Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America

Jorge I. Domínguez, Harvard UniversitySteven Levitsky, Harvard UniversityJames Loxton, Harvard University

Brandon Van Dyck, Lafayette College

Political parties are the basic building blocks of representative democracy. Political scientists have long argued that democracy is “unthinkable” (Schattschneider 1942: 1), or at least “unworkable” (Aldrich 1995: 3), without them. Yet more than three decades after the onset of the Third Wave of democratization, parties remain weak in much of Latin America. Established parties have collapsed or weakened in many countries and relatively few new parties have consolidated.1

Yet the party-building experience has not been universally bleak. Several new parties have taken root in Latin America during the Third Wave, including the Workers’ Party (PT) and Social Democracy Party (PSDB) in Brazil; the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and Party for Democracy (PPD) in Chile; the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador; the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico; the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua; and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in Panama.2 These successful cases suggest that party-building is difficult, but not impossible, in contemporary Latin America.

This volume seeks to explain variation in party-building in Latin America. Why do some new parties take root while others do not? The question has important implications for democracy. Where parties are weak, or where party systems decompose and are not rebuilt, democracies often suffer from problems of governability, constitutional crisis, and even breakdown (e.g., Peru, Venezuela). In contrast, where parties remain strong, or where previously inchoate party systems become institutionalized, democracies tend to remain stable (e.g., Chile, Uruguay) or become consolidated (e.g., Brazil, Mexico).

Scholars know little about the conditions that give rise to strong parties. The leading theories of party and party system development are based almost entirely on studies of the United States and Western European countries.3 Since almost all of these polities developed stable parties and party systems, much of the classic literature takes party-building for granted. Thus, while classic studies like those of Duverger (1954), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Shefter (1994), and Aldrich (1995) contributed much to our understanding of the origins and character of parties in the advanced democracies, they offer less insight into a more fundamental question: Under what conditions do

1Of the six party systems that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) scored as “institutionalized,” four have either fully (Venezuela) or partially (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica) collapsed, and of the four party systems that they classified as “inchoate,” three (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru) have weakened even further.2We score new parties as successful if they win at least 10 percent of the legislative vote in at least five consecutive national elections. 3 See, for example, Duverger (1954), Downs (1957), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Panebianco (1988), Kitschelt (1989), and Aldrich (1995).

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stable parties emerge in the first place?

This volume develops a new theoretical framework to explain the success or failure of party-building. Building on recent research on new parties in developing and post-communist countries,4 we argue that parties are most likely to take root when they develop (1) a strong brand and (2) a robust territorial organization. A strong brand helps parties develop a base of partisans, or individuals who feel an attachment to the party. Parties with clear brands come to “stand for” something in the eyes of supporters, who in turn are more likely to turn out for them at election time. Territorial organizations help parties survive over time. Parties with organized activist bases are less prone to collapse in the face of early defeats. Thus, although new parties may win elections without organizations, few of them can lose elections and survive without them.

Neither brands nor organization are easy to come by. Brand development requires programmatic differentiation and consistency, or, in the absence of these, strong performance in office (Lupu, this volume). Yet the debt crisis of the 1980s and the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s undermined government performance and induced many emerging parties to shift programmatically to the right. The combination of poor performance and programmatic inconsistency hindered brand development. Indeed, as Roberts’ chapter shows, most new left-of-center parties that implemented neoliberal reforms eventually collapsed. Organization-building is also difficult in the contemporary period. Mass media technologies enable politicians to win elections without activist-based organizations, weakening their incentive to invest in them (Hale 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). As Van Dyck’s chapter argues, parties are more likely to build organizations when access to the state and media is limited, as in the case of parties born under authoritarian rule. With democratization, however, these incentives to invest in organization weakened.

The volume’s central argument is that successful party-building is most likely to occur under conditions of intense polarization and conflict. Periods of intense (and often violent) conflict, such as revolution, civil war, authoritarian repression, and large-scale mobilization facilitate party-building by forging strong partisan attachments (and brands), creating powerful incentives for politicians to build organizations, and generating the kind of “higher cause” that attracts committed activists (which are essential to building organizations). Many of the most durable parties in Latin American history were born or consolidated during periods of revolution,5 civil war, 6 or intense polarization and repression.7 As the volume demonstrates, most of the new parties that took root in Latin America during the Third Wave were likewise born amid intense polarization and conflict. Nearly all of the new left parties that consolidated after 1978 either emerged out of violent revolutionary movements (e.g., FMLN in El Salvador, FSLN in Nicaragua) or resistance to

4On Latin America, see Mainwaring (1999); Mainwaring and Zoco (2007); and Lupu (forthcoming). On sub-Saharan Africa, see LeBas (2011); Arriola (2013); and Riedl (forthcoming). On Asia, see Hicken (2009). On the former Soviet Union, see Hale (2006) and Hanson (2010).5For example, the Mexican PRI and the Bolivian MNR.6For example, the Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia; the Blancos and Colorados in Uruguay; and the PLN in Costa Rica.7For example, AD and COPEI in Venezuela; the PRD in the Dominican Republic; APRA in Peru; and the Radicals and Peronists in Argentina.

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authoritarian rule (e.g., PT and PSDB in Brazil, PRD in Mexico, PPD in Chile). Similarly, the two most successful new right-wing parties in the region (ARENA in El Salvador and the UDI in Chile) emerged amid intense polarization and perceived leftist threat.

The chapters in the volume make several additional contributions to the emerging literature on party-building in new democracies.

New Bases of Party Organization. Contemporary parties confront a paradox: territorial organizations remain critical to long-term party success, but due to the availability of mass media, politicians no longer need them to get elected. Consequently, party organization is often under-supplied. Several of the volume’s chapters offer insights into what it takes to build robust organizations in such a context. They show, for example, that organization-building is most likely where politicians can build upon pre-existing mobilizing structures. These structures take diverse forms, including ex-guerrilla organizations (Holland), indigenous social movements (Madrid), private corporations (Barndt), and networks inherited from authoritarian regimes (Loxton). Eaton’s chapter on failed conservative party-building in the Bolivian east shows how weakening social movements can hinder party-building efforts.

Our contributors also highlight the importance of financial resources for building durable organizations. For example, Dargent and Muñoz show how reforms that limited national politicians’ access to patronage resources hindered party-building efforts in Colombia and Peru. Yet alternative sources of finance may substitute for patronage resources. Thus, Bruhn’s chapter highlights the role of (legal) public finance, arguing that generous public subsidies helped new parties to consolidate in Brazil and Mexico, and Barndt’s chapter argues that an increasing number of wealthy businesspeople have used private corporations as a means of party-building.

Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Party-Building. It is often assumed that, just as democracy needs parties, party-building needs democracy. Yet several of the chapters in this volume find that authoritarianism may facilitate party-building. For example, Loxton shows how authoritarian successor parties, or those whose leaders had previously occupied important posts in dictatorships, are more likely to possess an established brand, private sector funding channels, clientelist networks, and other organizational resources that facilitate party-building. And in his chapter on new left-wing parties, Van Dyck argues that parties that are born in opposition to authoritarianism have a stronger incentive to build durable organizations than those born under democracy, largely because the former lack access to the media and state resources that can substitute for party organization. Yet origins under authoritarianism may also have costs. Greene’s chapter argues that because parties that are born in opposition to authoritarian regimes are more likely to attract ideologically extreme activists, they often become “niche parties” that have difficulty competing for the median voter—even after democratization.

Rethinking the Role of Leadership and Populism. Dominant or charismatic leaders are widely viewed as antithetical to party-building. Personalistic leadership and electoral appeals are said to undermine party organization and hinder brand development. Yet, as several of our chapters show, popular leaders may also contribute to party-building. In presidential systems such as those in

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Latin America, parties without viable candidates are rarely competitive,8 and non-competitive parties rarely endure. Indeed, founding leaders have often played a critical role in making new parties electorally viable (e.g., the PT, Mexican PRD). Likewise, populism, in which personalistic leaders mobilize subaltern groups against the political and/or economic elite, is similarly viewed as antithetical to party-building. Populists’ plebiscitary, anti-establishment appeals tend to weaken existing parties and inhibit the institutionalization of new ones (Weyland 1999, Barr 2009). Yet if populists weaken parties in the short run, they may (unintentionally) strengthen them in the long run. Populism polarizes societies, and in many cases (Peronismo in Argentina, Aprismo in Peru, Chavismo in Venezuela), it triggers sustained conflict between populist and anti-populist forces. As the chapter by Levitsky and Zavaleta argues, such conflicts often generate strong partisan identities and activist bases, which may provide the basis for durable party organizations.

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The volume’s main audience will be scholars of Latin American politics and party politics. It should be widely assigned in graduate and upper-division undergraduate classes on Latin American politics, and in graduate courses on political parties. Indeed, given the quality of the contributors,9 we expect the entire book to be assigned in many courses. Our model is Mainwaring and Scully’s Building Democratic Institutions (Stanford, 1995), which shaped the agenda for the study of Latin American party systems for a generation. Its introduction and other chapters are still routinely assigned in undergraduate and graduate-level courses.

The volume complements recent or forthcoming Cambridge books on party-building in Africa (Arriola, Riedl), Asia (Hicken), and the former Soviet Union (Hale, Hanson), and it fits well into CUP’s recent collection of books on Latin American parties and party systems, including Hunter on the PT, Greene on dominant-party rule in Mexico, Kitschelt et al. on Latin American party systems, Van Cott and Madrid on indigenous parties, and forthcoming books by Lupu and Roberts.

At the same time, our book’s focus on party-building is distinctive. Recent books on Latin American parties focus mainly on party system collapse (Lupu, forthcoming; Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012) or the sources of programmatic party competition (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Hagopian, forthcoming). With the exception of the Van Cott and Madrid books on indigenous parties, none of these works examines party-building. Because we develop a new theory of party-building that travels beyond Latin America, the volume should be read (and assigned) not only by scholars of Latin America, but also by students of parties more generally.

8See Samuels and Shugart (2010).9Bruhn, Dargent, Eaton, Greene, Levitsky, Luna, Lupu, Madrid, Roberts, and Samuels are all Cambridge authors.

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Works Cited

Aldrich, John H. (1995) Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Arriola, Leonardo R. (2013) Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barr, Robert R (2009) “Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics.” Party Politics. 15(1): 29-48.

Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins.

Duverger, Maurice (1954) Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.

Greene, Kenneth F. (2007) Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hagopian, Frances (forthcoming). Reorganizing Political Representation in Latin America: Parties, Program, and Patronage in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hale, Henry E. (2006) Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hanson, Stephen E. (2010) Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hicken, Allen (2009) Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hunter, Wendy (2010) The Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 1989-2009. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert (1989) The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Parties in Belgium and West Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (2010) Latin American Party Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press.

LeBas, Adrienne (2011) From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Levitsky, Steven and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds. (2011) The Resurgence of the Latin American Left. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (1967) “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction.” In Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (eds). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press. 1-64.

Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcoming) The Right in Latin America: Strategies for Political Action. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lupu, Noam (forthcoming) Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Madrid, Raúl L. (2012) The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott (1999) Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully, eds. (1995) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Edurne Zoco (2007) “Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies.” Party Politics. 13(2): 155-178.

Morgan, Jana (2011) Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Panebianco, Angelo (1988) Political Parties: Organization and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Riedl, Rachel Beatty (forthcoming) Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Systems in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart (2010) Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Seawright, Jason (2012) Party-System Collapse: The Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Table of Contents

Introduction: Explaining Party-Building in Latin AmericaSteven Levitsky, James Loxton, and Brandon Van Dyck

This introductory chapter examines the challenges of party-building in Latin America and develops a new framework for understanding variation in success and failure among new parties formed in the region since 1978. The chapter begins by defining and operationalizing successful party-building (winning at least 10 percent of the legislative vote in 5 consecutive elections) and demonstrating that only 11 new parties have crossed this threshold since the onset of the third wave. Most new parties have failed. It then argues that the relative lack of successful new parties cannot be explained in terms of institutional design or societal cleavages. The chapter argues that party-building success is caused by three key factors: (1) a party brand, (2) a robust territorial organization, and (3) sources of elite cohesion. These three factors do not often arise in the context of peaceful democratic competition. Instead, the chapter argues that they are almost always the products of episodes of intense polarization and conflict, such as revolution, civil war, authoritarian repression, and waves of social mobilization. The final section discusses the theoretically contentious role of four factors in party-building: (1) authoritarianism, (2) access to the state, (3) party leadership, and (4) populism.

Chapter 2: Building Party Brands in Argentina and BrazilNoam Lupu

Successful mass parties need to build a stable base of partisans, or citizens who feel an affinity with the party. One important determinant of whether new parties succeed in building a partisan base is their ability to develop a strong brand. Party brands give voters an idea of the type of citizen a particular party represents. When parties offer a demonstrably consistent brand, voters attracted to that brand are more likely to form lasting attachments. Partisanship also depends on voters’ ability to distinguish among competing parties. Voters form stronger attachments to a party when they see important differences between their party and its competitors. This chapter examines whether these branding dynamics help to account for the rise and fall of partisan attachments with new parties in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s.

Chapter 3: Historical Timing, Political Cleavages, and Party-Building in Latin AmericaKenneth M. Roberts

Party systems in the “third wave” of democracy are often thought to be unstable because they have weaker mass organizations than those founded during earlier cycles of democratization. The recent Latin American experience suggests, however, that the stability of party systems is not strictly determined by their age or historical period of foundation. Well-defined left-right cleavages forged during the dual transitions to democracy and market liberalism could exert a stabilizing effect on party systems—even relatively new ones formed during the third wave. Conversely, dual transitions that de-aligned party systems programmatically tended to destabilize

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them electorally. The consequences of aligning and de-aligning patterns are explored through a comparative analysis of critical junctures in Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela.

Chapter 4: The Paradox of Adversity: New Left Party Survival and Collapse in Brazil, Mexico, and ArgentinaBrandon Van Dyck

This chapter argues that adverse conditions facilitate the creation of durable political parties. Most new parties collapse because they do not have strong organizations with committed activists and, consequently, do not survive early electoral setbacks. Paradoxically, new parties with strong organizations and committed activists are most likely to emerge under conditions of adversity. Elites with low access to patronage, finance, and mass media must undertake the slow, laborious, autonomy-reducing work of organization-building in order to contend for national power. Because organization-building is time-consuming, labor-intensive, and non-remunerative at the grassroots level, the process selects for ideologically driven, committed activists and leaders. The chapter illustrates this argument through a comparison of three recently emerged left-wing parties in Latin America: two that survived early electoral crises (Brazil’s PT and Mexico’s PRD) and one that did not (Argentina’s FREPASO).

Chapter 5: Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building: Chile’s UDI and El Salvador’s ARENA in Comparative PerspectiveJames Loxton

This chapter examines the phenomenon of authoritarian successor parties, or parties founded by incumbents of defunct dictatorships that remain widely associated with the old regime. Such parties have been surprisingly successful, particularly among new conservative parties in Latin America. What explains their success? This chapter argues that the answer is authoritarian inheritance: authoritarian successor parties often inherit valuable resources from former dictatorships that can help them to flourish under democracy. Such resources include a party brand, territorial organization, sources of cohesion, clientelistic networks and close ties to business elites. The chapter illustrates this argument through an examination of two successful new conservative parties in Latin America: the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile and the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador.

Chapter 6: The Niche Party: Regime Legacies and Party-Building Pathologies in New DemocraciesKenneth Greene

Niche parties are created by political outsiders in competitive authoritarian regimes and other situations of multiparty competition where the incumbent benefits from dramatic advantages.  As a result, their organizations are built to survive under difficult conditions and feature inward-looking, hermetic practices designed to protect their identities.  Niche parties exhibit party-building pathologies.  First, they produce candidates and leaders whose policy preferences are out-of-step with the average voter—a finding that runs counter to standard theory about the

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relationship between intra-party actors and inter-party competition.  Second, they represent minority core constituencies in the electorate and are poor vehicles for winning public office.  Finally, where niche parties take root, their organizations reproduce these practices even after transitions to fully competitive elections.  Niche parties thus demonstrate tremendous path dependency, rather than responding quickly to changes in the institutional environment as most rational choice theories of party organization would predict. 

Chapter 7: Successful Party-Building in Stable Party Systems: The Cases of the UDI (Chile) and Frente Amplio (Uruguay)Juan Pablo Luna

This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the electoral strategies of the UDI in Chile and the Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay, two recent instances of successful party-building. It illustrates how, over time, the UDI and the FA became socially rooted and achieved national significance, focusing on the patterns of party-society linkages (which progressively allowed electoral rootedness to take hold and endure) and how they are linked to specific organizational features of each party. The comparative analysis highlights how the elements identified in the introduction to the volume (a party brand, a territorial organization, and sources of elite cohesion) help explain the successful building of the UDI and FA, albeit in different ways.

Chapter 8: Money for Nothing? Public Financing and Party-Building in Latin AmericaKathleen Bruhn

Scholars of new democracies argue that public funding of political parties can provide insurance against anarchic and unstable party systems. The authors of this volume argue that successful new parties are most likely to emerge in the context of intense polarization and conflict. This chapter argues that public finance of parties is most critical at the second stage of new party development. Public finance helps to ensure the survival of new parties once the initial investment of resources to establish an electoral presence has been exhausted, since it provides both incentives and resources for parties to invest in an organizational presence throughout the national territory. However, public funding is not an effective tool for building voter loyalties or the construction of a party brand.

Chapter 9: Sub-National Ties and Party-Building: Examples from Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent and Paula Muñoz

This chapter highlights the importance of sub-national state resources for successful party aggregation and, hence, party-building. The chapter does so by showing how political reforms can affect parties’ control over the distribution of resources at the sub-national level and thus weaken party linkages across the territory. In the absence of other conditions that favor party-building, these reforms make party aggregation more difficult, limiting the possibility of a resurgence of political organizations. The cases of Colombia and Peru, two countries in which political elites pursued important reforms amidst a severe political crisis, allow us to show the mechanisms at work. By overlooking the importance of the concentration/dispersion of sub-

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national resources for party aggregation, reformers hindered party-building efforts in both countries. In this new institutional context, party-building has been largely unsuccessful in both cases.

Chapter 10: The Corporate Path to Durable PartiesWilliam Barndt

New stable parties have been rare in contemporary Latin America.  Yet one possible road to successful party-building has remained largely unexamined. In much of the region, individual corporations have spearheaded the construction of their own parties.  This chapter argues that an affinity exists between corporation-based party-building and the development of several of the attributes associated with party durability.  As such, there is good reason to expect that corporation-based party-building represents a new path to lasting political parties.  Drawing on original research, this chapter examines how parties have been constructed by supermarkets, breweries, and agro-industrial firms in Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in Latin America.  While corporation-based parties are unlikely to resemble conservative parties of the past, they may represent a new face of party politics in the region.

Chapter 11: Obstacles to Ethnic Parties in Latin AmericaRaúl L. Madrid

Ethnic parties in Latin America have typically had little electoral success. This chapter argues that this is due to resource disadvantages and low levels of ethnic consciousness in the region. Widespread mestizaje has blurred ethnic boundaries and weakened ethnic attachments, and the high levels of poverty in indigenous and Afro-Latino communities have meant that parties that originate in these communities have few local resources upon which to draw. Ethnic parties that succeeded overcame these disadvantages in two ways. First, they reached out to members of all ethnic groups by using traditional populist strategies in addition to an inclusive ethnic appeal. Second, they forged alliances with various social movements, which provided them with human as well as material resources. This chapter explores these arguments through an analysis of two cases of relative success (MAS in Bolivia and Pachakutik in Ecuador) and two cases of failure (Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti in Bolivia and Winaq in Guatemala).

Chapter 12: Insurgent Successor Parties: Scaling Down to Build a Party After WarAlisha Holland

The chapter analyzes why some insurgent organizations have formed successful parties and others have floundered after demobilization. It theorizes about the distinctive organizational inheritances of insurgent groups stemming from their origins in violence, and argues that investments in subnational elections can help armed actors become successful parties. Subnational elections open political careers to former fighters and help dilute polarizing brands by showing that former fighters can govern. The comparison of two insurgent successor parties that held great promise during their early stages, the FMLN in El Salvador and AD M-19 in Colombia, helps to illustrate the argument. The chapter speaks to theoretical debates on the impact of electoral decentralization

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on party-building, and to the question about when armed groups like the FARC become viable political contenders.

Chapter 13: Party-Building in Brazil: The Rise of the PT in PerspectiveDavid Samuels and Cesar Zucco Jr. 

This chapter explains variation in the evolution of mass partisanship across Brazil’s parties, focusing on the Workers’ Party (PT). Most Brazilians do not identify with any party, but about 25% self-identify as petistas. Only the PT has captured the partisan loyalties of a sizable slice of the electorate. How did the PT grow from a footnote in Brazil’s party system in the early 1980s to a dominant player today? The emergence of widespread partisanship for the PT is theoretically puzzling because comparative research predicts weak partisanship for all Brazilian parties, and because the PT’s partisan base grew even as its leaders abandoned its leftist positions and entered a confusing array of electoral coalitions. This chapter argues that the growth of petismo is not due to the fact that the PT has been in power since 2003 or because it has held power during relatively good times. Instead, the PT grew relative to its competitors because it combined organizational cohesiveness with member inclusiveness. That is, variation in party-building in the electorate can be traced to the relationship between parties’ organizational structure and the way that parties engage voters and organized civil society.

Chapter 14: Why No Party-Building in Peru?Steven Levitsky and Mauricio Zavaleta

Peru may be the most extreme case of party collapse in Latin America. Every new party created after 1990 has collapsed, failed to achieve national significance, or remained a personalistic vehicle. Parties have been replaced by “coalitions of independents,” or tickets composed of free agents that are cobbled together for elections and then dissolve. This chapter examines why parties have not been re-built in post-Fujimori Peru. Although this outcome is partly explained by the theoretical framework presented in the Introduction, the chapter argues that it is also a product of path dependence. After parties collapsed, politicians developed alternative strategies (partisan free agency, coalitions of independents) and technologies (use of businesses and media outlets as “party substitutes,” subcontracting of activists for campaigns) that allowed them to win elections without parties. The diffusion and informal institutionalization of these non-party strategies and technologies further weakened incentives for party-building, and electoral competition appears to select for politicians who make effective use of these strategies.

Chapter 15: Challenges of Party-Building in the Bolivian EastKent Eaton

This chapter seeks to explain why the eastern autonomy movement that brought Bolivia to the brink of civil war in 2008 has failed to create a viable political party. The failure of the eastern opposition to President Evo Morales is especially puzzling given the presence of three elements considered critical for party-building: brand attachments forged by identity-based social movements, preexisting territorial organization, and high levels of elite cohesion. The chapter

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explains this puzzle by examining two important (exogenous and endogenous) phenomena. First, since 2008 Morales has succeeded in driving a wedge between political and economic elites in the east, whose former cohesion fueled the movement for autonomy and whose apparent divorce has obstructed party-building. Second, party-building has been further hindered by internal divisions among eastern political elites and by the weakening of the territorial organization (Comité Pro-Santa Cruz) that had coordinated the movement for autonomy in the east.

Chapter 16: Past the Poof Moment: Cuba’s Future Political PartiesJorge I. Domínguez

This chapter considers the possible contours of Cuba’s party system after a hypothetical regime change or at least the holding of free, competitive elections. It examines social cleavages, societal changes that may blur inferences from the past, the parties of the last pre-authoritarian period, and electoral laws. The chapter also compares the Communist Party of Cuba to Eastern European communist parties after the transition to democracy. It argues that regionalism, race, religion, and class are unlikely to anchor new parties. Instead, a “party of power,” indispensable for any ruling coalition, will likely emerge as a core in the four-way splinter of the Communist Party. This split would also yield leftist-intransigent, national-patriotic parties, and social democratic parties, all with roots in Cuba, 1902-1958 and 1959-2013. Cuba’s rapidly aging population may split the elderly-Red vote between the first three successors of the Communist Party, giving social democrats a chance to govern in alliance with the party of power.

ConclusionJorge I. Domínguez

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Contributors

Editors

JORGE I DOMINGUEZ is the Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico and Vice Provost for International Affairs at Harvard University. He is the author of Cuba: Order and Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1978) and Cuba hoy: Analizando su pasado, imaginando su futuro (Editorial Colibrí, 2006). He is also author and co-editor of Cuban Economic and Social Development: Policy Reforms and Challenges in the 21st Century (Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2012) and Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations: Shall We Play Ball? (Routledge, 2011). He is a past editor of the journal Cuban Studies and a past president of the Latin American Studies Association.

STEVEN LEVITSKY is Harvard College Professor and Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2003), co-author of Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010), and co-editor of Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), and The Resurgence of the Latin American Left in Latin America (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). He is currently writing a book on the durability of revolutionary regimes.

JAMES LOXTON is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University. He has published on the topic of populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. His current research is on conservative party-building in Latin America, and on new parties with deep roots in defunct authoritarian regimes.

BRANDON VAN DYCK is an assistant professor of Government and Law at Lafayette College. He works in comparative politics, with interests in political parties, regimes and regime change, and Latin American politics.

Chapter Authors

WILL BARNDT is Assistant Professor of Political Studies at Pitzer College in Claremont, CA. He received his PhD in Politics from Princeton University.  His book manuscript, Democracy for Sale: Corporation-Based Parties and the New Conservative Politics in the Americas, demonstrates that particular business conglomerates are constructing their own parties and party factions throughout much of the western hemisphere. He has published his research in World Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, Journal of Politics in Latin America, and in edited volumes.

KATHLEEN BRUHN is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her recent publications include “Electing Extremists? Party Primaries and Legislative

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Candidates in Mexico” (Comparative Politics, 2013); “‘To Hell with your Corrupt Institutions!’: AMLO and Populism in Mexico,” in Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective to Democracy? (Cambridge University Press 2012); and “Too Much Democracy? Primaries and Candidate Success in Mexico’s 2006 National Elections” (Latin American Politics and Society, 2010). She is the author of Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004) and Urban Protest in Mexico and Brazil (Cambridge University Press, 2008), and co-author of Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development (University of California Press, 2001 and 2006).

EDUARDO DARGENT earned his PhD in Government from the University of Texas at Austin. He is associate professor of Political Science at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. His research focuses on comparative public policy, democratization and the state in the developing world. He is the author of Demócratas precarios: Élites y debilidad democrática en América Latina (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2009).

KENT EATON is Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Focusing on territorial politics in Latin America, his research examines the causes and consequences of reforms that redistribute authority between national and subnational governments. His co-authored and co-edited works on decentralization include Making Decentralization Work: Democracy, Development and Security (Lynne Rienner Press, 2010), The Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook (USAID, 2009), and The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness (The World Bank, 2010). His recent articles have appeared in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Latin American Studies.

KENNETH GREENE is Associate Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin.  His first book, Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2007), won the 2008 Best Book Award from the Comparative Democratization Section of the American Political Science Association.  In addition to his work on authoritarian regimes and democratization, he is Principal Investigator on the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, a multi-wave public opinion project.  His current work focuses on vote-buying in authoritarian and democratic contexts and on party systems in new democracies emerging from authoritarian rule.

ALISHA HOLLAND is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University. She has published on the political repercussions of rising crime in El Salvador. Her current research focuses on the politics of property law enforcement in Latin American cities.

JUAN PABLO LUNA is Associate Professor in the Instituto de Ciencia Política at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. His research focuses on political parties and democratic representation, the political effects of inequality, and the nature of state institutions. He is the co-author of Latin American Party Systems (Cambridge University Press, 2010). His dissertation was awarded the 2008 Juan Linz Best Dissertation Award by the Comparative Democratization

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Section of APSA and is forthcoming at Oxford University Press. His work has appeared in Comparative Political Studies, Política y Gobierno, Revista de Ciencia Política, Latin American Politics and Society, International Political Science Review, Third World Quarterly, Journal of Latin American Studies, Journal of Democracy, Perfiles Latinoamericanos, and Democratization. He has held visiting positions at Princeton University (2008), Brown University (2011), and Harvard University (2013). 

NOAM LUPU is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Trice Faculty Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His current book project, Party Brands in Crisis, explores how the dilution of party brands eroded partisan attachments in Latin America and facilitated the collapse of established parties. His dissertation won the 2012 Gabriel A. Almond Award and the Juan Linz Prize from the American Political Science Association. His research has appeared or is forthcoming in American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, and Latin American Research Review.

RAUL L. MADRID is Professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond (Stanford University Press, 2003), and is a co-editor of Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings (Cambridge University Press, 2010). His articles have appeared in Comparative Politics, Electoral Studies, Journal of Latin American Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Research Review, Political Science Quarterly, and World Politics.

PAULA MUÑOZ earned her PhD in Government from the University of Texas at Austin. She is associate professor of Social and Political Science at the Universidad del Pacífico. Her dissertation explores the use of electoral clientelism in Peru, a country with weak political parties. Her research focuses on political parties, electoral campaigns, sub-national politics, and public policy.

KENNETH M. ROBERTS is a Professor of Government at Cornell University, with a specialization in Latin American political economy and the politics of inequality.  He is the author of Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford University Press, 1998), and the co-editor of The Diffusion of Social Movements (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and The Resurgence of the Latin American Left (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).  His current work explores the transformation of party systems and political representation in Latin America’s neoliberal era.

DAVID SAMUELS is Distinguished McKnight University Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.  His most recent book (with Matthew Shugart) is Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers (Cambridge University Press, 2010). He is also the author of the introductory textbook Comparative Politics (Pearson Higher Education, 2012), and serves as the co-editor of Comparative Political Studies.

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MAURICIO ZAVALETA holds an undergraduate degree in political science from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. He is the author of Coalitions of Independents: The Unwritten Rules of Electoral Politics in Peru (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, forthcoming). He has published articles on subnational politics, political parties, and social conflict around mining activities in Peru.

CESAR ZUCCO Jr. is assistant professor at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas’ Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration. He was previously assistant professor in the Political Science Department at Rutgers, and has held visiting positions and postdoctoral fellowships at Princeton and Yale.  He has published articles and chapters on electoral politics, political parties, executive-legislative relations, ideology, and social policy, and his work has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and Legislative Studies Quarterly.

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