1-1 cmpe 259 sensor networks katia obraczka winter 2005 security
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CMPE 259 Sensor Networks
Katia Obraczka
Winter 2005
Security
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Announcements
Hw3 due today. Project presentations tomorrow from 4-
7pm. Project reports due tomorrow by
midnight.
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Security in sensor networks
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Security in sensor networks
For many sensor network applications, security is critical. Public safety, special operations,
healthcare, etc. Sensor network protocols should
incorporate security mechanisms in the original design.
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DoS in Sensor Networks [Wood et al.] What is DoS?
Attack that reduces or eliminates the network’s ability to perform its function.
E.g., hardware failures, software bugs, resource exhaustion, etc.
Paper looks at protocol layers and possible DoS attacks.
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Physical layer
Attacks: Jamming. Tampering.
Defenses: Jamming:
• Spread-spectrum techniques.• Lower duty cycle with priority messages.• Alternate modes of communication.
Tampering:• “Self-destruction”• Hiding nodes.
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Link layer
Attacks: Collision induction. Battery exhaustion. Unfairness.
Defenses: Collision induction. . Fairness.
• Error correcting codes (?) .Small frames.• Collision detection.• Collision-free MAC.
Battery exhaustion.• Rate limitation.• Streamlined protocols.
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Network layer: attacks
“Neglect and greed”. “Homing”. Misdirection. Gray/black holes.
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Network layer: defenses
Authorization. Only authorized nodes participate in
routing.• Need authentication mechanisms.
Monitoring.• Monitor node behavior.
Probing. Redundancy.
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Transport layer
Attacks: Flooding. Desynchronization.
• Message fabrication to get end points out of sync.
Defenses: Flooding:
• Limit number of connections.• Challenges/puzzles to clients.
Desynchronization:• Authenticate all messages (including header
fields)
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Sample protocol vulnerabilities Adaptive rate control [Woo et al.]
MAC layer modifications to 802.11. Preference to route-through traffic. Vulnerabilities?
RAP [Lu et al.] Similar vulnerability. Differentiated services can be exploited by
attacker.
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“On Communication Security…” [Slijepcevic et al.]
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Focus
Communication security in sensor networks.
Data classification and related security threats.
Location-based security mechanism.
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Types of data
Mobile code. Sensor node location. Application data.
Goals: Minimize security-related energy
consumption. Different protection levels.
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Target sensor net architecture Localized algorithms. Local broadcast. Mobile code.
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Security threats
Insertion of malicious code. Interception of messages with node
location information. Interception of application data. Injection of false data.
Lower risk.
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Security architecture
Symmetric key encryption. All messages encrypted.
Three security levels: Level I: mobile code. Level II: node location information. Level III: application data.
Encryption strength: Level I > level II > level III.
Encryption algorithm with adjustable strength (number of rounds).
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Security architecture (cont’d)
Group keys. Every user: set of keys, pseudorandom
generator, and seed. Periodically and synchronously, nodes
change keys.
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Security levels
Level I uses strongest encryption for mobile code injection. 32 rounds.
Level II: Location-based keys.
• Different for different “cells”.• Protect network from compromised keys.
Level I: Weakest security. 22 rounds.
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Performance
Cost of encryption/decryption. Energy considerations.
Rockwell WINS node.
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“Secure Routing…” [Karlof et al.]
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Focus
Routing security in sensor networks.
Problem: Current routing protocols for sensor
networks do not consider security. Vulnerable to attacks. Not easy to make these protocols secure.
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Contributions
Threat models and security goals for sensor network routing.
Two new attacks: sinkhole and HELLO floods.
Security analysis of routing and topology control algorithms.
Attacks against these protocols. Countermeasures and design issues for
secure routing in sensor networks.
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Deployment and platform
Heterogeneous deployment. Mica motes with TinyOS. Base stations. Aggregation points.
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Sensor- and ad-hoc networks
Traffic considerations: Ad hoc networks exhibit more general
patterns. Sensor networks:
• Many-to-one.• One-to-many.• Local.
Capabilities. Sensor nodes are typically more limited.
Trust relationships. E.g., to perform aggregation, duplicate
pruning, etc.
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Attacks
Spoofed, altered, replayed routing information.
Selective forwarding. Black/gray hole.
Sinkhole. Sybil.
Single nodes presents multiple id’s to others.
Wormhole. HELLO flood. (Link-layer) ACK spoofing.
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Countermeasures Outsider attacks:
Link layer encryption and authentication. Shared keys.
Insider attacks: Identity verification. Multipath routing. Bi-directional link verification. Limiting number of neighbors.
Sinkhole and wormhole attacks are harder to circumvent. Design routing protocols where these
attacks are ineffective. E.g., geographic routing. ???