Notes

1 Introduction1 . In this study, the term of Asia refers to the combined area of the northeast

Asia region and southeast Asia region in terms of the geographical defini-tion; the former includes the northeast part of China, the Korean Peninsula, Russian far east, Japan, and Taiwan (Mongolia stands somewhat at the bor-derline), and the latter includes the southeast part of China and the membersof ASEAN countries. Although, strictly speaking, the term “East Asia” is amore accurate denomination, concerning the exclusion of South Asia in theabove definition, the usage of Asia for the geographical region of East Asia has become largely accepted, common practice, and hence, is adopted in thisstudy.

2 . See, for example, Bruce Cumings, “The History of Practice of Unilateralism in East Asia,” in East t Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for r Regional Stability,ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2008), 55; Gregory W. Noble, “Japanese and AmericanPerspectives on East Asian Regionalism,” International Relations of theAsia-Pacific 8, no. 2 (2008): 247–62.

3 . See Yong Deng, “Japan in APEC: The Problematic Leadership Role,” Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (1997): 353–67; Deepak Nair, “Regionalism in the AsiaPacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?” Contemporary SoutheastAsia 31, no. 1 (2008): 123; David P. Rapkin, “The United States, Japan, and the Power to Block: the APEC and AMF Cases,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 3 (2001): 373–410.

4 . The original members of APEC were Australia, Canada, Japan, NewZealand, South Korea, the United States, and six ASEAN members, which gradually expanded to the current total of 21 members including Chinaand Russia. The ARF began with 18 original members (Australia, Canada,China, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, the United States, the EU, and eight ASEAN members) and now consists of 27members, including North Korea.

5 . Takashi Terada, “Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan’sApproaches to ASEAN in the Establishment of PECC and APEC,” ThePacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 195–220.

212 Notes

6. Alan Rix, “Japan and the Region: Leading from Behind,” in PacificEconomic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation orr Conflict? ed. RichardHiggott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill (Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1993), 62–82.

7 . Harry Harding, “International Order and Organization in the Asia-PacificRegion,” in Eastt Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, ed. rrRobert S. Ross (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 353.

8. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” Internationall Security 26 no. 3 (2001/02):153–85.

9. The basis of this thesis, see Robert Gilpin, War andd Change in Worldd Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

10 . Joseph M. Grieco, “Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas,” in The Political Economy of f Regionalism, ed. Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), esp., 173–5.

11 . Hence, Donald Crone presents a modified version of this thesis to explain the creation of APEC, arguing that the relative decline of US hegemonic predom-inance vis- à -vis Asian countries was the primary reason for the creation of APEC. Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matters? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy,” Worldd Politics 45 (1993): 501–25. Like other struc-tural-based explanations, this thesis, though original and thought provoking, fails to account for Washington’s contradicting actions—its initial reluctanceand later active support—over a short time period (and not just in the case of APEC but also in the ARF case), during which time the power balance betweenthe United States and Asian countries virtually remained the same.

12 . See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and d Interdependence, 2nded. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1989).

13. This point, including the statistic referred to above, is also pointed out byGrieco. See Grieco, “Systemic Sources of Variation,” 170–2.

14. For the general work of this vein, see, for example, Robert O. Keohane,“Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” in Neorealism andd Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 269–301; Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs,”Worldd Politics 37 (1984): 1–23.

15. For a general introduction of these works, see Peter M. Haas, “Introduction:Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,”Internationall Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1–35.

16 . I will discuss this point further in the analysis of Japan’s APEC policy in chapter 3 . For the discussions of those so-called track-II activities prior to the ARF, see Pauline Kerr, “The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific,” ThePacific Review 7, no. 4 (1994): 397–409.

17 . Katzenstein, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security,” 183.18 . Cited in Hemmer Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There

No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” Internationall Organization 56, no.3 (2002): 577.

Notes 213

19 . Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History,” Internationall Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 45.

20 . Rawi Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 4 (2006): 695.

21 . To be sure, some recent works dealing with the identity concept as their cen-tral explanatory variable began providing more nuanced, less deterministicaccounts about the function of identity, acknowledging the context depen-dent and/or nonstatic characteristics of identity. Andrew Oros’s work on Japan’s security policy is a good example. Yet, these works still stop shortof addressing consciously when and under what conditions identities matter. Andrew L. Oros, Normalizingg Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution off Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

22 . As detailed in the next chapter, the component of structural factors specified by this study’s analytical framework is not identical with that of neorealism.In this sense, this study does not embrace neorealism outright, but ratherreappraises “the structural-based approach” advanced by neorealism.

2 The Value-Action Framework andState Identity

1 . Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992): 245–70. A full discussion of his framework is included in his 1987 book, particularly inChapter 3. See Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and d Foreign Policy: Problems ofComparative Conceptualization (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

2 . Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” Mershon International Studies Review39, no. 2 (1995): 228.

3. Donald R. Kinder and Janet A. Weiss, “In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspective on Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Journal of f Conflict Resolution 22, no. 4 (1978): 732.

4 . Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem,” 255. It should be noted that Carlsnaes defines the structural dimension differently from my framework, by referring to both the international level factors and domestic level factors as the structural factors. This is because Carlsnaes treats “actors” of for-eign policy action as individual decision-makers: from the individuals’ pointof view, the structure can mean both domestic institutional structures andthose at the international level. I treat actors of foreign policy actions as agroup of individuals (decision-makers) who act as a state (representing theirstate), for which the structural factors mean those at the international level. Despite this difference, I find persuasive and useful the Carlsnaes’ logic of the function of structural dimension, especially in terms of its relations tothe next dimension––dispositional dimension.

5. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of f International l Politics (New York: RandomHouse, 1979).

214 Notes

6. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective in Human Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 11, emphasisadded.

7 . Jon Elster, “Anomalies of Rationality: Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of Rational Behavior,” in Sociological Economics, ed. Louis Levy-Garboua (London: Sage Publications, 1979), 65.

8 . Ibid., 66. 9. Quentin Skinner, “‘Social Meaning’ and the Explanation of Social Action,”

in Philosophy, Politics, andd Society, ed. Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman, and Quentin Skinner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 79.

10 . Anton Leist, “Introduction: Through Contexts to Actions,” in Action inContext, ed. Anton Leist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 3. For overviewsof competing views on theories of actions, see, for instance, John Hymanand Helen Steward, Agency and d Action (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2004).

11 . Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and d Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1980), 2–19.

12 . Indeed, Carlsnaes appears to acknowledge this inseparability, when he sug-gests that values color perceptions (even actors may not be aware of it), whileperceptions also fashion and reinforce actors’ normative premises and pur-suits. Carlsnaes, Ideology, 102.

13. Ibid., 88–89. 14 . Carlsnaes coined the term value complexity. Ibid., 97; Alexander L. George,

Presidential l Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use ofInformation and d Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). AlexanderGeorge, in his discussion about decision-making in US foreign policy,points out the existence of competing values in the mind of political leaders. Although George focuses on the value complexity solely at the individual level (within a single individual), there is no reason to limit the applicationof this concept to the analysis of decision-making by a single individual.In other words, the value complexity exists in the decision-making context where different actors, be they single individuals or groups of individual act-ing as a single entity, are involved.

15. I termed this mechanism the “value-processing function” and suggested three possible patterns in which one value (or a set of compatible values) becomesthe dominant value. See Kuniko Ashizawa, “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution-Building, and Japanese Foreign Policy,”International Studies Review 10 (2008): 580–1.

16 . Peter Hays Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?” European Journal off International Relations11, no. 2 (2005): 240; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwill, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’sDemise and the International System,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 243; Janice Bially Mattern, “The Power Politics of Identity,”European Journal of f International Relations 7, no. 3 (2001): 353.

Notes 215

17 . Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable.” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 4 (2006):696; Ted Hopf, Social Construction off Internationall Politics: Identities andForeign Policies, Moscow, 1955–1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2002), 4.

18 . Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander E. Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture off National Security: Norms and d Identity in World d Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 59; Alexander E. Wendt,Social l Theory off Internationall Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4.

19 . Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: CharlesScribner’s Sons, 1922), 2; Jorge Larrain, Ideology and d Cultural l Identity(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 151–4.

20. See, for instance, Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, China’s Quest forNational l Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

21 . In this regard, my approach is different from those dealing with state iden-tity as part of their meta-theorizing effort that tends to anthropomorphizestates, such as Wendt.

22 . Wendt, Social l Theory, 224. 23 . Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norm,” 60. 24 . For instance, Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy

Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of f International Relations5, no. 1 (1999): 23; Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,”European Journal of f International Relations 8, no. 2 (2002): 269; Hopf,Social Construction, 16.

25 . Carlsnaes, Ideology, 66. 26 . Wendt makes this point, by categorizing national interests in two forms—

objective national interests and subjective national interests. Hopf differenti-ates them as exogenous treatment versus endogenous treatment of interest.Hopf, Social Construction, 16; Wendt, Sociall Theory, 231–4.

27 . George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, Identities andd Interactions (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 8; Talcott Parsons, “The Position of Identity inthe General Theory of Action,” in The Self in Social Interaction, ed. ChadGordon and Kenneth J. Gergen (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), 21.

28. Harry C. Triandis, “The Self and Social Behavior in Differing CulturalContexts,” Psychological Review 96, no. 3 (1989): 506.

29. Parsons, “The Position,” 19–21.30 . Wendt also suggests that identity operates like a script or schema, which

“generates motivational and behavioral dispositions,” and therefore, leads to a particular behavior. Wendt, Sociall Theory, 224.

31. Related to this, Reus-Smit argues that identities “provide actors with pri-mary reasons forr action. Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of theState: Culture, Sociall Identity, andd Institutional l Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 29.

216 Notes

32 . Ralph H. Turner, “The Self-Conception in Social Interaction,” in The Self in Social Interaction, ed. Chad Gordon and Kenneth J. Gergen (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), 100–1.

33 . Ibid., 100–02. Also, see Parsons, “The Position,” 14–15. 34. Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in The

Culture of f National Security: Norms and d Identity in World d Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); MarijkeBreuning, “Culture, History, Role: Belgian and Dutch Axioms and ForeignAssistance Policy,” in Culture andd Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 99–123.

35. In their discussion of “logic of appropriateness,” March and Olsen point out appropriateness be conceived in relations with identities, and argue, “A calculus of political costs and benefits is less important; a calculus of iden-tity and appropriateness is more important.” James G. March and JohanP. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of f Politics(New York: The Free Press, 1989), esp., 38.

3 Japan and the Creation of APEC: MITI’s Quiet Maneuver, 1988–1989 1. APEC, “First Ministerial Meeting (Canberra, Australia, Nov 6–7,

1989) Chairman’s Summary Statement,” 1989, accessed August 17, 200,available from http://www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib.minismtig/mtgmin89.html.

2 . Andrew Mack and John Ranvenhill, “Economic and Security Regimes inthe Asia-Pacific Region,” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Andrew Mack and JohnRanvenhill (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 10–11.

3. Alan Rix, “Japan and the Region: Leading from Behind,” in PacificEconomic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? ed. RichardHiggott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 62–82; Takashi Terada, “Directional Leadership inInstitution-Building: Japan’s Approaches to ASEAN in the Establishment of PECC and APEC,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 195–220.

4 . Quoted in Takashi Terada, The Genesis of APEC: Australian-Japan Political Initiatives, Pacific Economic Paper No. 298 (Canberra: The Australia-JapanResearch Center, 1999), 21.

5 . Although there had been growing interest in the issues of regional economicinstitution-building in Canberra, no firm decision for Hawke’s proposal was made at the time Hawke left for South Korea, two days before the speech.It was South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s support and encouragementduring their summit meeting that led Hawke to make a decision to launchthe proposal on the following day.

6. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 56.

Notes 217

7 . Quoted in Terada, The Genesis, 33. Terada and Funabashi discuss the Woolcott missions in detail.

8 . The European Community (EC) was also invited. ASEAN-PMC was theextension of the foreign minister’s meeting between Japan and ASEAN,which began in 1978, where the Japanese foreign minister Sonobe joined at the end of annual meetings of AEAN foreign ministers (AMM). In the fol-lowing year, ASEAN expanded this meeting with additional countries, suchas United States and Australia, and came to name it ASEAN-PMC.

9 . Terada, The Genesis, 37. The ASEAN’s resistance at the ASEAN-PMC can be attributed to that ASEAN-PMC was the meeting of foreign ministers andabove, whose thinking tended to reflect more political implication and ques-tion of dignity than economic rationale, as they expressed skepticism, orfear, about creating a new regional institution that may weaken ASEAN’s existence.

10 . Two year later, three Chinas joined in APEC at the third meeting held in Seoul.

11. Indeed, no one was sure whether the APEC meeting would be held annually or end as a one-off meeting at the time when they came to the Canberra meeting. The founding members of APEC are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, The Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States.

12 . Personal interview, June 12, 2001, Tokyo. 13 . Ibid.14. Personal interview, January 10, 2001, Tokyo.15 . See Nikkei Shimbun, January 16, 1988, p. 3; Yomiuri Shimbun, January 16,

1988, p. 2.16 . Mike Mansfield, “Statement on a US–Japan Free Trade Agreement by

Ambassador Mike Mansfield,” in Pros and Cons of Initiating Negotiations with Japan to Explore the Possibility of a US-Japan Free Trade Area Agreement: Report to the Senate Committee on Finance and Investigation,ed. United States International Trade Commission, USTIC Publication(Washington, DC: USITC, 1988), A-2.

17 . Personal interview, June 12, 2001. 18 . Personal interview, May 2001, Tokyo. To be sure, there was also a voice to

support for US–Japan FTA within Japanese political circles. For example,the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Nobuo Matsunaga, pressed the idea to Prime Minister Takeshita, in late January, Nikkei Shimbun, January28, 1988, p. 3.

19 . Nikkei Shimbun, January 29, 1988, p. 3.20 . Sakamoto’s chairmanship was rather a nominal one. Toyoda was given con-

siderable free hand to carry out the project. 21 . MITI, Aratanaru Ajia-Taiheiyo Kyoryoku o Motomete: Konsensas Apurochi

ni yoru Tasouteki Zenshinteki Kyoryoku no Suishin (Tokyo: MITI, 1988).22 . Ibid., 25. 23. Ibid., 36 (emphasis added). As for the US–Japan FTA, the report sug-

gests it should continuingly be studied as an option in the long run. Other

218 Notes

frameworks such as an Asia-Pacific version of OECD and Asian free tradearea are categorized also as future options to study.

24 . Personal interview, December 7, 2000, Tokyo.25 . MITI, “64-nendo Tushosangyoseisaku no Juten,” Tsusansho Koho ,

no. 11575 (1988): 3. Although the languages in the report did not use “min-isterial-level” (instead, it used rather vague terms “leaders”), the underlying goal was certainly a ministerial meeting. See “Ajiakyoryoku de Shinshisaku,Tsusansho,” Asahi Shimbun, June 18, 1988, p. 9.

26 . Personal interview, January 10, 2001. Toyoda also met academics and oth-ers in foreign policy circles to see their reaction to the MITI report and its proposal.

27 . Terada, The Genesis , 7–15. 28 . Personal interview, July 19, 2001, Tokyo; and Terada, The Genesis , 16. 29. Personal interview, June 12, 2001, Tokyo.30. According to Muraoka, Duffy explained their preference for exclusion of

United States (and Canada) was mainly due to the thinking of Prime Minister Hawke, who appeared to view the recent conclusion of US–Canada FTA as akind of antagonism toward the western Pacific and Asia.

31. Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia after the Cold War,” International Security 18, no. 3 (1993/94): 48; Barry Buzan, “Japan’s Future: Old History versus New Roles,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 64, no. 4 (1988): 570; Craig C. Garby and MaryBrown Bullock, eds., Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? (Washington, DC:The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994); Saori N. Katada, Banking onStability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific Dynamics of International Financial Crisis Management (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 3; tPeter J. Katzenstein and Martin Rouse, “Japan as a Regional Power in Asia,” in Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, ed.Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1993), 217–48; Paul Kennedy, “Japan: A Twenty-first-Century Power?” inJapan: A New Kind of Superpower? ed. Craig C. Garby and Mary BrownBullock (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 193–200; Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan as an Asia-Pacific Power,” in East Asiain Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, ed. Robert S. Ross (Armonk, rrNY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 124–59.

32. Although Japan’s military size (manpower) and population were evidentlysmaller than China’s, given its economic capability and defense budget, I consider using the term “largest” as appropriate. Yet, I stop short to use the term “regional hegemon” to describe Japan’s power status, since thecountry’s providing public goods to region appeared not getting an adequate point to be defined as a hegemon.

33. William Zartman, “Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations,” International Organization 21 (1967): 545–64.

34 . Based on the data from “Trade Statistics of Japan,” Ministry of Finance,available from http://www.customs.go.jb/toukei/suii/html/time/htm. The precise numbers were 29 percent in 1988 and 27 percent in 1989, both of

Notes 219

which were indeed identical with the share of trade volume with the United States in the respective years. Those major Asian economies include ASEANcountries, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan.

35 . For instance, if one seeks to analyze Japan’s policy formulation toward thefall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s (instead of the creation of APEC), the researcher needs to identify Japan’s positionalrelations vis- à -vis Europe (instead of Asia) as its structural settings, whichwould be quite different from that in the present case, and hence a differentinference for the country’s structurally-disposed orientation).

36 . MITI, Ajiataiheiyou Kyoryokusuishin Kondankai Houkokusho: ToukeiShiryoushu (Tokyo: MITI, 1989), 12. Japan’s direct investment towardASEAN rose from US$ 2 billion to US$ 46.5 billion, and toward NIEs from US$ 0.8 billion to US$ 2.5 billion from 1985 to 1988. Asia’s share of Japan’s total trade also went up from 25 percent to 29 percent during this period.

37 . Personal interview, July 19, 2001.38. The comment was made by Makoto Kuroda, then vice minister of MITI, at

the conference held in May 1988. Makoto Kuroda, “Panel Statements onHorizon of Regional Cooperation,” in Global Adjustment and the Futureof f Asian-Pacific Economy: Papers and Proceedings of the Conference onGlobal Adjustment and the Future off Asian-Pacific Economy held on 11–13 May 1988 in Tokyo, ed. Miyohei Shinohara and Fu-chen Lo (Tokyo: Asia and Pacific Development Centre, Institute of Developing Economies, 1989), 538.

39 . Shinji Fukukawa, 21-seiki Nihon no Sentaku: Mittsuno Nyu-ism,Groubarizumu, Hyumanizumu, Indasutoriarizumu (Tokyo: TBS Britanika, 1990), 127–8.

40 . Although Hawke’s speech took Tokyo (and other capitals in the region) bysurprise, due to Canberra’s failure to inform their major counterparts of theproposal, MITI quickly treats this as a positive surprise. The Australian ambassador in Tokyo visited MITI next day of the Hawke’s announce-ment, with a transcript of the speech and a letter that sought to make up fortheir lack of prior consultation. Personal interview with Muraoka, June 12,2001.

41 . Although Hawke himself denied about his intention to exclude the United States in his memoir, many involved as well as observers of the subject sharethis account, see Robert Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1994), 431.

42 . Personal interview, June 10, 2001.43 . During the meeting with Muraoka, Malaysian Trade Minister Rafidah Aziz,

who was very enthusiastic about the MITI proposal, suggested Novemberas the best time for Malaysia’s participation. Personal interview, June 12, 2001.

44. Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 1989, p. 9.45 . As for the shift in Australia’s proposal concerning the question of US inclu-

sion, see, Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, 61–64; Terada, The Genesis, 32–33.

220 Notes

46 . MITI, Ajiataiheiyo Kyouryokusuishin Kondankai Houkoku -Hirakareta“Kyoryoku niyoru Hatten no Jidai” e- (Tokyo: MITI, 1989), iiii, 57.

47 . Personal interview, June 12, 2001. 48. Ibid. Other episodes of MOFA’s subtle tactics to hamper the MITI’s efforts,

see Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, 60–61.49. Muraoka interview, June 12, 2001. Nikkei Shimbun, April 28, 1989, p. 1.50. Asahi Shimbun, July 8, 1989, p. 2.51 . Terada, The Genesis, 30. A similar episode was already experienced by

Michael Dufy, Australian minister of Trade Negotiation, when he visited Tokyo in late February to meet both ministers of MITI and MOFA.

52. Kunihiro acknowledged that he observed that ASEAN leaders invariably expressed their understanding and overall support, if not an enthusiastic one, for the APEC concept, during the meetings of Prime Minister Takeshita’s visit to ASEAN countries in early May.

53. Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, 212. 54 . Personal interview, December 7, 2000. 55. For example, MOFA sought to add “culture” issues as one of the agenda

items for the first APEC meeting, while MITI (and other countries, too)rejected it on the ground that the focus should be economic.

56. Toshihisa Nagasaka, “Shinjidaie Mukau Ajiataiheiyokyoryoku,” TsusanJournal February (1990): 26–27. l

57 . Fred C. Bergsten, “Open Regionalism,” in Working Paper (WashingtonD.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997).

58. MITI, Aratanaru, 2, 36, emphasis added.59. Terada, The Genesis, 13. 60. MITI, Ajiataiheiyo Kyoryokusuishin, 7. 61 . Ibid.62 . Fukukawa, 21-seiki Nihon no Sentaku, 159.63. Personal interview, December 7, 2000.64. Personal interview, May 16, 2001.65. Ross Garnaut, “A New Open Regionalism in the Asia Pacific,” in

International Conference on World Economy (Colima, Mexico: 2004). 66. Personal interview, May 22, 2001. 67 . Personal interview, June 12, 2001 and July 26, 2001. 68 . Masakazu Toyoda, “Ajiataiheiyokyoruoku no Ichizuke,” Tsusan Journal

January (1989): 26. 69. Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, 196. There was certainly a different view,

which favors Japan’s more close relations to Asia and distancing from the United States, among MITI officials as well as other policy elites. Yet, those were rather of younger generations, and thus, did not hold the central partof decision-making at that time.

70. Personal interviews, June 12, May 22, 2001. 71 . Personal interview, July 18, 2001. 72 . Personal interview, May 16, 2001.73. Personal interview, June 12, 2001. 74. Seiichiro Otsuka, “Ajia-Taiheiyo Kyoryokukousou to Tounanajia,” Gaiko

Forum November (1989): 54.

Notes 221

75 . Personal interview, February 15, 2001. 76 . Personal interview, January 10, 2001.77 . MITI, Aratanaru , 25.78 . Ibid., 10. This point is repeatedly expressed by those MITI officials involved

in APEC policymaking in their personal interviews and writing. For instance,in his recollection of the June 1988 report, Hisashi Hosokawa, then the direc-tor of the International Economic Affairs Division in the Trade Policy Bureau,wrote, “It was the time when the prospect of a gradual decline of US influence in Southeast Asia was considered as a matter of thing, so that we foresaw with apprehension that there would be a new phase where the US-led regional order would be hard to sustain.” Hisashi Hosokawa, Daikyousoujidai noTsushosenryaku (Tokyo: Nihon Housou Shuppankai, 1999), 138–9.

79 . The report explicitly states the OECD-type organization is not applicable forAsia, given its diversity, for the immediate future. Yet, it does not excludesuch options for the long-term future. MITI, Aratanaru , 28–9.

80 . Takashi Terada, “The Origins of Japan’s APEC Policy: Foreign MinisterTakeo Miki’s Asia-Pacific Policy and Current Implications,” The Pacific Review 11, no. 3 (1998): 339.

81 . Brian J. Bridges, “1990-nendai niokeru Nihon no Senryakuteki Priority,” in JIIA-IISS Kokusai Shimpojiumu: 1990-nendai niokeru Nihon noSenryakutekikadai, ed. Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo (Tokyo: NihonKokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1993), 175–6.

82 . See Cabinet Office Government of Japan, “Public Opinion,” available from http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index.html .

83 . Economic Planning Office, Ajiataiheiyo-chiiki Hannei no Tetsugaku:Sougoukokuryoku no Kanten karamita Nihon no Yakuwari (Tokyo:Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1989), 79–83.

84 . Mie Oba, Ajiataiheiyo Chiikikeisei eno Doutei: Kyokaikokka Nichigono Aidentitimosaku to Chiikishugi (Tokyo: Minerva Shobou, 2004). To be sure, in terms of its structural position, Japan was the largest regional power, and therefore, can be understood as positioned in the center of Asia. Yet, identity is not just about structural conditions, but also about social, historical, and physical ones. Accordingly, Japan’s position in Asia in terms of its self-conception has been always at the periphery somewhat.

85 . See Mitsuzuka’s remarks at Shugiin Shoukou-iinkai, 114, May 23, 1989.86 . Yoshihiro Sakamoto, Meo Sekaini, Kokoro o Sokokuni: Kokuekitowa Nanika

o Toitsuzuketa Tsushoukoushou no Genbakara (Tokyo: Zaikaikenkyujo,2000), 117. Emphasis added.

87 . Personal interview, December 7, 2000.88 . Sakamoto, Meo Sekaini , 122. Personal interviews, May 22, 2001. 89 . Terada, “The Origins,” 346. 90 . Oba, Ajiataiheiyo Chiikikeisei , 40–42. 91 . Personal interview, May 26, 2001. Further on this point, see Funabashi, Asia

Pacific Fusion, 211–12, in which Mitsuzuka, foreign minister in June 1989after serving as the MITI minister, was quoted: “Gaimusho [MOFA] couldnot put up with MITI intruding into their jealously guarded turf—Asian diplomacy. It was their pride.”

222 Notes

92. See Gaiko Forum, “Zadankai: Tenkanki o mukaeta Ajia to Nihon,” Gaiko Forum November (1988).

93. On this point, Sakutaro Tanino, then Director-General of Asian Bureaulater admitted, “It was really regrettable that we spent our energy for such unproductive matters.” Personal interview, May 26, 2001.

94. MITI, Ajiataiheiyo Kyoryokusuishin, iiii, 57. 95 . Toyoda interview. According to Toyoda, MITI officials certainly consulted

relevant documents and writings with regard to the previous nongovernmen-tal regional institution-building, PECC, PBEC, and PAFTAD, but did notconsider their APEC idea as a direct offspring of these previous initiatives. One obvious difference was the geographical and membership scope: whilethe pre-APEC grouping primarily focused on cooperation among advancedeconomies, the APEC proposal consciously brought in both developed and developing countries together (hence, the coining of the term “Asia-Pacific,”as opposed to the previously used “Pacific”).

96 . For this account, see Ellis Krauss, “Japan, the US, and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia,” The Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 473–94.

97 . Personal interview, July 26, 2001. 98. Personal interview, July 10, 2001. 99 . Indeed, around this time, some MITI officials floated the idea of establish-

ing a new US–Japan bilateral framework where the two countries would dis-cuss each other’s domestic structural issues comprehensively—such areas as the financial sector, exchange control, and fiscal policy—in order to makean adjustment of overall economic policy toward each other. Through such a comprehensive policy adjustment—not the narrowly focused negotiations on specific industrial sectors, which had been hitherto practiced—the twocountries would work together for reducing the bilateral trade imbalance, thus helping to eliminate the root cause of the trade friction. Thanks toa similar proposal suggested by the US International Trade Commission(USITC), the idea materialized, at least partially, in the form of the Japan-US Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks that started in late 1989.

100 . Krauss, “Japan, the US,” 478.101 . Terada, “Directional Leadership,” 200.

4 The United States and the Creation of APEC:Global Hegemon and Regional Cooperation,1988–1989 1 . A comment by Seiichi Kondo, the spokesman for MOFA, quoted in The

Record, November 9, 1989, p. D4. 2. Quoted in “Asia-Pacific Economic Organization Takes Shape,” The

Christian Science Monitor, November 9, 1989, p. 3. rr 3. George Shultz, “Address Before the Association of Indonesian Economists,

Jakarta, July 11, 1988,” Department off State Bulletin 88, no. 2139 (1988): 26. 4 . Ibid.

Notes 223

5 . Personal interview, July 10, 2001, Tokyo. 6 . Richard W. Baker, “The United States and APEC Regime Building,” in Asia-

Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future off APEC, ed. Vinod K.Aggarwal and Charles E. Morrison (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 168.

7 . Takashi Terada, The Genesis off APEC: Australian-Japan Political Initiatives- , Pacific Economic Paper No. 298 (Canberra: The Australia-Japan ResearchCenter, 1999), 14.

8. Personal interview, January 10, 2001, Tokyo. 9 . Personal interview, March 19, 2002, in New York. 10 . Committee on Ways and Means US House of Representatives, East

Asia: Challenges for US Economic andd Security Interests in the 1990’s(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988).

11. Ibid., 43.12 . Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington,

MA: Lexington Books, 1991). 40.13 . Baker, “The United States,” 168. 14. To be sure, this coincided with the time that a possible fall of America as

the great world leader became a familiar theme in the United States andelsewhere; a theme that was widely spread by the publication of the historianPaul Kennedy’s book, The Rise and d Fall of the Great Powers: EconomicChange and d Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. Yet, this thesis tended toemphasize more on the relative changes and the future projection than the actual state of things.

15 . For instance, the Atlantic Ocean stretches for 3,470 miles (or 5,585 kilo-meters) from New York to London, whereas that the Pacific (between Los Angeles and Tokyo) has a width of 5,478 miles (8,815 kilometers). As for the other regions, here are some examples: the distance from Washington, DC to Dakar (West Africa) is 3,956 miles (6,366 kilometers); to Jerusalem (Middle East) is 5,913 miles (9,517 kilometers); and to New Delhi (South Asia) is7,480 miles (12,038 kilometers).

16 . For detailed descriptions of the Bush administration’s preoccupation withthe new world-order building agenda, see Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, AmericanExceptionalism andd US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of theCold d War (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 46–79.

17 . See, for example, James A. Baker III, The Politics of f Diplomacy: Revolution,War and d Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 606. Brady Plan was designed to help 15 largest borrowers in the Third World, most of which were Latin American countries. Mexico became the first country to receive debt relief under the Brady Plan.

18 . George Shultz, A Forward Look at Foreign Policy, October 19, 1984, Current Policy No. 625 (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1984), 3.

19. Personal interview, April 3, 2002. 20 . A former high-ranking State Department official stated that 80 percent of

the top-level attention in terms of foreign policy may go to the ongoing crisis management. Personal interview, June 1, 2002, Virginia.

21 . Baker, “The United States,” 186.

224 Notes

22 . A comment by Jeffrey J. Schott, a senior fellow of Institute for InternationalEconomics, in the interview article by a Japanese newspaper. Asahi Shimbun,March 25, 1989, p. 11.

23. Nikkei Shimbun, December 12, 1988, p. 5. 24. James A. Baker III, “Secretary-Designate’s Confirmation Hearings,”

Department off State Bulletin 89 (April), no. 2145 (1989): 13.25. Given the vast size and diverse scopes of issues associated with Asia, a

division of labor naturally existed within the State Department. With his background and experience at the Treasury Department, Baker himself committed to the economic issues in Asia, and also, the US policy towardJapan policy in this line, leaving Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, responsible for the rest of countries,such as Southeast Asian countries, Mongolia as well as South Korea. Below,Desaix Anderson, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asianand Pacific Affairs, mainly covered the northeast Asia, thus Japan, Korea, China, and Mongolia.

26 . In the article of Wall Street Journal, cited in Palmer, The New Regionalism,41. See, also, Baker III, The Politics, 609.

27 . Stated by a Senior State Department official in his background briefing for the Baker’s coming trip to the APEC first meeting. See US Department of State, “Background Briefing on Secretary of State Baker’s Upcoming Trip to Australia,” Federal News Service, October 30 1989.

28 . Nikkei Shimbun, December 22, 1988, p. 5. 29. Personal interview, February 21, 2002. 30 . Ibid. 31. Personal interview, April 3, 2002, Washington, D.C.32 . Quoted in Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC,

(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 62. 33. Around a dozen US officials were rounded up in the meeting whereas

there were just about three officials in the Japanese side, and according toMuraoka, such a high number of US attendance for a meeting of this typewas unusual.

34. Personal interview, April 3, 2002.35. Asahi Shimbun, July 8, 1989, p. 2. The official meeting with Hawke was

scheduled on the following day, June 27, although Baker had already spentsome time with Hawke the day before (June 25) when they together playedgolf with President Bush.

36. James A. Baker III, “A New Pacific Partnership: Framework for the Future, Secretary Baker’s Address Prepared for Delivery Before the Asia Society in New York City on June 26, 1989,” Department off State Bulletin (1989).

37 . Ibid. Those principles were further articulated and clarified in the Richard Solomon’s statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee onSeptember 21.

38 . Kyodo News Service, July 6, 1989; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 6, 1989, eveningedition, p.1; Yomiuri Shimbum, July 6, 1989, the evening edition.

39. Fauver interview, February 21, 2002.

Notes 225

40 . For the US interest in the Three Chinas’ participation, see Richard H.Solomon, “Hearing of the East Asian & Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, September 21, 1989, in the Q&A session.

41. Ibid. 42. “A Pacific Tale,” Economist, November 11, 1989, p. 39.43 . “Asia-Pacific Group not to be New Trading Block,” U.P.I. November 6,

1989.44 . “Membership Issue of APEC to be Discussed Next Year,” Central News

Agency, November 9, 1989.45 . Baker III, “A New Pacific.”46 . US Department of State, “Background Briefing.” 47 . Dennis Ross and Richard H. Solomon, “Informational Memorandum to the

Secretary, US and East Asia: A Strategy for a New Era,” ed. Department of State (1989), 2.

48. Personal interview, March 19, 2002. 49. Personal interview, February 21, 2002.50. Baker, “The United States,” 169.51 . Cited in Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, 64.52 . Personal interview, March 19, 2002.53 . Baker III, The Politics, 609. 54 . Personal interview, April 21, 2002, Washington, DC.55 . Personal interview, April 3, 2002.56 . Personal interview, March 19, 2002. 57 . Baker III, “A New Pacific.”58. Personal interview, February 21, 2002.59 . Baker III, The Politics, 605.60 . Quoted in John G. Ikenberry, “Multilateralism and US Grand Strategy,”

in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement,ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynn RiennerPublishers, 2002), 134.

61 . Baker III, The Politics, 610. 62 . Richard H. Solomon, “The Promise of Pacific Economic Cooperation:

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 21,1989,” Department of f State Bulletin December (1989): 34.

63. Ross and Solomon, “Informational Memorandum,” 2, emphasis added.64 . Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence off Sea Power upon History, 1660–

1783, 12th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1918).65 . Henry L. Stimson, “The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Committee

on Foreign Relations (Borah), United States Senate [Washington] February23, 1932,” in Peace and d War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, ed.US Department of State (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,1943), 173.

66 . See, for instance, US Department of State, “Briefing Materials for Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake,” (1961); US Department of State, “Secretary Dulles’ Letter to Mr. John C. Higgins,” (1957); White House, “Report of

226 Notes

the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East, Chapter 5 ,” (1954), 16. All accessed November 18, 2009. Available from Declassified Documents Reference System.

67 . US Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation: Southeast Asia: The Polish Proposals; Discussion of the French Position; Cambodia,” (1964),5, accessed November 18, 2009, available from Declassified DocumentsReference System.

68. US Department of State, “Presidential Decisions, The Seven-Nation Manila Conference and the President’s Asia Trip, October 17–November 2, 1966,” (1968), 15; US Department of State, “Remarks of the President, Parliamentary Luncheon, Canberra, Australia, Oct 21,” (1966), 3. Both accessed November 18, 2009, available from Declassified Documents Reference System.

69. See, for instance, US Department of State, “Ambassador Goldberg and Chiang Kai-shek discuss PRC and Vietnam: Memorandum,” (1967), 3; US Department of State, “Memo to Secretary Rusk from Ambassador Lodge regarding MARIGOLD,” (1967), 2; US Department of State, “President’s Asia Trip, October-November, 1966,” (1966), 10. All accessed November 18, 2009, available from Declassified Documents Reference System.

70. Quoted in Walt W. Rostow, The United States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific, 1965–1985 (Austin, Texas: University Texas Press,1986) 146.

71. Ibid.72 . US Department of State, “Report: Comments for the President’s Annual

Review of American Foreign Policy for 1970,” (1970), 32, 39, accessed November 18, 2009, available from Declassified Documents ReferenceSystem.

73 . See, for instance, US Department of State, “Memorandum for Mr. HenryA. Kissinger: Secretary of State’s Report to the Congress,” (1971), 4, 5; White House, “Letter: President Nixon to Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachom,” (1971). Both accessed November 18, 2009, available fromDeclassified Documents Reference System.

74. For instance, John Glen, US Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of f Korea,An Update: A Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate (1979), 6; US Department of State, “Minutes: A Meeting betweenChinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,”(1977); White House, “Memorandum for President: Your September 13Meeting with Ambassador Ch’ai Tse-min,” (1978). All accessed November 19, 2009, available from Declassified Documents Reference System.

75. Michael H. Armacost, “The United States in the Changing Asia of the 1990s:Address before the Japan-America Society of New York on June 6, 1988,” Department off State Bulletin 88, no. 2138 (1988): 12.

76 . George Shultz, “Remarks, Oct. 17, 1988.” Department of f State BulletinDecember (1988): 26

77 . Committee on Ways and Means US House of Representatives, Eastt Asia, 166. 78. “East Asia, the Pacific, and the US: An Economic Partnership,” Department

off State Bulletin April (1989): 33.

Notes 227

79 . “President’s Trip to Japan, China, and South Korea,” Department off StateBulletin May (1989): 22.

80 . Solomon, “The Promise,” 34. 81 . Baker III, “Confirmation Hearings,” 14.

82. Personal interview. 83 . Personal interview. 84 . Baker III, The Politics, 609. 85 . Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics andd International

Organizations 1919–1999 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 5–6; Norman J. Padelford, “Regional Organization and the UnitedNations,” International l Organization 8, no. 2 (1954): 206.

86. Stewart Patrick, “Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes andConsequences of US Ambivalence,” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman(Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2002), 7.

87 . John G. Ruggie, “Third Try at World Order: America and Multilateralism after the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 4 (1994): 559.

88 . George Shultz, “Key to the Future: Enlightened Engagement, SecretaryShultz’ address before the Financial Executive Institute in San Francisco on October 10, 1988,” Department off State Bulletin December (1988): 10.

89 . Baker III, The Politics, 605–06, emphasis original. 90. Ruggie, “Third Try.” 91 . Baker III, “Confirmation Hearings,” 10.92 . Solomon, “The Promise,” 34. 93 . US Department of State, “Background Briefing.”94 . Personal interview.

95 . Personal interview, February 21, 2002. 96 . US Department of State, “Background Briefing.” 97 . Baker III, The Politics, 605. 98 . For instance, see Baker, “The United States,” 170–71. 99 . US Department of State, “Background Briefing.” 100. Personal interview, February 21, 2002. Also, see Ellis Krauss, “Japan, the

US, and the Emergence of Multilateralism in Asia,” The Pacific Review 13,no. 3 (2000): 482.

101 . See, US Department of State, “Background Briefing,” and personal inter-views, February 21 and March 19, 2002.

102. See, for instance, Baker III, The Politics.

5 Japan and the Creation of the ARF: MOFA in Motion, 1991–1994

1 . Paul M. Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” in The SecurityEnvironment in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Hung Mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 7.

228 Notes

2. Quoted in Lee Siew Hua and Sinfah Tunsarawuth, “ARF Better thanExpected, Says Jaya,” The Straits Times, July 26, 1994, 14.

3. Quoted in Hisane Masaki, “Security Forum a test for Japan, ASEAN doubts are hindering leadership initiative,” Japan Times , July 19, 1994, 3.

4 . ASEAN, “Singapore Declaration, January 28 1992,” 1992, accessed February 12, 2001, available from http://www.aseansec.org/summit/sum-mit4.htm. ASEAN-PMC was the extension of the foreign ministers’ meet-ing between Japan and the ASEAN that began in 1978. The EU was also amember of ASEAN-PMC.

5 . US Department of State, “Winston Lord Assistant Secretary-Designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, Washington, DC, March 31, 1993,” US Department of StateDispatch 4, no. 3 (1993).

6. The original members of the ARF are ASEAN, Australia, Canada, China,Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and European Union.

7 . At the second meeting in 1995, the member countries laid the foundationfor the ARF’s institutional purpose, by adopting three principal agendas: (1) confidence building, (2) preventive diplomacy, and (3) conflict resolution. ASEAN, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,” 1995, accessedJune 6, 2003, available at http://www.aseansec.org/3635.htm.

8. Taro Nakayama, “Statement by His Excellency Dr. Taro Nakayama,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to the General Session of the ASEANPost Ministerial Conference, Kuala Lumpur, July 22 1991,” in ASEAN Shiryo Shushi 1967–1996 (CD-ROM), ed. Susumu Yamakage (Tokyo:Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1999).

9 . Masashi Nishihara, “Ajia-Taiheiyochiiki to Takokukan AnzenhoshoKyoryoku no Wakugumi: ASEAN Chiiki Forum o Chushin ni,” KokusaiMondai October (1994): 64.

10. Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance,” The Pacific Review13, no. 3 (2000): 368.

11. Gorbachev put forward the idea of a “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia” (CSCA) in his speech at Vladivostok in 1986, and Evans and Clark respectively proposed, on several occasions in 1990, a certain kind of regional grouping to deal with the regional security of Asia. Around this time, South Korean and Mongolian leaders also began to express their sym-pathy for these proposals of regional multilateral security arrangements. For detailed discussion on the development in the Soviet’s proposals during the latter half of 1980s, as well as on the subsequent proposals by other regional countries in 1990, see David Youtz and Paul Midford, A Northeast Asian Security Regime: Prospects After the Cold War, rr Public Policy Paper (NewrYork: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1992), esp., 5–18.

12 . US Department of State, “Remarks of Secretary of State Baker Following theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations Post Ministerial Conference,” July24 1991, accessed June 6 2003, available at Public Diplomacy Query.

Notes 229

13 . See, for example, Nikkei Shimbun, July 24, 1991, 2 and July 25, 1991, 8; Asahi Shimbun July 24, 1991, 3.

14. Midford, “Japan’s,” 384. All MOFA officials interviewed by the author admitted to their failure to conduct sufficient prior consultations with their counterparts of ASEAN countries and the United States.

15 . For the ASEAN’s reaction to the SOM proposal in the Nakayama proposal,see, for instance, Yomiuri Shimbun, July 24, 1991, 3.

16. Raul S. Manglapus, “ASEAN: Towards and Economic Treaty and A SecurityDialogue,” in The Twenty-Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conferences with the Dialogue Partners: Jakarta, 24–29 July1990, ed. ASEAN (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1990), 15–16.”

17 . ASEAN, “Joint Communique of the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN MinisterialMeeting, Kuala Lumpur, 1991,” 1991, accessed February 12, 2001, avail-able from http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm24.htm .

18 . Indeed, one of the key MOFA officials involved in the Nakayama proposal, Yukio Satoh, was present in both the above-mentioned ASEAN-sponsored conferences.

19 . Quoted in Midford, “Japan’s,” 385. 20 . Based on the date from “Trade Statistics of Japan,” Ministry of Finance,

available from http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time/htm. Theprecise numbers with major Asian economies (China, NIEs, and ASEAN)were 29 percent (1990), 31 percent (1991), 32 percent (1992), and 35 percent(1993), and with the United States were 27 percent, 26 percent, 25 percent, and 27 percent, respectively.

21 . Personal interview, February 23, 2001, Tokyo. 22 . Personal interview, February 15, 2001, Tokyo. 23 . Personal interview, January 5, 2001.24 . Toshiki Kaifu, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ‘Japan and

ASEAN: Seeking a Mature Partnership for the New Asia,’ Singapore 3, May 1991,” in ASEAN Shiryo Shushi 1967–1996 (CD-ROM), ed. SusumuYamakage (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1999).

25 . Satoshi Morimoto, “Marutakaidango no Ajia-Taiheiyo niokeru Anzenhosho,”Gaiko Jiho May (1990): 12.

26 . Personal interview, May 11, 2001, Tokyo. It should be noted that Nakayama, given his strong desire to take a certain diplomatic action for the region,organized a special dinner where the countries of Asia-Pacific were invitedin New York, September of the year, by using the occasion of UN General Assembly to which foreign ministers of most countries gathered. Indonesia cohosted the dinner, and many of the future ARF members, including Soviet Union and Vietnam, as well as the United States, participated. Yet, MOFA officials generally disregarded this dinner as Nakayama’s personal initiativeand less significant, and some officials even complained about it for its inclu-sion of Soviet Union.

27 . MOFA, Gaiko Seisho: Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo, 1990-nenban (Tokyo:Ohkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1990). As for the foreign minister’s speech before the Diet, see Taro Nakayama, “Dai-120 Kokkai niokeru Nakayama

230 Notes

Gaimudaijin no Gaiko Enzetsu,” in Gaiko Seisho: Waga Gaikouno Kinkyo,1991-nen ban, ed. MOFA (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1991).

28. Takakazu Kuriyama, “Gekidou no 90-nendai to Nihongaiko no Shintenkai,”Gaiko Forum May (1990): 16.

29. Comments by Kazuki Kasuya in Gaiko Forum, “Zadankai: Posuto Reisen toAjia-Taiheiyo no Shinchoryu,” Gaiko Forum February (1991): 22.

30 . Kaifu, “Policy Speech.”31 . Martin L. Lasater, The New Pacific Community: US Strategic Options in

Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 18–19.32 . See, for example, Nikkei Shimbun, June 17, 1990, 1. 33 . I use “multi-tiered” here as synonymous with “multilayered” or “multilevel”

which, in the Japanese documents I examined, is usually referred to “juso-teki”and sometimes “taso-teki” or “hukugo-teki.” Given the novelty of the concept for foreign policy discourse at the time, there was no unified use of these termsto refer to it, as the official English translations in MOFA documents also use both “multilayered” and “multitiered” as a translation of “ juso-teki .”

34. When referring to this new perspective of regional order, Japanese policy-makers employed the adjective “multi” such as multitiered, multilayered, and multiplex, rather than more concrete references of “four tiered” or so. Thiswas probably because MOFA officials involved in formulating the concept pragmatically sought to secure flexibility of adding further functions and arrangements (e.g., all-East Asia grouping) when necessary in the future.Yet, at the time of conceptualization, they constantly referred to these par-ticular four levels of functions, discussed here, as necessarily composing the multitiered regional order.

35 . The first paper was presented at the Thirty-second Annual Conference of theIISS, 6–9 September, and later compiled in the IISS’s Adelphi Paper series.See Yukio Satoh, “The Future Nature of US Influence in Western Europe and North-East Asia: A View from the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Adelphi Paper256: America’s Role in a Changing World, Part 1 (London: IISS, 1990/91), esp., 43. While the first paper did not use the term “multiplex,” the secondone did introduce the term, probably for the first time, in his writings. See Yukio Satoh, “Asian Pacific Process for Stability and Security,” Presentedat the Conference on ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s, 5–7 June 1991, Manila (1991), esp., 23. This paper was also submitted to the ASEAN-ISIS conference held inJakarta, May 31-June 1, 1991. MOFA later chose to include this paper, with some modifications, along with a collection of writings and speeches by other senior MOFA officials, in a special booklet, Japan’s Post Gulf International Initiative, published in August 1991. The most notable modi-fication from the original paper was the addition of the proposal for creating a multilateral security dialogue by using the ASEAN-PMC to the latter one, as it published after Nakayama made his proposal in Kuala Lumpur. As for the most streamlined summary of the multitiered perspective by Satoh, see Yukio Satoh, “Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan,” The Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995): 267–81.

Notes 231

36 . Personal interviews with Satoh, February 26, 2001, and with the drafter of the Nakayama proposal, who was then the director of the Regional Policy Division of the Asian Affairs Bureau of MOFA, February 15, 2001.

37 . Nakayama, “Statement.” The main drafter of the Nakayama proposal told the author that he found the term “multilayered” sitting very well with whatthey were envisioning for emerging post-Cold War relations in Asia. Personal interview, February 15, 2001.

38 . Kiichi Miyazawa, “‘The New Era of the Asia-Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation,’ Policy Speech by Prime Minister Miyazawa, Bangkok, 16 January 1993,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 9, no. 3 (1993): 376.

39 . For further discussions on how the multitiered approach was conceived and became firmly rooted in Japanese foreign policymaking as a new conceptualframework for the country’s regional policymaking in the 1990s, see Kuniko Ashizawa, “Japan’s Approach toward Asian Regional Security: From ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ Bilateralism to ‘Multi-Tiered’,” The Pacific Review 16, no. 3(2003): 363–84.

40. The Tokyo Declaration On the US-Japan Global Partnership: President George Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, January 9, 1992, (UnitedStates Information Service American Embassy, Tokyo, 1992), 12. This point of using the term “political dialogue” instead of “security dialogue” was sug-gested by Kikuchi. See Tsutomu Kikuchi, APEC: Ajiataiheiyo Shinchitsujono Mosaku (Tokyo: Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1995), 271.

41 . Kiichi Miyazawa, “Nashonaru Puresu Kurabu niokeru Miyazawa Naikaku Souridaijin Supiichi, July 2, 1992,” in Gaiko Seisho: Tenkanki no Sekai toNihon 1992, ed. MOFA (Tokyo: Ohkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1993), 404–10.

42 . Koji Kakizawa, “Statement by His Excellency Mr. Koji Kakizawa,Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to the General Session of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Manila, 24 July 1992,” in ASEAN Shiryo Shusei, 1967–1996 (CD-ROM), ed. Susumu Yamakage (Tokyo:Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1999).

43 . Jiminto Sogoseisaku Kenkyujo, “Nihon no Ajia-Taiheiyo Gaiko nikansuru Teigen, July 6,” (Tokyo: Jiminto Sogoseisaku Kenkyujo, 1992), 10, 16.

44. See, for example, Asahi Shimbun February 18, 1991, 2; Mainichi Shimbun,April 18, 1991, 5; Nikkei Shimbun, July 27, 1992, 2; Nikkei Shimbun,November 23, 1992, 7.

45. Niju-isseiki no Ajia-Taiheiyo to Nihon o Kangaeru Kondankai, “21-seiki noAjia-Taiheiyo to Nihon: Kaihosei no Suishin to Tayosei no Soncho,” (1992). The report also referred to the desirability of an inclusion of China andRussia for a new framework.

46 . MOFA’s internal report prepared by the National Security Policy Division, February 17, 1994.

47 . John G. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 50–79. The concept of “self-binding” in relation with Japan’sARF policy is also pointed out by Lisa J. Sansoucy, “Japan’s Regional SecurityPolicy in Post-Cold War Asia,” in The United States and Asian Security,

232 Notes

ed. Matthew Evangelista and Judith Reppy (Ithaca: Cornel University Peace Studies Program, 2002), 168.

48. Nakayama, “Statement.”49. Yukio Satoh, “Asia-Pacific Process for Stability and Security,” in Japan’s

Post Gulf War International Initiatives, ed. MOFA (Tokyo: MOFA,1991), 45.

50. Quoted in “Japan’s Dialogue Proposal Gets Cool Reception,” PacificResearch, November 1991, 25–26.

51. Personal interview, February 15, 2001, Tokyo.52. Sansoucy, “Japan’s,” 9.53. Personal interview, February 26, 2001, Tokyo. 54. Personal interview, May 11, 2002, Tokyo.55 . Personal interview, August 7, 2001, Tokyo. 56. MOFA, Gaiko Seisho: Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo, 1991-nenban (Tokyo:

Ohkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1991), 72–3.57 . MOFA, Ajia Taiheiyo no Anzenhosho, ed. Asian Affairs Bureau Regional

Policy Division (1992).58. Miyazawa, “The New Era.”; MOFA, ASEANN Kakudaigaisokaigi (Chugoku,

Roshia touno Sanka), ed. Asian Affairs Bureau Regioanl Policy Division(1993), 1; MOFA, Gaiko Seisho: Tenkanki no Sekai to Nihon 1992 (Tokyo:Ohkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1993), 32–3; Kabun Muto, “Statement by H.E.Mr. Kabun Muto, Ministory of Foreign Affairs of Japan to the GeneralSession of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Singapore, July 26 1993,” 1993, accessed February 12, 2001, available from http://www.ase-ansec.org/amm/pmc26osj.htm.

59. It should be noted that MOFA officials already referred to this value in their reasoning to support the creation of APEC, once they withdrew their oppo-sition to MITI’s APEC initiative as detailed in chapter 3 . See, for exam-ple, Seiichiro Otsuka, “Ajia-Taiheiyo Kyoryokukousou to Tounanajia,” Gaiko Forum November (1989). Otsuka was the then Councilor of AsianBureau.

60. Personal interview, February 15, 2001.61 . Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, December 8, 1991, 2. 62. Shinichi Kitaoka, “Subeteni Amerika o Makikome,” Voice September

(1991): 96.63. Personal interview, February 15, 2001.64 . Personal interview, November 24, 2000. Nishihara participated in the afore-

mentioned ASEAN-sponsored conference in June 1991 (where the partici-pants, including Yukio Sato of MOFA, agreed the need for a region-wide security dialogue), as well as some of the ARF-related preparatory confer-ences and meetings.

65. Personal interview, December 20, 2000. 66 . Satoh, “Emerging,” 273. 67 . See, for instance, remarks by Shintaro Abe (Shugiin Gaimu Iinkai, December

13, 1985), Yasuhiro Nakasone (Sangiin Honkaigi, September 18, 1986),

Notes 233

Yoshihiko Seki (Sangiin Gaikosogoanzenhosho, April 22, 1988), and KanjiKawasaki (Shugiin, Kokusaienjoheiwakyoryoku, November 1, 1990).

68 . Sakutaro Tanino, “Higashiajiano Chitsujosaihenseito Nihon no Yakuwari,” in Nihon to Ajia: Atarashiiseishin no Kizunao Motomete, ed. Shiro Saito (Tokyo: Ajia Shobo, 1993), 52.

69. Personal interview, May 11, 2002, Tokyo. 70. “Nakayama Regrets War Actions Against ASEAN,” Japan Economic

Newswire July 29, 1990.71 . Keith B. Richburg, “Many Asian Fear Potential Military Threat From

Japan,” The Washington Post, August 4, 1990, A18.72 . Personal interview, July 25, 2001, Tokyo.73 . Personal interviews, February 23, August 7, 2001.74. MOFA, “ASEAN kakudaigaisokaigi: Toriaezu no Hyoka,” ed. Asian Affairs

Bureau Regional Policy Division (1990), 5. 75. Michihiko Kunihiro, “Ajiataiheiyo-kyoryoku no Keizaisokumen,” Gaiko

Forum September (1990): 26. 76 . Harry C. Triandis, “The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural

Contexts,” Psychological Review 96, no. 3 (1989): 507. 77 . Alastair Ian Johnston, “Conclusion and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range

Theorizing and Beyond Europe,” International Organization 59 (2005):1033.

78 . Satoh, “Emerging,” 277. 79. Personal interview, February 15, 2001, Tokyo.80. Personal interview, August 7, 2001, Tokyo.81 . Personal interview, July 25, 2001, Tokyo.82 . The title was “Shindankai o Mukaeruka, Ajia-Taiheiyo” [The Asia-Pacific:

Entering a New Phase?]. It should be noted that the discussions at this point still revolved around the economic issues, stopping short of referring to the specific regional security matters.

83 . Nobuo Matsunaga, “Nichibeikankei o Kijikutoshitsutsu Ajianohaneini Doukoukensuruka,” Gaiko Forum October (1990): 60.

84 . Remarks by Seizaburo Satoh, an influential scholar on Japanese foreign pol-icy. Gaiko Forum, “Zadanakai: Jinrui ni totteno Nichibei Doumei towa,” Gaiko Forum, November (1991): 40.

85 . Personal interview, February 15, 2001, Tokyo.86 . MOFA, Gaiko Seisho – Aratanakokusaichitsujo no Houga to Nihongaiko

no Shinro: Jusotekinawakugumi no Kouchiku – (Tokyo: Okurasho–Insatsukyoku, 1996).

87 . Takeshi Yuzawa,. Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum:The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2007), 51–58.

88 . Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japanese Security Policy: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review 10, no. 4 (1997): 482–83.

89 . Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy, 52–53.

234 Notes

6 The United States and the Creation of the ARF:Hegemonic Approach toward the Post–Cold War Asian Security Order, 1990–1994 1. ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement: The First ASEAN Regional Forum,

Bangkok, 25 July 1994,” 1994, accessed July 28 2003, available from http://www.aseansec.org/3621.htm.

2. Strobe Talbott, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of the United States of America (at the General Session of the ASEAN PostMinisterial Conference, Bangkok, July 27 1994),” in ASEAN Shiryo Shushi1967–1996 (CD-ROM), ed. Susumu Yamakage (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1999).

3. The remarks made to a reporter of The Washington Post, see WilliamBranigin, “East, West Enter Forum on Security in Southeast Asia,” TheWashington Post, July 26, 1994, A14.

4. Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack, and Paul M. Evans, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific,” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes, ed. Andrew Mack and John Ranvenhill (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 236.

5 . Richard H. Solomon, “Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics, Diversity in Defense. Address at the University of California at San Diego, October 30, 1990,” US Department of State Dispatch 1, no. 10(1990): 244.

6 . Desmond Ball, Australia, The US Alliance, and Multilateralism in Southeast Asia, ed. Helen Hookey, SDSC Working Papers (Canberra: Strategic andDefense Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1997), 10.Also, see Kerr, Mack, and Evans, “Evolving,” 237. The letter was dated onNovember 19, 1990, and later leaked to the Australian Financial Review, on May 2, 1991.

7 . Solomon, “Asian Security,” 246. 8. Joseph A. Camilleri, “The Asia-Pacific in the Post-Hegemonic World,” in

Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Andrew Mack and John Ranvenhill (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1995), 205.

9. Ball, Australia , 10.10 . Quoted in ibid., 10. 11 . Richard H. Solomon, “US Relations With East Asia and the Pacific: A New

Era. Statement before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 17, 1991,” US Department of State Dispatch 1, no. 21 (1991): 387.

12 . US Department of State, “Settlement to Cambodia Problem Needed, BakerSays.” Remarks of Secretary of State Baker following the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Post Ministerial Conference, July 24 1991, accessedMarch 28 2002, available from Public Diplomacy Query.

Notes 235

13 . Richard H. Solomon, “The Evolving Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region: Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 30, 1991,” USDepartment of State Dispatch 2, no. 44 (1991): 818.

14 . See James A. Baker III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a PacificCommunity,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991/92): 4. Although Baker’s arti-cle mentioned the possible use of “flexible, ad hoc” multilateral arrange-ments for subregional level issues, such as the Cambodian peace negotiationand the territorial disputes over the islands of the South China Sea, this doesnot suggested he accepted the proposal of CSCA, or a multilateral security dialogue, in an institutionalized form. Close observers therefore concludedthat Baker’s reference to the regional multilateral option was “in no sense an endorsement of institutionalized multilateral security dialogues.” Kerr,Mack, and Evans, “Evolving,” 238.

15 . For instance, immediately after the ASEAN summit meeting, a StateDepartment official spoke with reporters on several foreign issues includ-ing the ASEAN summit, but did not make specific references to the securitydialogue question. See US Department of State, “US ‘Warmly Welcomes’ theASEAN Free Trade Area, Lord Says,” Assistant Secretary of State WinstonLord’s press conference with other ASEAN foreign ministers in Singapore,July 30 1993, accessed March 28 2002, available from Public Diplomacy Query.

16 . Robert B. Zoellick, “US Relations with Asia and the Pacific: A New Era, Address to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference, Manila, Philippines, July 24, 1992,” US Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 31 (1992): 598.

17 . US Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Association of Southeast AsianNations,” US Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 31 (1992): 601–2.

18 . US Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: A Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1992).

19 . Robert G. Sutter, “East Asia: Disputed Islands/Offshore Claims Issues for US Policy,” CRS Report to Congress (Washington, DC: CongressionalResearch Services, 1992), 10.

20 . For more details of US preoccupation in global order-building agendas, seeKuniko Ashizawa, “Building the Asia-Pacific: Japanese and US ForeignPolicy toward the Creation of Regional Institutions, 1988–1994,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,2005), 332–7.

21. Washington invaded Panama militarily to remove Manuel Noriega, while conducting a series of covert and overt operations in the Nicaraguan general elections to assist Violeta Chamorro of the Liberal Party against the socialist Sandinista Daniel Ortega.

22. US Department of State, “Focus on Central and Eastern Europe: Summaryof Initiatives,” US Department of State Dispatch, no. 40 (1991): 273–4.

236 Notes

23 . James A. Baker III, “The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East.Secretary of State Baker’s Address to the Aspen Institute in Berlin, June 18, 1991,” Department of State Dispatch, no. 25 (1991): 439–40.

24 . For example, see US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Security Policy in East Asia, 102th Cong., October 30 1991.

25. Although Washington took part in the peace settlement of Cambodia, another example of crisis management, it indeed let other actors, such as the UN and some ASEAN countries, lead the process.

26 . For details, see Lasater, The New Pacific, 18–23.27 . Personal interview, June 1, 2002, Mclean, Virginia. 28. Yuji Suzuki, “Beikoku no Ajia-Taiheiyou Kousou: Seiji, Gunji, Anzenhosho

no Sokumen kara,” Gaiko Forum (1990): 29–30. In a similar vein, Stuart and Tow argued that the Bush administration “did not succeed in articulat-ing a vision of US interests in Asia.” Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-PowerSystem in Asia, Adelphi Paper 299 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), 11.

29. Personal interview, November 4, 2002, Washington, DC.30 . Remarks by Senator Paul S. Sarbanes at the Senate’s hearing on US security

policy in East Asia. See US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Security Policy in East Asia, 102nd Cong., October 30 1991.

31 . Some might suggest the Defense Department’s report, titled “East AsiaStrategic Initiative” (EASI), which was published in April 1990 (and later updated as EASI-II in 1992) laying out the above-discussed phased forcereduction plan in Asia, can be viewed as Washington’s attempt to reexamine its overall relations with Asia. I consider the report as falling far short of such an undertaking, because it was prepared exclusively in terms of theUS’s global force deployment strategy. As Stuart and Tow point out, it was essentially “budget driven” to meet growing domestic demand for a “peace dividend” from the end of Cold War East-West confrontation, by reconcil-ing “cuts in defense spending with an Asian security posture that still laywithin the San Francisco framework.” It was, therefore, hardly a consciousattempt to reexamine and reconceptualize Washington’s relations with, and approach toward, Asia in a comprehensive manner.

32 . Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 24.

33. Stuart and Tow, US Strategy, 6. 34. Richard J. Ellings and Edward A. Olsen, “A New Pacific Profile: US Foreign

Policy toward Asia,” Foreign Policy, no. 89 (1992): 116–36. 35 . Sheldon W. Simon, “The Clinton Presidency and Asian Security: Toward

Multilateralism,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 2 (1993): 251.

36 . Donald C. Hellmann, “America, APEC, and the Road Not Taken: International Leadership in the Post-Cold War Interregnum in the Asia-Pacific,” in From

Notes 237

APEC to Xanadu: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific, ed. Donald C. Hellmann and Kenneth B. Pyle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 91–92.

37 . US Department of State, “Winston Lord Assistant Secretary-Designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1993.” US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 3 (1993): 212–21.

38 . Other goals were “forging a fresh global partnership with Japan;” “erasing the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula;” “restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China;” “deepening the ties with ASEAN;” “obtain-ing the fullest possible accounting of US MIA in Vietnam;” “securing anindependent and democratic Cambodia;” “strengthening APEC;” “spurringregional cooperation on other global issues (environment, refugees, non-pro-liferation);” and “promoting democracy and human rights.” US Department of State, “Winston Lord.”

39 . Lord began his career as a foreign service officer in 1962. After serving in the Defense Department for two years, he moved in 1969 to the Nixon White House as a planning staff for the National Security Council and a specialassistant to the president for national security affairs under Kissinger. With Kissinger moving to the State Department, Lord followed him as directorof the policy-planning staff and top advisor on China. In 1985, Lord was named ambassador to China.

40 . Personal interview, April 16, 2002, New York. 41 . US Department of State, “Winston Lord,” 218. 42 . William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul,

July 10, 1993,” in Public Papers of the Presidents, William J. Clinton -1993, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993),1054–6.

43 . Personal interview with David Brown, who served as director of this office between 1993 and 1996, November 4, 2002, Washington DC.

44 . Warren Christopher, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Warren Christopher, Secretaryof State of the United States of America,” July 26–28, 1993, accessed August 19 2003, available from http://www.aseansec.org/4448.htm.

45 . Quoted in “USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing: Upcoming ASEAN Meetings in Bangkok,” Federal News Service, July 19 1994.

46 . The report was formally published in February 1995. The President of the United States, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1995).

47 . Quoted in Anne Craib, “Asian Pacific Security Discussed at New AsianForum,” JEI Report July 29, 1994 (Washington D.C.: The Japan Economic tInstitute of America).

48 . Quoted in “New Framework for Security,” The Straits Times, July 26, 1994,p. 15; US Department of State, “Lord: The US Has Three Broad Goals forARF, ASEAN PMC.” Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord during a WORLDNET Interview regarding the Upcoming ASEAN RegionalForum and Ministers’ Conference, July 20 1994, accessed March 2, 1996, available from Public Diplomacy Query.

238 Notes

49. Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East AsianStrategy,” The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 54.

50. “State Department Regular Briefing,” Federal News Service, July 20, 1994; “USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing: Upcoming ASEAN Meetings inBangkok,” Federal News Service, July 19, 1994; “Lord: The US Has Three Broad Goals for ARF, ASEAN-PMC.” Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord during a WORLDNET interview regarding the upcom-ing ASEAN Regional Forum and ministers’ conference, 1994, accessedMarch 2, 1996, available from Public Diplomacy Query. Other objectives commonly added were “to regularize the ARF meeting” and “to have side-line bilateral meetings to discuss more specific security issues.”

51 . Robert Holden, ‘New Pacific Community’ Has US, Asia Sharing Ideas,”July 26, 1993, accessed March 2, 1996, available from Public Diplomacy Query.

52. Winston Lord, “The United States Is, and Will Remain, a Pacific Power: The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Discusses the Importance of the East Asia and Pacific Region in US Foreign Affairs,” July 1, 1993, accessed August 22, 2003, available at Public Diplomacy Query.

53. Quoted in Anne M. Dixon, “Can Eagles and Cranes Flock Together? US and Japanese Approach to Multilateral Security After the Cold War,” in The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 141. Other roles included to add a collective layer of diplomatic contacts, to reassure regional countries of the intentions of their neighbors, and to build a dispute negotiation mechanism in the long term.

54 . Personal interview, April 16, 2002.55. The United States adamantly opposed the proposal. The proposal remained

as one of contentious issues among the Asia-Pacific countries well into1995.

56. Personal interview, November 4, 2002.57 . Ibid. 58 . Personal interview, April 16, 2002.59. Goh, “The ASEAN,” 53. 60 . Lee Kim Chew, “ASEAN Launches New Initiative On Security,” The Straits

Times, July 26, 1993, 1.61. James A Baker III, “US-ASEAN Cooperation: Statement at the ASEAN post-

ministerial conference, Manila, Philippines, July 26, 1992,” US Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 31 (1992): 597.

62 . Richard H. Solomon, “Security Challenges and Alliances in a New Era: Address to the American Chamber of Commerce, Auckland, New Zealand,August 6, 1991,” US Department of State Dispatch 2, no. 24 (1991): 622–5.

63 . Richard P Cronin, “Japan’s Expanding Role and Influence in the Asia-PacificRegion: Implications for US interests and Policy,” CRS Report for Congress(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1990).

Notes 239

64 . Robert Holden, “US Attention to Pacific, APEC will Continue, Kristoff Says,”1992, accessed March 15, 1996, available at Public Diplomacy Query.

65 . Warren Christopher, “Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s Speech onUS Relations with Japan and Japanese Assistant Russia,” US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. SUPP-2 (1993): 12. For his subsequent remarks,see, for example, Warren Christopher, “Christopher: Japanese Concessions Revive Framework Talks. Secretary of State Christopher’s Press Briefing with White House Counselor David Gergen,” July 6, 1993, accessed August 21, 2003, available at Public Diplomacy Query; Christopher, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Warren Christopher.”

66 . “Focus on East Asia and the Pacific: A Periodic Update,” US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 16 (1993): 273.

67 . Lord, “The United States Is.”68 . Clinton, “Remarks,” 1053. 69 . Charles R. Larson, “US Forces Protect Economic Interests in the Pacific.

Statement by Admiral Charles Larson in Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” April 21, 1993, accessed March 2, 1996, available at Public Diplomacy Query.

70 . Personal interview, April 16, 2002, emphasis added.71 . Personal interviews with David Brown (October 14, 2008), Thomas Hubbard

(October 10, 2008), Peter Tomsen (June 1, 2002), Desaix Anderson (October 15, 2008), and Charles Pritchard (October 10, 2008).

72 . Ibid. 73. Winston Lord, “US Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Asia in the 21st

Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, ed. Michael D Bellows (Washington,DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), 19.

74 . David Capie, “Power, Identity, and Multilateralism: The United States andRegional Institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific” (Tronto: York University,2002); Goh, “The ASEAN.”; Galla Press-Barnathan, “The Lure of Regional Security Arrangements: The United States and Regional Security Cooperation in Asia and Europe,” Security Studies 10, no. 2 (2000): 49–97.

75 . The view was suggested by Goh, “The ASEAN.”; Press-Barnathan, “TheLure,” 94.

76 . The one exception was the statement by Secretary of State Christopher in 1993, made upon his arrival in Singapore, in which he stated “We hope that a central accomplishment of this conference will be to begin integrat-ing a number of other key nations—including Russia and China—into this regional security forum.” Warren Christopher, “US Will Remain ‘Fully Engaged’ in New Pacific Community,” arrival Statement in Singapore by Secretary of State Christopher, 1993, accessed March 2, 1996, available atPublic Diplomacy Query.

77 . Personal interview, April 16, 2002. 78 . Yi Edward Yang, “Leaders’ Conceptual Complexity and Foreign Policy

Change: Comparing the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush Foreign Policytoward China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010): 17–23.

240 Notes

7 Conclusion 1 . Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science.” Handbook

of Political Science, Vol.7, Strategies of Inquiry, ed. Fred I. Greenstein andNelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Welsley, 1975), 104.

2 . Ralph H. Turner, “The Self-Conception in Social Interaction,” The Self in Social Interaction, ed. Chad Gordon and Kenneth J. Gergen (New York:John Wiley & Son, 1968),. 100–102, emphasis added.

3. For the details of the AMF episode, see David P Rapkin, “The United States, Japan, and the Power to Block: the APEC and AMF Cases,” The PacificReview 14, no. 3 (2001): 373–410. Yong Wook Lee, “Japan and the AsianMonetary Fund: An Identity-Intention Approach,” International StudiesQuarterly 50 (2006): 339–66.

4. For details on the APT’s founding, see: Kenichi Itoh and Akihiko Tanaka, Higashiajiakyoudoutai to Nihonnoshinro (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2005), 411–32; Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN PLUS THREE: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Security 42, no. 3 (2002): 440–55.

5. See, for example, Takashi Terada, “Forming an East Asian Community: ASite for Japan-China Power Struggles,” Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (2006):5–17.

6. As for the US policy development vis-à -vis the EAS, see, for example, DickK. Nanto, “East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and SecurityArrangements and US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2008); Robert Sutter, “The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31,no. 2 (2009): 189–216.

7 . Indeed, the Pacific power reference has been constantly made by US foreignpolicymakers in their foreign policy speeches, well beyond the creation of theARF in 1994. See, for instance, the remarks by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, at the US Embassy in Singapore, December 3, 2007; Deputy Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte, at the BrookingsInstitutions, Washington, DC, July 28, 2008; and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, at the State Department, January 14, 2011. As for the Obama’s administration’s “Asia Pivot,” see for instance, Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century .

8. It should be noted that MOF officials did include Australia in their AMF pro-posal. Also, I found quite interesting that Yong Wook Lee attributes Japan’sAMF initiative to MOF officials’ conception of Japan as a rival country of the United States in promoting a particular model of economic development.This suggests that MOF officials conceived of Japanese state identity dif-ferently from those at MOFA and MITI, which is not surprising from thisstudy’s standpoint on the function of state identity in foreign policy. See Lee,“Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund.”

9 . Although there is certainly a possibility that Washington, prompted by itsglobal hegemonic position, may opt to lead a new regional institution-building

Notes 241

as a specific measure for international crisis management (as in the case of the Six Party Talks mechanism to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis),such leadership will not be maintained to further develop the newly-createdinstitution, once the crisis is over.

10 . In this regard, Tokyo’s apparent omission of ASEAN+3 in its major foreignpolicy statements (while referring to APEC and the EAS as regional institu-tions in Asia) earlier this year is indicative.

11 . In this regard, the analysis of the “Pacific power” identity in the case of Washington’s ARF policymaking in chapter 6 suggests that this concept of state identity had become further strengthened over six years since the cre-ation of APEC, because Washington’s action to participate in APEC, and subsequent experience within this first Asia-Pacific grouping likely contrib-uted to growing salience of the Pacific power identity in the thinking of American foreign policymakers. This exemplifies a self-regenerating func-tion of identity: the Pacific power identity was shaped more sharply by the very action the identity had called for in the first place.

12 . For instance, the recent intensifying interaction with China might havereinforced Japan’s “dual-membership” identity or the US’s “Pacific power” identity. Or, Tokyo’s increasingly manifold, often contentious, experienceswith the Beijing leadership may lead Japanese policymakers to become par-ticularly conscious of some essential differences between the two countries,resulting in their rediscovery (or reidentification) of the Japanese state as afull-fledged democracy.

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Acheson, Dean, 115administration changes: see also

Bush administration; Clintonadministration

role in institution-building, 6Akazawa, Shouichi, 54Alatas, Ali, 127Anderson, Desaix, 224n25Armacost, Michael, 112ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference

(ASEAN-PMC), 40, 124, 217n8, 217n9

as framework for regional security dialogue, 164

transition to ARF, 177ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): see

also Japanese policymakingand ARF; US policymakingand ARF

Bush administration and, 3 (seealso Bush administration)

Clinton administrationand, 3 (see also Clintonadministration)

creation of, 123decision-making context of, 37inaugural meeting of, 125, 178international relations theories

and, 7–11Japan’s state identity and, 4 (see

also Japan, state identity of)members of, 124–125, 211n4,

228n6

origins of, 2principal agendas of, 228n7as shift in policy, 2US ambivalence toward, 3, 124US state identity and, 4

Asian model of regionalism, 70as MITI preference, 57–60versus US-dependent model, 66

Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 202, 240n8

Asian regional economiccooperation, US-led versusrole-sharing model of, 44

Asian-model value, 17, 28, 58, 61, 63–64, 70, 72–73, 78, 196

Asia-Pacifi c concept, introduction of, fi155, 233n82

Asia-Pacifi c Cooperation PromotionfiCommittee, 76

Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperationfi(APEC): see also Japanese policymaking and APEC; USpolicymaking and APEC

decision-making context of, 37first meeting of, 41founding members of, 217n11goals of, 101international relations theories

and, 7–11Japan’s state identity and, 4 (see

also Japan, state identity of)members of, 211n4origins of, 2

Index

260 Index

Asia-Pacifi c EconomicfiCooperation—Continued

US acceptance of, 97–101US ambivalence toward, 3,

212n11US exclusion from, 46US state identity and, 4 (see also

United States, state identity of)US-in strategies and, 62–63

Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN)

ARF and, 2, 139–140and concerns about Japanese

domination, 151–152and concerns about US

leadership, 100Japanese direct investment in,

219n36Nakayama proposal and,

126–128as shift in policy, 2Singapore Declaration of, 139skepticism toward US, 5221st-century role of, 207

Association of Southeast AsianNations plus Three(ASEAN+3/APT), 241n10

Japanese and US responses to,202–203

participants and focus of, 202US and Japanese relationship

with, 207Australia

and evolution of US APECinvolvement, 97–100

initiating role in APEC, 2lead role of, 45–46US exclusion/inclusion and,

54, 61Azia, Rafi dah, 219n43fi

Baker, James, 92APEC proposal and, 56, 81–82,

93–101, 107, 224n35, 224n37

Asian regional institutions and, 105–106

confirmation speech of,112–113

multilateral proposals and,163–164, 235n14

Nakayama proposal and, 126and public support for APEC,

102–103shuttle diplomacy of, 169State Department focus of,

224n25and US as Pacific power, 114,

186–187US institution-building and,

115, 117US-European relationship and,

170–172Barnett, Michael, 35bilateral alliances

Japan-US, 1–2US adherence to, 162–164

Brady, Nicholas, 90Brady Plan, 90, 223n17Brown, David, 172, 182–183Bruening, Marijke, 35Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 111Bush, George H. W., 98

Asian trip of, 112Poland/Hungary visit of, 91Tokyo visit of, 138–139

Bush administration, 6APEC and, 3, 107, 119, 192approach toward post-Cold War

Asia, 172Asia policy review by, 117, 118foreign policy issues of, 169–171Hawke proposal and, 85and shift toward regional

economic cooperation,96–97

world order building and, 90, 169–170, 223n16, 235n20

Byrd, Robert, meeting withTakeshita, 42–43

Index 261

Cambodia peace settlement, 164Canada–US Free Trade Agreement

(CUFTA), 58, 60–61, 64, 76, 90, 218n30

Carlsnaes, Walter, 15–16, 19terminology and concepts of,

213n4, 214n12, 214n14on values and preferences as

causes of action, 22–23Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO), US role in, 114Cheney, Dick, 134China

APEC and, 41, 100, 124, 217n10, 225n40

ASEAN-PMC framework and, 124military capability of, 218n32

China factorARF and, 157–159, 190, 239n76in 21st century, 208–209, 241n12

Christopher, Warren, 161, 177, 178ARF and, 180on US as Pacific power, 186

Clark, William, Nakayama proposal and, 126

Clinton, Bill, 6ARF and, 3Korean National Assembly

address of, 176–177, 187on US as Pacific power, 186

Clinton administrationARF and, 124, 174–175,

188–189, 190Asia policy of, 180–181,

184–185, 190–191, 237n38,238n53, 239n76

China policy of, 191and commitment to regional

security dialogue, 177regional security dialogue

and, 184Cold War

end of, 116and Japan-US bilateral alliance,

1–2

Conference on Security andCooperation in Asia (CSCA), 162, 235n14

constructivist theory, 9–12crisis management, dominance of,

91, 223n20Crone, Donald, 212n11

Davidson, Donald, 22decision making

collective versus individual, 24structural attributes and, 17

decision-making contextidentity selection and, 198in Japan’s APEC policymaking,

65–70Pacific power identity and, 184role of, 6state identity and, 34–37typology of, 11, 35–37, 199–200

Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade (DFAT)

APEC development and, 40, 45cooperation with MITI, 45–46

dispositional dimension, 21–26in APEC process, 101–106

Asian model of regionalismand, 57–60, 101–104

implanting institutions in Asia and, 104–106

US-in value and, 60–63preferences and, 21–25proattitudes and, 21–25

dual-membership identity, 74, 198evolution of, 67–70potential dilemma of, 69–71and preference for Asia-Pacific

framework, 205Duffy, Michael, 45, 52, 218n30

East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI), 164, 236n31

East Asia Summit (EAS)membership of, 203–204Obama administration and, 204

262 Index

East Asia Summit—Continuedparticipants in, 202US and, 207

East Asian Economic Caucus(EAEC), 182, 203

Eckstein, Harry, 197economic bloc-ism, resistance to, 62,

70, 76economic interdependence theory,

Japan/US behaviors and, 8–9economic liberalization, and US

involvement in APEC, 119–121

Elster, Jon, 19engagement value, 18, 28

APEC and, 102–104, 108, 113, 118, 120–121

ARF and, 179–185, 188–189, 238n53

Pacific Power Identity as sourceof, 184–189

Enterprise for the Americas, 170environmental degradation, regional

institutions and, 1environmental factors, 19epistemic communities, 9–10

in Japan’s policymaking for APEC, 75–76

European bloc-ism, 70European Community (EC), 8,

217n8Evans, Gareth

APEC meetings and, 97–98Nakayama proposal and, 126

Fauver, Robert, 91, 103on APEC decision-making,

119–120Asian regional institutions

and, 105Asia-Pacific economic

cooperation and, 93–94Pacific power issue and, 113on US institution-building, 117on US role in APEC, 100

foreign policy: see also Japanesepolicymaking and APEC;Japanese policymaking andARF; US policymakingand APEC; US policymakingand ARF

China and, 208–209 (see alsoChina; China factor)

collective decision making in, 24identity-behavior causality in, 11key factors in, 4–7, 195 (see also

decision-making context;state identity; structuralattributes)

foreign policy actions, 16, 16fcausal factors in, 17 (see also

value-action framework)state identity and international

structural attributes in, 7types of, 27

Free Trade Agreements: see alsoCanada–US Free TradeAgreement (CUFTA);North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA)

bilateral, 209Byrd’s proposal for, 42–43

Fukukawa, Shinji, 43in APEC development, 51Open Regionalism and, 59–60

Fukuzawa, Yukichi, 68Funabashi, Yoichi, 61

George, Alexander, 10, 26Glenn, John, 111Goh, Evelyn, 179Gorbachev, Mikhail, 82, 86

meeting with Reagan, 90Nakayama proposal and, 126US relationship with, 169Vladivostok speech of, 162,

228n11Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere, 142, 144, 151Greenwood, Lawrence, Jr., 105

Index 263

Grieco, Joseph, 8Gulf crisis, 169–170

Harding, Harry, 3Hatakeyama, Noboru, 78Hawke, Robert, 119, 181–182

Bush administration and, 93–95and call for regional economic

cooperation, 40initiative of, 52–54regional proposal of, 82Seoul speech of, 41, 52, 57, 85,

216n5, 219n40US exclusion and, 218n30,

219n41and US shift toward regional

economic cooperation, 96Hay, John, 109hegemonic stability theory

Japan/US behaviors and, 8limitation of, 12

Hellman, Donald, 173Hills, Carla, 101

Asia-Pacific economiccooperation and, 95

Muraoka meeting with, 54Holbrooke, Richard, 112Hosokawa, Hisashi, 61–62,

221n78

identity: see also state identityapproaches to, 215n21, 215n30,

215n31factors in shaping of, 29–30function of, 213n21in IR theory, 11key features of, 198and logic of appropriateness,

216n35types of, 29

identity crisis, responses to, 73identity-behavior causality, 11identity-interest nexus, 32identity-preference nexus, 4identity-value nexus

Japan’s policymaking for APEC and, 70–73

state identity and, 31–34Ikeda, Tadashi, 144–145, 154Ikenberry, John, 142Institute of Strategic and

International Studies(ASEAN-ISIS), 10

institutional self-binding, 142, 144, 231n47

institution-buildingEast Asian, 207Japanese and US approaches to,

in 21st century versus APEC/ARF cases, 204–209

in 21st-century Asia, 201–209institution-building identity, 114–118,

198, 199; see also Japanesepolicymaking and APEC; US policymaking and APEC; US policymaking and ARF

institution-planting value, 18APEC and, 104–106, 121, 196ARF and, 196

intentional dimension, 26–27interests, concept of, 32international crises, US involvement

in, 90International Monetary Fund (IMF),

AMF proposal and, 202international relations theory

APEC/ARF cases and, 7–11growing scholarship on identity

in, 11identity concept and, 201outcome versus process

orientation of, 10–11state identity in, 31–32

international structural attributes seestructural attributes

Japanand advocacy for APEC/ARF, 15attitude toward regional

institutions, 1

264 Index

Japan—Continuedbehavior patterns of, 3concerns about past aggression

of, 145 (see also reassurance value)

defense spending in 1988–1989, 48t

defense spending in 1990–1993,129, 130t

and direct investment in ASEAN/East Asian NIEs, 51

economic position of, 47, 48teconomy in 1988–1989, 48teconomy in 1990–1993,

129, 130tand failure to reconcile with

victim countries, 149–150hegemonic stability theory and, 8identity-based values of, 5tand institution-building in 21st-

century Asia, 201–209international relations theories

and, 8–11as liminal nation, 69, 73, 221n84military capability of, 47, 48t,

218n32past aggressor identity of,

149–153preferences of, 5tquiet diplomacy of, 3, 46and relationship with Asia, 71–72state identity of, 4, 5t, 28,

148–155, 195–196in APEC versus ARF cases,

198–199as dual member of Asia and

West, 79, 153–155as past aggressor, 149–153

structural attributes of, 5, 6t, 17, 50–52, 73, 79, 138, 159, 195

structural settings of, 219n35structurally-disposed orientation

of, 6tand trade friction with US, 42,

77–78

and trade with Asian economies,218n34

values of, 17Japan External Trade Organization

(JETRO), 45, 54, 76Japanese Ministry of Finance, AMF

proposal of, 202Japanese policymaking and APEC,

39–79decision-making context and, 195identity-value nexus and, 70–73policymaking background of,

39–63historical narrative I in, 41–46historical narrative II in, 52–57value-action analysis

(dispositional dimension) of,57–63

value-action analysis (structural dimension) of, 46–52

questions and competingexplanations, 73–79

similarities with ARFpolicymaking, 196–197

state identity and, 195decision-making context and,

65–70determinant values in, 63–73dual Asia-West membership

and, 67–70, 74, 153structural attributes and, 5, 6t,

17, 73, 79, 195structural factors in, 47–52, 48t

objective, 47–48, 48tstructural setting, 48–50

Japanese policymaking and ARF,123–159

ASEAN support for, 139–140China factor and, 157–159, 190,

231n45, 239n76concept of new multi-tiered

regional order and, 132–138decision-making context and, 195explanation of, 123–148historical narrative I in, 125–128

Index 265

historical narrative II in, 138–140

MOFA’s commitment to,138–140

multitiered concept and,134–138, 230n33, 230n34, 230n35, 231n39

question and alternative explanation, 155–159

quiet diplomacy and, 138–139,231n40

reassurance value and, 17, 141–145

reduction of US forces in region, 134, 146–147

Russia and, 231n45similarities with APEC

policymaking, 196–197state identity and, 148–155, 195

as dual member of Asia and West, 153–155

as past aggressor in Asia,149–153

structural attributes and, 195structurally-disposed orientation

and, 128–129, 130t, 131–132US reduction in military forces

and, 151US reluctance and, 138–140, 145value-action analysis of

dispositional dimension, 140–148

structural dimension, 128–138Japan-US alliance, bilateral nature

of, 1–2Japan-US Structural Impediments

Initiative (SII) talks, 222n99Johnson, Lyndon, 110

Kaifu, Toshiki, 132, 133Kakizawa, Koji, 139Katzenstein, Peter, 7, 10Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi, 157Kikuchi, Tsutomu, 231n40Kitaoka, Shinichi, 147

Konno, Hidehiro, 52Kono, Yohei, on initiation of ARF, 123Krauss, Ellis, 79Kristoff, Sandra

APEC and, 84Asian regional institutions and, 105Asia-Pacific economic

cooperation and, 95Pacific power issue and, 113, 186on US institution-building, 117on US-in position, 103–104

Kunihiro, Michihiko, 55, 151Kuriyama, Takakazu, 133, 147Kuroda, Makoto, 51, 219n38

Larson, Charles, 186Lee, Yong Wook, 240n8Lord, Winston

ARF and, 124, 174–177, 180–183Asia policy and, 184, 187–188background of, 237n39

Mahan, Alfred thayer, 109Mahathir, Mohamed, 182, 203Manglapus, Raul, 127Mansfi eld, Mike, 42, 110, 111fiMarket-Oriented, Sector-Selective

(MOSS) negotiations, 77Marshall Plan, 115Matsunaga, Nobuo, 217n18McCormack, Richard, 104Miki, Takeo, 68, 72–73Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

APEC and, 54–57, 220n55ARF and, 131–140dual-membership concept

and, 153Nakayama proposal and,

126–128past aggressor identity and, 199reassurance value and, 152turf conflict and, 221n91,

222n92US-in option and, 54–55, 73,

74–75, 146–147, 232n59

266 Index

Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI)

APEC and, 2, 41–46, 50–62, 60,65–66, 69–71, 73–79, 75,82–85

ARF and, 2cooperation with DFAT, 45–461988-June report of, 41–46,

65–66, 76MOFA and, 54–56Nakayama proposal and, 132Open Regionalism and, 58–60past aggressor identity and, 199quiet diplomacy of, 52–54,

83–84strategy of, 52structurally-disposed orientation

of, 50–52US responses to initiatives of,

82–85US-in value and, 73in value-action analysis of APEC

process, 57–63Mitsuzuka, Hiroshi, 221n91

APEC meetings and, 98–99ASEAN-PMC and, 56and dual-nation identity, 69–70Woolcott and, 55

Miyazawa, Kiichi, 138, 145Morimoto, Satoshi, 132–133Mosbacher, Robert, 101Most Favored Nation (MFN), MITI

and, 58multilateral initiatives: see also

ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF); Asian model of regionalism; Asia-PacificfiEconomic Cooperation(APEC)

ARF and, 157calls for, 1decision-making context and, 6Japan and, 55, 57–58, 72, 74,

77–78, 126, 128, 135,138–139, 142–143

lack of, 2preference for, 15, 17, 28–29state identity and, 63US and, 3, 92, 94–95, 99, 101–102,

105, 107, 116–118, 162Muraoka, Shigeo, 218n30

APEC development and, 45–46, 50ASEAN meetings of, 52–53,

97–98Jakarta meeting of, 55meeting with Aziz, 219n43MOFA and, 54–55role of, 41–42US meetings of, 97–98, 224n33US-in value and, 62, 104on US-Japan trade friction, 78

Muto, Kabun, ARF proposal and, 145

Nakayama, Taro, 133and diplomatic overture to Asia-

Pacific countries, 229n26on Greater East Asia

Co-Prosperity Sphere, 151and proposal for multilateral

security forum, 125–128Nakayama proposal

ARF and, 125–128decision-making context of,

148–149 (see also Japan, state identity of)

multitiered, new regional orderconcept and, 132–138,156–157

as policy shift, 128reassurance value and, 142–144Satoh’s contribution to, 136–137shift embodied in, 138US response to, 163

national identity, versus stateidentity, 30

neoliberal institutionalist theory,Japan/US behaviors and, 8–9

neorealism, 12Nicaragua, US operations in, 170,

235n21

Index 267

Nishihara, Masashi, 147Nixon, Richard, 110Nixon Doctrine, 110–111North America bloc-ism, 62, 70North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA), 170North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), US role in, 114

Oba, Mie, liminal nation thesis of, 69, 73, 221n84

Okumura, Hirokazu, in APECdevelopment, 45, 51

Omar, Abu Hassan, 151Open Regionalism, 58–59; see also

Asian model of regionalismOrganization for Economic

Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD), Japan’s admission into, 68

Organization of American States(OAS), US role in, 114

Oros, Andrew, 213n21Otsuka, Seichiro, 63

Pacific Basin Economic Councilfi(PBEC), 10

Pacific Economic CooperationfiCouncil (PECC), 10

Pacific power identity, 240n7,fi241n11

in APEC policymaking, 108–114in ARF policymaking, 184–189,

192, 196, 198–199decision-making context and, 199and preference for Asia-Pacific

framework, 205Panama, US operations in, 170,

235n21Parsons, Talcott, 33past aggressor identity, 149–153; see

also reassurance valuePlaza Accord of 1985, 51preference, 16, 16f

definition of, 27

determining, 21–25structural attributes and, 12in value-action framework, 24–25values and, 28

proattitudes, 16, 21–25

Reagan, Ronald, 6APEC and, 3foreign policy priorities of, 82meeting with Gorbachev, 90

reassurance value, 17, 141–145, 156regional institutions

Asian absence of, 105membership issue in, 207–208policy issues requiring, 121st-century leadership of,

206–207US role in, 114

regional order, Japan’s new visionof, 6

regional security, Nakayama proposal and, 125–128

regionalism, Asian model of seeAsian model of regionalism

Ross, Dennis, 103Rostow, W. W., 110Rusk, Dean, 109

Sakamoto, Yoshihiro, 43, 70–71,217n20

Sakamoto Report see Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI), 1988-Junereport of

Satoh, Yukiodual-membership concept

and, 153on multilateral approach, 148on multilateral settings, 144multitiered concept and, 136,

230n35Nakayama proposal and, 131,

136–137reassurance value and, 143

Sembler, Melvin, 163

268 Index

Shultz, GeorgePacific power issue and, 112on regional economic institutions,

82–83, 92on regional US priorities, 91on US institution-building, 115

Singapore Declaration, 139Single European Act (SEA), 58, 64,

76Solomon, Richard, 101, 103,

112–113Asian regional institutions and,

106multilateral proposals and,

162–163State Department focus of,

224n25on US as Pacific power, 186US institution-building and, 116

Southeast Asia, US involvement in, 111

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), US role in, 114

Soviet Uniondisintegration of, 82, 86, 116region-wide security concept and,

162US relations with, 90

Sprout, Harold, 19Sprout, Margaret, 19state identity, 28–37; see also Japan,

state identity of; UnitedStates, state identity of

centrality in decision-making context, 6–7

context dependence of, 6, 11,34–37

defined, 4, 29–31function of, 11, 13identity-value nexus and, 31–34versus national identity, 30non-static character of, 200–201regional institution-building and,

208reservations about, 30–31

responses to crisis in, 73role in foreign policy behaviors, 7as source of dominant values,

197–198study findings for, 197–201in value-action framework, 32–33values derived from, 28, 152–153vis à vis China, 208–209

Stimson, Henry, 109structural attributes, 4–5, 7, 12–13,

16f, 17–21, 17fdistribution of capabilities

concept and, 19–20function of, 18influence on decision making, 18objective conditions of, 19role in foreign policy behaviors, 7state preferences and, 12structural setting of, 19–20

structural realism, 19structural settings, 16, 16f, 19structural-based approach, limitation

of, 12–13Study Group for Asian Trade and

Development, establishmentof, 43

Sugita, Junzan, 68Suzuki, Naomichi, 60, 62

Taiwan Strait Crisis, 158Takeshita, Noboru, 54, 217n18

APEC and, 55resignation of, 55US mission of, 42–43

Talbott, Strobe, 178Tanino, Sakutaro, 150Terada, Takashi, 45, 68, 72, 79theory of action, Davidson’s,

21–23Tiananmen crisis, 99Toyoda, Masakazu, 217n20, 218n26

and Japan’s relationship with Asia, 71

meetings with MITI, 43–44new model of regionalism and, 60

Index 269

on regional institution-buildinginitiatives, 222n95

role of, 42US-in value and, 63visits to ASEAN countries, 53Washington meetings of, 45, 84

Trade Policy Planning Office, fi41–42, 65

Triandis, Harry, 33Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

(TSD), 207Truman, Harry S., 115Turner, Ralph, 33–35

United States: see also USpolicymaking and APEC; USpolicymaking and ARF; US-invalue

ambivalence toward APEC/ARF initiatives, 3

ambivalence toward regionalinstitutions, 1

AMF proposal and, 202ASEAN skepticism about, 52Australia and, 54, 61 (see also

Hawke, Robert)behavior patterns of, 3Central American operations of,

170, 235n21concerns about economy of, 61,

70, 75, 221n78EAS membership of, 204economy in 1988–1989, 86, 87teconomy in 1990–1993, 166,

168tevolution in relationship to

regional institutions, 3evolution of attitude toward

APEC/ARF, 15exports/imports by region, 87,

87thegemonic interest of, 88–89hegemonic predominance of,

212n11identity-based values of, 5t

and institution-building in 21st-century Asia, 201–209

international crises of 1990–1993, 169

international relations theories and, 8–11

military capability of1988–1989, 86, 88t1990–1993, 166, 169tMITI’s inclusion of, 52–54preferences of, 5tregional interest hierarchy of,

89–90regional military downsizing and,

134, 146–147, 236n31relations with Asia, 88state identity of, 4, 5t, 28–29,

106–118as international institution-

builder, 114–118as Pacific power, 108–114

strategic commitments of, 167, 169t

structural attributes of, 5, 6t, 86, 89, 95, 97, 121, 167, 223n14

structural dimension of, 86–88structural settings of, 86–88,

223n15structurally-disposed orientation

of, 6tsuperpower status of, 86, 165

United States Trade Representative(USTR): see also Kristoff, Sandra

priorities of, 92Toyoda meeting with, 84

US policymaking and APEC, 81–122competing explanations of,

118–121explanation of, 81–106historical narrative I in, 82–85historical narrative II in, 93–95historical narrative III in,

97–101

270 Index

US policymaking andAPEC—Continued

Pacific power identity and,108–114

similarities with ARF policymaking, 196–197

state identity and, 106–118institution planting in, 114–118

structural factors in, 196value-action analysis of, 85–106

decision-making activation in,95–97

dispositional dimension in,101–106

structural dimension in, 85–93US policymaking and ARF, 161–193

alternative explanation/remainingquestion, 189–193

dispositional dimension/regional engagement value of,179–184

explanation of, 162–184historical narrative I and,

162–165historical narrative II and,

174–176historical narrative III and,

176–178institutional characteristics

and, 183Pacific power identity and,

184–189, 192, 196, 198–199and previous aversion to

multilateral options, 162regional concerns about US

commitment and, 182restraint in, 172–173shift in, 174–175, 178similarities with APEC

policymaking, 196–197structural factors in, 196US restraint and, 161value-action analysis (structural

dimension) of, 165–173

hegemonic orientation, 167,169–173

US structural position, 165–167, 168t, 169t

US-in value, 17, 156APEC and, 63–64, 70, 72–73,

78, 153, 196ARF and, 145–149, 153–156, 196Japanese policymaking and, 196Japan’s state identity and,

72–73, 74MITI and, 60–63MOFA and, 232n59, 232n64opposition to, 220n69strategies for, 62–63

US-Japan bilateral framework, MITIproposal for, 222n99

US-Japan Free Trade Agreement, 217n18, 217n23

US-Japan SemiconductorAgreement, 77

value complexity, 26, 34value-action framework, 4, 5, 13,

15–28, 16fcauses of action in, 23–25central analytical dimensions of,

15–17, 16fcontribution of, 11dispositional dimension of,

21–26dominant values in, 16, 16fforeign policy action in, 16, 16fintentional dimension of, 26–27objective conditions in, 16, 16fpreference in, 16, 16fstate identity and (see state

identity)structural dimension of, 16f,

17–21, 17fstructural setting in, 16, 16f

value-processing function, 214n15values, 16, 16f

defined, 4

Index 271

in determination of preferences, 21–22

in dispositional dimension, 24–26, 25–26

identifying sources of, 28sources of, 34–35state identity as source of, 4,

197–198Vance, Cyrus, 111Vietnam, US involvement in, 111

Waltz, Kenneth, 18–20Wendt, Alexander E., 215n21,

215n26, 215n30Woolcott, Richard

early meetings of, 40MITI meeting with, 55mission of, 54, 97–98

Yeltsin, Boris, 169Yuzawa, Takeshi, 157

Zoellick, Robert, 164Asian regional institutions and,

105–106Asia-Pacific economic

cooperation and, 93–94Muraoka meetings with, 54, 98US institution-building

and, 117