1 george mason school of law contracts i o.output contracts and distributors f.h. buckley...

147
1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I O. Output Contracts and Distributors F.H. Buckley [email protected]

Upload: beverly-watson

Post on 29-Jan-2016

219 views

Category:

Documents


3 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • *George Mason School of Law

    Contracts I O.Output Contracts and Distributors

    F.H. [email protected]

  • Output and Requirements contracts

    UCC 2-306(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.*

  • Requirements Contracts

    Requirements contract: producer agrees to sell as much of his product as buyer requires*

  • Requirements Contracts

    Requirements contract: producer agrees to sell as much of his product as buyer requiresStrategic behavior: misincentives as to quantity*

  • *Requirements Contracts and Incentives as to Quantity

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierGulf under-suppliesBuyerEastern Air Lines over-consumes

  • *Requirements Contracts and Incentives

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplier Empire GasEmpire Gas Over-suppliesBuyerAmerican BakeriesAmerican Bakeries under-consumes

  • Output Contracts

    Output contract: buyer agrees to purchase sellers entire output *

  • Output Contracts

    Buyer agrees to buy all of producers outputRisks to buyer:*

  • Output Contracts

    Buyer agrees to buy all of producers outputRisks to buyer:What if market price < contract price*

  • Output Contracts

    Buyer agrees to buy all of producers outputRisks to buyer:What if market price < contract priceWhat if buyer cant use the outputWeak demand for buyers productHigher costs for buyer*

  • Output Contracts

    Buyer agrees to buy all of producers outputRisks to seller:*

  • Output Contracts

    Buyer agrees to buy all of producers outputRisks to seller:What if market price > contract price*

  • Output Contracts

    Buyer agrees to buy all of producers outputRisks to seller:What if market price > contract priceWhat if sellers cost > contract price*

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Contract Price > Market Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierBuyer

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Contract Price > Market Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierBuyer

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Contract Price > Market Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierWoo-hoo!!!!Buyer

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Contract Price > Market Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierBuyerWants out

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Market Price > Contract Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierBuyer

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Market Price > Contract Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierWants outBuyer

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Market Price < Contract Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierBuyerWoo-hoo!!!!

  • *Price Changes: Output Contracts Assuming that Market Price < Contract Price

    Contract Price > Market PriceMarket Price > Contract PriceSupplierWoo-hoo!!!!Wants outBuyerWants outWoo-hoo!!!!

  • *What if Sellers Costs Increase?

    Contract Price > CostCost > Contract PriceSupplierBuyer

  • *Output ContractsCost to Seller

    Contract Price > CostCost > Contract PriceSupplierWants outBuyer

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy p. 332

    *Bakery Levy Distributor Feld Bread crumbs

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    A renewable one-year contract in which Levy agrees to sell all its bread crumbs to Feld for $1/lb.Feld thinks he can resell at $1.50/lb.

    *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    A renewable one-year contract in which Levy agrees to sell all its bread crumbs to FeldLevy discovers that the marginal cost ($1.06) exceeds the contract price ($1.00) and cancels

    *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    Held: It would be bad faith for Levy to stop crumb production just because their profits aren't as high as they expected, but it would be good faith for Levy to stop crumb production if they incurred losses from such production that were "more than trivial". *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    See excerpt on 345*

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    Does it make sense to require the baker to lose money?

    *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    Does it make sense to require the baker to lose money?Is there something troubling about the numbers?

    *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    What if the baker could sell elsewhere for $1.20Do you think this might do something to his reported costs, if this affords him an out?*

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    What if the cost of production is now $1.50?*

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    *

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    How is this case like Empire Gas?*

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    Can a buyer in a requirements contract purchase zero quantities?Empire Gas*

  • Output Contracts: Feld v. Levy

    Can a buyer in a requirements contract purchase zero quantities?Empire GasCan a seller in an output contract sell zero quantities?Feld v. Levy*

  • Output contracts

    Good faith standards imposed in both cases*

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon p. 341*Lady Duff Gordon

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    Wood to have the exclusive right to market her clothes or endorsementsIn return to receive one-half of all profits and revenuesOne year term, renewable unless cancelled on 90 days notice

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    Is this a binding contract?

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    Is this a binding contract?Is it too uncertain?Whats missing?

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    Is this a binding contract?Is it too uncertain?Does it lack consideration?

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    Is this a binding contract?Cardozo: decries a primitive age of formalismWhat is the canonical take-away?

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    Is this a binding contract?Finds an instinct with an obligation imperfectly expressed to use reasonable effortsThe Moorcock: Bowen L.J.: imply a term to give business efficacy to an agreement

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    What is the economic rationale for finding a binding contract here?

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    What is the economic rationale for implying duties by the distributor?Consider Woods incentive to make contract-specific investments absent a binding contract

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    How would you formulate the duties of the parties, as a matter of legal drafting?

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    How would you formulate the duties of the parties, as a matter of legal drafting?Good faith by Duff-GordonBest efforts by both

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    UCC 2-205. Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement."

  • Exclusive DealingWood v. Duff-Gordon*

    UCC 2-306(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale.

  • What are Good Faith Standards

    Van Valkenburgh p. 354*

  • What are Good Faith Standards

    Van Valkenburgh p. 354

    Just where did the publisher cross the line?*

  • What are Good Faith Standards

    Van Valkenburgh p. 354

    What is the answer to the query at the bottom of 354?*

  • What is best efforts?*

    Bloor v. Falstaff 343

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*What was the deal?Judge Charly Brieant

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*Falstaff buys all Ballantine assets except the brewery for $4M plus a royalty of 50 cents on each barrel of Ballantine sold over a 6 yr. periodBuyer to use best efforts to promote and maintain a high volume of salesBuyer to pay up to $1.1M if it substantially discontinues selling Ballantine

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Why structure it that way?What are the alternatives?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Falstaffs history with the Ballantine brand

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Falstaffs history with the Ballantine brandBrieant: nonfeasances and misfeasancesFalstaff stressed profit at the expense of volumeFalstaff simply didnt care about Ballantines volumeFalstaff put more effort into the Falstaff brand

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Falstaff to use best efforts to promote and maintain a high volumeWas this a drafting problem?Or did they get it just right?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Falstaffs history with the Ballantine brandRemedy?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Can you articulate a standard by which best efforts can be judged?What would be excessive?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Can you articulate a standard by which best efforts can be judged?What would be excessive?Friendly: Even without the best efforts clause, Falstaff would have been bound to make a good faith effort to see that substantial sales of Ballantine products were made

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Can you articulate a standard by which best efforts can be judged?What would be excessive?Friendly: Profit uber alles was the problem

  • *George Mason School of Law

    Contracts I O.Output Contracts and Distributors

    F.H. [email protected]

  • Exam

    Laptops*

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    How to establish what is the right amount of effort to require of Falstaff in pushing Ballantine beer?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    How to establish what is the right amount of effort to require of Falstaff in pushing Ballantine beer?The case is made easier by the finding that Falstaff maximized Falstaff profits and not the joint ventures profits

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Supposing that Falstaff had purchased Ballantine outright. Would profit uber alles have been a problem?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    Supposing that Falstaff had purchased Ballantine outright. Would profit uber alles have been a problem?Lets say that in such a case Falstaff had cut the Ballentine marketing efforts in just the same way

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*Would you expect that the parties would want to bargain for sales efforts that would exceed what Falstaff would expend had it a 100 % equity stake in the Ballantine brand?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*Would you expect that the parties would bargain for sales efforts that would exceed what Falstaff would expend had it a 100 % equity stake in the Ballantine brand?Would Ballantine be able to pay Falstaff to do so?Would you pay $10 to make $9?

  • Bloor v. Falstaff*

    An agency cost problem

  • Agency: Common Law*

    Legal relationship whereby a principal, expressly or impliedly, authorizes an agent to create a legal relationship between the principal and a third party

  • Agency: An economic concept*

    Any relationship in which a principal, expressly or impliedly, authorizes an agent to confer benefits or impose costs on the principal

  • The two definitions may overlap

    Real estate agents

    *

  • The two definitions may overlap

    Real estate agents

    Distributorships (Duff Gordon)

    *

  • The two definitions may overlap

    Real estate agents

    Distributorships (Duff Gordon)

    PartnershipsOne partners is an agent for his fellow partners*

  • But the economic definition is broader

    Beneficiaries and trustees

    *

  • But the economic definition is broader

    Beneficiaries and trustees

    Shareholders and company directors

    *

  • But the economic definition is broader

    Beneficiaries and trustees

    Shareholders and company directors

    Creditors and corporate debtors*

  • But the economic definition is broader

    Profit-sharing ventures: Falstaff

    *

  • Agency Costs

    Because the incentives of agents are not perfectly aligned with those of his principal, the agent may impose costs on him.

    *

  • The Agency Cost ProblemAgent misbehaviorUnderperformance by agent retained by principal (shirking, or breach of duties of care)

    *

  • Shirking*Of COURSE I can sell your beautiful house!!!

  • The Agency Cost ProblemAgent misbehaviorUnderperformance by agent retained by principal (shirking, or breach of duties of care)Expropriation of an opportunity (breach of duties of loyalty)

    *

  • The Agency Cost Problem

    How would a principal respond?Monitoring of agentUnderinvestment in agency relationships

    *

  • The Agency Cost Problem

    Agency Costs as the sum of Underperformance by agentsUnderinvestment by principalsMonitoring costs*

  • Back to Falstaff

    The agent (Falstaff) has to decide how much money to spend on marketing the principals (Ballantine) beer

    *

  • *Agency CostsHow much Ballantine beer to sell?Quantity of beer$Horizontal axis measures the quantity of beer sold

  • *Agency Costs$Marginal RevenueAssume a constant amount of revenue for each case of Ballantine beer sold

  • *Agency Costs$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingFalstaff has to spend an increasing amounton marketing for additional units of beer sold

  • *Agency Costs$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingXOptimal marketing and sales at Quantity X

  • *At X* Falstaff can profitably spend more on marketing$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingXX*

  • *At X* Falstaff can profitably spend more on marketing$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingXX*

  • *At X~ Falstaff can profitably reduce marketing expenditures$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingXX~

  • *At X~ Falstaff can profitably reduce marketing expenditures$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingXX~

  • *Now what happens when revenues are shared with an agent?$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingX

  • *The principals marginal revenue curve is lowered$MRFalstaff+BallantineMarginal Cost of MarketingXMRFalstaffThe 50 percent tax

  • *So that Falstaff has an incentive to reduce marketing expenditures$Marginal Cost of MarketingXMRFalstaffX*MRFalstaff+BallantineJensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976)

  • Falstaff

    What are Ballentines incentives?It gets 50 percent of the revenues and bears none of the marketing costs.So how much would it want spent on marketing?*

  • Falstaff

    Neither Falstaff nor Ballantine had perfect incentivesBallantine has an incentive to spend too much and Falstaff too little.

    *

  • Falstaff

    If the goal is optimal joint production, how would you formulate the legal standard?

    *

  • *Agency Costs$Marginal RevenueMarginal Cost of MarketingXOptimal marketing and sales at Quantity X

  • Falstaff

    If the goal is optimal joint production, how would you formulate the legal standard?How would you draft Falstaffs duties?

    *

  • Falstaff

    If the goal is optimal joint production, how would you formulate the legal standard?How would you draft Falstaffs duties?best efforts and good faithreasonable best effortsNon-discrimination

    *

  • Responses to Agency Costs?

    Legal standards (e.g., best efforts)*

  • Responses to Agency Costs?

    Legal standards (e.g., best efforts)Incentivize the parties Cost-sharingSliding scale*

  • Responses to Agency Costs?

    Legal standards (e.g., best efforts)Incentivize the parties Relational contracts *

  • Responses to Agency Costs?

    Legal standards (e.g., best efforts)Incentivize the parties Relations ContractsVertical Integration*

  • *Post-contractual opportunism

    But see R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L.E. 15 (2000)*

  • Responses to Agency Costs?

    Legal standards (e.g., best efforts)Incentivize the parties Relations and Iterated PD GamesVertical IntegrationMonitoring plus termination rights*

  • Wagenseller 356*Scottsdale Memorial Hospital

  • Wagenseller 353*The moon is out early tonight

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?Should that matter?

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?The English reasonable cause standard vs. the American at will standard

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?The English reasonable cause standard vs. the American at will standardDeveloping exceptions to the at will standardThe public policy exceptionE.g., refusal to commit perjury

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?The English reasonable cause standard vs. the American at will standardDeveloping exceptions to the at will standardThe public policy exceptionE.g., refusal to commit perjuryCould one bargain around this?

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?The English reasonable cause standard vs. the American at will standardDeveloping exceptions to the at will standardImplied in fact promise of tenureAn implied promise to keep the employee on for a period of timeIs this a question of free bargaining? (Sysco)

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?The English reasonable cause standard vs. the American at will standardDeveloping exceptions to the at will standardImplied in fact promise of tenureIs the firms personnel manual part of the contract?Does it matter if this is signed?

  • Wagenseller*

    Was she fired for reasonable cause?The English reasonable cause standard vs. the American at will standardDeveloping exceptions to the at will standardGood faith and fair dealingBad faith firing vs. no-cause firing

  • Wagenseller*

    Which rule best protects employees?English or American?

  • Wagenseller*

    Which rule best protects employees?Are you sure about that? So why not give them tenure?What are the economic arguments for and against tenure or the English rule?

  • Wagenseller*

    Which rule best protects employees?Should the parties be permitted to bargain for the employment regime they want?

  • Sysco at 362*Do the same principles apply in a distributorship agreement?

  • Sysco*

    What did the agreement say about termination rights?

  • Sysco*

    You have to terminate a franchisee. How do you do it?

  • Sysco*

    Franchisors cannot terminate for bad cause but can do so for no cause

  • Sysco*

    Who were the parties and why did that matter?

  • Note the two-way play

    The employer has a free hand to dismiss the employee under the at-will standard

    The employee can resign any time

    *

  • Note the two-way play

    The employee can resign any timeMight the employer be unhappy with this?Labor shortagesFirm-specific assetsTrainingProprietary info

    *

  • Note the two-way play

    The employee can resign any timeCan you think of some way in which the employer might bargain around this?*

  • Note the two-way play

    The employee can resign any timeCan you think of some way in which the parties might bargain around this?Compensation schemesNon-competes*

  • Non-competes: Farber at 372*

    Freedom of contract governed in Sysco. Why not in Farber?

  • Non-competes: Farber at 372*

    Freedom of contract governed in Sysco. Why not in Farber?

    Whom are we protecting by limiting freedom of contract here?

  • Non-competes: Farber at 372*

    What if we were talking about an accountant?

  • Non-competes: Farber at 372*

    What if we were talking about an accountant?Cf. Marcam at 379Cf. Maltby at 379

  • Non-competes: Farber at 372*

    Just how many years is excessive?

  • Non-competes: Farber at 372*

    How could a severance clause help the employer?

  • Restatement *

    Restatement 186: Covenants unreasonably in restraint of trade are not enforceable

  • Restatement *

    Restatement 186: Covenants unreasonably in restraint of trade are not enforceableAncilliary vs non-ancilliary?

  • Ancilliary Restraints on Trade*

    Restatement 188: If ancilliary to a valid contract, covenants in restraint of trade may be enforceable

  • Ancilliary Restraints on Trade*

    Restatement 187: If not ancilliary to a valid contract, covenants in restraint of trade deemed not enforceable

  • Non-competes*

    What is an ancilliary agreement?Cf Leatherman at 378

    ***************