participation, transparency and accountability: south korea, brazil and the philippines brian...
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Participation, Transparency and Accountability:
South Korea, Brazil and the Philippines
Brian WamplerNovember 2, 2013
Rebuilding state institutions: incorporating both participation and transparency mechanisms
What is the “PROBLEM” that participation is meant to solve?
Institutional development will vary significantly based on moment of intervention in policy cycle Policy formulation Policy implementation End-of project-Auditing
Carefully linking the political and policy interests of government officials (supply-side) and citizens (demand-side).
Supply-side
What types of authority are government officials willing to delegate to citizens? What is the level of risk acceptable to government officials?
Key issues to be considered: Use of multi-channel forums (in-person, online; consultative, binding) Engage citizens and CSOs at multiple stages of the budgetary cycle Cover a range of policy issues (education, basic infrastructure) Interlocking Institutions (Federal, across policy arenas, multi-channel Retrain public servants and technical experts to work directly with
citizens Reward local Governments and country-level agencies to work
directly with citizens
Demand-side
Demand-side: How will citizens and CSOs be able to use newly delegated authority? Can citizens simultaneously pressure and partner with government officials? Citizens have formal opportunity to exercise some
combination voice, vet, vote and veto
Include citizens and CSOs in discussions about the problems that the new institutions is designed to solve
Build capacity among CSOs Provide meaningful feedback loops Auditing and Monitoring can be carried out by citizens and
CSOs
Range of participation
Voice: The ability of citizens to express ideas, preferences, and opinions within and parallel to formal state-sanctioned bodies. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can also represent citizens’ voice
Vet: The ability of citizens and CSOs to review documents and information provided by government officials. Better quality vetting produces more informed voice
Vote: Citizens vote on policy proposals that emerge from civil society or from the government. A “binding” vote would be the strongest form of vote; it entails a public vote being translated into direct action. A “consultative” vote might be on general policy lines.
Veto: Citizens and citizens have the authority to reject policy proposals, year-end reports, and audits.
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2006 2008 2010 2012
Brazil 50 60 60 36
Croatia 33 33 40 36
El Salvador 33 53 47 14
Ethiopia
Indonesia 0 7 7 19
Jordan 0 27 13 11
Kenya 17 33 73 39
Mexico 33 27 53 25
Moldova
Philippines 50 47 67 53
South Korea 84 80 93 92
Tanzania 0 40 0 14
UK 50 67 67 56
US 84 87 87 58
Open Budget Survey, Participation Indicators
South Korea, Brazil, Philippines
South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-based participation
Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel state-building
South Korea: Rebuilding the state with mixed forms Participation and Oversight
Open Budget Survey, 2012Participation
South Korea Brazil Philippines
Overall Score on Index 75 71 48
Participation Score 92 36 53
Formal requirement for public participation
Exists and is strong
Exists but could be improved
Exists but could be improved
Mechanisms developed by the executive for participation during budget planning
Exists but could be improved
Exists but could be improved
Exists but could be improved
Mechanisms developed by the executive for participation during budget execution
Exists and is strong
Does not exist Exists but could be improved
Feedback by the executive on use of inputs provided by the public
Exists but could be improved
Does not exist Exists but is weak
Key Similarities
South Korea Brazil Philippines
Year of new Constitution
1988 1988 1988
Decentralization
1995 1988 1991
Renewal of civil society
Labor and student opposition during late 1980s
Mass-based opposition to military regime during 1970s and 1980s
Mass-based opposition to President Marcos during 1980s
Key DifferencesSouth Korea Brazil Philippines
State Capacity Strong Mixed: Significant variation in state capacity across regions and policy sectors
Mixed: Significant variation in state capacity across regions and policy sectors
Social cleavages Low Moderate to High
High
HDI, 2012 .909 .730 .654
Civil Society Technical Capacity at time of Democratic Transition
Moderate to low Moderate to Low Low
Current Civil Society Technical Capacity
High Moderate Mixed—Small cluster of NGOs with high capacity
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South Korea: Institutional Restructuring and Expert-
based participation
Three Plus One Fiscal Reform (2004)
South Korea: Distinguishing Features
Digital Brain: Leveraging IT to provide timely and easy to manage information
Extensive formal opportunities for expert-based participation
Participation largely involves policy experts and NGOs appointed by government officials
Local governments, encouraged by President Roh (2003-2008), promote “ordinary citizen” participation. Participatory Budgeting is used by local governments
Korea: Key Outcome
Brazil: Mass-based participation and multi-channel state-building
Participatory Budgeting (Subnational, mainly municipal) 100+ cities adopt; billions of US dollars spent on PB projects
Public Policy Management Councils (Federal in structure) 65,000 with 300,000 elected citizens-volunteers
Policy Conferences (Federal in structure) 83 since 2003; 6-7 million participants
Multi-year Planning process (Federal, state, municipal) 19 national councils + 350 civil society
Brazil: Distinguishing features
Multi-channel approach; wide diversity of issues
Mirrors Brazil’s Federal structure
Mass-based participation; elections used to select civil society representatives
Limited formal access to federal budgetary processes
Brazil: Outcomes
Participatory Budgeting Increase in spending on health care, sanitation; decrease in infant
mortality; Effects grow stronger over time (Touchton and Wampler, forthcoming)
Public Policy Management councils National-level councilors shape Federal policies, both at proposal and
implementation stages (IPEA 2012)
Policy conferences Holding conferences increases Presidential Decrees is policy arena
(Pogrebinschi)
Multiyear Planning Process Projects proposed by CSOs are included 4-year Planning document
(Teixeira)
Philippines: Rebuilding the state with mixed
forms Participation and Oversight
Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti-corruption
Seal of Good Housekeeping (Race to the Top for municipalities)
Budget Partnership Agreements (Agency-CSO agreement)
Bottom-up Budgeting Approach (Poverty reduction
Citizens’ Participatory Audits CSOs
Philippines:Distinguishing Features
Mix of citizens and policy expert participation
Reform at both local and country-level
Effort to empower citizens and CSOs
Participatory Auditing is important; Extensive effort to limit corruption
Philippines: Outcomes
Recent reform efforts: Too new to evaluate
Earlier reforms
Community-Driven Development (World Bank) Increased participation Empowerment-oriented
Monitoring programs led by CSOs Reducing corruption
Local level (Naga city) Increases in Participation
Voice, Vet, Vote and Veto
South Korea Brazil Philippines
Voice Expert; Policy-oriented
Mass-based + elected volunteers
Mass-based + elections of CSOs + Expert CSOs
Vet Robust Exists and is getting stronger
Exists and is getting stronger
Vote Exists for policy experts;Exists but is very weak for ordinary citizens
Exists at local level (PB);Consultative vote in councils and conferences
Exists at local level
Veto Non-existent Exists but is weak Exists but is weak
4 Key lessons
Political Will: Election of political reformers to presidency is crucial because it creates necessary political will to implement reform; In all three countries, the president’s political coalition established the contours of reform.
Civil Society: Renewal (increased density + new actors and issues) of civil society increases attention on basic governance issues; Engaged CSOs provides necessary partners for government reformers
State Capacity: The degree of state capacity strongly affects the type of reform undertaken and the pace of reform. We should expect more limited measurable effects when state capacity is weak.
Direction of change: The shape of institutional rebuilding is strongly affected by the political and geographic source of reform. Top-down/Center-periphery reforms are distinct from bottom-up/perhiphary-center reforms.
Key Lessons: Demand-side
Elite-based model Improves quality of debate; produces more equal negotiating partners;
Allows government and civil society to check power of entrenched business groups and bureaucrats
Key problem: Selection of policy experts; Independence of policy experts
Mass-based model Expands public debate and range of issues discussed; Promotes
empowerment but CSOs remain at information and knowledge deficit Key problem: General debate rather than specific details
Mixed model Empowers citizens and CSOs; allows for a variety of venues to
participate; promotes a wide-range of actors Key problem: What is the basis for different types of representation?
Key Lessons: Supply-Side
Governments and CSOs need to first identify the “so-what” problem that participation and transparency-oriented reforms would solve.
Country-level government can incentivize improvements in governance by rewarding local governments and agencies that introduce new programs and policies
Establishing formal institutions is first step; ensuring CSOs and citizens can make meaningful use voice, vet, vote and veto is step two.
Participation can included at multiple stages depending on the problem that government
Other Participation Reforms
Community-Driven Development (World Bank): “An approach to local development that gives control over planning
decisions and investment resources to community groups (including local governments).” CCD core course
International Labor Organization Convention 169 (UN agency Establishes Prior, informed consent for Tribal and Indigenous Populations
over local development issues 22 countries have ratified
Audits: Participatory and Social
Participatory Budgeting: Thousands of cities and districts across world Citizens directly engage each other and government officials in the
allocation of a small percentage of the government’s local budget.
Community-Driven Development
Indonesia (KDP)-:Villagers submit proposals to community coalitions of nominated village facilitators. Participants vote for specific projects. All transactions public with citizen engagement from planning to implementation.
Benin: Projects selected by elected management committees and tied to ministries to direct in policy and information-sharing.
Azerbaijan: Sub-projects proposed by local CSOs, community selects for implementation. Regional coordination is half CSO and half government for information, expertise, monitoring
Scaling-Up: Expanding CDD in
Indonesia Original Kecamatan Development Program expanded in
2007 National Program for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas
Nation-wide coverage with over 5,000 kecamatans and over 34 million beneficiaries
Since the first KDP has “financed over 109,000km of small roads, 17,000 bridges, 40,000 clean water systems
Increased upward mobility in PNPM areas (2.1%), real per capita consumption gains in PNPM areas (9.1%),
Participatory Budgeting Peru
Project Context 2003 national Participatory Budgeting Law requires all municipal-
level districts (1821) to use participatory budgeting processes Methodology
National government spearheading PB well-positioned to innovate at local level
All districts form local coordination councils to implement participatory budgeting programs; All Districts form Oversight committees, which is geared toward enhancing social accountability over the implementation phrase
Results A few key districts (municipalities) have produced robust results.
Most districts have produced limited results due to limited civil society participation; Most participation involves CSO representatives rather than individual citizens
Source: A New Social Contract for Peru: An Agenda for Improving Education, Health Care, and the Social Safety Net
India’s 100-Day Work Plan
100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum wage.
Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works.
Project methodologySocial Audits: Local governments are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken and the daily wage rate; List of employees is included
India’s 100-day Work Campaign
Project Context
100 days of paid employment to adults who are willing to work for minimum wage.
Problem: (a) ghost employees, (b) individuals who are not properly paid for their work, (c) resource leakage, and (d) poorly built public works.
Methodology Social Audits: CSOs trained to monitor implementation, Local
governments are required to post worksite boards that list the activities being undertaken, the daily wage rate, and list of contracted employees
Results Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption
Limited CSO capacity
Participatory Budgeting Uganda
Project Context Decentralization initiated in 1995
DFGG Intervention and Methodology National government initiates three levels of citizen engagement
Municipal officials meet with national government; Municipal governments meet with citizens; Municipal governments meet again with national government
Projects must meet national development guidelines
Results Initial results are reported as minimal, but mot important change is
opening budget to public scrutiny.
Source: Africa Good Governance Programme on the Radio Waves
Right to Information Campaign Rajasthan, India
Project Context Local governments have control over resources to implement small and
medium-sized public works projects; perceptions of corruption
Methodology CSO Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan organized demonstrations to
pressure local government officials to release information on public works programs due to wide-spread perceptions of corruption
CSO obtained copies of publicly available contacts, bill, receipts pertaining to project, which they then compared to actual practices
Public meetings are held to show to the community the extent to which the implementation matches formal contracts
Results Scaling-up as program moved from local to state level;
Initial reports indicate decrease in project-level corruption Source: Community Oversight of Construction
Final lessons
Key opportunities Link type of participatory venue to so-what problem
Elite involvement Empowerment Expanding participation
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