02a overview of infcirc225 rev5 (4) · 2 – iaea nuclear security series no. 13 the twenty-sixth...

2 – IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13

The Twenty-Sixth International Training Course

2. IAEA Nuc lear Secur i ty Ser ies No. 13 ( INFCIRC/225/Rev.5)

October 24 – November 11, 2016Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

Riyaz Natha

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13

Learn ing Object ives

After completing this module you should be able to: • Explain the purpose of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 • Identify the four objectives of a State’s Physical

Protection Regime• Identify the fundamental principles in the Amendment to

the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

• State the recommendations for physical protection against theft and sabotage

• Develop a foundation to apply knowledge you will gain from the ITC in addressing the recommendations in INFCIRC 225/Rev.5

2




Background

• INFCIRC/225 The de facto international standard for the physical protection of

nuclear material for decades Has provided internationally accepted physical protection

guidance since it was first published in 1975.• Revised in 1977, 1989, 1993, 1999 and 2011

Fifth revision of INFCIRC/225 was published in January 2011, following a five year international effort.

• INFCIRC/225 recommendations are integral to legally binding agreements governing U.S. nuclear exports to nearly 50 countries.

• Revision 5 is also IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13

3


Changes in Structure and Scope to INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

4

• INFCIRC/225 restructure Supports the amended CPPNM -- now aligns with the 12 Fundamental

Principles of Physical Protection and the four Physical Protection Objectives

• Expanded scope Includes new sections on the location and recovery of missing nuclear

material and mitigation of sabotage—two objectives of the amended CPPNM

• Provides a process to define which nuclear materials and facilities require protection against sabotage

• Complements two other NSS recommendations documents: Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities – NSS-14 Material Out of Regulatory Control – NSS-15




E lements of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 versus 12 Fundamental Pr inc ip les of CPPNM • STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Fundamental Principle A)• INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT (Fundamental Principle B)• ASSIGNMENT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITIES • LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Legislative and regulatory framework (Fundamental Principle C) Competent authority (Fundamental Principle D) Responsibilities of license holders (Fundamental Principle E)

• INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE • IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THREATS (Fundamental Principle G)• RISK-BASED PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND MEASURES

Risk management Graded approach (Fundamental Principle H) Defense in depth (Fundamental Principle I)

• SUSTAINING THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION REGIME Security Culture (Fundamental Principle F) Quality Assurance (Fundamental Principle J) Confidentiality (Fundamental Principle L) Sustainability programme

• PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR AND RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS (Fundamental Principle K: Contingency Plans)

5


Object ives of State ’s Phys ica l Protect ion RegimeProtect persons, property, society, and the environment from malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive material (2.1)• Objectives related to theft (2.1):

To protect against unauthorized removal: protecting against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear material.

To locate and recover missing nuclear material: ensuring the implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material.

• Objectives related to sabotage (2.1): To protect against sabotage: protecting nuclear material and nuclear

facilities against sabotage. To mitigate or minimize effects of sabotage: mitigating or minimizing the

radiological consequences of sabotage. 6




Phys ica l Protect ion Regime Object ives

• Achieve objectives through (2.2) Prevention of a malicious act by means of deterrence and by

protection of sensitive information Management of an attempted malicious act or a malicious act by

an integrated system of detection, delay, and response Mitigation of the consequences of a malicious

act

• Approach (2.3) Objectives should be addressed in an integrated

and coordinated manner, taking into account the different risks covered by nuclear security

7


Phys ica l Protect ion

People Procedures Equipment

Physical Protection Regime

Physical Protection System

Physical Protection Measures

8




Phys ica l Protect ion Regime Ent i t ies

• State• Competent Authority• Licence Holders

Operator of nuclear facilities Shipper for transport of nuclear materials

Nuclear Security Culture crosses all three levels

9


Phys ica l Protect ion System• “An integrated set of physical protection measures

intended to prevent the completion of a malicious act” NSS-13

• For a successful system design, the total time for detection, delay, and response must be less than adversary task time to complete his or her goal

Task 8

LimitedAccessArea Protected Area

Inner/VitalArea

Hardened EnclosureSensitiveMaterial

Task1

Task2

Task6

Task4

Task3

Task7

Task5

Consider Response Force Time

10




Phys ica l Protect ion Measures

• Detection Central Alarm Station Two-Person Rule, Guards

• Delay Access Delay Physical Barriers Guards, Response Forces

• Response Guards, Response Forces,

Contingency Plans

As a system consider:• Defense in Depth • Graded Approach• Performance Testing • Balanced Protection

Integrated

Integrated

Physical Protection

System

11


INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 Discusses Roles and Responsib i l i t ies for Di fferent Ent i t ies• Roles and responsibilities

for each entity• Joint responsibilities

Sustainment Nuclear Security Culture Quality Assurance Confidentiality Sustainability program

Planning and Preparedness

State

Establishes

License Holders

Implements legislation and regulations

Competent Authority

Implement Physical Protection

*Includes operators, shippers, and carriers12




S tate Responsib i l i t ies

Fundamental Principle AThe responsibility for the establishment, implementation, and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State.

13

Legal and Regulatory Framework

Assignment of Responsibilities

Physical Protection

Requirements

International Transport

International Cooperation

STATE


Internat ional Transport

Fundamental Principle BThe responsibility of a State for ensuring that nuclear material is adequately protected extends to the international transport thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to another State, as appropriate.

• Continuous control of nuclear material while under jurisdiction of the State (3.4)

• Custody transfer process Parties to the CPPNM Formal agreement for continued appropriate physical protection Coordination and status communications

• Special provisions for Category I material (3.7)• New structure for Transport recommendations

14




Legis lat ive and Regulatory Framework

Fundamental Principle CThe State is responsible for establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection.

• Regulatory framework (3.11-3.13) Licensing Regulations Evaluations

• Compliance with physical protection regulations• Test physical protection systems including training and readiness of

guards and/or response forces

15


Competent Author i ty

Fundamental Principle DThe State should establish or designate a competent authority that is responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework and is provided with adequate authority, competence, and financial and human resources to fulfill the assigned responsibilities.

• Designated by the State with clearly defined legal status and independent from (3.18) Applicants Operators Shippers Carriers

• Provided adequate Legal authority Competence Financial resources Human resources

16




L icence Holders

Fundamental Principle EThe responsibilities for implementing the various elements of physical protection within a State should be clearly identified. The State should ensure that the prime responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the holders of the relevant licences or of other authorizing documents (e.g., operators or shippers).

• Responsibilities of License Holders Compliance with regulations Cooperation and coordination with State entities having physical

protection responsibilities Material accountancy and control Development of security plan and contingency plan Optimum site selection and design Development and implementation of means and procedures for

evaluation and maintenance of the PPS Compensatory measures 17


Nuc lear Secur i ty Cul ture

Fundamental Principle FAll organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the entire organization.

• Consistent with IAEA Nuclear Security Culture (NSS-7)• Recognizes that a credible threat exists and that the individual plays

an important role in preserving nuclear security (3.48)• Brings together State, organizations, managers, and individuals to

work together for better security (3.49)• Is pervasive in all elements of the regime (3.50)• Provides regular security training (3.51)

18




Ident i f icat ion and Assessment of Threats

Fundamental Principle G The State’s physical protection should be based on the State’s current evaluation of the threat.

• Threat considerations should include Insider threat (3.36) Cyber threats/Computer Security Airborne threat (3.40) Stand-off attacks (3.40) Theft for off-site dispersal

• Be continuously updated• Design Basis Threat – Cat I, High Radiological Consequence facilities

19


R isk Management

• State is now asked to manage the risk of theft and sabotage to keep the risk at acceptable levels (3.41)

• Requires assessing threat and potential consequences (3.41)

• Developing a legislative, regulatory, and programmatic framework ensures that appropriate effective physical protection measures are put in place (3.42)

20




Graded Approach

Fundamental Principle HPhysical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the nuclear material, and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities.• Takes into account the current evaluation of the threat (3.43-3.44)

Relative attractiveness/nature of the nuclear material Potential consequences associated with

• Unauthorized removal• Sabotage• Loss of information

Personnel Trustworthiness

• Requires determination of Risk thresholds Commensurate protection levels Performance standards

21

As consequences increases

Higher levels of protection are needed


Defence In Depth

Fundamental Principle IThe State’s requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept of several layers and methods of protection (structural, other technical, personnel, and organizational) that have to be overcome or circumvented by an adversary in order to achieve his objectives.

• Physical Protection System has layers of protection Includes mixture of protection methods (3.45)

• Hardware (security devices)• Procedures (the organization of guards and their performance)• Facility Design (including layout)

Applies to detection, delay, and response (3.46)

• Takes into account the system for nuclear material accountancy and control to protect against insiders, external threats (3.47)

22




Performance Test ing

• Subsystem and Component-level testing• Now required also by operators and competent authority• Includes guards and response forces to truly test system

effectiveness • Some requirements on frequency of performance testing• Used also for exercising contingency plans and

emergency response to ensure interagency coordination is effective and for training purposes

23

Qual i ty Assurance

Fundamental Principle JA quality assurance policy and quality assurance programmes should be established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to physical protection are satisfied.

• Should ensure Physical protection system is designed, implemented, operated,

and maintained in a condition capable of effectively responding to the threat assessment or DBT

System meets the State’s regulations, including its prescriptive and/or performance-based requirements.

24





P lann ing and Preparedness for and Response to Nuc lear Secur i ty EventsFundamental Principle K Contingency (emergency) plans to respond to unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities or nuclear material, or attempts thereof, should be prepared and appropriately exercised by all licence holders and authorities concerned.

• Established by the State Competent authority ensures operator contingency plans are consistent with and

complementary to the State’s contingency plan Operator contingency plans (approved by the competent authority) should

effectively counter the threat taking the actions of response forces into consideration

• Coordination between guards and response forces during a nuclear security event should be regularly exercised

• Effectiveness of physical protection systems should be maintained during emergency conditions

• Initiated after detection and assessment of any malicious act 25

Conf ident ia l i ty

Fundamental Principle LThe State should establish requirements for protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

• State responsibilities Take steps to ensure appropriate protection of specific or detailed

information for which unauthorized disclosure could compromise physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

Specify what information needs to be protected and how it should be protected, using a graded approach

Establish sanctions as part of legislative or regulatory system against persons violating confidentiality

• PPS management should limit access to sensitive information to those with established trustworthiness and need to know

26





Def in i t ions for Protect ion P lanning

• Security Plans – Based on DBT/threat assessment and include design, evaluation, implementation, and maintenance of physical protection system and contingency plans

• Contingency Plans (CP) – Predefined sets of actions for response to security events, such as unauthorized acts indicative of attempted unauthorized removal or sabotage, designed to effectively counter such acts

• Emergency Plans – Predefined sets of actions for response to safety events or other emergency events

27


Cont ingency P lans versus Emergency P lans

Contingency Plan• Includes measures

that focus on preventing further damage, on securing the nuclear facility, and on protecting emergency equipment and personnel

Contingency plans and emergency plans should be comprehensive and complementary.

28

Emergency Plan• Consists of measures to

ensure mitigation or minimization of the radiological consequences as well as human errors, equipment failures, and natural disasters




Requ i rements for Measures aga ins t Unauthor i zed Remova l o f Nuc lear Mater ia l in Use and Storage• New structure is additive and based on category of

material• Addresses measures to locate and recover missing or

stolen nuclear material• Includes protection of computer-based systems• Describes prudent management practices

29

Material Form Category I Category II Category IIIc

1. Plutonium Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but morethan 500 g

500 g or less but more than 15 g

2. Uranium‐235 Unirradiatedb

‐ Uranium enriched to 20% 235U or more

5 kg or more Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg

1 kg or less but more than 15 g

‐ Uranium enriched to 10% 235U but less than 20% 235 U

10 kg or more Less than 10 kg but more than 1 kg

‐ Uranium enriched above natural but less than 10% 235 U

10 kg or more

3. Uranium‐233 Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g

500 g or less but more than 15 g

4. Irradiated Fuel (The categorization of irradiated fuel in the table is based on international transportconsiderations. The State may assign a different category for domestic use, storage, and transportation taking all relevant factors into account.)

Depleted or naturaluranium, thorium or low‐enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content)d/e


Nuc lear Mater ia l Categor izat ion(IAEA Categor izat ion)

a All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.b Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/hrc Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium; depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with prudent management practice.d Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical

protection.e Other fuel which by virtue of its original material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level

from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/hr (100rad/hr) at one meter unshielded. 30




Addi t ive Approach for Category-Based Phys ica l Protect ion

Site

Limited Access Area

Protected Area

Inner Area

Category III Material

Category II Material

Category I Material

(4.13 - 4.20) (4.13 - 4.20)(4.21 - 4.35)

(4.13 - 4.20)(4.21 - 4.35)(4.36 - 4.49) 31


Locate and Recovery Act ions

• The first step for location and recovery of missing and/or stolen nuclear material is to detect that the nuclear material is not in its authorized location

• After Operator confirms the nuclear material is not present, then relevant competent authorities within the State should be notified

• The Operator provides necessary information to other appropriate agencies

• In accordance with the contingency plan, the nuclear material should be secured once it is recovered

32




Requ i rements fo r Measures aga ins t Sabotage o f Nuc lear Fac i l i t i es and Nuc lear Mater ia l i n Use and S to rage

• Basis for graded approach• Design process• Requirements for physical protection against sabotage -

for high consequence and other facilities• Requirements for measures to mitigate or minimize the

radiological consequences of sabotage

33


G raded Approach to Phys ica l P rotec t ion aga ins t Sabotage

• Level of protection required should be related to potential level of consequences

• State must specify consequence levels for: High radiological consequences (HRC) - The level above

which vital areas must be identified and protected Unacceptable radiological consequences (URC) - The level

above which implementation of physical protection measures is warranted

• INFCIRC/225/Rev 5 specifies protection measures appropriate for vital areas

• State must specify protection requirements for facilities with consequences between unacceptable and high

34




Consequences - URC and HRCConsequen

ces

UnacceptableRadiologicalConsequences

HighRadiologicalConsequences

Secure and control access to safety‐related equipment

Graded protection requirements based on level of potential consequences

Identify vital areas and protect as specified in INFCIRC/225/Rev 5

35

36

Site

Limited Access Area

Protected Area

Inner Area

Vital Area

Consequences - URC and HRC (Cont ’d)




Requirements for Measures to Mit igate or Min imize Radio logica l Consequences

• New sets of requirements for the State and Operator• Develop security contingency plans (5.44-5.58)

Prevent further damage Secure the facility Protect emergency equipment and personnel

• Response forces must be familiar with site, sabotage targets and knowledge of radiation protection

• Contingency plan complements safety emergency plan by focusing on preventing further damage, securing the nuclear facility, and protecting emergency equipment and personnel

37


Requ i rements for Unauthor i zed Remova l and Sabotage dur ing Transpor t• Common requirements for transport of nuclear material (6.6)• Requirements for Categories I, II and III (6.11-6.43)• Requirements for measures to locate and recover (6.44-6.55)• Requirements for protection against sabotage (6.56-6.59) • Requirements for measures to mitigate or minimize radiological

consequences (6.60-6.73)

38




Summary

• INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 was revised to address an increased threat environment and ensure its compatibility with and guidance for implementation of the Amended CPPNM

• Rev.5 contains many strengthened recommended requirements for the protection of nuclear material during use, storage, and transport

39

02a overview of infcirc225 rev5 (4) · 2 – iaea nuclear security series no. 13 the twenty-sixth...

Documents