1 19 consti. law 2 digest

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ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL vs THE HONORABLE

CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]

FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.

There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of

Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charterof the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of

the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative

of due process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for motels; that the provision in the

same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized

representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or

accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or

persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times

and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth,

the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of

companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be

specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if

any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up

and affixed his signature in the presence of OMKA

That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18

years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn

unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the OMKA of

such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,

runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,

arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4

of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automaticcancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the

business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process

clause.

In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that

the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb

immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.

The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of Manila

to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No. 4760

would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.

HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. An ordinance, having been

enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities

of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which

surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not

be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of

police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for

evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factualfoundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption

of constitutionality must prevail.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for

evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which

is not the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower

court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of

validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside


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POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a

manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As

such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and

unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and

narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most

essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the great

public needs.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimizecertain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the

stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and

fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a

necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the

ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.

LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for

regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful

occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful

occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied

from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees themunicipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from

applying the well known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be

unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere

with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who

might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor

in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922],

42 Phil,, 818, 828).

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the

challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the

latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,

P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme

Court that taxation may be made to implement the states police power.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN.The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City

of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common

inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,

with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as

transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable

nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence

of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, everyregulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

Police Power Due Process Clause

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was

approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It

classified them into 1stclass (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2ndclass (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled

hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checksin to their rooms. It compelled

hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons.

Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary andagainst due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-

Malate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by

Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,

the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot

prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There

is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain


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practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only

discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the

revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The

due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has

reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was

to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by

mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the

following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:

refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed

form in the lobby in open view;

prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;

usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue

also);

making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and

cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on

certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to

public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the

ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face.

Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance

of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed

and injunction lifted.

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando

Facts:

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its membersHotel del

MarInc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be

applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board toregulate due to the fact thathotelswere not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted

that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being

unreasonable and violative ofdue process insofar because it would imposeP6,000.00 license

fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the

requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.


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There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of suchhotels,motels and lodging

houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative

of due process for being vague.

The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain

minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,

restaurant andlaundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being

arbitrary.

It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than

twice every 24 hours.

There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of

thehotelsthat violated the ordinance.

The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.

Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:

"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly

set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights

under the guise ofpoliceregulation.

O'Gorman & Young v. HartfordFire InsuranceCo- Case was in the scope of police power. As

underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this

character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual

foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in

the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulationof facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set

aside.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize

certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover,

the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind

from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income

of thecity government."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of dueprocess,equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the

power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the

governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in

each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist

both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from

legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of

justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.


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Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,

place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and

perceptive inquiryinto fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are

not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to

meet the due process requirement.

Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to thepolicepower

and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in

fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider

discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known

legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or

tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale

of liquors.

Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.

In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"

here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely asapolicepower measure.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24

hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not

license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of

the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general

well-being.

Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind

through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant

equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.

The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole

case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the

assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations

affected with public interest.

What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or

the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and

exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property,

the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.

On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of

establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities

about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using

common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILAFacts:

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative

of thedue process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonableor oppressive butalso vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the

invasion of the right to privacy and theguaranty against self-incrimination.Ordinance

No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and

gues ts of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a

registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to publ ic view at all

times, and by introducing several other amendatoryprovisions calculated to shatter

the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."Moreover, the

increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind

f romoperat ing for purpose other than legal " and at the same t ime, to


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increase "the income of the citygovernment."The lower court ruled in favor of the

petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional

Held:

No.

Rationale:

The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does notcover petitioners.This particular manifestation of a police power measure being

specifically aimed to safeguard publicmorals is immune from such imputation

of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported byanything of substance.

To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of

policepower which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the

least limitable of powers,

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extending as it does "to all the great public needs."It would be, to paraphrase another

leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if itcould be deprived or

allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health,

publicmorals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is thatinherent and plenarypower in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full

to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.On the legislative organs of the

government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exerciseof the police power,

which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations

topromote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the

people.In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable

constitutionalguaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect

the life, liberty or propertyof any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of

police power may be considered aseither capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a

denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may callfor correction by the courts.The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted

the injuction on the Ordinance inquestion.

***

Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made

to prevailover authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority

be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE v. WOODWARD

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Case Basics

Petitioner

Dartmouth College

Respondent

WoodwardDecided By

Marshall Court (1812-1823)

Opinion

17 U.S. 518 (1819)

Argued
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Tuesday, March 10, 1818

Decided

Tuesday, February 2, 1819

Facts of the Case

In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a

privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's

corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an

attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed

suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.

Question

Did the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with Dartmouth College's rights

under the Contract Clause?

Conclusion

Decision:5 votes for Dartmouth College, 1 vote(s) against

Legal provision:US Const. Art 1, Section 10

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a

contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that

the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil

institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to

transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the

government and its citizens."

Dartmouth College v. Woodward (17 U. S. 518, 1819)

Contract Clause, Limitations on the Powers of the States

The Issue

Under the Constitution, can a state legislature change the charter of a college?

What's at Stake?

Whether Dartmouth College would remain private or become a state school. More broadly,

what is protected by the Constitution's "contract" clause?

Facts and Background

In 1769 the King of England granted a charter to Dartmouth College. This document spelled

out the purpose of the school, set up the structure to govern it, and gave land to the

college. In 1816, the state legislature of New Hampshire passed laws that revised the charter.

These laws changed the school from private to public. They changed the duties of the

trustees. They changed how the trustees were selected.

The existing trustees filed suit. They claimed that the legislature violated the Constitution. They

said that Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution prevented a state from "impairing" (that is,weakening or canceling) a contract.

The Decision

By a 5-1 margin, the Court agreed with Dartmouth. The Court struck down the law, so

Dartmouth continued as a private college. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion.

He said that the charter was, in essence, a contract between the King and the trustees. Even

though we were no longer a royal colony, the contract is still valid because the Constitution

says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract.
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The Impact of the Decision

Historians believe that the decision greatly encouraged business investment and growth.

Corporations are also chartered by states. It states can't pass laws to impair those charters,

then businesses are more secure. They are also more apt to attract investors, employ

workers, and to add to the national prosperity.

The decision, handed down on February 2, 1819, ruled in favor of the College and

invalidated the act of the New Hampshire Legislature, which in turn allowed Dartmouth tocontinue as a private institution and take back its buildings, seal, and charter. The majority

opinion of the court was written by John Marshall. The opinion reaffirmed Marshall's belief in

the sanctity of a contract (also seen inFletcher v. Peck) as necessary to the functioning of a

republic (in the absence of royal rule, contracts rule).

The Court ruled that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private

parties, the King and the trustees, with which the legislature could not interfere. Even though

the United States are no longer royal colonies, the contract is still valid because the

Constitution says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract. The fact that the

government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civilinstitution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to

transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the

government and its citizens.[2]

Significance[edit]

The decision was not without precedent. Earlier the Court had invalidated a state act

inFletcher v. Peck, 10U.S.87(1810), concluding that contracts, no matter how they were

procured (in the case ofFletcher v. Peck, a land contract had been illegally obtained),

cannot be invalidated by state legislation. Thus, the court, though working in an early era,

was treading on Dartmouth. Fletcherwas not a popular decision at the time, and a public

outcry ensued.Thomas Jefferson's earlier commiseration with New Hampshire

GovernorWilliam Plumerstated essentially that the earth belongs to the living. Popular

opinion influenced some state courts and legislatures to declare that state governments had

an absolute right to amend or repeal acorporate charter. The courts, however, have

imposed limitations to this.

After the Dartmouth decision, many states wanted more control so they passed laws or

constitutional amendments giving themselves the general right to alter or revoke at will,

which the courts found to be a valid reservation.[3][4]The courts have established, however,

that the alteration or revocation of private charters or laws authorizing private charters must

be reasonable and cannot cause harm to the members (founders, stockholders, and the

like).[5][6][7]

The traditional view holds that this case is one of the most important Supreme Court rulings,

strengthening theContract Clauseand limiting the power of the States to interfere with

private charters, including those of commercial enterprises.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), was a

landmarkUnited States Supreme Courtcase dealing with the application of theContract

Clauseof theUnited States Constitutionto private corporations. The case arose when the

president ofDartmouth Collegewas deposed by itstrustees, leading to theNew

Hampshirelegislature attempting to force the college to become a public institution and

thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor. The Supreme

Court upheld the sanctity of the original charter of the college, which pre-dated the
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creation of the State. The decision settled the nature of public versus private charters and

resulted in the rise of the American business corporation.[1]

Contents

1 Facts

2 Judgment

3 See also

4 Notes

5 External links

Facts

In 1769 King George III of England granted a charter to Dartmouth College. This document

spelled out the purpose of the school, set up the structure to govern it, and gave land to the

college.

In 1815, over thirty years after the conclusion of theAmerican Revolution,the legislature of

New Hampshire attempted to alter Dartmouth's charter in order to reinstate the College'sdeposed president, placing the ability to appoint positions in the hands of the governor,

adding new members to the board of trustees, and creating a state board of visitors with

veto power over trustee decisions. This effectively converted the school from a private to a

public institution. The College's book of records, corporate seal, and other corporate

property were removed. Thetrustees of the Collegeobjected and sought to have the

actions of the legislature declared unconstitutional.

The trustees retained Dartmouth alumnusDaniel Webster, a New Hampshire native who

would later become aU.S. SenatorforMassachusettsandSecretary of

StateunderPresidentMillard Fillmore. Webster argued the college's case againstWilliam H.Woodward,the state-approved secretary of the new board of trustees. Webster's speech in

support of Dartmouth (which he described as "a small college," adding, "and yet there are

those who love it") was so moving that it apparently helped convinceChief Justice John

Marshall,also reportedly bringing tears to Webster's eyes.

Judgment

The decision, handed down on February 2, 1819, ruled in favor of the College and

invalidated the act of the New Hampshire Legislature, which in turn allowed Dartmouth to

continue as a private institution and take back its buildings, seal, and charter. The majority

opinion of the court was written by John Marshall. The opinion reaffirmed Marshall's belief in

the sanctity of a contract (also seen inFletcher v. Peck) as necessary to the functioning of a

republic (in the absence of royal rule, contracts rule).

Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)

CHRspower to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations

of it s adopted operat ional guidel ines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its

investigatorial powers.A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the

pet it io ne rs ) in his cap aci ty as an Executive Off icer of the Quezon City

Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,

and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North

EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a

grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) w ithin which to vacate

the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice,

the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be

removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#cite_note-0http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#cite_note-0http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#cite_note-0http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Factshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Factshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Judgmenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Judgmenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#See_alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#See_alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Noteshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Noteshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#External_linkshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#External_linkshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Revolutionhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Revolutionhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Revolutionhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Board_of_Trustees_of_Dartmouth_Collegehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Board_of_Trustees_of_Dartmouth_Collegehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Websterhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Websterhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Websterhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Senatorhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Senatorhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Senatorhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massachusettshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massachusettshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massachusettshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmorehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmorehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmorehttps://www.princeton.edu/w/index.php?title=William_H._Woodward&action=edit&redlink=1https://www.princeton.edu/w/index.php?title=William_H._Woodward&action=edit&redlink=1https://www.princeton.edu/w/index.php?title=William_H._Woodward&action=edit&redlink=1https://www.princeton.edu/w/index.php?title=William_H._Woodward&action=edit&redlink=1http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshallhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshallhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshallhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshallhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fletcher_v._Peckhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fletcher_v._Peckhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fletcher_v._Peckhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshallhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshallhttps://www.princeton.edu/w/index.php?title=William_H._Woodward&action=edit&redlink=1https://www.princeton.edu/w/index.php?title=William_H._Woodward&action=edit&redlink=1http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmorehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massachusettshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Senatorhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Websterhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Board_of_Trustees_of_Dartmouth_Collegehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Revolutionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#External_linkshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Noteshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#See_alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Judgmenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#Factshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodward#cite_note-0


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President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay)

with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion

Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City

to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sar i -

sa ri st or es , and ca ri nd er ia al on g Nor th ED SA . The complaint was docketed as

CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to

desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North

EDSApending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaintbefore theCommission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order,

dated 25 September1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for

carryingou t th e de mo li ti on of th e st al ls , sa ri -s ar i st or es an dcarinderia despite

the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. Issue: Whether or not

the CHR has jurisdiction :a)to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights"

of the private respondents whose stalls were demol ished by the peti tioners at the

instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt; Held:

a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, afore-quoted,

it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned

a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe casesof human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the

"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the

prevention

of t o r t u r e s , ( 3 ) f a i r a n d p u b l i c t r i a l s , ( 4 ) c a s e s o f disappearances,

(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)

otherc r i m e s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t t h e r e l i g i o u s . " W h i l e t h e e n um er at io n h

as not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a

statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the

delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation

of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall

withintheauthor i ty of the Commiss ion, tak ing into account i ts

recommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to

be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,

erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's

Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can

take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and

limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is

claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is,

in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis

the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the

order for the demolition of thesta l l s , sa r i -

sa r i st or es and car ind eri a of the pr iv ate respondents can fal l within the

compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by

the Constitution. b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized

to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for

violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR

acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any

person in

di rect or ind i rectcontempt, and to impose the appropr iate penal t ies inacc

ordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in th e Ru l esof Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to

apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidel ines

and rules of procedureesse nt ia l to carr y o ut i ts inv est i gato r ia l power s. Toexe

mplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to

cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline

to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative w ork . The

"or de r to de si s t" (a sem an ti c in te rp l ay fo r a restraining order) in the instance

before us, however, is


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noti nv es t i ga t or ia l in c ha ra c te r bu t p r es c in ds f ro m an adjudicative power

that it does not possess.

ISSUE:Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the

CRH?

HELD:No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of theCHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to " investigate,

on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and

political rights".

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that

the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for

preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have

been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the

Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the

Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no

jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by theJudge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further

proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) VS. PHILIPPINEBLOOMING MILLS CO.,

INC.G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

FACTS:Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a

massdemonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig policeand thatthey informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their

proposeddemonstration.The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after

learning the about theplanned mass. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was

confirmed by the union,explaining further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the

Company because theunion has no quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed out

that thedemonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of

thelaborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech

andfreedom for petition for redress of grievances.Company informed PBMEO that the

demonstration is an inalienable right of the unionguaranteed by the Constitution but

emphasized, however, that any demonstration for thatmatter should not unduly prejudice

the normal operation of the Company. For whichreason, the Company warned the PBMEO

representatives that workers who withoutprevious leave of absence approved by

the Company, particularly , the officers present whoare the organizers of the demonstration,

who shall fail to report for work shall bedismissed.Another meeting was convoked Company.

It reiterated and appealed to the PBMEOrepresentatives that while all workers may join the

Malacaang demonstration, those fromthe 1st and regular shifts should not absent

themselves to participate, otherwise, theywould be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel

the plan, the rally took place and the

officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and

NoLockoutclause of their Collective Bargaining

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO werefoundguilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently

deniedby the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.ISSUES:1.

Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA2.

Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing its employeesRULING:1.


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No. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also

political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and

complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the

periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the

administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The

citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental

officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful

sanctions on erring public officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights also protectsproperty rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.

Because these freedoms are "delicate

andvulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat ofsanctions may

deter their exercise almost as potently as the

actual applicationof sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting governm

entregulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru

prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights

areextinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attemptto limit the

power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the

tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs

political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression

and of

assemblyoccupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation andvitality of o

ur civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives theseliberties the sanctity and the san

ction not permitting dubious intrusions."The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of

peaceful assembly and ofpetition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed agai

nst publicofficials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women

by whom we shall be governed.

2. Company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on its part to permitall its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses

and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) workers from the service constituted an

unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom

petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an unfair labor practice defined

in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the

Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right

"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards

as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in

the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

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Executive Secretary v CA G.R. No. 131719. May 25, 2004.

07/06/2010

0 Comments

Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas

Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila

Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine

Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule

63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as

unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m),

Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the

respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.

Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have

stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of

a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a

period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the

petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the

inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were itsmembers and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order

enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k)

and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections

11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)

discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal

protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) ofthe Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only

overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers

also have the right to seek employment abroad.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated

because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It

cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while

unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and

unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibitionof the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal

recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning

agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid

classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property

and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to
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prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is

unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional

because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with

illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters

who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. ActNo. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based

on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides

being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the

Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of

recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal

recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8,

9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume

that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving

economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the

law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal

recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of

the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within

which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprivelicensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the

summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the

filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift

on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign

employers.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:

SEC. 9. Venue.A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall

be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense wascommitted or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of

the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire

jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated

provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at

the time of the effectivity of this Act.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent

has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules

implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions

do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by

Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.

In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As

earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of

petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from

the defect and impropriety of the petition.


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On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision

dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction

issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for

reconsideration of the said decision.

Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of

its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the

writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of

preliminary injunction issued by it.

Held:IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the

appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court datedAugust 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by

it in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to

the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its

discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may

be nullified via a writ of certiorari and prohibition.

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an

injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,

harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on

its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be

employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to

be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in theabsence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits,

or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of

hardships tips decidedly in its favor.

Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them

unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of

certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying

out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful

conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the

Constitution.

One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond

reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All

reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v.

Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation

of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the


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other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).

In view of petitioner's standing

The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-

profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although

the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed andregistered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its

Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent

the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as

to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while

the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented.

The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in

representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in

the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain ofinjuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its

members. 16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct

interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the

concerns of its constituents.

We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the

purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the

manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing,

creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its generalmembership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino

workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association

on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and

activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein.

In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers

However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of

unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered

recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section

2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered

recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the

petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.

In view of retroactivity

In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor

Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied

retroactively.

In view of equal protection clause

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the

permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing


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or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled

practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of

various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid

written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause

of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact theassailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or

class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which

it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality,

but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges

conferred and liabilities imposed.

In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042

The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment

agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v.

Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may

be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and

consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural

provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court,by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of

the said provisions cannot be enjoined.

Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and

employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the

enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who

commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may

be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the

prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.

The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered

recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the

assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the

enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The

respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the

enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that,

because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases

before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or

difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.

Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent

people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led

to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at

affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on

existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.


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By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the

trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed

them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment

abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52

embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.

The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of

jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason

that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of

preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

Case Doctrines- Constitutional Law 2

SECTION 1

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall

any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

A. Life, Liberty or Property

American Inter-Fashion v. Office of the President export quota allocation

Glorious Suns export quota allocation was a initially a privilege evolved into some form ofproperty which should not be removed arbitrarily and without due process and hurriedly

confer it to another.

Chavez v. Romulocitizens right to bear arms - The right to bear arms cannot be classified

as a fundamental right under the 1987 Constitution the right is a mere statutory privilege,

not a constitutional right. It is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the

people the

right to bear arms. The Second Amendment pertains to the citizens collective right to

take arms in defense of the state, not to the citizens individual right to own and possess

arms.

Exec. Secretary V. CAMigrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 A profession,

trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees; one

cannot be deprived of the right to work or the right to make a living because these rights

are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes

an actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute and the proper regulation of a

profesion is a valid exercise of police power.

Duncan v. Glaxo not ed to have a relationship with an employee of a competitorcompanyGlaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets. (related topic: equal protection)

Alejano v. CabuayOakwood Mutiny Case writ of habeas corpus is available where a

person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where

there is a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but also

unnecessary, and where a deprivation og freedom originally valid has later become

arbitrary. (related topic: privacy of communication and correspondence)


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B. Procedural Due Process

Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca mortgage foreclosure due process implies that: 1)

there must be a court or tribunal clothed with the power to hear or determine the matter

before it; 2) that jurisdiction has been lawfully acquired; 3) defendant shall have to

opputunity to be heard; 4) judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing. | NOTICE must

be given

Bautista v. CAland disputeWhen a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in

the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process

Rural Bank of Buhi v. CAbank receivership; insolvency there is no requirement whether

express or implied that a hearing must first be conducted before a banking institution may

be placed in receivership

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CAuntreated wastewater discharged to sewer Ex parte

proceedings - permitted by law in situations like these because stopping the discharged ofthe wastewater cannot be

made to wait until protracted litigation; standards set by the board enough not required

to prove immediate danger to life, health et. al

Fabella v. CA public school teachers striking DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDINGS

requisites: 1) actual or constructive notice of the institution of the proceedings which may

affect ones legal rights; 2) real opportunity to be heard personally or with counsel; 3) to

present witnesses and

evidence is ones favor and to defend his rights; 4) tribunal vested with competentjurisdiction reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality; 5) finding is supported by

substantial evidence

contained and made known to the parties

Guzman v. CA kicked out from school DUE PROCESS IN STUDENT DISCPLINE

PROCEEDINGSrequisites: 1) student must be informed in writing the nature and cause of

the accusation against him; 2) right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance

of counsel if desired; 3) they shall

be informed of the evidence against them; 4) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;

5) evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or officials hearing the

case

Lao Gi v. CA DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS same requisites as those

required in criminal proceedings (Rules of Court) Secretary of Justice v. Lantion extradition

case of Jimenez - DUE PROCESS IN QUASIJUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) taking and

evaluation of evidence; 2)

determining facts based upon the evidence presented; 3) rendering an order based upon

the facts proved Chavez v. COMELEC billboard of Chavez as endorser A statute or

regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutionality principle

that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state

regulations may nor be achieved by means

that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade protected freedoms

SECTION ONE of Article III of 1987 ConstitutionDue Process

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall

any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

(Lets try to understand the provision)


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Q: What does the law mean when it says PERSON

A: All person.

Natural (Citizen or Alien)

Juridical ex. corporations and parnership See: ?? Constitutional Law, Cruz pp. 101]

Q: So what does this provision have to do with persons?

A: It guarantees all persons security against deprivation of their life, liberty (freedom) or

property without due process. That natural or juridical person may invoke this right whenever

the government deprives them of such rights.Q: What does the law mean when it says deprive?

A: To deprive is to take forcibly, to prevent from possessing, enjoying, or using something.

Denial of right to life, liberty, property. Deprivation per se is not necessarily unconstitutional

but deprivation of life, liberty and property WITHOUT DUE PROCESS is unconstitutional.

Q: What are the protected rights under this section?

A: Life, Liberty and Property

Q: What does law mean when it says LIFE

A: It means the integrity of the physical person, the individual or any part of his body. [Cruz]

It also means good life or quality living or a decent standard of living. See: ?? The 1987

Constitution A comprehensive reviewer, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, pp. 24]

:right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment and extends

to the use of his God-given faculties, which makes life enjoyable. Read : ??Buck vs. Bell 274

SCRA 200

Q: Does this include the life of the unborn?

A: Yes. Article II, section 12 says the state shall equally protect the life of the mother and

the life of the unborn from conception.

Q: What does law mean when it says LIBERTY

A: Mabini once said, Liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong.


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A: No. ??Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.

Vested right to a public office is notregarded as property. However, salaray already earned

is considered as property. ??Cruz

Q: On classification of property into historical treasures.

A: Should be done with both substantive and procedural due process because it involves

imposition of limits on ownership.

Q: Right to collect pension plan

A: Employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part ofthe terms of employment. ?? GSIS vs. Montescarlos, GR no. 146494, July 14, 2004

*Human rights enjoy a higher status than property rights.

Q: What is Due Process?

A: It is a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and render

judgment only after trial.

Two Kinds of Due Process:

1. Substantive due process-requires that the law itself is FAIR, REASONABLE and JUST (FRJ)

-done in due process if under the authority of a valid law; requires the intrinsic validity of the

law (Cruz)

-did the law itself comply with the constitution as to its validity and effectiveness? is the law

valid and unconstitutional?

-it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws (Bernas)

-heart is reasonableness and absence of exercise of arbitrary power of the government

Requisites:

Valid governmental objectivePublic interest

Means employed (intrinsic procedure how the law will be enforced) are reasonably

related and necessary for accomplishment of purpose and not unduly oppressive

Presumption on states act interfering with life, liberty and property:

GR: Valid

XPN: In case of prior restraint

Void-for-vagueness rule a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary

intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so

indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions is void for

vagueness. Constitutional vice is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an

offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.

Law is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of oridnary intelligence

must guess as to the meaning and as to the application.

Vague law is repugnant to Constitution in 2 aspects:

1. Violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,

fair notice of the conduct to avoid.2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and it can

become an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle.

Overbreadth doctrine - decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by

means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the are of protected

freedoms.

Facial Challenge - allowed to be made to a vague statue and to one which is overbroad

because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.

On its face invalidation - results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they mightbe applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.

Conclusive Presumption of knowledge of law presupposes that law has been published.

(Art. 3, NCC)

2. Procedural Due Process - refers to method or manner by which the law is enforced

- Strike, but hear me first. -Themistocles

Twin requirements:

1. Notice

2. Hearing


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2 Kinds of Procedural Due Process

1. Judicial

2. Administrative

Judicial Due Process:

1. Impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter

before it

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over theproperty which is the subject matter

over person (civil) through valid service of summons -w/o this judgment will be

unconstitutional; (criminal) during arraignment the court acquires jurisdiction of the accused

over subject matter determined by Congress through law (Law may attribute jurisdiction to

RTC, MTC)

3. Notice and Hearing - right to adduce its own evidence and to meet and refute the

evidence submitted by the other party

4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing decision based on the merits,

evidence presented

Administrative Due Process:

1. notice and hearing (may or may not be assisted by a counsel)

2. court with competent jurisdiction

3. judgment upon lawful trial

Difference between the Judicial notice and hearing and that of Administrative:

Judicial: needs public trial

Administrative: no trial type proceedings, submission of position papers only; exception is

Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board which requires trial and hearing

**if the rule of any quasi-judicial proceeding requires trial type then it should be followed

otherwise there will be NO due process

Quasi-judicial functionnotice and hearing are requiredExecutive/legislative function not required

Q: Is appeal part a natural right and part of due process?

A: No. GR: may be allowed or denied by legislature; XPN: where Constitution gives the

person right to appeal, denial of such right is a violation of due process

Q: Is preliminary investigation a right

A: No. May be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it.

EXTRADITION delivery of an accused or a convicted individual to the requesting state in

whose territory he is alleged to have committed a crime

>There is no legal obligation to surrender a fugitive unless theres a treaty

>Religious or Political offenses are generally NOT extraditableQ: Is an extraditee entitled to a notice and hearing before the issuance of the warrant of

arrest once the petition for extradition is filed in court?

A: No. See ??Govt of US vs. Purganan

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988

GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, petitioner,

vs.

PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents.

Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.


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Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.

PADILIA,J.:

Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of

1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private

respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. 1As

required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with

administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5,

Republic Act No. 5185. 2

On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial

Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing,

private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and

documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent

Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office

as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 3

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction,

petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial

Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from

enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding

further with the administrative case.

According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51

issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly

violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of

the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of

preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated

the fundamental and elementary principles of due process. 4

On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary i

1 19 consti. law 2 digest

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