11

IIII

Is Affirmative Action Wrong?Is Affirmative Action Wrong?

22

Simon’s Central Argument

Robert Simon: “Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson”

• Thomson’s analysis of the issues bearing on preferential hiring is “seriously incomplete”. Granting Thomson’s claim that compensation is due victims

of social injustice, preferential hiring is a questionable method of distributing such compensation.

33

Recall Thomson’s Argument• Thomson proposes that, in a case of choosing between

candidates for an academic post, where all candidates are equally qualified, the hiring officer does no injustice to the white male candidate by choosing straightway for the black or female candidate.

The groups composed of blacks and women have been the victims of social injustices.

Members of the white male community have benefited from social injustices brought on groups of blacks and women.

White male candidates for a job have no right to the job. But blacks and women are owed some form of

compensation for the social injustices brought upon them, where white males are owed no such compensation.

Therefore, equally qualified white male candidates have no rights violated when jobs are given to black and female candidates straightway.

44

Groups and Individuals• Objection to Preferential Hiring: If special treatment for

blacks and women is justified, then other victims of injustice and misfortune should also receive special treatment.

• Thomson denies that, where distribution of compensation is concerned, other such victims of injustice and misfortune should automatically have priority over blacks and women. Thomson argues that blacks and women belong to certain

groups that have been treated unjustly, and so, as members of those groups, are owed a debt.

As such, even where some individual within that group has not himself been treated unjustly, Thomson’s proposed policy can justify giving him preferential treatment.

55

Groups and Individuals (cont’d)• However, on such a policy, a white male who is nevertheless

a victim of injustice and misfortune, is not a candidate recipient for special treatment.

• Thomson compares the plight of the black or female job candidate with that of the veteran job candidate: each belongs to a group that is owed a debt.

However, where the group of veterans consists in those who fought for the country (and, so, each is owed a debt), the groups of blacks and women does not consist of those who were treated unjustly by society.

“[I]f the reason for giving preference to a black person or to a woman is that the recipient has been injured due to an unjust practice, then preference must be given to anyone who has been similarly injured.” (389)

66

Groups and Individuals (cont’d)

The only possible group to single out is the group made up of those and only those who have been injured or victimized.

Thomson claims that all blacks and women belong to this group, and deserve compensation qua victim, and not qua black or woman.

77

Groups and Individuals (cont’d)• Possible Reply #1: Anyone injured in the same way as

blacks or women ought to receive compensation.

The problem, here, is that “same way” seems so narrowly defined that it applies only to blacks and women.

Such a policy implies that a nonblack male who has been terribly injured by social injustice has less of a claim to compensation than a black or woman who has only been minimally injured.

88

Groups and Individuals (cont’d)• Possible Reply #2: Compensation is not owed to individuals

per se, but to a group, and anyone who belongs to a victimized group ought to receive compensation.

Surely we can accept that the groups made up of blacks and of women have among the strongest claims for compensation.

However: “What should be noted is that the conclusion of concern here—that preferential hiring policies are acceptable instruments for compensating groups—does not directly follow.” (389)

That is, it does not follow from the fact that some group members are compensated that the group as a whole is compensated.

99

Groups and Individuals (cont’d) What is required are additional, plausible premises showing

how the award of jobs to particular members of a group qualifies as collective compensation to the group.

Thomson provides no such premises. Indeed, it seems that Thomson’s policy of preferential hiring is at odds with collective compensation, for preferential hiring awards compensation to an arbitrary segment of a group, not to the group as a whole.

1010

Groups and Individuals (cont’d)• The proponent of preferential hiring faces the following

dilemma:

Either (a) compensation is made on an individual basis, or (b) it is made on a group basis.

If (a), then whether one is black or female is irrelevant to whether one ought to receive special treatment.

If (b), then it is far from clear how preferential hiring policies are acceptable compensatory instruments.

1111

Arbitrariness in Distribution• Further questions arise as to how satisfactorily preferential

hiring treatments would honor entitlements to those deserving of compensation.

• Proportionality Principle (PP): The strength of one’s compensatory claim, and the quantity of compensation one is entitled to is, ceteris paribus, proportional to the degree of injury suffered. If X and Y were both injured to the same extent, and both

deserve compensation for their injury, then, ceteris paribus, each has a compensatory claim of equal strength and is entitled to equal compensation.

1212

Arbitrariness in Distribution (cont’d)• A hiring policy that gives preference to blacks and women is

unlikely to satisfy the PP because of the arbitrariness in the search for candidates on the open market.

“[W]hile the market place is used to distributed compensation, distribution will be by market principles, and hence only accidentally will be fitting in view of the injury suffered and compensation provided for others.” (390)

Preferential hiring policies arbitrarily discriminate in favor of some victims of past injustice and against others: the basis on which compensation is awarded is independent of the basis on which it is owed, so compensation is made on irrelevant grounds.

1313

Arbitrariness in Cost Assessment• Standard argument against preferential hiring: the burden of

compensation is unfairly placed on young men entering the job market—unfairly because (i) there is no special reason for placing the burden on this group, and (ii) many members of this group are not responsible for the injury done to blacks and women.

Thomson responds to (i): those white men who already hold jobs as professors should be expected to make some form of return to the young white men who bear the cost.

Thomson responds to (ii): many young white men have nevertheless profited by the wrongs inflicted on others, so it is not unfitting that they should make sacrifices now.

1414

Arbitrariness in Cost Assessment• But singling out white male professors in addition to the

young while men applying for jobs still does not seem to properly capture the group owing compensation. Rather, it seems, the debt is owed by society as a whole.

Paul Taylor: “The obligation to offer such benefits to (the previously victimized) group…is an obligation that falls on society in general, not on any particular person. For it is the society in general that, through its established (discriminatory) social practice, brought upon itself the obligation.” (391)

1515

Arbitrariness in Cost Assessment It is questionable whether all members of nonpreferred

groups are equally liable (or liable at all) for giving compensation, especially where members of the nonpreferred group have been unjustly victimized to a greater extent than an individual from the preferred group.

Even if all members of the nonpreferred groups have profited from discrimination against the preferred groups, it does not follow that all such members are equally liable for providing compensation.

Insofar as preferential hiring policies cannot account for this, they arbitrarily assess the costs of compensation.