1. 2 federation of european explosives manufacturers meeting of the transport working group on...

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Federation of European Explosives Federation of European Explosives ManufacturersManufacturers

Meeting Meeting of the of the

Transport Working Group onTransport Working Group onTuesday, 10 March 2015Tuesday, 10 March 2015in Brussels, Hotel Manosin Brussels, Hotel Manos

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Opening of the Meeting by the Opening of the Meeting by the ChairmanChairman

Normally the meetings are Normally the meetings are opened by the Chairperson. opened by the Chairperson. Unfortunately, our chairlady Unfortunately, our chairlady Marlies Becker has left Orica Marlies Becker has left Orica and consequently also our and consequently also our organization. Therefore, we organization. Therefore, we are in need to elect a new head are in need to elect a new head to this group. We will come to to this group. We will come to this under AOB.this under AOB.

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Meeting of the Transport Working Group

List of ParticipantsList of Participants

1.1. Jon Jones, Austin, UK Jon Jones, Austin, UK

2.2. Ivana Jakubkova, Austin Detonators, CZIvana Jakubkova, Austin Detonators, CZ

3.3. Maurice Delaloye, SSE, SwitzerlandMaurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland

4.4. Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, GermanyMartin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany

5.5. Lucie Holubova, Explosia, CZLucie Holubova, Explosia, CZ

6.6. Marin Dorobantu, Weatherford, RomaniaMarin Dorobantu, Weatherford, Romania

7.7. Thierry Rousse, EPC, FranceThierry Rousse, EPC, France

8.8. Rafael Lopez, Maxam, SpainRafael Lopez, Maxam, Spain

ApologyApology

1.1. Marlies Becker, Orica Europe, Germany, Chairlady Marlies Becker, Orica Europe, Germany, Chairlady

2.2. Janusz Dryzga Janusz Dryzga , Nitroerg, Poland, Nitroerg, Poland

In attendance: Hans H. Meyer, FEEM, BelgiumIn attendance: Hans H. Meyer, FEEM, Belgium

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2.) Compliance with European Competition 2.) Compliance with European Competition LawLaw

As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with

European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value

applying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Groupapplying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Group

have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited

discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to to

social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the

participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the

Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with

Competition Law.Competition Law.

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Compliance with European Competition LawCompliance with European Competition Law(cont.)(cont.)

Very clearly: You are not allowed to discuss or Very clearly: You are not allowed to discuss or exchange information exchange information

which is not in conformity with competition which is not in conformity with competition legislation, including legislation, including

e.g. on:e.g. on:

1.1. PricesPrices

2.2. Production detailsProduction details

3.3. Transportation ratesTransportation rates

4.4. Market proceduresMarket procedures

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Transport Working Group

3. AGENDA

1. Opening of the Meeting by the President2. Compliance with the European and National Competition Laws and Regulations3. Agenda and Approval of the Agenda 4. Minutes of the last meeting on Tuesday, 30th

September 2014 in Lisbon and approval 5. Secretary General’s Report

with in particular: a) Latest developments with European Explosives

LegislationI. Export of explosives to restricted

countries

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5. AGENDA (cont.)

II. T&T postponement for “non-registered” products manufactured between 2013 and 2015

III. Single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all

imports into the EU

6. Any other business: 1. Colour Coding2. Recording the location of each explosive3. Date and place of the next meeting4. Transport related incidents


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5. AGENDA (cont.)

II. Situation T&T postponement for “non-registered” products manufactured between 2013 and 2015

III.Results and résumés of XML file ring testIV. Single code for the manufacturing site to

be used for all imports into the EU

6. Any other business: 1. Colour Coding2. Recording the location of each explosive3. Date and place of the next meeting4. Transport related incidents

7. Subjects for the next meeting8. Date & Place of the next meeting


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Item 3: Approval of the Agenda

Do I find your agreement to this Agenda?


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Item 4: Minutes of the last Meeting in Lisbon on 30

September 2015 and approval

Do I find your agreement to these Minutes?


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Item 5:Item 5:

Secretary General’s ReportSecretary General’s Report


Latest Developments with European Explosives Legislation

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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIESCOUNTRIES

There are several European Council Regulations which prohibit the export of some types of civil explosives and ALL INITIATION SYSTEMS to certain “sensitive countries” under the concept of “products which can be used for internal repression”.

But the industry has to be careful! The ban refers not only to products and countries but also to individual persons, organisations and companies, e.g. in Russia and other sensitive countries. So you responsible export staff must investigate if their customers are not mentioned in some lists.

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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIESEXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIES

Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force are based on Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides a legal basis for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the Union’s economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, where such restrictive measures are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

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Some of these countries comprise:

BELARUS, REPUBLIC OF GUINEA, IRAN, LIBYA, MYANMAR, SYRIA, ZIMBABWE, AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, DEMOCRACTIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, COTE D’IVOIRE, ERITREA, REPUBLIC OF GUINEA (CONAKRY),GUINEA-BISSAU, IRAN, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MOLDOVA, RUSSIA

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EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES TO RESTRICTED COUNTRIESCOUNTRIES

However, there are several International and Multinational Companies working in these countries in the fields of: Exploration projects for fuel and gas, Cement, Iron, Fertilizers, Aluminium, Precious Metals (Gold, Silver, Platinum) and other Minerals and Raw Materials.

These companies are potential export customers and the European explosives industry is prohibited to supply them. This is a competitve disadvantage since non-EU suppliers (including US, South-Africa, India, Australia) do not face such restrictions.

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According to EUROSTAT, the EU imports gas, fuel and mining products from practically all the aforementioned countries under the internal repression ban; a number of multinational companies produce and export to EU from those countries cement, iron, fertilizers, aluminium, ornamental stones, gold, silver, platinum, fuel, gas, and other minerals and raw materials; it is important to say that nearly all the aforesaid activities require unavoidably the use of civil explosives and initiation systems.


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Based on these facts FEEM has made an Application for a REVISION OF THE EUROPEAN LIST OF PRODUCTS which can be used for internal repression (In practical terms this means, that FEEM has provided the text of the law, which has been taken over 1:1). FEEM argued that civil explosives and initiation systems - listed under the point 4 of the “internal repression list” - are specially conceived, designed and shaped for blasting activities in the fields of public infrastructure works and mining and fuel extraction and prospecting activities; its explosives properties, characteristics and the conditions and methods of use, are totally different to the military initiations systems and explosives and therefore it is possible to say that they can hardly be used for internal repression.

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Generally, military explosives need to be stabile, thus implying resistance to shock, moisture and other considerations that come about through the nature of their use. They usually need to be capable of being stored for long periods of time (about 10 years) without significant deterioration. They differ against blasting explosives by their chemistry (e.g. density about 1.8 g/cm³) and their physical properties like detonation velocity (e.g. Octogen: > 9,000 m/s). Civil industrial explosives like Dynamites, Emulsion Explosives or ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil) are only of limited shelf-lives which range between 6 months and 18 months. Their densities are between 0.9 g/cm³ (ANFO) and 1.4 g/cm³ (Dynamite). Detonation velocities are between 2,000 m/s and 5,500 m/s. Military explosives are readily available to repressive countries from various sources so there would be no call or need to use civil explosives anyway.

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Competitive SituationCompetitive Situation

As mentioned before no other countries in the As mentioned before no other countries in the world have such type of ban; the prohibition has world have such type of ban; the prohibition has been established only at European level and been established only at European level and consequently Non-European companies can sell / consequently Non-European companies can sell / export all types of civil explosives and initiation export all types of civil explosives and initiation systems without any restriction or export controls systems without any restriction or export controls to the countries under the internal repression ban; to the countries under the internal repression ban; in this sense it is important to highlight that civil in this sense it is important to highlight that civil explosives and initiation systems are not included explosives and initiation systems are not included neither in the international LISTS OF DUAL USE neither in the international LISTS OF DUAL USE GOODS nor in the MUNITIONS LIST (Wassenaar GOODS nor in the MUNITIONS LIST (Wassenaar arrangement).arrangement).Therefore, the negative effect for the European Therefore, the negative effect for the European Industry of civil explosives is very significant Industry of civil explosives is very significant because our competitors are supplying the goods, because our competitors are supplying the goods, mainly from USA, Canada, South Africa and mainly from USA, Canada, South Africa and Australia.Australia.

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A first success of FEEM’s Activities has already been achieved, because the “EU FOREIGN MINISTRY” relaxed in a 1st action the COTE D’IVOIRE sanctions to allow certain prohibited goods.

On 10 February 2015, the European Union published Council Regulation (EU) 2015/192 (which amends Council Regulation (EC) No 174/2005) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/202 (which amends Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP).

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An additional derogation from the prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer and export of equipment which might be used for internal repression has been introduced in order to enable the authorization of certain equipment, where appropriate, for the purposes of civilian use in mining or infrastructure projects, following the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/202. By way of derogation from Article 3, the competent authority, as listed in Annex II, of the Member State where the exporter is established or, in the case that the exporter is not established within the Union, the Member State from which the equipment may be sold, supplied, transferred or exported, may authorize, under such conditions as it deems appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment as listed in point 4 of Annex I, where the equipment is solely for civilian use in mining or infrastructure projects.

COTE D’IVOIRE sanctions

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These derogations are subject to authorization on a case by case basis by the exporting Member State. Where the equipment is purportedly for civilian use the exporting state must inform other Member States and the Commission of its intention to authorize at least one week in advance of doing so, and no more than two weeks after authorization where the equipment is for maintenance of public order.

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The other restricted countries on the The other restricted countries on the sanctions’ list will hopefully follow sanctions’ list will hopefully follow

in due course with identical in due course with identical derogations! The next priorities are derogations! The next priorities are

Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe and MyanmarMyanmar..


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5aII):5aII):

POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED” POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED” EXPLOSIVESEXPLOSIVES

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FEEM IT and T&T experts asked the Secretariat on the occasions of their meetings in Brussels and Prague in July and November 2014 to propose to the Commission a transition period for labeled but not traced products from April 2015 to 2016.

The legal department of the Commission has been contacted by the SG in July and November 2014 and again in February 2015 and they are working on it. Chances are considered as very low because of long EU and National legislation processes!


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FEEM has proposed to the Commission to investigate if there is a possibility for a transition period of one or more years after April 2015 for the integration of these “interim products” into the traceability managing systems. Concerning the transition period, the explosives industry suggested to propose two differing times because of the relevant shelf-lives of the products:A) ONE YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD (i.e. until 5 April 2016) for:1. Cartridged explosives and explosives in sacks2. Two-component explosives

B) TWO YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (i.e. until 5 April 2017) for1. Plain detonators2. Electric, non-electric and electronic detonators3. Primers and boosters4. Detonating cords and safety fuses


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Although the explosives industry is now fully ready for the implementation of phase 2 by 5 April 2015, due to different interpretations of the Directive many explosives manufacturers have been unable to forward details of uniquely numbered items to downstream users (dealers, distributors, end-users in mining, quarrying and construction) in sufficient time for the whole supply chain to record all movements of explosives items from 5th April 2015. Many downstream users will be ready to receive the electronic documentation only as of 5th April 2015, which leaves them in a situation of non compliance of quantities of explosives stocks throughout Europe. Some of the national Authorities recognise the issue faced but from a regulatory perspective they would need further guidance from the European Commission to enable a common pragmatic approach to be taken.


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SHE ASPECTS

The explosives industry has also emphasised the safety implications concerning this "remaining" stock if approval is not granted. The industry including their downstream users would be required to unpack/scan/repack all this product in each of its locations where it may not be feasible or licensed to do so, complications will be around the ability to move this products, having competent and trained personnel available throughout the supply chain and the impact of magazine capacity due to stock not being able to physically move.

POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-POSTPONEMENT FOR “NON-REGISTERED” EXPLOSIVESREGISTERED” EXPLOSIVES

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Since all FEEM members have made enormous efforts to avoid stocks of “non-traceable” items in their magazines this proposal is mainly to support our customers and other business partners, like distributors and end users. In case the proposal will be approved, we are aware that there are products in the market which are traceable and products which are not traceable. There it could be a natural tendency to prefer non traceable ones, since it would be easier. This would be detrimental not only to Security, but also to those manufacturers who have managed to have their Track&Trace system fully ready according to EU Directives 43/2008 and 4/2012.


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Therefore, FEEM has also informed the Commission on the following points to be considered in the case that a postponement was approved.

1. The obligation by all undertakings of the supply chain is to prioritize those products which are 100% traceable.

2. In case this is not feasible, the Commission must clearly establish regulations, limits, controls and conditions concerning the use of products which are not 100% traceable.

3. Additionally it is absolutely necessary to make clear to the Commission that, in case an incident would take place involving products which are not 100% traceable, there is not any responsibility on the side of the manufacturers.


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It must be mentioned that this initiative is not unambiguous; neither in our industry nor in the end-user associations.

There were complaints from some members that they have done their “home-work” and that they are ready as of next month.

Also UEPG signaled that their members and end-users do not understand the necessity for a postponement. Here I have the feeling that they didn’t understand the background although the explanations were structured and clear. E.g. they have been confusing marked und un-marked products.

FEEM has only been considering products which are unable to be broken down within the hierarchy (Pallet – Case – Item) because of the missing XML information.


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Item 5 a, IV:Item 5 a, IV:Results and résumés of XML file ring Results and résumés of XML file ring

testtest

I received an information last week I received an information last week from Kimit, Kiruna: from Kimit, Kiruna:

We are experiencing problems with the We are experiencing problems with the format from different suppliers around format from different suppliers around

Europe.Europe.

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Results and résumés of XML file ring Results and résumés of XML file ring testtest

At the last Track & Trace Workshop in Prague, Czech Republic on Wednesday, 19 October 2014 the delegates agreed to circulate “Test-Files” to each other in order to test the readability of the file-content.

How did it work?

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Item 5 a, III:Item 5 a, III:Codes for non-EU manufacturing sitesCodes for non-EU manufacturing sites

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Codes for non-EU manufacturing Codes for non-EU manufacturing sitessites

You remember that we had this You remember that we had this discussion before: Under the T&T discussion before: Under the T&T Directive, multiple codes for a Directive, multiple codes for a single manufacturing site and an single manufacturing site and an identical article are presently identical article are presently necessary if there are several necessary if there are several importers (in a single Member importers (in a single Member State or several Member States). State or several Member States). This could place an This could place an EU-based EU-based manufacturermanufacturer with overseas with overseas production sites or a production sites or a third country third country manufacturersmanufacturers at a competitive at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis EU disadvantage vis a vis EU manufacturers. manufacturers.

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FFor example, inventory production would or example, inventory production would have to shift to batch production for a have to shift to batch production for a specific order and the quantities of product specific order and the quantities of product at storage sites would increase. Marked at storage sites would increase. Marked products will not be able to be diverted for products will not be able to be diverted for other destinations and the likelihood of other destinations and the likelihood of products being incorrectly marked could products being incorrectly marked could increase. All this will lead to greater costs, increase. All this will lead to greater costs, would be confusing to customers and would be confusing to customers and regulators and could undermine the aim of regulators and could undermine the aim of improving security and traceability.improving security and traceability.


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Therefore FEEM has made a further proposal in November 2014 to the Commission:

SINGLE CODE FOR THE MANUFACTURING SITE SINGLE CODE FOR THE MANUFACTURING SITE TO BE USED FOR ALL IMPORTS INTO THE EU!TO BE USED FOR ALL IMPORTS INTO THE EU!


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Proposal:Proposal:

Clarification of COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC , CHAPTER 2, PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION, Article 3,

Unique Identification, Point 5, 2nd sub-paragraph, which reads:

Where the manufacturing site is located outside the Where the manufacturing site is located outside the Community and Community and

the manufacturer is not established in the Community, the manufacturer is not established in the Community, the the

IMPORTER of the explosives concerned shall contact a IMPORTER of the explosives concerned shall contact a

NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE MEMBER STATE OF MEMBER STATE OF

IMPORTIMPORT in order for the manufacturing site to be in order for the manufacturing site to be attributed a code. attributed a code.


What is the procedure for attributing manufacturing site codes to non-EU

manufacturing sites under Commission Directive 2008/43/EC, as amended by Directive 2012/4/EU?

The “QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS” on CIRCABC CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 93/15/EEC are more specific: ………..

he (the importer) could contact the national authority of the Member State in which he is established or of first import and obtain a single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all imports into the EU.


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Summary:

The Explosives Industry feels, that there is the potential to misconstrue the intent of the regulations by inferring that each "importer" is required to contact their National Authority for the attribution of a manufacturing code for a Manufacturer not established in the Community. If this is the case the manufacturer would be required to produce identification uniquely for each importer or distributor. This would not be feasible as it would enforce a "made to order" manufacturing strategy on non-EU sites where no mandate exists.


Proposal:

Where the manufacturing site is located outside the Community and the manufacturer is not established in the Community, the importer of the explosives concerned shall contact a national authority of the Member State in which he is established or of first import and obtain a single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all imports into the EU.


6. Any other Business6. Any other Business

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COLOR-CODING OF COLOR-CODING OF EXPLOSIVESEXPLOSIVES

In July 2014 FEEM has distributed to their members the I.R.E. (ISTITUTO RICERCHE ESPLOSIVISTICHE) Report with recommendations to the EU Commission (Directorate – General Home Affairs) toward setting standards and regulating the colour-coding of explosives and blasting accessories such as igniters, detonators and detonating cords.

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Color-Coding of ExplosivesColor-Coding of Explosives

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FEEM complaint to the Commission FEEM complaint to the Commission about this abstruse proposal on the about this abstruse proposal on the occasion of the October 2014 EU-occasion of the October 2014 EU-Experts’ meeting.Experts’ meeting.

Consequently this issue will not be Consequently this issue will not be pursuit any longer. It has been pursuit any longer. It has been stopped. DG Home and the Italian stopped. DG Home and the Italian Research Centre have been Research Centre have been instructed accordingly. instructed accordingly.

Recording the Location of each ExplosiveRecording the Location of each Explosive

Recording the Location of each ExplosiveRecording the Location of each ExplosiveBackground:

COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC of 4 April 2008 setting up, pursuant to Council Directive 93/15/EEC, a system for the identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses amended by Commission Directive 2012/4/EU of 22 February 2012: Article 14 Obligations of undertakings

(a) keeping a record of all identifications of explosives, together with all pertinent information including the type of explosive, the company or person to the custody of whom it was given;

(b) recording the location of each explosive while the explosive is in their possession or custody until it is either transferred to another undertaking or used;

Recording the Location of each ExplosiveRecording the Location of each ExplosiveStatement:: Article 14(b) states "recording the location of each explosive" is ambiguous as there is no definition of "Location", this can be deemed as a distinct physical location e.g. magazines or warehouses OR a single location/Site inclusive of multiple physical locations e.g. magazines or warehouse.

Request: FEEM seeks guidance, clarification or consensus, we understand that "Location" is defined as a distinct physical location where explosive material is stored and managed as inventory e.g. individual magazine, warehouse etc., this confirmation is required for our industry to standardise their supply chain and also ensure that there is no impact between industry members when reporting to/or dealing with regulators.

Recording the Location of each ExplosiveRecording the Location of each Explosive

The general consensus of our members is that it is classed as Distinct Physical Location, but some countries see this different. Therefore, official guidance from the Commission would be appreciated.

6.3) Date and Place of the next Meeting6.3) Date and Place of the next Meeting

You have the choice:You have the choice:

Either Monday/Tuesday, 21./22. September 2015 in Either Monday/Tuesday, 21./22. September 2015 in Budapest or alternatively Monday/Tuesday, 12./13. Budapest or alternatively Monday/Tuesday, 12./13. October in BarcelonaOctober in Barcelona

Transport / Storage Related IncidentsTransport / Storage Related Incidents

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TRUCK EXPLOSION ON THE TRUCK EXPLOSION ON THE MITCHELL HIGHWAY, MITCHELL HIGHWAY,

QUEENSLAND ON 5 SEPTEMBER QUEENSLAND ON 5 SEPTEMBER 2014 2014

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Queensland AccidentQueensland Accident

A TRUCK carrying AN in outback Queensland A TRUCK carrying AN in outback Queensland exploded with such force that residents more than exploded with such force that residents more than 30km away thought an earthquake had occurred. 30km away thought an earthquake had occurred.

Four firefighters and a policeman were among eight Four firefighters and a policeman were among eight people injured when a truck carrying 50 tonnes of people injured when a truck carrying 50 tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded on the Mitchell ammonium nitrate exploded on the Mitchell Highway, about 30km south of Charleville in Highway, about 30km south of Charleville in southwest Queensland.southwest Queensland.

The explosion occurred as emergency crews The explosion occurred as emergency crews responded to reports of a truck rollover.responded to reports of a truck rollover.

The force of the blast destroyed a bridge, cutting off The force of the blast destroyed a bridge, cutting off the main route between Charleville and nearby the main route between Charleville and nearby Wyandra. It also severely damaged two fire trucks at Wyandra. It also severely damaged two fire trucks at the scene.the scene.

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Queensland AccidentQueensland Accident

Four firefighters were also injured, with two Four firefighters were also injured, with two still recovering in hospital, along with a still recovering in hospital, along with a police officer and another member of the police officer and another member of the public. Charleville police officer-in-charge public. Charleville police officer-in-charge Senior Sergeant Adrian Rieck said the Senior Sergeant Adrian Rieck said the Queensland Fire and Emergency Service Queensland Fire and Emergency Service crews were able to remove the driver from the crews were able to remove the driver from the wreck before the explosion.wreck before the explosion.

"They were very close, within 30 metres of the "They were very close, within 30 metres of the wreckage, and at that time there were two wreckage, and at that time there were two explosions within quick succession," he said.explosions within quick succession," he said.

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Queensland AccidentQueensland AccidentThe truck belongs to Kalari Transport Ltd., which The truck belongs to Kalari Transport Ltd., which is one of Australia’s specialist bulk logistics is one of Australia’s specialist bulk logistics providers to the mining and resources sector providers to the mining and resources sector carrying AN from ORICA'S YARWUN plant at carrying AN from ORICA'S YARWUN plant at GLADSTONE.GLADSTONE. FIVE trucks a week depart Orica's Yarwun factory FIVE trucks a week depart Orica's Yarwun factory loaded with ammonium nitrate, headed for all loaded with ammonium nitrate, headed for all parts of the country. parts of the country. One of those trucks overturned on the Mitchell One of those trucks overturned on the Mitchell Hwy near Charleville on Friday, headed for South Hwy near Charleville on Friday, headed for South Australia. Australia. Diesel spilling from the fuel tank came into Diesel spilling from the fuel tank came into contact with the load, creating a massive contact with the load, creating a massive explosion which seriously injured eight and explosion which seriously injured eight and obliterated the highway and truck. obliterated the highway and truck. An attending fire truck was also destroyed. An attending fire truck was also destroyed. In light of the explosion, Gladstone residents have In light of the explosion, Gladstone residents have expressed concerns about living in the same town expressed concerns about living in the same town as an ammonium nitrate plant. as an ammonium nitrate plant.

(from the Australian “Observer”, 9.9.14)(from the Australian “Observer”, 9.9.14)

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2. VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA2. VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA

The 2014 Gorni Lom explosions were The 2014 Gorni Lom explosions were a series of explosions that began on a series of explosions that began on the afternoon of 1 October, 2014, at the afternoon of 1 October, 2014, at 16:59 pm local time at the former 16:59 pm local time at the former Midzhur Ammo Plant belonging to Midzhur Ammo Plant belonging to Videx Explosives Ltd. in the village of Videx Explosives Ltd. in the village of Gorni Lom, in Bulgaria's Gorni Lom, in Bulgaria's northwestern Vidin Province. The northwestern Vidin Province. The series of blasts completely destroyed series of blasts completely destroyed the factory, killing 13 men and 2 the factory, killing 13 men and 2 women who were inside and injuring women who were inside and injuring 3 others who were some distance 3 others who were some distance away. away.

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VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIABULGARIA

VIDEX produces civil explosives like:VIDEX produces civil explosives like:

various types of Ammonites (AN + TNT)various types of Ammonites (AN + TNT)ANFO & Mixtures with demil. explosivesANFO & Mixtures with demil. explosivesCast TNT BOOSTERSCast TNT BOOSTERS

& they deal with& they deal with

All sorts of demil. explosives All sorts of demil. explosives (TNT/RDX/PETN/HMX)(TNT/RDX/PETN/HMX)DetonatorsDetonatorsDet. CordsDet. CordsThey also offer blast & drilling servicesThey also offer blast & drilling services

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The main explosion took place at 16:59 pm The main explosion took place at 16:59 pm local time, with a large secondary blast local time, with a large secondary blast taking place at 21:45 pm. The approximately taking place at 21:45 pm. The approximately 15 people who were working inside the 15 people who were working inside the factory at the time of the first explosion are factory at the time of the first explosion are presumed to have died instantly, while 3 presumed to have died instantly, while 3 female workers in the vicinity of the female workers in the vicinity of the complex suffered injuries from flying glass complex suffered injuries from flying glass and shrapnel. Authorities estimated around and shrapnel. Authorities estimated around 10 tonnes of highly explosive chemicals 10 tonnes of highly explosive chemicals were stored at the site, in addition to the were stored at the site, in addition to the weapons being dismantled. weapons being dismantled.

VIDEX Explosives, BulgariaVIDEX Explosives, Bulgaria

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According to Nikola Nikolov, the head of According to Nikola Nikolov, the head of the interior ministry's civil defense the interior ministry's civil defense force, the blasts were powerful enough force, the blasts were powerful enough to completely destroy the main buildings to completely destroy the main buildings in the plant, leaving huge craters the in the plant, leaving huge craters the size of football fields behind and sending size of football fields behind and sending debris flying up to a kilometer away. The debris flying up to a kilometer away. The workers were reportedly dismantling old workers were reportedly dismantling old Greek mines at the time of the accident Greek mines at the time of the accident in Gorni Lom, approximately 145 km in Gorni Lom, approximately 145 km northwest of Bulgaria's capital Sofia.northwest of Bulgaria's capital Sofia.

VIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIAVIDEX EXPLOSIVES, BULGARIA

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The same plant had received several urgent The same plant had received several urgent citations by authorities just two months prior to citations by authorities just two months prior to the accident, notifying the owners of outdated the accident, notifying the owners of outdated equipment, improperly stored explosives and a equipment, improperly stored explosives and a larger amount of munitions at the site than it larger amount of munitions at the site than it could safely handle. could safely handle.

The same plant suffered two blasts in 2007 and The same plant suffered two blasts in 2007 and 2010 that injured a total of 6 people and flattened 2010 that injured a total of 6 people and flattened two separate buildings. In the aftermath of the two separate buildings. In the aftermath of the disaster labour minister Yordan Hristoskov vowed disaster labour minister Yordan Hristoskov vowed to never allow the factory to reopen, placing the to never allow the factory to reopen, placing the future of around 150 jobs in question and future of around 150 jobs in question and prompting condemnation from local residents.prompting condemnation from local residents.


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This was Bulgaria's tenth such This was Bulgaria's tenth such accident since 1979 and the second accident since 1979 and the second one in just two months, after a blast one in just two months, after a blast at a similar plant in Kostenets injured at a similar plant in Kostenets injured 10 people on August 8. An explosion 10 people on August 8. An explosion at another facility near Sliven killed 3 at another facility near Sliven killed 3 people in 2012, and in 2008 a series people in 2012, and in 2008 a series of huge blasts at an arms depot near of huge blasts at an arms depot near Sofia injured 3, forced the closure of Sofia injured 3, forced the closure of Sofia Airport and registered as a 3.2 Sofia Airport and registered as a 3.2 tremor on seismographs. tremor on seismographs.


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In response to the disaster, authorities In response to the disaster, authorities dispatched Army units equipped with drones dispatched Army units equipped with drones and thermal cameras to search for survivors and thermal cameras to search for survivors and assess the damage. After a period of 24 and assess the damage. After a period of 24 hours since the last explosion had passed, hours since the last explosion had passed, investigators were allowed access to the investigators were allowed access to the scene and began their work, making the scene and began their work, making the initial trip in a Bulgarian Army Sand Cat initial trip in a Bulgarian Army Sand Cat vehicle as a safety precaution. One of the vehicle as a safety precaution. One of the members of that initial team, Valentin members of that initial team, Valentin Radev, said that "the plant and the people Radev, said that "the plant and the people seem to have just vanished" and described seem to have just vanished" and described the scene as a "moonscape". the scene as a "moonscape".


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The experts think the most likely reasons behind the The experts think the most likely reasons behind the tragedy are a human error or non-observance of tragedy are a human error or non-observance of technological discipline and probable violation of technological discipline and probable violation of workplace safety rules.workplace safety rules.Asked to comment on what a human error meant, one Asked to comment on what a human error meant, one official said: “For instance, I hold a particular official said: “For instance, I hold a particular opinion. At the workshop, there was a machine at one opinion. At the workshop, there was a machine at one of its ends that broke trinitrotoluene taken out of the of its ends that broke trinitrotoluene taken out of the mines to powder. That trinitrotoluene is of lower mines to powder. That trinitrotoluene is of lower sensitivity and can be processed in that manner but in sensitivity and can be processed in that manner but in the American-made mines – M16 there are explosive the American-made mines – M16 there are explosive charges of a more sensitive explosive substance. charges of a more sensitive explosive substance. When one has not taken it out and it comes to be in When one has not taken it out and it comes to be in the blocks containing trinitrotoluene, it is highly the blocks containing trinitrotoluene, it is highly sensitive and this may have caused the blast.“ sensitive and this may have caused the blast.“


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““Major responsibility falls upon Major responsibility falls upon company’s management. They used company’s management. They used to show criminal negligence to show criminal negligence towards the recommendations of towards the recommendations of the Labour Inspectorate and the the Labour Inspectorate and the dangerous substances control dangerous substances control service (KOS),” said Bulgarian service (KOS),” said Bulgarian interim Deputy Prime Minister and interim Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Minister of Labour and Social Policies, Yordan Hristoskov.Policies, Yordan Hristoskov.


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A truck fire that began before 3 p.m. PT resulted in A truck fire that began before 3 p.m. PT resulted in the closure of Highway 1 at Six Mile Hill near the closure of Highway 1 at Six Mile Hill near Tobiano for over three hours Thursday afternoon.Tobiano for over three hours Thursday afternoon.The situation was very serious due to the contents The situation was very serious due to the contents that were being hauled.that were being hauled."The tanker truck contains an explosive material, "The tanker truck contains an explosive material, therefore the highway has been closed in both therefore the highway has been closed in both directions until further notice," she told CBC News directions until further notice," she told CBC News just before 3:30 p.m. PT. "Police are currently just before 3:30 p.m. PT. "Police are currently assessing the situation and determining evacuation assessing the situation and determining evacuation requirements for residents in the area."requirements for residents in the area."The driver was able to unhook the trailer from the The driver was able to unhook the trailer from the burning cab.burning cab.Just before 6:30 p.m. the scene was clear and the Just before 6:30 p.m. the scene was clear and the highway had reopenedhighway had reopened

Fire on truck hauling Fire on truck hauling 40 tonnes of AN solution closes highway near Kamloops, Canada on closes highway near Kamloops, Canada on 06 06

November 2014November 2014

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Once the fire burnt down, the trailer that was transporting the AN solution was inspected and deemed fit for service. It was relocated to an Orica site for secure storage.



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AOBAOB

New Chairlady / ChairmanNew Chairlady / Chairman

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Thank you for your Thank you for your attention and a good attention and a good

meeting. meeting.

Lunch will be served now in Lunch will be served now in the Restaurant. the Restaurant.

1. 2 federation of european explosives manufacturers meeting of the transport working group on...

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chairlady marlies becker