1 introduction tesco.com non-food clubcard

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Introduction Tesco.com Non-FoodClubcard

http://www.andidas.com/

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1987 1990 1995 2000 2004 Tesco 8.5 9.8 13.6 16.1 19.2 Sainsbury’s 10.0 11.3 12.5 11.6 10.8 ASDA 4.9 7.0 7.2 9.5 11.2 Safeway 5.9 7.1 7.2 7.7

9.7 Morrison 1.5 1.7 2.4 3.2 Other 69.2 63.1 57.1 51.9 49.6 S

ourc

e: ID

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UK Grocery Retailing, 1987-2005

Tesco.comClubcardIntroduction

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Tesco’s Growth Strategies

Introduction

Products

Services

Expanded non-foods

Financial services

Hypermarkets

Convenience stores

Internet

How to increase sales

New customers in new channels

More to existing customers in existing stores

New geographies

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All customers can be placed at some point in this 3-D cube

A customer’s location in the cube suggests actions suitable to earn his/ her lifelong loyalty

• Contribution: profitability today

• Commitment: future value

- likelihood of remaining a customer

- ‘headroom’

• Championing: ambassador

Scoring Points (2003), Humby et al

Why do retailers invest in loyalty programmes?

Key goal is to increase customer loyalty

Commitment

Contribution

Consumer

Champion

Clubcard

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Why do retailers invest in loyalty programmes?

Clubcard

For a loyalty programme to be effective, it must increase contribution, commitment, and championing

Contribution

Championing

Commitment

Attitudes that must be created by programme

Behaviour generated by attitudes

Retailer becomes customer's first choice

Retention of existing customersRecruitment of new customers

Customers spend larger share of wallet inthe retailer's stores instead of rivals' stores

Volume of buying increases

Customers buy additional products and services from retailer

Diversity of products increases

Customers are willing to recommend retailerRecommendations attract new

buyers

Customers have high overall satisfactionDisinterest in switching to

alternatives

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But if everyone does the same thing, isn’t it a zero sum game?

Clubcard

If all retailers are able to copy one another’s moves, we would not expect customers to become loyal to a particular retailer

But by 2005, Vodafone and Barclaycard had exited the Nectar group and Nectar is struggling to catch up with the Clubcard phenomenon

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Tesco has been able to outwit and outlast most competitors

After lagging Sainsbury for many years, Tesco’s newly launched Clubcard programme allowed it to leapfrog the leader in just 6 months in 1995:

Supermarket UK market share (%) (Source: Taylor Nelson Sofres)

1995 Jan Feb Mar Apr May

Sainsbury 19.4 19.0 19.1 18.7 18.8

Tesco 18.1 18.5 19.3 19.9 19.4

The launch of Clubcard increased Tesco’s sales by 28% and reduced Sainsbury’s sales by 16% in 1995 alone

By 2005, Tesco's Clubcard has more than 10 million members who collectively make up 75 per cent of the company's UK transactions and 82 per cent of its UK turnover.

What is so unique about the Clubcard that has allowed Tesco to achieve such overwhelming success?

Clubcard

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To underpin the success factors, we conducted some research …

Clubcard

Based on a questionnaire with a sample size of 100, we identify key areas in which Clubcard has performed significantly better than other loyalty cards

Customers like the Clubcard programme mainly due to the personalised treatment they receive and the relevance of rewards

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Data insights are the foundations of Relevance

Clubcard

(1) Tesco does data mining

(2) Identifies customer profiles/ lifestyles

(3) Responds to different segments’ needs with tailored rewards

(4) Improving product linesbased on Clubcard data

You are What you Buy – Innovative Customer Segmentation

It is Tesco’s creative approach to customer segmentation that has allowed it to offer more personalised treatment and relevant rewards than competitors

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(1) Data mining Key advantage of the Clubcard scheme is the ability to gain data insights from customer behaviour:

Now possible to infer why customers make certain decisions, not just who, what, when, and how much … …

Clubcard

Customers must provide basic geo-demographic details when registering

Time series of transactions can be formed to provide a chronicle of every customer’s individual buying habits

Tesco is able to use the card to link the customer with their transaction

Lifestyle segments are created based on an analysis of both geo-demographic and actual behavioral transaction data


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Finest pre-packaged Chicken Tikka Rice:

Someone who values quality and lacks time to prepare food

Tropicana orange juice:

Someone who is not very price sensitive and values quality

Expensive pre-cut, prepared fruit:

Someone who is not price sensitive and values convenience

Clubcard

An example:

Mr. X’s typical receiptAddress: 66 xx Kensington, London, SW1

Contact no: 07339 884893

Age: 53

Number of people in household: 1

Special dietary requirements: no red meats Mr. X


Can be profiled as non-budget, convenience-driven customer

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You are what you buy – innovative customer segmentation

Easy to consume

High quality

Healthy

Innovativeness

Cookingfrom scratch

Product Attributes

(2) Customer profiles/ lifestyles

AverageScore

Classified asnon-budget/ convenience

lifestyle

85 90 80 85

90 90 90 90

85 60 50 65

70 60 80 70

0 0 0 0

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Clubcard

Customer segmentationBrands launched to target

segments

Source: Coriolis, 2004 Source: Coriolis, 2004

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(3) Tailoring rewards to various customer segments

This is because Tesco tailors its rewards – Tesco has 8 million variations of its quarterly mailings sent out to 10 million Clubcard members,

with targeted vouchers and advertisements catering to their differing lifestyles and geo-demographic circumstances

For instance, Tesco ensures that it does not send meat vouchers to health conscious vegetarians, and focuses on issuing vouchers for low-calorie products and articles on keeping fit

Clubcard

People who join loyalty programmes expect relevant rewards

Each member of the Clubcard scheme receives a personalised pack containing a mailing, product-specific advertisements, and vouchers

Our research indicated that many people ranked Clubcard’s rewards as more relevant than those of competitors

Tesco also has dedicated clubs (eg. Baby club) that cater to different customers in various lifestages

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(4) Improving product lines based on Clubcard data

If Tesco identifies that Special Dietary Spreads are doing poorly in growth, they can use Clubcard data to identify the problems

‘Healthy’ consumers are skewed towards Special Dietary Spreads

Clubcard

Source: Dunnhumby website

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Tesco can examine which customer groups are driving category performance – since ‘healthy’ consumers were shown to be extremely loyal towards Special Dietary Spreads (SDS), we would predict the highest growth in spend on SDS to come from the ‘healthy’ group if the SDS product line is relevant to them

BUT actual results show that growth of SDS is one of the lowest in the ‘healthy’ segment – this implies that Tesco may be selling the wrong SDS products in its stores, and thus it has to improve its SDS selection to improve growth

Clubcard


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Identifying new opportunities in SDS:

Healthy customers are increasing their spend mainly on 2 products within SDS (Benecol and Pro-Activ) – Tesco can lock in healthy shoppers

by launching new Benecol and Pro-Activ products (eg. 1Kg versions)

Clubcard


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Loyalty programmes are costly

Clubcard

Loyalty programmes are extremely expensive.

Even if a loyalty scheme can increase sales revenues, it can lead to reduced profits if the

costs are not minimised.

But Tesco has been successful in minimising costs as well!

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Tesco’s advertising costs are not significantly higher than those of other big retailers, and still its sales growth and market share are above industry average

1) More value from marketing expenses

Clubcard

Why Clubcard is more cost - efficient than others

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Clubcard’s cost effectiveness (1/3)Making mass marketing very niche

Direct communication with customers

Clubcard

Magazine segmentation based on lifestyle segments

64% of customers claimed they are likely to buy products because of the articles they read in the magazine

Able to charge 6 times higher prices for the space in the media

All market research is carried out with the use of Clubcard data and focusing on individual customers.

Tesco sells data to other retailers and suppliers

8 million variations of quarterly mailings

Highly personalised vouchers and rewards

Tesco Magazine Market research “in house” Targeted Promotion

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According to the Competition Commision Report: “Tesco engages in the practice of requiring or requesting suppliers permanently to reduce the previously agreed wholesale price of products in support of the marketing initiatives with which the price initially was associated”

This approach generated demand and preserved margins for Tesco

Clubcard


2) Discounts are mainly supplier funded

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Look for price-sensitive consumers

Identify the products they buy and others don’t

By not knowing their customers, many retailers are effectively wasting their money on price cuts that could be targeted to people who want them because they need them.

The targeted price cuts enabled Tesco to attract more shoppers from competitors and capture the volume that supported the lower prices.

…which resulted in over 60% fewer promotions, reduced management cost, further contributing to price reduction, and more tailored, effective promotions.Lowering the prices of those

products

Clubcard


3) Clubcard data facilitates targeted pricing strategies

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UK Online Retail Grocery Market, 2005

Tesco, 65%

ASDA, 15.5%

Sainsbury's, 15.9%

Waitrose & Ocado, 5.5%

Source: Verdict, Keynote, Hitwise

Tesco.com

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Tesco.com VS Sainsburystoyou.com

Link with loyalty card yes (Clubcard) yes (Nectar)Delivery coverage 98% 74%

Link to services (e.g. finance) yesfragmented(microsites)

Delivery charge £3.99-5.99 £5Assortment offered in non-food wide narrowMinimum order none £25Order tracking, cancelling yes noShopping guide for new users yes noProduct search yes yesOnline virtual shopping list yes no

Shopping idea lists yesyes, but

very limited

Popular item lists yes noPrice comparison yes noRecipe ideas yes yes

extra featurestravel booking,

energy providerschoice of

ripeness of fruits

Feature

Tesco.com

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Tesco.com

Tesco.com

ž First mover advantage

ž Switching costŸ Shopping basket (used by 92% of shoppers)Ÿ Customer management (touch strategy)Ÿ Convenient and efficient site design

ž Offline advertising in store for Online offer

ž Clubcard: low cost of winning new customers

ž Integrated offer of non-foods goods, partnering

ž Ebay way of introducing new categories

ž Industrialisation of the picking processŸ Picking trolley, shelf identifier, lean supply chain management

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In-house Outsource In-house OutsourceGross margin 23.00% 23.00% 23.00% 23.00% 23.00% 23.00%Labour cost 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 5.00% 5.00% 9.50%Adminstration cost 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 2.00%Advertising cost 10.00% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 1.50%Depreciation cost 0.75% 1.01% 0.75% 0.40% 0.14% 1.40%Other expenses 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.70% 1.70% 7.00%Delivery cost 10.80% 5.40% 6.50% 5.40% 6.50% 0.00%Total operating expenses 27.38% 14.74% 15.58% 16.50% 17.34% 21.40%Net margin -4.38% 8.26% 7.42% 6.50% 5.66% 1.60%

Capital expenditure (£ million) 113 113 84 44 16 157

Source:Lehman Brothers. Interviews with relevant Companies' Investor Relations departments

Bricks&mortarCost elementBrick&click warehouse

Brick&click in-store picking

Internetonly

Break-even analysis

In-house Outsource In-house OutsourceNet margin -4.38% 8.26% 7.42% 6.50% 5.66% 1.60%Average order size £85 £85 £85 £85 £85 £85Investment required 113 113 84 44 16 157Orders needed to payback (million) - 16 13 8 3 115

Bricks&mortarCost elementInternet

onlyBrick&click warehouse


Comparison of alternative grocery models

Tesco.com

No player chose outsourcing. Why?

Outsourcing has operational advantageover its counterpart

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In-house cost > market cost

In-house cost < market cost

Asset specificity

Cost associated with hold-up, negotiation,and writing contract

A

T

Outside supplier cannot easily aggregate demand with other clients

Shared system in material handling,order processing, transportation,& inventory management

Labour specialisation

System covers the entire country

ProduceIn-house

T = Min in-house production cost –

Min arm’s length market production cost

Supplier

Why didn’t Tesco outsource e-grocery logistics?Asset specificity - high

Economies of scale - moderate

Scale of transaction - large

Tesco.com

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Which e-grocery mode is better? (1/2)

Generally, the decision whether to adopt warehouse depends largely on the estimates of:

Market size

Market growth

Percentage of market captured

Tesco.com

Aspect In-house picking Dedicated warehouse

Investment required minimal largeTechnical efficiency lower higherExpansion fast slowCapacity small largeProximity to buyers near far

In-store picking

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Which e-grocery mode is better? (2/2)

Go online

Brick & mortar only

0

0

In-storepicking

Dedicatedwarehouse

-44

-113

High growth (p = .5)

Low growth (1-p = .5)

282

181

High growth (p = .5)

Low growth (1-p = .5)

291

145.5

238

97

178

32.5

0

238

97

178

32.5

167.5

105.25

167.5

0

167.5

Tesco.com

Calculating Free Cash FlowGrowth rate: 20.0% RRR: 5.0%

I. Instore picking- high growth 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001sales 112.0 134.4 161.3 193.5 232.2Less: Total operating expenses 18.5 22.2 26.6 31.9 38.3EBIT 93.5 112.2 134.7 161.6 193.9Less: Income taxes (40%) 37.4 44.9 53.9 64.6 77.6EBIAT 56.1 67.3 80.8 97.0 116.4Add: Depreciation expenses 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9Less: Change in Net working Capital 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.6 2.7Free Cash Flow 56.6 67.4 81.1 97.1 114.6

Present Value 354.8

In-house Outsource In-house OutsourceGross margin 23.00% 23.00% 23.00% 23.00% 23.00% 23.00%Labour cost 3.33% 3.33% 3.33% 5.00% 5.00% 9.50%Adminstration cost 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 2.00%Advertising cost 10.00% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 1.50%Depreciation cost 0.75% 1.01% 0.75% 0.40% 0.14% 1.40%Other expenses 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.70% 1.70% 7.00%Delivery cost 10.80% 5.40% 6.50% 5.40% 6.50% 0.00%Total operating expenses 27.38% 14.74% 15.58% 16.50% 17.34% 21.40%Net margin -4.38% 8.26% 7.42% 6.50% 5.66% 1.60%

Capital expenditure (£ million) 113 113 84 44 16 157

Source:Lehman Brothers. Interviews with relevant Companies' Investor Relations departments

Bricks&mortarCost elementBrick&click warehouse


Internetonly

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UK Retailers’ Online Delivery Strategies

sell online

Brick & mortar only

In-storepicking

Dedicatedwarehouse

pureplay:

Tesco.com

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The predicted value of UK E-Commerce (1997)

quoted in Foresigth, 2000, Retail E-Commerce

Tesco.com

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000m

illio

n p

ou

nd

s

Datamonitor 37 118 280 490 1,207

Optimedia 400 1,200 2,500 4,700 6,300 7,200

NOP 3,000 9,500

IDC 2,730

Jupiter 101 189 384 730 1,404 2,580

MSDW 118 279 490 1,204

DTI 390

Fletcher 230 3,000

Real 424 1,056 2,277 3,487 5,062

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

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0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Total sales Online sales

Tesco’s sales VS online sales

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05

Tesco.com as a niche market

Tesco.com

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 997 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05

Tesco’s online sales Sales (£M)

Despite Tesco.com’s success, its e-grocery unit remains as asmall part

Additional investments for e-grocery have to be weighted against ROI of other projects

Analysis of market demand

Planning for e-grocery

Consumer research

Is demand potential sufficient in the region?

Does return on warehousejustify its additional investment?

Adopt in-storepicking approach

Adopt warehouseapproach

End

yes

no

yes

no

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37



UK Grocery Market Saturation

Diversification into Alternative Non-Food Markets

Non-Food

ServicesN-F Consumer Products

Expansion into Non-Food

Apparel

Electronics

Household

Health & Beauty

Entertainment

Personal

Finance (TPF)

Telecoms / Mobiles

Travel

DVD Rental

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Why Tesco has Targeted Non-Food

Core Grocery Market Saturation:Stagnation, intense competition & price deflation: seek alternatives.

Diversification Opportunities:Potential to exploit weaker competition and higher margins (cross-subsidize core groceries).

Threat of Competition:Industry trend: Asda already established, others to follow. Early-mover advantages.

Synergies:Benefit from existing resources and competencies inc: store networks, distribution & logistics infrastructure, management experience.

Competitive Advantage:Key competitive differentiator. Offer attractive diversified product lines: set goal of “being as strong in non-food as we are in food.”

Non-Food

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Shares of Non-Food Market

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

Tesco Asda Sainsbury's Morrison's

% 1999

2004

Non-Food

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Growth / expansion

Scale economies

Control ofSupply chain

Lower prices &higher margins

Virtuous Cycle

Tesco’s Virtuous Cycle of Non-Food Expansion

Non-Food

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Clothing is the most important market for Tesco within non-foods, with sales accounting for 40% of the total non-food portfolio.

The UK Market is highly competitive with a range of traditional high street and discount retailers. Supermarket entrants have driven price deflation and captured market share

Consumer N-F Products: Apparel (Clothing)

Non-Food

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Tesc

oAsd

a

Deben

ham

sNex

t

Arcad

iaM

&S

%

2003

2004

%

Tesco’s clothing sales grew 28% in 2004 to £700m, doubling its market share from 0.9% to 1.8%;

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Clothing: Brand Comparison

Average Good Poor Good Poor Medium

Average Good Average Good Average Medium

Poor Good Good Good Good Medium

Good Good Good Average Good Strong

Average Good Average Average Poor Weak

Average Good Poor Average Poor Weak

Good Average Average Average Average Medium

Weak Average Average Average Average Strong

Average Good Good Average Good Strong

M&S (3.4)

Next (1.8)

Arcadia (1.7)

Asda (1.3)

Matalan (1.0)

BHS (0.9)

Primark (0.6)

GAP (0.4)

H&M (0.4)

Pricing RangeFashion /

imageStore

network PromotionOverallrating

Firm(sales B£)

Source: Goldman Sachs Non-Food and Convenience Analysis (2005)

Non-Food

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Factors Driving Tesco’s Success in N-F: Apparel

I. Low prices

II. Low costs

IV. Format& convenience

III. Ranges of products

& promotions

Non-Food

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I. Pricing Strategy

Consistent Strategy: Tesco has extended its low price positioning in core groceries across non-foods lines to undercut competition. Low price / high volume.

Price Key Competitive Advantage: Tesco is between 40-60% cheaper than the industry average. Market Research: low price factor highest correlation in choosing Tesco.

Competition: Intense price competition with discount retailers and closest rival, Asda: “George” brand (launched 1990) based on successful concept of “affordable fashion.”

Non-Food

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Average Pricing Competitiveness

-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60

%Primark

Asda

Tesco

Matalan

H&M

Average

BHS

Arcadia

M&S

Next

Debenhams

Zara

Non-Food

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II. Purchasing: Costs and Logistics

Buying Power: bulk buying discounts; critical mass drives down costs.

Direct Sourcing: (65% UK clothing) eliminates intermediary agent mark-up: captures greater percentage of gross margins.

International Purchasing: low cost factors of textile production (labour, materials) in Asia (India, Sri Lanka, China, Indonesia).

Distribution: Initially utilized existing purchasing and distribution channels. Subsequent development of efficient dedicated N-F infrastructure: warehouses, logistics and specialized management systems.

Non-Food

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In Contrast to Asda’s , Tesco has chosen a multi-brand differentiated format to appeal to a wider range of consumers and niche sub-markets, including:

Other niche lines include: Sixteen-Twenty-Six (plus size), Greenbaby (infant), children’s wear & branded sports apparel.

Exclusive license US casual wear brand, launched in 2002

Own-label school wear

More formal men and women’s wear, launched in 2000

Price-sensitive own-label basics

III. Product Range: Tesco’s Clothing Brands (1/2)

Non-Food

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Product Range & Promotion (2/2)

Most successful in niche categories of children’s wear and value lines: standardized products in most price sensitive categories.

Less successful in mainstream women and menswear. Suffers from relatively negative fashion / brand image status.

Tesco has attempted to incorporate fashionable trends, employing well known designers and rival firm management; emphasizing rapid product design and production.

Heavy in-store merchandizing & external promotion (inc TV advertising) to stimulate demand, build awareness & create brand name equity.

Non-Food

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Presentation (Format)

Expansion: New stores / adding space to existing locations. Trial of N-F only stores (Homeplus). 40% of new N-F floor space dedicated to apparel.

Convenience: High store footfall: “one stop shop” for all grocery and other N-F lines also attracts customers to apparel. Consistent with current UK retailing trends.

Synergy in Demand: Apparel has become a key driver of customer traffic in its own right, spillover effects on demand for other product categories .

Non-Food

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Over-Diversification: management need to keep its “eye on the ball” and may lose focus on its core grocery business, over-stretched resources.

Competition: anticipated entry and imitation by other supermarket retailers (Sainsbury’s & Morrison's) will increase price deflation and reduce profit margins. Price retaliation.

Cyclicality: Non-Food expansion increases likely cyclicality of demand and exposure to economic downturns. However may be beneficial with value image.

Lack of Competencies: move in to unfamiliar products / markets may lack resources, proprietary skills and required knowledge: overcome by partner involvement.

Quality: may be sacrificed in pursuit of low costs.

Evaluation of Non-Food Strategy: Threats

Non-Food

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Why financial services?

Additional competitive advantage

Additional source of revenue

Meeting customers’ needs

Synergies with core business

Exploiting existing information about customers

Non-Food

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TESCO Personal Finance

ž Established in 1997

ž 50-50 joint venture with the Royal Bank of Scotland

ž 5 mln customer accounts in 2005

ž 16 products, including credit cards, loans, saving accounts, loans and mortgagesŸ In-store staff support and cash machinesŸ The most simple and mass market products. Easy and quick

access to products: online, in store or by phone

Non-Food

53




Source: Company data

Pretax profit and growth

-50

0

50

100

150

200

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

pre

tax

pro

fit,

mn

GB

P

-150%

-50%

50%

150%

250%

350%

450%

550%

Y-O

-Y G

row

th, %

Non-Food

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Co-opetition

Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996

CompetitorsComple-mentors

Customers

Suppliers

Non-Food

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Co-operate or Compete?

D>C>A>B

Compete Co-operate

Compete A, A C, B

Co-operate B, C D, D

Non-Food

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Complementors: reasons for co-operation

ž TescoŸ Access to expertise and technologyŸ Risk management

ž Royal Bank of ScotlandŸ Access to an established consumer baseŸ New geographies Ÿ Opportunity for future growth of other products

Non-Food

57



Non-Food

Clubcard

TESCO.com

Culture

Conclusion

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59



Back-up Slides

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Touch Strategy

Ÿ Logged-on¡ Offer of email and phone support, and £5 discount on first purchase

Ÿ Cautionary¡ 5 days pp: email with link to online satisfaction survey

Ÿ Developing¡ 2 week pp: Direct mail with tips on using the service.

Ÿ Established¡ Generic monthly e-newsletter, encouraging cross selling

Ÿ Dedicated¡ 2 months pp: £5 off for next shop

Ÿ Logged-Off¡ Customer does not buy for an extended period: reactivation email, survey, and

£5 incentive¡ Follow up incentive after first shop after a break

Tesco.com

61




Source: Company data

Number of customer accounts (millions)

0

1

2

3

4

5

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Non-Food

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Increased size of ‘pie’

•Outstanding household debt-income ratio 1.4 in 2004 vs. 1.05 in 1994

•8% average annual growth rate of personal deposits for the past 5 years

Total Household Deposits and Loans

0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

Sep-97

Sep-98

Sep-99

Sep-00

Sep-01

Sep-02

Sep-03

Sep-04

Sep-05

Dep

osi

ts/L

oan

s, m

n £

Deposits

Loans

Source: Bank of England.

Non-Food

63



TESCO as a competitor

Non-Food

Personal Loans

TESCO Sainsbury Natwest

Age limit 23 18 18

Amount, £ 3000-25000 1000 - 25000 1000 - 25000

Minimum income 10 000 - -

APR, % 6.3 6.1 7.4

Time period 1 - 10 years 1 - 8 years 1- 7 years

1 introduction tesco.com non-food clubcard

Documents

clubcard introduction

nonfood clubcard http

tescos clubcard

clubcard phenomenon

increases customers

launched clubcard programme

sales new customers

customers location