14 j. allan hobson and edward pace-schott’s response: commentary by margaret gilmore and edward...
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7/25/2019 14 J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schotts Response: Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and Edward Nersessia
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J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schotts Response:Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and EdwardNersessian (New York)Margaret M. Gilmore M.D.
a& Edward Nersessian M.D.
b
a120 East 75th Street, New York, NY 10021
b72 East 91st Street, New York, NY 10128, e-mail:
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.
To cite this article:Margaret M. Gilmore M.D. & Edward Nersessian M.D. (2000) J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-SchottsResponse: Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and Edward Nersessian (New York), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary
Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:2, 202-211, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773306
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7/25/2019 14 J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schotts Response: Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and Edward Nersessia
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J.
Allan Hobson
and
Edward Pace-Schott s Response
Commentary by
Margaret
Gilmore
and
Edward Nersessian (New York)
Gilmore-Nersessian
For the second issue
of
Neuro-Psychoanalysis Dr.
J
Allan Hobson provided the target paper on the neuro
regulation and neurophysiological processes
of
sleep
and dreams. This target paper was followed by formal
commentaries on the target paper prepared by three
experts in the field
of
sleep and dreaming, Drs.
M
Solms,
Braun, and M. Reiser. As Hobson s paper
and those respondent papers dealt not only with neuro
physiological findings but also with aspects of Freud s
psychological theory
of
dreams, the editors
of
the jour
nal decided that a brief summary
of
Freud s dream
theory would help orient those readers
of
the journal
who might be less familiar with psychoanalytic con
cepts to the discussion. Therefore, they asked us to
write a brief and somewhat simplified synopsis
of
Freud s psychoanalytic theory
of
dreams. The editors
planned to place the synopsis as the first paper in the
journal so that it could serve as a general orientation
for the reader. However, at the urging of Dr. Hobson,
who was concerned that readers might misread the
summary as a target paper, the editors elected to place
it at the end
of
the interchange, as an appendix.
We, the authors
of
the brief synopsis, were aston
ished that Hobson and Pace-Schott chose to give such
prominence to our little summary in their response to
the commentaries. Our surprise was partly the result
of
the fact that our summary was not prepared as a
response to the commentary
on
Hobson s target paper,
but only
as
an outline
of
Freud s theory. We are
pleased that Hobson chose to address our summary in
such detail, and in his
hold
no punches style, as he
has given
us
the opportunity to respond to his target
paper and his commentary. It is our hope that our
response will further the discussion between neuro
physiologists and psychoanalysts.
Contributions to the Neurophysiology of Sleep
and Proposals for a Model of Dream
Formation
We appreciate Hobson s careful neurophysiological
and neurochemical research establishing the reciprocal
Margaret
M
Gilmore, M.D.,
is
an Assistant Course Instructor in
Psychoanalysis, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Assistant Clinical
Professor
of
Psychiatry, Cornell Medical Center, New York.
Edward Nersessian, M.D., is Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,
interaction between acetylcholine stimulation and ser
otonergic and noradrenergic inhibition in the pons in
REM sleep generation (Hobson and McCarley, 1977;
Hobson, 1999). We also recognize his courage in pro
posing his activation-synthesis model for dream for
mation based upon those findings (Hobson and
McCarley, 1977; Hobson, 1999). In addition we ad
mire the flexibility in model building that Hobson has
demonstrated by amending his original activa
tion-synthesis hypothesis to incorporate new data
from neurochemical studies of transmitters, brain im
aging, and brain lesion studies. We applaud his will
ingness to acknowledge an unexpectedly prominent
role
of
the limbic system (Hobson, 1999, p 157)
during sleep following instigation of REM, as well as
his willingness to address data indicating that lesions
of the deep frontal lobes impair dreaming (Hobson
and Pace-Schott, 1999).
However, we are deeply dismayed at Dr. Hob
son s refusal to openly acknowledge the major change
in his dream model from his original activation-syn
thesis model in which he viewed dream content as
vacuous (Braun, 1999) to his present model in
which he suggests that
salient memories
n
emo
tions serve as the primary shaper of dream plots
rather than playing a secondary role (Braun, 1999,
p
196). As Braun notes, in his new model Hobson
acknowledges an active participation of forebrain
mechanisms in dream generation-not simply a sec
ondary senseless response to chaotic brainstem
events (Braun, 1999, p 196).
What happened to Hobson s original activa
tion-synthesis hypothesis in which the forebrain pas
sively synthesized images in response to the activity
of the oculomotor system or vestibular system which
had been activated by the automatic firing
of
the brain
stem? Let us compare the two models
of
dream forma
tion: In the original activation-synthesis model the
cortex was passively receiving information from the
eye movements and then synthesizing the visual imag
ery appropriate to them. An hypothesis is that the
oculomotor activity is generated at the brainstem level
and that the cortex is then provided with feed-forward
New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Clinical Associate Professor of Psy
chiatry, Cornell University Medical College, New York.
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Ongoing Discussion: Hobson
and
Pace-Schott
information about the eye movements (Hobson and
McCarley, 1977, 1338).
Hobson proposed that two other examples
of
such
passive forebrain synthesis of dream content occurred
when the forebrain responded to the activity of the
vestibular system, which had been activated by the
brainstem firing, and when the forebrain responded to
the motor atonia
of
sleep, which had also resulted from
brainstem activation. This model of dream content for
mation, a model based upon strict biological determin
ism, led Hobson to propose that such typical dream
contents as that in which a person experiences motor
inhibition (the person as a whole cannot move or can
not move some part of his body), or in which the
person experiences himself as flying, occur as a result
of the forebrain's providing content in response to the
activation of motor paralysis or to the activation of
the vestibular system during REM sleep (Hobson and
McCarley, 1977).
First, we would like to point out that Hobson
seemed unaware in proposing his model for motor in
hibition in dream content that Freud in The nterpreta-
tion reams (1900) had made the same suggestion
with regard to manifest dream content in which motor
inhibition occurred; that is, in dreams with motor inhi
bition content perhaps the mind was using its aware
ness of the motor paralysis of sleep to create manifest
dream content. However, Freud went
on
to ask the
next logical question If this is so, why does not every
dream represent some motor paralysis since there is
almost always motor paralysis during sleep? Does not
the fact that this paralysis occurs in only some dreams
represent that some selection has occurred in what
will be represented in the dream (Freud, 1900) Why
does Hobson's sleeper not dream of flying or motor
inhibition in every dream? Freud answered this ques
tion by suggesting that during dreaming, the psycho
logical mind selected only those perceptions of brain
or body functioning during sleep that were useful to
the expression of psychological states. Whether Freud
was right or wrong in his proposed answer to the ques
tion
of
why motor inhibition appeared only in some
dreams, the point is, the question must be asked and
Hobson did not ask it. It is our argument that
if
Hobson
had asked the question, and he still wanted to maintain
his biological determinism, then the question would
have led him to search for more complex brain func
tioning during dreaming.
In their 1999 activation-synthesis model
of
dream content, Hobson and Pace-Schott claim: We
have always emphasized our own clinical interest in
dreams as the transparent syntheses of current con-
3
cerns, past conflicts and cognitive-emotional style
(p. 206). In addition, they state what the brainstem
does is set the forebrain stage for dreaming (p. 218).
We quote these statements for two reasons: first to
point out Hobson's refusal to openly acknowledge his
rejection
of
his first activation-synthesis model
of
dream formation, which regarded dream content as
random, as wrong (see below); and second to empha
size that this new activation-synthesis model, which
attributes a much more active role for the limbic sys
tem and forebrain in the shaping of dream plots, opens
the door to the possible importance
of
psychological
(including emotional and thinking) influences upon
dream formation. As for the first point of Hobson's
refusal to admit his error and his rewriting of the his
tory of his belief in the importance of dream content
in revealing current psychological concerns and past
emotional conflicts, we would like to remind Hobson
and Pace-Schott of their statement that if we are to
have a scientifically respectful dialogue we expect our
psychoanalytic colleagues to be able to say that, of
course Freud was probably wrong about most, if not
all, of his dream theory (Hobson and Pace-Schott,
1999, 218). We respectfully suggest that Hobson
apply this requirement to admit to errors in his own
research and theories But we have a more important
reason for making our comparison between the earlier
and later activation-synthesis models of dream forma
tion. The second activation-synthesis model, which
includes the activation
of
the brainstem and, in addi
tion, the activation
of
the limbic, paralimbic, and basal
areas of the forebrain, and a relative deactivation
of
prefrontal areas during REM, provides a much more
complex portrait of brain functioning during REM
than did the first activation-synthesis model. While
this complex portrait does not preclude Hobson's in
sistence on biological determinism, the activation of
the limbic, paralimbic, and basal forebrain areas would
also not be inconsistent with a theory
of
dream forma
tion that includes contributions from psychological in
put (emotions, memories, thoughts) into the causation
of
dream content. In this way, the second model
of
brain functioning during REM differs sharply and im
portantly from the first model. In the first model, there
was no possibility for any areas
of
the brain other than
the brainstem to contribute to the activation
of
other
brain areas. Thus, Hobson argued that since there
could be no psychological mind in the brainstem, then
there could be no psychological mind that contributed
to instigation
of
dream content. However, in the sec
ond model
of
the brain functioning during REM sleep,
the existence
of
activation in the limbic, paralimbic,
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204
and basal forebrain areas raises the possibility that
psychological events might make contributions to
dream formation.
In summary, we find Hobson and Pace-Schott to
be very careful neurophysiological researchers and
their neurophysiological results regarding brainstem
activation during REM sleep to be compelling evi
dence for the importance of the brainstem activation
of REM sleep. We appreciate Hobson s masterly over
view of the state of information on brain functioning
during sleep and welcome these findings, which ad
vance our understanding
of sleep and dreaming. How
ever, we object strenuously when they extrapolate
from these neurophysiological results to propose a
model
of
dream formation (a psychobiological phe
nomenon) that is based on the apriori assumption that
only neurophysiological events can be causative in
dream formation. We object to their scientific method
ology when they
select
only their own interpretation
of the neurophysiological data (that
if
certain brain
areas are activated during dreaming then this activa
tion must
c use
the dream content). They then exclude
alternative hypotheses; for example,
if
certain brain
areas are active during dreaming this may reflect not
only the impact of brain activation on dream content
but also the possibility that some of these areas of
brain activation reflect psychological functioning dur
ing sleep, which may, in turn, influence which areas
of brain are activated during dreaming sleep. Further
more, we object to their biased stance in their treat
ment
of
psychological data gathered from patients
dream reports and the relevance of this data to under
standing the emotional salience
of
dreams. While Hob
son and Pace-Schott accept the psychological data that
they have, a priori, decided to be relevant the pa
tient s conscious dream report and some associa
tions they reject as unscientific all psychological
data gathered by the psychoanalytic method (see be
low for discussion
of
biological reductionism).
Scientific Differences with Hobson
and
Hobson
and
Pace-Schott
As scientists, we have four major disagreements with
Hobson s form of biological reductionism and its ram
ifications in his data gathering and theory building.
First, in his model of the mind-brain, causation is a
one-way street from brain to mind: brain functioning
determines psychological phenomena and psychologi
cal phenomena cannot determine brain functioning.
Second, the dream model relies upon an unsubstanti-
Gilmore Nersessian
ated assumption that there is no unconscious goal
directed mental functioning during sleep. Third, Hob
son deprives mental (psychological) data other than
that which confirms his thesis (conscious dream re
ports and sometimes even those associations are ig
nored see below), and in particular psychoanalytic
data, of any scientific status. Fourth, Hobson ignores
the scientific principle that the data observed depend
upon the method of observation when he claims that
psychoanalytic data are invalid because he does not
observe them in psychotherapy.
We wish to be quite clear here that we are not
objecting to Hobson s data or theorizing
on
the
grounds that the biological and the psychological rep
resent two different domains of study that require two
different sets
of
data and
theory a
model of parallel
dualism (Reiser, 1999). Rather, we maintain the posi
tion that there is mind-brain, that while these are two
different domains with two different requirements for
data, these domains interact. This model involves
mind-brain interaction (Sperry, 1983) in which the
mind may direct brain functioning and the brain may
direct mind functioning. In this interactionist model,
there is a possibility of finding correlations between
brain activity and mental activity. We wish to distin
guish this mind-brain model from Hobson s biological
reductionism in which the dreaming mind is an epi
phenomenon of brain activity.
As to the first point, Hobson s model for dream
formation claims that all the psychological phenom
ena of dreaming are determined by biological events.
For example, Hobson (1999) states, The loss of ori
entational stability (which is at the cognitive root
of
dream bizarreness) and the loss of self reflective
awareness (which is the basis of the delusion that we
are awake in our dreams) are two related deficits
which could be
c used
by the aminergic demodulation
of the brain in sleep (p. 160). Note also his model
for dream amnesia, Without the aminergic neuro
modulators norepinephrine and serotonin, the mne
monically weak dream trace c nnot be converted into
dre m rec ll (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999,
212). Dream amnesia is the result of a weak dream
trace due to a shift in neuromodulation. If this is so,
why do we ever recall dreams or why is there variation
in the clarity with which we recall individual dreams
at different points in time? But more importantly, this
form of biological reductionism is disputed by studies
indicating that psychological states and thoughts can
influence brain functioning. For example, in studies
using positron emission tomography (PET), Pardo,
Pardo, and Raichle (1993) measured cerebral blood
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Ongoing Discussion:
obsonand
Pace-Schott
flow in subjects at rest and again as the subjects imag
ined or recalled sad situations. The investigators found
that there were significant differences in regional
blood flow between the two states (Gabbard, 1994).
Gabbard concludes that one implication of these pre
liminary findings is that psychological influences can
cause neurophysiological changes in the brain (1994,
p
4); Gabbard extends this reasoning to his summary
of
Kandel s experiments on the marine snail indicating
that synaptic connections can be strengthened and
permanently altered through the regulation of gene
expression connected with learning from the environ
ment (p. 4). Gabbard (1994) quotes Kandel in his
statement that
it
is only insofar as our words produce
changes in each other s brains that psychotherapeutic
intervention produces changes in patients minds
(Kandel, 1979).
Our second problem with Hobson s model is that
his biological reductionism eliminates psychological
data s scientific data in the study of the mind or the
brain. We attribute Hobson s statements, such s that
we find Freud s theory to be scientifically un
founded (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999) to reflect
Hobson s refusal to accept Freud s psychological data
from patient associations in analysis as valid informa
tion useful to describing dreams and dream mentation.
We ask Hobson: How does he account for Freud s
accurate description of aspects of dream mentation
such s the importance of long-term memory, vivid
visualization, condensation, displacement, plastic rep
resentation, affectively driven plots, regression with
loss of reality testing, and delusional belief in the
dream and dream amnesia? Did Freud make up this
description out of whole cloth or did he derive these
descriptions and models from his psychoanalytic data
garnered from dream analyses? How does Hobson ex
plain Freud s suggestion that there exists two methods
by which the mind can process thoughts, memories,
impulses, and emotions: the primary and secondary
process with the primary process most characteristi
cally observed during dreaming and the secondary pro
cess most characteristically observed in waking
thought?
Third, we argue that Hobson s formof biological
reductionism leads him to the assumption that during
sleep there is no unconscious mental functioning that
could impact the brain states. Hobson makes this as
sumption despite evidence of thinking during sleep
derived from sleep laboratory studies in which patients
were awakened during NREM sleep and reported
thoughts. Also, is Hobson unaware that Freud also
proposed that there were thoughts during nondreaming
5
sleep and that dreams represented only one form of
thinking during sleep? Our point here is that even
when faced with data indicating that thoughts occur
during sleep, Hobson is not considering the possibility
of thoughts during sleep as impacting brain function
ing. He is
asserting
that brain states determine psycho
logical states. If the only data that Hobson will accept
as scientific is the biological data, then how can there
be any place in his model of
the dream (a psychobio
logical phenomenon) for psychological data or deter
minants? We argue that this is circular reasoning.
For our fourth disagreement with Hobson s sci
entific approach, we would like to remind him of the
principle that the data observed depend very much on
the method
of observation. Let us look at this principle
as it applies in regard to his claims about the transpar
ency of dreams. To most psychoanalysts, many aspects
of
the reported dream are
s
transparent as we assume
they are to Hobson. However, the psychoanalyst uses
the psychoanalytic method
of
observation (distinct
from psychotherapy) for data collection: the patient s
free associations to elements
of
his or her dream con
tent are considered valid psychological data about the
dream elements. The psychoanalyst listens to the pa
tient s free associations, as one
of
us did to the
green dream, and finds that other associations to
particular dream events pour forth. For example, in
the
green
dream the patient s associations to the
reported dream point to the connection between the
patient s present sexual longings (his memory
of
wish
ing to call J.) and his present sexual prohibition by
his own conscience (neither mother nor wife actually
prohibit his phone call: they only prohibit his phone
call in the patient s mind), and the memories from
childhood of gratified incestuous sexual activities pro
hibited by mother. None of these associations is pres
ent in the reported dream. These thoughts and feelings
are all derived from the patient s associations to the
recalled dream. In the reported dream, all the patient
does is experience danger as he sees himself in a green
room with an unidentified woman. Only in his associa
tions does he link the green room to the upstairs apart
ment, which in childhood was the site of his satisfied
sexual curiosity and longings. If the psychotherapist
does not listen to the
patient s
associations and as
sumes he, the psychotherapist, understands the trans
parent emotional meaningof the dream, then naturally
that is the understanding at which the psychotherapist
and investigator will remain. We argue that there is a
scientific error involved in this approach to the data.
There is a refusal to acknowledge the principle that
the data that are observed are determined by the
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206
method of observation. This is the same error that a
man observing a cow with his naked eye makes when
he asserts that only the gross anatomical cow that he
observes exists and that the cow is not made up
of
cells. When another man observes parts
of
the cow
with a microscope and proclaims the existence
of
cells,
the first man denies the existence of cells because he
cannot observe them with his naked eye and refuses
to use a microscope.
At this point we would like to continue to address
the scientific standing of Hobson and Pace-Schott s
approach to the green dream. or us the anxiety
(or terror) is primary, not secondary, and the object
or quality with which it was associated can be almost
anything (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999, 207;
emphasis added). We would like to point out to Hob
son and Pace-Schott that it is the patient who had the
dream and not them. Thus the psychological data, just
as the biological data on brain state, to be considered
must come from the patient, not from them. According
to the psychoanalytic method of observation, it is not
to their (Hobson, Pace-Schott, or the analyst s) associ
ations that the analyst looks in an attempt to under
stand the meaning to the patient of his dream but to the
patient s associations. The patient does not mention
terror: whose association is this? Whose dream is it
anyway? The patient says nothing about terror, but he
does give multiple associations to the events of the
previous day, to his present and past sexual excite
ments, to his memories
of
childhood sexual play and
the places in which it took place, to his mother, to his
associations of green to his mother and to his mother s
angry prohibitions of incestuous sexual activities. It is
our argument that, in this instance, Hobson and Pace
Schott s claim that
the
object or quality with which
it [this anxiety] was asociated can be almost anything
represents their refusal to accept the patient s associa-
tions his dream as the scientific data in the realm
ofpsychology to which the scientist must account. The
scientist is not free to disregard the patient s associa
tions (after all it is the patient who has had the dream)
and assert by biological data that the object or quality
with which the anxiety can be associated
can be al-
most anything.
We think this example represents in a nutshell
Hobson s refusal to use psychoanalytic data as im
portant information in trying to understand the mean
ing of the psychobiological event
of
the dream to the
patient. Furthermore, this is a good example of Hob
son s refusal to acknowledge the importance of the
method of observation in the determination of the data
to be employed in theory building. Hobson and Pace-
Gilmore Nersessian
Schott refuse to use the patient s free associations or
the analytic method (microscope)
of
observation.
We would like to add here that Hobson s claim
that psychoanalysts think all dreams must be transfer
ence dreams is a creat ion of Hobson s. This claim is
not a finding of Freudian analysis. By the way, was
such a claim made about the green dream?
Hobson and Pace-Schott asked us (p. 207) why
the patient would need to disguise or symbolize his
mother s disapproval of his temptations or would we
think that if the patient simply dreamt tha t he was
talking to his mother and she explained concern about
his impulsiveness that he would awaken. Our answer
is that now it is not his mother s disapproval or his
own internal disapproval that must be disguised. What
the patient must disguise is his satisfaction of his sex
uallongings: the patient defies his mother and his con
science in his dream and returns to the scene in
childhood in which he defied the prohibitions and
gained sexual satisfaction. The dream protects the pa
tient s sleep only to the degree to which the dream
represents the patient s present sexual longings as satis
fied in a sufficiently disguised form. Sexual excite
ments left over from the previous day are making
demands on the sleeper s mind that he find satisfaction
for them. These demands leave the sleeping patient in
the situation of either having to awaken to find sexual
satisfaction in the present or, if Freud were right, to
maintain sleep by dreaming of sexual satisfaction and
thus trying to delude himself that these demands have
been satisfied. As we said in our report, we agree
with Hobson and Pace-Schott, this dream fails and the
patient awakens. His sleep is not protected.
For another example
of
Hobson and Pace
Schott s unscientific approach to building models for
dream formation, let us focus on their reaction to the
issue of the dream as guardian of sleep. Despite Hob
son and Pace-Schott s assertion that psychoanalysts
do not question their theory,
Mark
Solms (1999) cor
rectly reported that this psychoanalytic proposition
has never been tested and suggested clinicopathologi
cal studies. Hobson s argument for his disagreement
with the thesis that the dream might act as the guardian
of sleep underscores the non-data-driven assertions
that he makes. He and Pace-Schott state,
We
have
grave doubts about (i) the philosophical assumptions
of the hypothesis (how can a dream, which is a psy
chological experience, serve a physiological func
tion?), (ii) its intrinsic validity (dreaming might have
many other functions or even be an epiphenomenon),
and (iii) its testability (p. 220). Is it beyond Hobson
and Pace-Schott s consideration that a psychological
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Ongoing Discussion: Hobson
an d
Pace-Schott
event (a dream) could influence a neurophysiological
event such as brain functioning during sleep? Could it
be that a psychological phenomenon (dreaming) could
have an impact on the neurophysiology? (See above
for a more detailed description and critique of Hob
son s specific form of biological reductionism.) Or is
questioning the intrinsic validity of something the
same as asserting that it is true, without testing it?
Is psychological data by its nature unscientific and
inadmissable?
Let us look at another example of Hobson and
Pace-Schott s lack of scientific approach to data as it
occurs in their discussion of dream amnesia (Hobson
and Pace-Schott, 1999). Allen Braun (1999) raises
doubts about their strictly biological model for dream
amnesia by noting the observable fact that dream am
nesia is atypical and variable. In response, Hobson
offers the frequency
of
his own waking recall
of
dreams (a study with a sample size of one, no controls,
and which disregards data from other sleepers ) as
proof that dream amnesia must be only biologically
determined and that the psychological model
of
re
pression has been disproved
Hobson an d Pace-Schott as Psychotherapists
Let us address our reactions to Hobson and Pace
Schott as psychotherapists. Hobson and Pace-Schott
assert (p. 207) that as psychotherapists they have two
principles in regard to work with dreams: one, that
dreams are characterized by transparent emotional sa
lience, and two, that all dreams are hyperassociative.
Well, we could not agree more and are pleased that
dreams are no longer the meaningless epiphenomena
of the activation-synthesis model of Hobson and
McCarley (1977). However, we feel compelled to tell
Hobson, if he has certain principles that he applies to
the clinical work and case reports of others, then he
should also apply them to himself. When he makes
assertions about how he understands dreams as a psy
chotherapist, why not offer the reader one
of
his cases
with all the requirements for an unedited clinical re
port, controls, and an alternative explanatory model
that he demands of us in a brief synopsis? Where is
his clinical data to support his assertions?
In this same section
of
comments, Hobson and
Pace-Schott then claim to be not only psychotherapists
but psy hodyn mi psychotherapists. What do Hobson
and Pace-Schott mean by dynamic conflict but only
conscious conflict? If they are psychodynamic psycho
therapists, why don t they understand the patient s
7
reasons for disguising from himself the connection be
tween his present sexual longings and the gratified
but prohibited (then by mother, and now by his own
conscience) incestuous activities
of
childhood? Per
haps Drs. Hobson and Pace-Schott assume Freud s
ideas to be mythology because they refuse to consider
the possibility
of
unconscious mental processes affect
ing conscious experience?
Hobson
an d
Pace-Schott s Questions to
Gilmore
an d Nersessian
We find it necessary to begin this section by offering
a more detailed description of the Freudian model of
dream formation. We hope this more detailed sum
mary will clarify some of the answers that we offer
to the questions Hobson and Pace-Schott have posed
for us. As will become evident, we think that some of
the questions Hobson and Pace-Schott ask are derived
from a misunderstanding of Freud s theory of the mind
and dreaming.
Freud proposed the psychological construct of the
mind, or what he called the mental apparatus, as the
mental functions that developed to serve the function
of
satisfying bodily and emotional demands in such a
manner as to be both gratifying of the person s needs
and consistent with the offerings and limitations of the
external environment. The mental apparatus received
input from the external world through sensory percep
tions and input from the internal bodily world from
the internal bodily perceptions and emotions. Freud
proposed that the mind had two processes available
for handling these internal and external perceptions
and their demands for mental wor
the primary and
secondary process.
Th e
dreaming mind employed the
more archaic primary process. The primary process
handled a demand by rapidly recalling prior experi
ences of gratification (memories) and presenting them
to the mind as present experiences (i.e., as hallucinated
present realities). The primary process was character
ized by visual memory processing, lack of verbal rep
resentation of the perception or demand, lack of
rational thought and logic, and lack of reality testing.
The awake mind employed the more advanced second
ary process. The secondary process was characterized
by putting the demands into verbal form, associating
these verbal symbols with memories for prior relevant
experience, categorizing these memories and putting
them into verbal thoughts, which could then be treated
with logic, and searching the data from incoming sen-
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8
sory perceptions for possibilities for satisfaction avail
able in the external world.
In The Interpretation
reams Freud asserted
that the mind continued throughout sleep to respond
to demands placed upon it by the body and its internal
perceptions and also by some weakened perceptions
received from the extern al world. He prop osed that
while this mental processing took place th roug hou t
sleep, that at some points there was an upsurge in
some appetitive demands from within the body. This
upsurge in appetitive demands from the sleeping body
made upon the sleeping mind coincided with a weak
ness in the mental apparatus characterized by severely
decreased executive functions of the mind secondary
process functions) and severely decreased reception
of sensory information from the external world
to
the
mind blocking of sensory input from the external
world). He also stated that this appetitive upsurge and
weakening of the executive functions
of
the mental
apparatus was usually accompanied by a motor paraly
sis. Freud proposed that manifest dreams were the re
sult of the mental apparatus responding to these
demands by processing them with primary process
mechanisms.
From the d ata he g athered from d ream analyses
on adults, Freud hypothesized that frustrated appeti
tive longings from the p rev iou s day, when they were
reenforced by earlier, more primitive, and unsatisfied
appetitive demands, made demands
of
sufficient inten
sity to require that the mental apparatus respond with
some gratification. In order that the sleeping mind at
tempt to satisfy these demands in the awake mi nd s
usual secondary process manner, including rational
thoughts leading to rational motor actions in reality,
the mind would have to awak en its executive mental
functions, its executive control over motor actions, and
its conscious perception of sensory information from
the ex tern al world. Thus, in ord er to try to satisfy the
d emand by processing it in its usual adult seco ndary
process manner, the sleeping mind would have to
awaken.
Again, from the data he gathered from the pa
tient s associations to dreams, Freud hypothesized the
following process for the formation of a dream. Dur
ing sleep, the mental apparatus registered the upsurge
of an intense appetitive demand in a verbal secondary
process manner. Freud suggested that the intense ap
petitive demand was capable of obtaining verbal rep
resentation from the executive function of the mind
during sleep because although the executive functions
were severely weakened during sleep, there was still
some weak executive functioning available. Actually,
ilmore Nersessian
he suggested that the amount of available executive
mental functioning p robab ly v aried throu gh ou t the
sleep cycle according to the varying level of con
sciousness
of
the patient. Freud further suggested that
the weakened executive functionof the secondary pro
cess also had the capacity to reject this now verbal
demand as unacceptable for psychological reasons for
further representation and treatment by the secondary
process. He labeled the executive function responsible
for this rejection the censor. Next, the sleeping mind,
in response to the blocked access to secondary pro
cess, treated this now verbal appetitive demand
through a different, more archaic and primitive mode
of
handling demands. Freud labeled this archaic mode
the
primary process
and it handl ed a deman d by rap
idly recalling prior experiences of gratification mem
ories) and presenting them to the mind as present
experiences; that is, as hallucinated present realities.
Thus, the sleeping mind employing primary process
tried to co nv in ce the d reamer that his app etitiv e de
man d was b eing satisfied and thus there was no need
to awaken.
Freud suggested that the primary process was
characterized by affective-driven motivation; visual
rather than verbal memory representation; and rapid
recall
of
multiple different memories of experiences
of gratification. These memories could be associated
easily o n the basis of one shared characteristic or af
fective tone displacement) and could easily be com
bined into one image or one composite image
condensation), and be presented as a present experi
ence in which the dreamer believed delusionally loss
of reality testing). The primary process lacked the ver
bal encoding, categorization of memories, verbal
thinking in thoughts, and logical treatmentof thoughts
that characterize the secondary process. Freud claimed
that the primary process treated words and thoughts,
not as symbolic representations with specific mean
ings, but as concrete objects that could be chopped up
an d asso ciated with o ne another, like any other co n
crete object such as a chair or a person on the basis
of
a single characteristic such as their accompanying
sound. Thus the word
nun
could be substituted by the
associated word none not o n the basis
of
shared defi
nition
of
the symbolic meaning of the word but only
on the basis of the sound of the word. Or the word
nun
could be associated by sound to
none
an d then
represented in plastic visual manner by an empty con
tainer none). Thus, the words expressing the appeti
tive demand, when subjected to treatment by the
p rimary process durin g d ream fo rmatio n, wou ld be
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Ongoing Discussion: Hobson and Pace Schott
chopped up or associated on the basisof similar sound
or represented in plastic forms in the dream content.
Another point to be emphasized is the fact that
in Freud s model of dream formation the motivation
for censorship derived from the censor (the weakened
executive function
of
the secondary process) but the
mode of censorship derived from the manner of pro
cessing the demand or from the primary process treat
ment
of
the demand (primitive archaic function). Thus
the motivation for censorship is correlated with the
censor and secondary process but the modeof censor
ship is the result
of
primary process nonverbal func
tioning. We wish to emphasize this point because
whether Freud was right or wrong, Hobson is fre
quently confused in his understanding of this point in
the theory. Hobson assumes that the censor (an execu
tive function
of
the mind and thus secondary process
in Freud s model) is responsible for
creating the bi-
zarreness
of
the dream mentation and then questions
how this can be possible
if
the forebrain (the seat
of
executive mental functions) is relatively deactivated
during REM sleep and dreaming. In Freudian dream
theory, the dream bizarreness is a product of the pri
mary process mode
of
treatment of the appetitive de
mand. The secondary process censor is responsible
only for lending the demand verbal representation and
then blocking the demand s access to further second
ary process treatment by the sleeping mind.
As an aside we would like to mention here that
Freud described all
of
these bizarre characteristics
of
dream mentation (vivid visualization, condensation,
displacement, concrete treatment of words, regression
to delusional experiencing, and lackof reality testing)
in The Interpretation reams We are puzzled why
Hobson when making the same descriptionsof dream
mentation never cites Freud s descriptions (Hobson
and McCarley, 1977; Hobson, 1999). Perhaps this
lapse in recall or reading can explain Hobson and
Pace-Schott s claim that t he problem, as Solms must
recognize, is that if disguise-censorship is explicitly
renounced (as we think it should be), there is really
nothing left to the Freudian dream theory (Hobson
and Pace-Schott, 1999). What has happened to Freud s
elegant descriptions of primary process dream menta
tion (including vivid visualization, affective motiva
tion, condensation, displacement, lack of reality
testing and delusional belief in the dream) and of sec
ondary process mentation as characteristic of awake
mind functioning? What has happened to Freud s
claim for the emotional salience
of
dreams; and to his
claim for the importance of early memories to dream
content; and to his proposition that the sleeping mind
2 9
continues to think throughout the night but only some
times does this
thinking
take the form
of
a dream?
Were these observations and proposals, which are all
part of Freud s dream theory, complete mythology so
that if dream censorship is disproved then nothing is
left
of
Freudian dream theory?
To continue with Freud s model
of
dream forma
tion. Freud proposed that mind continued to make
modifications to dream material throughout its awak
ening from sleep and often throughout the following
day. He based this hypothesis on his observation that
patients continued to make changes in their reported
dreams when asked to repeat them or when they spon
taneously repeated them. Freud suggested that as the
mental apparatus awakened and gained access to more
secondary process functions, the awakening or awake
patient added secondary process comments such as
This
is only a dream or rearranged dream content
in more narrative sequential order secondary revi
sion in order, if necessary, to further disguise the
gratified but prohibited dream event. Freud pointed
out that in these instances, the awakening or awake
mind employs the secondary process in a defensive
manner (as contrasted with the primary process contri
butions to dream formation that result in more bizarre
dream content). Now the awake or awakening patient
can employ his increasingly available secondary pro
cess functions, including repression (forgetting or the
ability to ignore unacceptable mental content), to de
fend the awake patient from recognition
of
his having
satisfied the prohibited appetitive demand during
dreaming sleep.
If
successful in his secondary process
defense, the patient will repress his awareness
of
the
appetitive demand and forget his dream. Thus, Freud
explains dream amnesia by the ability
of the secondary
process executive functions of
the awake mind to ig
nore the unacceptable appetitive demands.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that Freud s model
of
dream formation includes a dynamic balance be
tween the appetitive drive and its prohibition and dy
namic balance between primary and secondary
process treatment
of
this appetitive demand. Freud
proposed that the sleeper passed through different lev
els of consciousness throughout the night (and daytime
also for that matter), and that perhaps the primary and
secondary processes corresponded to different levels
of
sleep-wakefulness.
Now for Hobson s and Pace-Schott s questions.
As for their first question regarding stimulus dis
charge, our definition of psychic stimuli as the appeti
tive demand should help to clarify the confusion raised
by our use of the word stimulus in our previous synop-
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2
sis. We are referring to a psychological stimulus and
not to an electrical neurochemical stimulus Their
question is simply why do we need psychological solu
tions to psychological stimuli? Why can t we have a
purely physiological sleep maintenance model? Our
answer is that there probably is a physiological sleep
maintenance function, but the evidence from analytic
dream interpretations is that there is also a psychologi
cal sleep maintenance function that comes into play
when psychobiological demands arising during sleep
threaten to prematurely disrupt sleep. In these in
stances, dreams help maintain sleep by misleading the
sleeper into believing that these demands have been
satisfied, at least temporarily.
As for the answer to their second question regard
ing the biological correlates in brain functioning for
the mental phenomena of primary process, we think
Drs. Hobson and Pace-Schott are in a much better
position as expert neurophysiologists and researchers
to answer the question about possible brain activity
site correlations. However, perhaps the limbic lobe
regional activation and posterolateral cortical activa
tion in combination with the relative defrontalization
of REM sleep, to which Hobson and Pace-Schott
(1999) attribute dream bizarreness, are correlates?
Question number three about the reason an expe
rience must become verbal in order to be in the system
conscious, is a question of definition of the character
istics of the system conscious or secondary process
functioning as described by Freud. He spawned these
confusions by his inconsistent use of the words con-
scious and unconscious Freud s original use
of
the
labels conscious and unconscious were as purely de
scriptive of whether the person was consciously aware
or not of the particular psychological phenomena or
perception. However, in The Interpretation Dreams
Freud used the term the system conscious to denote
the secondary process system of treating appetitive
demands and the system unconscious to denote the
characteristics of the primary process treatment of ap
petitive demands. A characteristic of secondary pro
cess treatment by the mental apparatus was that the
demand be represented by a verbal symbol that would
allow the demand to be specifically categorized, and
thought about logically. Freud claimed that some feel
ings, thoughts, and impulses were treated by the sec
ondary process or
system conscious
but that the
process could take place in a
descriptively unconscious
r preconscious
state of awareness. Thus, a person
could process thoughts with the system conscious, us
ing secondary process mental function but do so in a
descriptively unconscious state of awareness; that is,
Gilmore-Nersessian
be consciously unaware of his thinking. Thus some of
Hobson s premonitions and intuitions may be the re
sult of descriptively unconscious thoughts that are
nevertheless processed by the system conscious and
to which the person only has some feeling awareness.
In question number four, Hobson and Pace
Schott point out that cortical areas known to be in
volved in verbal processing and expression are rela
tively deactivated in REM and NREM sleep and they
ask how could this neurophysiological data correlate
with the Freudian claim that associations to manifest
dream reports reveal that word play and plastic repre
sentation of words contribute to manifest dream con
tent? This word play and plastic representation are
consistent with Freud s model of the dreaming mind
as employing the nonverbal primary process in which
words are treated as concrete things (see explanation
above). The point is that the words are not treated as
symbolic representations of their specific referents but
rather as objects characterized by their sound or im
plied shapes. Thus the Freudian model would predict
a relative deactivation of brain areas correlated with
verbal and executive functions (frontal lobes?) and an
increased activation of brain areas that might correlate
with more primitive primary process functioning in
which words would be treated as things.
Could Freud s hypothesis that there are two
methods by which the mind may treat appetitive de
mands, the archaic primary process and the newer sec
ondary process, be correlated with relative shifts in
activity level in older and newer brain areas? Could
not Freud s hypothesis be correlated with Hobson and
Pace-Schott s physiological claims that the biological
brain in sleep is characterized by a brain state in
which there is selective activation in the pontine brain
stem, the deep mediobasal subcortex, the limbic sys
tem, the paralymbic cortices, unimodal associative
cortices, and the parieto-tempero-occipital-junction
and by selective deactivation
of the dorsolateral pre
frontal cortex (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999), p.
219.
The answer to Hobson s question as to why
dreams of convenience are rare in adults is that Freud
concluded from analyzing the dreams of adults that
only when the minor appetitive demands arising dur
ing the night (hunger, thirst, etc.) could gain force by
linking up with more forceful, primitive demands that
remained unsatisfied in daily life due to their prohibi
tion in the civilized person, would the minor appetitive
demand reach sufficient intensity to require some sat
isfaction through dream formation. Otherwise, even
the weakened adult mental apparatus of sleep was ca-
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Ongoing Discussion: Hobson and Pace Schott
pable
of
ignoring minor appetit ive demands. Freud
suggested that dreams of convenience may be more
common in young children who have less developed
secondary process mental capacities and thus when
those processes are further weakened during sleep, mi
nor appeti tive demands may be sufficient to demand
satisfaction with a dream of convenience.
Conclusion
We would like to conclude this commentary by thank
ing Drs. Hobson and Pace-Schott for providing us with
such a thorough review of the present neurophysiolog
ical information on sleep an d dreaming. More espe
cially, we would like to thank them for their trenchant
critique
of
Freudian dream theory, because this cri
tique stimulated our thinking about
mind brain
models
based upon either assumptions aboutmind brain inter
action or mind-brain biological reductionism. This in
creased our curiosity about the results of more recent
PET studies on the brains
of
people that image them
in different psychological situations or when they are
recalling particular types
of
memories. Hobson and
Pace-Schott s tough questions challenged us to clarify
our description
of Freudian dream theory.
Finally, as Dr. Braun (1999) stated, we recog
nized that neurophysiologists and psychoanalysts now
agree on many aspects of dream investigation: the
emotional salience of dreams; the importance of early
memories in dreams; the descriptions
of
characteris
tics
of
manifest dream mentation; the descriptions
of
the differences in the
form
of mentation in dreaming
and waking thought; and the forgetting
of
dreams. The
neurophysiological findings
on
the dreaming brain
raise interesting correlations between
Freud s
model
of dream formation and the neurophysiologist s model
of
brain functioning during RE M sleep. However,
there are also important disagreements between the
psychoanalysts and some
of
the neurophysiologists.
We object to theories that rely strictly upon unproven
and contradicted models of biological reductionism
2
and which reject the scientific validity
of
psychoana
lytic data
and
dismiss the possibility that mental pro
cesses, both conscious and unconscious, may dictate
brain functioning. However, these neurophysiological
explorations are challenging and expand our knowl
edge of brain processes during sleep and dreaming and
we hope these fruitful discussions continue.
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Margaret M Gilmore M.D.
120 East 75th Street
New
York
10021
Edward Nersessian M.D.
72 East 91 st Street
New York 10128
e mail: [email protected]