14-2184 motion to intervene

8/9/2019 14-2184 Motion to Intervene

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__________________________14-2184_____________________________

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________________________________

ADA MERCEDES CONDE-VIDAL; MARITZA LOPEZ-AVILES; IRIS DELIARIVERARIVERA; JOSE A. TORRUELLAS-IGLESIAS; THOMAS J.

ROBINSON; ZULMA OLIVERASVEGA; YOLANDA ARROYO-PIZARRO;JOHANNE VELEZ-GARCIA; FAVIOLA MELENDEZ-RODRIGUEZ; PUERTO

RICO PARA TOD@S; IVONNE ALVAREZ-VELEZ,Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DR. ANA RIUS-ARMENDARIZ, in her official capacity as Secretary of theHealth Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; WANDA LLOVET

DIAZ, in her official capacity as the Director of the Commonwealth of Puerto RicoRegistrar of Vital Records; ALEJANDRO J. GARCIA-PADILLA, in his official

capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; JUAN C.ZARAGOSA-GOMEZ, in his official capacity as Director of the Treasury in

Puerto Rico,Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court from the District of Puerto Rico

Civil Case No. 14-1253 (PG)Honorable District Court Judge Juan Pérez-Giménez

BRIEF FOR EIGHT (8) NAMED SENATORS AND FIVE (5) NAMED REPRESENTATIVES DULY ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AS INTERVENOR

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT-APPELLEE FOR PURPOSESOF APPEAL

Case: 14-2184 Document: 00116823395 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/14/2015 Entry ID: 590012


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Come Now Eight (8) duly elected Senators along with Four (4) duly elected

Representatives by Puerto Rico constituents, Honorable Ángel Ramón

“Chayanne” Martínez-Santiago, Honorable José “Joíto" Pérez-Rosa,

Honorable Luis Daniel Rivera-Filomeno, Honorable Pedro “Pedrito”

Rodríguez-González, Honorable Migdalia Padilla-Alvelo, Honorable Ángel

Rodríguez-Otero, Honorable Ramón Ruíz-Nieves, Honorable Itzamar Peña-

Ramírez, Honorable José A. “Toni” Rodríguez-Quiles, Honorable Nardem

Jaime-Espinosa, Honorable Antonio L. “Tony” Soto-Torres, Honorable

María Milagros “Tata” Charbonier-Laureano, José E. “Quiquito” Meléndez

Ortíz (hereinafter “Movants”) through the undersigned counsel, and hereby

respectfully move this Court for leave to intervene as a party-appellee, either as a

matter of right or permissibly, in the above-captioned matter for purposes of filing

an appeal. In support of this motion, the Eight (8) Senators and the Five (5)

Representatives state the following:

[SPACE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY]



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The Movants As Prospective Intervenors1

1. Honorable Ángel “Chayanne” Martínez-Santiago and Honorable José “Joíto”

Pérez-Rosa are duly elected senators by Puerto Rico constituents residing within

the District of Arecibo. Both senators are a PNP members, minority party.

2. Honorable Luis Daniel Rivera-Filomeno and Honorable Pedro “Pedrito”

Rodríguez-González, are both duly elected Senators by Puerto Rico constituents

residing within the District of Carolina. Both senators are PPD members, majority

party.

3. Honorable Angel Rodríguez-Otero is a duly elected senator by Puerto Rico

constituents residing within the District of Guayama. He is PPD member, majority

party.

4. Honorable Ramón Ruiz-Nieves is a duly elected senator by Puerto Rico

constituents residing within the District of Ponce. He is a PPD member, majority

party.

1 Under Article III §§1-3 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

legislative power is vested solely upon the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico.



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5. Honorable Migdalia Padilla-Alvelo is a duly elected senator by Puerto Rico

constituents residing within the District of Bayamón. She is a PNP member,

minority party.

6. Honorable Itzamar Peña-Ramírez is a duly elected Senator At Large by Puerto

Rico constituents. She is a PNP member, minority party.

7. Honorable José A. “Toni” Rodríguez-Quiles, is duly elected representative for

District 16 (Isabela, San Sebastián, and Las Marías). He is a PPD member,

majority party.

8. Honorable Nardem Jaime-Espinosa is a duly elected representative for District

Thirty-five (35) (Humacao). He is PPD member, majority party.

9. Honorable Antonio L. “Tony” Soto-Torres, is a duly elected representative for

District 6 (Cataño, Guaynabo, and Bayamón). He is a PNP member, minority

party.

10. María Milagros “Tata” Charbonier -Laureano, is a duly elected Representative

at Large. She is a PNP member, minority party.

11. José E. “Quiquito” Meléndez Ortíz is a duly elected Representative at Large.

He is a PNP member, minority party.

12. They all appear in their individual capacities as prospective Intervenors

(hereinafter “Movants”). Because the Appellee-Defendants have refused to



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defend Puerto Rico’s marriage law (Article 68) on appeal, Movants move to

intervene for the purposes of pursuing an appeal, protecting its significant interests,

and ensuring that the critical constitutional questions presented in this case are

properly defended.

Argument

1. Appellants are comprised of a gay rights advocacy group and five same-

sex couples seeking the right to marry in Puerto Rico or recognition of their

foreign marriages sued four government officials to invalidate Article 68

under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment. On October 21, 2014 the District Court dismissed their claims

under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), based on Massachusetts v. HHS, 682 F.3d 1,

8 (1st Cir. 2012), and Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). This appeal

ensued.

2. On March 20, 2015, the defendant-appellee, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

(the Executive branch of government), changed its position before the Court by

filing its appellee brief, now in support of the appellants request for remedies

asserting, in summary, that it cannot be established that, what they describe as

“Puerto Rico’s ban on same-sex marriage”, is narrowly tailored to advance a

compelling state interest and that constitutional strict scrutiny should be applied

whether it be under Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause. The



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position assumed by the Executive Branch is contrary to Puerto Rico’s public

policy duly enacted through the legislative process.

3.

The prospective intervenor brief is submitted by government officers who

will properly defend the Puerto Rico’s marriage law.

4.

They have an interest in the case.

5. Appellant-Plainffs challenge Puerto Rico’s marriage law (Article 68) on

constitutional equal-protection grounds. The challenged law defines

marriage and limits recognition of marriage within the State to the union of

one man and one woman.

6. The challenged law originated as legislation in the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico’s legislature. 7. On October 21, 2014 the District Court dismissed Appellants claims under

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), based on Massachusetts v. HHS, 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 2012), and Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).

8. The Governor of Puerto Rico, through its Secretary of Justice, although at

first defended Puerto Rico’s marriage law before the district court, had a

change of heart and on appeal took the position that Puerto Rico’s Article 68

is now unconstitutional.



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9. Movants, as duly elected officials have plenary authority to regulate the

institution of marriage in this State. From the law’s perspective, the well-

being of marriage as a social institution in Puerto Rico has been uniquely

entrusted to the Legislature, which has a significant interest as the State’s

legislative body, and as the author of the challenged laws, to ensure that the

State’s marriage laws are adequately defended when challenged in court.

10. If the Prospective Interveners cannot intervene the legislature’s ability to

protect its significant interests in the subject of this action will be impeded.

11. The Legislature’s significant interests in the subject of this action are

inadequately represented by existing parties. In addition, the Appellant has

consented that another group of senators appear as amici in order to

advocate on their behalf as well.

12.

Appellee’s inaction and refusal to defend Puerto Rico’s marriage laws has

the effect of undermining the legislature’s interests in defending the

challenged marriage laws. In fact, the Appellee is now advocating on behalf

of the Appellant.

13. Substantial justice requires that Movants be allowed to intervene given the

Appellee’s refusal to defend Article 68. Allowing the Prospective

Interveners to intervene furthers substantial justice by ensuring the orderly



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and dignified resolution of a constitutional question of enormous state and

national importance.

14. Granting the Movant’s motion to intervene will not prejudice the existing

parties.

15. Movants have a cognizable interest in defending the enforceability of

statutes the legislature has passed when the Governor declines to enforce

them and Movants interests are not currently being adequately represented in

this action. Abandonment of the Executive branch’s traditional role of

defending duly-enacting statutes, that decision imposes substantial burdens

on the legislature. Movants’ intervention is of surpassing importance to the

separation of powers.

16. --Movants have standing to intervene in this appeal to defend the

constitutionality of Article 68. Our highest court has expressed that

“Congress is … a proper party to defend the constitutionality of [the

challenged statute].” (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). By

comparison, Puerto Rico’s legislature would also be a proper party to defend

the constitutionality of the challenged Article 68.

17. In the accompanying brief in support, Movants will establish, among other

things, that (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) they have an interest

relating to the defense of Article 68 as policymakers; (3) the disposition of



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the action threatens to create a practical impediment to the intervenor’s

ability to protect its interest; and (4) no existing party adequately represents

the intervenor’s interests.

Wherefore, the Eight (8) Senators and the Five (5) Representatives respectfully

urge this Court to grant its motion to intervene.

In Caguas, Puerto Rico this 14th day of April, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

s/EVELYN AIMÉE DE JESÚSEVELYN AIMÉE DE JESÚSUSCA 1st Cir. Bar No. 81601Counsel for Prospective IntervenorsPO Box 88Caguas, PR 00726-0088Telephone (787) [email protected]@me.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this same date, I electronically filed the foregoing

document with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by using the

CM/ECF system. I certify that the following parties or their counsel of record are

Registered as ECF Filers and that they will be served by the CM/ECF system:


mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Omar Gonzalez-PagánHayley GorenbergKaren L. LoewyJael Humphrey-SkomerGary W. KubekHarriet M. AntczakJing KangRyan M. KusminMark C. FlemingFelicia H. EllsworthRachel I. GurvichWilmer Cutler PickeringPaul R.Q. WolfsonAlan E. Schoenfeld

Celina Romany-SiacaCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Maritza López Avilés and Iris D. Rivera Rivera; José A. Torruellas Iglesias and Thomas J. Robinson; Zulma Oliveras Vega and Yolanda

Arroyo Pizarro; Johanne VélezGarcía and Faviola Meléndez

Rodríguez; and Puerto Rico ParaTod@s

Ada M. Conde VidalCounsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Ivonne Álvarez VélezJosé L. NietoCounsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Ada M.Conde VidalIdza Díaz-RiveraAndrés González-BerdecíaMargarita Luisa Mercado-EchegarayTanaira Padilla-RodríguezCounsel for Defendants-Appellees

By s/EVELYN AIMÉE DE JESÚSUSCA 1st Cir. Bar No. 81601Counsel for Prospective Intervenors



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INTERVENOR’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE

Proposed Intervenor-Defendants: Honorable Ángel Ramón “Chayanne”

Martínez-Santiago, Honorable José “Joíto" Pérez-Rosa, Honorable Luis Daniel

Rivera-Filomeno, Honorable Pedro “Pedrito” Rodríguez-González, Honorable

Migdalia Padilla-Alvelo, Honorable Ángel Rodríguez-Otero, Honorable Ramón

Ruíz-Nieves, Honorable Itzamar Peña-Ramírez, Honorable José A. “Toni”

Rodríguez-Quiles, Honorable Nardem Jaime-Espinosa, Honorable Antonio L.

“Tony” Soto-Torres, and Honorable María Milagros “Tata” Charbonier -Laureano,

José E. “Quiquito” Meléndez Ortíz, by and through counsel, respectfully submit

this Proposed Intervener Brief, in Support of Motion to Intervene.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Under the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code, “Marriage is a civil

institution whereby a man and a woman mutually agree to become husband and

wife,” and foreign same sex marriages are invalid. P.R. LAWS A NN. tit. 31, §221

(“Article 68”).

Appellant-Plaintiffs are a gay rights advocacy group and five same-sex

couples seeking the right to marry in Puerto Rico or recognition of their foreign

marriages (“Plaintiffs”) sued four (4) government officials (hereinafter, “Puerto

Rico”) to invalidate Article 68 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed their claims under



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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), based on Massachusetts v. HHS, 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.

2012), and Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).

ARGUMENT

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, through the passage of Article 68 of its

Civil Code, have maintained marriage as a legal union between one man and one

woman. It specifically states the following: “[m]arriage is a civil institution

whereby a man and a woman mutually agree to become husband and wife. Any

marriage between persons of the same sex or transsexuals contracted in other

jurisdictions shall not be valid.” (Article 68 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.

31, §221).

Appellants-Plaintiffs are comprised of a gay rights advocacy group and five

same-sex couples seeking the right to marry in Puerto Rico or recognition of their

foreign marriages sued four government officials to invalidate Article 68 under the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After

Appellee-Defendants defended Article 68, on October 21, 2014 the District Court

dismissed Appellants claims for failing to present a substantial federal question

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), based on Massachusetts v. HHS, 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 2012), and Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).

On March 20, 2015, the defendant-appellee, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico



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(the Executive branch of government), changed its position before this Court by

supporting appellants request for remedies asserting, in summary, that it cannot be

established that, what they describe as “Puerto Rico’s ban on same-sex marriage”,

is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest and that constitutional

strict scrutiny should be applied whether it be under Equal Protection Clause or

Due Process Clause. The position assumed by the Executive Branch is contrary to

Puerto Rico’s public policy which was duly enacted through the legislative

process.

I. MOVANTS ARE ENTITLED TO INTERVENE

There is no Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure that specifically governs

motions to intervene. However, this Circuit has held that motions to intervene in

appellate proceedings should be “guide[d] . . . by analogy to Rule 24 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power

Comm’n, 201 F.2d 334, 342 App. (1st Cir. 1953). Other circuit courts have adopted

the same position. See, e.g., Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 628 F.3d 790,

790 (6th Cir. 2010) (“On appeal, we may grant either intervention of right or

permissive intervention.”); Northeast Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell ,

467 F.3d 999, 1006-08 (6th Cir. 2006) (allowing Ohio Attorney General to

intervene, pursuant to Rule 24, to defend constitutionality of state statute).

Movants meet the Rule 24 requirements for intervention in this case.



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INTERVENTION IS APROPRIATE UNDER RULE 24(a)(2)

Federal Rule 24(a)(2) provides that:

On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:

(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is thesubject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the actionmay as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent thatinterest.

Under the law of this Circuit, four criteria must be satisfied before

intervention as of right under this rule will be granted:

(1) the motion to intervene must be timely;

(2) the putative intervenor must have an interest relating to the

property or transaction that forms the basis of the ongoing suit;

(3) the disposition of the action threatens to create a practical

impediment to the intervenor’s ability to protect its interest; and

(4) no existing party adequately represents the intervenor’s interests. B.

Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544 – 45 (1st Cir.

2006) (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998)).

The Movants easily satisfy each of these requirements.



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1. Timeliness

First, Movant’s motion is timely. Appellee-Defendants, announced on

March 20, 2015 the decision to no longer defend Puerto Rico’s marriage law,

(Article 68) from equal protection challenges. On that same date they filed their

appellees’ brief. Today, this Court ordered the parties to confer an propose a

schedule for further proceedings in view of the cases pending before the Supreme

Court of the United States such as Obergfell v. Hodges, 14-556, among others.

Second, Movants have a strong interest in defending the constitutionality of

its legislative handiwork codified in Article 68 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann.

tit. 31, §221, which states that “[m]arriage is a civil institution whereby a man and

a woman mutually agree to become husband and wife. Any marriage between

persons of the same sex or transsexuals contracted in other jurisdictions shall not

be valid.”

Third, appellees’ refusal to defend Article 68 threatens Movants’ ability to

protect its interest in seeing that Article 68’s constitutionality is upheld because

both parties to the appeal contend that Article 68 is unconstitutional under the

equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment and Appellees refuse to

defend against that challenge. Therefore, unless Movants intervene, they will have

no ability to protect its constitutional interests.



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Lastly, for exactly the same reason, none of the existing parties represent

Movants’ interest in defending the constitutionality of Puerto Rico’s marriage law

against equal protection challenges. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940. While there is

normally a rebuttable presumption that the government will adequately defend an

action, that presumption is overcome where, as here, there is a divergence of

interest between the governmental entity charged with defending an action (here,

Secretary of Justice and the Governor) and the intervenor (here, Legislators). See

Cotter v. Mass. Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers , 219 F.3d 31, 35 – 36

(1st Cir. 2000).

In short, given appellees intent to not defend Article 68, it would be

appropriate that Movants be allowed to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).

2. Movants Have Significantly Protectable Interests in the Subject Matter

Movants have significant protectable interests in the subject matter of this

appeal. See U.S. ex rel. Frank M. Sheesley Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.

Co., 239 R.R.D. 404, 409 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“The interest at stake must be

‘significantly protectable,’ which binding precedent interprets to mean ‘a legal

interest as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character.’

Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir.1987)”).

Movants, as duly elected legislators, have a significantly protectable interest

in the Commonwealth’s laws and policy making through a democratic process.



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This includes matters of domestic relations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed that domestic relations of husband

and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.” See Windsor ,

133 S.Ct. at 2691 — 92, (citing Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler , 280 U.S. 379, 383-

384 (1930)).

Puerto Rico’s Article 68 is the embodiment of state regula tion of domestic

relations. The voter’s exercise of their reserved power must be preserved and

protected. Regulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded

as a virtually exclusive province of the States. See Windsor , 133 S.Ct. 2691.

3. Absent Movant’s Intervention as a Party, the Court’s Ruling WillImpair Their Significantly Protectable Interests

As a practical matter, the outcome of this appeal has the potential to

adversely affect Movant’s significantly protectable interests. The U.S. Supreme

Court previously ruled that domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and

child were matters reserved to the States.” See Windsor , supra.

In harmony with Windsor’s ruling, the district court expressed that the

question of whether to exclude LGBT people from marriage is for “the People,

acting through their elected representatives.” (Conde-Vidal vs. Rius Armendariz,

14-1253-PG, D.P.R. page 21). The district court, citing Schuette, infra, went on to

emphasize the importance of the role of the people, acting through their elected

representatives to regulate marriage:



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For now, one basic principle remains: the people, acting through theirelected representatives, may legitimately regulate marriage by law.This principle is impeded, not advanced, by court decrees based on the proposition that the public cannot have the requisite repose to discuss certainissues. It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the votersare not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rationalgrounds . . . Freedom embraces the right, indeed the duty, to engage in arational, civic discourse in order to determine how best to form a consensusto shape the destiny of the Nation and its people. (emphasis supplied).

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. __, 134 S.Ct.

1623, 1637 (2014)(Op. of Kennedy, J.).

By granting intervention to Movants, this Court will guarantee as well as

safeguard their legal interests to appropriately defend the people’s right in

regulating their domestic policies through their elected representatives.

4. The existing parties do not adequately represent Movants’ interests.

The existing parties are not defending the suit on appeal and have simply

acquiesced to the A ppellant’s claims when they changed their position and decided

not to defend Article 68. Therefore, existing parties’ representation is inadequate

since they are not diligently litigating the case.

“[A] decision not to appeal by an original party to the action can constituteinadequate representation of another party’s interest.” Americans United for

Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 922 F.2d 303, 305 (6thCir 1990) (agreeing with the District of Columbia Circuit); see also Pellegrino v.

Nesbit , 203 F.2d 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1953); Solid Waste Agency of Northern CookCounty v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F.3d 503, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1996)(collecting cases from the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).



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A proposed intervenor “should be treated [by this Court] as the best judge of

whether the existing parties adequately represent ... her interests, and ... any doubt

regarding adequacy of representation should be resolved in [her] favor.” 6 Edward

J. Brunet, Moore’s Federal Practice § 24.03[4][a] (3d ed. 1997).

proving that Movants’ interests are not adequately represented.

Thus, as Appellee-Defendants assumed the position of not defending Article

68 on appeal Movants’ interests are not adequately represented.

STANDING

On the matter of standing, in this Circuit “an applicant who satisfies the

‘interest’ requirement of the intervention rule is almost always going to have a

sufficient stake in the controversy to satisfy Article III as well.” Cotter , 219 F.3d at

34 (citing Transam. Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997)); see

also Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d

104, 110 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Although the two are not identical, the ‘interest’

required under Rule 24(a) has some connection to the interest that may give the

party a sufficient stake in the outcome to support standing under Article III.”). As

discussed above, Movants clearly satisfy the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2).

Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that intervenors met the “rather modest

requirements of Article III.” Daggett 172 F.3d at 109, 114 (holding that defendant-

intervenors possessed Article III standing and explaining that it was therefore



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unnecessary to decide whether an intervenor as of right must possess standing

under Art. III); see also Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat , 317 F.3d. 45, 62 (1st Cir. 2003)

(declining to decide the “complicated question” of whether standing is required to

intervene if the original parties are still pursuing the case because “it is clear that

[the intervenor] has sufficient standing under Article III”).

II. MOVANTS ARE ENTITLED TO PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

Movants are also entitled to intervention are also entitled to permissive

intervention. “On timely motion, the court may permit a . . . governmental officer

or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on a statute.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(b)(2).

In this case, it is undeniable that Movants are duly elected legislators with

plenary authority to regulate the institution of marriage in this State. From the

law’s perspective, the well-being of marriage as a social institution in Puerto Rico

has been uniquely entrusted to the Legislature, which has a significant interest as

the State’s legislative body, and as the author of the challenged laws, to ensure that

the State’s marriage laws are adequately defended when challenged in court.

Therefore, this Court should permit Movants to intervene in this appeal in

order to defend Article 68.

Additionally, a court may grant permissive intervention upon a timely

motion, provided that a proposed intervenor “has a claim or defense that shares



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with the main action a common question of law or fact,” and that the intervention

will not “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). First, Movants established above that their motion is timely,

and the same argument applies with equal force here. Second, Movants’ defense

shares a common question of law with Plaintiffs’ claims — namely, whether Puerto

Rico’s Marriage Law violates the United States Constitution. Third, the litigation

will not be delayed, nor will the existing parties be unduly prejudiced by Movants’

intervention in this case because they do not seek to relitigate matters before the

district court but only to defend on appeal. Thus permissive intervention is proper

here. Further, a compr ehensive defense of Puerto Rico’s Marriage Law before the

appellate courts is desirable to ensure that the important constitutional question

raised in this case is properly refined by the crucible of appellate review. See

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

The Court should therefore grant Movants’ request for permissive

intervention.

[SPACE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY]



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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Movants’ request to

intervene as an Appellee-Defendant in this case.

Respectfully submitted in Caguas, Puerto Rico this14th day of April, 2015

s/EVELYN AIMÉE DE JESÚSEVELYN AIMÉE DE JESÚSUSCA 1st Cir. Bar No. 81601

Counsel for Prospective IntervenorsPO Box 88

Caguas, PR 00726-0088

Telephone (787) 593-3055

[email protected]

[email protected] OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this same date, I electronically filed the foregoing

document with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by using the

CM/ECF system. I certify that the following parties or their counsel of record are

Registered as ECF Filers and that they will be served by the CM/ECF system:



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Omar Gonzalez-Pagán

Hayley Gorenberg

Karen L. Loewy

Jael Humphrey-SkomerGary W. Kubek

Harriet M. Antczak

Jing Kang

Ryan M. Kusmin

Mark C. Fleming

Felicia H. Ellsworth

Rachel I. GurvichWilmer Cutler Pickering

Paul R.Q. Wolfson

Alan E. Schoenfeld

Celina Romany-Siaca

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Maritza López Avilés and Iris D.

Rivera Rivera; José A. Torruellas Iglesias and Thomas J. Robinson;

Zulma Oliveras Vega and Yolanda

Arroyo Pizarro; Johanne VélezGarcía and Faviola Meléndez

Rodríguez; and Puerto Rico Para

Tod@s

Ada M. Conde Vidal

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Ivonne Álvarez Vélez

José L. NietoCounsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Ada M.Conde Vidal

Idza Díaz-Rivera

Andrés González-Berdecía

Margarita Luisa Mercado-Echegaray

Tanaira Padilla-Rodríguez

Counsel for Defendants-Appellees

By s/EVELYN AIMÉE DE JESÚS

USCA 1st Cir. Bar No. 81601



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Counsel for Prospective Intervenors


14-2184 motion to intervene

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