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Military HistoryChapter 21

Vietnam War

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Vietnam War- Strategic Overview • Vietnam was longest US combat

deployment (so far):– US combat units fought hostile actions (1965-72)

– SOF also involved before & after that (1961-73)

– Military advisor role started in 1959

• But no fixed date of start of US involvement– No Lexington & Concord or Pearl Harbor

– or… New York Trade Center Towers

• US entered & left incrementally – In series of incremental steps => 1950s-1970s

• Successive US Administrations actively participated in the War:– From Truman to Nixon

• All tried to save Vietnam from Communist take-over (as part of Containment Policy)

• All would ultimately fail

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Lay of the Land

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Brief Historical Outline • Truman (May 1950)=> authorized $$Mil to aid French=>

– preserve post-WW2 French Indochina colonies (image)

• Ike continued US support, even following Dien Bien Phu – Aim: build Vn Nation out of diverse political factions

– After French defeat, US took control of bad situation

– Deployed military advisors to build SVN’s military

– Tasked CIA to conduct psychological war against NVN

• JFK: tripled $$ aid to SVN & increased military advisors:– Early ‘61 secretly deployed 400 SF & 30 Navy SEALs:

– Tasked to “advise” ARVN & SVN Navy: CI tactics & techniques• Covert direct action against North Vietnam (Oplan 34A) & VC in South

– By Nov ‘63 16,300 advisors operate thru-out N/S Vietnam

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Johnson’s War• After JFK’s assassination, LBJ took over war

– Determined not to “lose” Vietnam like Truman “lost” China

– Embarked on a limited war strategy to convince NVN to cease infiltration of South Vietnam

• After Tonkin Gulf incident & its resolution in Aug 1964:– LBJ secured Congress support (as equivalent of war):

– Authorized by resolution to “take all necessary actions”

– Following his 1964 re-election, LBJ did just that

• Result: US military commitment intensified incrementally:– LBJ personally directed sustained bombing of targets in NVN

– Mar ‘65=> Rolling Thunder began=> would last until 31Oct68

• US also deployed first combat units (USMC) in March 1965*

– US took over war from ‘65-’69 when force levels peak @ 543K+

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Statistics & “Vietnam Syndrome”• Statistic totals: 2.7M served in Vietnam => 1.6 in combat:

– 58K+ KIA & 300,000 WIA, ~ approx 2500 remain MIA

• US spent between $140B to $175B on the war• American outlook deeply influenced by Vietnam War:

– Future Presidential Foreign Policy decisions affected as result

– “Vietnam syndrome” hovered always in background to present

• Not since Civil War has a conflict divided US society so – America’s first war ever lost

– Humiliating political defeat for USG institutions

– Especially for the US military- long time to recover

• VN vets came home as Nation tried to forget & move on– VN Vets were ignored at best & blamed for war at worst

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Vietnam’s History of People’s War • Vietnam has had a long tradition of war

against outsiders– rebellion against China: the Trung sisters;

– Later Trieu Au would lead another revolt in 248 AD

– 10th century: defeated China’s Fleet & won independence

• 13th century: Vietnam repulsed Kublai Khan 3 times– In process became experts in employing GW =>

– Stressed protracted war to wear a superior military power down

– Raid & ambush tactics on the enemy’s over-extended LOCs

• Outlined in Dao’s “Essential Summary of Military Arts”– Strategy: drew enemy into protracted campaign to wear him down

– (Also applied these techniques to 1st & 2nd Indo-China wars)

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Historical Experience with Outside Threats

• Vietnam’s defeat of Mongols & Chinese=> – Now key part of Vietnam’s martial tradition & history:

• i.e. struggle & resistance against superior outside forces

• All became part of Vietnam’s military heritage

• (In addition to Vietnam’s civil war that soon followed)

• French involvement came in late 1850s:– Vn persecuted Fr & Euro missionaries & their converts– Gradually (late 1800s) => Fr establish & expand their

colonies – French then expanded throughout all of Indo-China =>

• Also suppressed Vietnam’s civil war in process

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“On Protracted War” – An Overview• Mao’s Guerilla War model:

– “On Protracted War”– Vietnam drew heavily on Mao’s model for war

• Model instructed followers to proceed by 3 stages:– 1st - defensive stage:

• survive, establish base & gain people’s support• conduct hit & run raids & ambush of soft targets

– 2nd - equilibrium: • gradually expand offensive campaigns =>• stage larger battles of a more conventional nature

– 3rd - Counter-Offensive: • Incorporate conventional military ops with guerilla warfare• Then ramp up to full scale conventional war (when ready)

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First Indo-China War • WW2: Japan occupied & controlled

Vietnam since 1940– Vietnamese allied with China to fight Japanese (GW)

• Following Japan’s defeat, Ho Chi Minh asserted his leadership: – Led coalition of Communists Nationalists

– Declared Vietnam independence on 2Sept45

– Began talks with French

– But both sides failed to agree on basic strategic aims

• Nov’46=> Viet Minh attacked French garrisons => – 1st Indochina war began => would last 8 yrs (1946-54)

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Escalation to Major Battle• Jan’48: Viet Minh begin 2nd stage:

– Expand military operations – Conduct bigger battles against French

• Meanwhile (late ’49)=> China became Communist state under Mao: – Result=> China provides Vietnam with

economic & political support– Also sanctuaries within China’s sovereign

territory

• 1951: Vietnam launched stage 3 prematurely:– Result: suffers major conventional defeat – Temporary set back for Viet Minh

• 1953: at China’s insistence Vn lures French Commander (Navarre) into:– Plain of Reeds => near a place called (?) – ?_______ __________ ____________

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Dien Bien Phu (Nov53-May54)

• Gen Navarre established several strong French Firebases on surrounding hills near main base:– All manned by paratroops & Fr Foreign Legion

– supplied thru airstrip by airlift

• 1954: Chinese press Vietnamese to act decisively:– Giap orders arty/ammo towed into surrounding mtns

– Complete surprise (operational and tactical surprise)

• Viet Minh bombard French outposts from mountain sites:– Paratroops forced to abandon outposts 1 by 1 =>

– 13Mar’54: Beatrice falls within hours of attack

– Gabrielle & Anne Marie overrun during next 2 days

– Impact: denied French airfield- key to French defense• Reinforcement & re-supply (also Fr arty suppressed)

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Dien Bien Phu (final assault) • Remaining outposts must be re-supplied by airdrop

(men/supplies):– Drops inaccurate (high altitude drops due to Vn AAA)

• French situation now desperate– French government requests US help – Ike refuses to send US troops or tactical Nukes

• Many French Foreign Legion troops desert– Hide in caves along Nam Yum & scavenge for food– Paratroopers left to fight alone until the end

• 7 May’54: Last French position overrun– Fr survivors marched into captivity & humiliation

• At on going Peace talks in Geneva– French must now accept distasteful political terms– Unfavorable terms a direct result of French tactical defeat– US must now take up containment directly

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Expanded US involvement • By ‘54 US paying close to 80% of War’s cost

– French viewed as containing communism in Asia

• Ike refused to sign Geneva Accords:– Rejects VN’s temporary 2 year partition at 17th parallel

– Wary of nation wide elections to determine fate in 1956

– Well aware of who is most likely to win (who?)

• Instead US used 2 yr time to back separate non-communist Government below 17th parallel– Government in South to be led by who?

– ?________ ______ ________- a Catholic

– What is the faith of Vietnam majority?

– ?_________________

• 1956 elections overwhelmingly favor Ho Chi Minh:– Vote results ignored by US & new RVN Gov

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Second Indochina War• Following South Vietnam refusal to allow

free election=>– Ho Chi Minh began modernization of his forces– Prepares to deploy NVN advisors south– Begins armed struggle in South Vietnam (SVN)

• Diem starts search to rout out Viet Minh south in 1956– Included all viewed as opposed to his rule:– i.e. All non-Catholics & minorities alike

• By ’57: Viet Minh in South close to all but eliminated– Result: Viet Minh launched major rebellion

against Diem’s Government– Initiate guerilla warfare, intelligence ops,

propaganda– Focus: develop support base in rural villages– Diem’s harsh policies facilitate Viet Minh efforts

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Violence Escalates• Raids & assassinations escalate

between 1958 => 1960:– 1958: 700 gov. officials killed– 1960: 2500 killed

• By 1960: National Liberation Front (NLF) established– (Political arm of Viet Minh rebellion)– By Dec’63: PAVN (NVA) escalated

infiltration/support to Viet Minh – Ho Chi Minh Trail established– NVN sends men & supplies south

• By 1965: full blown insurgency was established in SVN:– US concludes Diem’s regime will fall

without direct military support

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NLF’s War Aims & Strategy • Political Aim:

– Unite South under NVN government of Ho Chi Minh

• NLF Grand Strategy:– Combine political & military aspects of struggle– Undermine SVN political & military positions– Rally people & popular support for NLF cause

• Political Tactics:– Conduct “Agitprop” – Tactical focus: village level

• Establish a tight political & military structure

– By’63: NLF was successful =>• Signed up 300K supporters in countryside

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NLF Military Strategy & Tactics

• Tactics formulated to serve strategic & political ends:– 1st stage: hit & run raids & just survive

– Targets selected for maximum psychological impact

• Assassination: target most effective & most despised– Mayors, village chiefs, teachers

– Ambush ARVN troops & government strategic Hamlets

– Sabotage commercial transport infrastructure

• Strategic Objective:– Provoke government to react w/repressive actions:

– Aim: alienate the very people government is suppose to protect

– Demonstrate to people ineffectiveness of Gov efforts

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Chinese Tactical Model• By’65: PAVN provided direct support to SVN insurgents:

– Employed Chinese model, tactics, & techniques

– Totaled 500K troops with 500K in reserve

– Divisions comprised 10K Troops:• Used 7.62 AK-47s w/3-5 grenades each member

– 3 infantry regiments in South:• Weapons company attached: 60/82 mm mortars

• 57/75mm recoilless rifles, RPGs & Machine Guns

• Train extensively in night ops & effective concealment– Small unit tactics employing stealth

– Meticulous planning & full scale rehearsals

– Detailed withdrawal plans & back-up contingencies

– Preposition supplies & ammo & escape routes

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Tactical Focus• Bottom line:

– a well respected opponent:– NVA soldier was good, dedicated,– Well trained & highly motivated troop:– Extensive training & battlefield prep

• NVA tactics & doctrine’s focus:– Raid & ambush=> (became experts at)– Small unit mobility to minimize US technology:

• Extreme close contact • (often at “Danger Close” ranges)

– Concentrate on weak point, overwhelm & encircle– Then quickly withdraw => rarely held territory

• Key Lesson Learned: – Never follow a blood trail – why? ?_________________

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US Counter Insurgency (CI) & Limited War • US foreign policy (FP) focused on Containment:

– Halt communist expansion directed from Moscow

– Main focus of US FP throughout Cold War (CW)

• Vietnam War viewed as just another communist threat of attempted expansion:– Specific attempt at communist expansion in SE Asia

– Ho Chi Minh & NVN inspired by Moscow & Beijing

• During’60s=> Vietnam became test case for JFK’s CI doctrine:– JFK campaigned to replace

Ike’s massive retaliation=>

• Replacement National Security Strategy?

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Result: Flexible Response • JFK placed major emphasis on CI:

– To counter Mao’s guerilla warfare in SE Asia

– Carried out by SOF advisors• 400 SF & 30 SEALs May 1961

• 16,300 military advisors by Nov 1963

• Also JFK ordered covert actions against NVN – (OPLAN 34A) by SOG Teams

• CI Strategy against NLF:– Build-up of military support to ARVN:

• APCs, CV air support, Helos, TACAIR

– SF advisors conducted training & civic action:

– US Helo support to ARVN:• Infiltration/extraction & Medivac

– Direct support, to include “advising” SVN SOF teams into enemy held areas

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Strategic Hamlet Program • Another attempt to protect people from insurgents by

isolating them• Theory: serve as instrument of $$ & social reform &

security:– Attract the people to SVN gov programs– Convince peasant SVN gov better than NLF

• Objective: relegate insurgents to outlaw status– Lose support of masses => force revised NLF aims:– Return insurgent to Survival mode (stage 1)

• Reality: program failed in both concept & execution:– Dislocated peasants from village bred resentment– SVN Government (not NLF) viewed as bad guy– Poor security => vulnerable villages easy to overrun

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Factors in Failure• Result: opposite of desired government objective

– People’s discontent rose while security & safety fell

– Atrocious execution by Nhu alienated peasants

• Another factor – conventional military mindset:– Conventional US Army leaders resisted CI

– Did not support CI concept

– Conflict in philosophies of war: Clausewitz vs. Sun Tzu

• Conventional military preferred conventional methods:– Bigger = better mindset employing modern weapons

– Even though jungle warfare very tough environment

– Conventional infantry & armor profile ineffective

– Tactical surprise unlikely – operational surprise hard

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Battle of Ap Bac (2 Jan 1963) • LTC John Paul Vann:

– Pressed IV Corps tactical zone Cmdr MG Cao, & Col Dam, Cmdr of 7th ARVN, to attack 3 VC radio companies (350 men) near hamlet of Ap Bac

– Located 65 KM southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta

– Plan: 3 pronged pincer attack from different directions by 3 Battalions of 7th Infantry,

• Supported by regional units, 13 APCs (3500 men), ABN & US Helos (CH-21s & UH-1s)

– Objective: Surprise & overwhelm enemy with numbers

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Execution• Execution badly flawed:

– ARVN commander delayed attack too long

– Allowed enemy to discover Cmdr’s intent:

– Time to prepare defense to receive attack

• No tactical surprise => – First sign of resistance ARVN froze

– 1 prong of offense refused to even attack

– Remaining units purposely failed to block enemy’s escape

• Result: numerous ARVN casualties (friendly fire):– 61 KIA & 100 WIA

– Viet Cong slip away undetected (3 KIA)

• Victory claimed anyway (why?) – Rationale: conventionally- held ground

– ARVN performance does not bold well for future

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Tonkin Gulf Incident • SVN maritime sea commandos & advisors

– Conduct sea-borne & raids on NVN radar

– Raids conducted in/around Tonkin gulf op area

• Objective: – Force NVN to light off radar’s ELINT

– Permit US DDs w/special ELINT collection

• NVN Response:– Torpedo boats attack SVN commandos:

– SOF insertion craft (NASTIES) in vicinity

• NVN craft see US DD Maddox & engage:– Result: 3 enemy PT sunk or damaged

• 2 days later- NVN PT appear to fire on US DDs:– USS Maddox & Turner Joy call for CV air CAS

• Who find nothing

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Tonkin Gulf Resolution• Capt of USS Maddox not sure second

NVN attack actually occurred, but...– Files report to CINCPAC via chain of command

• LBJ sees opportunity to exploit NVN “attack”:– Applies much political pressure to confirm attack

– Meanwhile=> Admin prepared draft resolution for Congress:• Resolved for President to “take all action necessary”

• Protect US forces & its allies

• While Navy still try to figure out what really occurred:– LBJ exploits incident: Tonkin Gulf Resolution

– Passed unanimously by House & all but 2 in Senate

– (Just as administration drafted it) => significance?

– Future impact on US involvement?

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NLF Threat Grows• By 1965 => NLF secured

Mekong Delta (Map) =>– Appeared to have gained

both momentum & initiative, especially in the Delta

– Appeared to US that SVN Gov about to fail

• US concluded it must send massive assistance to prevent its collapse– Specially configured

armored landing craft were deployed

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Operation Rolling Thunder (Mar’65- Nov‘68) • Mar ‘65 (after LBJ safely

re-elected)=> US strikes:– Launched massive strategic

bombing of North

– Longest sustained air bombing campaign in US history

• Targets primarily along northern areas of DMZ:– Included bridges, railheads,

& logistic supply dumps

– Also re-supply routes along Ho Chi Minh Trail

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Major US Ground Combat Introduced • LBJ also deployed USMC to DaNang

in late July’65:– Two Battalion Landing Teams

waded ashore

– Prepare to conduct active forward defense & search & destroy ops

• From then on, US begins to take direct control of war =>– Major ground combat & key battles

conducted by US

– More US combat units deploy

– ARVN relegated primarily to garrison defense duties as the US directly takes over the War

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Theory & Practice of Limited War • Flexible Response (review):

– Tailored action required only to meet political aim– Avoids dilemma of massive retaliation as only option– Result: military instruments limited to minimum needed

to send the enemy a message• Target hit to modify enemy’s behavior (political end)

• Limited War theories & civilian theorists:– Flexible Response provided basis of limited war theories– Ltd War Theories provide set of broad guidelines:

• Focused on attaining US political objectives• Military considerations not taken into account

– Craft military response to send clear signal to enemy• Convey political intent to attain desired enemy response

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Theory vs. Reality• Result in practice:

– Political considerations dominated military actions

– Military responses limited to minimum required

– Civilian leadership prevalent thru-out all operations• LBJ selected many of the bomb targets personally

• Limited geographic battle areas of operations

– BDA unimportant =>only political message sent is central

• Theory’s Flaw? – Reality of war - military factors do count:

– Assumption regarding enemy’s response & friction’s role?

– Precision of message sent & how it is received & interpreted

– How the enemy will respond remains uncertain

– Gradual escalation in attempt to get desired response flawed

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Modern Hi-tech Military Advances

• Flexible Response strategy => conventional forces– SECDEF McNamara modernized US forces

– Established “Brush War” capability (for Vietnam)

• USAF & USN build-up:– WWII BBs refitted & updated

– CV/CVN on Yankee Station in Tokin Gulf launch F-4/A-4 strikes

– B-52 (Guam) & F105/F-4 (Thailand): Rolling Thunder

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Weapons Technology Advances

• High Tech Equipment:– Radar units small & portable developed

– Sniffers attached to skids of UH-1s to detect infiltrators’ odors

– Sensors & passive transmitters alert SF teams

– IBM computers predict enemy movements

– Puff (AC-47 gunships) &

– AFSOC AC-130 Specter Gunships • provide devastating fire support

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Troops, Weapons, & Equipment

• Troops: best ever trained & equipped to date:– 1 Million men combat ready & divisions expand:11 to 16

– Airlift & equipment stockpiles expanded

– Army reorganization:

• Task oriented for specific jobs

• Direct ground support weapons & equipment:– Armor Personnel Carriers

– Weapon advances: (M-60, M-16, Stoner LMG, M-79)

– Helo & its role: UH-1, Cobra, CH-47, 1st Air Cavalry

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Next: Military History Chapter 21b Vietnam War

(to be continued)

Back-up Slides

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US Combat Units: Direct Ground Operations • US also deployed first full

combat units in March 1965:– 3500 USMCs land on DaNang

beaches for combat ops– Key US threshold passed – (Many to follow incrementally)

• From then until April 1969, US commitment gradually increased: – US ground troop levels &

combat units grew steadily– US combat actions rose

incrementally for next 4 yrs– Operation Starlite was typical

• From ‘65-69: US took over most fighting from ARVN– US troop levels peaked at

543,400 troops by early 1969

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Conflicting post-War Analysis • Several hard lessons were learned as a result of Vietnam• For some=> we simply backed the wrong horse:

– US Military power & $$$ support never be enough regardless=>

– Military & $ pwr couldn’t prop up RVN’s corrupt & failed regime

– Local revolutionary war fought for nationalistic & political aims• Therefore US caught in middle of bitter civil war

• For others: war too hard to win under political constraints:– War considered integral part of global Cold War threat

– Key political concern for LBJ administration: avoid escalation• Both in intensity of fighting & geographic region

• Result: US attempted to fight limited conventional war – Without a coherent & realistic operational strategy

– While applying separate poorly chosen tactics to support it

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Serious Strategic Disconnect• US approach to war appeared to have serious disconnects:

– Political Aims were unrealistic given military constraints

– Operational Strategy poorly matched to those strategic aims

– Tactics employed served a failing strategy

• Result: Tactical success served poor operational strategy – Which in turn attempted to achieve Unrealistic strategic aims =>

– Which ultimately resulted in political failure at the end of the day

• Political decisions makers failed to realize until too late:– That superior American military power can’t make up for what?

– American people’s lack of political will to continue war indefinitely!

• These failures would affect many in different ways– Including foreign policy decisions taken following the Cold War