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    Psychology. The Cognitive Powers by James McCosh; Introduction to Psychological Theory byBorden P. Bowne; Psychology by John DeweyThe American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1887), pp. 146-159Published by: University of Illinois PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1411236 .

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    146 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATE-RE.cians,on the otllerhand,who usedtopracticehealingarts n thegoodoldtime,when " Godlikewas thedoctor,whowas also a phil-osopher,"are beginning o take some interestn the body, nd toreadbooksonmindcures, nd psycho-physics,ygiene nd physio-logicalpsychology,nd to realize thatthe student f religion ndof idealismcannot,withimpunity, eglect he studvof the com-mon forms fmorbidpsychosis. NVedesire,forour part,to seethe psychologicalmovement, hich now seemsdestinedto marktlle present s the psychological,s the last quarter f a centuryhas beenthe biologico-evolutionaryge,kept n the severesl; enseexperimental nd scientific.Tlle dangers nd difficultiesrevastandthespeciousfalsewaysmany,butwe have a nucleusof solidlyestablishedfacts,and the rewardof everyachievement s likelyto be at least no less than anythathave crowned heprogress fscience n thepast. Butwemust verremindourselves hatwhile"strange thingsare true,tlleyare not trulyknowntill thev arerelated owhat s tested, lse theyremainsolitary nd unfruitful."Great redit s duetheEnglishsociety or allingattentionfreshto themysteriousideofhuman ife, nd for atermakingknown oEnglishreaders omethingfthevaluablework ftheFrellch nves-tigatorsfParis,Nancy, tc. Mr.BIevershastakellgreat ainstoseemanyofthesenzen nd theirwork. If good hypnotic ubjects relllorenumerousnFrancethan nEngland, twouldseemthatghostscersare nlostcommon mongcultivated lasses n England. It isto be hoped, however, hat the indicationof more independentworkin the studyof abnormalstatesnow apparentwill lead tomore olidresults,nd thatthecrude nd prematureheory f tele-pathy,which is byno means impossible, erse n some sense,butas yet lacks everything pproacllingproof ave to amateursandspeculative psychologistswill he allowed to lapse to forgetful-lless. To the carefuland patientexperimentersnd observersnthisfield here reno^rfarbetter nd far urer nd farmoreuseful? sults hanthese, houghbymethods arharder nd slower. Butlt is bythesethat e prefer o labor.Psyc7wology.he Cognstiveotoera. By JAMESMcCosH, D. DLL. D., etc.,PresidentofPrincetonCollege. NewYork,1886.Pp. 245.I?wtroductiono Paychological heory. BY BORDEN . BOWNE, ro-fessorof Philosophyin BostonUniversity. New York,1887.p.Psyc7wology.Y JOHNDEWEY,Ph. D., AssistantProfessorof Phi-losophy n WIiclliganniversity. NewYork, S87. Pp. 427.

    Theworkfirstn theabovelist is tobe supplemented yanotheron themotivepowers f the mind, ncludingconscience, motionsand will. The cognitive owersare here treatedn threebooksasrespectivelypresentative,representative nd comparative. Dr.McCoshhas taughtpsychology or hirty-fourears,and compareshiswork oUncleToby's stockings, arnedtill hardly threadoftheoriginalfabricremains. The book is neitherdull or dry,butabounds n aptquotatiollsn prose nd poetry,tories,llustrationssudden and unexpectedbut always ilupressivemorals and hor-tatory assages, ncl eemstoreflect,n theclearest nd mostdirectlvay, hestrongnd beneficent ersonalityf the author,not only

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    1.47SYCHOLOGICAL LITEEtATIJRE.his convictions, ut even very many illcidelltsfromhis own ex-perience being interspersed. Almost every page containstakingpoints admirably presented to catch the wandering ttention f'listless tudents n llon-elective lasses. The book is of Jalue to-every houghtfuleacherof this subject for its pedagogical uggest-ilJeness. It is evidentlymade up of three factors: (ieneral mat-ters of miscellaneous orts,which, n an unusually prolollged x-perience s a teacher, ts author has found ef3ective nd beneficialwiththe average college enior- he essential points ill the Scotchphilosophy, r more particularly n Thoma's Brown Stewart, ut-ler, Macintosh,Abercrombie, . Stnith, tc., hich ilave surviveclfrom long-ago tudy f thesewriters; and, thirdly, uch material'in contemporarysychology s in-some cases its commanding m-portancehas brought o the attention f everyeminent dministra-tive educator, ncl in other cases such as mere accidental or per-sonal relations (as with his distinguished pupils, ProfessorsMacloskie, Allen Starr nd :F. M. Baldwin), have impresseduponthe author'smind. That with his advanced years,his heavy edu-cationalcares and responsibilitieso vigorouslv orlle, ncihis earlyabsorption n the Scotch philosophy, he imitations f vhich hosewho most directly nherit ts traditionsnow best see, Dr. McCoshshould have maintained a mind so opell to so many of the newernfluencesn the rapidlywidening ield f psychology,s a strikingillustration f the beneficent Sects of the true spirit inbred bvstudies in this domain, and makes the task of the honest andfriendly critic particularly npleasallt. Judged from a scientific*standpoint,owever, ittle that is good can be said of the lzookThe wood-cuts f brain and sense organs hat are inserted re butlittlemorerelatedto the text than the marginal igures ith whichancientmissals were illuminatedwere Ntollt o be. It is perhapssomething o associate the study of perceptioll n tlle olcl bstractfashionwith even the pictures f these thillgs, lthoughbut in themo3t asual way, as xve ssociate a boolvwiththe tree under rllichwe read it. There s all apparellt ncommellsurabilityetween ee-ing,feeling nd thinlring n the olle hand, nd the visualalld tactileimage of the corona, orpora nd vermicelli t' tlle convolutions, nthe other, o the llovice, llat even mere uxtapositionmayallel7iateSymbolic fi$ures ike the ondell of Mr. Bettsor tlle pyramidofDr. Hopkins, or the circles f modern ogicians, r currentliagramsillustratingphasia, etc., have obvious llustrative alue. The rela-tion betaveen hought nd brain,hosever, is anythingbut obviousbut appears more plainly s the allatomy f brain ancl nalysis ofpsychicprocessesbecome finer. It is far less, and-perllaps lOt 11by virtue of its laorphology, ut rather by virtue f its finer na-tomlcal and chemical ploperties, hat the brain is the orgall ofpsychic actierities,s yet but imperfectlylllknown. This, ^e be-lieve, should be carefully ndicated,or else the anatomical partpassed over, n elementary eaclling. Manyof the allusionsto finerstructuresnd processes y Dr. ZIcCosll are inexcusably areless, ouse no stronger erms.AVe re tolll hat "all alongthe spinalcolumllthere s automatic ctionwhich is refies." " There s a cell calleda ganglion nto mllichone nerve entersand from -hich anothergoes out." Questions f structurere referreclo physiology. Thecommunication rom the spinal cord is "up bv the medullawl-longata and the crura cerebri to the corpora striata and opticthalami." " The actionto the braintrar ls at the rate of 140to 150

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    148 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.feet n the second. The actionfrom he braintravels bout 100feetin the second." The authorhastens n through his strange egionWhiCh iS dismissedwith a caution that all materialisticdeas mustbe left behind,despite the temptation f youtll to the contrarynthe study f psychology. " We are not to allow ourselves o lookon mind tself, r any of its operations, s occupying pace, as ex-ten(led or having figure, s having weight or levity, height ordepth, elevation or depression, ttractionor repulsion, solidityor elasticity,motion or rest, light or darkness,warmthor frig-idity. Even words derived from material objects, as ideapsychic, pirit,feeling, motiotl, mpression,understanding, on-ception and apprehension,must be stripped f materialisticsso-ciations with their etymologies. But why then tlle anatomicalillustrations,which not only precede, but follow? AVhy henthe skin with ts "two layers," and the nerves n the tongue,fin-gers nd lips " generated t these pointsby use," and " the musclesense, including in it the volition and the resistance whichfirst ives us the idea of Power, Potency, Energy or Force,out of which proceeds our idea and conviction as to cau-sation " XVhy are we told that " distinctnessof vision re-quires that objects shall be so far apart that their mages on theretina shall reach more than one cone?" Why, apart from themany uch inaccurate r mistaken tatements,s space givento theanatomical alld physiological relationsof aphasia, memory ndassociation, tc.? Still we are thankfulfor the good will towardsscielltific sychology, nd commendthe sagacity hat sees its im-portance, ven if the former e as yet all unreconciledwith thetraditions f the intuitive chool and the latter uninstructed ndetails.A still more grave defectof the l)ook is the essential failureof the authorto profit romboth Greelz nd Germanphilosophy.There is abundant evidence here, ancl in his other works,thathe has nevertakenthe trouble o acquaillt himself, n ally historicor sympathetic rayR ith the great writers n his field in boththese anguages. He elseBhere declares hat dealism has no placein philosophy, nd thatthe atter ill neverbe properlv stablishedtill this is acknowledged, ut pleads for he old Scotch " realism,"as the ideal " American philosophy." As the Scotch school maybe said to representhard-headedcommonsense, without lle re-finements r subtleties hat re bred of specialized research, y anyset method or direction, his is a most convenient ttitude or abusyman, wllo mustkeep up the semblanceof philosophy n shortallowance of time and information nd must commend tself tomany practical Xmerican mindswho cultivate he power to makesummary nap-judgments n all topics,finite r intillite. lVe be-lieve, however, that blindness to the great lessolls of historicalphilosophy nvolves the gravest loss to students. A course inidealism, s treated y Kant, whomour author cannot abide, PlatoHegel anel the rest,we beliete, stimulates the developmentofmental power, gives inner resources gainst all corrodingnessi-misms,tact to solve the practicalproblems f life and mind andzest,breadth and insight n any intellectual areer unsurpassed fnot unequaled by any other element of modern education. Itespecially llumillates religioussentiments, nd gives both poiseand a repertoryf weapons against doubt, nd ought o be entirelyindispensable to all who wlYouldpeak and be heard on religious

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    PSYCEOLOGICA L LlTERATURE. 149topics. That Dr. BIcCosh,withhis great and long opportunities,has failedto utilizethese deep sourcesof wisdom we regard sdeplorableforthe real interests f religion, s mrelis of science.This, we believe, will be the verdict of those laborers in thephilosophic ieldmostnearly n sympathywiththereligious tand-pointof the author.Ollce morethere s often dogmatismnelself-assertationhichis only calculated to entail prejudices and seriously to limitthe unfoldment f rnentalpowerand future fEectiveness.Afterstating hatman's knowledge"begins notwithrelations,but withvith things,"he adds, " in layingdo^ n this proposition, under-mine one of the most fatal as I regard it-errors of the dav."After ayingthatthe infinites bothbeyondour widest thought,and thatto which nothing an be addecl or subtracte(l, e says:" Afterworking ut this two-foldspect, foundthat I had beenallticipated yAristotle." The greatproblemwhetherwe arecon-sciousof all ourmentaloperations,s dismissedwith hestatement" I hold thatwe were COllSCiOUS of the acts at the time, but thatthey were not retained,as therewas nothing o fix themin thememory." Again, " I do not agree ^ ththetheory f thosewhoascribe llecreations f geniusto unconsciousmentalnction." Eachof these is a commollplace iew long current ll philosophical it-erature,but is stated dogmatically nd in the most momentousmanner, ithout facts or arguments o sustnill t, as if it were agreat nd original discovery. Thushe conclu(les"Xxe ave tracedthe powers of intelligence rom he owest o the highest, ndhaveshownhowour coCIlitionnnd ideas arise." This modest claim ishardlycalculated o encourave urthertudyn thisfield. The bookabounds n irrelexancies nd discontinuity,nd is of all gradesofmerit, rom he extremes f garrulityo very mpressive ortatoryperorations. Had it been clearlyrecognized hatthe problemnasto writean attractive rimer n psychology,ringingogethernlythe resultsmostuniversally ssentedto, and of mostpractical m-portance, nd pedagogicallyfirst, he book, with some materialanflmanyminorchanges,mighthave been made cornmendable.Teacherswho introduceyouugmen, seniorsthouglltheybe, intothesestudies,must xpendtheirwisdom n showingwhere obeginand shunning he nculcation f a sense of finality, urnishncen-tive to thosewho need it to pursue theirstudiesfurthern thetheologicallchool, the psycho-physicaboratory, r graduatehis-torico-philosophicalr educational tudy. 'Rhisbook illustrates,na word,not realismin anysavingsense as the authorclaims,butecclecticismn everyrespect,which makes thatword philosophi-callyoffensive.Professor owne'sbook s mailllydevoted owhat he holdsto bethe underlying rillciples f pure or introspectixes distilletfromand presupposed yall forms fempirical sychology. These prin-ciples,he thinks, re best illustrated n commonfacts,and tllatan " authology f madhouseand hospital tories has an " odorofquackery." Though physiology means well," and is an "esti-mablescience," ts nfluencen reconstructingsychology eemstothe authordeclining. He is COllSCiOUS that n his bookmany " willnot indwhattheywant," and " stillmorewill finclwhat theydonotwant," and manyarbitrarymissions re confes.sed,wingtothe plan ofthework,but others re as free lotto readas he topub-lish,etc. The workfalls ntotwoparts the factors f the mental

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    laO PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.life, nd their ombination. The startingpointis the analysisofthe individualconsciousness. Psychology s a subjectiveand notan obJectixrecience, nd is based on introspection. t is nottrulystudiedby an analysisof language. Psychogenesis, bservationsofanimals, tc., "admit of almostno experiment," nd its "factsadmitof no exact measurement." "The man who feelscold iscold," etc. All materia]isticssumptionsretobe " repudiatednad-vance." Anatomical iscreetnesss inconsistent ithmentalUllity.If thebrain ecreted houghtwe could collectand look at it as wedo bile. Materialism ejects hereality f theself s thesubjectofthemental tates,which s theburden fwhatpositivedoctrine hebookcontains. " Thought ndfeelings emand subject, nd haveno meaningapartfrom t." "Rational life,by its very naturedemandsa unitary onsciousnessnd a unitary ubject." Neitherthematter fthephysicist, or he hinkingmatter fthehylozoistnorthetheory f twoparallel series, s rational. " If materialismbe truereason s exploded." It is depressing, as no standardoftruth, fflictshe pure psychologistmrithtedious superficialitiesand drolleries." " Whateverprogress rainphysiologymaymakeitwillneverbringus onestepnearer omaterialism." It has " anirresistibleendency oward rror,uperstitionndfalsehood,"andithas " falsifiedxperience tthestart," nd givesa " manikin on-ception f humanity." The diiculty in identifyinghysicalandmental acts ies in theircompleteunlikeness. Vibrations re notsensations. "No peering, ven intothe living brain,wouldgivethe eastsuspicion fthemental eries ttendingt." Again,nervesnever eel. Sensations rementalreactions gainstnervous ctionsandarenotpassedalong " fromone atonzto another,ike a letterfrom andtohand." A sentient ervous ction s a square circle.Thedoctrineof the specific nergs of nerves "has been largelyabandoned." Itisthe "terminalstructure" nwhich the specificenergy esides. Thus " concerninghe particular ormof thener-vous ctionnothing an be known," but " our complete gnoranceofwhattakesplace inthenerves s no psychologicaloss." Neitherpracticallyor" psychologicallyhouldwebe better fff we knemrallabouttheform fthe nervous ction in any special experienceand the place of its location." All such factsare "not properlypsychological actsat all," nor even "facts of any kind" to theidealist. The psycho-physicaw represents no significantrin-ciple." A blind enthusiasm as magnified echner's formulantoundue importance. " In the name of a mathematicalformulapsychologys loaded down with meaninglessabsurdity. Allexplanationsof after mages are " purely hypothetical." Themixturefcolorsbyrotating isk " doesnottakeplace in themindbutin the nerves." Such works as Helmholtz "Sensations ofTone and " Physiological ptics -" revealno newpsychologicalprinciples." Thereare probablynounconsciousensations. Ideashaveno intensitynd also no attractiverrepulsive orces vu-hichtheyseparate or unite. The studies of association-timemerelyshowwhat was known before, riz.: that familiarprocesses requickest. The "cerebral theory" of meluory,which fillsa longappendix, has generallybeen regardedas demandingseparatecellsfor the preservation f distinctexperiences." itCachdea"we aretold," is basedon theactionof a separatecell. Molassese.g. has an odor, aste, name forear and ee is of many kindsandassociatedwith manythings,and is after ll but one word,

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    151SX CEOLOGIC.iL LITERATE-RE.wllile a man like Mezzofanti poke fluently hirty, nd knew some-thing of seventy-twoanguages. Eaeh one of all these variationsdemands a eell, and thus if the eerebralistswere right he eells" would get filled up," and the possibilities of experienee andknowledge would be exhausted. The faets of aphasia on theeerebral heory lead to the mostfantastie nd grotesque ssump-tions and whimsies." It is all "physiologieal mythology orn ofmaterialism." It " neeessarily nereases our diffieulties ithoutadding any insight," " explains the obseure by the obseurer,"abounds in " unmanageable features," is a purely gratuitoushypothesis," pieee of "physiologieal metaph^rsics," immenselyinereasesour diffieulties ithout dding any insight," te., ete.The " thought-faetor,"eeording o Professor owne, works versensation under the idea of time, spaee, eause, ete. Sensation sset over against he self, elassified nd related. If Mill's " psyehieehemistry theory f the origin of spaee-perception ere true, twoulds'bringthinkingtoan end." 'l'he notion that sensationorthat the mind s extended s also a " whimsey." If the thought fextension s extended he thought f nfinite xtensionmustrequirean infinitelyarge mind to contain t. Mill's view of the nature fthe thinking elf s " plain nonsense." By the theorv f the " per-manentpossibilities f sensation " language has been outraged,"and " we are in the lowest depths of unintelligibility." " Themetaphysical enial of the reality f substance eads to nonsense nthe mentalworld nd to nihilism nd solipsism n the outerworld."" The associative heory s one of the sorriest forts f speculation."" Materialism annot be joined with any sensational philosophynithoutmutualdestruetion." This alliance is "one of the manyineonsisteneies f evolutionary hinking." Mind-stufEnd psyeho-plasm are " highly legant onceptions as " figures f speech thatdefy ll interpretation." " Evolution has no sueh importance orpsychology s its friends magine." Its facts re " without heoreti-cat signifieanee." Herbert's deduetion f feelings s " a failure nall respeets." Physiologieal stheties s rejeeted, or a noise hurtsa ners-e o more han a note does. The elaim thatthe self s madeout of the sum of mental tates s made up of " some extravaganeesome ambiguity nd eonsiderable onsense." Fiehte's view of therise of self-eonseiousnessis an abuse of language." NVhether ecan be eonseious f more han one thing t a time is " an idle ques-tion." The view that memory is the form f mental etion mostdependenton physieal eonditions is " probably mueh exagger-ated." Many faets f aphasia are " utterly paque on anv theory."The treatment f the udgment n formal ogie s " entirely alse toits psyehologieal haraeter," " highly rtifieial," nd " oftendoesviolenee to the psyehologieal aet," " a barren study f verbal per-mutations." This tendeney eaehes ts climax in the aterforms fssymbolieogie by beeoming urelymechanical. The fourth imen-sion theories are like reasoningon the assumptionof a squarecirele. The soul is in direet nteraetionwith the brain,but neednot be in it, but at an infinite ibstaneerom t. and in faet is not inspaee at all. The subjeet of loealization of the funetions f thebrain s " in entire uneertainty." That the groundof insanity sphysieal " ean hardlybe said to be made out." Yet the soul andDody are in some kind of interaetion nd mutual dependenee" Certainforms f memory eem evell eonditioned y physiealparticipation."

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    152 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.Besides these salient points, the book of Prof. Bowne containsmuch current psychologicalmatter and a few subtle criticisms.Thoughhis spirit s much more narrow and provincial, he authoris farbetter ead in both the ideal and empirical iterature f histopicthan the writer f the book noticed above. But his work ur-passes anythingwe have ever read in the field f modern sychol-ogy, not only in its hardihood of brunt lenial of acceptedfactsand interpretations,hich f sustainedwouldreducemany a settledconsensusback to the plane of debate,but in offensivend ill-bredlanguage,which can only tend to lowerthe tone of the controversy,and which fills us all alollg with painful doubts whether self-respecting eviewer ought to touch it. Students whose knowl-edge of psychologywas derived from his book aione, would be

    le(l to believe that all workers in a vast field of science, nofonly deal largely in "plain nonsense," "whimsies," that "out-rage language," "are loaded with meaningless nconsistencies,"if indulged in are liable to "explode reason," "bring thinkingto an end," etc., but that scientificmen at heart know betterand are "ever seeking to evade, "explain away, "escape" somegreat nd obviousfirst ruth f reason. They would think hat hosewho seriously study the localization of functions n the brainpsycho-physics,ymbolic ogic, neurological hysiology, ompara-tive psychology, sycho-genesis,he two greatworks f Helmboltzand all who abor n thosefields; thatmorbid sychology,heuncon-scious n all its forms, nd everything hat savors of matter, volu-tion or sensation, represent vast incoming tide of perversitywhippedup, to be sure,by diabolic cunning nto fine nd insidiousintellectual illabub,which is s^ eet to the palate, but which it isnot merely olly but morally nfectious o imbibe. The resourcesagainst hese new rnen nd methods nd topics are first ravado ofnegation. Eane not several critical nventories f human powersshown that understanding an never know this, and reason cannever do that? No faculty or investigatormust be allowed topoach beyond the lines laid down by the great Kantean surveyeven for an hypothesisor conjecture. It is the function f thephilosopher o enforce he icet and non-licet f the code. Secondlymind must be dematerialized, whicll now means deneuralized.To do this at es-ery oint s Professor owne's chief fort. Amongthe many phobias,or morbid ears,now quitewell defined,s myso-phobia, or fear of dirt, irstdescribed n 1878,which impels thepatient o wash every bject he must touch, nd to wash the handsafter readedcontactwitheverythingmore palpable than thin airoften coresof times dav, to avoid pollution r contamination. tsanaloguewe may call hylephobia, r morbid fear of materialismalso a verymoderndistemper, hich afflicts, ow and then, phi-losopherwitha horror f contactwith the fresh facts f science onecessary o his survi+raln the world of modern thought, nd im-pels him to trvto purge every lement f rnatter rom actshe can-not escape. IIylephobia, however, s now often regarded as asacred madness, s epilepsy used to be. It befallsonly the good*and the richer nd {airer the world of sense, and the moreviolentthe phobia against t, the more surpassingly ich and fair nd realroust the purely ubjective,rational, deal world appear. All thewisdom f scientific sychologymelted in this author's crucible sbut slag and dross, nd thatof so malodorous kind that not onlyis he as excusable for the oft-repeatedrrors nd ignorance f de-

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    153SX-CHOLOGICAL LITERATE RE.tails his pages betray s he ould be for holdillg his llostrils n afoul alr, but ^e suspect that this itnorance and audaciousdefianceof authorities s a partof the disease, and thus as sublillle s thefilth ll mhichwhite-souled nchorites lorieel. Thubs t woul(l bellot only a long, but an all too-thankless, nd exen idle task,topoint out the blunders n detail. Although tudents f the book+^oul(l find t infectious f this mania, theywould get xery ittleknoxvledge f the adversary aaainst whosll they were to cru-sade. Indeed, they would hardly suspect evell the existenceof a vast an(l concillient ody of facts concerning he vali:litr ndssitnificancef whichthere s no dispute molla those competent ojudge, and still less would they glimpse their ast variety, heirw ide-reaching uggestieness, or realize the unsurpassedmentaldiscipline and moral vigor they afford, he quickeningof all the)sychological roots f the religious entiments f reverence, ubor-dination and hopefulness hev hring. Ngainst he old materialismof Bvichner,Moleschott, >'arlWrogt,r (,'zolbe. which is the realobject of many of our authors' ttacks, nd of Mllich man residuastill linger,especially among yount men, his meapons are occa-sionally efTectixe, ut the psycho-lzhysicsofo-day s far nearerthe standpoilltof Kant than of these writers, nd admits, asfullr as Profebssorolvlle himself, he utter ncommensurabilitythat appears between pllysical solid and collscious ctivity. Herepudiatesmad-house ales, but Mr. Galton says: " No professor fmetaphysics, r sychology, or religion, an claim to knowthe ele-ments f what he teaches,unless he is acquainted ith the ordinaryphenomena f idioev, madness and epilepsv. He must study thernanifestationsf disease and congenitalfolly, s well as those ofsociety and high intellect." The spirit animating his volurne sutterly nlike that of Lotze, whom the author followedwith suchfidelityn an earliern-ork, r thatof Prof. Alexander,who admir-ably says: " There are t^ro commonmistakes-one, the denuncia-tion of physiologicalmethods by men xvho have never seen aganglion cell; the other,the denunciation f subjective methodsby men who have never given aSnhour to introspectioll. t doesnot appear to be llecessarar, owever, hata knowledge f one set offacts should be incompatiblevith a knonrledgef the other set.A combination f the two s the ideal psychology." WVe ould notlav aside this lmostpurelynegative ook,+^rhicht s generally eryhard to treat eriously, owever,without xpressing ome real obli-gations to the author, o whose vigorous nalvsis mre re indebtedfor some insiaht, and who has pointed out a fe^^r eal defects nboth the methods and inferences f modernpsychology. Thesedefects are by llo means fatal, but very slight, incidental,andeaSsily orrected. "Indeed," he says, "if our melltal possessionshollld suddellly hrink to what we kllow, the residue would bepaSltrynd pitiable n the extreme. It is only by venturing eyondknowledge hat a social or evell mental xistence ecomespossible."This cheap opinion of knowledge may perhaps aSccount or hisuncermonious ay of treating t, and his struggles eyond it, f itbe a struggle or mental existence, every evolutionistwill easilyexcuse. Again,he exclaims n a collapsillg r despairillg ay, nearthe end of the book, " there s a great body of factswhich suggestthat the mental ife canllotgo on mrithouthe physical. Can anylight be thro^N-nn this question?" That is, indeed, the seriousquestion, but does it not belong at the begillnina of any helpful

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    154 PSYCEOLOGIC AL LITERATE'RE.book,devoted so largely to just this question, atherthan at theend ? That is, at least, preeiselywhere the psseho-physies e soperhorreseesbegins, and that is just the question. Even thefew solatedfaetshe reports,f sympathetieallyerutinized,tart s.so hopefully, t least, towards nswering.

    Dr. Dewey's book is to Hegel as Prof.Bowne's is to Lotze. Ineaeh ease the spirit f the masters nimates the pupil, but has llotgained in insightor breadth f view. Dr. Dewey is a less servilediscipleof a bettermaster, s on the whole better rained,not onlyin psyehology, ut n the generalfield f philosophy, nd his bookis pervaded by an indefinitely etter pirit, nd his material iswrought ogetherwith far more vigor,eoherenee nd originality.There is no trace of eynieismor vulgarity. The author unfoldswiththe most harming nd unreserved rankness nd enthusiaslllthe schemeof absolute idealism in a simple yet eomprehensiveway, well ealculated to impressbeginners n philosophy, o whomthe book is addressed, nd withhelpful edagogie iverslons. Psy-ehology s the scienee of the " self," whieh has the powerof reeog-nizing tself s I, knowsthat t exists,or " existsfor tself." Thisis eonseiousnesswhieh " can be neither defined or deseribed.""The fact of the existenee of self or of eonseiousness s accord-ingly a unique, individual fact." The eontentof knowledge s.universal,for all eould know it. Psychology s definedas "thescieneeof the reproductionf some universal content r existeneewhether f knowledge r aetion n the form f individual,unshar-able conseiousness." Thus "physiological psychology annot aidpsychology ireetly. The mere knowledge f all the functions fthe brain and nervesdoes not help the scienee,except so far as itoccasions more penetrating, sychologieal nalysis, nd thus sup-plements he deficieneies f ntrospeetion." Physiological aets re"of no avail, for they tell us only about eertain objectixTe ro-cesses " "The ultimate ppeal is to self-eonsciousness."Knowl-edge 1S thus universal,while feeling s individual, nd will eon-nects the two. These three are not faculties but inseperableaspectsof consciousness, esulting rom rtificiai nakJsis, ut forconveniencemade the basis of the three-fold ivisionof the bookthe greaterpart of whieh is given to knowledge. Here, too, ies.its ehiefmerlt nd originality. Sensation s " the elementary on-seiousnesswhieh arises from he reaetion f the soul upon a nervousimpulse, ondueted o the brain from he affeetionf some sensorynerve-ending y a physieal stimulus." The latter s always someformof motion. "A sensation is a eonseiousness it not onlyexists,but t exists for he self." Yet we are told on the next pagethat ve have no more direet kllowledge f it than of an atc)m, ndthat t S not immediately resent n eonseiousness. Sensations ellus nothing ut theirown existenee, r how the subjeet is afected.Motion nd sensationhave nothing n eommon. Despite the usualdualistie " ehasm, lnOtiOll iS lnerely mental phenomenon Thenervous hange s not eause, but stimulus r oeeasion on whieh thesoul develops sensation. A sensation is "the transitions f thephysieal nto the psyehieal." On this whole topieof sensation, tis impossible to grasp the author's meaning. Sensations are notknowledge. They are purely ubjective, eparate nd distinct, achfrom aeh; in short, haotie. Knowledgeeonsists n the proeessesof relating hese ndividual feelings nd diseretefragments. They

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    155SYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.must be transformed ot only into unities higher than those oftime and space, objects, relations and ideals, but they must bechanged into the self that knows and idealizes. To this endthe mind must react upon sensuous material in attention, ndretain the appercievedcontent n memory. Thus sense becomessignificant, nd its elements coherelltly related. Association" never leaves sensuous elements isolated." It combines air-pulses to tones, makes all colors out of the tllree elementarysensations, fuzes and redintegrates ccording to tlle familiarrubrics of successive, simultaneous, ontiguous nd similar,etcArtistsuse philosophersnotice, the associative tie that broadensbut does not burden the mind, and controlshabit. These pro-ductsof synthesismay be disassociatedby diSerent nfluences, sinterest r value is given to difEerentlements. Sensations re thusdistinguished y tone,by nearness f relation o self, llorality, tc.,till apperruptive rgans, r "ways in lvhich we tend to interpretsensations," are establishecl. t)isassociation hus breaks uD themechanism bursts he bonds thatwould tie the mind down t-o b-jective data, allows it to plav freely, ccording o its nterests,ndbreaksup control y environment. Thus ideal internalends maybe pursued bv attention,which is internallv nitiated, to theends of the self. Attentions "that activity f the self which con-nects ll elements resented o it into one whole, with reference otheir deal significance." On the fundamental rinciple hat"noth-ing can be in consciousness which consciousnessdoes not Dutthere," attention, s the organ of selection, s very mportant. Itselectsonly thoseelementswhich pointbeyond themselves. Thusonly interpreted ensations, rld never sensations s such, en-ter into our knowledge. 'rhis is idealization, for it passesbeyond present existence. By attention the whole organizedself is broughtto bear or "read into" selected sense elementsso as to give them meaning by "reading itself into them."Thus unity, idealization, meaning, (listinctness arise. Atten-tiOsl s fundamentally "self-developing ctivitv." Thus iththe aid of the assimulative unetion f retention the worldbecomesobjectified elf, nd the selfsubjectified orld." "The worldknonnis the externalized elf; the self-existings the knownor internal-ized world." Leaving the activitiesof knowledge, ts stages arestudied as perception,memorv, magination, hinking nd intui-tiOll respectively. PerceitSings "opposed to thinking," ecause t isobjective nd not subjective. XTisual nd tactual pace are brieflyconsidered, o show how it is the mrill hich separates objects fromitself. This is the centraldistilletionn this fielelwheredifferelltia-tion predominates ver identification. Memorys higher for thepresent s transcended. All itisobjects are "wholly ideal." Pastand present are related or unifie(l n rythm. Memory s possi-ble only where here s a permanent elf mid changing xpressions.Imagination mbodies ideas and is freed from he limitations fmemory. It is a "universalizing ctivity," eleasing he ideal fromthe petty nd particular,makingpoetry n a sense truerthan his-tory, nd implies basal unity etweenman and man,alld man andnature; n short, emonstrateshe "unix rsal self of humanity" norganicunitywith nature. Thinking till further (lissolves out"the universal and ideal "to discover the meaningof factsulliver-sally." It is distinguished s (a) conception,which "is the apper-ception f the apperceptive rocess;" b) judgment,which refers he

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    106 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITEXATURE.ideal, or universal, o theparticular lement; nd c) reasoning, hiclis the recognitionf relations. The highest easoning s philosophywhich is ''complete science," an(l seeks to find a true universe.Intuitions immediate knowledge of the world, self and God.F,^rery act s seen to be related o every other, he whole s foun(lin the part, nd this completed nterdependences necessity. Theworld s knowllbecause we idealize t, n(l the elf s lznown ecauseit is realized. This process goes on through the self and fromthis fact we gain the conception f freedom. God is the true elf-related, or the organic union of the self, and the world, of theideal and the real. The goal of all knowletlge r truth s "the colll-plete manifestation f the unifying nd distinguishing ctivitiesof the intelligence," nd all error or agnosticislll s emphasizingone to the exclusion of the other of these processesFeeling s " the nternal spectof mental ife," and exists so faras consciousness s unobjectified. As the latter s never completefeelillg, hough unique and unsharable s "as wide as the wholerealmof self," and is the undividual ide of ts activity. lf the self;s furthered, leasure; f hindered, ain results. Successful djust-xnents pleasant. Feelings are sensuous and formal,qualitativentellectual, sthetic and personal. The last three have graduallyllnfoldedntouniversality. Under per,sonal eelinaspeace, depend-ence, faith, obligation,remorse,humility, ympathy, ove, con-science, etc., are treated. Conscience, . g., is a "feeling of thellniversal nd objectiveworthof personal acts, but in what degreethe feelings are true to fact depend upon how universal andobjective is the self which feels. WVill riginates n sensuousimpulses. It is the selfrealizing tself. The essence of self is theself-determiningctivity f the will which is objectifyingctivity.Science is the objectifiedwill. Wili finds ts motive n feelinits result n knowledae. It unites he ndividual and the universejoins the finite elfand the infinite ersonalityn whichtruth, ap-piness and righteousnessre united n one.T)r. Desvey's book is admirably adapted to reproduction y aresumd f salientpoints nd ever recurrent hrases. Its merit ndoriginalityre great, ut they all lie in the scheme rudely utlinedabove. That the absolute idealism of Hegel could be so cleverlyadapted to be " read nto such a range of facts,new and old, sindeed a surprise s great as when geology nd zoology re ingen-iously ubjectedto the rubricsof the six days of creation. Theoldergeneses,whether f the world or of mind, re so simple anflultimate, ave been rounded to such epic completeness nd sub-limity, hat as they re supersededby still larger and loftier on-ceptions, heir dissolutivephases are oftenpathetic. The pathoshere lies in the naive unconsciousness ithwhich the systemofuniversal onsciousness nfolds ll its vast canvas of definition nthe stormiest f all seas that science tries o navigate. Definitionsmake the fibre f the book, and even the favorite orm f sentence.The author s always working rompartial to completedefinitionsor conversely. There are scoresof formally uite novel definitionsof nearly ll the subject matter f psychology. They are treated sIself-luminous,r, at most, heirfit r self-relations their ustifica-tion, and these constitute he warp of the entire abric. Viewedfrom he standpoint f facts, ery fewof themare satisfactorv,ndmany we believe to be fundamentally rong and misleading. Toenter upon this, however, could only at most open perhaps ong

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    157SYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.but certainly ruitless ontronersy.But the author s more ntellton the mutual nterpretationnd coherence f his network f defi-nitions han on theirrelation o facts, nd it is just thls that makeshis book as unitary s Dr. McCosh's s rambling nd incoherent, spositive s Professor owne s negative. The " self," e. g., streatedbas omething f settled and exact connotation, imple and unde-finable and immaterial,without hint or suspicion of the xastproblems openedby both disease and by hypnotism, ointing o itsderivitive, r at least exceedingly complex nature. Iemory istreated only as a memberof a hierarchv f faculties, nd with llowordto suggest hattherenow ies the chieffield of controversvllpsychology etween a nlaterial nd pneumatic iew of soul. Thewhole vast field of what was at first nd so crudelytermedbyHartman he unconscious, nd where he scientifictudvof psvehicactivitieshas of ate won ts chief riumphs,s substantiallygnoredalthough onsciousnesstself,withwhich the author s solely con-cerned,we are told " can be neitherdefined r described." To saythat an act is unconsciousmeans simply hat the act s done bv thebody" as a result f simultaneous ssociationBesides definitions, he other ngredientof the book is illus-tratie facts. In the selection and use of these, for which theuriter is often ndebted to the resultsof modern cientificmeth-o(ls and is duly grateful, ies the other chief merit of the lsoolwhich, however, by a man of great abilit^T s Dr. Dewev clear]risX might have been writtenhalf a century go, and have beenpoorer only by a numberof pat physiological llustratiolls. Thefacts are never allowed to speak out plainly for themselves orleft to silence, but are always "read into" the system whichis far more important han they. They are llearer to the sphereof sensation, ncohate, dark, solitary, han to the pure self-lumi-nous light of self-consciousness,hich is turned n them in thesepages. In the field of these facts the statements re extremelyoftenvague, nexactand even mistaken, nd abound in the errors,often etty, ometimes rave,of non-expertness. hese we can onlysample. " A toave exgth f .ooons illimetre,"t is said, can excitethe sense of hearing. The retinal mage is " interrupted y theblind spot." Flavor is said to involvetactile elements. The toIleof a tuning ork s simple; " all others re complex." The wholestatement f this great discovery,which Helmholtz alls " the mostimportant f recent times," is vague and general to the vergeofutter nintelligibility. ?our or five times ill the book we are toldof the ower nd upper imits of tone-perception,nd the sensationabove 40,000 ribrations second is repeatedly escribed s " Mhir-ring," a term t hardly eems as if one who had once felt t couldapply. " NVhirring is near the ower imit. " It is highlyproba-ble thatthe auditory lerve ontinuesthe sound stimulus n vibrat-ing form." Heat is said to be a stimulus hat " afEectsll sensoryorgans alike." Touch "is distributed y means of the skin overthe whole body." Again, "the skin is regarded s made up ofmyriads f sensory ircles." All but hot and cold spotson the skinFare aid to be "sensitive o no kind of temperature istinction," ndcocoine anaethesia and leaves the parts afEected as sensitive odifferencesf heat alld cold as ever." " The reasonthat we do notsee the stars n the daytime s that theydo not give oW of the lightof the sun." The psycho-physic aw unquestionablymerits farfuller reatmentll any psychology. Almost nothing s said of n-

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    158 PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.stinct rofmorbid ranthropologicalsychology.Omissions, ow-ever,maybepardoned,naccuracies ever. If wearetohave factsantlresults f aboriousscientificwork, et thembe stated learlyand exactly. Dr. Dewey'smethod s throughnd throughpecula-tive,and psychologyn its leading features s to him one of themost ompleteand finished ciences, nsteadof being in themostinterestingtage of uncertaintynd incompleteness.Notonlyallactualbutall possiblefuture actsare certain otaketheirplace inthis dealistic cheme. Theymay ndeed enrich t,but can neveressentially hange t. In the open fieldof research, owever,t ispreciselythese general views that are now most uncertain ndwavering. Is self-consciousnessnscrutible, nd ultimate,andsupreme? What is it,what is theself, ndwhat is knowledge? sthere ' chasm? Is sensationpureand manifold, ris itthemostperfect nowledge, easonbeing ensation n the making, s Maehassumes? What are ideas,and canwe know an " organicunitymore completethan, say, a gaglion cell? Is not such an unityrathern thenervous ystemthan in consciousthought?What ifconsciousness e notonlya partialand fragmentary anifestationof ndividual ife,but,as somepostulate, form fdisintegration,setofsignsof the imperfect orkingof our nfinitelyomplicatedautomaticapparatus? None of these are open questionsforDr.Dewey. It is not enoughto knoweven if weknowtruly, utwemustknowthatwe know. It is notsufiicientor ightto shine* itmust ight tself. Even " theperceivedworld s more hantheex-istentworld." One vvho hilosophizesby this method mightexactly s well writea text book on any science whateveras onpsychology.The light is always esselltially ighting tself,fromwhatever bjects thappensto be reflected.As an artists less in-terestedn the subject of a picturepritlted n theprogramme,rthephilologistares less forthestory f a classicwriterbut botharemore ntent n an ulterior nalvsis that shall reveaithegreatelementsof style and motive,and reach a meaningbelow theauthor's onsciousness,o themodernpsychologisttudies hegreatsystems f philosophic hought-thiswiththe rest. In the sys-tem of "progressivfeelf-realizationi"n the idealistic sense hesees the llftand expansionof adolescent, ltruistic orces, lwaysinspiring nd ennobling,which everyyoungman is the strongerand broaderfor havingfelt,theenthusiasm fwhichno studentof anyphilosophic ubjectcan misswithoutgraveloss,and to themeaningof which,havingfelt,he willalwaysremainpious. Butit is a stageofdevelopmentwhichminds hatcometofull cientificFmaturityre certain otranscend. tsphrasesgrowdimand unrealandhave a hollow,uncertain ound, n thequestofsomethingmoredefinite nd realand systematic.WVerehis issue reachedat theend,ortendencies othis argerviewseenin theauthor, hepropa-deuticvirtue f the bookwould be greatly nhanced. To studentsinclined o immerse hemselvesn an ideal viewoftheworld twillprovevery tirnulating,utdirewillbe thedisappointmentfthosewhohopetofind n it the methodsor resultsofmodern cientifiepsychologr. The literary eferencest theendofthechapterswillproveveryhelpful,butthoseofmost cientificalue are notmuchutilizedn the text, and nearlyall these authorswouldnotagreewiththe argument,or uch it is, of thework. Finally,forclass-room sethe book is far fromsatisfactory.Statisticsnowbeforeus,embracing early hreehundred olleges, reveryfarfrom us-

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    PSYCHOLOGICALITERATURE. 109taininghe tatemetltf the prefacehat it is the customfourcolleges omakepsychologyehe ath by which o enter hefieldsofphilosophy."Elen7entsfPhygotogtcatsyc7wotogy.Treatise f theActivitiesandNature f theMind, romhePhysical ndExperimentalPoint fNiew. By George . Ladd, ProfessorfPhilosophyin Yale University.NewYork, 887. pp. 696.Thanks oProfessoradd'sbook it is at last possible oreada plainstatementfthefacts f a good partofthe field f ex-perimentalsychologyn English. Its merit n this undamen-talrespects incomparablyreaterhan anyonebook n our an-guage, nd t s likely obe for long ime ndispensableo everystudentf the ubject ot amiliar ithGerman.Roughlypeak-ing, overfive f his nine hundred aaes are devoted o a con-densed ndgenerallylearlyrrangedccount fresults f pecialscientificnvestigations,essconciselytated han nHermann, utmore ucidthan in NVundt. he factsare often athered lthgreatndustryrommanypecialmonographs ore ecenthan hechiefGermanext ooks, ndalongome ines roughtown odatewithoutubstantialmissions.heauthQrsnot ntent n llustrat-ingany heory r ystemelongingoanutterlyifferentttitudeperiod ndmethod, r stageofdevelopment,ut he ystemon-sists na plaingroupingf hefactswhich re llowed ospeak utforhemselves. aken ll inall,thebook annot ail o have mostwholesomendstimulatingffectnthestudy fmental henom-enon n the institutionsfhigher ducationn thiscountry. tshould e readby tudentsfmedicine nd theology,s well s ofphilosophy,ndteachers hodesire o know hescientificasisofmodernmethods f pedagogy ill derivegreatbenefitrom tspages. Thevastfields f morbid nd also ofanthropologicalsy-chology,sycho-genesisnd instinct,hichmight e included nthe itle, reexcluded,ndevenwithin he imitsmposed n him-selfbythe author,here remany eficiencies,utfromhe factof so large book, overingnly part f ts field,hereaderwilIreadilynter he mmenseccumulationf material hich lreadycrow(lshepsycho-physicomain, nd superficialrdisparagingtext-booksn thisfieldwillhencefortheimpossible,r at leastignored. All thisapplies othe firstwoparts, rtothefirstwo-thirdsf thebookonly. The first art sdevoted othenervousmechanism.The nervouslementsre irst onsideredhemicallyand histologicallyndphysiologically,ndthen heir ombinationintoa systemnvolving sketch fthegeneralnatomy f thecerebro-spinalystem.Nerves s conductors,utomaticnd reflexfunctionsndorgans,hedevelopmentf thenervousystemndthe mechanicalheory f its action, re each givena chapter.Partsecond s on thecorrelationsfthe nervousmechanismndthe mind. Two ong haptersregiereno ocalization,ndtwotothe quality fsensations,ne to their uantity-hen cometwochapters aguely ntitled hepresentationsf sense,devoted othe perception,s it is more ommonlyermed f space,formmotion, tc.;then comephysiologicalime, eelings,nd a finaiand solated nthropologicalhapterncertain tatisticalelationsof the body nd mental henomena.These chapter#re illus-trated y one hundred nd fourteen oodcuts, boutninety f