© the treasury/code fiscal institutions in new zealand: the question of spending caps and spending...
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Fiscal Institutions in New Zealand: The question of spending caps and
spending reviewsJohn Janssen
February 2011
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A timeline of budget management
From 1989:
FixedNominalBaselines
From 1997:
FiscalProvisions
For details and fit with overall fiscal legislation refer:Fiscal Institutions in New Zealand and the Question of a Spending Cap http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2010/10-07
From 2002:
FiscalManagementApproach
From 2011:
FiscalManagement
Approach+
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Fixed Nominal Baselines
• Prior to 1989 the budget process involved regular adjustments to personnel costs
• Operating and capital adjusted annually with 1-year ahead forecasts only
• Early 1990s – fixed nominal baseline over a 3-year forecast period that changed only with specific policy decisions
• Formula-driven indexation to non-departmental spending (eg, inflation indexation of transfers; volume changes)
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Operating balance for 1997/98: Forecast and policy changes
Forecasts of the 1997/98 operating balance ($billion)
Policy and Forecast changes from 1994 DEFU to actual result ($billion)*
1994 Update 7.6
Revenue: Policy 1.0
1995 Budget 7.8
Revenue: Forecasting 1.1
1996 Budget 3.3
Expenses: Policy 2.7
1997 Budget 1.5
Expenses: Forecasting 0.6
1998 Budget 2.8
Other forecasting 0.2
1998 Actual 2.5 Total: Policy 3.7 Total: Forecasting 1.5 Actual less initial
5.1 5.2
* Change is expressed in terms of the impact on the operating balance. Totals do not sum due to rounding. Source: Adapted from Table 1.4, OECD (1999).
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Fiscal Provisions
• 1997 Budget introduced a $5 billion (cumulative) spending cap on new initiatives over fiscal years 1998 – 2000
• Spending cap sat on top of fixed nominal baselines and formula-driven indexed items
• Rules established to determine what counted against the spending cap
• Spending cap re-labeled as fiscal provisions – for both operating and capital
• Included as line items in fiscal forecasts (3 years ahead)
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Decomposition of operating expenses
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Fiscal Management Approach
• 2002 Budget re-labeled the fiscal provisions as operating allowances and capital allowances
• Shifted the focus to the paths of operating balance and debt rather than just the nominal allowance
• Fiscal allowances reviewed twice a year with reference to updated forecasts and progress against fiscal objectives (especially debt-to-GDP)
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Sources of spending change
• Anticipated price and volume effects for formula driven items built into forecasts (eg, rising cost of pensions from population ageing)
• Discretionary initiatives as part of the fiscal allowance. Expectation that allowances adjusted only in response to structural changes in the fiscal outlook
• Changes in forecast costs due to revisions of initial forecast (eg, higher than anticipated take-up)
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Revenue surprises
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Operating allowances
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Operating balance
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Aims of proposed spending cap
• Increase transparency around the total level of spending with more focus on baselines, relative to discretionary allowances
• Provide some inertia in response to revenue surprises
• Looked at experiences of Sweden, Netherlands and Finland
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Key features of proposed cap
• Absolute dollar figure for operating expenses
• Exclude unemployment expenses and finance costs
• Set for three years with the third year set on a rolling basis
• Margin of 1% to act as a buffer for unforeseen events
• Cap set by current administration rather than prescribed in legislation
• Transparency around potential breaches and policy reaction
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• Risks around spending cap: complexity; flexibility; target rather than upper limit; still cycle versus trend identification challenge (especially in rolling third year)
• Current system places a cap on discretionary spending via the operating and capital allowances – which have been set at much lower levels than mid-2000s
• Increase the range of expenses subject to scrutiny – to improve control over higher-than-expected increases in expenses
• Set aside a portion of the existing allowance to deal with these
Selected approach – FMA+
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• Shift resources to frontline services (headcount cap for core government administration)
• Improve balance sheet management (publication of detailed investment statement)
• Investigate mixed ownership model for some commercial assets
• Alternatives to public provision (eg, PPPs)• Better administrative and support services• Drawing on skills beyond the core public services (eg,
Defence Review; Review of Expenditure on Policy Advice)
Other changes
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Future developments?
• Recent Taskforce suggestion that Public Finance Act be amended to require the Minister of Finance to specify a five-to-ten year target for future operating expenses (capacity exits in Act but not typically used)
• Independent Fiscal Council
• Taxpayer Bill of Rights – limit spending growth to inflation rate and population growth, with any higher spending subject to a referendum
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A timeline of budget management
From 1989:FixedNominalBaselines
From 1997:FiscalProvisions
From 2002:FiscalManagementApproach
From 2011:FiscalManagement
Approach+
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Main lessons
• Classification – discretionary/other; cycle/trend
• Context – surplus environment (pressure to revise a cap upwards); deficit environment (shift to other tools such as reviews)
• Change – some change is inevitable as people learn the rules
• Continuity – credibility and understanding of broad approach – with adjustments at the margin
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Extra slides
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Changes in Core Crown operating expenses relative to 2009/10 year