I ^iNAL

IN_T:FIE..SIIPREME C NOFO€YIOJ

12-0126CITY OF MAPLE HEIGHTs

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs:

WILLIAM WOODS

) On Appeal From The Cuyahoga) County Court Of Appeals) Eighth Appellate District

Court of Appeals) CaseNo.: CA1109699$

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION

OF APPELLANT WILLIAMWOODS

Counsel for Plainfiff-Appellee

Prosecutor John J. Montello, Esq.City of Maple HeightsLaw Department5353 Lee RoadMap1e Heights, Ohio 44137 °Phone: 216.662.6000

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant

William Woods20009 Buttesnut LaneWarrensville Heights,: OH 44128Phone: 216.991.6066 (home)

404.721.5012 (mobile)216:244.2444 (mobile)

(Pro se)

JAN 23Z01i

CLERK OF COURTSUPREME COURT OF OHIO

TABLE OF COhITENTS

Page

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLICOR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND INVOI.VES A SUBSTANTIALCONSTITUTIONAL"QUESTION ......: ....:..:. .......:: ......... ......... .......::........... ............. 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS .......:.' .:...................................4

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW ........................:......6

Propositi on of Law No. Ia" In giving testimony concerning an alleged red lightviolation, in cases where the, police officer was, stationed on the opposite side ofthe traffic light and did not actually see the driver's side of the light turn red, theprosecution must present sufficient evidence that thexraffic light was properlyfiinctioning on that day and that both sides of it were in sync ................ .........6

Proposition of Law No. II: In giving t'estimoo.y concerning an alleged red lightviolation, in cases where there is a clearly marked stop line, more weight is givento the witness who is able to recall more defmitively where the vehicle was inrelation to the stop line at the time the light turned red pursuant to R.C. Section451'1.13 (c)(1) ....:.... ....................... .,.. . .< ..........:.8

Propositi on of Law No. III: As long as their acts or omissions were not withmalicious purpose, in bad faith, or in awanton or reckless manrier, any licensedand insured operator of a motor vehicle shall be granted reasonabte, immunityfrom prosecution ofmoving violations when an emergency medical service orpublic safety vehicle has been called and is slow to respond and said operatormust act as an emergency ca`regiver to their self or fellowman....... .. ............. 10

CONCLUSION'.. ........:^ ....................: ......... ..:..:.:. ...:.:... .....:......:12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....... .........:............................................... 13

APPENDIX Appx. Page

Opinion of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals(December 8; 2011) ............................... .....,............... ......:.. ........ ....14

Judgment Entry of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals(December 8, 2011) .....................................................:.............:..............14

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLICOR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND INVOLVES A

SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL OUESTION

This cause presents three critical issues for the future of red light violations in the

state of Ohio: (1) whether a police officer's testimony of an alleged red light violation

should be given considerable weight when that officer was not on the same side of the red

light as the driver and he can only assume that both sides of the light were in sync; (2)

whether a driver should be considered in violation of a red light ordinance if his car had

fully crossed the stop line yet he was still within the intersection when the light turned

red; and (3) whether a driver operating under a certain degree of an emergency situation

should be granted liniited immunity and allowed to run a red light as long as he proceeds

is case; the court of appeals ruled that although the officer's testimony was

contrasted and outweighed by that of the Appellant and his witness, it was not erroneous

the court toaccept the officer's version of the incident. The court also ruled that

although the defendant was responding to an emergency situation, he was not entitled to

any form of immunity as he was not an agency created by the state.

The decision of the court of appeals threatens the very trust that citizens devote

towards the, judicial system as it pertains to a trier of facts ability to not give a police

officer's testimony an unfair or unmerited amount of weight over that of the citizen

simply because the one is a police officer. Moreover, the court of appeals' decision

impedes on a citizen's 9a' Amendment unenumerated right to preserve public health. and

safety and to respond within reason during the emergence of a crisis.

3

In sum, this case addressesissues that occur every day in the State of Ohio, and

affects every operator of a moto`r vehicle in Ohio. To preserve the integrity of the trier of

fact and encourage Good Samaritan acts with the state, this court must grant.

jurisdiction to hear this case and review the erroneous and dangerous decision of the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On Apri19 2011, at approximately 10:16 A.M., Appellant, William Woods

(hereinafter "Mr. Woods") was cited by Officer Steve Basiewiez (hereinafter "The

Officer.") of the Maple Heights Police Department as having ran a red light pursuant to

the City's Codified Ordinance Rule 414.03.

P04Q93 was the issued ticket number and a pre-trial was set for Apri126, 2011 in the

Maple Heights Mayor's Court. Mr. Woods appeared and pled "Not Guilty" and trial was

set for May 19, 2011 at the Garfield Heights Municipal Court under case number

TRD1103901,

The Appellant-Defendant, Mr. Woods, represented himself Pro Se. The Appellee-

Plaintiff, City of Maple Heights (hereinafter "The City'), was represented by Prosecutor

John Montello. The case was heard before Judge Jennifer P. Weiler who, during the

course of trial, allowed all evidence from both sides to be admitted. The City presented

one witness in the form of testimony from Officer Steve Basiewicz; the issuing officer.

There wasno video evidenee: Mr. Woods presented two witnesses, several affidavits and

photos. The decision was found in favor of the City.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Woods is the C.E.O. of What A Lovely Home, LLC which is a company that

rehabs homes for the elderly and disabled. He is also the Executive Director of The

Jackie O. Foundation which is a non-profit organization that provides emergency

assistance to those in distress. Just prior to receiving said citation, he received a phone

call that an individual had fallen off a ladder and was in need of emergency medical

assistance. As he was only two minutes away, Mr. Woods headed out to provide care to

the individual:

While en route and travelingwithin the speed limit, southbound on Warrensville

Center Road, Mr: Woods came to the intersection in question and noticed a police officer

sitting in a marked car approximately 100 hundred feet away and on the opposite side of

the light. The traffic light had just turned yellow as Mr. Woods crossed over the stop line

and remained yellow as he passed oveithe crosswalk and entered the intersection. The

traffic light didn't turn red until the back of his car passed under the actual traffic light

itself. A witness who had been following a few car lengths behind Mr. Woods in a

separate vehicle had stopped at the intersection for the red, light witnessing the entire

event (ExhibitB-2).

Said Officer initiated the traffic stop; at which time, Mr. Woods vehemently

declared his innocence while asking the Officer to clarify exactly where his vehicle was

in relation to the intersection at the time the light turned red. The Officer responded that

Mr. Woods barely missed the light (transcript page 6, line 9) and that his car was just

prior to the intersection when the light turned red (transcript page 6, line 7).

Maintaining his innocence, Mr. Woods took the matter to trial which was held 40 days

after the summons was issued. Having never been informed of his right to counsel, he

appeared Pro se and was found Guilty. The Appellee never entered an appearance at the

appeal.

ARGiJMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

Proposition of Law No. I: In giving testimony concerning an alleged

red light violation, in cases where the police officer was stationed on

the opposite side of the traffic light and did not actually see the

driver's side of the light turn red, the prosecution must present

sufficient evidence that the traffic light was properly functioning on

that day and that both sides of it were in sync.

At the time of trial, the City presented one witness (the Officer) who

testified that Mr. Woods was just prior to the intersection when the traffic light turned

red. For his part, Mr. Woods presented two witnesses (himself and Keith Bowman via

admitted Affidavit) who both testified that he had entered the intersection while the light

was yellow (transcript page 11, line 8 and Exhibit B-2). Clearly the evidence should

weigh heavily in favor of Mr. Woods as both of his witnesses were immediately before

the light and intersection and therefore at a better vantage point thain the Officer to

ascertain the precise location of the subject vehicle as the light progressed from green to

yellow to red. Section 4511.13 (b)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code provides, in pertinent

part:

6

Vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolleys facing a steady circular yellowor yellow arrow signal are thereby warned that the related green movement isbeing terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter.

Ohio Courts have construed both local and state traffic code provisions to mean

that a znotorist who enters an intersection on a yellow signal is lawfullly in the intersection

and having the right of way may proceed with caution through the intersection. See

Kapel; South.Euclid v. Moss, Oct. 14, 1999. See City of Columbus v. Muhanad N. Sharaf

(Ohin Court ofA'pp: 10' District Franklin County 2002).

Based on the Officer's own testimony, not only was he 100 feet down the road

and away from the intersection in the parking lot of a fire station (transcript page 7, line

25), he was positioned in a way to monitor speed and not the traffic signal (transcript

page 4, line 4). From such a lengthy distance and poor vantage point, it is very likely that

his estimation of when the light turned red and exactly what time the subject vehicle

entered into the intersection would have been miscalculated. Monitoring the crossing

point of a vehicle that is 100 feet ahead and traveling towards you leaves some room for

error; and in this case, that error could have been that at least part or all of the subject

vehicle was in the intersection prior to the light turning red. The Officer would have had

a better opportunity to judge the infraction had he been stationed parallel or to the side of

the intersection. In fact, since the Officer didn't even know which lane the subject vehicle

had traveled in (transcript page 7, line 8), it's obvious that his perception was somewhat

flawed. How could he possibly state with certainty that the subject vehicle was just prior

to the intersection when the light turned red if he didn't even know which lane it was

traveling in?

7

Further, the Officer also testified that he was behind Mr. Woods' light and never

actually even saw his light turn red (transcript page 8, line 2). He merely assumed and

trusted that all of the lights were in sync. Unfortunately, there was insufficient evidence

presented by the City to support that the lights were in sync as there had been no

diagnostic tests performed by the Officer on the lights that day (transcript page 6, line

14).

Proposition of Law No. II: In giving testimony concerning an alleged

red light violation, in cases where there is a clearly marked stop line,

more weight is given to the witness who is able to recall more

definitively where the vehicle was in relation to the stop line at the

time the light turned red pursuant to R.C. Section 4511.13 (c)(1).

The trial court held that based on the Officer's testimony, Mr. Woods'

vehicle "was on the other side of the stop line" when the light turned red (transcript page

13, line 8). However, the Officer's actual testimony was that he gauged only when it was

that the vehicle had entered into the intersection as the sole basis of whether the light was

ran (transcript page 6, line 17). In fact, upon further examination as to exactly where the

subject vehicle was in relation to the intersection and stop line when the light turned red,

the Officer stated that he "could not pinpoint exactly" but merely felt that said vehicle

was prior to the intersection. The trial court should have viewed such testimony as

insufficient because it fails to address the subject vehicles exact location in relation to the

stop line which in this instance should have been the primary concern. Section 4511.13

(c)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code provides, in pertinent part:

8

Vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolleys facing a steady red signal aloneshall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalkon the near side of the intersection, or if none, then before entering theintersection and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shownexcept as provided in divisions (C)(2) and (3) of this section.

In this instance, the Officer testified that there was a clearly marked stop line in

place (transcript page 7, line 10). Therefore, this is the only spot that should have been

used in deterniining whether Mr. Woods ran the light. In fact, the "stop spots" in

significant order are: 1. Stop line, 2. Crosswalk and 3. Intersection. By testifying only

that Mr. Woods' vehicle was just prior to the intersection, the Officer failed to establish

whether Mr. Woods' vehicle had crossed either the stop line or the crosswalk when the

light turned red. In fact, judging froni the photo, it is possible that the entire length of the

subject vehicle could have crossed over the stop line but still not have made it into the

intersection when the light turned red; in which case, Mr. Woods would still have not

been in violation of running the light.

The law should clearly states the magnitude of the Officer needing to know the

exact location of the subject vehicle as it relates to the stop line in red light violation

cases where there is a clearly marked stop line. In a similar matter, the decision of the

trial court was upheld only because the Officer testified that the subject vehicle was

directly on the painted white stop line at the time the light turned red. See Village of

Highland Hills v. Marc A. Feldman (Ohio Court ofApp. 8`h District Cuyahoga County,

Case No. 81094). In this instance, the patrolman knew the exact location of the subject

vehicle and not that it was merely somewhere before the intersection.

The law should also clearly state the magnitude of the Officer needing to be at a

proper angle to make any factual deterniination. In a similar matter, the decision of the

9

trial court was reversed as the Officer stated that he could not see the stop line at the time

the supposed infraction occurred. See Village of Moreland Hills v. Martin S. Bursky

(Ohio Court of App. 8t1i District Cuyahoga County, Case No. 91762).

In light of the afore-mentioned, the trial court erred to the prejudice of the

defendant as insufficient evidence was presented to support that the subject vehicle had

not yet crossed the stop line when the light turned red and he was therefore guilty of the

red light infraction.

Proposition of Law No. III: As long as their acts or omissions were not

with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless

manner, any licensed and insured operator of a motor vehicle shall be

granted reasonable immunity from prosecution of moving violations

when an emergency medical service or public safety vehicle has been

called and is slow to respond and said operator must act as an

emergency caregiver to their self or fellowman.

Although Mr. Woods emphatically denies that he ran the red light, even if he had

he should have received immunity since he was responding to an emergency call.

Section 4511.03(a) of the Ohio Revised Code provides:

The driver of any emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle, when responding toan emergency call, upon approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign shallslow down as necessary for safety to traffic, but may proceed cautiously past suchred or stop sign or signal with due regard for the safety of all persons using the

street or highway.

10

Section 4511.01(e)(4) of the Ohio Revised Code provides in pertinent part that a

public safety vehicle is:

Any vehicle used to transport or provide emergency medical service to an ill orinjured person, when certified as a public safety vehicle, shall be considered apublic safety vehicle when transporting an ill or injured person to a hospitalregardless of whether such vehicle has already passed a hospital.

Section 2744.01(a) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that:

"Emergency call" means a call to duty, including, but not limited to,communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal observations bypeace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediateresponse on the part of a peace officer.

Mr. Woods is the Executive Director of the Jackie O. Foundation, a non-profit

organization which provides emergency assistance to those in distress. The subject

vehicle was registered under the non-profit's name. On the date and time in question, he

had received an emergency call that an employee had required immediate medical

attention and that the City was slow to respond. He then proceeded to drive to the

location, pick up the injured person and transport them to the nearest hospital (Exhibits B

and C). During the e„t#niehe_onexat •^^vehicle with due regard for the safety of

all persons by not speeding or driving in a reckless manner; the Officer confirmed this in

his testimony (transcript page 4, line 3). The law clearly states that drivers of emergency

or public safety vehicles, negligence is present, are immune from

prosecution as long as their actions didn't constitute willful or wanton niisconduct. See

Whitley v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 125 Ohio St. 3d 1449, 2010 Ohio 2510, 927

1V.E.2d 1129.

11.

Further, the law clearly states that employees of a political subdivision enjoy a

presumption of immunity in connection with their performance of goverpmental or

proprietary functions. They are immune unless their acts or omissions were with

malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. See Herweh v. Bailey

(Oct. 23, 1996), Ist Dist. No. 960177, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4621.

Although Mr. Woods' vehicle doesn't fall under the category of public safety

vehicle and his organization doesn't fall under the category of a political subdivision, he

was still compelled to act heroically and such honorable actions should be commended

rather than punished.

Moreover, the 9`t' Amendment provides the unenumerated right of a citizen to

preserve public health and safety and to respond within reason during the emergence of a

crisis. Given the circumstances and the way in which Mr. Woods responded with both

caution and care, said traffic citation impedes on that right.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, this case involves matters of public and great

general interest and a substantial constitutional question. The appellant requests that this

court accept jurisdiction in this case so that the important issues presented will be

reviewed on the merits.

Respectfully Submitted,

William WoodsDefendant-Appellant (Pro se)

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was sent via hand delivery this 18'h day

of January, 2011 to the following:

John Montello, Esq.City of Maple Heights Law Department5353 Lee RoadMaple Heights, OH 44137Phone:.216.662.6000

Counsel for Plaintiff-AppelleeCity of Maple Heights

William Woods20009 Butternut LaneWarrensville Heights, OH 44128Phone: 216.991.6066

Defendant

Court of RpPPA6 of QobiD

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICTOOUNTY OF_.CUYAHOGA ..

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINIONNo. 96998

CITY OF MAPLE HEIGHTS

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

WILLIAM WOODS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT:AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from theGarfield Heights Municipal Court

Case No. TRD 1103901

BEFORE: Sweeney, P.J., Keough, J., and E. Gallagher, J.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 8, 2011

FOR APPELLANT

William D. Woods, Pro Se20009 Butternut LaneWarrensville Heights, Ohio 44128

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

John J. Montello, Esq.Law DirectorCity of Maple Heights5353 Lee RoadMaple Heights, Ohio 44137

-i-

-1-

JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant William Woods appeals the decision of the Garfield

Heights Municipal Court that found him guilty, as cited, for a traffic violation.

We affirm.

Defendant was charged with violating code section 414.03 of the city of

Maple;Heights Ordinances and the matter proceeded to a bench trial.

At trial, the officer testified that on Apri19, 2011 he was working routine

patrol in his marked vehicle and wearing his full uniform. At 10:16 a.m., he was

parked in the lot of the fire station located on Warrensville. Center Road when

he observed defendant drive through a red light. He had a clear view and there

was no doubt in the officer's mind. There was about 100 feet between them. He

said defendant's car was in front of the intersection, and had not crossed into it,

I r_.__ ^^._ i:_1^4 4-.__..a _,.a 11._ TL_UC1V1C L11C 11g11L LUli1CU 1CU. LC1C11U^1.11L Glo^a-elSa111111GU L11C V11R:CI. 111C VL11l:CL

confirmed that he had told defendant he had "almost made it but missed it by

a fraction of a second." The officer was watching the traffic iight from the

opposite direction when he determined defendant ran the light. The officer

testified that he knows these lights are f`in sync" from both directions. The

officer did not know the last time there was a diagnostic test performed on the

light.

-2-

The defendant made a statement on his own behalf. He stated that he had

been busy in Maple Heights renovating homes when he received a call that one

of his workers had been injured. Defendant was headed to that location when he

got pulled over. After receiving his traffic citation, defendant proceeded to pick

up the worker and take him to the hospital. Defendant stated he knew that he

made the light and asserted he was in an emergency situation helping someone

that he thought should result in a ruling in his favor. The court found defendant

guilty and imposed a fine and costs. Defendant has appealed.

"First Assignment of Error: The verdict of the trial court is contrary to law

and against the manifest weight of the evidence."

"Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erred when it ruled that the

defendant's vehicle was on the other side of the stop line when the light turned

recl:"

Defendant chaIlenges the court's findings and verdict in these assignments

of error, which we address together.

City of Maple Heights Ordinances 414.03 governs traffic control signals

terms and lights, and in section (a)(3)A. provides:

"(3) Steady red indication.

"A. Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall stop at a clearly

marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of

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the intersection, or if none, then before entering the intersection, and shall

remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown except as provided in

divisions (a)(3)B. and C. of this section."

When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must

determine, "after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State u. Jenks (1991),

61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492.

The proper test for an appellate court reviewing a manifest weight.of the

evidence claim is as follows:

"The appellate court sits as the `thirteenth juror' and, reviewing the entire

record, weighs all the reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

in rnanlying ennflirtg in evirenne, t}ie ^llrvVV1L11GJO^i9 a.i1U li

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State U. Thompkins (1997),

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.

The trial court's judgment was not erroneous under either standard of

review. The officer and defendant gave conflicting testimony. The court accepted

the officer's version of the incident and found there was no evidence presented

that would suggest the traffic light was not properly functioning at the time of

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the infraction. The court acts as the finder of fact in a bench trial and it was

within its province to resolve conflicts in the evidence. The trial court's judgment

was not contrary to law or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

"Assignment of Error III: The trial court erred by not granting immunity

to the de£endant who. was responding to an emergency call."

Defendant is raising for the first time on appeal a sovereign immunity

defense applicable to political subdivisions, which, even if applicable, has been

waived. Nonetheless, there is no evidence in the record that any of the

immunity provisions he cites are applicable to him or his alleged non-profit

organization. Defendant submitted emergency records to support his statement

that he was on his way to help an injured employee at the time he received his

, ,• , r--` d-°-- ^---` ,^^ ` • • i'"'citation. W hlle we QO riOL Q15pUte ti11S la.Cb, Ue1ei1Uatli, Utu i1vu raiSe, itvr 10 iic

entitled to political subdivision immunity or the emergency call doctrine of R.C.

Chapter 2744 or R.C. 4511.03(a). See N.Z. v. Lorain Head Start (Jan. 12, 2000),

Lorain App. No. 98CA007254 (a non-profit organization with an additional

designation as a community action agency is not an agency created by the state

and is not entitled to statutory political subdivision immunity.)

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.

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The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the

Garfield Heights Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The

defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is

terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified, copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., andEILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR