HOW TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION BASED ON CRIM ACT

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, Petitioners, vs.HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

The case is the Petition for Review on, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.

Facts:

1. Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van’s driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van’s passengers.

2. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

3. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.

4. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action.

5. Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping

6. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.

7. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners’ cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.

8. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.

9. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cause of action was based on quasi –delict which will prescribe in 4 years from the constitution of the cause of action or one of ex-delicto and that will expires 10 years from the finality of the judgment.

HELD: SC granted the petition.

1. Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.

2. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,

a. (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and b. (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those

i. (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or

ii. (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

iii. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.

3. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

4. We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer.

5. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.

6.