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of this paper8 % may remark in passin that on this point the P: 3ersion is clearer andmore decided than the M 3ersion.R1

These fe9 eneral considerations do not claim to be anythin more than a sketchy

analysis of the problems Skepticism is faced 9ith 9hen tryin to deal 9ith the conceptualle acy it has inherited. % hope they 9ill not pro3e useless 9hen studyin the particularnotion 9ith 9hich the rest of this paper 9ill deal8 namely8 the notion of a kriterion .R05 %t

oes 9ithout sayin that this notion is supremely important in Se tus?s in@uiry8 as it iscentral in the philosophical tenets of the :ellenistic period. >hen Se tus comes to rips9ith it8 it already has a 3ery lon historyD and this history has been further e tended8 in itsearlier part8 by the fact that earlier philosophical doctrines ;of the classical and e3en the!rchaic period< ha3e been reinterpreted by the Skeptics and retrospecti3ely construed asso many ans9ers to the kriterion @uestion. urin this lon history8 the 9ord kriterion9as applied to different entities8 construed in different meanin s8 subdi3ided alondifferent lines. These intricate de3elopments ha3e been e 6

R1 R05A 04 A

cellently analyCed not lon a o.R00 % shall rely on this and try8 by e aminin there ularities and irre ularities in Se tus?s o9n 9orks8 to unco3er some traces of this pasthistory8 of the problems he inherited from it8 and of the labor he had to e pend because ofthose problems.

The 9ord kriterion 8 accordin to Se tus8 is used in many sensesD he de3otes t9o rou hly parallel sections ;M .716 and P: 7.0B60 < to their orderly enumeration. ,eforelookin at this classification8 ho9e3er8 it may be of some interest to point out somethin

peculiar to the M 3ersion. %n M .74Hi.e.8 e3en before i3in any account of the se3eralmeanin s of the 9ord kriterion HSe tus makes use of this 9ordD and the sense in 9hichhe uses it is at the same time ;0< defined precisely and uni3ocally8 ;7< determinati3e ofthe o3erall structure of books 628 ; < missin in the classification i3en later of thedifferent meanin s of this 9ord in .716 8 and ;B< inconsistent 9ith the sense that8 in thislater classification8 9ill be marked out as the proper ob ect of Skeptical in@uiry. :ereindeed are a lot of anomalies. Let us look at them in a little more detail.

%n the conte t of the passa e % ha3e in mind ; .7B674

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Since it is enerally accepted Rdokei that 9hat is e3ident Renar e is kno9n from itselfRautothen throu h some criterion Rdia kriteriou tinos 8 9hereas 9hat is nonmanifestRadela has to be tracked do9n throu h si ns and proofs Rdia semeion kai apodei eon 8

by 9ay of transfer Rkata metabasin from 9hat is e3ident8 9e shall ask oursel3es in order8

first 8 9hether there is a criterion for thin s that sho9 up from themsel3es8 either perceptually or intellectually Rei esti ti kriterion ton autothen kat?aisthesin e dianoian prospiptonton 8 and then 8 9hether there is a semiotic or probati3e procedure concerninnonmanifest thin s Rei esti semeiotikos e apodeiktikos ton adelon tropos .

%n this first occurrence8 the notion of kriterion seems to be a uni3ocal notion8 about 9hichthere is a consensus ;dokei < amon philosophersD from 9hat is said here8 9e could not

uess that the 9ord that e presses this notion is "used in more than one 9ay" ;pollachosle omenon

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it 9ould probably be pointless to distin uish both of them ;under the name of kriteria e make use of 9hat 9e call a criterion 9hen 9e areunable to ans9er some @uestion immediately. *or instance8 9hen 9e cannot easily see9hether some ob ect a is * or not8 9e try to find a criterion for *6ness.A 04K A

%f there is a property G8 other than *8 such that ;0< ;I< * iff G 8 and ;7< it is possible todecide immediately 9hether Ga or not8 then 9e say that there is a criterion a3ailable. %n asimilar case8 the prodelic conception of the krtierion 9ould commit us to sayin that here

is a case of kno9led e throu h a si nD only if 9e had been able to find immediately that*a ;or not6*a< could 9e say that here is a case of kno9led e throu h a kriterion .

The prodelic conception of the kriterion and the mediate immediate distinction inkno9led e 9ith 9hich it is linked constitute the 3ery basis of the o3erall structure of M

62H9ith this @ualification8 that since the notion of a kriterion is specified as a kriterionof truth8R0B the first part of the books 9ill fall into t9o sections8 correspondin to thet9o hal3es of the phrase. >e thus et the follo9in scheme8 as Se tus 9ill 9ork it outN;0.0< the kriterion ;M .7 6BBK

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:ere 9e can see that the enar e adela distinction is still predominant8 but that nonethelessSe tus sho9s 9ith clarity ho9 reatly altered the enar e are after the theories of thekriterion ha3e been sub ected to criticism. $o9 the e3ident thin s are nothin more than"so6called e3idences"D and this is because kriterion and enar eia are conceptually linkedto ether8 so that once the e istence of anythin satisfyin the definition of a kriterion is

made doubtful8 the e istence of anythin enar es at once becomes @uestionable. $osimilar indication can be found in the correspondin passa e of M 28 9here Se tus sumsup the results of his in@uiry about the kriterion of truth ;0B5

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supposedly is limited to a purely e e etical aim8 is not 9ithout polemical bearin s. Thereare t9o reasons for this. *irst8R0A 041 A

9hen Se tus i3es an account of 3arious doctrines that made reason8 or perception8 or both8 kriteria of truth8 he cannot keep himself from pointin out deli htedly that these3ie9s are not only different but also incompatible 9ith one another8 and hence ri3als toone another ;staseis 8 .B 8 7K06K7

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;,< 7.0. General senseN "e3ery measure of apprehension."7.7. Special senseN "e3ery technical measure of apprehension."7. . "Quite special" senseN "e3ery Rtechnical8 P: measure of apprehension of somethinnonmanifest R adelou pra matos " X kriterion lo ikon .

;+< 7. .0. !s a ent ;huph?ou

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and thus created an impression that there 9as a diaphonia about the kriterion ; io enesLaertius 1.14

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or8 perhaps more accurately8 discursi3e. :eintC and his follo9ershen Se tus presents the ;7.7< meanin 8he says that it e cludes phusika 8 and8 9hen he presents the ;7. < meanin 8 that ite cludes biotika . %n order to et matters @uite in order8 biotika should form the e act

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surplus of ;7.7< o3er ;7.

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;7. .:eintC< is to make it sharper8 but so as to lessen its importance. The other ;that of G.Striker and also of J. ,arnes8 as 9e shall see

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proof8 i.e.8 dialectical ;hence technical < procedures for raspin adela D those 9ill bestudiedR R BA 0K2 A

only in ,ook 28 after the end of the in@uiry concernin kriterion in the normalHi.e.8 prodelicHsense.

This interpretation is @uestionable in se3eral 9ays. *irst8 some terminolo ical likenessesmay be pointed out8 9hich seem to sho9 that ;pace :eintC< the notion of a kriterionlo ikon has the same content in ;ta lo ika kai haper hoi do matikoi ton philosopkon

pareisa ousi < as in B ;peri tou lo ikou kai para tois philosophois thruloumenou

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commentin on this fra ment8 Se tus says that the ods are here only a representati3esample of the 9hole class of adela ;M .45

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nothin can be said about the e ternal 9orld e cept by con ecture ;stochaComai 8 K4

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%n Epicurus8 the predominant useRB of the notion is fundamentally based on an analo y bet9een kriterion and kanon . ! kanon 8 a ruler or a s@uare8 is paradi matically ri ht andallo9s the problematic ri htness of a line or an an le to be tested. Similarly8 a kriterion oftruth is a pur3eyor of truths8 immediately e3ident in themsel3es8 that can be used to testthe truth63alue of opinions ;or theories or hypotheses8 etc.< that bear on not perceptible or

not immediately kno9n states of affairs8 and thus are neither dearly true nor dearly false.Their bein intrinsically true is 9hat allo9s them to function as they doD but their 3alue asa kriterion depends on their bein used to test the truth63alue of statements other thanthemsel3es.RBB

)n the other hand8 the predominant Stoic use of this notionRB4 is no lon er determined by the kanon6 paradi m. Phantasia kataleptike is claimed to be a kriterion 8 not because itallo9s one to test somethin other than 9hat it "presents8" but because it al6RB RBB RB4A 0 B A

lo9s one to state that somethin is the case8 9hich is the 3ery state of affairs "presented" by it ;and causally producti3e of it

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)n the +riterion in order to satisfy dili ent hunters for parallel passa es from the 3arious philosophers 9ho pro3ided his cultural back round.R T9o briefR7 RA 0 2 A

points can be made in defense of a more enerous readin of his essay. *irst8 Ptolemy9as a practicin scientist8 not a philosopher 9ith any declared alle iance to one of theestablished schools. Second8 the breadth and nature of his scientific interestsH astronomy8 astrolo y8 music8 optics8 eo raphyHdo much to e plain 9hy he found ituseful to state his position on epistemolo y and psycholo y. :o9 9e interpret hiseclecticism8 or attitude to the cultural tradition8 is a @uestion to 9hich both these points9ill be pertinent.

:is empiricist thesis and his psychosomatic thesisHto refer back to Ptolemy?s t9o principal claims in this bookH9ere i3en an interestin prominence by the first moderneditor8 %shmael ,ullialdus8 in a "brief note" at the conclusion of his 0KK edition.RB

#nder the headin !d subtilissimi philosophi 'enati +artesii de animae specie intellectuiimpressa opinionem 8 ,ullialdus dre9 on both of Ptolemy?s theses in a trenchant criticismof escartes?s most famous ar ument8 a criticism that can be summariCed as follo9s.

E o co ito8 er o sum does nothin to shake the clarity and e3idence of the principle nihilest in intellectu8 @uod prius non fuerit in sensu . escartes?s inference8 thou h true and3alid8 does not support his claim that the soul e ists @uite independently of the body. Thesub ect of his co ito is not anima co itans 8 as he proposed8 but homo ipse co itans 89hich is a composite of body and soul. "Since it is man himself 9ho thinks8 and 9hocannot produce any actions e cept by the con unct operation of his constituent parts8 he9ill not be able to perform any function of reasonin or thinkin e cept by the con unctoperations of the intellect and the bodily or ans desi ned for recei3in impressions ofthin s and for containin spirits" ;01K

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really are. :e ad3ances no aporiai 8 de3elops no comple ar uments8 and indicates no@uestions that need fuller consideration. :e names no philosophers either as supporters oras opponents8 and his book is almost completely free from the eneraliCed polemics9hich are so common in this kind of 9ritin .R4 $either of these omissions is his practiceelse9here. :ere8 ho9e3er8 his essay takes the form of a statement8 to the effect that the

facts are strai htfor9ardly such as he describes them or at least may most reasonably beso construed.

These bland procedures 9ould be disconcertin if Ptolemy 9ere en a in directly 9iththe issues that Se tus Empiricus records in his ar uments a ainst all 3ersions of thecriterion of truth ;!d3ersus mathematicos

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then the Stoics publiciCed the notion that a philosopher?s primary task is to establish thefoundations of our kno9led e of the 9orld8 and to do so by settin out the canonicalstandards 9hich are man?s natural e@uipment for makin secure discriminations bet9eentruth and falsehood or bet9een 9hat is and 9hat is not. The paramount importance theyattached to the criterion of truth should be seen as both a conse@uence and a cause of the

contemporary de3elopment of skepticism. !s moralists8 Epicureans and Stoics looked todisco3erable facts about human nature and the 9orld at lar e as the rounds for theirconceptions of happiness. Epicurus 3ery probably elaborated his "canonic" as a re oinderto the Pyrrhonian denial that there are ob ecti3e or "natural" criteria for discriminatinfacts and 3alues8R thus distancin himself from earlier atomist reser3ations about theco niti3e reliability of the senses. The Stoics @uite certainly 9ere fiercely attacked by thene9ly skeptical !cademy ust as soon as eno of +itium promul ated the "co niti3eimpression" ;phantasia kataleptike < as a state of a9areness that uarantees secure andaccurate perception of its ob ect.R2

The :ellenistic debates bet9een do matists and Skeptics 9ere

RK R R2A 027 A

conducted in terms that became permanent features of the intellectual tradition8 and thecommon property of all philosophers and scientists in the 'oman Empire. $othin aboutsuch a 9riter?s school alle iance or sympathy can be inferred from his usin suchori inally Epicurean terms as enar eia 8 "self6e3idence8" prolepsis 8 "preconception8"epimarturesis 8 "attestation8" or from his dra9in from the much richer technical lan ua eof Stoicism such 9ords as katalepsis 8 "co nition8" sunkatathesis 8 "assent8" ;koine ithin the :ellenistic period itself a common

philosophical ar on had de3eloped8 and terms emanatin from one school 9erefre@uently appropriated by another. >hat came to be shared8 moreo3er8 9as not ust9ords or concepts8 but somethin 9e mi ht call professionalism or e pertise. Ptolemyand his contemporaries 9ere 9ritin for audiences 9ho had been educated similarly tothemsel3es8 and 9hom they could e pect to be familiar 9ith an intellectual traditioncharacteriCed by a community of concepts8 standard @uestions and ans9ers8 commonar umentati3e methods and ob ections. ialectical interchan es bet9een the schools of

philosophy and medicine8 educational curricula8 learned commentaries8 anddo o raphical handbooks helped this process of unification @uite as much as the mer inof philosophical identities or eclecticism associated more specifically 9ith thinkers suchas !ntiochus of !scalon or Philo of !le andria.R05

This lin ua franca is shared by Ptolemy and Se tus but8 like any lan ua e8 it is a bluntinstrument. !mbi uities could ariseR1 R05A 02 A

as technical terms became disseminated and detached from their ori inal conte ts.atalepsis is a case in point. %n Stoicism8 its ori inal home8 it si nifies an infallible act of

co nition based on the kataleptic impression8 and such impressions refer primarily to

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self6certifyin acts of sense6perception. >riters of the 'oman Empire8 ho9e3er8fre@uently use katalepsis as a synonym for episteme or nosis 8 mental apprehension @uite

enerally.R00 Ptolemy8 like Galen8 complains about e cessi3e fussiness o3erterminolo y8 but he reco niCes the importance of pickin out the different properties ofmultiple items for 9hich a sin le name is in use.R07 The criterion of truth itself is an

e ample.

!s a technical term8 this be ins its life8 as % 9as sayin 8 to describe the Stoic andEpicurean accounts of the natural means at our disposal for makin utterly securediscriminations bet9een truth and falsehood. The application of a criterion of truth8 inthis usa e of the term8 tests the e istence of somethin or the truth of a proposition aboutsomethin . Self6e3idence ;enar eia < from sense6perceptions or the clarity anddistinctness of co niti3e impressions ;phantasiai kataleptikai < pro3ided Epicurus and theStoics8 respecti3ely8 9ith incorri ible standards for ud in 9hat really e istsD and the

primary locus of both criteria 9as the phenomenal 9orld. There are no precise analo uesto these doctrines in earlier Greek philosophy. :ence it is an anachronism8 in a sense8 for

Se tus Empiricus to identify the criteria of truth of philosophers from the 9hole precedin periodH:eraclitusR00 R07A 02B A

and Parmenides do9n to !ristotle and Theophrastus. Throu hout this time8 ho9e3er8 philosophers had been preoccupied 9ith @uestions concernin the co niti3e 3alue of ourmental faculties8 and particularly about the reliability of the senses as compared orcontrasted 9ith that of the intellect. %n a conte t discussin Prota oras?s dictum that manis the measure of all thin s ;a likely precursor of the technical concept of the criterion oftruth

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enerally8 the co niti3e faculties men ha3e at their disposal. %n this latter sense of theterm8 most Greek philosophers could be said to ha3e stated opinions on the criterion oftruth8 as Se tus Empiricus maintains that they did8 e3en thou h they did not use thee pression or en3isa e anythin comparable to its specific sense. Misrepresentation8ho9e3er8 could arise if the t9o senses 9ere run to ether8 so implyin that an opinion on

the 3alue of our co niti3e faculties committed its holder to an opinion about the infallibleapplication of one or more of these8 or that !ristotle8 for instance8 9as concerned 9ith ust the same epistemolo ical @uestions as the Stoics. Se tus in the do o raphy andcriticism of M does nothin e plicitly to disambi uate these t9o concerns. To thate tent his account of the 3ie9s adopted on the criterion is misleadin ly homo eneous as9ell as anachronistic. %t is also ill suited to capture a position like that of Ptolemy8 9ho ise plicitly interested in both these senses of the criterion8 but the second more prominentlythan the firstDR0K for Ptolemy i3es more attention to ad udicatin bet9een the co niti3econtributions of sense6perception and intellect than to in3itin the full Skepticalchallen e by specifyin the precise conditions under 9hich comple facts can beinfallibly determined. ,ut e3en Se 6ms8 by his practice8 enables his readers to distin uish

bet9een theories about criterial faculties in eneral and theories about criterialapplications in particular. This helps us to see that Ptol6R04 R0KA 02K A

emy belon s more closely 9ith Se tus?s 3ie9 of the Platonic and !ristotelian traditionthan 9ith Stoicism or Epicureanism.R0

%t 9ould be 9ron to imply that @uestions about criterial faculties and @uestions aboutcriterial applications had to be satisfied 9ith different ans9ers. Plato and !ristotlesometimes su est that any properly functionin acti3ity of intellect ;nous < isimmediately co niCant of the truth. :ellenistic philosophers8 ho9e3er8 appear to ha3ereco niCed the conceptual difference bet9een these @uestions8 or somethin like them8and to ha3e distin uished different aspects of the criterion of truth accordin ly. Potamoof !le andria8 9ho founded a so6called eclectic school of philosophy at the time of theemperor !u ustus8 is said to ha3e distin uished bet9een the "a ent" and the "instrument"of the criterion of truth8 identifyin the former of these 9ith the he emonikon ;the Stoicterm for intellect< and the latter 9ith "the most accurate impression" ;phantasia

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impression.R01 The distinction bet9een a ent and instrument rarities this relationship byindicatin that 9ell6founded ud ment is an act of the intellect usin co niti3eimpressions as its instrumental standard. Moreo3er8 the Stoic lists of criteria of truthspecify co niti3e facultiesHkno9led e8 sense6perception8 ri ht reasonR75 Has 9ell as

co niti3e impressions8 preconceptions8 and common conceptions8 any one of 9hich is@uite particular8 as faculties are not8 in its content.

,esides its ackno9led ment of the t9o criterial aspects % ha3e been discussin 8 Potamo?sscheme has t9o further uses. *irst8 it makes it possible to detect different sources ofsound and unsound ud ments. *aulty discriminations may be due either to unsoundinstruments ;e. .8 inaccurate sense6perceptions< or alternati3ely8 or in addition8 to theunsound minds or co niti3e faculties that apply them. Second8 his scheme is sufficiently

eneral ;recall his "eclectic" stance< to accommodate other accounts of the criterion besides the Stoics? and thus to pro3ide a basis for classifyin or reconcilin differentopinions on the sub ect.

,oth of these points can be illustrated from the use to 9hich the t9ofold criterial schemeis put in the compendium of Platonism by !lcinous or !lbinus8 a document rou hlycontemporary 9ith Ptolemy and Se tus.R70 !lbinus8 as % 9ill call him8 reflects current

practice by be innin his summary of Plato?s philosophy 9ith an account of the criterion.Like Potamo8 he identifies the "a ent" aspect 9ith intellect or8 as he says later8 "the

philosopher." The "instrumental" aspect in !lbinus is different. :e calls it "a naturalcriterion for ud in truths and falsehoods" or8 more summarily8 "natural lo os ." T9osubdi3isions of this follo9N first8 a distinction bet9een di3ine lo os 8 absolutely accurate

but inaccessible to man8 and human lo os 8 9hich is "infallible for the kno9led e ofthin s." Second8 !lbinus di3ides lo os into "sci6R01 R75 R70A 022 A

entific" ;epistemonikos

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%n !lbinus?s defense8 it can be said that his distinction bet9een intellect and lo os is nomore than a fa[on de parler 8 enablin him to indicate t9o different co niti3e states of theintellect itself. $e3ertheless8 his procedure seems to illustrate the difficulty of applyin aconception of the criterion desi ned for one philosophy to another for 9hich it 9as notintended. Turnin no9 to Ptolemy and Se tus8 9e find them startin from a more

comple di3ision of criterial aspects. %s it likely8 % 9ant to ask8 that their schemes 9ere prompted by a concern ;not ori inal to them< to e pound the criterion of truth in 9aysthat preser3e Potatoo?s distinctions bet9een a ent and instrument8 but do not risk con6flarin them8 as !lbinus does=

Ptolemy be ins his book by elaboratin a fi3efold scheme8 illustrated by analo y 9ith thela9 court ;dikasterion

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thou h associated 9ith the Skeptical !cademy8 has a Stoic ori in.R 5 %n some accountsof Stoic theory8 a co niti3e ;9hich 9ill also normally be a con3incin < impression iseither a piece of systematic kno9led e or a true but 9eakly held opinion8 dependin on9hether it is the co niti3e impression of a 9ise man or a fool.R 0 Thus there is noincompatibility bet9een Ptolemy?s and Se tus?s accounts of the third criterial aspect.

,oth their formulae allo9 the final sta e of a criterial process to be the stable kno9led eor unstable opinion 9hich the mind arri3es at by its application or its criterialinstruments.R71 R 5 R 0A 010 A

%n itself this is scarcely a note9orthy claim. ,ut no9 consider it in relation to the t9ofoldscheme. There 9e found Potamo identifyin the instrument 9ith "the most accurateimpression"Hthe scales8 so to speak. ,ut any one impression is an indication or apparentdetermination of some fact. !nd thisH 9hat the impression indicatesHis not analo ousto the scales themsel3es8 but to the 9ei ht that they re ister. *urthermore8 the threefold

scheme8 by distin uishin instruments from the mode of ud ment they facilitate8hi hli hts the udicial function of the third member8 the intellect itself. %t is the intellect?stask to use criterial instruments for the production of its ud ments. This point has specialrele3ance to Stoicism8 9here a mark of the fool is precipitancy in assentin toimpressions8 an o3erhasty readin of the scales8 as 9e mi ht say.

This una3oidably intricate discussion of criterial schemes helps to elucidate Se tus?sdo o raphy and criticism8 and the particular interests and contributions of Ptolemy.Se tus structures his criticism of the do matists around the three aspects of the criterionof truth8 ar uin a ainst each of them in turn. %mplicitly8 it seems8 he indicates the ne9de3elopments of :ellenistic philosophy by identifyin the criterion @ua "mode ofapplication" 9ith phantasia and by confinin his criticism to the Stoics and !cademicSkeptics. Presumably he or his sources could find nothin comparable to the Stoics?"co niti3e" or the !cademics? "con3incin " impressions in pre6:ellenistic philosophy.:ence his criticism of this aspect e cludes e3eryone from the earlier period. The criterion@ua "instrument8" ho9e3er8 9as entirely suitable for analyCin their 3ie9s on the relati3emerits of sense6perception ;aisthesis < or opinion ;do a

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discriminatin bet9een particular truths and falsehoods=" %n orthodo Stoicism the first@uestion had been 3irtually reduced to the secondN "co niti3e impressions8" ase periences of a mind that has no "irrational" faculty8 are themsel3es "rational" and sotranscend the old distinction bet9een bare sensation and intellect.R B Ptolemy?s entirestrate y is to preser3e and elucidate this distinction. So he ans9ers the first @uestion as

posed in the terms % ha3e statedD but his response to it helps to pro3ide his ans9er to thesecond @uestion. :e thus combines the t9o approaches to the criterion of truth that 9eha3e found in Se tusN the pre6:ellenistic interest in e3aluatin co niti3e faculties8 andthe :ellenistic concern 9ith the application of indubitable standards.R R BA 01 APtolemy?s Epistemolo y

:a3in elaborated his criterial scheme and introduced the concepts he 9ill apply to its3arious aspects8 Ptolemy concludes the main part of his essay ;sections 2607< 9ith anaccount of his epistemolo y that loses little by bein summariCed as follo9s.

%ntellect is posterior to sense6perception in its actualiCation and depends on the"transmission" ;diadosis < of sense6impressions ;phantasiai < for its primary co nition ofob ects.R 4 ,ut sense6perception is limited to the immediate e periences it under oes8and it cannot pass ud ment on any e ternal ob ects as such.R K Some of the 9ays it may

be affected misrepresent e ternal ob ects. %t is also liable to confusion and impediment9hen it has to deal 9ith properties common to more than one sense8 or impressions fromcomple ob ects.R (et it al9ays tells the truth about the 9ay it is affectedD and itsapprehension of its simple and specific ob ectsHseein colors8 hearin sounds8 etc.H 9hen these are percei3ed under dear and normal conditions8 is al9ays 3eridical8 or asinfallible as a human faculty can be.R 2 #nder these circumstances8 the senses areimmediately co niti3e of their proper ob ects and need no other foundation8 so far as self6e3idence itself ;enar eia < is concerned.R 1

%ntellect8 thou h dependent on sense6perception for its startin 6point8 is the "more3aluable" criterion8 and it is not sub ect to the same limitations.RB5 Throu h memory of

percepts and the concepts it ac@uires thereby8 intellect can pass ud ment on sense6 perception and on e ternal ob ectsD it ad udicates doubtful cases8 classifies sensorye3idence on the basis of its empiricallyR 4 R K R R 2 R 1 RB5A 01B A

deri3ed concepts8 and applies purely rational processes to its assessment of ob ects.RB0%ntellect has an intrinsic and "infallible" capacity to discriminate amon any impressionsthat it recei3es8 in contrast 9ith the confusion that may attend the senses.RB7 Like these8it is liable to error 9hen it has to pass ud ment on comple ob ectsHe. .8 "man is thesame as horse @ua animal but different @ua rational"RB Hbut it has its o9n pro3ince of"proper" ob ects ;theoretical and practical< about 9hich it al9ays tells the truthN e. .8same and different8 e@ual and une@ual8 appropriate and inappropriate.RBB More

enerally8 intellect8 unlike sense6perception8 functions by dra9in inferences about

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ob ects. >hen these are one6off apprehensions8 so to speak8 or "detached" from ascientific disposition8 the result is merely opinion ;do a

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for ud in ob ects8 9hether by applyin its concepts to the e3idence of the senses or byusin one sense to check another ;0 8 line 7560B8 line D 0B8 line 7B6048 line 0D 048 line0 60K8 line B

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The ud ment on these thin s is referred to phantasia 8 as the recent !cademics say8 notonly that 9hich is con3incin but also tested and undi3erted8 or co niti3e as +hrysippusand his follo9ers say8 or sense6perception and self6e3ident thou ht as men in eneral say.%n spite of the apparent difference of the terms8 on careful scrutiny they ha3e the same

sense8 as 9hen someone says he be ins from the common conceptions8 and that he positsthese as the primary and intrinsically reliable criteria of e3erythin .

:ere 9e find the same indifference to terminolo ical and fine conceptual distinctions thatPtolemy e hibits. ;%ndeed the difference bet9een the !cademics? "con3incin "impression and the co niti3e impression of the Stoics could only be treated as a fine one

by someone 9ho 9as either philosophically inept or unconcerned8 for his o9n purposes89ith the distinction bet9een the "apparently true" and the "certainly true." Galen kne9the difference8 but chooses here to i nore it.< Galen also likes to stren then the case foran epistemolo ical consensus by the de3ice8 so fa3ored at this period8 of citin the"ancient philosophers" ;e. .8 Meth. med .8 3ol. 058 K

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A 757 A

Plato8 and of the Peripatetics too8 that 9ould incorporate much of Stoicism8 the leadindoctrinaire philosophy of his day. Skepticism8 thou h still ali3e in the time of Ptolemyand Galen8 9as not an issue they felt called upon as practicin scientists to confront head6

on. Their broadly based epistemolo ies could be used to respond to Skeptics8 as 9e see inGalenD but their most immediate purpose has more bearin on the history and philosophyof science than on philosophy construed more narro9ly.

Galen8 as is becomin dear from recent studies8 steers a careful middle course bet9eenthe e tremes of the Empiricist and the 'ationalist schools of medicine.RK0 :e finds theEmpiricists? account of medical kno9led e defecti3e in their reliance on non6rationale perience ;peira < and in their efforts to base cures on memory of obser3able treatmentsand symptoms8 to the total e clusion of in3esti ation of underlyin causes by analo icalinference from the e3ident to the none3ident ;Subfi . emp . 0678 600 X eich r ber8Empirikerschule 8 B78 BB8 K762K

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"commandin 6faculty" ;he emonikon

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or cultural eclecticism. %n another sense8 Ptolemy is self6consciously eclectic8 practicinthe methodolo y % ha3e called optimum a reement. This should be re arded as adialectical strate y to i3e ma imum credibility to the position he holds on the proper

balance bet9een empiricism and rationalism. :e states his o9n con3ictions in a form thatresists identification 9ith any one school8 9hile at the same time makin it difficult for

any school e cept Skepticism to ar ue a ainst them8 and implicitly poolin thedo matists? resources a ainst the Skeptics. :is psy6RKKA 75 A

cholo y is more ob3iously a compromise than his epistemolo y8 but this 9as due to thenature of the in@uiry. Ptolemy had to make choices o3er such contro3ersial issues as themind?s location8 pans8 and relation to the body. :ere too8 ho9e3er8 his decisions arecalculated to restrain disa reement as far as possible. *or most of them8 like Galen8 hecould cite the authority of the ancients.

$either sense of eclecticism8 ho9e3er8 is ultimately satisfactory as an account of )n the+riterion and +ommandin 6*aculty . The first makes the patroniCin point that Ptolemy9as ust a man of his time. The second8 thou h much more informati3e8 is limited tosho9in ho9 and 9hy he presented his thou hts in 9ays that could command eneralassent. >hat eludes eclecticism here8 and perhaps any9here else8 is Ptolemy?s e3identcommitment to the doctrines he presentsHdoctrines 9hich still contain much that seemsa reasonable appro imation of the facts. That is 9hat appealed to ,ullialdus in these3enteenth century8 and 9hat source6criticism of Ptolemy?s essay has tended to obscure.)n the +riterion is the 9ork of someone 9ho has made up his mind on t9o issues of

reat comple ity8 but prefers to i3e us his decisions ;the third aspect of the criterion oftruth< rather than the instruments ;the second aspect< he applied in reachin them.A 752 A

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2 isco3erin the ima ination Platonists and Stoics on phantasia

2isco3erin the ima ination Platonists and Stoics on phantasia

G. >atson

The history of phantasia in +lassical thou ht pro3ides many e amples of eclecticism.)ne of the most interestin of these in3ol3es the process 9hereby this Greek 9ord 9ase tended in its meanin from a term practically confined to technical philosophicaldebate in Plato8 !ristotle8 and the Stoics into somethin more like "fantasy" in themodem En lish sense8 9hich can include in its ran e of meanin the notion of the

creation of an unreal and e3en ideal 9orld8 3isualiCed by the artist and shared 9ith othersfor their pleasure and enli htenment8 the 9orld of the ima ination. The dearest e ampleof the e tension8 and indeed transformation8 of the term occurs in a fi ure 9ho li3ed atthe end of the period 9e shall be considerin 8 the Philostratus 9ho 9rote the Life of!pollonius . %t is enerally a reed that this Philostratus li3ed from about !. . 0 5 to 745and that his Life of !pollonius 9as not published until after 70 .R0 There is also enerala ree6R0A 751 A

ment that Philostratus 9rote8 amon other 9orks8 one called Eikones 8 9hich containsdescriptions of si ty6fi3e paintin s and 9hich 9as put into 9ritten form in $aples.R7 !tsome sta e durin his life he came to 'ome and 9as accepted into the circle around themother of +aracalla8 Julia omna8 for 9hom he undertook to 9rite the life of !polloniusof Tyana8 a 9onder69orker and philosopher of the first century !. .R

The Eikones indicates a man 9ho 9as interested in paintin and the po9er it possessed8and abo3e all in attemptin to con3ey this po9er in 9ords. The same interest isabundantly e3ident in the Life 8RB 9hich8 in spite of some possible historical content8 9eneed hardly take as a critical bio raphy. %t does8 ho9e3er8 allo9 Philostratus to sho9 offhis many6sided kno9led e and skill. This freedom allo9s him to raise the @uestion of the3alue of paintin 8 throu h the mouth of !pollonius8 and the discussion de3elops into aconsideration of mimesis ;7.77e learn from this that 9hile all human bein s ha3e the

po9er of imitation8 artists ha3e it in a more de3eloped 9ay8 because of the skill that theyha3e learned. %t is because 9e all share in the po9er of imitation that 9e can appreciatethe skill of artists8 either in reproducin 9hat 9e ha3e all seen or in con urin up 9hathas perhaps ne3er happened but can be ima ined8 as8 for instance8 the e pression on theface of ! a emer in from his delusion.

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%n this 9hole section there is no mention of phantasia 8 e3en thou h it is difficult todiscuss the section in En lish 9ithout referrin to the "ima ination." Later in the Life 8ho9e3er8 phantasia is specifically contrasted 9ith mimesis ;K.01hen someone 9ishes to produceeus8 he must do it as Phidias did8 and 9hen !thena8 he must con ure up ;ennoein e ha3e8 then8 in this passa e a mo3ement from the praise of art based on mental 3isionto the e altation of the mental 3ision itself8 e3en if8 or especially 9hen8 it does not issuein art. This sounds e tremely Platonic8 and so too does an earlier passa e in B. . There!pollonius ad3ises the people of SmyrnaN

Pay more attention to your o9n culti3ation than to the appearance of the city8 because acity 9hich is adorned 9ith ood men i3es more pleasure than one decorated 9ithcolonnades and paintin s and old. The cities 9hich are beautiful throu h their 9orks ofart are like the statue of eus by Phidias in )lympia8 sittin there.... ,ut men 9ho oe3ery9here are like the eus of :omer8 9ho is presented in many forms by the poet andso is more 9onderful than Phidias?s eus of i3ory. *or he is seen only here on earth8 but:omer?s eus can be thou ht of o3erall in the hea3ens.A 700 A

%n other 9ords8 the less earthbound it is the more 9onderful the art8 and that is 9hyliterature is superior to paintin or the plastic artsN it is a product of the mind and not tiedto material place or time. The artist is not confined to reproducin e istin realityN the

po9er of phantasia 8 9hich is a hi her one than that of mimesis 8 creates 9hat the eye hasne3er seen but the mind has concei3ed.

%t may seem a little un enerous to cite these passa es from Philostratus and thenimmediately start lookin for the sources of his ideas8 especially 9hen they do look ne9

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and e citin 8 and 9hen he has been credited 9ith i3in art a ne9 standin .R4 %t seemsnecessary to do so8 ho9e3er8 e3en if 9e 9ere to i nore the doubtful consistency of his3ie9s on mimesis 8 9hich seems to indicate importation 9ithout assimilation.RK That notall of Philostratus?s ideas are ori inal seems to be indicated by a passa e in +icero?s)rator 8 9ritten more than t9o hundred years before Philostratus8 in 9hich 3ie9s

remarkably similar to those of the sophist are put for9ard. The conte t ; ff.< is adiscussion of the ideal orator. The supreme orator he is paintin has perhaps ne3ere isted8 says +icero8 and the elo@uence 9e are seekin is at the 3ery most su ested8 no9and a ain8 in speeches8 copies as it 9ere of the perfect. >e see 3arious beautiful thin s8

but none of them is so beautiful as that of 9hich it is a copy.

This cannot be percei3ed by eyes or ears or any senseN 9e rasp it only throu h thinkinRco itatione tantum et mente complectimur . *or e ample8 in the case of the statues ofPhidias8 the most perfect of their kind 9hich 9e can see8 and in the case of the paintin smentioned Rin 48 by Proto enes and !pelles 8 9e can8 in spite ofR4 RK

A 707 Atheir beauty8 ima ine somethin more beautiful.R That reat sculptor Phidias8 9hileshapin the ima e of Jupiter or Miner3a8 did not keep lookin at some person from 9homhe dre9 the likeness8 but in his o9n mind there d9elt a surpassin 3ision of beautyD atthis he aCed and8 fi ed on this8 he directed his art and hand to the production of alikeness of it. !ccordin ly8 as there is somethin perfect and surpassin in the case ofsculpture and paintin 8 9ith the 3ision of 9hich in the mind there are associated in the

process of imitation those thin s 9hich are ne3er actually seen8 so 9ith our minds 9econcei3e the ideal of perfect elo@uence8 but 9ith our ears 9e catch only the copy.R2These patterns of thin s are called ideai by Plato.... These8 he says8 do not "become"D theye ist fore3er and are to be found in intellect and reason Rratione et intelle entia D otherthin s come into bein and cease to be8 they are in flu and do not remain lon in thesame state.

:ere8 as distinct from Philostratus8 the reference to Plato is e plicit8 and the ob3iouslyPlatonic "somethin perfect and surpassin ... 9ith the 3ision of 9hich in the mind areassociated in the process of imitation those thin s 9hich are ne3er actually seen ..."corresponds to 9hat Philostratus ;in K.01< says about phantasia and that 9hich has not

been seen. ,ut this is precisely our difficultyD the use of the term phantasia in a Platonicconte t. %f the conte t 9ere Stoic8 this term 9ould be @uite understandable8 indeede pected. ,ut it mi ht appear unlikely that a Platonist 9ould praise ima ination as afaculty that 9ould help us to create artHart8 accordin to Plato8 is an imitation of animita6R R2A 70 A

tionHor that he 9ould use phantasia as a term of approbation for a hi her kind of insi ht.

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%t must be emphasiCed that it is 9ith the use of the term in a Platonic conte t that 9e areconcerned. %t is not a matter of denyin the real e istence or employment of ima ination8as 9e understand it8 by Plato or 9ithin his system. %ndeed8 it mi ht be maintained ;and8on occasion8 critically8 as by !ristotle< that it is in this direction that Plato?s theory of*orms leads us. >ith the ima ination 9e stretch beyond the sensually 3erifiable and

reach or create a 9orld 9hich 9e fed should e ist8 and 9hich satisfies a lon in thatseems to us reasonable. %t ou ht to e ist8 and 9e 9ould like to say that therefore it doese ist. Plato said that the 9orld of *orms e ists because it must e ist. There must besomethin beyond the buCC of sensation that i3es 9hat 9e hear and see meanin anddirection. Mind8 too8 i3es a superior 3ision8 particularly of beauty 9hich8 because beautyhas de rees8 points beyond itself and so creates a desire that cannot be satisfied by theseen. Lon inus refers specifically to Plato in chapter 4 of )n the Sublime 8 and e3enthou h he does not purport to be @uotin him8 he ne3ertheless puts for9ard 3ie9s 9ith9hich Plato 9ould certainly not disa reeN

$ature has brou ht us into life8 into the 9hole 3ast uni3erse8 there to be spectators of all

that she has created.... Thus from the first she has implanted in our souls anuncon@uerable passion for all that is reat and for all that is more di3ine than oursel3es.*or this reason the entire uni3erse does not satisfy the contemplation and thou ht that lie9ithin the scope of human endea3ourD our ideas often o beyond the boundaries by 9hich9e are circumscribed8 and if 9e look at life from all sides8 obser3in ho9 in e3erythinthat concerns us the e traordinary8 the reat and the beautiful play the leadin part8 9eshall soon realiCe the purpose of our creation.;trans. orsch8 Pen uin +lassicshen8 in 'omantimes8 Greek philosophy de3eloped a technical e pression for free 9ill that 9ent beyond

phrases like "9hat is up to us8" the term most enerally employed is to aute ousion 8

9hich simply means "9hat is in one?s o9n po9er8" as in +icero?s in nostra potestate . Just9hen this term 9as introduced8 % do not kno9.R70 >e find it8 e. .8 in EpictetusR77 andin Plotinus. Tertullian8 9ritin shortly after !. . 7558 reports aute 6R75 R70 R77A 740 A

ousion as a technical term 9hich he translates as libera arbitrii potestas 8 "the free po9erof decision."R7

The metaphor of freedom8 9hich 9as implicit as early as Epicurus?s reference to our o9nresponsibility in action as adespoton 8 "sub ect to no master8" seems ne3er to ha3e

hardened into a technical e pression in Greek. Plotinus8 in his famous essay on "the 9illRthelema of the )ne8" uses the terms "9hat is up to us" ;to eph? hemin

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R iscourses .4. May death find me en a ed in no other concern than 9ith my moralchoice Rprohairesis 8 that it may be serene8 unhampered8 unconstrained8 free. R0.77.05Some thin s are up to us Reph? hemin 8 some thin s not. #p to us are moral choiceRprohairesis and all the 9orks of choiceD not up to us are body8 possessions8 family...

R0.07.1 :e is free for 9hom e3erythin happens in a reement 9ith his moral choiceRprohairesis . R0.0.7 RThe tyrant says8 "% 9ill put you in bonds." ">hat are you sayin = put me in bonds= (ou 9ill fetter my le 8 but not e3en eus can con@uer my prohairesis. "

%t seems dear that Epictetus has used this rather old6fashioned term to e press afundamentally ne9 idea8 much the same idea that Seneca had recently e pressed by3oluntas .R74 Epictetus?s use of prohairesis ser3es to e pand the notion of consent intothe broader notion of moral character and personal "commitment" as shaped in our day6to6day8 moment6to6moment decisions on ho9 to deal 9ith our inner feelin s and outerrelationshipsD andR74

A 74 Athis notion is presented not only as the decisi3e factor in practical e istence but as thetrue self8 the inner man8 the "%" of personal identity. ,y contrast8 for Plato and !ristotlethe "%" or true self 9as nous 8 the principle of reason most fully e pressed in theoreticalkno9led e. This shift is a momentous one for the e3olution of the idea of person andselfhood. *or theoretical reason is essentially impersonal8 and the Platonic6!ristotelianidentification of the person 9ith his intellect offers no basis for a metaphysics of the selfin any indi3idual sense. Epictetus8 on the other hand8 identifies himself 9ith somethinessentially personal and indi3idualiCedN not 9ith reason as such but 9ith the practicalapplication of reason in selectin his commitments8 in keepin his emotional balance8 hisserenity8 by not e tendin himself to oals and 3alues that lie beyond his control. This isa delicate operation of e3ery 9akin moment8 to be carefully monitored by periodicscrutinies of conscience8 by steady application of the rule 9ith 9hich his :andbookopensN

Some thin s are in our po9er Reph? hemin 8 some thin s are not. %n our po9er are ud ment8 impulse8 rational desire8 a3ersion8 and8 in one 9ord8 our o9n business. $ot inour po9er are the body8 property8 reputation8 political office8 and in one 9ord8 9hat is notour o9n business. >hat is in our po9er is by nature free and unobstructedD 9hat is not inour po9er is 9eak8 ensla3ed8 obstructed8 and alien .... Test e3ery phantasia by these rules8and if it concerns somethin 9hich is not in our po9er8 be ready to say8 "this is nothin tome."

The life of the committed Stoic is thus a continual process of self6definition8 ofidentification 9ith the inner 9orld that is "in our po9er8" of deliberate detachment fromthe body and from the e ternal 9orld that lies beyond our control.

Traditional Greek terminolo y offers no appropriate term for this intense preoccupation9ith the inner life8 the late Stoic parallel to a +artesian co ito or focus on consciousness.

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8/13/2019 ' Studies in Later Greek Philosophy[1]. University of California Press, c1988

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8/13/2019 ' Studies in Later Greek Philosophy[1]. University of California Press, c1988

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my kneesD and % did all this because % made an act of 9ill R3olui to do it .... % performedall these actions8 in 9hich the 9ill R3elle and the po9er to act Rposse are not the same.(et % did not do that one thin 9hich % should ha3e been far8 far better pleasedR7 R72A 74 A

to do than all the rest and could ha3e done at once8 as soon as % had the 9ill to do it Rmout 3ellem8 possem 8 because as soon as % had the 9ill to do so8 % should ha3e 9illed it9holeheartedly. *or in this case the po9er to act 9as the same as the 9ill R3oluntas . To9ill it 9as to do it. (et % did not do it.;2.2hy does this occur=... The mind Ranimus orders itself to make an act of 9ill Rimperatut 3elit 8 and it 9ould not i3e this order unless it 9illed to do so Rnisi 3ellet D yet it doesnot carry out its o9n command. ,ut it does not fully 9ill to do this thin Rnon e toto 3ult

and therefore it does not fully i3e the order.... *or the 9ill commands that an act of 9ill

should be made8 and it i3es this command to itself8 not to some other 9ill. The reason8then8 9hy the command is not obeyed is that it is not i3en 9ith the full 9ill Rnon plenaimperat .... So there are t9o 9ills in us8 because neither by itself is the 9hole 9ill8 andeach possesses 9hat the other lacks.;2.1