· pdf file177 10.20 an enduring power of attorney (financial) allows a person aged 18 years...
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10Chapter 10
173
CONTENTSIntroduction� 174
Victorian�Parliament�Law�Reform�Committee� 175
Current�law� 176
Community�responses� 183
The�Commission’s�views�and�conclusions� 187
Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
INTROduCTION10.1 Inthepreviouschapters,theCommissionrecommendednewmechanismstoassist
peoplewithimpaireddecision-makingabilitythatdonotinvolvecompletelossofresponsibilityformakingdecisions.Inthisandthefollowingchapters,theCommissionexaminesmechanismsthatdoinvolveotherpeopletakinglegalresponsibilitytomakedecisionsforpeoplewhoareunabletomaketheirowndecisions.
10.2 Thischapterdealswithpersonalappointmentsofpeopletoactassubstitutedecisionmakersatsometimeinthefuture.Chapter11dealswithhowapersonmaydocumentwishesaboutactionstheydoordonotwanttakeninthefuture.Chapter12dealswithtribunalappointmentsofsubstitutedecisionmakers.
10.3 Therearetwoimportantmeansbywhichanadultmaydirectorinfluencedecisionsabouttheirfuturewhentheyareunabletomaketheirowndecisionsorexperiencedifficultydoingso.
10.4 First,anadultwithcapacitymayappointanominatedpersontomakedecisionsfortheminthefuture,ortosupportthemtomakedecisions.Wecallthisa‘personal appointment’.CurrentVictorianlegislationprovidesforvariousappointmentsofthisnature1—forexample,anenduringpowerofattorney(financial)oranenduringpowerofguardianship.
10.5 Secondly,apersonmayprovidewritteninstructionsaboutthedecisionstheywantmadeifparticularcircumstancesariseinthefutureandtheydonothavecapacitytoprovidedirectionsatthetime.Thistypeofdocumentisoftencalledan‘instructional directive’.
10.6 Athirdmechanismcombinesapersonalappointmentandaninstructionaldirective(a hybrid appointment).Itallowsapersontoappointsomeonetomakedecisionsfortheminthefutureandtoprovideinstructionsabouthowthatpersonshouldexercisetheirdecision-makingpower.WhilecurrentVictorianlegislationpermitsthisinsomecircumstances,2theextentofitsuseisunknown.
10.7 ApersonalappointmentofasubstitutedecisionmakerorsupporterenablesanadultwithcapacitytoexercisesignificantlymoreautonomythanifanappointmentismadebytheVictorianCivilandAdministrativeTribunal(VCAT)orifadecisionmakerisautomaticallyappointedunderthe‘personresponsible’provisionsoftheGuardianship and Administration Act 1986(Vic)(G&AAct).3Ahybridappointmentcombinesthebenefitsofbothmethodsbyallowingapersontoappointsomeonewhowillmakedecisionsforthemwithinstructionsabouthowtoexercisethatpower.
10.8 TheCommissionbelievesthatfutureplanningshouldbeencouragedbecauseitpromotesself-determination.Awell-functioningsystemofpersonalappointmentsofpeoplewithenduringpowershasthefollowingadvantages:
• Itenhancesautonomybyallowingapersontochoosewhowillmanagetheiraffairs.4
• Itavoidsthepotentialstressandembarrassmentofatribunalhearingtodeterminewhetherapersonlackscapacity.5
1 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35A(1);Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s115;Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5A.2 Forexample,apersonwhoappointsanenduringguardianmaygivedirectionsintheinstrumentofappointmentabouthowtheguardian
shouldusetheirpowers.3 For‘personresponsible’,seeGuardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s37.4 See,eg,AustralianLawReformCommission,Enduring Powers of Attorney,ReportNo47(1988)7;OfficeofthePublicAdvocate(Victoria),
SubmissionNo9toLawReformCommittee,ParliamentofVictoria,Inquiry into Powers of Attorney, 4August2009,7.5 AustralianLawReformCommission,Enduring Powers of Attorney,ReportNo47(1988)7.
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• Itprovidesaprivate,simpleandcheapalternativetoVCATproceedings.6
• ItreducestheburdenonVCATandbodiessuchasthePublicAdvocateandStateTrustees.7
10.9 TheCommissionbelievesthatreformisneededtosimplifytheexistingschemeofpersonalappointmentsandtoencouragetheiruptake.InChapter5,werecommendedasingleActtoprovideanintegratedsystemofpersonal,automaticandtribunalappointments.Thereformsinthischapteraimtoprovidesimple,clearandharmonisedmethodsformakingpersonalappointmentsandclear,accessibleinformationaboutthelegaleffectofthesedocuments.
10.10 ToimproveandenhanceunderstandingofpersonalappointmentstheCommissionrecommendsreformsincluding:
• reducingthenumberofpersonalappointmentsthatarecurrentlyavailable
• modernisingterminology
• clearerpowersforpeopleappointedtoprovidedecision-makingassistanceunderthenewActandgreaterclarityaboutwhenthosepowerscomeintoeffect
• clearerresponsibilitiesandgreateraccountabilityforpeopleexercisingpowersunderpersonalappointments
• registrationofpersonalappointmentsandinstructions.
VICTORIaN PaRLIamENT Law REfORm COmmITTEE10.11 TheVictorianLegislativeAssemblyaskedtheVictorianParliamentLawReform
Committee(ParliamentaryCommittee)forproposalsthatwouldstreamlineandsimplifypowerofattorneydocuments.8Thetermsofreferencerequested,amongotherthings,considerationoftherequirementsformakingpersonalappointmentsundertheInstruments Act 1958(Vic)andtheG&AAct.9TheParliamentaryCommitteereleaseditsfinalreport,Inquiry into Powers of Attorney, inAugust 2010.
10.12 TheVictorianGovernment’sresponsetotheParliamentaryCommittee’sreport,tabledinParliamenton10February2011,indicatedbroadsupportformanyoftheCommittee’s90recommendations.TheGovernmentResponsealsonotedthatitwouldfurtherconsideranumberoftherecommendationsonceitreceivestheCommission’sfinalreport.10
10.13 TheCommissionsupportsmostoftherecommendationsproposedbytheParliamentaryCommitteeandthereformsinthischapterbuildonthoserecommendations.ThischapterhighlightstheParliamentaryCommitteerecommendationsthattheCommissionbelieveswarrantfurtherconsiderationormodification.
6 See,eg,KeithBradley,‘PowersofAttorney’(2008)86Precedent16,18;RobinCreyke,‘EnduringPowersofAttorney:CinderellaStoryofthe80s’(1991)21University of Western Australia Law Review122,124;JonathanFedermanandMegReed,GovernmentLawCenterofAlbanyLawSchool,Abuse and the Durable Power of Attorney: Options for Reform (1994)4;HouseStandingCommitteeLegalandConstitutionalAffairs,ParliamentofAustralia,Inquiry into Older People and the Law (2007)71.
7 HouseStandingCommitteeLegalandConstitutionalAffairs,ParliamentofAustralia,Inquiry into Older People and the Law (2007)71;OfficeofthePublicAdvocate(Victoria),SubmissionNo9toLawReformCommittee,ParliamentofVictoria,Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,4August2009,7.
8 LawReformCommittee,ParliamentofVictoria,Inquiry into Powers of Attorney (2010)iv(‘Inquiry into Powers of Attorney’).9 Ibid.10 VictorianGovernment,Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee Inquiry into Powers of Attorney Report
(10February2011),2<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/lawrefrom/powers_of_attorney/20110210.lrc.poa.GOVTRESP.pdf>(‘Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee’).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
CuRRENT LawPERSONaL aPPOINTmENT Of SubSTITuTE dECISION makERS10.14 Thecurrentlawiscomplexbecauseitpermitsanadulttomakefourdifferentpersonal
appointmentsofsubstitutedecisionmakersunderthreedifferentActs.11Therearedifferentprocessesforeachappointment.Theexistingappointmentsare:
• generalpowerofattorney
• enduringpowerofattorney(financial)
• enduringpowerofguardianship
• enduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment).
financial appointments10.15 Therearetwowaysofpersonallyappointingasubstitutefinancialdecisionmaker—by
useofageneralpowerofattorney12oranenduringpowerofattorney(financial).13BothtypesofappointmentaremadeundertheInstrumentsAct.
General power of attorney10.16 Apersonwhogivessomeoneapowerofattorney(adonor)usesageneralpowerof
attorneyiftheywanttoauthoriseanotherperson(theattorney)toactforthemforaparticularperiodorpurpose—forexample,toallowsomeonetorunabusinesswhilethedonorisonholiday.Thepowersgiventotheattorneymaybeunlimited,orlimitedforaspecifictimeorpurpose.Adonormayappointonepersonormorethanoneperson.Ifthedonorappointsmorethanoneperson,thegeneralpowerofattorneyshouldspecifyiftheymustacttogetheroriftheymayactjointlyandseparately.14
10.17 Thedonorcanspecifyadateonwhichthegeneralpowerwillcease.Ifitdoesnotspecifyacessationdate,thegeneralpowerofattorneystopsifthedonordies,revokesitorloseslegalcapacitytomaketheirowndecisions.
10.18 TheCommissionmakesnorecommendationsaboutgeneralpowersofattorneyinthisreportbecausetheParliamentaryCommitteedealtadequatelywiththemodernisationoftheseappointmentsinitsreport.Further,theseappointmentshavenodirectintersectionwithguardianshiplaw:ageneralpowerofattorneyisdesignedforusewhenthepersonordonorhasthecapacitytomaketheirowndecisionsbutwishestodelegatethispowertoothersforthesakeofconvenience.TheCommission’sreviewconcernslawsthatassistpeoplewithimpaireddecision-makingability.
Enduring power of attorney (financial)10.19 Ageneralpowerofattorneyceasestohaveanyeffectifthedonordoesnothave
capacity.However,anenduringpowerofattorneydoesnotceasetooperatewhenthedonorlosescapacity.15Theterm‘enduring’isusedbecausetheappointmentendures(orcontinues)beyondthepointwhenthepersonwhogavethepower(thedonor)lackscapacity.EnduringpowersofattorneywereintroducedintoAustralianlawbystatutetoallowpeopletoplanfortimeswhentheynolongerhavecapacitytomaketheirowndecisions.16
11 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic);Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic);Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic).12 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)ptXI.13 IbidptXIA.14 Ibidss107,119.15 Ibids115(2).16 SeegenerallyRobinCreyke,‘EnduringPowersofAttorney:CinderellaStoryofthe80s’(1991)21University of Western Australia Law Review
122,121–5.VictoriawasthefirstjurisdictioninAustraliatoprovideenduringpowersofattorney: Instruments (Enduring Powers of Attorney) Act 1981(Vic).
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10.20 Anenduringpowerofattorney(financial)allowsapersonaged18yearsorovertogiveanotheradultperson,knownasanattorney,thepowertomakefinancialandlegaldecisionsfortheminthefuture.17Thepersonwhomakestheappointmentcandecidewhenthepowerscomeintoeffect.18
10.21 Ifthedocumentdoesnotspecifywhentheattorney’spowerscommence,thepowerbeginsimmediatelyandtheattorneycanactevenifthedonorstillhascapacity.19Ifthepowerscommencewhenthedonorlosescapacity,theattorneymustdetermineifthedonorisnolongercapableofmakingdecisionsunlessthedocumentcontainsotherarrangementsfordealingwiththisissue.
Appointment of enduring attorney (financial)10.22 Anenduringpowerofattorney(financial)mustbeappointedintheprescribedform.20
Thedonororsomeoneactingatthedirectionandinthepresenceofthedonormustsignit.21
10.23 Theformmustalsobesignedanddatedbytwowitnesses.22Thetwowitnessesmustcertifythatthedonorsignedthedocumentfreelyandvoluntarilyinthepresenceofthewitnessandthedonorappearedtohavethecapacitytomaketheenduringpowerofattorney.23
10.24 Theattorneymustalsoaccepttheappointmentbysigninganddatingastatementofacceptance,whichmustbeintheprescribedform.24
Capacity to make an enduring power of attorney (financial)10.25 Inorderfortheappointmentofanenduringattorney(financial)tobevalid,thedonor
musthavelegalcapacitytomaketheappointment.
10.26 TheInstrumentsActprovidesthatapersononlyhascapacitytomakeanenduringpowerofattorney(financial)iftheyunderstandthe‘natureandeffect’oftheappointmentwhenthedocumentissigned.25ThisisdiscussedfurtherinChapter7.
10.27 Section118oftheInstrumentsActincludesanotestatingthat‘itisadvisableforthewitnesstomakeawrittenrecordoftheevidenceasaresultofwhichthewitnessconsidersthatthedonorunderstandsthesematters’.26
Registration10.28 InVictoria,thereisnorequirementtoregisteranenduringpowerofattorney
(financial).
Discontinuing an enduring power of attorney (financial)10.29 Anenduringpowerofattorney(financial)maybediscontinuedby:
17 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)ptXIA.Incommonwithageneralpowerofattorney,adonorcanappointasingleenduringattorney(financial)ormorethanone:ats119.
18 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s117(1).19 Ibids117(2).20 Ibidss123(1),125ZL.AnapprovedformisaformapprovedbytheSecretarytotheDepartmentofJusticeunders125ZL.21 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s123(2).22 Ibids123(3).Section125detailswhocanbeawitness.Itprovidesthat:apersoncannotbeawitnesstoanenduringpowerofattorneyif
theyarethedonorofthepowerorthepersonappointedasattorney;onlyoneofthewitnessescanbearelativeofthedonorofthepowerorthepersonappointedasanattorney;andoneofthewitnessesmustbeapersonauthorisedbylawtowitnessthesigningofastatutorydeclaration.
23 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s125A(1).Section125A(2)providesspecialwitnessingrequirementsifanenduringpowerofattorneyissignedbysomeoneelseforthedonor.Thewitnessesmustcertifythat:thedonorofthepowerdirectedthepersontosigntheenduringpowerofattorneyforthedonor;thedonorofthepowergavethatdirectionfreelyandvoluntarilyinthepresenceofthewitness;thepersonsigneditinthepresenceofthedonorandthewitness;atthetime,thedonorappearedtothewitnesstohavethecapacitynecessarytomaketheenduringpowerofattorney.
24 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)ss125B,125ZL.AnapprovedformisaformapprovedbytheSecretarytotheDepartmentofJusticeunders125ZL.
25 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s118(1).26 Ibids118.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
• anexpressrevocationbythedonor27
• thedeathofthedonor28
• alaterenduringpowerofattorney29
• accordingtoitsterms,forexample,ifitisexpressedtooperateforaspecifiedperiod30
• resignationbytheattorney31
• theattorneyceasingtohavelegalcapacity32
• theattorneybecominginsolvent33
• theattorney’sdeath.34
10.30 Oncethedonorlosescapacity,theycannotrevokeanenduringpowerofattorney(financial).VCAThasthepowertorevokeanenduringpowerofattorney(financial)ifthedonorhaslostcapacity.35Itmaydosoifitissatisfiedthatitisinthebestinterestsofthedonortorevoketheappointment.36Arevocationdoesnotmeanthatthepowerisvoidfromthestart—actionstakenundertheenduringpowerofattorney(financial)beforeitsrevocationarevalid.
10.31 VCATmayalsodeclarethatanenduringpowerofattorneyisinvalid.37Itmaydosoifsatisfiedthat:
• thedonorlackedcapacityatthetimetheenduringpowerofattorneywasmade
• itdoesnotcomplywithpartXIAoftheInstrumentsAct,or
• itisinvalidforanyotherreason,suchasthedonorwasinducedtomakeitbydishonestyorundueinfluence.38
IfVCATdeclaresanenduringpowerofattorneyinvalid,theappointmenthasnolegaleffectfromthetimeitwasmade.39
10.32 Inadditiontorevokingapowerordeclaringitinvalid,VCATmayalsovary40orsuspendanenduringpowerofattorney(financial).41VCATmayalsogiveanadvisoryopiniononanymatterrelatingtoanenduringpowerofattorney(financial).42
Third party protection10.33 TheInstrumentsActallowsthirdpartiesandattorneystorelyonapowerexercised
underaninvalidenduringpowerofattorneyiftheyactedingoodfaithandwithoutbeingawareoftheinvalidity.43
27 Ibidss125H,125I.28 Ibids125K.29 Ibids125J.30 Ibids125L.31 Ibids125M.32 Ibids125N.33 Ibids125O.34 Ibids125P.35 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)ss125Q,125X.ForadiscussionofVCAT’ssupervisorypowersinrelationtoenduringpowersofattorney,seeDJB
(Guardianship)[2010]VCAT280(9March2010).36 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s125X(1).37 Ibids125Y.38 Ibids125Y(1).39 Ibids125Y(2).40 Ibids125Z(1)(b).41 Ibids125Z(1)(c).42 Ibids125ZA.43 Ibids125U.ThesectionsoftheActthatprotectthirdpartiesandattorneysuse‘invalid’inabroadersensethanthewayitisusedifVCAT
declaresapowerofattorney(financial)invalid.Itencompassesinvaliditybecausetheenduringpowerofattorney:isnotexercisableatthetimewhen,circumstanceinwhich,oroccasiononwhichitispurportedlyexercised;hasbeendeclaredtobeinvalidbyacourtorVCAT;hasbeenrevoked;wasmadeinanotherstateorterritoryanddoesnotcomplywiththerequirementsofthatotherstateorterritory:ats125Y.
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Powers10.34 Anenduringattorney(financial)canauthoriseanattorneyto‘doanythingonbehalfof
thedonorthatthedonorcanlawfullyauthoriseanattorneytodo’.44TheInstrumentsActdoesnotprovideanyfurtherdetailabouttheextentofthepowersthatcanbegiventoanattorney.Thedonorcanprovideinstructionsandlimitthewaytheattorneyshouldcarryouttheirresponsibilities.45
10.35 Anythingdonebytheattorneywithinthescopeoftheirpowershasthesamelegaleffectasifthedonordiditwithcapacitytoact.46
Responsibilities of an attorney10.36 Anattorneyhasanumberoflegalresponsibilities,includingafiduciarydutynot
toactintheirowninterestsinsteadofthedonor’s.47Thestatementofacceptancesignedbytheattorneyincludesanundertakingacknowledginganumberoftheirresponsibilities.48WediscusstheseresponsibilitiesindetailinChapter17.
Enduring power of guardianship10.37 Anyadultwithcapacitymayappointanotherpersontobecometheirguardianifthey
losetheabilitytomakedecisionsaboutpersonalmattersatsometimeinthefuture.49Theappointedpersoniscalledan‘enduringguardian’,andthedocumentthatappointsthemiscalledan‘enduringpowerofguardianship’.
10.38 Theappointmentonlycomesintoeffectwhen,andtotheextentthat,thedonorlosescapacitytomakedecisions.Beforethen,theenduringguardianhasnopowertomakepersonaldecisionsontheperson’sbehalf.50
10.39 Thereisnoformalprocessfordeterminingwhenthepersonnolongerhasthecapacitytomaketheirowndecisions.Inmostcases,theenduringguardianmustdeterminethelackofcapacitythatactivatestheappointment.
Appointment of an enduring guardian10.40 Anenduringguardianmustbeappointedinwriting.51TheG&AActprovidesaform
thatcanbeusedwhenappointinganenduringguardian.52
10.41 Theenduringguardianmustaccepttheappointmentbysigninganddatingastatementofacceptance,whichmustbeintheprescribedform.53Theappointmentmustalsobesignedanddatedbytwowitnesses.54
Who can be an enduring guardian10.42 Anenduringguardianmustbeaged18yearsoroverandmustnotbeprofessionally
involvedinthecareoftherepresentedperson.55
44 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s115(1)(a).45 Ibids115(1)(b).46 Anenduringattorneyhasthepowertoexecuteinstrumentsforthedonorofthepower.Aninstrumentexecutedinthiswayisaseffectiveas
ifexecutedbythedonor: ibids125E.47 Foradiscussionoftheobligationsunderafiduciaryrelationship,seeRe OAC [2008]QGAAT72(14October2008)[13]–[20].See:Instruments
Act 1958 (Vic)ss125B(5),125D,125M(2).48 Instruments Act 1958(Vic)s125B(5).49 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35A(1).TheenduringguardianshipprovisionswereaddedtotheG&AActin1999.50 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35B(1).51 Ibid.s35A(1).52 Ibidsch4form1.Itisnotmandatorytousethepreferredformwhenappointinganenduringguardian,buttheinstrumentappointingan
enduringguardianmustbe‘totheeffectof’thisform:ats35A(2)(a).53 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35A(2)(b).54 Ibids35A(2)(c).Thewitnessingrequirementsaresetoutins35A(2)(c).Thecertificateofwitnessesprovidedinsch4form1requiresthe
witnessestocertifythattheappointerandtheproposedenduringguardianandalternativeenduringguardian(ifrelevant)signedthedocumentfreelyandvoluntarilyinthepresenceofthewitnessandappearedtounderstandit.
55 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)ss35A(3)–(4).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
Capacity to appoint an enduring guardian10.43 AlthoughtheG&AActdoesnotexpresslystatethatapersonmusthavecapacity
toappointanenduringguardian,acombinationofgenerallawprinciples,thesurroundingsectionsoftheActandthewitnessingrequirementsindicatethatcapacityisanimpliedessentialrequirement.56WediscusscapacityinmoredetailinChapter7.
Registration10.44 Thereisnorequirementtoregisterorfileanenduringpowerofguardianship
anywhere.Itisvalidassoonasitismade,butthepowersgiventotheenduringguardianmaynotbeactivateduntiltheprincipallosescapacity.57
Discontinuing an enduring guardianship10.45 Apersonwithcapacitycanrevoketheirappointmentofanenduringguardian
inwritingatanytime.58Ifapersonappointsanenduringguardianoralternativeenduringguardian,anyearlierappointmentofanenduringguardianoralternativeenduringguardianisrevoked.59
10.46 AnapplicationcanbemadetoVCATtocancelanenduringpowerofguardianship.60VCATmaycanceltheappointmentifitissatisfiedthattheenduringguardian:
• nolongerwantstherole
• isnolongerwillingorabletofulfiltherole
• hasnotactedinthebestinterestsoftheperson
• hasactednegligentlyorincompetently.61
10.47 AnappointmentofanenduringguardianisnotrevokedifVCATalsoappointsaguardianfortheperson.62TheG&AActdoesnotspecifywhosepowerswouldprevailexceptinrelationtothemedicalordentaldecisionsunderthe‘personresponsible’hierarchy,whichplacesapersonappointedunderaguardianshiporderwithrelevantpowersaboveanenduringguardianwithrelevantpowers.63
Advice from VCAT10.48 AnenduringguardianmayapplytoVCATforadviceordirectionsaboutthescopeor
exerciseoftheirpowers.64
Powers of an enduring guardian10.49 Thepowersofanenduringguardiancanbespecifiedinthedocumentthatappoints
them.65Ifthepowersareunlimitedintheappointmentdocument,theenduringguardianhasthefullpowersofaplenaryguardian.66Section24(1)oftheG&AActdefinesthepowersofaplenaryguardianas‘allthepowersanddutieswhichtheplenaryguardianwouldhaveifheorshewereaparentandtherepresentedpersonhisorherchild’.67
56 Ibid sch4form1certificateofwitnessesrequiresthewitnessestocertifythatthe‘appointorappearedtounderstandtheeffectoftheinstrument’.Seealsos37(1)(d)whichispremisedontheideathatapersonmusthavecapacityatthetimetheymakeanenduringguardianshipappointment.
57 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)ss35A(2),35B(1).58 Ibids35C(2).59 Ibids35C(1).60 AnapplicationcanbemadebythePublicAdvocate,theenduringguardianoralternativeguardian,theadministratoroftheappointor’s
estateoranyotherpersonwhosatisfiesVCATthattheyhaveaninterestinthepersonorintheestateoftheperson:Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35D(2).
61 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35D(1).62 Ibids35D(3).63 Ibids37(1).64 Ibids35E(1).65 Ibids35B(1).66 Ibidss35B(2),24.Seealsos35B(3).67 SeealsoGuardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35B(3).
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10.50 Whenappointinganenduringguardian,apersonmightindicateinthedocumentspecificdecisionstheywanttheguardiantomake,suchasnottoagreetolivinginaparticularresidentialservice.Theseinstructionsarenotlegallybinding,althoughtheguardianshouldusethemasaguidewhentheirpowerscomeintoeffect.WediscusstheseinstructionsindetailinChapter11.
10.51 Anenduringguardianwithhealthcarepowersmayconsenttomedicalordentaltreatmentorwithholdconsenttomedicalordentaltreatmentonbehalfoftherepresentedperson.68WediscussthedistinctionbetweenwithholdingconsentandrefusingconsentinChapter13.
Responsibilities of an enduring guardian10.52 TheresponsibilitiesofanenduringguardianarethesameasthoseofaVCAT-
appointedguardian.69Anenduringguardianmustactinthe‘bestinterestsofthedonorofthepower’.70WediscusstheseresponsibilitiesfurtherinChapter17.
Enduring power of attorney (medical treatment)10.53 TheMedical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)allowsapersontoappointasubstitutedecision
makertomakedecisionsaboutmedicaltreatmentfortheminthefutureiftheybecome‘incompetent’.71
Appointment of an agent10.54 ApersonappointedundertheMedicalTreatmentActiscalledanagentand
isappointedusingadocumentcalledanenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment).72Theappointmentonlycomesintoeffectwhenthedonorlosescapacitytomakedecisions.73
10.55 ApersonappointedundertheMedicalTreatmentActcanrefusetreatmentonbehalfofthedonor.74Thisisdonebycompletingarefusal of treatment certificate.75
Capacity to make an enduring power of attorney (medical treatment)10.56 TheMedicalTreatmentActdoesnotspecificallyrequirethatapersonhavecapacity
atthetimetheyappointanagent.However,thesurroundingsectionsoftheAct,thewitnessingrequirementsandthegenerallawstronglysuggestthatthisisarequirementforavalidappointment.76
10.57 TheMedicalTreatmentActdoesnotdescribethelevelofcapacityrequiredforapersontomakealegallyeffectiveappointmentofanagent.
Who can be an agent10.58 TherearenoguidelinesintheMedicalTreatmentActaboutwhocanbeappointedas
anagent.
68 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)ss42L,42M.69 Ibidss35(5),28.70 Ibids28(1).71 Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5A.Theagentcanrefusemedicaltreatmentonbehalfofthepatientbycompletingarefusaloftreatment
certificate:ats5B.Theagentmayalsobea‘personresponsible’entitledtoconsenttomedicaltreatmentundertheGuardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)ss37,42H.
72 Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5A(2)(a).73 Ibids5A(2)(b).74 SeeChapter13forfurtherdiscussionofrefusalofmedicaltreatmentbysubstitutedecisionmakers.75 Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5B.ThispowerisalsoavailabletoaguardianappointedundertheG&AActiftheorderprovides
relevantlyfordecisionsaboutmedicaltreatment:atss5A(1)(b),5B.76 Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)sch2whichsetsouttheformforappointinganagentrequiresthewitnessestoverifythattheperson
makingtheappointmentisofsoundmindandunderstandstheimportofthisdocument.Seealsos5A(4)(a)whichimpliesthepersonmusthavecapacitywhentheymaketheappointmentbyspecifyingthat‘anenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment)isnotrevokedbythesubsequentincapacityofthedonorofthepower’.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
Registration10.59 Thereisnorequirementtoregisterorfileanenduringpowerofattorney(medical
treatment).
Discontinuing an enduring power of attorney (medical treatment)10.60 Ifapersonmakesanenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment),anyearlier
powerofattorney(medicaltreatment)givenbythatpersonisrevoked.77Anenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment)isnotrevokedbecauseaguardianisalsoappointedforthepersonwhograntedthepower.78
10.61 VCATmaysuspendorrevokeanenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment).79Itmaysuspendthepowerforaspecifiedperiodifitissatisfiedthatarefusaloftreatmentisnotinthebestinterestsoftheperson.80Itmayrevokethepowerifitissatisfiedthatitisnotinthebestinterestsofthedonorforthepowertocontinue.81
10.62 InChapter13,wetakeacloserlookatstatutoryappointmentsrelatingtorefusalofmedicaltreatment.WealsoconsidertheinteractionbetweentheMedicalTreatmentActandthelawsrelatingtoconsenttomedicaltreatmentintheG&AAct.
OThER SubSTITuTE dECISION-makINg aRRaNgEmENTS10.63 Thereareothersubstitutedecision-makingarrangementsinVictoria.Some
corporations,suchasprovidersofessentialservices,allowindividualstonominatesomeonetoshareinformationand/ormakechangestotheiraccount.82SomearrangementsoperateunderotherVictorianlegislation,suchastheMental Health Act 1986(Vic)andtheDisability Act2006(Vic).SomeoperateunderCommonwealthlegislationsuchasCentrelinkNomineesintheSocial Security (Administration) Act1999(Cth).
10.64 ACentrelink‘correspondencenominee’cantakeactiononbehalfofanotherperson,includingreceivinginformationandapplyingforbenefitsundertheSocialSecurity(Administration)Act.83ACentrelink‘paymentnominee’canreceivebenefitsonbehalfofanotherperson.84Thesearrangementsoperatewiththeconsentoftheperson,or,whereapersonisunabletosignaform,whenCentrelinkhassufficientinformationtobesatisfiedthatapersonshouldactasanominee.85Onceappointed,thenomineemustactintheperson’sbestinterests.86
77 Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5A(3).78 Ibids5A(4)(b)(ii).TheMedical Treatment Act1988(Vic)s5A(4)(b)(i)providesthatthisalsoappliesifapersonbecomesaprotectedperson
underthePublic Trustee Act 1958(Vic).However,thissectionisunlikelytohaveanypracticalrelevancebecausethisActwasrepealedbytheState Trust Corporation of Victoria Act 1987(Vic)s57(1)sch3,nowitselfrepealedandreplacedbyState Trustees (State Owned Company Act) 1994(Vic)s24.TheG&AActrequiredthetribunaltoholdahearinginrespectofeveryprotectedpersontodeterminewhetheraguardianshiporadministrationordershouldbemadeandonceadeterminationwasmadethepersonceasedtobeaprotectedperson:Guardianship and Administration Act 1986(Vic)ss85(3),(6).
79 Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5C(1).80 Ibids5C(3).81 Ibids5C(4).VCATalsohaspowersinrelationtoanalternateagent.Itmayrevoke,suspend,ordeclarethatthepowerdoesnotauthorisea
particulardecision:Medical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)s5C(4A).82 Foreg,aTelstraaccountholdercangiveanotherpersononeofanumberofvarious‘accesslevels’(from‘limitedauthority’to‘legallessee’,
whichisakintothestatusofpersoninwhosenametheaccountisregistered):Telstra,Personal: Frequently Asked Questions<http://help.telstra.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/18380/session/L2F2LzEvdGltZS8xMzIzMjMxODk0L3NpZC92R0FDSFlLaw%3D%3D/~/giving-permission-for-someone-to-make-enquiries-about-your-telstra-accounts>.
83 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999(Cth)ss123C,123H,123I.84 Ibids123B.85 ConsultationwithCentrelink(30April2010).86 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999(Cth)s123O.
183
10.65 SimilararrangementsexistforallowingrecipientsofbenefitsfromtheDepartmentofVeterans’AffairstonominateapersontocommunicatewiththeDepartmentontheirbehalf.87Thisrequiresthewrittenconsentofthepersonentitledtothebenefit.88Thebeneficiaryofveterans’paymentscanalsoappointapersonastheiragenttoreceivetheirpension,89andtheagentmust‘managethepensionorallowanceinaccordancewiththepensioner’swishes’.90Alternatively,atrusteecanacceptandmanageaperson’spensionwherethatpersonlackscapacitytomanageitthemselves.91ThisrequiresaformalapplicationtotheDepartmentandtwoprofessionals(oneofwhommustbeadoctor)confirmingincapacity.92Thetrusteehastomanagethepensionmoneyaccordingtotraditionaltrusteeprinciples:inthebeneficiary’sbestinterestsandavoidingconflictsofinterest.93
10.66 Afurtherexampleofasubstitutedecision-makingarrangementthatdoesnotdependonaformalattorneyappointmentistheabilityofanindividualtomakean‘agreement’withanagedcareproviderforservicesforapersonwithoutcapacity.94Thepersoncanbeafamilymemberorfriend.95Suchagreementsinclude‘residentagreements’,whichstipulatethetermsandconditionsofcarewhenapersonisenteringafacility.
COmmuNITy RESPONSES10.67 Communityresponsestotheinformationpaperabouttheoperationofthepersonal
appointmentsschemesuggestedproblemsinthefollowingareas:
• Thereisawidespreadlackofcommunityunderstandingaboutpersonalappointmentsthatgrantenduringpowerstoanotherperson.Somepeoplearesimplyunawarethatpersonalappointmentsexist,andothersdonotunderstandthedifferencebetweenthedifferenttypesofpersonalappointments—medical,financialandguardianship.
• Theproceduresforpersonalappointmentsareoutlinedindifferentlegislationandareinconsistent.
• Itisdifficultforinterestedthirdparties,suchasmedicalpractitionersandfinancialinstitutions,toestablishthatanappointmentisvalidandcurrent.
• Thereispotentialfortheabuseofvulnerablepeoplebecauseofinsufficientsafeguards.
10.68 Ourresponsestotheseproblemsarefoundinthisandthefollowingchapters:
• Chapter5,whichrecommendsthecreationofanewconsolidatedActtoprovideforbothpersonalandVCATappointmentsandbroadcommunityeducation,aswellasnewterminologyforappointments
• Chapter16,whichdiscussestheestablishmentofanonlineregisterofappointments
87 DepartmentofVeterans’Affairs(Commonwealth),Arrangements for Other People to Act on your Behalf(2010),3<http://factsheets.dva.gov.au/factsheets/documents/LEG01a.pdf>.
88 Ibid.89 Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986(Cth)s58D.90 DepartmentofVeterans’Affairs(Commonwealth),Arrangements for Other People to Receive Payments on your Behalf(2010),2
<http://factsheets.dva.gov.au/factsheets/documents/LEG01b.pdf>(‘ Arrangements for Other People to Receive Payments on your Behalf’).91 Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986(Cth)s202.92 Arrangements for Other People to Receive Payments on your Behalf,aboven90,2.93 Ibid.94 Aged Care Act 1997(Cth)s96.5.95 AgedRightsAdvocacyService,Information Sheet: Participating in Decision Making in Aged Care Homes(2001)<http://www.sa.agedrights.
asn.au/files/18_participating_decision_making_in_res_care.pdf>.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
• Chapter17,whichproposesnewprinciplestoguidesubstitutedecisionmakingandconsiderationsthatshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenmakingdecisions
• Chapter18,whichrecommendsanumberofaccountabilitymechanismsforsupportersandsubstitutedecisionmakers.
10.69 Inthissection,weconsidercommunityresponsestosomeoftheproposalsputforwardintheconsultationpapertoimproveandenhanceunderstandingofthepersonalappointmentsscheme.
fEwER PERSONaL aPPOINTmENTS
Combining medical power of attorney and enduring guardian appointments10.70 Intheconsultationpaper,weaskedwhetheritwouldbebeneficialtostreamline
andsimplifythepersonalappointmentschemebyreducingthenumberofenduringappointmentsfromthreetotwo.
10.71 MostpeoplewhosupportedareductioninthenumberofappointmentsconsideredthatthiswouldbebestachievedbyremovingtheoptionofappointinganagentundertheMedicalTreatmentActandbyrequiringpeopletouseenduringguardianshiptoappointapersontomakedecisionsaboutmedicaltreatment.96Onesubmissionsuggestedcombiningenduringguardianandenduringpowerofattorney(financial)appointmentsbutretainingaseparateappointmentforanenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment).97Itwassuggestedthismightbeapreferableoptionbecauseitacknowledgestheoverlapbetweenfinancialandpersonaldecisionmakingthatexistsindecisionssuchastheselectionofanagedcarefacility.98
10.72 Acommonjustificationforreducingthenumberofappointmentsbycombiningmedicalpowerofattorneyandenduringguardianappointmentswasthatit‘wouldprovidegreaterclarityandcoherenceintheguardianshipsystem,andbringVictoriaintolinewiththemajorityofotherjurisdictionsinAustralia’.99Itwasalsonotedthataseparationbetweenlifestyleandpersonalmatters(includingmedicaltreatmentdecisions)andfinancialmattersreflectsthecurrentdivisioninthepowersthatmaybegiventoguardiansandadministrators.100
10.73 Asmallnumberofsubmissionsproposedthatonlyonetypeofappointmentshouldbeavailablethatallowsarangeofpowerstobegiven,includingpersonal,medicalandfinancialpowers.101
10.74 Submissionshighlightedtheideathatpeoplemayhaveskillsinaparticulartypeofdecisionmaking,suchasfinancialdecisionmaking,butnotinanother.102Anumberofsubmissionsemphasisedthatevenifthenumberofappointmenttypesisreduced,itshouldbepossibletoappointdifferentpeopletomakedecisionsindifferentareas.103TheFederationofCommunityLegalCentressubmittedthat:
‘itremainsimportantthatifapersonwishestodonatethepowertorefusemedicaltreatmenttoaseparatepersonfromanyappointeewhohasotherguardianshippowers,theybeabletodoso’.104
96 Foreg,SubmissionsCP19(OfficeofthePublicAdvocate),CP20(EpworthHealthCare),CP33(EasternHealth),CP35(UrsulaSmith),CP43(AlfredHealth),CP63(Shih-NingThen,ProfLindyWilmott&AssocProfBenWhite(QUT)),CP65(CouncilontheAgeingVictoria),CP68(AustralianNursingFederation),CP70(StateTrusteesLimited)andCP75(FederationofCommunityLegalCentres(Victoria)).
97 SubmissionCP49(RespectingPatientChoicesProgram—AustinHealth).98 Ibid.99 SubmissionCP63(Shih-NingThen,ProfLindyWilmott&AssocProfBenWhite(QUT)).100 SubmissionCP65(CouncilontheAgeingVictoria).101 Foreg,SubmissionsCP8(LeonieChirgwin),CP22(Alzheimer’sAustraliaVic),CP37(MilduraBaseHospital),CP43(DrMichaelMurray),and
CP59(CarersVictoria).102 Foreg,SubmissionCP22(Alzheimer’sAustraliaVic).103 SubmissionsCP22(Alzheimer’sAustraliaVic)andCP75(FederationofCommunityLegalCentres(Victoria)).104 SubmissionCP75(FederationofCommunityLegalCentres(Victoria)).
185
10.75 Itwasalsonotedthatitisimportantforthedocumentsmakingtheappointmenttoclearlyandunambiguouslyidentifywhoisappointedtoexerciseparticularpowers.105
10.76 Anumberofsubmissionsarguedthatthepowersgivenunderanenduringpowerofattorney(medicaltreatment)aresosignificantthatadistinctionshouldbemaintainedbetweenthistypeofappointmentandotherenduringappointments.106Onereasongivenforretainingthreetypesofappointmentwasthatmaintainingaseparatepowerformedicaltreatmentprovidessafeguardsbyensuringthatthepurposeandlimitationsofthepowerareclearlyunderstoodbyboththepersonandtheappointee.107Submissionsalsonotedthedifferentcompetenciesorskillsrequiredfordifferenttypesofappointments.108TheCatholicArchdioceseofMelbourneconsideredthat:
appointmentstomakemedicaltreatmentdecisionsneedtobetreatedverydifferentlyandshouldbeseparatefromappointmentsforothertypesofdecisions…theStatehasobligationstoprotecthealthandlifeandoughtnottoprovideauthoritytomakedecisionsthatarenotinthebestinterestsoftherepresentedperson.109
POwERS10.77 TheCommissiondidnotspecificallyseekresponsesabouthowtoclarifythepowersof
personalappointees.However,theconsultationpaperproposedamendmentstothepowersofVCATappointees,andtheCommissionhasconsideredresponsestothoseproposalsinmakingrecommendationsinthischapter.
Commencement of powers10.78 TheCommissionproposedthatallenduringappointmentsuseasinglecriterionfor
activation,forexample,lossofcapacityinrelationtotheparticulardecisionscoveredbythatappointment.Somepeopleexpressedconcernthattheholderofanenduringappointmentisrequiredtodeterminethatthepersonhaslostcapacityinordertostartusingtheappointment.110Itwassuggestedthatthismaybedifficultwhentheperson’scapacityisfluctuating111orbecauseappointeesaresometimesreluctanttomakethisdecisionaboutacloserelative.112
10.79 Otherssuggestedthatitmightbeunhelpfultouseasinglecriterionforactivationbecauseitisinconsistentwithanacceptanceoffluctuatingcapacityandtheassociatedideaofacontinuumofdecisionmaking.113Severalpeopleobservedthattheremightbeaneedtomovebackwardsandforwardsbetweenprovidingsupportandprovidingsubstituteddecisionmakingtoaccommodatefluctuatingcapacity.114
10.80 Anumberofsubmissionsfavouredintroducingaconsistentapproachacrossallenduringappointmentsfordeterminingthetimeforanenduringappointmenttocomeintoeffect.115
105 SubmissionCP37(MilduraBaseHospital).106 Foreg,SubmissionsCP23(DrKristenPearson),CP27(CatholicArchdioceseofMelbourne),CP71(SeniorsRightsVictoria),CP73(Victoria
LegalAid)andCP78(MentalHealthLegalCentre).107 Foreg,SubmissionsCP73(VictoriaLegalAid)andCP78(MentalHealthLegalCentre).108 Foreg,SubmissionsCP27(CatholicArchdioceseofMelbourne)andCP71(SeniorsRightsVictoria).109 SubmissionCP27(CatholicArchdioceseofMelbourne).110 Foreg,consultationwithAustralian&NewZealandSocietyforGeriatricMedicine(7April2011).111 Foreg,consultationswithAustralian&NewZealandSocietyforGeriatricMedicine(7April2011)andAlzheimer’sAustraliaVicand
roundtablewithpeoplecaringforparentswithdementia,(8April2011);SubmissionCP19(OfficeofthePublicAdvocate).112 ConsultationwithAustralian&NewZealandSocietyforGeriatricMedicine(7April2011).113 Foreg,consultationswithAustralian&NewZealandSocietyforGeriatricMedicine(7April2011)andAlzheimer’sAustraliaVicand
roundtablewithpeoplecaringforparentswithdementia,(8April2011);SubmissionCP19(OfficeofthePublicAdvocate).114 Ibid.115 Foreg,SubmissionsCP19(OfficeofthePublicAdvocate),CP22(Alzheimer’sAustraliaVic);CP65(CouncilontheAgeingVictoria),CP71
(SeniorsRightsVictoria)andCP78(MentalHealthLegalCentre).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers10.81 Somesubmissionssupportedachievingconsistencybyrequiringthatallappointments
shouldonlybeabletotakeeffectatthetimethepersonlosescapacity.116Othersconsideredthatthebestapproachwouldbetoallowthepersonmakingtheappointmenttoelectwhetherthepowersshouldtakeeffectimmediately,oratatimespecifiedbytheperson.117
10.82 Otherpeopleconsideredthatitwaseitherinappropriateorunhelpfultoallowalltypesofenduringpowerstobeactivatedatthesametime.118Thesesubmissionssupportedmaintainingadistinctionbetweentheactivationtimesofdifferenttypesofenduringappointmentsbasedonthepowersthataregiven.119TheLawInstituteofVictoriasubmittedthat‘[m]ostclientswouldbeunlikelyorveryreluctanttoappointanenduringguardianwithimmediateeffectbecauseofconcernsthatanenduringguardiancouldoverridetheirdecisions’.120
10.83 Particularemphasiswasplacedonthedifferencebetweenfinancialandmedicalappointments.121Anumberofsubmissionssuggestedthatwhiletherearegoodreasonswhyadonormightwishafinancialappointmenttooperatewhiletheystillhavecapacity,thisisunlikelytobethecaseformedicalpowers.VictoriaLegalAidnotedthat:
[i]nrelationtomedicalpowers,therewouldseemtobelessreasontohaveapowerthatapplieswhilethepersonstillhascapacity;itishardtothinkofasituationrequiringmedicalconsentwhereapersonmayhavecapacitybutneedsomeoneelsetoconsentortransactforthem.122
PROOf Of IdENTITy10.84 Proofofidentityofthosepeoplewhomakeandacceptenduringappointmentsisan
importantmeansofguardingagainstfraudandotherdishonestbehaviour.
10.85 CommunityresponsestotheCommission’sproposalforanonlineregisternotedtheimportanceofproofofidentitychecksonthepartiesinvolvedintheappointment.123
10.86 Itwassuggestedthathigh-levelproofofidentitystandardsshouldapplyduringtheprocessofmakinganappointment.124Thisisparticularlyimportantifregistrationbecomesproofofavalidappointment.
10.87 Becausesomepeopledonothavesufficientproofofidentitydocumentsitwillbenecessarytodevisepracticestodealwithsuchsituations.WediscussthisfurtherinChapter16,whereweoutlinerecommendationsforthenewonlineregister.
TRaNSITIONaL aRRaNgEmENTS10.88 Anumberofsubmissionsstressedtheimportanceoftransitionalarrangementsto
honourappointmentsmadeundertheexistinglegislation.125
116 Foreg,SubmissionsCP55(OfficeoftheHealthServicesCommissioner),CP65(CouncilontheAgeingVictoria)andCP78(MentalHealthLegalCentre).
117 Foreg,SubmissionsCP19(OfficeofthePublicAdvocate)andCP71(SeniorsRightsVictoria).118 Foreg,SubmissionsCP27(CatholicArchdioceseofMelbourne),CP35(UrsulaSmith),CP73(VictoriaLegalAid),CP77(LawInstituteof
Victoria)andCP75(FederationofCommunityLegalCentres(Victoria)).119 Foreg,SubmissionsCP27(CatholicArchdioceseofMelbourne),CP73(VictoriaLegalAid),CP77(LawInstituteofVictoria)andCP75
(FederationofCommunityLegalCentres(Victoria)).120 SubmissionCP77(LawInstituteofVictoria).121 Foreg,SubmissionsCP27(CatholicArchdioceseofMelbourne)andCP77(LawInstituteofVictoria).122 SubmissionCP73(VictoriaLegalAid).123 ConsultationswithVictorianRegistryofBirths,DeathsandMarriages(16February2011)andAustralianBankers’Association(16March
2011);SubmissionCP60(OfficeoftheVictorianPrivacyCommissioner).124 AnexampleistheNationalProofofIdentityframeworkadoptedbyBDM(Vic)whichrequiresthatproofofidentitydocumentsareeither
authenticatedatBDM(Vic)officeorphotocopiesofproofofidentitydocumentsarecertifiedbypoliceforpostalapplications:consultationwithVictorianRegistryofBirths,DeathsandMarriages(16February2011).ThisisdiscussedinmoredetailinChapter16.
125 Foreg,SubmissionsCP49(RespectingPatientChoicesProgram—AustinHealth),CP70(StateTrusteesLimited)andCP77(LawInstituteofVictoria).
187
muTuaL RECOgNITION10.89 Participantsinconsultationsrecognisedthedesirabilityofnationallyconsistentlaws
aboutenduringappointments.126TheCommissionhasmaderecommendationsrelatingtothisissueinChapter27.
CONfLICT TRaNSaCTIONS10.90 Communityresponsesemphasisedthatsubstitutedecisionmakersshouldberequired
toacthonestlyandrespondappropriatelytoconflictsofinterest.127InChapter17,werecommendthatguardianshiplawsshouldspecificallyrequirethesestepstobetaken.
10.91 TheCommissionnotesthatanumberofpeopleexpressedconcernthatsituationswhereaconflictofinterestmayarisebetweensubstitutedecisionmakersandtherepresentedpersonarepoorlyunderstood.128
ThE COmmISSION’S VIEwS aNd CONCLuSIONSRETaININg ENduRINg PERSONaL aPPOINTmENTS10.92 Enduringappointmentsplayacrucialroleinallowingpeopletoplanfortheirfuture.
Thecurrentlawisoverlycomplex,providingforthreedifferenttypesofenduringappointmentinthreedifferentActs.Theprocessofmakinganappointmentisinconsistentandtheterminologyusedtodescribeboththepersonmakinganappointmentandthepersonappointedisdifferent.
10.93 TheCommissionbelievesthatnewguardianshiplegislationshouldcontinuetoallowadultswithcapacitytomakepersonalappointments.Whilenewlawsshouldencouragetheseappointmentsbybeingasaccessibleandsimpleaspossible,theyshouldalsocontainsafeguardstoprotectvulnerablepeopleagainstabuse.
RECOmmENdaTIONRetain enduring powers of attorney
92. Anadultwithcapacityshouldcontinuetobeabletoappointapersontomakedecisionsforthemaboutpersonalmatters,includingmedicaltreatmentandfinancialmatters,whentheylackcapacitytomakethesedecisionsinthefuture.
VICTORIaN PaRLIamENT Law REfORm COmmITTEE10.94 TheCommissionsupportsnearlyalloftherecommendationsmadebytheVictorian
ParliamentLawReformCommitteeaboutpowersofattorney.
10.95 MostoftherecommendationsinthischaptercomplementtherecommendationsoftheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteebyseekingtoincorporatethemwithinourproposalsforreformofguardianshiplaws.TheCommissiondoesnotrefertoorcommentuponalloftheParliamentaryCommittee’srecommendations.InthosefewinstanceswheretheCommissionbelievesthattheParliamentaryCommittee’srecommendationsrequirefurtherconsiderationormodification,detailedcommentaryisprovided.
126 Foreg,consultationswithAustralianBankers’Association(16March2011)andVictorianSectionoftheCollegeofClinicalNeuropsychologistsoftheAustralianPsychologicalSociety(23March2011);SubmissionCP23(DrKristenPearson).
127 Foreg,SubmissionsCP19(OfficeofthePublicAdvocate),CP21(ActionforMoreIndependence&DignityinAccommodation),CP72(SeniorsRightsVictoria)andCP77(LawInstituteofVictoria).
128 Foreg,SubmissionCP77(LawInstituteofVictoria).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
TERmINOLOgy10.96 TheCommissionacknowledgestheneedtostrikeabalancebetweenfamiliar
terminologyandmoremoderntermsthatmanypeoplewillfindeasiertounderstand.
Names of substitute decision makers10.97 InChapter5,theCommissionrecommendednewtermsforpeopleappointedto
substitutedecision-makingrolesunderpersonalappointments.Whensomeoneappointsanotherpersontomakesubstitutedecisionsabouttheirlifestyleandpersonalmatters,thatpersonshouldbeknownastheir‘enduringpersonalguardian’.Whensomeoneappointsanotherpersontomakesubstitutedecisionsabouttheirfinances,thatpersonshouldbeknownastheir‘enduringfinancialadministrator’.ThesetermscomplementtheCommission’srecommendationsforthenewtermstodescribesubstitutedecisionmakersappointedbyVCAT.
10.98 Theterm‘attorney’isconfusingbecauseitisusedinsomeplacestorefertoalawyer.TheCommissionbelievesthatitwouldbewisetoabandonuseofthiswordinguardianshiplaw.TheCommissionprefersconsistencywiththetermsproposedforVCATappointments.Newguardianshiplawsshouldrefertotheappointmentofanenduring‘personalguardian’andanenduring‘financialadministrator’.
Names of documents making appointment10.99 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteealsoproposednewtermsfor
describingthedocumentsinwhichthoseappointmentsaremade.
10.100 TheCommissionidentifiedtwooptionsfordescribinganappointmentthatoperatesafterthepersonhaslostcapacity—‘enduring’or‘lasting’.While‘lasting’isthemoremodernterm,Victorianshavedealtwithenduringpowersofattorneyfor30years.Onbalance,theCommissionfavoursretainingtheterm‘enduring’.
Names of other parties10.101 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteealsoproposednewtermsfor
describingthepeoplewhomakepersonalappointments.
10.102 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteerecommendedthattheterm‘principal’shouldbeusedtodescribeapersonwhocreatesanenduringappointment.Italsorecommendedthatapersonappointedunderalltypesofpowersshouldbecalleda‘representative’.129
10.103 TheVictorianGovernmenthasindicatedthatitsupportsinprincipletheuseofsimpleandconsistentnamesforpartiestoanenduringappointment.Itindicateditwouldfurtherconsidertheuseofthegenericterm‘representative’.130
10.104 TheCommissionsupportstherecommendationthatapersonwhomakesapersonalappointmentshouldbecalledaprincipal.
10.105 TheCommissiondoesnotsupporttheuseofthetermrepresentative,regardlessofappointmenttype,recommendedbytheParliamentaryCommittee.Werecognisethatthistermissimpleandsuggeststhatthepersonisrepresentingtheprincipal’sinterests,butcallingallpeopleappointedunderapersonalappointmenta‘representative’willincreaseconfusionaboutthepowersapersonmayexerciseundereachappointment.Providingdifferentnamesforthetwoappointmenttypes—andindeedotherappointmentsunderthenewAct—highlightsthedifferentrolesthesepeopleperform.Forthisreason,theCommissionfavourstheuseoftwotermstodifferentiatebetweensomeonegivenfinancialpowersandsomeonegivenpowerstomakedecisionsaboutpersonalmatters.
129 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,47.130 Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee,aboven10,6.
189
RECOmmENdaTIONSTerminology
93. Thedocumentsusedtocreateanenduringappointmentshouldbecalled‘enduringappointmentofapersonalguardian’and‘enduringappointmentofafinancialadministrator’.
94. Apersonwhomakesanenduringappointmentshouldbecalleda‘principal’.
95. Thepeopleappointedunderthesedocumentsshouldbecalledan‘enduringpersonalguardian’andan‘enduringfinancialadministrator’.
fEwER aPPOINTmENTS—REmOVaL Of mEdICaL agENTS10.106 InChapter5,theCommissionrecommendedtheintroductionofanewGuardianship
Actthatcontainsseparateprovisionsforpersonal,financialandmedialdecisionmaking.
10.107 TheCommissionbelievesitisdesirabletostreamlineandsimplifythepersonalappointmentschemebyreducingthenumberofenduringappointmentsfromthreetotwo.ThisisbestachievedbyremovingtheoptionofappointinganagentundertheMedicalTreatmentActandbyrequiringpeopletouseanenduringguardianshipappointmentformedicaltreatmentmatters.ThisrecommendationreflectsthecurrentdivisionofpowersbetweenVCAT-appointedguardiansandadministrators,andwouldmakeVictoriaconsistentwithmostotherAustralianjurisdictions.WediscussthisrecommendationinmoredetailinChapter13whereweconsidermedicaltreatmentlaws.
RECOmmENdaTIONRemoval of medical agents
96. Therangeofpowersthatcanbegiventoanenduringpersonalguardianshouldincludethepowertoconsenttoorrefusemedicaltreatmentonbehalfoftheprincipal.ThesenewprovisionsshouldreplacethecurrentprovisionsintheMedical Treatment Act 1988(Vic)forappointinganagenttomakesubstitutedecisionsaboutmedicaltreatment.
REgISTRaTION aNd TRaNSITIONaL aRRaNgEmENTS10.108 InChapter16,theCommissionrecommendsthatanonlineregisterofpersonal
appointmentsandVCATappointmentsbeestablished.Weconsiderthatitshouldbecompulsorytoregisteranenduringpersonalappointmentforittobevalid.Thiswillprovidecertaintytothirdpartiesandhelptoensurethatenduringappointmentsarerecognisedandrespected.
10.109 Inordertopromotecertainty,theregistrationofanappointmentofanenduringpersonalguardianundernewguardianshiplegislationshouldrevokeanypreviousappointmentsofanenduringguardianundertheG&AAct.TheappointmentofanagentundertheMedicalTreatmentActshouldsurvivetheregistrationofanenduringpersonalguardianappointmentundernewguardianshiplegislation,unlesstheenduringpersonalguardianisgivenmedicaltreatmentdecision-makingpowers,includingthepowertocompletearefusaloftreatmentcertificate.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers10.110 Theformsforappointinganenduringpersonalguardianshouldclearlystatethat
registeringanenduringpersonalguardianappointmentwillrevokeanypreviousappointmentsofanenduringguardianundertheG&AAct.Theformsshouldalsospecifythepowersthataprincipalcangivetoanenduringguardian.
10.111 Thesameapproachshouldbetakenforenduringappointmentsoffinancialadministrators.TheformforappointinganenduringfinancialadministratorshouldclearlystatethatregisteringanewappointmentwillrevokeanypreviousappointmentsofanenduringattorneyundertheInstrumentsAct.
RECOmmENdaTIONSRegistration
97. Itshouldbecompulsorytoregisteranenduringappointmentofapersonalguardianandanenduringappointmentofafinancialadministratorfortheappointmenttobelegallyvalid.
98. Afterthecommencementofnewguardianshiplegislation:
(a) registeringanappointmentofanenduringfinancialadministratorwillrevokeanappointmentofanenduringattorneymadeundertheInstruments Act 1958(Vic).
(b) registeringanappointmentofanenduringpersonalguardianwillrevokeanappointmentofanenduringguardianmadeundertheGuardianship and Administration Act 1986(Vic).
(c) registeringanappointmentofanenduringpersonalguardianwithdecision-makingpowersinrelationtohealthmatterswillrevokeanappointmentofanagentmadeundertheMedical Treatment Act 1988(Vic).Iftheenduringguardianhasnotbeengivendecision-makingpowersinrelationtohealthmatters,theappointmentoftheagentundertheMedicalTreatmentActshouldsurvive.
99. Theregistershouldindicateifanappointmentofanenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancialadministratorisonethatgrantsstandard(full)powersorifthepowersgrantedarelimitedorsubjecttoconditionsorrestrictions.
TImE TO REgISTER aN ExISTINg PERSONaL aPPOINTmENT10.112 TheCommissionbelievesitisimportantthatpersonalappointmentsmadeunder
existinglegislationbepreservedbyappropriatetransitionalarrangements.Peopleshouldbegivenfiveyearstoregisterexistingappointments.InChapter5,theCommissionrecommendedthatcommunityeducationprogramsaboutthenewActalsoincludeinformationaboutthistransitionperiod.
RECOmmENdaTIONSTransitional provisions—time to register an existing personal appointment
100.AnenduringguardianappointedundertheGuardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic),enduringattorneyappointedundertheInstruments Act1958 (Vic)oranagentappointedundertheMedical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) beforethecommencementofnewguardianshiplegislationshouldcontinuetohavethepowersprovidedbytheappointment.
101.Theseappointmentsshouldberegisteredwithinfiveyearsofthecommencementdateofnewguardianshiplegislationinordertobevalid.
191
POwERS10.113 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteerecommendedclarifyingthepowers
thatmaybegiventopersonallyappointedsubstitutedecisionmakers.131
10.114 Itisimportantthatboththeprincipalandthesubstitutedecisionmakerunderstandthenatureofthepowersgivenbyanenduringappointment,aswellasanylimitsorconditionsontheexerciseofthosepowers.
10.115 Topromoteintegrationofguardianshiplaws,thepowersthataprincipalcangivetoanenduringpersonalguardianorfinancialadministratorunderapersonalappointmentshouldbethesamepowersavailabletoVCATwhenitmakesappointments.
10.116 TheCommissionrecommendsaconsistentapproachwiththatproposedbytheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommittee.TheCommissionbelievesthattheappointingdocumentshouldspecifythedecision-makingpowerstheenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancialadministratorcanexercise.Theformsshouldprovidetheoptionofgivinganenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancialadministratorfull or limited powers.
10.117 TheCommissionconsiderslegislativeclarityisbestachievedbyprovidingthatanenduringfinancialadministratormaybegivenpowersfor‘financial matters’andanenduringpersonalguardianmaybegivenpowersfor‘personal matters’.FinancialmattersandpersonalmattersshouldbedefinedinthenewAct.
10.118 Thereshouldbeanon-exhaustivelistofpowersthatcanbegiven.Thedefinitionsshouldalsoincludealistofrestrictionsonthepowersthatcanbegiventoanenduringpersonalguardianortoanenduringfinancialadministrator.
RECOmmENdaTIONSPowers
102.Anadultwithcapacity(theprincipal)shouldbeabletoappointanenduringpersonalguardiantomakedecisionsforthemaboutpersonalmatters,includingmedicaltreatment,oranenduringfinancialadministratortomakedecisionsforthemaboutfinancialmatters.
103.Thedocumentappointinganenduringpersonalguardianoranenduringfinancialadministratorshouldspecifywhichdecision-makingpowerstheenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancialadministratoristohave.
104.‘Financialmatters’and‘personalmatters’shouldbedefinedinthestatute.Thedefinitionsof‘financialmatters’and‘personalmatters’shouldincludeanon-exhaustivelistofpowersthatcanbegiven.Thedefinitionsshouldalsoincludealistofrestrictionsonthepowersthatcanbegiventoanenduringpersonalguardianortoanenduringfinancialadministrator.
105.Aprincipalmayspecifyconditionsandlimitationsonthepowersandexerciseofpowersbytheenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancialadministrator.
131 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,157.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
Financial matters
106.Afinancialmattershouldbedefinedasamatterrelatingtotheperson’sfinancialorpropertymatters.Anappointmentmaygiveanenduringfinancialadministratororafinancialadministratorfullpowerstomakedecisionsaboutfinancialorpropertymattersorspecifythepowersthataregiven.Examplesofthefinancialdecision-makingpowersthatcanbegiventoanenduringfinancialadministratororfinancialadministratorarelistedinDivisions3and3AofPart5oftheGuardianship and Administration Act 1986(Vic)andincludebutarenotlimitedto:
(a) payingsumsofmoneytothepersonfortheirpersonalexpenditure
(b) payingmaintenanceandaccommodationexpensesforthepersonandtheirdependants,including,forexample,purchasinganinterestin,ormakingacontributionto,anestablishmentthatwillmaintainoraccommodatethepersonoroneormoreoftheirdependants
(c) payingtheperson’sdebts,includinganyfeesandexpensestowhichanadministratorisentitledunderadocumentmadebythepersonorunderalaw
(d) receivingandrecoveringmoneypayabletotheperson
(e) carryingonatradeorbusinessoftheperson
(f) performingcontractsenteredintobytheperson
(g) dischargingamortgageovertheperson’sproperty
(h) payingrates,taxes,insurancepremiumsorotheroutgoingsfortheperson’sproperty
(i) insuringthepersonortheirproperty
(j) otherwisepreservingorimprovingtheperson’sestate
(k) investingfortheperson
(l) continuinginvestmentsoftheperson,includingtakinguprightstoissuesofnewshares,oroptionsfornewshares,towhichthepersonbecomesentitledbytheirexistingshareholding
(m) undertakingarealestatetransactionfortheperson
(n) dealingwithlandfortheperson
(o) undertakingabeneficialtransactionforthepersoninvolvingtheuseoftheirpropertyassecurity(forexample,foraloanorbywayofaguarantee)foranobligation
(p) withdrawingmoneyfrom,ordepositingmoneyinto,theperson’saccountwithafinancialinstitution
(q) alegalmatterrelatingtotheadult’sfinancialorpropertymatters.
193
Limitations on financial decision-making powers
107.Thefinancialdecision-makingpowersthatcannotbegiventoanenduringfinancialadministratororfinancialadministrator,andthatshouldbelistedinthestatute,includebutarenotlimitedto:
(a) makingorrevokingtheperson’swill
(b) managingtheestateoftheprincipalupontheirdeath
(c) consentingtoanunlawfulact
(d) makingdecisionsthatrestricttheperson’spersonaldecision-makingautonomy,butcannotbereasonablyjustifiedinordertoensurepropermanagementoftheirfinances
(e) aconflicttransaction,unlessthetransactionhasbeenspecificallyallowedintheorder.
Personal matters
108.Apersonalmattershouldbedefinedasamatterrelatingtotheperson’spersonalorlifestylematters,includingmedicaltreatment.Anappointmentmaygiveanenduringpersonalguardianorpersonalguardianfullpowerstomakedecisionsaboutpersonal,lifestyle,andmedicaltreatment,orlimitthepowersthataregiven.Thepersonaldecision-makingpowersthatcanbegiventoanenduringpersonalguardianorpersonalguardianandthatshouldbelistedinthestatute,includebutarenotlimitedto:
(a) whereandwithwhomthepersonlivesanddecisionsaboutrestrictionsuponliberty(discussedfurtherinChapter15)
(b) withwhomthepersonassociates
(c) whetherthepersonworksand,ifso,thekindandplaceofworkandtheemployer
(d) decisionsabouthealthcare,includingrefusaloflife-sustainingmedicaltreatmentiftheconditionsforrefusalofmedicaltreatmentarefulfilled,andconsenttoforensicexaminations(discussedfurtherinChapter13)
(e) whateducationortrainingthepersonundertakesandtheplacewherethisoccurs
(f) dailylivingissues,including,forexample,dietanddress
(g) anylegalmattersnotrelatingtotheperson’sfinancialorpropertymatters.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
Limitations on personal decision-making powers
109.Thepersonaldecision-makingpowersthatcannotbegiventoanenduringpersonalguardianorpersonalguardian,andthatshouldbelistedinthestatute,includebutarenotlimitedto:
(a) makingorrevokingtheperson’swill
(b) makingorrevokinganappointment,enduringappointmentorcommonlawadvancedirective,orrefusaloftreatmentcertificatesorinstructionaldirectives
(c) votingontheperson’sbehalfinaCommonwealth,stateorlocalelectionorreferendum
(d) enteringintoordissolutionofamarriageorsexualrelationship
(e) decisionsaboutthecareandwellbeingofanychildrenoftheperson,includingadecisioninrelationtoadoption
(f) adecisiontodetainorcompulsorilytreatthepersonforreasonsotherthanthepersonalandsocialwellbeingoftheperson
(g) consentingtoanunlawfulact
(h) adecisionaboutaspecialprocedure.132
muLTIPLE REPRESENTaTIVES10.119 Somepeoplealsoemphasisedthatdifferentskillsorcompetenciesarerequiredfor
differenttypesofappointment.TheCommissionbelievesthatallowingtheprincipaltoappointmorethanone,butnotmorethanthree,enduringpersonalguardiansorfinancialadministratorswillresolvethisissue.133Thisapproachsimplifiesthepersonalappointmentschemewhilestillallowingtheprincipaltodistributepowersbasedonskillsorcompetencies.Aprincipalwillhavetheoptionofappointingoneenduringguardiantomakemedicaldecisionsandadifferentpersontomakedecisionsaboutothermatters,suchasaccommodation.Theformsandassociatedinformationshouldbedraftedtomakethisoptionveryclear.
10.120 Aswiththecurrentlegislation,intheeventthatamultipleappointmentisnotworkingwell,anappointeeshouldbeabletoapplytoVCATtohavetheappointmentreviewed.134VCAT’scurrentremedialpowerstovarytheappointment,135providedirections136orrevokeanappointmentshouldcontinue.137
132 InChapter13theCommissionproposesthatthespecialproceduredefinitionandprocessesthatlimitauthorisationoftheseprocessestoVCATintheGuardianship and Administration Act 1986(Vic)beretainedinnewguardianshiplegislation.See:atss3,39(1)(a).
133 Ourrecommendationsanticipatethatmultiplerepresentativescanbeappointedtoexercisethesameordifferentpowers.TheInquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,145,alsodiscussedtheappointmentofmultiplerepresentatives.IntheirReport,theCommitteefocusedprimarilyonmultiplerepresentativesexercisingthesamepowers.TheCommitteealsodiscussedtheissueofmultiplerepresentativesnotagreeing,whichwouldbemostlikelywheretheserepresentativesareexercisingthesamepowers.TheCommissionsupportsRecommendation40oftheReportwhichsays‘thataprincipalcanappointmultiplerepresentativestoactjointly,jointlyandseverally,orinanycombination,forexampleasamajority’(147)andRecommendation41whichproposesthat,wheremultiplerepresentativesdisagree,VCATcanprovidebindingguidancetotherepresentatives(148).
134 SeeInstruments Act 1958(Vic)ss125V,125ZA.135 Ibids125Z(1)(b).136 Ibids125V.137 Ibids125X.
195
RECOmmENdaTIONSMultiple representatives
110.Theprincipalshouldbeabletogiveanenduringpersonalguardianoranenduringfinancialadministratorasmanyorasfewoftherelevantavailablepowersastheywish.
111.Theprincipalshouldbeabletoappointmorethanonebutnotmorethanthreeenduringpersonalguardiansorenduringfinancialadministratorsandshouldbeabletogivedifferentpowerstoeach.
CONSENT aNd aCkNOwLEdgEmENT Of RESPONSIbILITIES10.121 TheCommissionbelievesanenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancial
administratormustformallyaccepttheappointment.AcceptanceshouldbegivenusingaprescribedformsetoutinthenewAct.Thestatementofacceptanceshouldincludeanundertaking(asisrequiredcurrentlyintheInstrumentsAct)bytheappointeetoactinaccordancewiththeirresponsibilities.WediscussthisreformideainChapter18.
10.122 Someonewhoisauthorisedtowitnessaffidavitsshouldwitnessthestatementofacceptance.Thiswitnessmaybe,butneednotbe,thesamepersonwhowitnessedtheprincipal’ssignature.
RECOmmENdaTIONSConsent and acknowledgement of responsibilities
112.Anappointmentofanenduringpersonalguardianorenduringfinancialadministratorshouldonlybeeffectiveiftheappointeesignsaformformallyacceptingtheappointment.
113.Acceptanceshouldbegivenusingaprescribedform.Theprescribedformsshouldbesetoutinthenewstatute.
114.Thestatementofacceptanceshouldincludeanundertakingbythepersonacceptingtheappointmenttoactinaccordancewiththeirresponsibilities.
wITNESSINg aN aPPOINTmENT10.123 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteerecommendedthatnewguardianship
legislationshouldrequireallpersonalappointmentstobewitnessedbytwopeople,oneofwhomisauthorisedtowitnessaffidavitsorisamedicalpractitioner.138
10.124 Currently,allpersonalappointmentsrequiretwowitnesses.139Oneofthewitnessesmustbesomeonewhoisauthorisedtosignastatutorydeclaration.140Thelistofpeoplewhoarepermittedtowitnessastatutorydeclarationisquiteextensive.Itincludesjusticesofthepeaceandpeopleactinginvariousprofessionalrolessuchaslawyers,dentists,vets,pharmacists,schoolprincipals,bankmanagers,local
138 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,77.139 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s123(3);Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35A(2)(c);Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic)s5A(2)(a).140 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s125(3);Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic)s35A(2)(c)(iv); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic)s5A(2)
(a).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
councillorsandmembersofparliament.141TherangeofpeoplewhomaycurrentlywitnessanenduringappointmentinVictoriaisbroadincomparisonwithmanyotherjurisdictions.142
10.125 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteesuggestedthatthecurrentclassofauthorisedwitnessesistoowide.143Itsrecommendationnarrowstherangeofpeoplewhomaywitnessanenduringappointmenttoprovidebetterassurancethattheauthorisedwitnessisabletoassesstheprincipal’sunderstandingofthedocumentandidentifyanyevidenceofduress.144
10.126 TheVictorianGovernmentindicatedsupportinprinciplefortherequirementthatallappointmentsshouldhavetwowitnesseswithappropriatequalifications.TheGovernmentwishedtoconsiderissuesrelatedtolimitingauthorisedwitnesses.145
The Commission’s view10.127 TheCommissionbelievesitisimportanttoachieveanappropriatebalancebetween
stringentwitnessingrequirementsandnotdiscouragingpersonalappointmentsbymakingittoodifficultforpeopletolocateeligiblewitnesses.
10.128 TheCommissionagreeswiththereformsproposedbytheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommittee.TheCommissionhasalsoconsideredwhetherthewitnessingrequirementsshouldbedifferentforaprincipalwhoisgivingpowersthatrelatetomedicaltreatment,butconsidersthatraisingtheauthorisedwitnessrequirementtorequiresomeonewhoisauthorisedtowitnessanaffidavitadequatelystrikesthisbalance.146
10.129 InChapter11,weconsiderthewitnessingrequirementsformakingastand-aloneinstructionaldirectiveaboutmedicaltreatment.
RECOmmENdaTIONWitnessing a personal appointment
115.Newguardianshiplegislationshouldrequireallpersonalappointmentstobewitnessedbytwowitnesses,oneofwhomisauthorisedtowitnessaffidavitsorisamedicalpractitioner.
PROOf Of IdENTITy10.130 TheCommissionrecognisestheimportanceofensuringthatadequateproofof
identitychecksontheidentityoftheprincipalareundertakentopreventfraudulentregistrationofenduringappointments.
10.131 TheCommissionconsidersthatthebestwaytodothisistorequiretheprincipaltoshowproofofidentitydocumentstothetwowitnessesatthetimetheenduring
141 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s107A.142 Somejurisdictionsrequireonlyonewitnessbutlimittheclassofpossiblewitnessestoamuchnarrowerrangeofpeopleactingina
professionalrole.NewSouthWalestakesthisapproach.Itrequiresonlyonewitnessforanenduringpowerofattorney(financial),butlimitstheclassofpeoplewhomayactaswitnessestocourtregistrars,lawyers,conveyancersorappropriatelyqualifiedemployeesofatrusteecompany.Powers of Attorney Act 2003(NSW)s19.Otherjurisdictionshaveevenmorerigorouswitnessingrequirements,requiringtwowitnesseswhoeachhaveprofessionalexpertise.ForegEnduringPowersofAttorneyOrdinance(HongKong)cap501,s5(2)(a).Seealso:<www.opa.sa.gov.au/cgi-bin/wf.pl?pid=&hi=&mode=show&folder=../html/documents/05_Consent&file=23-Informal_Arrangements_for_People_with_Mental_Incapacity.html>.
143 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,77.144 Ibid.145 Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee,aboven10,10.146 InChapter24theCommissionproposesanadditionalwitnessingrequirementwhenapersonwishestoappointanenduringpersonal
guardianwiththepowertomakedecisionsaboutpsychiatrictreatmentwhichoverridethepowersofanauthorisedpsychiatristundertheMentalHealth Act 1986(Vic)insomeinstances.
197
appointmentismade.Thewitnesswhoisthepersonauthorisedtowitnessthedocumentshouldcertifythattheyhaveseenappropriateidentificationdocuments,whichconfirmtheprincipal’sidentity.
RECOmmENdaTIONSProof of identity
116.Theprincipalshouldshowproofofidentitydocumentstothetwowitnessesatthetimetheenduringappointmentdocumentissigned.
117.Theauthorisedwitnessshouldberequiredtocertifythattheyhaveseenappropriateidentificationdocuments,whichconfirmtheprincipal’sidentity.Newguardianshiplegislationorregulationsshoulddetailwhatcombinationofdocumentsiseligibleaseffectiveproofofidentification.
SIgNINg fOR ThE PRINCIPaL10.132 TheInstrumentsActcurrentlyallowsadonortoauthorisean‘eligibleperson’to
signanenduringpowerofattorneyontheirbehalf—attheirdirectionandintheirpresence.147Theeligiblepersonmustbeagedover18yearsandmustnotbeawitnesstothedocument,currentlyappointedasanattorneyornominatedasanattorneyinthedocument.148Ifthisprocessisundertaken,witnessestotheappointmentmustcertifythat:
• thedonorofthepowerdirectedthepersontosigntheenduringpowerofattorneyforthedonor
• thedonorofthepowergavethatdirectionfreelyandvoluntarilyinthepresenceofthewitness
• thepersonsigneditinthepresenceofthedonorandthewitness
• atthetime,thedonorappearedtothewitnesstohavethecapacitynecessarytomaketheenduringpowerofattorney.149
10.133 TheCommissionbelievesthatthisprocessprovidesanimportantmeansforpeoplewhoarephysicallyincapableofsigningadocumenttomakeanappointment,andprovidesadequatesafeguardsagainstabuse.TheCommissionproposesthatthisprocessbeextendedtoallpersonalappointmentsofsubstitutedecisionmakers,andalsotheappointmentof‘supporters’,whichweconsiderinmoredetailinChapter8.
RECOmmENdaTIONSSigning for the principal
118.If,becauseofphysicallimitations,theprincipalisunabletosignthedocumentsmakinganenduringappointment,itshouldbepossibleforsomeonetosignforthemontheirdirectionandintheirpresence.
119.Similarprovisionstothosecontainedinsections123(2)(b),124and125A(2)oftheInstruments Act 1958(Vic)shouldbeincludedinnewguardianshiplegislationtoprovideforthispractice.
147 Instruments Act 1958(Vic)s123(2)(b).148 Ibids124.149 Ibids125A(2).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
CONfLICT TRaNSaCTIONS10.134 TheCommissionbelievesthatnewlegislationshouldclearlydefineaconflict
transaction.Itshouldprohibitsomeoneappointedasanenduringfinancialadministratorfromengaginginconflicttransactionsotherthanwhenclearlypermittedtodoso.WehavebasedourconflicttransactionproposalonQueenslandlegislation.150
10.135 Aconflicttransactionshouldbedefinedasatransactioninwhichtheremaybeconflict,orwhichresultsinconflict,betweenthedutyofanenduringfinancialadministratortowardstheprincipalandtheirotherinterests.
10.136 Therearesomesituationswhereconflicttransactionsshouldbeallowedifproperlyauthorised.NewguardianshiplegislationshouldprovidethatanenduringfinancialadministratormustnotenterintoaconflicttransactionunlesstheyhavebeenauthorisedeitherbytheprincipalintheappointmentbeforethetransactiontakesplaceorbyVCAT.LegislationshouldalsoallowaprincipalwhohascapacitytoretrospectivelyauthoriseorratifyaconflicttransactionandalsopermitVCATtoratifyacompletedconflicttransaction.
gifts10.137 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteealsoaddressedtheissueofgifts
thatanappointeemightmakeonbehalfoftheprincipal,eithertothemselvesortoapersonwithwhomtheprincipaliscloselyinvolved.151
10.138 Itrecommendedthatthelawshould:
providethatarepresentativecanmakeagiftoftheprincipal’sproperty,includingtotherepresentative,onlyif:
thegiftisreasonableinthecircumstances,particularlyinviewoftheprincipal’sfinancialsituationAND
thegift:
• is to a relative or close friend of the principal and is of a seasonal nature or for a special event OR
• the gift is of a type of donation that the principal made when he or she had capacity or might reasonably be expected to make.152
10.139 NewguardianshiplegislationshouldspecifythatgiftsmadeinaccordancewiththegiftingprovisionsasrecommendedbytheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteedonotamounttoaconflicttransaction.Newlegislationshouldalsospecifythatprovisionmadeforthemaintenanceoftheprincipal’sdependantsinaccordancewiththelegislationwouldnotbeaconflicttransaction.
10.140 Apersonappointedasanenduringfinancialadministratorwillfrequentlybethespouseorpartneroftheprincipal.Oftenproperty,suchasthefamilyhome,willbeheldjointly.TheCommissionconsidersthatitisunworkableandoverlyoneroustoclassifyatransactionasaconflicttransactionsolelybecauseitinvolvespropertyjointlyheldbytheenduringfinancialadministratorandtheprincipal.Thismattershouldbeexpresslydealtwithinnewlegislation.
10.141 InChapter12,weconsiderhowgiftingprovisionsshouldapplyintribunalappointments,andparticularlytheroleofVCATinmonitoringcompliancewiththeseprovisions.
150 Powers of Attorney Act 1998(Qld)s73;Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld)s37.151 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,200.152 Ibid202.
199
RECOmmENdaTIONSConflict transactions
120.Newguardianshiplegislationshoulddefineaconflicttransaction.Itshouldprohibitsomeoneappointedasafinancialadministratororanenduringfinancialadministratorengaginginconflicttransactionsandsetouttherelevantexceptionstothisrule.
121.Aconflicttransactionshouldbedefinedasatransactioninwhichtheremaybeconflict,orwhichresultsinconflict,between:
(a) thedutyofafinancialadministratororanenduringfinancialadministratortowardstheprincipal,and
(b) either—
(i) theinterestsoftheappointee,orarelation,businessassociateorclosefriendoftheappointee,or
(ii) anotherdutyoftheappointee.
122.Thelegislationshouldprovidethat:
(a) Anenduringfinancialadministratormaynotenterintoaconflicttransactionunlesstheyhavebeenauthorisedpriortothetransactiontakingplace.Theenduringfinancialadministratormaybeauthorisedinadvancebytheprincipal,whomusthavethecapacitytoauthorisetheconflicttransaction,orbyVCAT.
(b) Aprincipalmayauthoriseaparticularconflicttransaction,conflicttransactionsofthattypeorconflicttransactionsgenerally.
(c) Aprincipalwhohascapacitymayretrospectivelyauthoriseorratifyaconflicttransaction.
(d) VCATmayauthoriseaparticularconflicttransaction,conflicttransactionsofthattypeorconflicttransactionsgenerally.
(e) VCATmayratifyaconflicttransaction.
123.Newguardianshiplegislationshouldspecifythat:
(a) GiftsmadeinaccordancewiththegiftingprovisionsrecommendedbytheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteearenotaconflicttransaction.
(b) Provisionmadeforthemaintenanceoftheprincipal’sdependantsinaccordancewiththelegislationwillnotbeaconflicttransaction.
(c) Atransactionisnotaconflicttransactiononlybecausebythetransactiontheappointee,intheappointee’sownrightandonbehalfoftheprincipal:
(i) dealswithaninterestinpropertyjointlyheld,or
(ii) acquiresajointinterestinproperty,or
(iii) obtainsaloanorgivesaguaranteeorindemnityinrelationtoatransactionmentionedin(i)or(ii).
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
COmmENCEmENT Of POwERS10.142 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteerecommendedthataprincipalshould
beabletoelecttomakeapersonalappointmenteffectiveimmediately,oruponalaterdateorsubsequenteventregardlessofwhetheritprovidesguardianshiporfinancialpowers.Italsorecommendedthatifaprincipaldoesnotspecifywhenanenduringpowercommences,itshouldcommenceimmediately.153
10.143 TheVictorianGovernmentindicatedsupportinprincipleforallowingaprincipaltomakeanenduringpowerofattorneyforfinancialorguardianshipmatterseffectiveimmediatelyoruponalaterdateorevent.TheGovernmentwishedtoconsiderfurtherwhetheranenduringpowershouldcommenceimmediatelyiftheprincipaldoesnotspecifyadateforcommencement.154
10.144 TheCommissionrecognisesthatprovidingthatalltypesofenduringappointmentsmaycomeintoeffectatatimespecifiedbytheprincipalorotherwiseimmediatelyprovidesconsistency.However,theCommissionbelievesthatenduringpowersofguardianshipshouldnotbeabletocomeintoeffectbeforetheprincipalhaslostcapacity.Ourconsultationsrevealedthatthereislittlesupportforallowingactivationofanenduringguardianshipappointmentpriortolossofcapacity.Strongdiscomfortwasexpressedwiththeideathatmedicalpowerscouldbeusedbysomeoneappointedunderanenduringappointmentwhentheprincipalstillhascapacity.
10.145 BecausetheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommittee’stermsofreferencedidnotincludeconsiderationofanagentundertheMedicalTreatmentAct,itdidnotconsiderthetimeanenduringappointmentshouldcomeintoeffectinrelationtodecisionsaboutrefusalofmedicaltreatment.
10.146 TheCommissionbelievesthatdecisionsaboutpersonalmatterssuchasmedicaltreatmentorhousingshouldnotbemadeforaprincipalwhilethatpersonstillhascapacity.
10.147 Whileaprincipalshouldbeabletoelectwhenthepowersgivenbyanenduringappointmentofafinancialadministratorcomeintoeffect,thepowersofanenduringguardianshouldonlybeeffectivewhentheprincipallosescapacity.Ifnotimeisspecifiedforthecommencementofthepowersofanenduringfinancialadministrator,thosepowersshouldcommencewhentheprincipallosescapacity.Thisapproachreflectstheprimaryintentofanenduringappointment,whileenablingaprincipaltomakethepowerexercisableimmediatelyiftheywish.
RECOmmENdaTIONSCommencement of powers
124.Theappointmentofanenduringfinancialadministratormaycomeintoeffectimmediately,atadatespecifiedbytheprincipal,oronaspecifiedoccasionorcircumstance.
125.Thedocumentmakingtheappointmentcanincludeconditionsabouthowadeterminationshouldbemadethataspecifiedcircumstancehasoccurred.
126.Ifnodateisspecified,thepowersofanenduringfinancialadministratorcomeintoeffectwhentheprincipallosescapacity.
127.Thepowersofanenduringpersonalguardianshouldonlycomeintoeffectwhentheprincipallosescapacity.
153 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,93.154 Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee,aboven10,14.
201
RESIgNaTION, REVOCaTION aNd VaRIaTION10.148 TheCommissionproposesnochangetothelawgoverningresignationfromand
revocationofapersonalappointment.Underthecurrentlaw,arepresentativecanresignwhiletheprincipalretainscapacitybutoncecapacityislostcanonlydoso‘withtheleaveofacourtortheTribunal’.155
10.149 Newguardianshiplegislationshouldrequirethatnoticeofresignationberecordedinaprescribedformthatisprovidedtotheregistry.Therepresentativeshouldberequiredtotakereasonablestepstoinformtheprincipaloftheresignation.Aresignationshouldtakeeffectonlywhenregistered.Theregistryshouldalsoinformtheprincipaloftheresignation.
10.150 Aprincipalwithcapacityshouldretaintherighttovaryorrevokeapersonalappointmentatanytime.156
RECOmmENdaTIONSResignation by the enduring personal guardian or enduring financial administrator
128.Anenduringpersonalguardianoranenduringfinancialadministratorshouldbeabletoresignatanytimewhentheprincipalhascapacity.Ifaprincipalhaslostcapacityorthereisdoubtabouttheircapacity,itshouldnotbepossibletoresignwithouttheleaveofVCAT.
129.Anenduringguardianorenduringfinancialadministratormustresigninwritingusingaprescribedformthatisprovidedtotheregistry.Theenduringguardianorenduringfinancialadministratorshouldmakereasonableattemptstonotifytheprincipaloftheresignation.
130.Aresignationshouldnotbeeffectiveuntilregistered.
131.Whenaresignationisregistered,theregistryshouldmakereasonableattemptstonotifytheprincipal.
VCAT’s power to revoke appointments
132.AnypersonwithaninterestintheaffairsoftheprincipalshouldbeabletoapplytoVCATwhentheprincipalhaslostcapacityforanorderthatapersonalappointmentberevokedorvariedordeclaredinvalidonthegroundthat:
(a) theprincipallackedcapacityatthetimeitwasmade
(b) thedocumentisnotaproperrecordoftheprincipal’swishesatthetimeitwasmade
(c) theappointeeisnotcomplyingwiththeirobligations
(d) theappointeelackscapacitytoperformtheirobligations.
155 Instruments Act 1958(Vic)s125M.156 Ibids125I.
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10Chapter 10Personal appointments of substitute decision makers
RECOmmENdaTIONS Of ThE VICTORIaN PaRLIamENT Law REfORm COmmITTEE REquIRINg fuRThER CONSIdERaTION
Excluding some classes of people from witnessing enduring personal appointments10.151 Asnotedabove,theCommissionagreeswiththeVictorianParliamentLawReform
Committeerecommendationthatnewguardianshiplegislationshouldrequireallpersonalappointmentstobewitnessedbytwowitnesses,oneofwhomisauthorisedtowitnessaffidavitsorisamedicalpractitioner.157
10.152 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteealsorecommendedthatcertainclassesofpeopleshouldbeexcludedfromwitnessinganenduringappointmentdocument.Thoseclassesofpeopleareapartytothedocumentandanypersonwhocouldbenefitfromthedocumentincludingarelativeofapartytothedocument.158Italsorecommendedthattheformsforcreatingallpowersofattorneyshouldrequireeachwitnesstodeclarethattheyarenotapartytothedocumentandnotrelatedtoanypartytothedocument.159
10.153 TheVictorianGovernmentindicatedsupportinprincipleforthisproposal.TheGovernmentindicateditwouldconsiderfurtherhowtodefineapersonwhocouldbenefitfromapowerofattorney,includingarelativeofapartytoapowerofattorney.160
The Commission’s view10.154 TheCommissionbelievesthatfurtherconsiderationshouldbegiventowhether
relativesshouldbeautomaticallyexcludedfromwitnessingappointments.Inkeepingwiththeaimofencouragingpeopletomakeenduringappointments,itmaybeprudenttokeeptherangeofnon-professionalwitnessesbroadandprovideasafeguardbyrequiringthewitnesstosignadeclarationthattheyarenotgoingtobenefitfromtheappointment.Arelativemayoftenbethemostreadilyavailablepersontowitnessanappointment,willnotnecessarilybenefitfromanappointmentandmaybewell-placedtoassessaprincipal’sunderstandingofthedocuments.Acompromisemightbetoallowrelativestowitnessanenduringappointmentbutexcluderelativesfromactingastheauthorisedwitness(whowouldattestthataprincipalunderstandsandisundernoduress).Ifrelativesareautomaticallyexcludedfromwitnessingenduringdocuments,carefulconsiderationshouldbegiventohowarelativeisdefined.
Excluding unsuitable representatives10.155 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteealsorecommendedthataperson
whohadpreviouslybeenconvictedofanoffenceinvolvingdishonestyshouldbeexcludedfromactingasarepresentativeunderafinancialenduringappointment.However,itwassuggestedthataprincipalshouldbeabletoapplytoVCATforapprovaltoappointapersonwhohaspreviouslybeenconvictedofanoffenceinvolvingdishonestyasarepresentativeunderanenduringpowerofattorney(financial).Itrecommendedthatwhenacceptinganappointmentasarepresentative,apersonmustdeclarethattheyareeligibletobeappointedasarepresentative,andthatapersonwhoacceptsanappointmentasarepresentativewhoisnoteligibleshouldbeguiltyofanoffence.161
157 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,77.158 Ibid79.159 Ibid.160 Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee,aboven10,10.161 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,143.
203
10.156 TheVictorianGovernmenthasindicatedthatitsupportsexcludingunsuitablepeoplefrombeingappointedasrepresentatives,includingpeoplewhohavepreviouslybeenconvictedofanoffenceinvolvingdishonesty.162
Personal monitors10.157 TheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteerecommendedthataprincipal
shouldbeabletoappointoneormorepersonalmonitorstooverseetheoperationofanenduringpowerofattorney(financial)oranenduringpowerofattorney(guardianship),andthattheVictorianGovernmentshouldproducesimple,easy-to-understandinformationandeducationalmaterialsforpersonalmonitors.163
10.158 TheVictorianGovernmenthasindicatedthatitwillconsiderthisproposalaswellastheprovisionofinformationresourcesforpersonalmonitors.Whilerecognisingpotentialbenefitsoftherecommendation,theGovernmentconsideredsomemattersneededfurtherthoughtsuchasthepotentialpowers,dutiesandliabilityofapersonalmonitor.164
The Commission’s view10.159 TheCommissionbelievesthatitwouldbedesirabletotakeacautiousapproachtothe
inclusionofmonitorsinlegislation.
10.160 TheCommissionnotesthataprincipalcancurrentlyattachconditions,limitationsandinstructionsontheexerciseofpowersbyanenduringattorney.165Thesecouldincludeconditionsorinstructionsconcerningtheuseofamonitor.
10.161 TheCommissionseesmeritintheviewexpressedbytheVictorianParliamentLawReformCommitteethattheprincipalisbestplacedtodeterminetherole(ifany)ofapersonalmonitor,andforthisreasonsuggeststhereislittlebenefitindealingwiththematterexpresslyinlegislation.166ThisproposalrequiresfurtherconsiderationbytheVictorianGovernment.
162 Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee,aboven10,19.163 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,200.164 Government Response to the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee,aboven10,26.165 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)s115(1)(b).166 Inquiry into Powers of Attorney,aboven8,199.