Chris Tomlinson

Arup Resilience, Security and Risk

21 October 2011

Security Master-planning Issuesin Built Environments

Risk appetite, at the organisational level, is the amount of risk exposure, or potential adverse impact from an event, that the organisation is willing to accept/retain. (Mark Carey - Deloitte & Touche LLP)

An economically-conditioned balance between maintaining profitability, while not facing reputational exposure through culpable risk-mitigation failure. (Me)

Threat Likelihood Impact Risk

There will be a Risk Appetite

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Questions that might guide Risk Appetite

Identify headline risk impacts on life safety, economic reinstatement or reputation

What adjacencies might increase or decrease risks?

What are the acceptable norms for protecting the space in its operational and aesthetic context – is there an extant security milieu that appeals as a benchmark?

What risks can be treated, transferred, terminated and what is left to tolerate – the latter lies at the core of risk appetite?

What design basis threats are likely to remain beyond practical (cost-effective) mitigation?

Life Safety

Risk Appetite Illustrated in Counter TerrorismLevels of Resilience to the Effects of Blast

Life Safety + Evacuation

Economic Reinstatement

Operational Continuity

All of which is a little counterintuitive, given that organisations normally say that they are want to be operationally viable after a catastrophic event

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The Implications for Risk Owners You cannot mitigate everything, so figure out what you

can handle as risk appetite – challenging with crowded places

Doing nothing is not an option, but mitigation sufficiency is linked to risk appetite

Get a risk assessment done and one that offers deductions for best protective fit against form, function and budget

Scalability – things change (think about review programmes)

Have an audit trail for what was agreed on and why Do it early because security as an afterthought is ugly

and expensive (think sustainability) Think about balances between security technology and

operations.

Threats, Likelihoods and Mitigation Impact

Minor Serious

Terrorism

Arson

Less LikelyMore Likely

Relatively Low Project Impact Relatively High Project Impact

Anti-Social Behaviour

Kidnap

Bodily Harm

Robbery

Civil Disorder

TheftVandalism

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A Built Environment’s Characteristics Accessed by many people and services during an often

extended working day – highly permissive

Capable guardian numbers will be small in relation to space user populations

A highly predictable and well-publicised diurnal cycle

There will be lots of back-of-house areas

Private spaces are contiguous with public spaces - so good mobility corridors (vehicle and pedestrian)

Technical surveillance challenged in crowded multi-function spaces

Protective stand-off distances between potential threat loci and key assets is often well below what is desirable.

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Permeability

• Pedestrian routes need to be as open as possible to facilitate the business day and avoid clogging at pinch points (e.g. mass transit interchanges etc)

• Effective vehicle control will generally rely on compliant behaviours – traffic enforcement rather than HVM

• Natural barriers need to be enhanced (e.g. water obstacles)

• Fences used sparingly and only along poorly surveyed and ‘lonely’ boundaries

• Atypical behaviours need to stand out – video analytics.

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Urban Buildings• Highly packed on constrained footprints

• Dense occupation – the economics of modern high-rise

• Pedestrian connections across building demises – access control zoning

• Mixed use inner spaces

• Legibility and way-finding encouraged

• Servicing and logistics areas

• Multiple security points needed

• Presence patrolling challenged by site complexity and multiple ownership.

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Building Forms

Sightlines along frontages Heritage Lighting Nuisance alcoves Pinch points Capable guardianship Fear of crime promoters IED Blast propagation.

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Crowded Public Spaces

Auditoria Galleries & museums Nationally-symbolic sites Mass transit interchanges Stadia Night-time economies Retail centres.

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Do Not Forget Crime• Crime

• High concentration of retail outlets

• High footfall

• High level of mixing between workers, shoppers, tourists and others

• Mix of space management (inconsistent security operations)

• Night-time economies

• Cash machines

• Fear of crime

Introducing Crime Prevention Early in Design

There is an academically supported view that “the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life”(Crowe, 2000)

Space designers, owners and users can rarely influence the law, the nature of targets (specifically their attractiveness), but they can do something about the nature of a crime target’s location.

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is all about ‘shaping’ the working, entertainment, retail, domestic, commute and recreational spaces we use; to encourage legitimate use, whilst discouraging the illegitimate use of those spaces.

CPTED Intent

The theory of CPTED is based on a simple idea i.e. that crime results partly from the opportunities presented by physical environment

CPTED is the design or re-design of an environment to reduce crime opportunity and fear of crime through natural, mechanical, and procedural means

CPTED is best applied with a multi-disciplinary approach that engages planners, designers, architects, landscapers, law enforcement and (ideally) residents/space users

The synergies with sustainability are a good selling point

It has limits and cannot solve all crime issues.

Territoriality - reinforcing notions of a “sense of ownership” in legitimate users and discouraging illegitimate users

Surveillance - if offenders perceive that they can be observed (even if they are not), they may be less likely to offend

Access control - denying access to potential target spaces creating a heightened perception of risk in offenders

Target hardening - increasing the effort that offenders must expend in the commission of a crime

Image maintenance - ensuring that the physical environment transmits positive signals to all users

Activity support - the use of design to promote and strengthen intended patterns of usage of space

CPTED

More Open Environment – Inclusive and welcoming immediately

challenges desire for legitimate use

Greater Permeability – pedestrian and vehicle permissive – not all future

space users will be influenced by soft controls versus clear harder rule-

setting design

Concentrations of People – increased duty of care and policing/guarding

demands

Space Complexity – increased high-rise complex building forms and

complex space relationships – natural and technical surveillance

challenged

Situational Awareness and Incident Response – the things that will be key

influencers of overall operational effectiveness.

The Security Master-plan Must Account For

Opportunity Decreases Cost Increases

The Unfortunate Truth in Protective Security

A Project’s Timeline