1 - park hazard_analysis risk_models

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Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & RiskAssessment Models for the Korea Railway

International Railway Safety Conference 2008Denver, Colorado

October 5-10, 2008

Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi
http://www.krri.re.kr/


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About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute


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Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government

254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division

Key research area

- Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering,

railway policy & operation

National projects

High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway,

design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction

National safety R&D program from 2004

Homepage : www.krri.re.kr

About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute


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I Introduction

Contents

II Risk Assessment Procedure

III Hazard Identification

IV Risk Assessment Model Development

V Conclusion


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Background1. Introduction

Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents- 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities

- 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities

- 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities

Environmental changes in Korea- KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004

- Structural reform of railroad industries

- Electrification of conventional lines

- Preparation of TCR & TSR

Railway Safety Act announced in 2004- Focused on the risk-based safety management

- Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations

- Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control


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1. Introduction

Research ObjectiveSince Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed

the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models

for the Korea Railway.

- Developing procedure of the risk models

- Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.

Research Objective is to introduce


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Construction

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Common Approach Risk Management

Railway System

Techniques/

Technology

Context

Organization

Operation

Concept Design Exploitation Demolition

SystemDefinition

RiskManagement

RiskAnalysis

RiskDefinition

RiskEvaluation

RiskReduction

Modification

MaintenanceSystem Life Cycle

Risk Management Process

2 Ri k A t P d


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National Railway Risk ManagementSystem Architecture

Safety

Evaluation

National SafetyManagement

System

SafetyControl

Measures

Hazard

Analysis

Constructionof Safety

Infrastructure

Safety

Management

SE Management Concept Design Design Production Operation Evaluation

1. National Safety

Policies (NSP)

2. National Safety

Objectives (NSO)

3. National Safety

Organization (NSOR)

4. National Safety

Integrated Plan (NSP)

5. National Safety

Information Sys. (NSI)

6. Nation Risk

Assessment Sys. (NRA)

7.National Education

& Training Sys, (NET)

8. National Accident

Investigation Sys, (NAI)

9. Training & Supply

for Safety Specialist (TS)

10. Safety P.R. Sys.

(SPR)

11. Infrastructure

Safety Inspection (ISI)

12. Infrastructure

Safety (IS)

13. Railway Rolling

Stock Safety (RS)

14. Train Operation Safety

& Train Protection (TR&TP)

NSO Evaluation

NSO Evaluation

SPR Appropriateness

Evaluation

NRA EstablishmentEstablishment of

Basis Direction for NRANRA Construction

NRA Operation &

ManagementNRA

Utility Evaluation

NET

Utility Evaluation

TS

Utility Evaluation

NAI

Utility Evaluation

NSP Evaluation

NSI Evaluation

NSP

Evaluation

TR&TP Safety Performance

Evaluation Operation

IS Safety Performance

Evaluation

IS Safety Performance

Evaluation Operation

ISI Sys.

Appropriateness Evaluation

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NET

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NAT

Establishment of

plan for NSP

Establishment Of National

Safety Objectives

NSOR Design

SPR Establishment

NET Establishment

TS Establishment

NAI Establishment

NSP Establishment

NSI Design

Resource Construction &

Distribution

NSOR Construction

SPR Construction

NET Construction

TS Construction

NAI Construction

NSI Construction

Resource Management

NSOR Management

SPR Operation

NET Operation &

Management

TS Operation &

Management

NAI Operation &

Management

NSP OperationManagement

NSI Management

Construction of

Operation Basis for NSP

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSPConstruction of

Basis for NSPNSP Management

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSO

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSOR

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSP

Establishment of

Basis Direction for NSI

IS Hazard Analysis

TR&TP Hazard Analysis

- Terror, illegality

RS

Hazard Analysis

Establishment of TR&TP

Safety Design Requirements

Establishment of IS Safety

Design Requirements

Establishment of RS Safety

Design Requirements

ISI Plan Establishment

Construction of TR&TP

Safety Certification System

Construction of IS


Construction of RS


ISI Sys.

Modernization

TR&TP Safety Certification

System Operation

IS Safety Certification

System Operation

RS Safety Certification

System Operation

ISI Sys.

Operation

Establishment of

Basis Direction for TS

Establishment of

Basis Direction for SPR

Analysis of ISI Problems

2 Risk Assessment Proced re


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Railway Risk Assessment Procedure

Railway Accident

Appearance Scenarios

FTA Model

Railway Accident

Progress Scenarios

ETA Model

Casua

l

Analys

is

Conseque

nce

Analysis

Hazard Identification

Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events

Development of Accident Scenarios

Risk Evaluation & Reduction

Hazardous

Events

3 Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios


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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Hazard Identification Procedure

System definition and boundary setting

Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers

Developing accident appearance scenarios

Developing accident progress scenarios

Accident scenario management

Setting up objective of hazard identification &

its boundary

Including the definition of measures

which stops the increases of accident

Defining relationships among hazardous

events, hazards and barriers.

Considering the relevant key influential

factors.

Drawing up hazard log.



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System & Boundary DefinitionTypical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project

According to the accident classification of Railway Accident Report Regulation,

The scenarios were divided into the five main areas

1) Train collision accident,

2) Train derailment accident,

3) Train fire accident,

4) Level crossing accident,

5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.



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Hazardous Event IdentificationRailwayCategory Hazardous Events

Train

Collision

Misrouted trainMistaking in dealing points, point faults, mistaking in dealing blockage,

interlocking system faults

Faults in drivingSignal/direction violation, signal fault, mistaking in dealing braking

system, braking system fault, over speeding

Abnormal train Train separation, car rolling, train stop, backward moving

Obstacles

on the track

External obstacles, parts from train/freight falling, infrastructure

collapsing/obstruction

Level

Crossing

Accident

Being trappedin level crossing

-Engine stop-Deviation of pathway-Gangway blocking-Lack of propulsion/braking-Violation entry-Limit interference-Breaking or detour

Crossing duringwarning signal

Breaking through ordetour the barrier

Railway

Traffic

Casualty

Accident

Peoplestruck/crushed

Striking with train, Striking with objects

Trip/SlipTrip/slip during train boarding/alighting, Trip/slip by train emergencybraking/emergency start

Falling Falling from train, Falling from platform during train boarding/alighting

Caught/Dragged Caught in a train door, Caught between platform and train

Others Electric Shock, Burn, Suffocation



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Railway Accident Appearance Scenario

Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes.

Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events

- Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events

- Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events

Underlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions

- Human Management Factors

- Technological Factors

- External Factors



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3 a a d de t cat o us g a ay cc de t Sce a os

Immediate Causes Underlying Causesazardous Event

Railway Accident Appearance Scenario



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g y

Railway Accident Scenario

Critical factors influencing accident severitywere identified in the accident progress scenarios

Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios

4. Risk Assessment Model Development


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Risk Measure Method

Collective Risk(Average Number of FWI/year)

=Frequency

(Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs)

X

Consequences(the number of FWI/scenario sequence)

1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries

Risk assessment model

: the form of a cause and consequence analysis: using fault trees and event trees.



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Data Population

Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database.

Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills

Many thousands of recordsare reviewed and classified

Where data was not available,

Use was made of:

- Human error probability assessments

: using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)

- Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway.

- Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.



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Railway Risk Assessment & InformationManagement System (RAIMS)

RAIMS

AccidentAnalysis

Accident Search

EnvironmentAnalysis

Hazard Analysis

Damage Analysis

Options Analysis

RiskAnalysis

Event Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis

Risk Evaluation

Human FactorAnalysis

Safety RequirementVerificationManagement

Safety RequirementManagement

Railway SystemManagement

Safety RequirementChange

Management

RequirementTraceability

Management

SystemManagement

User Management

Code Management

ClassificationManagement



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Web-Based Accident Analysis SubsystemOne purpose is to provide

- Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents

- Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the publicThis system is composed of three modules

1) Accident input module.

2) Accident analysis & statistics module

3) Hazard management module.

Environment Analysis Accident Analysis Accident Statistic Analysis

Application running on the web



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Risk Analysis Subsystem Dedicated railway risk assessment software package

- Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis

The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach

- Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor.

- Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees,

which can be developed by a fault tree editor.

- Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern.

Windows-based application

Event Tree Editor View ET/FT Linking approach Fault Tree Editor View



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Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA) ModuleSupporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors

Used underthe railway risk assessment framework

Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process.

Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB

Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping

factors (PSFs)

General Information Input Error Analysis & Quantification Reporting Results



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Railway Accident Risk Assessment ResultsRailway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea

Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp..

The total risk: 217 FWI per year

The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences.Railway casualty accident

: Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls)

Train accidents

: Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events

: Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.

Accident Category Risk (FWI)

Train collision accident 0.6744

Train derailment accident 3.6898

Train fire accident 14.1Level crossing accident 16.94

Railway traffic casualty accident 161.138

Railway safety casualty accident 20.742

Total 217.284



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Future Development of the Risk Model

The model is being prepared currently and will include:

Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model

Improved level of human factors modeling

Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques


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5. Conclusion

This study has proposed

Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway

Application of their application to the Korea railway

The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway

Which will

Increase the industrys knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls

Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction

Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes


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Thank you!

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