Public private partnerships in transportatioEuropean experience

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IATSS Research 36 (2013) 8387

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

IATSS Retries are confronted by the necessity to improve competitiveness by different approaches with respect to user charges and ownership struc-tures. But despite the differences, a framework for what are now referredto as PPPs has emerged within the European Union. The approach iscertainly well established in the European Union; in fact, from 2002 to2006 an average annual value of approximately 30 billion euros was

Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 7679 1557.vest in smart city solutions. The development of critical infrastructuresuch as transport is therefore part of the investment portfolio, notonly of European public authorities, but also of the private sector.

Given the current economic crisis, however,many European countriesare contendingwith twodivergent policies, therst ofwhich is that coun-

investment strategy and nancing already in use [4,5]. Within thiscontext we need to keep in mind that member state governments arecharacterized by strongly diverse administrative cultures and capabili-ties and distinct legal and planning traditions. For instance, institutionaldiversity in the transport sector is considerable, with countries adoptingE-mail addresses: f.medda@ucl.ac.uk (F.R. Medda), g(G. Carbonaro).Peer reviewunder responsibility of International Associatio

1 Tel.: +352 4379 2761.

0386-1112/$ see front matter 2012 International Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iatssr.2012.11.002ecline of birth rates andthe environmental con-gy consumption and in-

Notwithstanding that the 27 EU member states differ substantiallyin their social and economic structures and infrastructure endowment,this should prepare us for the variety of approaches to infrastructurethe migration trends. On the other hand laycerns, which include the need to reduce enervest in its infrastructure stocks; suchinfrastructure renewal and rehabilitamember states of the EU, and to connew infrastructure in the most recenconcerns characterize European infrone hand are the population trends suaging due to increased life expectancycreasing necessity to in-ents will be directed tobove all in the originalon and development ofber states. Two strong

ure investment; on thee advance of population

are compelled to contain their public budgets. These two divergent policystreams provide countries with a powerful incentive to explore alterna-tive funding approaches to build transport infrastructure and provideservice delivery. As a result, there is a widespread interest in variousforms of private and public involvements that have been developed andapplied widely in the transport sector under Public and Private Partner-ship (PPP) approaches [13]..carb

n of

ssociainvesting in transport infrastructure (see, for instance, the debate onhigh-speed rail investment in the UK). Secondly, several member states1. IntroductionFrancesca Romana Medda a,, Gianni Carbonaro b,1, Sa UCL QASER Lab, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingb European Investment Bank, 100 Bvd K. Adenauer, L-2950 Luxembourg

a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 28 June 2012Received in revised form 9 November 2012Accepted 12 November 2012

Keywords:Public private partnershipTransportation

Most EUmember states andnancial resources for high pEU panorama of PPP marketthis type of nancial arrangeEurope is based on theexibic and institutional environmsector. We conclude by obsea European dimension and a

2012 International Aonaro@eib.org

Trafc and Safety Sciences.

tion of Trafc and Safety Scienn: Some insights from the

an L. Davis a

European Commission regard the PPP as an important tool to attract additionality investments such as transport. The objective of this paper is to delineate thed investigate the impacts of EU institutions in the development and success ofnt for the transport sector in Europe. We examine how the scope of the PPP inand adaptability of the contract to the features of the project and to the econom-t. These issues are illustrated through a number of examples in the transportg that the market for PPPs, although still fragmented nationally, is developingcting resources from a variety of players.ciation of Trafc and Safety Sciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd.

All rights reserved.

searchsigned under PPP contracts.Most EU member states and the European Commission regard the

PPP as an important tool for attracting additional nancial resourcesfor high priority investments such as transport. Many denitions of aPPP are present in the literature, butwedeem themost suitable overarch-ing denition selected by the European Commission, where PPP refers toforms of cooperation between public authorities and businesses, withthe aim of carrying out infrastructure projects or providing services to

ces. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

the public [3]. Although it is difcult to provide a clear-cut characteriza-tion of the evolution of public works nancing methods, given thevariety of initial conditions, we can nevertheless observe a shift awayfrom conventional traditional models of transportation service delivery(distinguished by hierarchical decision structures, vertical integrationin delivery, and relatively undiversied funding tools), to a more diver-sied nancial landscape. The objective of our paper is thus to delineatethe EU panorama of PPP markets, and to investigate the impacts of EUinstitutions in the development and success of this type of nancialarrangement for the transport sector in Europe.

2. Institutional diversity in Europe

Starting from the 1990s, the European Union had two principalobjectives: the achievement of the Single Market and of marketintegration; and the preparation for the European Monetary Union(EMU) (Fig. 1). To achieve these two objectives it was of prime impor-tance to improve the physical integration among European countries,and increase the accessibility of the peripheral regions by targetingthe network infrastructures energy, telecommunications and trans-port. In this context the construction of transport Trans-European net-works (TENs) assumes a critical role for European integration.

The TEN policy identies 30 transnational transport corridors on thebasis of proposals frommember states. The European Union must aimto promote the development of Trans-European Networks as a keyelement for the creation of the Internal Market and the reinforcement

due to different cultures and traditions in planning and managementof public works, deciencies in legal and institutional structures, andpolitical awareness and acceptance of the PPP concept. The UK has thelongest and most substantial experience in PPP agreements; othercountries have followed the British framework and developed pilotprocurements for many years. The twomain institutional frameworksare (1) PPP unit at a central government level, and (2) the promotionof PPP legislation. In relation to the PPP units, in certain cases theseunits have only a consultative capacity, for example, Sweden, Franceand Luxembourg; whereas PPP units have a more active role in pro-moting and facilitating PPPs, for example, Ireland and the Nether-lands (Table 1).

Table 1 depicts the different experiences among European memberstates. Among transport investments, road is the most common underPPP agreements, however, only in the UK and Portugal do road PPPagreements have sufcient breadth and scope to enable them to deter-mine structural changes in the procurement procedure. In newmemberstates, especially for highway networks, additional investment is neces-sary due to the transition process, i.e. in order to satisfy EU standards.The World Bank [7] has estimated a gure of 65 billion over the next15 years for infrastructure investment in new member states, wherePoland has the highest need for infrastructure investment (21.4 billion).

There are several determinants related to each country's PPP ap-proach. One is the planning determinant, throughwhich transport invest-ment planning is implemented according to the different approacheswhich are, in various degrees, systematic. For instance, in some countries

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84 F.R. Medda et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 8387of Economic and Social Cohesion. This development includes the inter-connection and interoperability of national networks as well as accessto such networks [3]. However, by 2003 only one-third of the networkhad been built, and only three of the 14 specic projects endorsed bythe European Council at Essen in 1994, had been completed. Totalinvestment in the Trans-European Network Transport (TEN-T) duringthe period of 20002006 was 859 billion. At present, the completionof the TEN-T is estimated at 550 billion until 2020 [6]; it is for thisreason that private sector nance and the implementation of a commonPPP framework is now considered to be essential to the success ofTEN-T development.

Although nearly all the countries in the EU use PPP arrangements,as we have observed, there are different ways of adopting this policy

The Single MaThe Single Ma

Need for increased action in favor of physical integration and peripheral regions

Critical role of TENs

New Rthe Priv

the PSec

* Increased Commercializ* Increased Deregulation

* Priva* Public / Private Partne

Fig. 1. The relationship between Single Mark

Source: European Investment Bank.such as Italy, investment decisions are seldom supported bymaster plansor cost-benet analyses. Conversely, in the EU there are countries with astrong transportation planning tradition which is either project-focussed on CBA, as in the United Kingdom or emphasizes strategicnetwork development, as in France and the Netherlands. The differentapproaches often contribute to the structure of the private interventionand thus to the feasibility of a PPP framework and institutional arrange-ment in transport investment.

Fig. 2 species the various institutional arrangements in the Europeanroad sector. The gure presents two columns dividing the differentprojects in relation to approach chosen for the user charges (with tollsand toll-free). The projects are listed in relation to the ownership of thetransport infrastructure (at the top, private ownership and at the bottom,

ket & EMUket & EMU

Need to implement strict budgetary policy to meet Maastricht criteria

Reduced investment by and increased efficiency of the Public sector

es for te and blic rs

n and Competitionhird Party Accessionips & Risk sharing

uropean Monetary Union (EMU) and PPPs.

Table 1. A summary of PPP experiences in European Union member states.

Member states PPP unit Year Location PPP law Airport Ports/canals Heavy railway Light railway/bus Road

Austria O ____ Belgium/anders X 2002 Ministry of nance X (2003) # # Czech Republic X 2004 Independent _ _ _ # # /#Denmark X 2006 Line ministry X (2010) France X 2005 Ministry of nance _ _ _ /# /# #Finland O ____ Germany X 2009 Independent _ _ _ #Greece X 2006 Ministry of nance X (2005) # # Hungary X 2003 Ministry of nance X /#Ireland X 2003 Ministry of nance X # !Italy X 1999 Ministry of nance X !Latvia X 2002 Ministry of nance X (2009) # #Luxembourg O ___ #Netherlands X 1999 Ministry of nance _ _ _ # /# /#Poland X 2001 Line ministry X (2005) # # #Portugal X 2003 Independent X (2003) # # # !Spain O X # # !Sweden O ___ # #UK X 1997 Ministry of nance X ! # # ! !

LegendX: PPP unit existing/PPP legislation in place.O: no dedicated PPP unit.: In some sectors specic legislation is in place.__: Legislation being proposed.#: Some experiences.!: Substantial number of closed projects.: Projects in procurement.

85F.R. Medda et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 8387public ownership). As shown in thegure, several funding strategies havebeen applied in some cases within the same country; for example, in theUK tradition, public nancing has been implemented alongside BOT con-cessions. But we can conclude that certainly since the 1990s the trend ofinfrastructure nancing has shifted from traditional public provisionto increasing private participation.

3. PPPs in transport some key features

Despite national differences, the rationale for developing a PPPapproach from the vantage point of the public sector is based on

Sources: [16] PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004), OECD (2010), UCL QASER elaboration.the opportunity to attract additional nancial resources through the

Fig. 2. Institutional divSource: Luigi Marcon,involvement of the private sector, thereby reducing pressure on pub-lic sector borrowing and facilitating closer control of capital-spendingbudgets. According to various researches [810] efciency gains areanother important main rational for the use of private nance andprivate sector skills. Linked to these gains is the possibility of inducingan efcient service management throughout the whole project life andachieving design optimality to ensure minimum life cycle costing contract design is essential. Therefore, a paramount consideration overthe course of the contract is the strategy of transferring risk from thepublic sector to the private sector. Risk is allocated to the partner bestable to manage it, and who is best equipped to minimize its costs. This

aspect assumes relevance, particularly in light of contract renegotiation,

ersity in Europe.European Investment Bank.

86 F.R. Medda et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 8387which is often brought about by the strategic behavior of the private sec-tor during the contractual bids, and also by systematic optimistic over-estimation of the transport demand [9,11].

The PPP approach can induce indirect effects related to improve-ments in public sector management. In the partnership the publicsector needs to correctly evaluate transport demand, road capacityand safety levels; and by so doing it prompts the private sector toachieve best practice in terms of project design, management andtechnical innovation. The public sector therefore benets from theaddition of new operators for instance, specialists in constructionand management in transport infrastructure and also new markets,such as the emergence of a bond market for transport infrastructure.

The possible benets in a PPP agreement must nevertheless beweighed against possible disadvantages. In particular is the risk that inthe case of uncongested transport infrastructure, the user charges nec-essary to achieve nancial sustainability may diverge substantiallyfrom the economically optimal price, which can represent a fraction ofthe price necessary for cost recovery. The approaches to user chargesin Europe have been various. In some cases the decision has been toadopt shadow tolls (as in the SCUTs project in Portugal); others haveadopted a targeted approach in applying real tolls.

Another issue of concern is the funding cost and thus the PPP applica-bility. Some scholars have indicated that the ex-ante premium onprivate nance in road projects is signicant and in line with the costoverruns in road projects often observed empirically [12]. However, thisobserved increase in costs generally indicates that a higher funding costis needed in order to compensate private investors for taking nancialrisks, which however, may be structured within an incentive mechanismin the PPP contractual agreement [9]. Nonetheless, the judgment ulti-mately depends on whether a reasonable and efcient evaluation alongwith allocation of risks to the private sector is achievable in the PPP,and whether this risk allocation is appropriate from a welfare point ofview [8].

Finally, it is well-recognized that the transaction cost of transport PPPagreements is higher compared to the transport projects supported bytraditional nancing mechanisms. This situation is due to the high costsof negotiation and contracting and additional costs for monitoring andregulatory systems. However, standardization has advanced considerablyin EU countries, in particular countries with long experience of PPP pro-jects, as in the UK, where the transaction costs have decreased overtime [13].

4. Strategic aspects of transport PPPs some illustrations

After the experience of a few toll-based estuary road crossingschemes, the DBFO model (Design Build Finance and Operate) waslaunched in the early 1990s in the United Kingdom as part of the PrivateFinance Initiative (PFI). Key features of the DBFO are the application ofshadow rather than real tolls and that the private party normally aspecial purpose company is responsible for the nancing, design andconstruction of the project and its operation for a number of years. Thesolution of the shadow tolls was at that time very innovative. The High-way Agency, which is responsible for transportation planning, projectprioritization, and the selection of the company through a competitivetender, secures debt repayment and any return on shareholders' funds.The decision to use shadow rather than real tolls was justied on eco-nomic grounds so that users would not be discouraged by the need topay for road access, but also by the fact that imposing road tolls in theUK would have been excessively controversial and politically risky.

The risk transfer to the private sectorwas very high in the early exam-ples, including not only trafc risk but also delay and civil unrest risksrelated to the environmental and planning obligations. The so-calledbanding mechanism was devised essentially to facilitate nancial engi-neering. Themechanismallows bidders to address trafc-related revenuerisks by structuring their offers through variable unit payments the

trafc band in order to achieve the revenue to match foreseen capitalcosts and maintenance costs. In a typical DBFO there can be four trafcbands with the lower band (applying when trafc falls below a certaincapacity), priced at some amount as an availability payment, therebyguaranteeing that the private sector covers the cost partly at least. Morerecently, the payment mechanism has changed in ways that give moreweight to availability than trafc capacity, particularly in infrastructuressubject to intense competition, such as projects in urban road networks.

The DBFO approach has evolved in various concession models inother European countries. The German road concession model wasconceived in 1994 in order to allow off-balance sheetnancing of trans-port infrastructure. The approachwas essentially a pre-nancing devicewith very limited risk transfer, where the main risk transferred to theprivate party was a construction risk, i.e. cost and time of completion,without any trafc risk. Apart from the possibility of off-balance sheetnancing, the main advantage of this approach was that public pay-ments would be easily tradable on the nancial market and providean easy exit for the builder after construction, as well as additionalliquidity to the road construction market.

In 2005 new nancing models were introduced in Germany bysuccessive legislative amendments similar in substance to a private -nance approach; these were the A-model and F-model of PPP. Underthe A-model, a private party can take the construction, operationand maintenance of a federal trunk road section for a period up to30 years. The private investor receives funds from the public sector,part of which can be raised through the revenue from the HVG federaltolling system. Under the F-model, which has been applied thus far toschemes like tunnels and xed crossings, real tolls can be applied. Inboth cases the maximum amount of public subsidy is limited to a per-centage of the overall project cost.

A further example of an application of the DBFOmodel to the trans-port sector is in Portugal, where an impressivemassive shadow toll pro-gram, the SCUT, was launched in the late 1990s. However, by 2004 itbecame clear that shadow toll obligations for the public sector, estimat-ed at 660mper year by 2008, were becoming overbearing and thus thegovernment now plans to convert shadow tolls to real tolls.

Interesting applications of the PPP contracts in the European Unionhave been and continue to be projects where the public sector is ableto confer an existing asset to the private sector in order to optimizerisk allocation and achieve the success of the contract by fostering theprivate sector capacity in efcient provision, management skills andentrepreneurship ability. Two examples can better clarify this concept.

The Vasco de Gama Bridge on the Tagus River is one the main pro-jects of its kind recently implemented in Europe; its length is 12 km(18 km with the connecting links to the trunk road network), 140 mhigh central pylons, and 47 m vertical water clearance across the cen-tral span. As a key infrastructure for the Lisbon metropolitan area, itwas built according to schedule andwithin the cost, and opened to traf-c inMarch 1998, in time for the Expo 98 universal exhibition (this wasa key requirement in the concession agreement). Despite the complex-ity of the project and the long preparation period, the need for a secondriver crossing had been apparent since themid-1970s; the execution ofthe concession proceeded smoothly with the international tender in1992, the selection of the concessionaire in 1994, contract signature in1995, and works completed in 1998.

The cost was approximately 900 m, covered by shareholder fundsfor 12%, the Cohesion Fund for 36%, revenues from the existing bridgeduring construction for 7%, a loan from the European Investment Bankfor 35%, and other sources for 10%. The strategic objectives of the PPPcontract were to stimulate development in northern Lisbon and to thewest of the metropolitan region (Montijo) in order to attract inwardinfrastructure investment to the city, but above all to reduce the conges-tion on the existing 25th April Bridge. The Portuguese public sector inthis case has conferred to the private partner the rights not only of thenew bridge but also of the existing asset with consolidated revenuestreams in this case the existing 25th April Bridge for the length of

the concession period. And indeed, the adoption of a unied concession

tional environment, which has facilitated, stimulated and directed

87Research 36 (2013) 8387of the two bridges is certainly the key to the success of the Vasco deGama Bridge project, since this strategy was able to signicantly reducethe revenue risk of this PPP project.

Another remarkable example of early European project nance isthe Prado Carenage tunnel in Marseille, which is especially interestingbecause here again we have a successful PPP example of the publicsector conferring an existing asset to the private party. The project isan opportunistic project which has exploited an existing unusedformer rail tunnel which was converted for light vehicle use and fullyfunded through private resources. This was the rst PPP project of itstype in France and the rst example of toll paying infrastructure withina city. The Marseille municipality was the conceding authority andthe special purpose company was the Societe Marseillaise du TunnelPrado-Carenage (SMTPC), comprised by construction companies andbanks. Investment cost was approximately 175m, funded 15% byshares and subordinated convertible debt and 85% by long-term loans.

Work began in 1991 and the tunnel was in operation by 1993,ve months earlier than expected. Public reaction, however, wasunenthusiastic and despite a 25% decrease in initial tolls, trafcremained well below the forecast (22,000 vehicles per day vs 35,000).However, through a systematic marketing policy and diversied tariffpolicy by the private agent in accordance with the Marseille local au-thority, the trafc targetwas achieved in year 2000. The Prado Carenagetunnel is another interesting example of how problems assessing trafcrisks, which are particularly troublesome in cities where users haveaccess to alternative non-tolled routes, can be overcome by using thestrengths and capacities of the public and private partners towardsthe same goal: the success of the PPP contract.

At this point we can conclude by observing that, in the transportsector in the European Union, the logic of pure project nance, withproject revenues associated to user charges as the only support for invest-ment, is not always easy to apply. It is well known that project benetsonly partly translate into the willingness to pay by nal end users. Infact, project benets can spill into networkbenetswhichmaybedifcultto capture through revenue streams accruing to a conventional projectvehicle. In addition, trafc and revenues can easily be vulnerable to sub-stantial competition.

For these reasons, the intransigent approach to project nance typi-cal of the early generation of PFI projects in theUnitedKingdom,with itsradical transfer of risks to the private sector and a negotiating attitudeperceived as excessively antagonistic by private sector operators, hasbeen replaced by a softer approach with a more realistic assignmentof risk to the private partners. But more importantly, the prevailing atti-tude is to regard partnership as a long-term cooperative relationship forwhich renegotiation of contract terms is acceptable, and where the na-ture of the public sector contribution ranges from conferring assets toproviding guarantees, to contractual and regulatory measures.

5. Conclusions

It is interesting to recall how a senior speaker from the English Na-tional Audit Ofce compared the preparation of project nance opera-tions in the Private Finance Initiative to the art of preparing a fuguor moon sh, a very well known delicacy in Japan. Apparently, the shis a true delight but it contains a powerful poison, and if it is not accu-rately prepared it will kill the unfortunate gourmand. The messagehere is that although PFI and in general PPP deals do not kill, if theyare not well-structured they can cause considerable pain to carelesspublic promoters. Several European transport PPPs have encounteredproblems, from the notorious Eurotunnel mega-project, to failuressuch as the VAL-Orly urban rail connection, the Rostock tunnel, thenorthern orbital in Lyon, and the Shefeld Supertram, tomention a few.

The main potential benet of the PPP approach in transport as wellas in other sectors is its exibility in adapting the structure of incentivesand risk-sharing to the features of the project and to the economic and

institutional environments. But because of this exibility, it is perhapsthe European PPP approach.The impacts of the European Union have therefore been threefold,

of which the rst are institutional and regulatory changes such as pro-curement directives aimed at harmonizing the European market forconcessions. Secondly, the EU has developed and disseminated softinstruments such as guidelines for PPPs and promoted cross-nationalnetworks of PPP authorities. And thirdly, the EU has promoted theTrans-European transport networks (TENs) and a number of large-scalecross-border projects. The EU Commission's proposal to partly guaranteethe debt incurred byprivate parties to fund cross-border sections of prior-ity TEN projects may indeed encourage private investment through PPPagreements. The result is amarket for PPPs that, although still fragmentednationally, is developing a European dimension and attracting resourcesfrom a variety of players. The European transport PPP market thus farcan be regarded as an example of how integration may be pursued. It isa learning process in which the results are controversial but the essentialobjectives and advantages are very clear.

References

[1] J. Delmon, Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure: Project Finance, PPP ProjectsandRisks, seconded. Kluwer International and theWorldBank,Washington, DC, 2009.

[2] In: M. Button (Ed.), A Practical Guide to PPPs in Europe, City and Financial Pub-lishing, London, 2006.

[3] European Commission, The Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), 2005.[4] DLA Piper, European PPP Report: 2005, DLA Piper, February, 2006.[5] European Investment Bank, The EIB's Role in PublicPrivate Partnerships (PPPs),

European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, 2004.[6] European Commission, Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes, 2009.[7] World Bank, Private Participation in the Transport Sector, Transport Papers, TP-24,

Washington, DC, 2009.[8] F. Medda, E. Pels, Modelling Public and Private Provision, Papers in Regional Sci-

ence 91 (2012) 645657.[9] E. Engel, R. Fischer, A. Galetovic, The basic public nance of publicprivate partnerships,

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper no. 13284, 2007.[10] Standard and Poor's, Infrastructure nance ratings, Public Private Partnerships,

Global Credit Survey, Standard and Poor's, London, 2006.[11] J.L. Guasch, Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions, Doing it Right,

The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2004.[12] B. Flyvbjerg, N. Bruzelius, W. Rothengatter, Mega-Projects and Risk, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, 2003.[13] T. Beckers, C. von Hirschhausen, J.P. Klatt, Current PPP-models for German motor-

ways, in: Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research, Berlin University ofTechnology, October 2005.

[14] HM Treasury Value for Money: Update, UK Government London, 2009.[15] HM Treasury Value for Money, UK Government London, 2006.[16] Developing Public Private Partnerships in New Europe, PricewaterhouseCoopers,unwise to seek a unique model of PPP that can be easily replicatedacross sectors and across countries. The choice context PPP or conven-tional approach is amulti-objective decision. And in practice, the pub-lic sector agency has to achieve a judgment about the trade-offsbetween the various, and sometimes conicting, objectives.

For public sector promoters the difcult task is to avoid PPP transac-tions that end up as zero-sum games. An intelligent value for moneyanalysis should be an essential step in reducing the probability of nega-tive outcomes. Unfortunately, systematic value for money analysis isnot part of the administrative practice in all European countries. How-ever, particularly in the early phases of the process of creating a PPPmarket, where price signals for PPP transactions, e.g., cost and creditpricing signals, are not yet available, value for money should be seenas an essential step of good practice [14,15].

Against these general conclusions, we can observe that the growthand structure of the European PPP market in the transport sector hasbeen determined by several interlinked and mutually reinforcing fac-tors that fall into two broad categories. The rst relates to trends inthe market for transport infrastructure services towards increasingintegration on a continental scale. Not only have construction compa-nies been consolidating into larger companies active in several coun-tries, but transport operators too have extended their operationsgeographically. The second category involves the policy and institu-F.R. Medda et al. / IATSS2004.

Public private partnerships in transportation: Some insights from the European experience1. Introduction2. Institutional diversity in Europe3. PPPs in transport some key features4. Strategic aspects of transport PPPs some illustrations5. ConclusionsReferences