1 questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policy françois héran i n e d institut...
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Questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policy
François Héran
I N E D
Institut national d'études démographiques, Paris
“Europe and the demographic challenge”
6th Munich Economic Summit Panel 3: "Europe's childless societies:
Go forth and multiply"
CESIfo / Herbert Quandt Stiftung, Munich, 21-22 June, 2007
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Do we have a clear vision of the objectives of a family policy?
Filling the gap between people's wishes and behaviour concerning the number of children ("fertility gap")?– To invoke the interest of the State is not sufficient– Possible justification: filling the "fertility gap" contributes to
the well-being of the couples and can be a goal for the State
Compensating for the additional costs of childbearing and child raising (micro-level)?– Objection: it is up to each couple to decide. Why should the
State interfere with people's preferences? See the US case
Ensuring the active population renewal? – Could be done also through immigration: a collective choice
Ensuring the replacement of generations?– As a duty towards the next generations? But no such thing as
a "right to be borne" for the future generations or a "right to find a successor" for the present one
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Necessity of further research
No definite answers to these philosophical questionsBut the necessity of accumulating better knowledge on the implications and consequences of each choice:1/ explaining the different mechanisms of population ageing: to what extent are they "avoidable" or "unavoidable"?2/ having a better comprehension of the micro-motives and the macro-factors which influence the fertility behaviour– See the recent calls launched under the 7th EU
Framework-programme: they explicitly address these demographic issues for the first time
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I.- The three factors of population ageing
First of all: population ageing high up the age pyramid (in French: "vieillissement par le haut")– Due to increased longevity (a 4th floor added to the pyramid) = the unavoidable part of ageing
Less important : population ageing generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas")– Secular decline of fertility under replacement level
less than 2.05 children per woman ("2nd demographic transition")
= the avoidable part of ageing, open to pro-active policy
Strong but limited in time: the backlash of the baby boom (present impact of temporary rise of fertility)– At the beginning large birth cohorts rejuvenate the pyramid
but make it older 60 years later = unavoidable ageing
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-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
1/ Population ageing at the bottom (before)
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-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
1/ Population ageing at the bottom (after)
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2/ Population ageing high up the pyramid
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
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2/ Population ageing high up the pyramid (additional floor due to
longevity)
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
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3/ A temporary additional fertility (baby-boom) which first rejuvenates the population…
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
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…but 40 years later makes it older
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
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The French case: Age pyramids in 2005 and 2050 (INSEE demographic prospects)
Effectifs en milliers Effectifs en milliers
0100200300400500
Hommes
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Femmes
Âge
France, 2005 2050, scénario central
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An illustration of the divide between "avoidable" and "unavoidable" ageing
UN demographic prospects (2006) in a selection of EU countriesThe graphs give the growth of population aged 65+ and that of population aged 15-64, indexed to 100, over 2000-2050Basis: the "medium scenario", prolonging the present trends, with a convergence close to 1.8 children per woman in 2050The "high variant" = an additional fertility of 0.5 child eventually 2.35 instead of 1.85 (a considerable change)
The widening gap between the 65+ and the 15-64 curves displays the relative population ageing– countering population ageing would mean closing the gap
between the two curves!
The slim difference between "medium" and "high" fertility variants illustrates the capacity of a pro-natalist policy to maintain the active population over time– A limited impact, compared to the impact of increased longevity
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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 SWEDEN 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
SWEDEN 65+
SWEDEN 15-64
High variant 15-64
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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 UK 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
UNI TED KI NGDOM 65+
UNI TED KI NGDOM 15-64
High variant 15-64
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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 FRANCE 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
FRANCE 65+
FRANCE 15-64
High variant 15-64
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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 ITALY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
I TALY 65+
I TALY 15-64
High variant 15-64
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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 GERMANY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
GERMANY 65+
GERMANY 15-64
High variant 15-64
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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 POLAND 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
POLAND 65+
POLAND 15-64
High variant 15-64
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Conclusion of part I
Sweden, UK or France: a population policy supporting the fertility rate is able to maintain the active population over the next decadesItaly, Germany, Poland: it will fill but a part of the gapIn all EU countries, however, the increased longevity accounts for most of the population ageing process (France is no exception)Immigration policy cannot hinder population ageing; it brings but a slight retrospective correction to the fertility rates of 30 years ago– nevertheless, immigration contributes to the working of home
care and institutional care
Finally, population ageing cannot be compensated by any population policy– neither policy immigration– nor family policy
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II.- Some questions about the micro-motives and macro-
conditions of the fertility decision-making
To assess how policy initiatives could influence the free decisions of the individuals in the number and time of births, we need to understand:– the real costs and benefits of having a child (an additional
child)– the individual perceptions of the economic and non-
economic constraints– the decision-making process within the couple
But also the macro-factors of the fertility decision
including the micro-perceptions of the macro-conditions
Many difficulties in the micro-macro articulation
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Macro-level factors (1): Economic circumstances
Since the 80's, fertility is higher in European countries with high female labour-force participation, possibly due to policies in favour of work/family life conciliationHowever, further research is needed to bridge the macro-micro divide and elucidate some paradoxes– the French paradox: high fertility, despite high unemployment– the American paradox: high fertility, despite weak family policy
And a more general paradox – At the micro-level, unemployment, atypical working hours, and
economic uncertainty negatively affect the fertility decisions– However, except for mega-crises (e.g. the fall of Communist
regimes), aggregated data in time series show few correlation between the economic ups and downs and the fluctuations of fertility
– Attempts to take into account meso-determinants (such as the "economic morale" of the households) are not very conclusive
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Macro-level factors (2): Norms and values
A common theory: individualism, hedonistic values, dissociation of sexuality and marriage, gender equality, etc. tend to reduce fertilityConfirmed at micro-level, within the same country : individuals with "progressive" family values have lower fertility
However, the correlation is negative at the macro-level: – Fertility is higher in countries where individualism and
gender equality is highly valued (see World Values Survey)– Marital instability does not entail low fertility levels– "Lowest low fertility" prevails in countries with traditional
"familistic values" and rigid family structures (where it is still believed that parents should be married to have children, and mothers should stay home to raise them)
The new order: "familistic" values are anti-natalistic, family flexibility is pro-natalist
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Macro-level factors (3): Cultural orientations
Cultural explanations of fertility variations (religion, fatalism, or patriarchy seen as "resistance to change") do not square with the facts E.g. the Maghreb case (or the Iranian case): – steep decline of fertility in 25 years (from 7 children per woman
in the 70's to 2.2 in 2000), despite the Islamic revival
E. g. the Sicilian case (or the Andalusian case)– Fertility variations across Italy (or Spain) imputed to the cultural
divide between North and South, Christianity and Islam– But how can you explain recent evolutions with multicentennial
factors? The chronological fallacy of anthropological ground
The Italian "mamma": an argument easily turned round– In the 60's, the Italian matriarch loved children so much that
she had many of them (multiplicative love)– Nowadays, she loves her children so much that she has few of
them and doesn't want them to leave home (exclusive love)
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Macro-level factors (4): Public policies
To fill the "fertility gap" between people's wishes and behaviour, policies may support family formation and alleviate the costs of child-raisingSuch policies are not limited to the benefits of the Maternity or Children branch of Social protectionInclude also sector-based policies (much more relevant than the catch-all cultural factors), such as:– Housing policy (e.g. rented housing for the young couples
who wish to found a family, as a first step of the autonomy)– School policy (full-day elementary school, universal pre-
elementary school at age 3)– Policies of companies and administrations (parental leaves,
definition of working hours, involvement in child care centres)
– Child-friendly town-planning– Positive image of motherhood and fatherhood in the medias
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Concluding remarks
Most of the population ageing process is due to the inexorable increase of longevity, as a consequence of permanent collective choices
Policy initiatives to increase the fertility rate will never overcome the "unavoidable" part of population ageing
They make sense only if their objective is to counter the "avoidable" part of population ageing, due to low fertility, alleviating the economic and non-economic constraints
However, there is no scientific rationale to justify the priority of internal growth (native births) on external growth (through immigration): the decision is merely political
In practice, the natural increase of European countries will decline, and immigration will turn out to be the first engine of demographic growth (even in France). Family policy is not a domestic alternative to immigration. Both are part of our future in Europe.
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Annex 1.Family policy in France, in the European context
Source: Social protection counts elaborated by DREES (the Direction of statistics and studies of the French Ministry of Health)J. Bechtel and L. Caussat, in Études et résultats #376, Febr. 2005
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Social protection benefits in France, 2003Distribution of risks (or functions)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Old age
Sickness, health care
FAMILY, CHILDREN
Unemployment
Survivors
Disability
Housing
Work accidents
Poverty, social exclusion
% of social protectionbenefits
% of GDP
Total amount: 465 billions € = 30% of
GDP
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Social protection benefits for the families in Europe: cash / in kind [education excluded] (in % of GDP)
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4
SpainI taly
PortugalNetherl.Greece
DenmarkU. K.
I relandSwedenFinlandBelgium
FRANCEGermanyAustria
Luxemburg
Cash benefi ts
Benefi ts in kind
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Some traits of the French family policy
Complex and not always consistent– More than 30 measures (not easy to evaluate)– Means-tested benefits (for social redistribution),
but also tax cuts (quotient familial, tax-splitting system")– Still wavering between extra support to the 3rd child
and benefits from the 1st child
But quite consensual and politically neutral– Unquestioned in the last electoral debates– Confirmed every year by la Conférence de la famille
More feministic then familistic– No need to be married; no need to stay home– Strong support to the one-parent families
A 60-year continuity that inspires confidence in the population
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Annex 2. Two children per woman in France in 2006:
is this due to immigration?
Source: INSEE data, exploited by François Héran and Gilles Pison, "Two children per woman in France in 2006: are immigrants to blame?", Population & societies, 432, March 2007 (downloadable from http://www.ined.fr/en)
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A large contribution to births may go with a limited impact on fertility
It is often claimed that the French fertility rate is due to foreign populationSurprising though it may seem, the foreign population brings a large contribution to births but a limited impact on fertility (see graph)– 2005: 94 000 babies born to a foreign mother out of 774 000 = 12 %– This raises the national fertility rate by just 0.10 child,
from 1.8 (for French women) to 1.9 (for women of all nationalities)Explanation: – Foreign women have 1.5 child more than the nationals– But represent only 7% of the female population of childbearing age the 1.5 additional child accounts only for 7% in the national rate– The impact of foreigners on the number of births depends more from
the extra number of foreign women than from their extra fertilityIf we take immigrant rather than foreign women, the contribution to births increases, while the contribution to fertility gets smaller– since the immigrants have arrived at an earlier age, they resemble
more native French women in terms of fertility