1 ftc luke froeb, vanderbilt university of texas arlington, tx april 28, 2006 post-merger product...
TRANSCRIPT
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1FTC
Luke Froeb, Vanderbilt
University of Texas
Arlington, TX
April 28, 2006
Post-Merger Product Repositioning
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2FTC
Joint Work & References
Co-authors Amit Gandhi, University of Chicago & Vanderbilt Steven Tschantz, Math Dept., Vanderbilt Greg Werden, U.S. Department of Justice
Merger Modeling Tools Vanderbilt Math: “Mathematical Models in Economics”
http://math.vanderbilt.edu/~tschantz/m267/ http://www.ersgroup.com/tools
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3FTC
Talk Outline
Policy Motivation: why are we doing this? How does this fit into economic literature? Computing Equilibria without calculus Model & Results
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4FTC
FTC: Man Controlling Trade
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5FTC
1900
Laws enacted in 1900 or before
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6FTC
1960
Laws enacted in 1960 or beforeNote: EU introduced antitrust law in 1957
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7FTC
1980
Laws enacted in 1980 or before
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8FTC
1990
Laws enacted in 1990 or before
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9FTC
2004
Laws enacted in 2004 or before
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10FTC
Enforcement Priorities
US & EC1. Cartels2. Mergers3. Abuse of dominance (monopolization)
New antitrust regimes1. Abuse of dominance2. Mergers3. Cartels
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11FTC
QUESTION: Which is best?ANSWER: Enforcement R&D
How well does enforcement work? What can we do to improve?
How should we allocate scarce enforcement resources? Cartels; Mergers; Monopolization
Merger question: how do we predict post-merger world? Market share proxies Natural experiments Structural models
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12FTC
0
500
1000
1500
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3500
4000
4500
5000
1981
1982
1983
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1989
1990
1991
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1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
Num
ber o
f HSR
Tra
nsac
tions
Billable f ilings under the post January 2001 system
Merger Activity
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13FTC
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
4.00%
4.50%
5.00%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Seco
nd R
eque
sts
as a
Per
cent
age
of T
otal
Fili
ngs
Merger Investigations
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14FTC
FTC Merger Challenges, 96-03
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2 to 1 3 to 2 4 to 3 5 to 4 6 to 5 7 to 6 8+ to 7+
Significant Competitors
Nu
mb
er o
f M
arke
ts
Enforced Closed
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15FTC
What’s wrong with structural proxies? Competition does not stop at market
boundary Shares may be poor positions for
“locations” of firms within market. No mechanism for quantifying the
magnitude of the anticompetitive effect. Benefit-cost analysis?
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16FTC
Merger Analysis Requires Predictions about Counterfactual Back-of-the-envelope merger analysis
What is motive for merger? Are customers complaining? What will happen to price?
Price predictions are difficult Natural Experiments
Good if nature has been kind Model-based analysis
Model current competition Predict how merger changes competition
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17FTC
Natural Experiment:Marathon/Ashland Joint Venture Combination of marketing and refining assets of
two major refiners in Midwest First of recent wave of petroleum mergers
January 1998 Not Challenged by Antitrust Agencies Change in concentration from combination of
assets less than subsequent mergers that were challenged by FTC
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18FTC
Natural Experiment (cont.):Marathon/Ashland Joint Venture Examine pricing in a region with a large change
in concentration Change in HHI of about 800, to 2260
Isolated region uses Reformulated Gas Difficulty of arbitrage makes price effect possible
Prices did NOT increase relative to other regions using similar type of gasoline
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19FTC
Difference Between Louisville's Retail Price and Control Cities' Retail Price
-25.00
-20.00
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
1/1
/1997
3/1
/1997
5/1
/1997
7/1
/1997
9/1
/1997
11/1
/1997
1/1
/1998
3/1
/1998
5/1
/1998
7/1
/1998
9/1
/1998
11/1
/1998
1/1
/1999
3/1
/1999
5/1
/1999
7/1
/1999
9/1
/1999
11/1
/1999
Week
Cen
ts
Chicago Houston Virginia
Merger Date
Differences-in-Differences Estimation
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20FTC
Bertrand (price-only) Merger Model Assumptions: Differentiated products, constant
MC, Nash equilibrium in prices. Model current competition
Estimate demand Recover costs from FOC’s (P-MC)/P =1/|elas|
Prediction: Post-merger, MR for the merging firms falls as substitute products steal share from each otherMerged firm responds by raising prices Non-merging firms raise price sympathetically
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21FTC
Structural Model Backlash
How reliable are model predictions? Test merger predictions
Yes (Nevo, US breakfast cereal)No (Peters, 3/5 US airlines; Weinberg, US
motor oil and breakfast syrup) Test over-identifying restrictions, i.e.,
does (p-mc)/p=1/|elas| ?Yes (Werden, US bread; Slade, UK beer)
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22FTC
Backlash (cont.)
Does model leave out features that bias its predictions? Static, Price-only competition, MC constant
Related research Ignoring demand curvature can under- or overstate merger
effect Ignoring vertical restraints can under- or overstate merger effect Ignoring capacity constraints likely overstates merger effect Ignoring promotional competition likely understates merger effect
This research, Ignoring repositioning likely overstates merger effect
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23FTC
Backlash (cont.)
Tenn, Froeb, Tschantz “Mergers When Firms Compete by Choosing both Price and Promotion”
Ignoring promotion understates estimated merger effect “estimation bias” (estimated demand is too price-
elastic); and “extrapolation bias” caused by assuming that post-
merger promotional activity does not change (it declines).
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24FTC
What if Firms Compete in Other Dimensions? Other dimensions of competition?
4 P’s of marketing: Price, Product, Promotion, Place Repositioning in Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Thought to have effect similar to entry Non-merging brands move closer to merging brands
Our BIG finding: merging brands move increased product variety as all brands spread out 2 Price effects
Cross elasticity effect (merged products move apart) attenuates merger effect
Softening price competition effect (all products spread out) amplifies merger effect
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25FTC
Related Economics Literature
Berry and Waldfogel, “Do Mergers Increase Product Variety?” Radio stations change format post-merger
Norman and Pepall, “Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition?”
Anderson et al., “Firm Mobility and Location Equilibrium” simultaneous price-and-location games “analytically
intractable”
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26FTC
Econ. Lit Review (cont.):“too much rock and roll” Andrew Sweeting (Northwestern) Following mergers among (rock n roll) stations,
play lists of merged firms become more differentiated. Merged stations steal ratings (listeners) from non-
merging stations. No increase in commercials
These findings Match our theoretical predictions
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27FTC
Why do we need to compute Equilibria? IO methodology now allows estimation of
game parameters without equilibrium Bertrand (BLP) Dynamic (Bajari) Auctions (Vuong)
must have equilibria for benefit-cost analysis How else to compute policy counterfactual?
e.g., what does post-merger world look like?
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28FTC
Computing Equilibria
Fixed-point algorithmsRequire smooth profit functionsRequire good starting pointsCan’t find Multiple equilibria
Stochastic response dynamicAll it needs are profit functions.
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29FTC
How does methodology work?
Players take turns moving. Player i picks a new action at random If i’s new action improves Profit(i)
then accept move, and go to next player. If i’s new action does NOT improves Profit(i)
choose new action with probability P and go to next player. Let P tend towards zero
quickly reach state where no one wants to move. this is a Nash equilibria
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30FTC
Why does methodology work?
Consider RV’s X and Y w/joint pdf p(x, y). The conditionals p( x | y ) and p( y | x ) are enough
to determine the joint p(x, y). Let the conditionals p( x | y ) and p( y | x ) each be
unimodal. If (x , y ) is a local maxima of the joint ∗ ∗p(x, y), then x maximizes the conditional p( x | ∗y ) in the direction of X and y maximizes the ∗ ∗conditional p( y | x ) in the direction of Y.∗
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31FTC
Why? (cont.)
Suppose we want to generate a draw (x, y) from the distribution of (X, Y ). Here is a recipe for doing so: Start at any initial state (x0, y0). Draw x1 from p( x | y0 ) and y1 from p( y | x1 ). Repeat
After enough repetitions, the draws (xn, yn) can be treated as a sample from joint distribution (X, Y). This is the Gibbs Sampler.
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32FTC
Why? (cont.)
Think of each profit function Ui(a−i, ai) as a conditional profit Ui(a−I | ai)
Normalize conditional profit to be positive and integrate to 1, e.g., g(ai | a−i ) exp[U∝ i(a−I | ai) /t] The normalization does not change game.
Interpret conditional utility as conditional probability. Let t → 0. This causes the sampler to get stuck in a local
mode of g. Multiple runs for multiple modes. Each node is a Nash equilibria
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33FTC
Why? (cont.)
Note that g(a′i|at−i)/g(at
i|at−i)=
exp[(Ui(a′I,at−i) -Ui(at
i,at−i))/t]
We are back to the painfully easy algorithm.
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34FTC
How do we actually make draws?
Pick action a′i uniformly at random from Ai
Set at+1i = a′i with probability
Max[1, g(a′i|at−i)/g(at
i|at−i)
Else, set at+1i = at
i
Let t0
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35FTC
Example: Cournot equil.={1/3,1/3}
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36FTC
Example, 2 equil={{5,8},{8,5}}
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37FTC
Demand Model
Consumers on Hotelling line
Indirect utility is function of price + travel cost + random shock
Resulting demand is logit
)()(),,(
),,(
xdFe
eq N
j
e
xxpv
ixxjpjvj
iii
xp,
ijjiiiij xxdtpBv )),(*(
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38FTC
Supply Model
Vendors simultaneously choose price and location
Nash Equilibrium in two dimensions
Post merger, merged firm maximizes sum of vendor products
)()( xp,iiii qcpprofit
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39FTC
Pre-merger Locations
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40FTC
Merger Decomposition
PRE-merger LOCATION POST-merger LOCATION=Pre-merger ownership at post-merger
locations “Softening price competition” effect
LOCATION - PRE Amplify merger effect relative to no repositioning
“Cross-elasticity” effect POST – LOCATION Attenuate merger relative to no repositioning
Total Effect=Softening + Cross-elasticity
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41FTC
Pre- (dashed) and Post- (solid) Merger Locations (outside good)
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42FTC
Net Merger Effect =Cross elasticity + Softening
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43FTC
Non Merging Firms Softening
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44FTC
Profit Changes
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45FTC
Price-only models can miss a lot
Taxonomy of effects As products separate, price competition is softened As merged products separate, smaller incentive to
raise price As non-merging products spread out, smaller
sympathetic price increases. Relative to a model with no repositioning
Total and consumer welfare may be higher Merging firms raise price Non-merging firms may reduce price
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46FTC
What Have We Learned?
Repositioning by merged firms is more significant than repositioning by non-merging firms Similar to effect of capacity constraints on merger.
Pre-merger substitution patterns likely overstate loss of competition.
Non merging firms can do worse following merger Price can go up or down; Consumers can be better or worse off New algorithm for finding Nash equilibria
Important complement to existing estimation methods