104555809 is there anything new about new terrorism

7/27/2019 104555809 is There Anything New About New Terrorism

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Is there anything new about new terrorism?

The concept of Terror as the systematic use of violence to attain socio-political

ends was first codified by Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution (Atran,

2003: 1534). However, Terrorism as a phenomenon has been around for millennia

(Atran, 2003: 1534)&(Evans, & Newman, 1998: 530). Nevertheless, in recent years some

scholars have asserted that we have witnessed the emergence of a new form of Terrorism.

According to proponents of this hypothesis, this New Terrorism is distinguished from

its predecessor by a new structure (of networks), a new attitude (an apparently increased

willingness to inflict mass casualties), and a new kind of personnel, amateurs who often

come together in ad hoc or transitory groupings (Laqueur, 1996: 34)&(Tucker, 2001: 1).

Drawing on a historiographical survey of the phenomenon of Terrorism this essay will

critically analyze the said assertion in the context of recent evolutions in the common

perception of Terrorism and conclude that it is not that we have witnessed a new form of

Terrorism but rather it is the rhetoric of Terrorism analysis which has changed .

By its very essence the history of terrorism is coextensive with the history of

politics and sociality (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Terrorism is a relative concept, ergo for as

long as there has been politics and social interaction there has been political and social

opposition. Yet before the attacks in the United States on September 11 th 2001 the subject

of Terrorism did not loom large in academic discussion. Since then, however, extensive

debates have emerged on the definition of Terrorism and how it has evolved over time

(Primoratz, I., 2007: 1)&(Victoroff, 2005: 9). Defining Terrorism is thus perhaps at the

psychosocial crux of the matter. As Noam Chomsky puts forth in his bookManufacturing


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Consent, there is an intrinsic bias inherent in all human perceptions and this bias

manifests itself most profoundly in the spheres of political analysis. Centering his focus

on the United States, Chomsky argues that this dichotomous treatment of worthy and

unworthy victims is politically advantageous to policy-makers because focusing on

victims of enemy forces shows those enemies to be wicked, while also distracting from

and allowing otherwise controversial U.S. lead policies to proceed more easily

(Chomsky, 2002: xix-xx).

Despite the claims of those who support the New Terrorism hypothesis it is

important to note that the term Terrorism is itself a very recent one that has only been in

use since the French Revolution in the late 18th century1. More to the point since that

time the parameters of the terms use have repeatedly shifted meaning that

conceptualizations of Terrorist groups have tended to focus primarily on modern factions,

dismissing antecedent groups that predate this etymology(Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Thus,

given that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, it is unlikely that any

belief in New Terrorism will be generally accepted either (Atran, 2003: 1534). Described

by Chomsky as an invidious word, an example of the innate bias of the label

Terrorism lies in the current branding of Extremism and Islamic Fundamentalism

(Chomsky, 2002: xx)&(Atran, 2003: 1535). As Scott Atran argues, calling the current

wave of radical Islam Fundamentalism (in the sense of Traditionalism) is misleading,

approaching an oxymoron. Present day radicals whether Shiite (Iran, Hezbollah) or

Sunni (Taliban, Al Qaida), are much closer in spirit and action to Europes post-

11789-1799


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Renaissance Counter-Reformation [sic] [than to any new form of New Terrorist ideology.

In fact,] this idea has its clearest historical model in the Holy Inquisition2 (Atran, 2003:

1535).

Atrans statement would suggest that the extremist element supposed about New

Terrorism is most certainly not new. Equally as David Tucker points out, citing the

example of the Gruppi di Azione Partigiana in Italy, the Polish Underground of WWII

and the IRA among many others; the assertion that there is something new about the

network structure commonly in use by modern Al-Qaeda linked Islamic paramilitaries is

somewhat of a fallacy. In fact there is a very long tradition of these kinds of networks

(Tucker, 2001: 4). We can find precedents to what is now called the network structure

in the leaderless Rosa Luxembourg inspired anarcho-syndicalist movements during the

era of the Russian Revolution (Tudor, 2009: 1)&(Torrance, 2009: 1).

By definition all groups are in essence comprised of a network3. Understood in this

way, it is clear that a network structure is not so much an alternative to a hierarchy, but is

rather a necessary and integral component of it. Indeed networks are frequently critical to

the proper functioning of an organization. Thus, despite their ostensibly hierarchical

structure a federation of any kind can be regarded as a network. Likewise, the formal

structure of Hizballah [sic] [or any other Terrorist organisation] is highly bureaucratic but

interactions among members are volatile and do not form rigid lines of control (Tucker,

2This is a broad reference to the Conservativism of the Roman Inquisition, not simply the Spanish

Inquisition3The definition of the term network in the Oxford English Dictionary is a group of people who interacttogether - (http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/network?view=uk)


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2001: 9). As such, all Terrorist organizations can be regarded as being fundamentally

based on a network structure. In this light the recent emergence in the Middle East of

organisations less cellular or hierarchical than those that operated in the 1970s and 1980s

can be seen as more of a return to a traditional model than the emergence of anything

new (Masters, 2008: 397)&(Tucker, 2001: 4).

More to the point, it should not be assumed that adopting a more devolved network

structure would be a progressive and entirely beneficial measure to a Terrorist group. As

autonomous units, network cells are undoubtedly more adaptable. Yet increased

autonomy also renders the network more susceptible to exogenous and endogenous

security threats. Diminished centralisation increases discovery and entry opportunities for

enemies, in turn threatening the entire networks security. Thus even New network

organisations are to some degree likely to be hierarchically structured in a traditionally

concentric or centrifugal fashion (Tucker, 2001: 10-11).

Furthermore, a network structure can also impair the integration of strategic and

tactical coordination and control (Laqueur, 1996: 25). Diminished control and

coordination, in turn, can increase the difficulty of accomplishing complex tasks

(Tucker, 2001: 10). Crucially, it can also increase the likelihood that an ill-judged action

will undermine constituency support and legitimacy (Tucker, 2001: 10). A primary

example of this was the Real-IRA bombing of Omagh town centre in 1998 after which

the organisation was forced temporarily to suspend its operations as a result of the loss of

support and mass condemnation triggered by widespread popular revulsion at the carnage


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(The CAIN Project). Thus it is unlikely that New Terrorist organisations will become

anymore delegated or cellular than their predecessors.

Noam Chomsky argues that the idea of New Terrorists apparently greater

propensity to commit acts of mass and indiscriminate slaughter is a biased misperception

based on the fact that on 9/11 an attack on a rich and powerful country succeeded for the

first time on a scale that commentators outside the ranks of Western privilege often

responded with a welcome to the club (Chomsky, 2003: 607). Terrorist attacks have

been increasing steadily since the Iranian Revolution

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, yet it is only as a result of recent

rapid technological development and heightened media-awareness that Terrorism has

achieved such striking global coverage (Masters, 2008: 406)&(Evans, & Newman, 1998:

530). In turn the increasing resistance of governments and the declining news value of

terrorist incidents as they become more commonplace has encouraged further and greater

attacks and consequently changed the rhetoric of terrorism analysis (Jenkins, 1982: 18).

Yet as David Tucker points out, the premise that New Terrorists somehow have an

increased willingness to commit mass indiscriminate attacks to a greater extent than what

has previously been seen is a skewed analysis which rests on a very few cases compared

to the total number of international terrorist attacks (Tucker, 2001: 6). Organisations

driven by extreme ideologies have always resorted to extreme and horrific acts of mass

and indiscriminate slaughter. Radical aims could only be pursued by similarly radical

methods and their success was due largely to the arbitrary character [of their attacks]

and the unpredictability of their choice of victims (Primoratz, I., 2007: 1). Indeed the

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mass indiscriminate attacks carried out by the Islamic extremists of today are a form of

Terrorism which best hark back to the heyday of totalitarian terrorism in the 1930s and

1940s [When revolutionary movements in Russia, Germany, France, Spain and

elsewhere] sought to impose total political control on society(Primoratz, I., 2007: 1).

Much like the current crop of Islamist Terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, many national

liberation and separatist movements of the time resorted to grand scale attacks either as

the main method of struggle or as a tactic complementing guerrilla warfare (Primoratz, I.,

2007: 1). Terrorism is neither a species of guerrilla warfare nor insurgency although it is

often isomorphicly confused with both (Evans, & Newman, 1998: 531). Thus, perhaps it

is the case that what we are witnessing is not the dawn of a new kind of terrorism but

rather a misunderstanding of a conventional Terrorist group (Evans, & Newman, 1998:

531).

Given that a sustained campaign of asymmetric warfare requires popular assistance,

to the extent that terrorists with religious motivations also have political and social

agendas, [as well as constituency concerns to do with safe houses, weapons supply and

financial backing etc.], they are subject to the same constraints, and are reliant on the

same need of constituency support for their methods and aims as paramilitary groups

which have exclusively socio-political goals (Evans, & Newman, 1998:

215+531)&(Tucker, 2001: 7). Furthermore, as Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation

points out, since 2001 there has been a tendency to exaggerate the dimensions of the

threat posed by terrorists and the strategic impact that their violence has actually wrought.

By overreacting and falling prey to a sense of acute fear and intimidation, the terrorists


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power is disproportionately inflated in ways that are both counterproductive and often

completely divorced from reality (Hoffman, 2001: 419). This does not mean however

that a religious or political group would never commit a mass-casualty attack, just that

such groups have the same reasons not to do so (Laqueur, 1996: 34)&(Tucker, 2001: 7).

Equally, as Hoffman points out, the real issue and a more likely threat may not be

posed by the mass and indiscriminate use of violence - such as with chemical, biological,

radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons - but a more concise and strategic use or the

threat thereof which, psycho-socially, could still achieve a similar level of impact

(Hoffman, 2001: 424). Much like suicide bombers or indeed any form of Terrorist attack,

the real advantage of a CBRN attack is as a weapon of psychological warfare. Its primary

target being not the immediate victims killed in the attack, but the wider public audience

made to witness it (Atran, 2003: 1534). 9/11 demonstrated that terrorists did not require

a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) to cause mass casualties (Enders, & Sandler,

2005: 260). The New Terrorism hypotheses may therefore be missing the point. A

strategic threat could very easily create a disproportionately large amount of publicity,

fear and alarm and therefore prove a more expedient and practicable tactic for terrorists

than actually carrying out a large-scale attack (Hoffman, 2001: 424). Either way, given

the misleading rhetoric and hyperbole in which the threat of terrorism is frequently

couched it is important to note that as serious and potentially catastrophic as a terrorist

attack might prove, it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely undermine the

national security, much less threaten the survival of a nation (Hoffman, 2001: 426).


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A common part of this misestimated hyperbole is the belief amongst proponents of

the New Terrorism hypothesis that terrorist missions by volunteers constitute a radical

new departure, dangerous because they are almost impossible to prevent. However that

is a myth, like many others in which terrorism has always been shrouded (Laqueur,

1996: 26). True some contemporary groups appear more loosely connected or indirectly

linked through networks comprised of both professional - i.e., full-time - terrorists and

amateurs - supporters, sympathisers, and would-be terrorists who may lack the expertise

or experience of their more established counterparts - (Hoffman, 2001: 418). However, as

David Tucker puts it, all Terrorists are amateurs when they begin (Tucker, 2001: 4).

Amateurism has always been an element of terrorist strategy and amateur militants have

since the beginning appeared in all eras and cultural traditions (Laqueur, 1996: 26).

Therefore although Terrorism has increased in volume and severity, modern

terrorists still operate within self-imposed constraints with a limited technical repertoire

that has changed little over time (Jenkins, 1982: 11). In the aftermath of 9/11 the framing

of contemporary terrorist groups began to take on the form of New Terrorism

(Masters, 2008: 411). Yet as has been shown, there is nothing new about New

Terrorism. The label is a fallacy based on a misperception of a phenomenon which

predates the academia propounding the New Terrorism hypothesis. Thus it is not that we

have witnessed a new form Terrorism but rather it is the rhetoric of its analysis which has

changed.


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104555809 is there anything new about new terrorism

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