt on Crown
land. It started in continuous C2 Boreal spruce
fuels and ran into an area that had previously
been thinned as a fuels management project.
FIGURE 1 - MAP OF 14LA-LAGOON FIRE NEAR THE COMMUNITY OF STANLEY MISSION
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FIGURE 2 - CL215T DROPPING FOAM ALONG ROAD NEAR THE GAS STATION.
FIGURE 3 - HELICOPTER BUCKETING ON HOTSPOTS.
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Fire History
The Lagoon Fire was
discovered at 14:31
hours by Forest
Protection Officer
Wes Boehr while en
route to the nearby
Stanley Fire, which
also started on May
21, 2014. The
Stanley Fire was just
across the bay to the
west of the Lagoon
Fire. Due to the
Lagoon Fire’s close
proximity to the
community, air
tankers were
diverted from
another fire to
action the Lagoon Fire. Within 16 minutes of
discovering the wildfire at a Rank 1 surface fire,
it quickly escalated to a Rank 5 crown fire
before suppression began. By 14:45 hours, the
Stanley Mission type 2 fire crew was at the fire
and began pump and hose line setup from the
lake north of the fire. Helicopter 31, a Bell 204B,
was returning to La Ronge from Southend and
landed at the Stanley Mission schoolyard to
attach a bucket to help support the fire crews.
At 14:47 hours, Bird Dog 167 with CL215T’s
#217, #218 and #219, along with CV 580’s #471
and #473, were over the fire and began air
support. An initial attack crew from La Ronge
was also dispatched during this time to support
the local type 2 crew already working the fire.
FIGURE 4 - FIRE ORIGIN ALONG TRAIL.
Bird Dog 167 was released from the fire for
refueling and was replaced by Bird Dog 161.
Another CL215 was requested to support the
fire. The CV580’s laid retardant lines along an
existing fireguard, from the road to the lake,
approximately 85 metres west of the local gas
station. Another retardant line was placed to
the west of the point of origin to prevent the
fire from spreading in that direction. Three
CL215T aircraft dropped water and foam
directly on the main fire while Helicopter 31
focused on bucketing on four small spot fires
that had jumped the existing fire guard. At
17:11 hours the fire was being held and 20
minutes later, the fire was reported at an
intensity of level 1, with airtankers working the
hotspots and ground crews working the head of
the fire with a hose line.
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In total, the CL215T’s dropped 61 loads of water
(73,200 gallons) and 28 loads of foam (33,600
gallons), along with the CV580’s delivering four
loads (6,560 gallons) of retardant to the fire. All
air support was off the fire by 18:50 hours that
day.
Ground crews continued to action the fire until
midnight and were back at the fire by 09:20
hours the next day. For the next four days,
crews continued patrolling the fire and mopping
up hotspots. On May 26, the fire was scanned
and no hot spots were found. The fire was
declared out on May 27, 2014.
A conservation officer from the Ministry of
Environment’s Compliance and Field Services
office conducted an investigation into the cause
of the fire. The conservation officer determined
that the fire was intentionally set by individuals
under the age of 12.
FIGURE 5 – AIR TANKER ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PHOTOS.
FIGURE 6 - AERIAL PHOTO OF BURNT AREA AND INITIAL ATTACK CREW MEMBER WALKING WITHIN TREATED AREA.
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Weather Observations
TABLE 1 - OBSERVED WEATHER THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 21ST 2014.
Fuel Treatment Background
FIGURE 7 - THINNED AREA OF FUEL TREATMENT PROJECT
The community of Stanley Mission has had
ongoing fuel management work completed
within and around the community since 2007.
The thinned area that the Lagoon Fire burnt up
to was completed in the winter of 2008/2009.
This fuel management project was funded by
Western Economic Diversification Canada as
part of their economic stimulus initiative and
was completed jointly by Saskatchewan’s
Ministry of Environment Wildfire Management
Branch and the Lac La Ronge Indian Band. The
Prince Albert Grand Council worked directly
with Western Economic Diversification Branch
to receive the funding for the project and was
responsible for the administration of the
project.
The project area was 4.45 hectares in size and
the prescription was to thin the softwood
(coniferous) stands by hand to a minimum
crown spacing of two to three metres with a
desired outcome of six stems per 100 square
metres. Ladder fuels were removed and the
remaining trees were pruned to a height of two
metres. All branches and dead and down fuels
were piled and burnt within the project area.
All salvageable wood was piled and left for
firewood to be used by local community
members.
Station Temp RH Wind Direction Wind Speed Distance from Fire
La Ronge 19 26 190 22 52.3 km 226°MN
Otter 20 25 178 19 23.1 km 316°MN
Station FFMC DMC DC ISI BUI FWI
La Ronge 92 31 80 17 32 26
Otter 93 37 69 16 36 27
Station ROS C2 m/min Head Fire Intensity C2 (HFI) kW/m Crown Fraction Burn C2 (CFB)%
La Ronge 19.1 13200 98
Otter 19.6 14700 98
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Wildfire Behaviour Analysis The daily fire report comments for the Lagoon
Fire started on May 21, just one hour and 32
minutes after the fire started: “The fire hit the
thinning project and this project knocked the
fire to the ground.”
On May 22, Wildfire Prevention staff arrived on
site to collect information regarding the
effectiveness of the fuel management site.
While at the location of the fire, assessment
staff spoke with the local crew leader, who was
one of the first people to respond. When
questioned about the fire behaviour, he
specified
that his crew was able to safely run a hose line
up to the head of the fire, within the fuel break,
because the intensity of the fire had dropped as
it came into the treated area.
The total area burnt within the fuel treatment
area was 2.01 hectares. The fire burnt through
the fuel break on the northern portion where it
was only 50-60 metres wide. In this narrow
portion of the fuel treatment area the main fire
was stopped at the fire guard but embers
spotted over the fireguard in four locations, the
furthest distance being 85.3 metres from the
fire line. The fire did not burn through or spot
over the southern half of the break which was
200 metres wide.
FIGURE 8 - MAP SHOWING LOCATION OF SPOT FIRES
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FIGURE 9 - LAGOON FIRE NEARS THE COMMUNITY
FIGURE 10 - PEGASUS FIRE GROWTH PROJECTION 6 HOURS.
A Pegasus1 Wildfire Projection was completed for the Lagoon Fire. The six-hour projection shows an area
burnt of 91.9 hectares which includes the northwest corner of the community.
1 Pegasus is an online version of Prometheus that was developed by the Canadian Forest Service in collaboration
with Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Environment Wildfire Management Branch.
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FIGURE 11- SPOT FIRES UP TO 85.3 METRES IN FRONT OF FIRE.
FIGURE 12 - SCORCH HEIGHTS WITHIN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE
TREATED AREA
Scorch heights within the thinned area were
recorded to be a maximum of 1.25 metres high.
Spot fires were observed up to 85.3 meters in
front of where the fire line was held. These spot
fires were in C2 fuels that had not been
included in the fuel treatment area.
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FIGURE 13 – BURNT AREA WITHIN FUEL BREAK.
Data was collected from two 100 square metre sample plots, one in the treated and one in the
untreated area within the vicinity of the Lagoon Fire.
Untreated area
Untreated Plot
Black Spruce
8100 stems/m
Birch 400
stems/ha
Alder 100
stems/ha
Labrador Tea 20%
Feather Moss 80%
Height Class 15m
Crown Separation 0-0.5m
Crown Closure 90%
Crown Base Height 2m
TABLE 2 - UNTREATED PLOT INFORMATION
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Treated Area
The 14LA-Stanley Fire, pictured in the
background of Figure 15, was reported on May
21 at 13:54 hours, just half an hour before the
Lagoon Fire. Both of these fires were human-
caused. The Stanley Fire consumed 9,889
hectares of the boreal forest before being called
out on June 19, 2014. This fire may have
influenced the direction and intensity of the
Lagoon Fire due to its close proximity.
Treated Plot
Black Spruce 1000
stems/ha
Birch 100
stems/ha
Feather Moss 25%
Labrador Tea 25%
Blue Berry 10%
Height Class 15m
Crown Separation 2-3 m
Crown Closure 25%
Crown Base Height 2m
TABLE 3 - TREATED PLOT INFORMATION
FIGURE 14 - SAMPLE PLOTS TREATED VS UNTREATED
FIGURE 15 - AERIAL VIEW OF THE LAGOON AND STANLEY FIRES.
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FIGURE 16 - LAGOON AND STANLEY FIRE MAP
Conclusion
Good burning conditions combined with highly
flammable fuel types resulted in the Lagoon Fire
quickly becoming a full crown fire that was
heading directly toward the community of
Stanley Mission. Tankers initially actioned the
fire with limited success but once the fire
reached the treated area the intensity dropped
and the tankers were able to successfully action
the fire. Bird Dog and air tanker pilots
commented that their drops were very effective
within the treated area, given the combination
of the decrease in fire intensity, the ability to
see the fire line, and the openness of the stand.
Interviews with ground crews who were tasked
with suppressing the fire revealed that they
were able to safely access the head of the fire
as soon as it hit the treated area because of the
reduction in intensity and rate of spread. The
reduction of the amount of available fuel,
combined with the effectiveness of air tanker
drops within the thinned area, both contributed
to result in a reduction of fire behaviour.
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When Education and Prevention staff mapped
the boundary of the fire they documented that
the fire burned into the fuel break a maximum
distance of 120 metres. It was noted that the
firewood piles that were left from the original
thinning project were the one significant fuel
source that sustained the fire when it burnt
through the wider portion of the thinned area
as a surface fire. These piles were
approximately two to three feet high and four
feet long and were piled in the thinned area
with full sun exposure. It was not evident that
the piles produced embers to advance the fire
but they appeared to have sustained the
surface fire spread further into the thinned
area.
Where the treatment area was less than 50
metres wide an intermittent crown fire
progressed through the treated area up to the
fireguard and the higher intensity resulted in
spot fires across the existing fireguard that the
treated area was tied into. It was noted that
the treatment completed in this area did not
meet the desired prescription of the project,
leaving enough fuel for the fire to sustain high
intensity. For this fuel type the thinned area
should be a minimum of 100 metres wide and
be thinned to the stated prescription to be
effective during high hazard conditions. It is
important to note that fuel treatment areas rely
on suppression support to be effective in this
type of fuel.
Based on documented fire behaviour and
suppression effectiveness, it can be confidently
determined that the fuel break played a
significant role in the control of the Lagoon Fire
and likely prevented the loss of structures
within the community.
FIGURE 17 - BURNT PILES THAT WERE LEFT WITHIN THE THINNING PROJECT.
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FIGURE 18 - LAGOON FIRE, UNDER CONTROL.