© International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). OfficeBogotá,D.C.,Colombia Carrera 5 No. 67-01 Telephone: +571 3450046 www.ictj.org

Contested Transitions: DilemmasofTransitionalJusticeinColombiaandComparativeExperience

Títuloediciónenespañol:Transicionesencontienda:disyuntivasdelajusticiatransicionalenColombiadesdelaexperienciacomparada

EditorEnglishEdition:AmandaLyonsEditorsSpanishEdition:MichaelReed&MaríaCristinaRiveraAcademicCoordinators:MichaelReed&AmandaLyons

CoverDesign:©2010-ICTJ.PabloPrada.CoverPhoto:CalebKimbrough,http://lostandtaken.com/

ISBN:978-958-99465-0-3FirstEdition:october2010Bogotá,Colombia

DesignandPrinting:OpcionesGráficasEditoresLtda.Telephones:2241823-4827071Bogotá,Colombiawww.opcionesgraficas.com

ThispublicationwasmadepossiblebythefinancialsupportoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsthroughtheproject“TechnicalAdviceandProductionofAcademicKnowledgeontheProtectionofVictims’RightsandTransitionalJusticeMechanismsinColombia”. Thecontentof thispublication is theexclusiveresponsibilityofitsauthorsanddoesnotnecessarilyreflectthepositionoftheInternationalCenterforTransitionalJusticeortheGovernmentofNorway.

Lyons,AmandaContestedtransitions:dilemmasoftransitionaljusticeinColombiaandcomparativeexperience/AmandaLyons,MichaelReed.--Bogotá:AmandaLyons,2010.400p.:il.;24cm.Incluyebibliografía.ISBN978-958-99465-0-31.Justiciatransicional-Colombia2.Justiciarestaurativa-Colombia3.Solucióndeconflictos-Colombia4.Conflictoarmado-Colombia5.Justiciatransicional-Estudioscomparados-ColombiaI.Reed,MichaelII.Tít.303.69cd21ed.A1257880

CEP-BancodelaRepública-BibliotecaLuisÁngelArango

Acknowledgments

WiththefinancialsupportoftheMinistryofForeignRelationsofNorway,the International Center for Transitional Justice Colombia Program is pleasedtopresentthisvolume.Thisbookisthefinalproductofayear-longprocessofdialogueandwrittenreflectiontostudythechallengesarisingwherethemeasuresanddiscourseoftransitionaljusticeareemployedoutsideoftheoriginallyintendedcontexts, suchas in situationsofongoingarmedconflict.With thisproject theICTJseekstoenrichtheliteratureontheimplementationoftransitionaljusticetoolsingeneralandtodrawlessonsfortheColombiancaseinparticular.

The project has counted on the assistance of numerous individuals. Firstandforemost,ourappreciationgoestoMaríaCristinaRivera,CommunicationsDirectorforICTJ-Colombia,whosededicationtotheprojectandtotheeditionoftheSpanishpublicationisreflectedinthequalityoftheEnglisheditionaswell.

Inordertofacilitatedialogueonthecontemporarychallengesoftransitionaljusticeandcreateanopportunityforpointedfeedbackoneachsubmission, theICTJheldtwoworkshopsinBogotáwiththecontributingauthors,inSeptemberandDecember2009.Theseworkshops—andthelogisticcoordinationthattheyimply—wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheassistanceofJeimmyPatiño,LuzMeryMontoya,andCatalinaBlanco.TheadministrationofthefinanceforthisprojectwascoordinatedbyCarolinaMejíaandMilenaAmezquita.

Akey component of thewritten reflection component of this project hasbeen to ensure that these studies and analyses are available for both Spanish-speaking and English-speaking audiences through high-quality translations.Making contemporary and expert analysis of theColombian case available inEnglish,aswellasforeigncasestudiesavailablefortheColombianaudienceisavitalcontributionfortheexerciseofcomparativereflectionandcommentary.Forthis,weappreciatethededicationofthetranslatorsthatworkedonthechaptersof this collection:Andrés Samuel Roth, JorgeAmaya, Diego Bolívar, GwenBurnyeat,VivianaBolívar,EdwardHelbein,MelodyGonzalez,CharlieRoberts,andJorgeTorres.ThetranslationswerealsosubmittedfortechnicalreviewwithICTJ-Colombiastaff.ForvaluableassistanceinthiscrucialprocessofeditionwethankCatalinaUprimnyandEstefanieRobertson,aswellasourinternsLudwigUreelandMayaIbars.

AveryspecialthankyoutoPablodeGreiff,DirectoroftheResearchUnitforICTJ,whohasbeenaconsistentsupportoftheacademicinitiativesofour

office,forhisguidanceonthisprojectandparticipationincommentingmanyofthechapters.WealsorecognizethevaluableassistanceofDelphineLecombe,oneofthecontributingauthors,intheinitialplanningforthisprojectduringhertimewiththeICTJColombiaProgram.

Finally, our heartfelt thanks go to the contributing authors for thededicationandenthusiasmthattheyhaveshownthroughouttheproject,namelytheir willingness to engage in the debates over the dilemmas—which remainunresolved—of applying the instruments of transitional justice in contexts ofongoingarmedconflict,suchasColombia.

MichaelReedHurtado AmandaLyonsDirector,ICTJColombia Researcher,ICTJColombia

Part I: ColombIa

Chapter 1 InternationalInfluenceonOrdinaryJurisdictionandNationalActors:TransitionalJusticeProcessesinContextsofArmedConflictTatiana Rincón 35

Chapter 2 TheColombianGovernment’sFormulasforPeacewiththeAUC:AnInterpretationfromthePerspectiveofPoliticalRealismCamila de Gamboa Tapias 61

Chapter 3 TransitionalJusticeUnderFire:FiveReflectionsontheColombianCaseMichael Reed Hurtado 87

Chapter 4 GenderedTransitionalJusticeandtheNon-stateActorFionnuala Ní Aoláin & Catherine O’Rourke 115

Chapter 5 ChallengesforTransitionalJusticeinContextsofNon-transition:TheColombianCaseFelipe Gómez Isa 144

Chapter 6 AConflictedPeace:EpistemicStrugglesaroundtheDefinitionofTransitionalJusticeinColombiaDelphine Lecombe 165

Chapter 7 AModelofJusticeforDemocracyIván Cepeda Castro 179

Chapter 8 CivilSocietyintheColombianTransitionalJusticeFrameworkGabriel Arias 187

Contents

ContributorBiographies 7

IntroduCCtIon ForaJustTransitioninColombiaAmanda Lyons 15

Part II: ComParatIve exPerIenCe

Chapter 9 Uganda:PursuingPeaceandJusticeintheShadowoftheICCMichael Otim & Marieke Wierda 207

Chapter 10 TheImpactofHybridTribunals:CurrentPracticeinBosniaandHerzegovinaandCambodiaOlga Martin-Ortega & Johanna Herman 230

Chapter 11 DomesticLegalProcessandInternationalJudicialSystems:TheArgentineCaseLeonardo Filippini 260

Chapter 12 TransitionalJustice,CriminalJustice,andExceptionalisminSouthAfricaHoward Varney 281

Chapter 13 PowerofPersuasion:ImpactofSpecialWarCrimesProsecutionsonCriminalJusticeinBosniaandSerbiaBogdan Ivanišević 300

Chapter 14 Honduras:TransitiontoDemocracyRigoberto Ochoa 322

Chapter 15 MaybeSomeDay:TheChallengesofNon-repetitioninElSalvadorBenjamín Cuéllar Martínez 347

Chapter 16 AfghanistanandtheChallengeofNon-repetitionofViolencePatricia Gossman 380

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Contributor Biographies

Gabriel Arias is an associate with the International Center for Transitional Justice(ICTJ)ColombiaProgram.Heisalawyerwithpost-graduateconcentrationsinagencyandconstitutionallaw.Gabrielhasmorethantwentyyearsofexperiencein human rights and international humanitarian law with non-governmentalorganizations,theOfficeoftheOmbudsperson(Defensoría del Pueblo),andasaconsultantfortheUnitedNationsHighCommissioneronHumanRights.

Iván Cepeda Castro is a human rights defender, spokesperson for theNationalMovementofVictimsofStateCrimes(MOVICE),directoroftheManuelCepedaVargasFoundation,andmemberofColombianMenandWomenforPeace.Hewaselectedin2010totheColombianHouseofRepresentatives.Forthelastfifteenyears,hisworkhasbeendedicatedtoadvocatingfortherightsofvictimstotruth,justice,andreparationincasesofcrimesagainsthumanityandgenocideinColombia.HeholdsadegreeinphilosophyfromSofiaUniversity,inBulgariaandaDEA(equivalenttoM.Phil.)inhumanrightsfromtheCatholicUniversityofLyon,inFrance.Heisaresearcherandconsultantinhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw.ForyearshewasacolumnistinthenewspaperEl Espectador. InDecember 2008, Iván co-authoredwith JorgeRoja a book on the history ofparamilitarism in Córdoba and El Ubérrimo, the presidential ranch, entitled A las puertas de El Ubérrimo (AttheDoorsofUbérrimo).Heisalsotheco-authorand editor of Las perlas uribistas (2010) (TheUribist Pearls),Duelo, memoria, reparación(1998)(Hurt,Memory,andReparation),andLa memoria frente a los crímenes de lesa humanidad (1996)(MemoryandCrimesAgainstHumanity).

Benjamín Cuéllar holdsdegreesinjurisprudenceandsocialsciencesfromtheUniversityofElSalvador,andinpoliticalscienceandpublicadministrationintheNationalAutonomousUniversityofMexico.Heworkedinsocialmobilizationand defense of human rights inEl Salvador between 1972 and 1983. In 1984hefoundedtheFrayFranciscodeVitoriaHumanRightsCenterinMexicoandservedastheExecutiveSecretaryuntil1991.InJanuary1992hereturnedtoElSalvadortodirecttheJoséSimeónCañasHumanRightsInstituteoftheCentro-American University (IDHUCA), a position he currently holds. He is on theboardofdirectorsofCEJIL(CenterforJusticeandInternationalLaw),basedinWashington,D.C., andwas theorganization’sVice-President from1998-2002.BenjamínheadstheElSalvadorIndependentMonitoringGroup(GMIES),whichpromoteshumanrightsinmaquiladoras(cross-borderassemblyfactories).Underhisdirection,theIDUHCAreceivedanhonorablementionfortheFrenchMedalforHumanRightsin2002,andtheHumanRightsAwardfromtheValencia,SpainsectionoftheInternationalBarAssociation(IBA).

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Camila de Gamboa Tapias isDirectoroftheDemocracyandJusticeresearchprojectofthePublicLawResearchGroupandDirectorofthedoctorateprograminlawattheUniversityofRosario,inBogotá,Colombia,whereshealsoobtainedherlawdegree.ShealsoearnedanMAandPhDinphilosophyfromBinghamtonUniversity (SUNY), and was a Fulbright scholar. Her research areas includedemocracy, transitional justice,moral sentiments, and the relationship betweenmorality,politics,andlaw.Shehaswrittennumerousarticlesontransitionaljusticeand political philosophy. She is the editor of the special edition of Revista deEstudios Socio-jurídicos: “Justicia transicional: memoria colectiva, reparación,justiciaydemocracia”,andofthebookJusticiatransicional:teoríaypraxis,editedbytheUniversidadofRosarioandtheColecciónDebatesDemocráticos(CollectionofDemocraticDebates).

Leonardo FilippiniearnedhislawdegreewithhonorsattheUniversityofBuenosAires.HealsoholdsanMAinlawfromtheUniversityofPalermo, inArgentina,andreceivedhisLLMatYaleLawSchool,whereheiscurrentlyaJSDcandidate.HehasalsotaughtattheUniversitiesofPalermoandSanAndres,andiscurrentlyaresearcherfortheICTJinArgentina.Hisprofessionalandacademicinterestsareinternationallaw,criminallaw,andhumanrightslaw.Hehasbeenaconsultantforvariousinternationalandnationalorganizations,andhasservedas Relator Letrado (lawclerk) in theSupremeCourt of Justiceof theBuenosAiresprovinceandCoordinatoroftheInstitutionalReformAreaoftheCenterofLegalandSocialStudies(CELS).Leonardohasalsobeenapartofavarietyofinterdisciplinaryresearchteams,andwasthedirectorofthestudyEl Estado Frente a la Protesta Social, Siglo XXI(TheStateandSocialProtest:21st Century).

Felipe Gómez Isa isProfessorofPublicInternationalLawattheUniversityof Deusto, in Spain, and Researcher for the Pedro Arrupe Human RightsInstitute,whereheservesasDirectoroftheEuropeanMasterinHumanRightsandDemocratization.HehasparticipatedintheUnitedNationsWorkingGroupfor the elaboration of an Optional Protocol to CEDAW (Convention on theEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen)(NewYork,1998and 1999), and has been a visiting professor in several universities inEuropeandLatinAmerica.HisbooksincludeLa Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights) (1998);El derecho al desarrollo como derecho humano en el ámbito jurídico internacional(TheRighttoDevelopment asHumanRight in InternationalLaw) (1999);El Caso Awas Tingni contra Nicaragua: Nuevos horizontes para los derechos humanos de los pueblos indígenas (The Case of Awas Tigni vs.Nicaragua:NewHorizonsfor IndigenousRights) (2003);Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation(Co-editorwithKoendeFeyter,2005);El derecho a la memoria (TheRighttoMemory)(Director,2006),Colombia en su laberinto: Una mirada

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al conflicto(Colombiainitslabyrinth:ALookattheConflict)(Director,2008);and International Human Rights Law in a Global Context (Co-editorwithKoendeFeyter,2009).

Patricia Gossman isanindependentconsultantonhumanrightsandruleof law issues in SouthAsia, particularly focused onAfghanistan. She holds aPhDfromtheUniversityofChicago.SheiscurrentlyaconsultanttotheUnitedStatesInstituteforPeace(USIP)andtheICTJondocumentationandtransitionaljusticeissuesinAfghanistan.In2008-2009shewasaUSIPgranteeforabooksheiscompletingonthetensionbetweentransitionaljusticeandstability in post-2001Afghanistan.ShehasconductedresearchforavarietyofNGOs,aswellastheUN,ontransitionaljustice,judicialreform,anddisarmamentissues.In2001sheestablishedtheAfghanistanJusticeProject todocumentpastwarcrimesinAfghanistan.Prior to that shewasSeniorResearcheronSouthAsiaatHumanRightsWatch. She has recently relocated to theWashington, D.C. area fromIstanbul.

Johanna Herman isaresearchfellowat theCentreonHumanRightsinConflict(www.uel.ac.uk/chrc).ShereceivedherMAininternationalaffairsfromColumbiaUniversity,withaconcentrationinhumanrights.SheholdsaBAinsocialandpoliticalsciencesfromFitzwilliamCollege,CambridgeUniversity.ShehasworkedinvariouscapacitiesforUN-HABITAT(theUnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgram)andtheUNDP(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram)inJapan,Afghanistan,andNewYork.Herresearchinterestsincludepeace-building,transitionaljustice,andhumanrights.Sheisco-authorofWar, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice(Routledge,2009)andco-editorofSurviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult Situations(Routledge,2009).

Bogdan Ivanišević is a Belgrade-based consultant to the ICTJ formerYugoslaviaProgram,apositionhehasheldsinceNovember2006.HereceivedhisLLMfromtheAmericanUniversity–WashingtonCollegeofLaw.Priortothat,hewasaresearcherontheformerYugoslaviaforHumanRightsWatchfrom1999to2006,andProgramandAnalysisDirectorat theHumanitarianLawCenter,aleadinghumanrightsgroupinSerbiafrom1997to1998.HehasalsoconductedresearchfortheProsecutor’sOfficeoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia(ICTY)throughtheWarCrimesResearchCenterattheCenterforHumanRightsandHumanitarianLawoftheAmericanUniversity–WashingtonCollegeofLaw(1996).

Delphine LecombeisaPhDcandidateinpoliticalscience,withafocusonLatinAmericaat theParis InstituteofPoliticalStudies (or,Sciences-Po). Shestudiesthemobilizationofstateandinternationalsocialactorsaroundtransitional

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justiceinColombia.SheholdsanMAincomparativepoliticsfromSciencesPoandwroteherthesisontheColombianNationalReparationandReconciliationCommission (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, CNRR).Throughherdoctorateprogram,shehastaughtclassesatSciencesPo,andwasinvited in 2009by theExternadoUniversity ofColombia, inBogotá, toworkasaprofessorandresearcher.Shealsoworkedfor threemonthswiththeICTJinBogotá. In July 2009, she presented “Trust and distrust about the diffusionof transitional justiceinColombia,”at theWorldCongressof theInternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,heldinSantiagodeChile.ShehaspublishedtwoarticlesinFranceontheCNRR.

Amanda LyonsisalegaladvisorandresearcherwiththeICTJinColombia.ShereceivedherJDmagna cum laude fromtheUniversityofMinnesota,withaconcentrationininternationalhumanrightslaw,andholdsaBAinsociologyfromtheUniversityofNotreDame.AmandataughtLegalResearchandWritingattheUniversityofMinnesotaandservedasManagingEditorfortheMinnesota Journal of International Law.Shehasresearchandadvocacyexperienceininternationalcriminal law,asylum law,Guantánamodetaineedefense, andchildren’s rights,andhasworkedwithhumanrightsorganizationsintheUnitedStates,Brazil,andColombia.

Olga Martin-Ortega isSeniorResearchFellowat theCentreonHumanRightsinConflict,attheUniversityofEastLondonintheUnitedKingdom.Shereceived her PhD in international human rights law at theUniversity of Jaén,Spain.SheholdsalawdegreefromtheUniversityofSevilla,Spain.Herresearchinterests include business and human rights, post-conflict reconstruction andtransitionaljustice.Sheisauthorofthemonograph“EmpresasMultinacionalesyDerechosHumanosenDerechoInternacional”(Bosch,2008).Sheisco-authorof War, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice (Routledge,2009)andco-editor of Surviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult Situations (Routledge,2009).

Fionnuala D. Ni Aoláin isconcurrentlyaprofessoroflawattheUniversityofMinnesotaLawSchoolandat theUniversityofUlster’sTransitionalJusticeInstitute,whichsheco-foundedandisAssociateDirector.SheholdsanLLBandPhDinlawfromQueen’sUniversityLawFaculty,andanLLMfromColumbiaLawSchool.ShehaspreviouslyresearchedatHarvardLawSchoolandtaughtatColumbiaLawSchool,Schoolof InternationalandPublicAffairsatColumbiaUniversity,HebrewUniversityinJerusalem,Israel,andPrincetonUniversity.Herteachingandresearchinterestslieinthefieldsofinternationallaw,humanrightslaw, national security law, and feminist legal theory. Shewas a representativeof theICTYProsecutorat thedomesticwarcrimestrials inBosnia,workedas

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UnitedNationsSpecialExpertonpromotinggenderequalityintimesofconflictandpeace-making,andwasamemberoftheIrishHumanRightsCommission,theExecutiveCommitteefortheBelfast-basedCommitteeontheAdministrationofJustice,andtheIrishCouncilforCivilLiberties.

Rigoberto Ochoa isaHonduranlawyerwithaspecialtyinhumanrights,whoearnedhisdegreesattheComplutenseUniversityinMadrid,Spain.Hehaspreviously served asCoordinator ofLegal Services for theCommittee for theDefenseofHumanRights inHonduras (CODEH). Heworked for theUnitedNationswiththeMissioninGuatemala(MINUGUA).HeistheformerDirectorof theDemocracy andHumanRights inCentralAmericaRegionalProject, ofHondurasandtheEuropeanUnion.Hehasbeenaconsultantintheareasofjustice,humanrights,andsecuritywithseveralinternationalagencies,includingtheUNOfficeofProjectsServices, Inter-American InstituteofHumanRights,UNDP,andDueProcessLegalFoundation.RigobertowasalsoactivelyinvolvedinthecivilsocietygroupswhichworkedtoapprovetheprocessLawonTransparencyandAccesstoPublicInformation,aswellastheLawontheSuperiorTribunalofAccountsinHonduras.Hehaspublishedintheareasofjusticeandhumanrights,andhisarticleshaveappearedinseveralinternationalcollections.

Catherine O’RourkeisalecturerinhumanrightsandtheInternationalLawandGenderResearchCoordinatorattheTransitionalJusticeInstitute,UniversityofUlster,NorthernIreland.SheholdslawdegreesfromtheQueen’sUniversity,BelfastandUniversityofUlster,andanMAingenderfromtheLondonSchoolofEconomics.Herdoctoralworkexaminedfeministengagementwith,andgenderedoutcomesof,transitionaljusticeinChile,NorthernIreland,andColombia,withparticularreferencetothelegaltreatmentofviolenceagainstwomenandthelegalregulationofwomen’sreproductivelives.Whileconductingthiswork,shewasavisiting researcheratAmericanUniversitySchoolof InternationalStudies inWashingtonDC,andthelawschoolsofUniversityDiegoPortalesinSantiago,ChileandUniversityoftheAndesinBogotá,Colombia.Sheiscurrentlyworkingonthepublicationofthisresearchasamonograph.

Michael OtimistheHeadofOfficefortheICTJUgandaProgram.HeholdsaBAineconomicsfromMakerereUniversityinKampalaandanMAinbusinessadministrationfromGuluUniversity.FormorethaneightyearshewastheDirectorand Program Coordinator for Gulu District NGO Forum (GDNF) in NorthernUganda. While at GDNF, Michael co-founded the Justice and ReconciliationProject.HealsoparticipatedinthepeacenegotiationsinJuba,SouthSudanbetweentheLord’sResistanceArmy(LRA)andtheGovernmentofUgandaastheSecretarytotheCulturalandReligiousLeaders’delegation.MichaeliscurrentlyservingastheMinisterforRehabilitationoftheKerKwaroAcholi,thetraditionalleadership

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of theAcholi. Hehasadvisedandparticipated inanumberofmajoradvocacyefforts,includingthereport“HiddenWar:ForgottenPeople” (2003,HURIPEC),thedocumentary“UgandaRising”,aswellasa2005delegationofculturalandreligious leaders to the International Criminal Court to discuss the situation inNorthernUganda.

Michael Reed Hurtado is the director of the ICTJ Colombia Program.He received his JD from the University ofMinnesota and a Bachelor’s DegreeinJournalismandaBAinLatinAmericanStudiesfromtheUniversityofTexas.Asahumanright lawyer,hehasworkedwithavarietyofintergovernmentalandnon-governmental organizations in theAmericas, Europe, Asia, andAfrica. HewasaprotectionofficerfortheUNHCR(UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees) in Colombia, an advisor on criminal and penitentiarymatters for theUNHCHR(UnitedNationsHighCommissioneronHumanRights),andadvisoronforceddisplacementfortheUnder-Secretary-GeneralforhumanitarianaffairsfortheUnitedNationsmissiontoAfghanistan.MichaelisaprofessorofthesociologyofviolenceandhehaspublishedworksintheareasofCentralAmericangangs,prisons,administration of criminal justice, freedom of expression, homicidal violence,violenceagainstwomen,economic,socialandculturalrights,humanitarianaction,andarmedactorsandhumanitariandialogue.

Tatiana Rincón Covelli holdsalawdegreefromtheExternadoUniversityof Colombia, an MA in logic, history and philosophy of science from theDistanceLearningUniversityofMadrid,Spain,andaPhDinlaw,withafocusonfundamentalrights,fromtheUniversityofCarlosIIIinMadrid.SheisaprofessorwiththeundergraduateanddoctoralprogramsinlawattheUniversityofRosario,inBogotá,Colombia,andteachescontemporarytheoriesofjustice.Formerly,shetaughtcontemporarypoliticalphilosophy,legalethics,humanrightsfundamentals,thehistoryofhumanrights,andcontemporarycriticalthoughtattheUniversityofRosario,theUniversityoftheAndes,inBogotá,theCanoHumanRightsInstituteinMadrid, and theUniversity of Carlos III, respectively. She haswritten onhumanrights,transitionaljustice,moralphilosophyandpoliticalphilosophy.

Howard Varney is a member of the Johannesburg Bar and is SeniorConsultant with the ICTJ.As a consultant for the ICTJ, he has assisted withthedevelopmentoftransitionaljusticeinitiativesinseveralcountriesinAfrica,Asia and Europe.His legal practice includes human rights, constitutional andadministrative law litigation. In the early 1990sVarneywas an attorneywiththeLegalResourcesCentreinDurbanwhereherepresentedvictimsofpoliticalviolenceinpublicinterestlitigation,judicialinquestsandcommissionsofinquiry.In themid-1990she ledan independentcriminal investigation inSouthAfricaintostate-sponsoredhit squadactivity. Varneywas theChief Investigator for

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theSierraLeoneTruth&ReconciliationCommission.HehasalsoworkedwiththeSouthAfricanTruth&ReconciliationCommissionandtheCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliationinEastTimor.

Marieke WierdaistheDirectoroftheCriminalJusticeProgramatICTJ.ShejoinedICTJin2001andhasworkedonUgandasince2005.ADutch-nationalborn and raised in theRepublic ofYemen,MariekeWierda earned anLLBattheUniversityofEdinburgh inScotlandandanLLMatNewYorkUniversity,specializing in international law and human rights. She has worked with theUnitedNations,notablyasanassociatelegalofficerfortheInternationalCriminalTribunal for the formerYugoslavia (ICTY) from1997 to2000. Since joiningICTJ,shehasworkedoncriminal justice issues inawidevarietyofcountries,includinginparticularSierraLeone,Lebanon,Afghanistan,andUganda.Shehasaauthoredanumberofpublications,includingabookoninternationalcriminalevidence,co-authoredwithJudgeRichardMayoftheICTY.Shealsoco-editedabookentitledBuilding a Future on Peace and Justice(2009),withKaiAmbosandJudithLarge.

For a Just Transition in Colombia

Amanda Lyons

Transitional justiceor“justice in transition”originally referred toexactlythat: efforts to pursue justice in what is essentially a purely political transitional process.Inmanyofthecornerstonecases,transitionaljusticecameintothepictureinresponseto,andimportantly,after,amajorpoliticaltransformationwasagreed.Transitionaljusticeevolvedasafieldseekingtocheckthetransitionwithreferencetoconsiderationsofjustice.LouisBickford,amongothers,hassuggestedthattheterm transitional justice ismisleading,“as itmorecommonly refers to ‘justiceduringtransition’thantoanyformofmodifiedoralteredjustice.”1 The concept of “transition”inthetermgenerallyreferstosignificantpoliticaltransformationandarupturefromthepast:“Whenasociety‘turnsoveranewleaf’or‘getsafreshstart,’mechanismsoftransitionaljusticecanhelpstrengthenthisprocess.”2

Today, however, the tools of transitional justice are increasingly calleduponinsituationswherethereisnodefiningmomentoftransition,nosenseofarupturewiththepastofferinganewleaforfreshstartforthesociety.3Inlightofthis,considerationoftheroleandrelevanceofacontextoftransition,orrathera lack of one, in the application of transitional justicemeasures has taken onnewimportanceandurgency.4Formanyofusworking incontexts thatappearmuchclosertonon-transitionalthantransitional,speakingof(andworkingfor) transitionaljusticecanprovokemomentsofexistentialcrisis.Thereistheconcernthatinsuchcasestheonlyrelevanceof“transitional”istoserveasaqualifierof“justice”—thatinthesescenariosreferencetotransitionaljusticecaninfactleadtoamodifiedoralteredjustice.Incontrastwiththeoriginsofthefield,thereisafearthattheappropriationoftransitionaljusticeconceptsinsuchcontextsmaybemoreeffectiveforthoseaimingtolowerhumanrightsstandardsthanforthoseseekingtodefendthem.

1 LouisBickford,Transitional Justice, in the enCyClopedIa of GenoCIde and CrImes aGaInst humanIty vol.3,at1045(2004).

2 Id.Bickfordoffersasexamplesofcasespresentingkeyhistoricalmomentsof transition:Chile(1990), Guatemala (1994), South Africa (1994), Poland (1997), Sierra Leone (1999), and EastTimor(2001).

3 See, e.g.,UNSecretary-General,TheRuleofLawandTransitionalJusticeinConflictandPost-ConflictSocieties,U.N.Doc.S/2004/616(Aug.23,2004).

4 Foranexcellentlookattherelevanceandroleoftheword“transitional”intheemergenceofthefieldoftransitionaljustice,seePaigeArthur,How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights,31hum rts. Q. 321(2009).

Introduction

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Colombiaisacaseinpoint.Thereisnotransitionlikethatwhichisconsideredor assumed in the conceptual basis of transitional justice or in several of thekey transitional justice experiments that are relied on for comparative insight.Nonetheless,inColombiathelanguageoftransitionaljusticeiswidelyemployedtoframecompetingpolicyinterestsandthestandardsorguidelinesdevelopedinthefieldoftransitionaljusticearewidelyinvokedtoevaluateandorientdifferentinitiatives.WhattheColombiancasearguablypresentsthenisanexampleoftherecoursetotransitionaljusticebyanalogy.5

Theinternationallegallandscape,andalsodomesticinmanycases,thatisrelevantfornegotiatingtransitionisarguablymuchdifferenttodaythanitwasatthetimeofthepoliticalprocessesthatprecededthemostreferencedtransitionaljustice experiments such as Chile, Argentina, and South Africa. There is anincreasingconsensusthatblanketamnestiesandpardonsruntheriskofviolatingstates’ duties to investigate, prosecute, and punish grave violations of humanrightsunderthemajoruniversalandregionaltreaties.Universaljurisdiction,aswellastheRomeStatuteandInternationalCriminalCourt,alsosuggestthatanamnestyofferedbyastateforinternationalcrimeswillnotnecessarilyguaranteeindividualsimmunityfromprosecution.Thus,therecoursetotransitionaljusticelanguage,considerations,andtoolsbeforethereisadefinedtransitiontopeaceasameanstoaddresstheexigenciesofinternationaljusticeislikelytobecomethenormandnottheexception.

The Colombian case in particular has been presented to the domesticaudience,aswellastoforeigncounterpartsandtheinternationalcommunity,asanewandimprovedbrandoftransitionaljusticesuitedtotheevolvinginternationallandscape6—wheretheofferoffullandbroadimpunityisnolongeracceptedaspartofthetoolboxforstatesnegotiatingtransitionandwherethedutytoguaranteevictims’rightsisfirmlyestablishedininternational(andinmanycasesdomestic)

5 PabloDeGreiffexplainsthatwhentheuseofthetermtransitionaljusticeisextendedbeyondtheintendeddomain,itistypicallydonebyanalogy.See PabloDeGreiff,Una concepción normativa de la justicia transicional, in JustICIa y paz, ¿Cuál es el preCIo Que debemos paGar? (AlfredoRangeled.,2009).DeGreiffnotesthatthisdoesnotnecessarilyimplythattheuseisillegitimate,butitdoes,however,requireincreasedcaution.Inreferencetoclassictransitionaljusticecases,heexplains:“[T]hetransitionaljusticemeasuresthatwereimplementedweredesignedtoaddressasimilartypeofhumanrightsviolations,namely,thosethatresultedfromtheabusesofpowerby authoritarian states, and not for example, the type of generalized violence that sometimesaccompaniesthecollapseorabsenceofinstitutions.”DeGreiffposesthat“theextensionoftheuseofmeasuresoftransitionaljusticefromthepost-authoritarianismdomaintothepost-conflictdomainalsotakesplacebyanalogy,andtherefore,isalsothesubjectofcontroversy.”Id. The use ofanalogytoapplytransitionaljusticemeasuresanddiscoursetosituationsofongoingconflictisarguablymoretenuousandundoubtedlymorecontroversial.

6 For a recent example of theColombian government’s representation of the transitional justicein thecountry, see the submissionof theMinistryofForeignRelationson theoccasionof theRomeStatuteReviewConference,transItIonal JustICe In ColombIa – the JustICe and peaCe law: an experIenCe In truth, JustICe and reparatIon(June2010),available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/Stocktaking/Stocktaking.htm.

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law.TheinclusionoftheColombiancaseintheinternationalfieldoftransitionaljustice and its frequent citation as an example of domestic efforts to combatimpunitymeanthattheimportanceofcriticalanalysisoftheuseoftransitionaljusticeinColombiatodayextendsbeyonditsimpactwithinthecountry.

Thisprojectofdialogueandstudy,ofwhichthisvolumeisthefinalproduct,hassoughttostimulatereflection,groundedincasestudies,ontheeffects,risks,and potential of extending the field of transitional justice to cases that do notpresentakeymomentofpoliticaltransitiontopeaceordemocracyandinsteadaredefinedbypoliticalcontinuityandongoingconflict.Tothisend,thisvolumecontainsacollectionofdetailed,contemporaryanalysesoftheColombiancase(PartI),aswellasofrelevantexperiencesandchallengesfrombothtransitionalandnon-transitionalcases(PartII)inordertofostercomparativereflection.

Inordertoprovideabackdropforthedilemmasoftransitionaljusticethatareexploredindepthinthisvolume,thisintroductionwillpresentthecontextinwhichtransitionaljusticeisbeingappliedinColombia.Transitionaljusticeservesasafieldofcontention,andtheuncertaintyastowhichobjectivesinwhichinstancesaremostservedbytherecoursetotransitionaljusticelanguageandmeasuresisacentralfocusofthisproject.Theintroductionconcludeswithageneraloutlineofthecollectionandasummaryofthemainissuesaddressedbyeachchapter.

I. An Introduction to Transitional Justice in Colombia

A. The Partiality of the Official Transitional Justice Project

TheoddsofColombiahavingonekeyordefiningmomentthatdemarcatestheconflictasthepastandbeginsanewpageofhistoryarenotlikely.Theconflictis multi-actor: several independent left-wing guerrilla groups at war with theState,whichhasbeenbackedinitscounterinsurgencybynumerousparamilitaryblocs.Thereisnoaccepteddateoreventfordefiningwhentheconflictbegan,butthemodernconflictisgenerallyunderstoodtospanmorethanfourdecades.It isworthmentioning that theUribe administration has assumed the positionthatthereisnointernalarmedconflict,assertinginsteadthatitisasituationofademocraticstateconfrontingterroristorganizations.7Drug-traffickinghasplayedakeyroleinfinancingandfuelingtheactorsintheconflictandhasindependentlyledtomassiveviolence,leadingtodiscrepanciesoverthepoliticalnatureoftheconflictandtheactors.Thesefactors,amongothers,complicatetheexerciseofimaginingwhatmightwarrantthedeclarationofa“post-conflict”Colombia.

7 Cf. U.N.HighCommissionforHumanRightsOfficeinColombia,Sobrelaimportanciadelprin-cipiohumanitariodedistinctionenelconflictarmadointerno(Ontheimportanceofthehumani-tarianprinciplethatdistinguishesaninternalarmedconflict),June30,2010.

18

Colombiahashadseveralpeaceprocesseswitharmedinsurgent(guerilla)groups, which resulted in broad grants of full amnesty or pardon.8 The two majorguerillasgroups—theRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,orFARC)andtheNationalLiberationArmy(Ejercito de Liberación Nacional,orELN)—havebeenweakenedthroughthemilitarystrategyoftheUribeadministration,butremainactive.Whiletherehave been individual demobilizations, there is currently no perspective of anegotiatedpeacewiththesegroups.

Inadditiontoadocumentedhigh-levelofhumanrightsabuses,9 theStatealsocontinuestocommitgraveandsystematicviolationsrelatedtotheongoingarmed conflict.An example that has recently gained important attention bothdomestically and abroad is the continued practice of a particular brand ofextrajudicial executions referred to as “false positives.”Themilitary has beenknowntokillcivilians,generallyfrommarginalizedcommunities,andthendresstheminguerillafatiguesinordertoportraythemascombatdeaths.10 Whereas in mostkeyexamplesoftransitionaljusticeprojects,thepoliticalviolencecommittedbytheStatehasbeenthecentralfocusoftheinitiatives,inColombiathereistodatenomechanismthathasbeenputforthtoaddresstheroleoftheStateinthedecadesofconflictortopurgethearmedforcesorotherpublicpowersofactorsresponsibleforpastandongoingviolations.

Thekeymomentor“transition”thatformsthebasisoftheofficialtransitionaljusticeprojectinColombiaisthedemobilizationprocessthatwascarriedoutwithparamilitary groups from 2002-2006. The Colombian government negotiatedthe demobilization of more than 30,000 individuals associated with variousparamilitarygroupsbroughttogetherundertheheadingoftheUnitedSelf-defenseForcesofColombia(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia,orAUC).

This demobilization did not include all of the paramilitary blocs and asignificant number of individuals that participated in the demobilization have

8 Onthis,seeCamiloBernal’scontributionforthisproject,includedonlyintheSpanishedition,under the title Excepcionalidad permanente. Un ensayo de comprensión histórica de la justicia penal de excepción y la justicia transicional en Colombia.

9 See, e.g., Cingranelli-Richards(Ciri)HumanRightsDataProject,http://ciri.binghamton.edu.10 The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions described this “well known

phenomenon”:Thevictimisluredunderfalsepretensesbya“recruiter”toaremotelocation.There,theindividualiskilledsoonafterarrivalbymembersofthemilitary.Thesceneisthenmanipulatedtomakeitappearasiftheindividualwaslegitimatelykilled in combat. The victim is commonly photographed wearing a guerrillauniform,andholdingagunorgrenade.Victimsareoftenburiedanonymouslyincommunalgraves,andthekillersarerewardedfortheresultstheyhaveachievedinthefightagainsttheguerillas.

PressRelease,StatementbyPhilipAlston,UNSpecialRapporteuronExtrajudicialExecutions,MissiontoColombia,June8-18,2009.

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resumedorcontinuedcriminalactions.11Oftheindividualsthatdemobilizedasparamilitaries, the executive branch has submitted approximately 3,500 to thenewtransitional justicelegalmechanism,Law975of2005or the“JusticeandPeaceLaw.”12Theremainingmorethan27,000individualsthatpassedthroughthe official demobilization processeswere to be pardoned pursuant to a 2002lawimplementedfor thatpurpose.13Of thisgroup,more than10,000improperamnestiesorpardonswereissuedbeforetheSupremeCourtofJusticehaltedthispracticein2007.14Thelegalsituationsofthemorethan17,000demobilized,self-identifiedmembersofparamilitarygroupsthathaveneitherbeenpardonednorsubmittedtoJusticeandPeaceremainunresolved.

Regardingthisdemobilization,thefactorputforthastriggeringtheapplicationoftransitionaljusticeinColombia,thegovernmentassertsthattherehasbeena“definitive dismantling of the illegal self defense structures [paramilitaries].”15 Puttingaside thedeficienciesor failuresof theactualdemobilization, themostseriousdesignflawisthatthedemobilizationofparamilitarygroups—bynatureparalleltotheState—didnotcontemplateanytransformationoftheStateoraddressinanywayitsroleindirtywarfare.Thesuggestionthatparamilitarismcouldbedismantledwithouttouchingthepolitical,economic,andmilitarystructuresthathavefueledthisphenomenondefiesthewidelyknownanddocumentedrealityofahistoryofStateandelitecomplicityandactiveengagementwithparamilitarismin the country.

The partiality, false delineations, and deficiencies of this process arereproducedintheofficialtransitionaljusticeframework.TheJusticeandPeaceLawislimitedbydesign(andmuchmoreinpractice)toonlyafractionoftheconflict—toafractionofthepotentialuniverseofperpetrators,afractionofthevictims, a fraction of the truth, and none of the ongoing context of continuedviolationsandrepression.Whilepartialityisarealityofanyattempttoaddressacontextofmassatrocity,thespecificnatureofthepartialityoftheprocesswiththe paramilitaries appears to be serving the specific objective, heightened bythecontextofwar,ofavoidingdiscussionofStateresponsibilityandassuagingdemandsforreform.

11 See, e.g.,human rIGhts watCh, paramIlItarIes’ heIrs: the new faCe of VIolenCe In ColombIa (Feb.3,2010).

12 TheJusticeandPeaceLaw,discussedatlengthinthechaptersonColombiainthisvolume,isaconfessionalcriminaljusticemodelthatofferswillingcandidatessignificantlyreducedsentences(fivetoeightyearsinprison)inexchangeforsatisfactionofseveralconditions,includingcessationofcriminalactivity,fullconfessiontopastcrimes,andsubmissionofallpersonalassetsforvictimreparation.

13 Law782of2002.14 SupremeCourtofJustice,CriminalCassationChamber,rulingofJuly11,2007,No.26945,Speaker

MagistratesYesidRamírezBastidasandJulioE.SochaSalamanca.15 See, e.g.,transItIonal JustICe In ColombIa,supra note 6.

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B. Transitional Justice Initiatives Beyond the Official Project

TheexecutiveandlegislativeuseoftransitionaljusticedoesnotconstitutethetotalityofinitiativesandstancesthatoughttobeconsideredinaninterrogationoftheapplicationoftransitionaljusticeinColombia.Otheractors,primarilytheCourtsandcivil society,haveactivelyembraced the languageandknowledge-base of the field of transitional justice to contest the scope of the purportedtransition.Onseveraloccasions,actorsotherthanthepolicy-makersbehindtheofficialtransitionaljusticeprojecthaveemployedthemeasuresanddiscourseoftransitional justice toconfront the legacyofpastabusesbyStateactorsand toprovokeatransformationofcurrentpoliticalandmilitarybodiesandstructures—specificallywhattheofficialtransitionaljusticeprojectappearsintentonavoiding.Judicialactorshavecontestedandexpandedtheexplicitly limitedscopeof theofficial transitional justiceprojectbytransferringinformationobtainedthroughJusticeandPeaceproceedingstoinstigateinvestigationsandprosecutionsagainstcurrentmilitaryandelectedofficialsfortiestoparamilitarism.

ConsideringtheCourtsascontentiousactorsoutsidethe“official”transitionaljusticeprojectisaresultoftheextremepolarizationandpowerstrugglesbetweenthe executivebranch and the judicial branch inColombia.As is explored in anumber of the contributions to this volume, the Courts have been a resilientand stubborn backstop, onmany occasions significantly altering the course ofthetransitionaljusticepolicytheUribeadministrationhassoughttoimplement.The Constitutional Court made a broad swathe of substantive modificationsto the text, design, and formula of the Justice andPeaceLaw.16TheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticehasbeenputinthepositionofreviewingandrulingontheconstantproceduralimprovisationsthathavetogethershapedwhat the JusticeandPeaceprocess looks like inpractice.17 The Courts haveimposedchangestothepoliticalprojectthathavesoughttobringtheprojectin linewith internationalanddomesticstandardsof justiceandvictims’ rights.SucheffortsonthepartoftheCourtshavebeenindefianceofpoliticalwillandthecontextofinsecurityinwhichtheyareforcedtooperate.18

16 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006,No.D-6032,May18,2006.17 Forathematicallyorganizedcompilationofextractsfrommorethan300rulingsoftheCriminal

ChamberinrelationtoJusticeandPeaceuptoOctober2009,seeel proCeso penal de JustICIa y paz: CompIlaCIón de autos de la sala de CasaCIón penal de la Corte suprema de JustICIa (2009).TheexecutivebranchhasalsoissueddecreesseekingtoregulatetheJusticeandPeaceprocess.Onthisback-and-forth,seeCamiladeGamboa’schapterinthisvolume,The Colombian Government’s Formulas for Peace with the AUC: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Political Realism.

18 See UN Special Rapporteur Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva, Report on theIndependenceofJudgesandLawyers,MissiontoColombia,U.N.Doc.A/HRC/14/26/Add.2(Apr.15,2010).

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BeyonditsworkindevelopingandexpandingthenormativecontentoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw,theSupremeCourtofJusticehasconvertedtheJusticeandPeaceproceedingsintoaformofcatalystforinvestigatingthetiesofpoliticalandmilitaryleaderstoparamilitarygroups.Confessionsfromparamilitarieshavebeenused as evidence in several important convictions against politicians andhaveledtoinvestigationsandconvictionsforwhathasbeentermed“parapolítica”orparapolitics.Theparapolitics scandal that emergedoutof these confessionsledtheSupremeCourttocreateadedicatedinvestigationprocessforthematter.Competencyoverinvestigationsintocurrentpoliticianswashighlycontentious.To date 93 congresspersons, 12 governors, and more than 200 municipalrepresentativeshavebeencriminallyinvestigatedbythejudicialbranch,eitherbytheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeortheProsecutorGeneral’sOffice.19

A crucial impulse behind much of the developments in the judicialsystemisColombiancivilsociety,themoreobviousactoroutsidethe“official”transitional justiceproject.Colombiahas a robust and active civil society thathas been valiantly advocating for truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees ofnon-repetition for decades, if only recently under suchheadings.20 ParticularlyprominentinColombiaaredocumentationeffortsandotherprojectsofnonofficialtruth-seeking and memory construction, which incorporate elements from thetransitionaljustice“toolkit”andproposerelatedobjectives.

A particularly illustrative example taking place completely outside theofficialtransitionaljusticeprojectistheadvocacyrelatedtothe1985siegeofthePalaceofJustice.OnNovember6,1985membersof theM-19guerrillagroupviolentlyinvadedandtookcontrolofthePalaceofJusticeandover300hostages,inthehopesofholdingtheSupremeCourtJusticeshostageandforcingapoliticaltrialofthenPresidentBelisarioBetancur.ThisledtoamilitaryoperationtoretakethePalace.Theconfrontationandstandofflastedtwenty-sevenhours,andremainsone of the bloodiest events inColombian history.Nearly one hundred peoplewerekilledandelevenindividualsdisappeared,severalofwhomareseenleavingthePalacealive incustodyof themilitaryonvideofootage.There isevidenceoftortureandexecution-stylekilling,aswellasindicatorsthatthemilitaryhadinformationregardingtheplannedinvasionandallowedittogoforwardinorderto forcea confrontationwith theguerrillas.Theeventshavebeen shrouded incontroversyandimpunityformanyyears.

There have been twomajor developments related to this case—the finalreportofanextrajudicialTruthCommissionandthefirstcriminalconviction.Both

19 Formonitoringdocumentsrelatedtoparapolitica,seethecompilationofdocumentsavailableathttp://www.verdadabierta.com.

20 ThisisnotparticulartoColombia.Thefieldoftransitionaljusticegroupedtogetherandreframedinitiativesandprinciplesthathavealonghistory,mainlywithinthehumanrightcommunity.See Arthur,supra note 4.

22

areveryrecentasofthiswritingbutreflectyearsofpersistenceandeffortsonthepartofthevictimsandtheindividualsandorganizationsthathaveaccompaniedthem.

In2005,anextrajudicialTruthCommissionon theeventsof thesiegeofthePalaceofJusticewascreatedontheinitiativeoftheSupremeCourt,withtheobjectivesof“constructinghistoricalmemoryandcontributingtothesatisfactionof the victims’ and society’s right to truth.” The Truth Commission receivedtechnical assistance from the International Center for Transitional Justice anda broad outreach strategy was employed in order to solicit information fromthevictims,witnesses,andbroadersociety.TheTruthCommissionreleaseditscomprehensivefinalreportonDecember17,2009.21

ThePalaceofJusticesiegeisalsoanexampleoftheimportantworkbeingdonetocombatimpunityandvindicatethevictims’andsociety’srightstotruthand justice via the ordinary criminal justice system. As the moment of thiswriting,Colombiaisstill reelingfromtherecentconvictionofformerCoronelAlfonsoPlazasVega for his responsibility, as leader of themilitary operation,intheforceddisappearancesofelevenindividualsfollowingtheretakingofthePalaceofJustice.Thejudgesentencedtheretiredcoroneltothirtyyearsinprison,the first conviction related to these events. Importantly, she remitted the casefileorderingthattheentiretyofthemilitaryandpoliceleadershipofthetimebeinvestigatedandrequestingthattheroleofthenPresidentBelisarioBetancuralsobereexamined.

Nearlytwenty-fiveyearshavepassedbetweentheeventsathandandthesedevelopments.Thisdelayisprimarilyareflectionofthetenacityoftheoppositiontosuchinitiativesfortruthandjustice.Arguably,however,thesedevelopmentstoday, in themidstofcontinuedoppositionand insecurity,alsoevidencesomedegreeofopeningorspaceinColombiaforsuchdiscussionsanddevelopments.Theopposition,bothfromsomeofficialvoicesandsectorsofpublicopinion,totheparapoliticsinvestigationsaswellasthePalaceofJusticeinitiativesrevealsthatthisspaceisprecarious.Theradicalpolarizationofthesocietyandtheinfluenceofthecontextofongoingconflictandinsecurityareclearinthewarlogicpresentintheopposition.AsignificantpartofvoicescondemningtheeffortsaroundthePalaceofJusticesiegetoconfront thepast, torecognizethevictims, topursuejustice,andtoconstructhistoricalmemorywereframedintermsofa“legalwar”beingwagedbytheenemiesoftheStatetopersecutetheheroesofthenation.22 Notably,amongsuchvoicesisthePresidentoftheRepublic.Uponnewsoftheconviction,PresidentUribesaid:“Ithurts,it’sverysad.”Hestatedpubliclythata

21 ThefinalreportisavailableattheTruthCommission’swebsite,http://www.verdadpalacio.org.co.22 RetiredGeneralHaroldBedoyaofferedthecomparisonthatitwaslike“convictingtheliberator

SimónBolívarafterhehadgivenusourfreedom.”Uribe y militares analizan fallo contra Plazas Vega,semana,June10,2010.

23

legalreformisneededtopreventthedishearteningofthemilitary.23HecalledanexceptionalmeetingatthePresidentialPalacewiththemilitaryleadershipandtheMinisterofDefensetoanalyzetheconviction.

This reality of political continuity and ongoing conflict can lead to asituationwhereeffortstoconfrontthepastofteneitherareorareperceivedtobedirectconfrontationswithcurrentpoliticalandmilitarypower.BecausethereiscontinuityintheStateandnorupturefromthepast,thecurrent-dayadministrationmayidentifymoreclosely topast regimes, inpartbecauseofcontinuity in thepolicies,andassumeaprotectionistposturetowardpastStatecrimesasameasureof self-interest.24 This dynamic is one of the key factors in considering howtransitional justicepoliciesandinitiativesarecontestedandchallengedinnon-transitionalcontexts.

C. Peace v. Justice in a Context of Political Continuity and Ongoing Conflict

Attheheartoftransitionaljusticeisoftensaidtobethetensionsbetweenthe political necessities of securing peace and stability and the imperatives ofpursuing justiceandaccountability.Transitional justice is seenas allowing fordiscussions and proposals that seek to balance and limit the tensions of thepoliticalneedtoprotectapossiblyfragiledemocracyorpeacewithclamorsforjusticeandtruth.Whilethesegoalsarenotinherentlyinoppositionandinmanycasesareinfactcomplementary,theexistenceoftensionscannotbedenied.Intermsofthemagnitudeofthesetensionsandtherelativeeaseofusingthemtojustifyretreatsfromstandardsofjusticeandvictims’rights,theimportanceofthedegreeandnatureofthe“transition”andthedifferencebetweentransitionalandnon-transitionalorpost-conflictandconflictsocietiescannotbeunderstated.

The“peaceversus justice”debatehasbeenarticulated inseveralways inColombia.InthebeginningoftheprocessofnegotiationswiththeparamilitariesPresidentUribeforexamplesaidthat“inacontextof30,000terrorists,itmustbeunderstoodthatadefinitivepeaceisthebestjusticeforanationinwhichseveralgenerationshavenever liveda singledaywithout theoccurrenceofa terrorist

23 “WearegoingtohavetothinkofadraftlawinColombia,arevisionofthelegalorder,toavoidthe disheartening of the Colombian Armed Forces. It is fine that the Armed Forces have tobe effective and have to be transparent, that they have to totally recover the public order andabsolutelyrespecthumanrights.But there isabigdifferencebetweenthatandmistreating theArmedForces.”PressRelease,Officeof thePresidentof theRepublic,‘Yo tengo dolor por las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia’: Presidente Uribe,June10,2010,http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2010/junio/10/01102010.html.

24 Forexample,upontheconvictionofPlazasVegaforthePalaceofJusticeSeige,PresidentUribejustifiedhispublicpronouncementson thedecisionof the judiciary regardingevents that tookplacenearly25yearsagobyasserting:“Imustspeakout.Why?BecauseasthePresidentoftheRepublic,IamtheCommanderoftheArmedForces.”Id.

24

act.”25However,itsoonbecameclearthatsuchaconceptionofjusticewouldnotbeacceptedonitsfacebytheinternationalcommunityanddomesticcivilsocietyin lightofevolvingandstrengtheningobligations regardingaccountabilityandvictims’rights.

TheColombiangovernmenthasbecomemuchmoreadeptat speaking intermsofbalancingthetensionsbetweenjusticeandpeace.AsFelipeGómezIsacites inhischapter in thisbook, theUribeadministrationrepeatedlyexplainedthat its formula would be “asmuch justice as possible, asmuch impunity asnecessary.”26Mostrecently,theColombiangovernmentdescribedtheobjectiveoftheJusticeandPeaceLawasseekingtoachievethat“delicatebalancebetweenthedesireforreconciliationofmillionsofColombiansandtherequirementsoflocalandinternationallaw.”27

Reflected in these representations is that pursuits of justice and legalstandards are obstacles for resolving the conflict and reconciling the society.Those who, based on legal andmoral arguments, assume contentious stancestoward the government and the transitional justice formula it has put forwardorconfrontpoliticalandmilitaryabusesofthepast,areeasilyconvertedinthegovernment’srepresentationsintoobstaclestoattainingpeace.Withtheextremepolarizationcharacteristicofwar,thegovernmentisquitesuccessfulinpresentingthe leap that if such advocates contest the government’s peace initiatives—whetherdemobilizationoftheparamilitariesorthemilitarystrategyagainsttheguerillas—theseactivistsnecessarilyfavorthecontinuationofviolenceandarethusinalliancewithguerillas,terrorists,orcriminals.AsMichaelReeddescribesinhiscontributiontothisvolume,bothofficialspokespersonsandparamilitaryleadershaveblamed“humanrightsfundamentalists”forchallengesandsetbacksintheprogresstowardpeace.28

The challenges presented by political continuity and ongoing conflictcondition toasignificantextent thedegree towhich thescopeandnatureofatransitional justice policy can be democratically contested. This is one of thedefiningdifferencesbetweensituationsofpost-authoritariantransitionsandothersituations towhich transitional justicemaybe extended, andonewhich raisesquestionsastotheadequacyandconsequencesofapplyingtransitionaljusticeinsituationsofconflict.

The examples presented above however attest to the fact that despite thehostileandadversecontext,pursuitsoftruthandjusticehavecontinued.Thereareexamplestosuggestthatthearrivaloftransitionaljusticehascreatedanopeningandadditionalleverageforsuchlong-standingefforts.Thegovernmenthasadoptedthe

25 PeterSlevin,Colombian President Defends Amnesty for Paramilitary Troops,WASH.POST,Oct.1,2003,atA17.

26 See,forexample,El as bajo la manga de los Uribistas,el tIempo,Feb.13,2005.27 transItIonal JustICe In ColombIa,supranote6,at2.28 See,inthisvolume,MichaelReed,Transitional Justice Under Fire.

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languageoftransitionaljusticetopursueitspolicyobjectives,butindoingsomayhavevalidatedadiscussionthatitcannotpossiblycontrolexclusively.TheCourts,civilsociety,andthevictimsareactivelyseekingtocontestthescopeanddepthoftheexecutive-led,political“transition”byembracing transitional justicedespitethelackoftransitioninordertopursuewhatareseenasrelatedobjectives.

Transitional justice in Colombia is in some cases functioning as a fieldof contentionwhere it isnotonly thedegreeand typeof justice tobeappliedduringthetransitionthatisupforcontention.Tosomeextent,transitionaljusticelanguage,best-practices,andmeasuresarebeingadoptedinordertofuellong-standingeffortstopromotetransformation.Inthisway,transitionaljusticemayservetocontestnotonlythejustice,butthetransition.

II. Transitional Justice as a Field of Contention Recognizingthat,whateverthetransitionalstateofColombia,itisdistinct

inseveralessentialwaysfromothertransitionaljusticecasesisasimpletask.WecouldsimplyclassifyColombiaasnon-transitionalbydefaultandconcludethattransitionaljusticehasnoplace.However,thevitalandmostinterestingquestionremainsastowhether,despitethemanyandimportantdifferences,therecoursetotransitionaljusticebyanalogyisusefulforpursuingobjectivesassociatedwiththefield—objectivessuchasguaranteeingvictims’rightstotruth,justice,reparation,and non-repetition; promoting a true and just reconciliation; consolidatingdemocracy;andpromotingtheruleoflaw.Theconcerningcorollaryquestioniswhetherinsuchnon-transitionalcontextstheadoptionoftransitionaljusticebyanalogyisequallyormoreeffectiveforpursuingpoliciesthatunderminetheseobjectives.Addingsignificantweighttothesuggestionthatthesearethecrucialquestionsisthefactthatregardlessofanyconceptualinaccuracies,thelanguageoftransitionaljusticehasundoubtedlybeenwidelyembracedbyvirtuallyallofthe actors in thepublicdebate inColombia, and the instruments characteristictothefieldarebeingproposedandimplemented.Intermsoftheimpactonthefieldoftransitionaljustice,wemustalsothenconsidertheeffectsuchusesmighthaveonhowtheconceptsandinstrumentsoftransitionaljusticeareunderstood,particularlyifthetrendinexportingtheColombiancaseistodisregardthefactthat the application of transitional justice to Colombia may only be by quitetenuousanalogy.

InconsideringtheuseoftransitionaljusticeinColombia,LisaLaplanteandKimberlyTheidon(somewhatoptimistically)refertoColombia’sstatusas“pre-post-conflict.”29Inadditiontodemonstratingtheconceptualneedtoanalogizein

29 LisaJ.Laplante&KimberlyTheidon,Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de Justicia y Paz,28mICh. J. Int’l l.49,51(2006).

26

ordertobringtheColombiancaseunderatransitionaljusticerubric,thisexpressionisinfactahelpfuldescriptivetool.Itisquitesuggestiveofhowtransitionaljusticeis being applied in Colombia, as well as other contexts of ongoing conflict.30 Transitionaljusticeisnotbeingusedexclusivelyorevenprimarilyasachannelfor inserting justice considerations during a transition; the field of transitionaljustice has been charged with establishing the foundations for transition—ineffect,withcarryingoutthetransition.TheMinistryofForeignRelationsrecentlyexemplifiedthis logic:“Theresultsof theexperienceof transitional justicearecreatingtheperfectenvironmenttoendtheviolentcycleinColombia.”31

AttributingtotransitionaljusticethefunctionofproducingthetransitioninColombiafromconflicttopeaceislikelyaninappropriateandunrealisticextensionof thevirtuesof thefield. However,given that transitional justice instrumentsand objectives are aimed at provoking a certain degree of transformation it isnotunreasonabletoexpectthatsomechangebeproduced.Nonetheless,forthetimebeing,thechangeinColombiaremainstobeseen;itmaybeimpossibletodefineortoestablishdirectlinkstothemeasuresthathavebeenimplemented.TheconflictinColombiaisongoing,andthiscollectionseekstoexploretheeffectofthiscontextonthedevelopmentandpotentialimpactoftransitionaljustice.

Adifferenceoftransitionaljusticecomparedtotheparticularemphasisofthefieldofhumanrightsorthefightagainstimpunityisthattransitionaljusticeexploresareasofsocialandpoliticalchangethatgobeyondtheexclusivelylegalfocus32.Whilethereareobviousoverlapsandcomplementsbetweenall,adifferenceseemstobefoundinresponsestothequestion:“whyconfrontthepast?”Thefieldoftransitionaljusticeoffersamorerobustresponsetothisquestion,whichmayoffergreaterpoliticalandsocialcurrencyinpolicydebates.“Properlyunderstoodand implemented, transitional justice is as forward-looking as it is backward-looking.”33Inadditiontobeinggroundedfirmlyonthelegalobligationsandmoralimperativestoaddressalegacyofmassatrocityandrepression,transitionaljusticeasafieldhasbeenconsolidatingarguments,evidence,andexperienceregardingthecause-and-effectrelationshipthatthedegreeandnatureofjusticeforthepasthaswiththefutureconstructionofdemocracy,peace,andruleoflaw.

By intervening in the use of transitional justice approaches or policies,actorscanparticipateinwhatmeaningisgiventocertaininstrumentsandhowthatmeaningiscommunicatedtothesociety.Inadditiontoservingasapossiblevehicletoexpandjusticemeasuresandcontributingtomaximizingtheirpoliticaland social transformative effects, the Colombian case suggests that there is

30 For example, in Chapter 16 of this book,Afghanistan and the Challenge of Non-repetition of Violence,PatriciaGossmanreferstoa“not-yet-post-conflict”setting.

31 transItIonal JustICe In ColombIa,supra note 6.32 See Arthur,supra note 4.33 PaulvanZyl,Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies,in seCurIty GoVernanCe

In post-ConflICt peaCebuIldInG209(AlanBryden&HeinerHanggieds.,2005).

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also the possibility that the recourse to transitional justice allows for amoredemocraticallyparticipativeprocessastothescopeandnatureofthetransitionitself.As asserted above, the official transitional justice project is explicitlylimitedtoillegalarmedgroups.Therewasneveranimpulseorinitiativeonthepartofthepublicpowersnegotiatingtheparamilitarydemobilizationtoconfrontthe legacyof theState’s relationship toparamilitarismin thecountry—infactquitetheoppositeistrue.

Despite the intense self-protection impulse of the current government inputting fortha transitional justiceproject, transitional justicecoming intoplaybeforetheestablishmentofapoliticaltransformationhasmeantthatthebalancingdiscussionsoftransitionaljusticeandthestandardsandguidelinesassociatedwiththefield arebeing inserted into the contentious spaceswhere the scopeof theexpectedordesiredtransformationaredetermined.

TheColombiangovernmentpresents,andseeksapprovalfor,thetransitionaljustice “experience”ofColombia as a result of the novel andbold balanceofinterests that it has adopted. But what is clear is that the transitional justiceexperienceinColombiaisaresultoftheprojectbeingwrestledfromtheexclusivecontrolof thegovernment.Thepresenceof the internationalcommunity in theprocessandtheparticipationofdomesticcivilsocietyareoftencitedtovalidatethedemocraticandtransparentnatureofthegovernment’sprocess.TheboundariesofthetransitionsandjusticeinColombiaarehighlycontestedandthewaythatcompetingobjectivesrelatedtopeaceandjusticearebeingresolvedinColombiaisnotareflectionoftheofficialpreference,butratherdespiteit.Itisinthiswaythattransitionaljusticemayserveasafieldofcontention.Thiscollectionlooksatinwhatinstances,inwhatways,andwithwhatconsequencesthecontentionspresentintherecoursetotransitionaljusticelanguageandmeasures,inbothtransitionalandnon-transitionalcontexts,hasservedparticularobjectivesorinterestsmorethanothersandtowhatextenttheprevailingobjectivesareinaccordanceornotwiththosegenerallyassignedtothefieldoftransitionaljustice.

III. Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Colombia and Comparative Experience

Thestudiesinthefirstpartofthiscollectioneachanalyzeindepthcertain“spacesofcontention”intransitionaljusticeinColombia.Theauthorsexamineindetailhowthedifferentkeyplayers—includingtheCourts,theadministration,civilsociety,thevictims,andtheperpetrators—haveadoptedtransitionaljusticeconcepts or approaches and how such stances relate to their interests in the contention.ThechaptersexaminewhattheconsequenceshavebeenintermsoftheshapetransitionaljusticeistakinginColombiaandwhatimpactthismighthavemorebroadly.

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The second part of this volume gathers analysis of foreign experienceswithsomeofthebroadquestionsthatareraisedbytheapplicationoftransitionjustice in non-transitional contexts such as Colombia. The chapters look atcontexts of post-authoritarian transition and post-conflict transition, aswell asnon-transitionalcases.Basedontheirexpertiseaspractitionersandresearchesinaparticularnationalcontext,theauthorslookatquestionssuchas:theinfluenceofinternationalactorsandstandardsofjustice,theimpactoftransitionaljusticeinitiativesontheordinaryoperationofdomesticlegalsystems,theroleofdomesticjudicialactors,andcontextsofongoingconflictandviolence.

Part I: Colombia

In Chapter 1, Tatiana Rincón explores the complications posed by thepartialityofthetransitionaljusticeframeworkthroughananalysisofkeydecisionsinrecentjurisprudenceoftheSupremeCourtofJustice,oneofthekeyactorsinshaping transitional justice inColombia.Shenotes that inColombia there aretwosystems forprosecutinggraveandsystematichumanrightsviolations thatoperate simultaneously—the ordinary criminal justice system and the limited,exceptional,“transitional”legalframeworkofJusticeandPeace.RincónfocusesonhowtheColombianHighCourtshaveinterpretedinternationallawandlegaldecisionsintheirpronouncementsonthecontentanddesignofthetransitionaljusticeframeworkinColombiaandtherelationshipofthesedevelopmentswiththeordinarycriminaljurisdiction.

In Chapter 2, Camila de Gamboa analyzes the Uribe administration’sstrategiesfornegotiatingwiththeparamilitarygroupsstartingin2002,theeffortstodesignatransitionallegalmechanisminthisframework,andtheadministration’sresponses to pushback from civil society and the judicial branch.DeGamboafindssuchstrategiesareconsistentwithabroadertendencyonthepartofstatestousepoliticalrealismineffortstoreachanegotiatedpeace.Sheconcludesbypresentingacritiquefromademocraticperspectiveexposingtheriskposedbysuchstancestoeffortsseekingtoconsolidatedemocracy.

In Chapter 3,MichaelReed looks at the conceptualmanipulation beingemployedinordertoperpetuateastateofdenialinColombia—particularlyastotheglossputonparamilitarismthatconstitutesthebaseofthepurportedtransition.ThismanipulationhaseffectivelydistortedthefactsoftheColombianconflict,theinterestsoftheactors,andthestandardtobeappliedtothetransition.ReedarguesthattheUribeadministration’sapplicationanduseoftransitionaljusticeamountstoa“regimeofdenial”thathasbeenlargelysuccessfullyinrewritingthehistoryofparamilitarisminColombiaandallayingtheState’sresponsibilityinviolationsandperpetuationoftheconflict.Throughouttheentireprocess,thegovernmenthashadshownnoqualmsaboutincludingnarcotraffickingintothepolitical-legalframework.Reedconcludesthattheresultofthetransitionaljusticeexperiment

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sofarhasbeenadevaluationofhumanrightsstandardsandtheneutralizationofcivilsocietyandthevictims.

In Chapter 4,FionnualaNíAoláinandCatherineO’Rourkeexploregenderedgaps of accountability for violence perpetrated by non-state actors in contextsofnegotiated transitionsandongoingconflicts.Theauthorsevaluateminimumhumanitarianstandardsandimputedstateliabilityaspotentialrealmsofactionformoreeffectivelysecuringaccountabilityandnon-repetitionforviolencesuffereddisproportionatelybywomen.

In Chapter 5, Felipe Gómez Isa reviews the use of transitional justicediscourseinColombia,andafteralertingtomajorrisks,offersadefenseofitsvaluedespiteColombia’snon-transitionalcharacteristics.Theauthornotesthevictims’increasedpresenceaspoliticalactors,theirroleinchallengingtheofficialrhetoricandimpulses,advancesmadeinclarificationofthetruth,andtheestablishmentofminimumguidelinesthatmaybeadvantageousinfuturepeaceprocesses.

In Chapter 6, Delphine Lecombe explores the tensions experienced inColombia—thoseinherenttothefieldoftransitionaljusticeandthoseoriginatingfromColombia’scontextofongoingconflict.Asillustrationsofhowthedefinitionsof transitional justice concepts and instruments are contested in Colombia,LecombeanalyzesthetrajectoryofthedefeateddraftVictims’Law,thedesignandfunctioningoftheNationalCommissionforReparationandReconciliation,andrepresentationsmadeduringthe2009InternationalDDRConference.

In Chapter 7, Iván Cepeda explores the conception of crimes againsthumanity and proposes a definition that more accurately encompasses thesocialprocessesandrelationships thatarebothdestroyedandreflectedin theirperpetration.Inlightofthisexpandedconceptionofthecrime,conceptsofjusticeandreconciliationcanbemorescrupulouslyevaluated.Theauthorexplainsandcontraststhemodelofjusticeputforthbythegovernment(reconciliation)andthemodelofjusticeadvocatedbythevictims’organizationMOVICE(democracy).

In Chapter 8,GabrielAriasexplorestheroleofcivilsocietyinthetransitionalframework inColombia.Ariasdescribes the solidhistoryof traditionalhumanrightscivilsocietyinColombiaandlookshowtheapplicationoftransitionaljusticehaschangedthecourseofcertainsegmentsofthatsociety.Theresulthasbeenanotablemoveawayfromcivilsociety’simportantplaceasacounterweighttotheexcessofthehegemonicpoweroftheState.Thetextconcludesbycommentingontheroleofinternationalcooperationagenciesandthemediainthisdynamic.

Part II: Comparative Experience

In Chapter 9,MichaelOtimandMariekeWierdaanalyzethedynamicsofthepeaceprocessinUganda.ThechapterlooksparticularlyattheinfluenceofICCinvolvementintheunfoldingofthenegotiationsandthecontentofthetransitionaljusticeframeworkthatresulted.Theauthorsexplainhowthenatureoftheconflict

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and its consequences have shaped the varied positions and perceptions of theprocess.Anover-emphasisonformalcriminaljusticemeasuresattheexpenseofamorecomprehensivestrategyisoneidentifiableimpactofICCinterventionandpreparationforapotentialcomplementaritychallenge.

In Chapter 10, Olga Martín-Ortega and Johanna Herman explore andcomparethecurrentpracticesandimpactofthehybridtribunalsinBosniaandHerzegovinaandCambodia.Thisstudyconsidersthepotentialcontributionsofprosecutionsandtribunalswithbothinternationalandnationalelementsforthefieldsoftransitionaljustice,rule-of-lawpromotion,andpeacebuilding.Throughcomparison,theauthorsevaluatewhetherthecourtsaremaximizingtheirpotentialpositiveimpactthroughcapacity-buildingandoutreach,aswellastheobstaclesfaced in each situation.

In Chapter 11, Leonardo Filippini analyzes the relationship betweeninternationallawandthepoliticaltransitioninArgentina.FilippininotesthattheArgentine legal community is to a large extent quite “permeable” in terms ofturning to and accepting domestic application of international law.Exceptionswouldincludethetensionaroundthenotionofreconciliationandcontroversyovertherecentreopeningofprosecutions.However, international lawandoversightbodiescannotbeseenashavingposedathreattothepoliticaltransition;criticismofthissortisactuallydirectedmoretowardthedomesticjudicialactorsthataredrivingthelegalprocess.Filippiniconcludesthatdevelopmentsininternationallaw and in foreign jurisdictions have served to reinforce domestic values andobjectivesofpursuingjustice.

In Chapter 12,HowardVarney describes the tradeoff thatwas designedinSouthAfricainthehopesofpromotingnationalreconciliation—thetruth-for-amnestyincentiveformula.Thisapproachdemandedagreatsacrificeonthepartof thevictims in termsof their rights.Thisexceptional formulawasexplainedbytheexigenciesofthepoliticalmomentanddependedonanobligationonthepartoftheStatetomatchtheincentivewiththethreatofeffectiveprosecutionofthosethatdidnotapproachtheCommissionorweredeemedineligible.Varneyanalyzestheeffectofthefailuretofollow-uponthoseperpetratorsthatdidnotgo through the transitional justiceprocess andexplores the test of exceptionalmeasuresoutside the limitedcontextofa transition,particularly in lightof thevictims’rights.

In Chapter 13,Bogdan Ivanisevicexplores the relationshipbetween twosets of criminal justice—transitional justice and regular (“ordinary”) criminaljustice—inbothBosniaandHerzegovinaandinSerbia.Therehavebeensomesigns of a positive impact from the special initiatives to criminally prosecutecrimes,suchasincreasedprofessionalismandseveral important jurisprudentialdevelopments.Specialprosecutorialmechanismshoweverarenotapanacea toproblems in theordinary justice systemand in fact theremay in fact bequitelimited influence from special mechanisms to the ordinary jurisdiction. The

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impacthasbeenthemostevidentwheretheinternationalcommunitywasdirectlyinvolvedinbroaderjudicialorlegalreforms.

In Chapter 14,RigobertoOchoaanalyzes the transition todemocracy inHondurasandhighlightsthecommonthreadsbetweenauthoritarianism,transition,andelectoraldemocracy.Heexploresin-depththetypesofjudicialreformthatwereenactedandtheeffectsrelativetotheconsolidationofdemocracyandtheruleoflaw.Ochoaconcludesbyexplaininghowthedeficienciesinthetransitiontodemocracyarereflectedincurrentdifficultiesforguaranteeingnon-repetition.

In Chapter 15,BenjamínCuellardiscussesthechallengesofnon-repetitioninthecaseofElSalvador.AnalyzingElSalvador’stransitionaljusticeinitiativesin light of the Chicago Principles of Post-Conflict Justice, the short- andlonger-termnegativeimpactofalackofpoliticalwillandstrongoppositiontoparticularmeasuresoftransitionaljusticeareexplored.ThechapterconcludesbyinterrogatingthecorrelationbetweenafailuretoadequatelyaddressthepastwiththeconsolidationofpowerandviolenceinElSalvadortoday.

In Chapter 16, Patricia Gossman discusses the challenges national andinternationalactorshavefacedintryingtoincorporatetransitionaljusticemeasuresinthecontextofongoingconflictinAfghanistan.Gossmanevaluateshowthemajorpoliticalandmilitaryactorshaverespondedtocallsforreckoningwiththecountry’slegacyofatrocitiesandanalyzestheinterconnectednessofcorruption,impunity,and conflict in a “not-yet-post-conflict”Afghanistan.The chapter concludes byhighlightingtheimportanceoffar-reachingandcomprehensivereforms,forwhichtheprinciplesthatinformtransitionaljusticearehighlyrelevant.

Conclusion

ThiscollectionseekstoofferexpertanalysisoncontemporaryquestionsoftransitionaljusticeinColombiaandanumberofothercountriesinordertogaininsightforColombiainparticular,andonthecurrentfieldoftransitionaljusticeingeneral.Togetherthiscollectionofstudiesconsiderthedomesticeffectsandnuancesofapplyingtransitionaljusticebyanalogy,thepotentialimpactonthisextendedapplicationonthefieldoftransitionaljustice,andcomparativeelementsand challenges in both transitional and non-transitional contexts.This volumeshould serve asmaterial for future reflection on and critique of the degree towhich,uponwhichconditions,andtowhateffectweareabletodrawcomparisonsandextendtransitionaljusticetonon-transitionalcontexts.

Part I:

Colombia

International Influence on Ordinary Jurisdiction and National Actors: Transitional Justice Processes in Contexts of Armed Conflict

Tatiana Rincón

Whether a transitional justice process exists in Colombia is notsomethingthathasbeenacceptedpeacefullybecause,amongotherreasons,the internal armed conflict persists and despite the demobilization of asignificant number of paramilitaries, the paramilitary structures have notyet been deactivated or dismantled.1Without denying this reality, in thischapterIshallassumetheexistenceofatransitionaljusticeprocessbasedontheconsiderationmadebytheColombianConstitutionalCourtinitsrulingC-370of2006.2FortheConstitutionalCourt,Law975of2005(JusticeandPeaceLaw) regulatesa transitional justiceprocess.3Theexistenceof suchaprocesshasalsobeenreaffirmedjudiciallyinseveraldecisionsissuedbytheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJustice(“Criminal

1 RegardingwhetherornotitisappropriatetospeakofatransitionfromwartopeaceinColombia,orevenif it isappropriate torefer toapartial transition,seeRodrigoUprimny&MariaPaulaSaffon,Usos y abusos de la justicia transicional en Colombia,4AnuariodeDerechosHumanos165(2008).AmongauthorswhoviewtheColombianprocessasoneof transitional justice,seeKaI ambos, el marCo JurídICo de la JustICIa de transICIón8(2008).Theseauthorsbelievethattransitionaljusticeisnotlimitedtopost-conflictsituationsorthoseinvolvingregimechangebutthatitalsohasrelevanceinsituationsofpeacewithinanongoingconflictand/oraformaldemocracy.Withrespecttothelatter,thecurrentColombiansituationiscitedasthemostimportantcase.

2 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006,No.D-6032,May18,2006.3 Law975of2005providesforthereincorporationofmembersoforganizedillegalarmedgroups

whoeffectivelycontributetoachievingnationalpeaceandmakesotherprovisionsforhumanitarianaccords.Article1,whichsetsouttheobjectiveofthislaw,establishesthat:“ThepurposeofthisLawistofacilitatepeaceprocessesandtheindividualorcollectivereincorporationofmembersof illegalarmedgroups intocivilian life,guaranteeing thevictims’ rights to truth, justice,andreparation.” This Law provides the demobilized members of illegal armed groups that fulfillcertainrequirements(setout inArticles10and11) thebenefitofalternativesentencesrangingfromfivetoeightyearsimprisonment.Inrelationtotheprocedureforobtainingthisbenefit,theCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticehasstatedthefollowing:

[R]egardingtheobjectivesoftheinvestigationcontemplatedinLaw975of2005andotherregulatorydecrees,inthefirstplace,itisnecessarytostresstheobjec-tiveofthistransitionaljustice,which,inadditiontofacilitatingpeaceprocessesandindividualorcollectivereincorporationofmembersofillegalarmedgroupsintocivilianlife,alsoincludesguaranteeingthevictims’rightstotruth,justice,and reparation.

Criminal Cassation Chamber, Supreme Court of Justice, ruling of Feb. 18, 2009, No. 30775,SpeakerMagistrateJorgeLuisQuinteroMilanés,at18.

Chapter 1

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Chamber”), as the second-instance forum for judicial review under theJusticeandPeaceLaw.4

Based on this assumption and in accordancewith some of the questionssuggestedbytheeditorsofthisvolume,myinterestinthischapteristoanalyzethewayinwhichthehighestdomesticjudicialbodies—particularlytheSupremeCourtofJustice—haveincorporatedinternationalhumanrightsstandardsandthefindingsof internationalbodiesintheirrulingsrelatedtotheJusticeandPeaceprocess.IamspecificallyinterestedintheSupremeCourtforanumberofreasons.First, because it is the court of last resort for the special criminalproceedingsprovidedforunderthetransitionaljusticeprocessoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw.Second, because the SupremeCourt has had to dealwith problems related toimplementingthisspecialcriminalprocessinthewakeoftheinitialrulingsbytheConstitutionalCourt on theunconstitutionalityof certainprovisionsof theJusticeandPeaceLawandtheconditionalvalidityofothers.Third,theCourthasconsequentlyhadtheprimaryroleofguaranteeingtheprotectionoftherightsofthevictimandsocietyintheunfoldingofthisspecialprocess.Andfinally,itisthecourtthathasmadethemostprogresstowardconceptualizingtheregulatedspecialcriminalproceedingsasatransitionaljusticeprocess.

However,toaccepttheexistenceofatransitionaljusticeprocessinColombiabasedontherulingsofitsHighCourtsalsoimpliesassumingtheparticularitiesof theprocess. In termsofwhat Iwish toaddress in thischapter, Iconsider itnecessary to point out two. First, the transitional justice process, at leastwithrespecttocriminalinvestigations,isonlybeingcarriedoutinrelationtooneofthe actors linked to theColombian armed conflict, namely the paramilitaries.5 Second, inadditiontothat limitation,notallof theparamilitariesarelinkedtotheJusticeandPeaceprocess.ThismeansthatintermsofcriminalproceedingsinColombiatherearetwoprocessesfortheinvestigation,trial,andpunishmentofgravehumanrightsviolationsandbreachesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL),whichoperateinaparallelmanner.Thereistheprocessprovidedforinthe Justice andPeaceLaw, a special transitionalprocess; andalso theprocessprovidedforintheCriminalProcedureCode,partoftheordinarycriminaljusticesystem,whichisresponsibleforinvestigating,trying,andpunishinggravehumanrightsviolations andbreachesof IHL thatdonot fall under the jurisdictionofJusticeandPeace.

4 Article26ofLaw975,regardingrecoursesandappeals,providesfor thefollowing:“Appeal ispossibleforcourtordersdecidingsubstantiveissuesduringproceedingsandagainstsentences.Theyaretobelodgedduringthesamehearinginwhichtherulingishandeddown,andasuspensoryeffectwillbeconcededbeforetheCriminalChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJustice.”

5 Even though Law 975 of 2005 generically refers to “illegal armed groups” and a number ofmembersoftheguerrillagroupshavedemobilizedindividually,therealityisthatJusticeandPeaceproceedingsprincipallyinvolvemembersoftheparamilitarygroups.Amongotherreasons,thisisbecauseitwaswiththesegroups—orasignificantpartofthem—thattheColombiangovernmentnegotiatedthedemobilizationandsubmissiontojustice.

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Thus,formyanalysishere,IwillalsorefertocertainrecentSupremeCourtrulings produced in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction in order to compare thewayinwhich internationalstandardsarereceivedin the twojusticesystems—JusticeandPeaceandordinarycriminaljustice—inatransitionaljusticesetting.Thiswill demonstrateone aspectof theparticular complexityof a transitionalprocessinColombiaandrevealcertainproblemsthatmayneedspecialattentionintransitionalprocessescarriedoutinthemidstofanarmedconflict.

Part I of this chapterwill brieflydescribe theway inwhich internationalhuman rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminallaw(Iwillrefertothesetas“internationalhumanrightslaw”or“internationallaw”) are received indomestic law inColombia. InPart II, Iwill analyze thereception of international human rights law in three recent decisions by theCriminal Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice relating to thespecialcriminalproceedingscarriedoutundertheJusticeandPeaceLaw,oneofwhichisarelateddecisionbutfromoutsidetheJusticeandPeaceframework.PartIIIwillofferananalysisofarecentdecisionfromtheCriminalChamberintheordinaryjurisdiction,inwhichthecentralfoundationsoftherulingdrawuponthejurisprudenceofthissameChamberinthecontextofJusticeandPeace.6

Beforebeginningtoaddressthesethreepoints,Ireiteratethattheconceptualdistinction to which I am referring—between special criminal proceedings, as transitional justice proceedings, and ordinary criminal proceedings—is adistinctionestablishedin the jurisprudenceof theColombianHighCourts,andoneIwillassumeforthepurposesofthischapter.

I. Reception of International Human Rights Standards in Colombian Domestic Law

International human rights law has been widely received in Colombiandomesticlawinrecentyears,withbasisinArticle93oftheColombianPoliticalConstitutionandtherelatedconstitutionaldoctrinedevelopedbytheConstitutionalCourt.7Thisreceptionhasfacilitatedcontinuousadjustmentofdomesticlawin

6 TherearenumerousrulingsbytheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticethatwouldbeworthwhiletoanalyzeintermsoftheirrelevancetothisdisscussion.However,intheinterestofbrevityIshalllimitmyselftothoseIhavementioned.

7 Article93oftheColombianPoliticalConstitutionestablishesthefollowing:“TheinternationaltreatiesandcovenantsratifiedbyCongressthatrecognizehumanrightsandprohibittheirlimitationduringstatesofemergencyhavesupremacyinthedomesticlegalorder.TherightsanddutiesenshrinedinthisChartershallbeinterpretedinaccordancewithinternationalhumanrights treatiesratifiedbyColombia.”TheConstitutionalCourthasstated,inrelationtotheconstitutionaldoctrine,thatthis

includes those rules and principles that, without formally appearing in theconstitutionaltext,areusedasparametersforconstitutionalreviewofthelaws,becausetheyhavebeenlegallyintegratedintotheConstitutionbydiversemeans

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lightofinternationalhumanrightsprinciplesandstandards,promotednotonlybytheConstitutionalCourtbutalsobytheCouncilofStateandtheSupremeCourtofJustice.Itcouldbesaidin thisregardthat theincorporationof internationalhuman rights law intoColombian domestic norms is already a part of settledjurisprudence,atleastattheleveloftheHighCourts.Tothatextent,areflectiononthewaythattransitionaljusticeentitiesareincorporatinginternationalstandardsandpronouncementsintotheirrulingsmusttakeintoaccountthatthedomesticreception of these standards and principles—both prior and in parallel to thespecialprocesses—hasbeenanestablishedpracticeoftheordinaryjurisdictionbodies.

The relationship between the Colombian High Courts and internationalhumanrightslaw,internationalhumanitarianlaw,andinternationalcriminallawhas been developing and strengthening in the framework of domestic rulingsthat have been issued to protect and defend fundamental rights. In this vein,theConstitutionalCourt,initsrulingC-228of2002,developedawide-rangingconceptofvictims’rights,whichincludestherightstotruth,justice,andreparation.WiththistheCourtmodifiedtherestrictedconceptofvictims’rightsincriminalproceedingsfoundintheCriminalProcedureCodeatthattime.Inthisdecision,theConstitutionalCourtexpresslyreferredtodevelopmentsintheprotectionoftherightsofcrimevictimsbothininternationallawaswellascomparativelaw.8

Sincethisruling,theConstitutionalCourthasconsolidatedanddevelopeditsjurisprudenceontherightsofvictimsofcrimesandofhumanrightsviolations,always reinforcing the link between domestic law and international law—whetherhumanrightsand/orinternationalhumanitarianlawand/orinternationalcriminallaw.9Similarly,acontinuousconversationbetweentheHighCourtsand

andbymandateoftheConstitutionitself.Theyarethereforetrueprinciplesandrulesofconstitutionalvalue; that is, theyarenormsofconstitutional stature,despitethefactthattheymaysometimescontainmechanismsofreformthataredifferentfromtherulesoftheconstitutionaltextstricto sensu.

ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-225of1995,No.L.A.T.040,May18,1995,SpeakerMagistrateAlejandroMartínezCaballero,at43.

8 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-228of2002,Apr.3,2002,No.D-3672,SpeakerMagistratesManuelJoséCepedaEspinosa&EduardoMontealegreLynett.TheConstitutionalCourthadpreviouslyruledonmovingbeyondthemerelyeconomicnatureofthecivilpartyincriminalproceedings.Inthisregard,seealsoConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-293of1995,July6,1995,No.D-810,SpeakerMagistrateCarlosGaviriaDíaz;ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-163of2000,Feb.23,2000,No.D-2486,SpeakerMagistrateFabioMorónDíaz;ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-1149of2001,Oct.31,2001,No.D-3524,SpeakerMagistrateJaimeAraujoRentería.

9 OneexpressionoftheconsolidationandcontinuousdevelopmentofthejurisprudenceoftheCo-lombianConstitutionalCourtinconstantharmonywithinternationallawregardingtherightsofvictimsofhumanrightsviolationsisitsjurisprudencewithrespecttotherightsoftheinternallydisplacedpopulation.This isparticularlyevident in rulingT-025of January22,2004and thevariouscourtorderssupervisingcompliancewiththatruling.ConstitutionalCourt,rulingT-025of2004,Jan.22,2004,No.T-653010,SpeakerMagistrateManuelJoséCepedaEspinosa.InrulingT-025,theCourtdeclaredthecurrentstateofinternalforceddisplacementtobeunconstitutional.Anotherexpressionofthisprocessofconsolidationanddevelopmentinharmonywithinternational

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internationalbodiesforhumanrightsprotectionhasfavoredandempoweredthedomesticreceptionofinternationalstandards.Inthissense,rulingsbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightshavehadparticularinfluenceonthereceptionof these standards.10Thus,whenthecourts(specifically,theConstitutionalCourtandtheSupremeCourtofJustice)haveinterpretedthedomesticnormsthatgovernthetransitionaljusticeprocessinlightoforadjustedtointernationalprinciplesand standards,what theyhave done is bring to the transitional justice processapractice that theyhavebeendevelopingand that theycontinue todevelop inrelationtothenon-transitionallegalorder.11

RulingC-370of2006oftheConstitutionalCourtwasthemostsignificantinternal adjustment of the Justice and Peace Law to accordwith internationalprinciplesandstandards,atleastattheregulatorylevel—whichisnotthesameastherealeffectsthattheCourt’sdecisionhasactuallyhadonthepracticeofthe

lawisthejurisprudencereferringtotherightsofvictimsinordinarycriminalproceedings.See, e.g.,ConstitutionalCourt rulingC-454of2006, June7, 2006,No.D-5978,SpeakerMagistrateJaimeCórdobaTriviño.

10 Inthisregard,seeCouncilofState,AdministrativeContentiousChamber,ThirdSection,rulingofOct.19,2007,No.29.273,SpeakerMagistrateEnriqueGilBotero.Inthisruling,theCouncilof State, following the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court for HumanRights,made adistinctioninrelationtotherighttoreparation:ontheonehand,casesinvolvingdamagesderivingfromhuman rightsviolations and,on theother, those regarding losses resulting fromharm topropertiesor legal interests thatdonotrelate toaperson’shumanrights.TheCouncilofStateconsidered that this distinction

willmake it possible to determinewithin the framework of domestic law theeffectsofapronouncementofaninternationalbodyortribunalthatdecidesacaseinvolvingtheState’sresponsibilityforhumanrightsviolationsand,additionally,willservetodetermine,inconstitutionalcases,thepowersthatthenationaljudgehastoputastoptothethreattoorviolationofthecorrespondingright.

Id.at22.Inthissameruling,theCouncilofStateintroducedthedoctrineof“internationalresjudicata,”basedon,amongothers,thefollowingarguments:

[I]tmaybeaffirmedwithoutanyhesitationthatifthereisaninternationalrulingbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsagainstaStatefortheviolationofoneormorehumanrights,andwithinthatproceedingabindingdecisionwasadoptedinrelationtoasettlementofdamagesonbehalfofthevictimsandtheirrelatives,atthedomesticleveltheContentiousAdministrativeJurisdiction—inthecontextofanordinaryproceedingfordirectreparation—shalldeclareonitsownoruponthepetitionofoneofthepartiesinternationalresjudicata,becauseitisnotviablethatadomesticjurisdictionalbodyignorearulinghandeddownwithinaninternationalframework,particularlywhentheInter-AmericanCourtgenericallydefinesthefullresponsibilityoftheState,anddoesnotmerelycon-fineitselftothespecificaspectofthedamage.

Id. 11 Again,inreferringtoanon-transitionallegalorderIamspeakingofthesetofnormsthatdonot

directly concern theprocessof transitional justice. InColombiaaparticularpracticehasbeentaking shape of differentiating between the norms governing the transitional justice process,understoodinawide-rangingsense(criminalproceedings,civiloradministrativeproceedingsforrestitutionofproperty,andotheradministrativeproceedings),andtherestofthelegalsystem.TheCriminalChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticerefers,inthissense,tothe“legalframeworkoftransitionaljustice.”

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variousactorsinthejudicialsystemthatareresponsibleforimplementingthisLaw.ThisrulingisexemplaryofthewayinwhichtheColombianHighCourtshavetriedtointerprettransitionaljusticeingeneral,andtheColombiantransitionaljusticeprocessinparticular:inharmonywiththedemandsofinternationalstandards.12 Assupportforitsdecision,theCourtinvokedextensivelytheinternationalhumanrights norms and jurisprudence that it consideredpertinent and relevant to thelegalproblemsthatithadtoresolve.Thishasbeenandcontinuestobecommonpractice in relation to non-transitional jurisdiction.13TheConstitutionalCourt’srulingalsotookintoaccountitspreviousjurisprudenceregardingvictims’rightsundertheCriminalProcedureCode.Inthisway,theCourtestablishedaconsistentjurisprudentiallinebetweendecisionsonnon-transitionalnormsanddecisionsonthenormsgoverningthetransitionaljusticeprocess.Todatethisjurisprudentialcontinuityhasbeenmaintained.ThesignificantadvancesthattheConstitutionalCourtmadeintheabove-mentionedrulingregardingprotectionfortherightsofvictimsofhumanrightsviolationstotruth,justice,reparationandnon-repetition,basedtoalargeextentoninternationalnorms,havebeentakenuprepeatedlyandextendedtosubsequentrulingsonnon-transitionallegislationandtheprotectionoffundamentalrights.

The influence of international human rights law (including decisions byinternationalbodies)onColombiandomesticlaw,andparticularlyinthejudgmentsofitsmainjudicialbodies,hastodaybecomeapartoftheColombianlegalreality.Inthissense,itisnotstrangethattheinterpretationandapplicationofthenormsgoverningthetransitionaljusticeprocessalsorespondtothatinfluence.Whatisnoteworthyhowever,isthewayinwhichthisreceptionofinternationallawhasinfluencedtheSupremeCourt’sdevelopingconceptualizationofthetransitionalcriminal proceedings and its difference from the ordinary criminal procedure.Secondpointofnoteishow,despitethisconceptualdifference,thejurisprudencethatisbeginningtotakeshapeintheJusticeandPeaceProcessisstartingtohaveaneffectonjudicialrulingsissuedinordinarycriminalproceedings.

12 RulingC-370of2006isthejudgmentthatintroducedthegreatestnumberofessentialmodificationstoLaw975of2005,bydeclaringcertainprovisionsunconstitutionalandbymodifyingotherprovisionsin the process of upholding them. TheConstitutionalCourt has to date issued fourteenrulingsofconstitutional controlof thisLaw.These rulingsareavailableon theConstitutionalCourt’swebsite,http://www.courtconstitucional.gov.co.

13 See, for example, Constitutional Court, ruling C-095 of 2007, Feb. 14, 2007, Nos. D-6341&D-6350, SpeakerMagistrateMarco GerardoMonroy Cabra, in which the Court ruled on theconstitutionalityofaparticularconceptofprosecutorialdiscretionknownas the“principio de oportunidad.”InthisrulingtheCourtprohibitedtheapplicationofthisprosecutorialdiscretiontocrimesamountingtowarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,orgenocideundertheRomeStatuteandotherinternationaltreatiestowhichColombiaisasignatory.

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II. The Supreme Court’s Reception of International Human Rights Standards in Recent Rulings Related to the Justice

and Peace Process

Iwill referfirst to tworulingsbytheCriminalCassationChamberof theSupremeCourtofJustice:thefirstissuedonMay12,2009,andthesecondonJuly31,2009.14ThesetworulingsontheJusticeandPeaceLawreaffirmedthespecialnatureofthecriminalprocessregulatedbytheJusticeandPeaceLaw—as a transitional justice law—and based on that factor the Criminal Chamberapplied internationalhuman rights standards.15Thequestionhere, as Iwill tryto demonstrate, is not so much the application of these standards, but rathertheir interpretationby theCriminalChamber in the JusticeandPeaceprocess.Furthermore, thequestionarisesas towhether thesame interpretationof thesestandardsshouldbeappliedinordinarycriminalproceedingsdealingwithgravehumanrightsviolationsandbreachesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Ireiterateinrelationtothissecondquestionthenotionthat therearetwojusticesystemsoperating in parallel: a transitional criminal justice and the ordinary criminaljustice.16

Additionally,IwillrefertoarecentrulingissuedbytheCriminalChamberdenying the extradition of Mr. Luis Edgar Medina Flórez, a demobilizedparamilitary in the Justice and Peace Process.17 In this opinion, the CriminalChamberdivergedfromitspreviousjurisprudence,denyingtheextraditionbasedontheColombianState’sinternationalhumanrightscommitmentsandparticularlythe implicationof thosecommitmentsfor therightsof thevictimsto truthandreparationintheJusticeandPeaceprocess.

14 Criminal Cassation Chamber, Supreme Court of Justice, ruling ofMay 12, 2009, No. 31150,SpeakerMagistrateAugusto IbáñezGuzmán;CriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourtofJustice, ruling of July 31, 2009,No. 31539, SpeakerMagistrateAugusto IbáñezGuzmán. Forconvenience,Iwillrefertotheserulingsbythedateonwhichtheywereissued.

15 ForinformationonalloftherulingsthattheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticehasissuedinthecontextofJusticeandPeace,seetheÍndice temático: Ley de Justicia y Paz,maintainedbytheCourtitselfandavailableattheCourt’swebsite:http://190.24.134.121/webcsj/Consulta.

16 I reiterate that the distinction between the two systems of justice is one that is reinforced inthe jurisprudence of theCriminalCassationChamber of theSupremeCourt of Justice,whichexpresslyrefersto“transitionaljustice”whenitalludestothespecialcriminalprocessregulatedbytheJusticeandPeaceLaw.ThisisbasedonthefactthattheprocessofjudicialclarificationprovidedforinLaw975of2005isnotonlyaspecialcriminalprocessinsideatransitionaljusticeprocess—theLawalsopresupposestheestablishmentofJusticeandPeaceUnitsintheAttorneyGeneral’sOffice,JusticeandPeaceChambersinthevariousdistrictcourts,andtherightofappealtotheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJustice.

17 Criminal Cassation Chamber, Supreme Court of Justice, ruling of Aug. 19, 2009, No. 30451,SpeakerMagistrateYesidRamírezBastidas.

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A. The Justice and Peace Rulings of May 12, 2009 and July 31, 2009

1. Ruling of May 12, 2009

In thisdecisionresolvingseveralappealsmotions, theCriminalChamberclarifiedanumberofpoints,ofwhichIwillhighlightthree.First,theCriminalChamberreaffirmedacleardistinctionbetweentheprocessprovidedforintheJustice and Peace Law—a transitional justice law—and the ordinary criminaljusticesystem.TheCriminalChamberstatedthefollowing:

The Chamber observes ab initio that the decision of the court a quo departs from thepolitical-criminal structure andpurposesofLaw975of2005.BecauseoftheLaw’suniquenatureitcannotbebasedonthelegal requirementsfor theadversarialprocess in theCodeofCriminalProcedure—Law906of2004—excepttheprovisionsofarticle62.Thisis because the right to truth, justice, and reparation demands that wefollow the regulations specificallydesigned topromote theprocess ofnationalreconciliation,asestablishedinarticle2,subsection1,ofDecree3391of2006,whichpartiallyregulatesthatframework.18

ThisdistinctionisthekeytounderstandingtheChamber’ssecondclarificationthat Iwould like tohighlight: the significance and roleof the confession in theJustice and Peace process.According to theCriminalChamber, the Justice andPeaceprocessdoesnothaveanadversarial characterbecause it is assumed thatthedemobilizedpersonwhosubmitstoLaw975of2005doessovoluntarily.Thelaw requires voluntary submission in order to obtain the benefit of alternativesentencing.Therefore,thesignificanceofthatperson’sconfessionisdifferentfromthatofaconfessioninanordinarycriminalproceeding.FortheCriminalChamber,a confession in the Justice and Peace process has three characteristics: (1) it isa component of the truth,within the goal of reconciliation towhich the JusticeandPeaceLawaspires;(2)itisarequirementprovidedforinthelawinorderto

18 RulingofMay12,2009,at24-25.Decree3391,art.2(1)statesthefollowing:Law 975 of 2005 enshrined a special criminal justice policy for restorativejustice for the transition towards the achievement of a sustainable peace,through which it facilitates the demobilization and reinsertion of the illegalarmed groups, cessation of the violence perpetrated by them and their illicitactivities,thenon-repetitionofthosecrimes,andtherecoveryofinstitutionalruleoflaw,guaranteeingthevictims’rightstotruth,justice,andreparation.Tothiseffect,theintegratedprocedureestablishedinthislawincludesaneffectivejudicialprocedureforinvestigation,trial,sanction,andofferingofincentivestodemobilizedpersonsfromtheillegalarmedgroups,inwhichthevictimshavetheopportunitytoexercisetheirrightstoknowthetruthaboutthecircumstancesinwhichthepunishableactstookplaceandtoobtainreparationforthedamagesuffered.

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participateintheprocess;and(3)itisanevidentiaryelementtobeassessedcriticallyandaccordingtorulesoftestimony.Iwillfocusonthefirstoftheseaspects.

The confession is the backbone of the Justice and Peace process, whichdependsonthesuspensionofthepresumptionofinnocenceandoftheguaranteeagainst self-incrimination:whoeveragrees toparticipate in theprocessacceptsfromtheoutsettheirmembershipinacriminalenterprise(anillegalarmedgroup)and the commission of crimes pursuant to thatmembership during the periodinwhich it lasted. In thewordsof theCriminalChamber:“UnderLaw906of2004[CriminalProcedureCode]theprosecutionhastheburdenofdisprovingthepresumptionofinnocence,whereasinLaw975of2005,therenunciationofthatguaranteeisthestartingpointforpreliminarily—butnotexclusively—bringingtheprocess(thetruth)tofruition.”19

Whatthenisthesignificanceorrole,undertheseconditions,ofaconfessionin the Justice and Peace Process? It is an element of truth; however, it is notonlyanelementofcriminalprocedural truthbutessentiallyofhistorical truth.ThisisbecausethatisthetruththattheJusticeandPeaceprocessmustguaranteepursuanttotheinternationalstandardsinvokedandinterpretedbytheCriminalChamber.Inpreviousrulings,theCriminalChamberhadalreadyreferredtothisgoalofthetransitionaljusticeprocess.Itsreferencestotheguaranteeoftherighttotruthhaveunderstoodtheconceptoftruthinamuchbroadersensethanmereknowledgeof the facts. For example, in a ruling issuedon July 23, 2008, theCriminalChamberstated:

[I]ntherealmofJusticeandPeace,the truthinadditiontobeingtheguidingprincipleandobjectiveandarightofthevictimsandofsociety,becomesadutyoftheState;aninvestigativeresponsibilityforthepublicservantsthatareoperatorsof thisspecialandtransitional justice;anassumptionandobligationforthosewhosubmittotheprocedureandbenefitsofLaw975of2005;andgroundsforlossofthebenefitofalternativesentencingiftheyweretoomitordivideit.20

Regardingthescopeoftherighttoknowthetruth,theChamberstatedinthissamerulingthatthisright“transcendsbasicinformationregardingtheactsandincludesknowledgeoftheperpetrators,causes,ways,andmotivesofthoseacts,aswellasthefactthattheyamounttohumanrightsviolationsandbreachesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.”21Inthisway,theresponsibilityofthedemobilizedpersonthatconfessesinJusticeandPeacereferstohistoricaltruthaswellasthereconstructionofthecollectivememory:

19 RulingofMay12,2009,at32.20 Criminal Cassation Chamber, Supreme Court of Justice, ruling of July 23, 2008, No. 30120,

SpeakerMagistrateAlfredoGómezQuintero,at25.21 Id. at23.

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As a component of truth, the confession tends to be characterized asoneof the formsof reparationaimedatpreventingcollectivememoryfrombeingforgotten,asestablishedunderprincipal2ofJoinet’sSet of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Prevent Impunity.Thecollectiverighttoknowthetruthimpliesthat society as awhole discover the truth aboutwhat happened alongwiththereasonsandcircumstancesinwhichthecrimeswerecommitted;itemergesasa formofhistorical reconstruction, in that it showshowthe legal system of a particular society seeks to build the future byredesigningthepastanditsrelationshiptoit.ThereconstructionofcollectivememoryisaresponsibilityforthosewhosubmittotheJusticeandPeaceLaw,byvirtueoftheircommitmenttocompletelyandtruthfullyconfessthecrimescommittedwithinthearmedapparatusofpower,renouncing,withrespecttowhattheyhaveadmitted,the procedural guarantee of the presumption of innocence.Their taskis irreplaceablebecauseintheirnarrativetheyaretomakethevictimsvisible,reconstructthesharedpast,andprojectreconciliationbasedonwhatcannotberepeated.22

Inthatcase,iftheconfessionisthebackboneoftheJusticeandPeaceprocessanditsessentialsignificanceisasanelementofhistoricaltruthandreconstructionofcollectivememory,howcantheprocessguaranteethatitwillinfactfulfillthatroleinacriminalinvestigation?WhileJusticeandPeaceisaspecialprocess,itisaboveallacriminalinvestigationproceedingandtheconfession,asanevidentiaryelement,must address potentially criminal acts, the victims of those acts, theplaceswheretheyoccurred,thosewhoparticipatedinthem,andthemannerinwhichtheywerecommitted.ThisistheminimumcontenttobeexpectedinafullandtruthfulconfessionbydemobilizedindividualsthatsubmittotheJusticeandPeaceLaw.

Buthowcaneachoftheseaspectsbeassembledintoahistoricaltruththatalsoexaminesthecauses?FortheChamber,thenexusbetweentheindividualconfessionofademobilizedpersonanditscharacterasanelementofhistoricaltruth and collective memory is in the modus operandi: the modus operandidescribedintheindividualconfessionmustbeprojectedontothebackgroundof criminalpatterns.Thesepatterns arenotgiven in the confessionbutmustinstead be previously established by the investigative authority (the JusticeandPeaceprosecutor),basedonthecontext.Inthiswaytheconfessioncanbevalidatedasanelementofhistoricaltruthandreconstructionofthecollectivememorybasedonpatternsandcontexts;itdoesnotneedtobecontrastedwithother elements of proof and does not require other validation criteria.Thosecontexts and patterns are sufficient for the application of “sana crítica” or

22 RulingofMay12,2009,at30-31(internalcitationsomitted).

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logicaldeduction,themethodforauthenticatingorvalidatingevidenceadoptedinColombiancriminallaw.

This brings us to the third clarification of the Criminal Chamber that Iwould like to highlight.Why are these contexts and patterns sufficient?Theyaresufficientbecausetheconfessionisproducedinatransitionalprocess,whichaccordingtotheChambermustbeguidedbydifferentevidentiarycriteria—lessformalandmoreflexible.TheJusticeandPeaceprocesscentersoninvestigationsofgrave,systematic,andmassivehumanrightsviolationsthatwerecommittedunderconditionsthatmakeitimpossibletouseevidenceandevidentiarycriteriathatwouldbeproperinordinarycriminalproceedings;consequentlyothercriteriamustbeapplied.Buthowcantheseconsiderationsandconclusionsbesupported?TheCriminalChamberlookstotheevidentiarystandardsestablishedbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,asacourtthatinvestigates, interalia,gravehumanrightsviolations.InthewordsoftheCriminalChamber:

Itisillustrative,forthepurposeofthisruling,toexaminetheVelásquezRodríguez case, where the Inter-American Court of Human RightsruledagainsttheStateofHondurasforthedisappearanceofitscitizen,ManfredoVelásquezRodríguez,emphasizingthatthisdisappearancewaspartofapatternofforceddisappearancesperpetratedbytheHonduranmilitary forces between1981 and1984; in otherwords, evenwithoutotherelementsofproof,thecriminalpatternpermittedtheinference.One observation regarding the lack of evidentiary records before theInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsproposesawaytoexaminetheevidencetakingintoaccounttheparticularitiesfoundincasesofgravehuman rights violations, which without neglecting legality and dueprocesshasmadeitlessformalandmoreflexible.Undoubtedly,thecomplexityofreconstructingthefactsduetotheintensityoftheconflictandthebarbarityofthemethodsusedincarryingoutthecrimes (chopping the victims’ bodies into pieces,mass graves), alongwiththedifficultiesrelatedtothepassingoftimeinmanycases,deficientcivilrecords(births,deaths)innotaryandcommercialregistries,constantmovementofdisplacedcommunities,amongsomanyotherdifficulties,make it necessary to examine the context and bemore flexible aboutevidentiary thresholds,notonlywith respect toverifying thenarrativeofthepersonmakingtheconfession,butaboveallregardingthedamagecaused,whichmustbeprovenusingmethodsappropriatefortransitionaljustice.23

Inthiswaytheconfession,projectedontocriminalpatterns,reconstructedandestablishedthroughtheuseofcontext,servestoreaffirmthepatterns—the

23 RulingofMay12,2009,at37-38.

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modusoperandiisinfactanexpressionofthosepatterns.Theconfessionvalidatesitselfandinscribesitsnarrativeinamuchwiderhorizon,ahorizonthatisatthesametimehistoryandmemory.

Wecan thereforesee that for theCriminalChamber there isasubstantialdifference between the Justice and Peace process and the ordinary criminalprocess.Thisdifferenceisevidentin,amongotheraspects,thesuspensionofthepresumptionofinnocenceandoftheguaranteeagainstself-incrimination.Basedonthissuspension,theconfessionbecomesanessentialelementofthehistoricaltruthandthereconstructionofcollectivememory—obligatoryobjectivesoftheJusticeandPeaceprocessaccordingtointernationalstandards.Theconfession,understood in thatsense, isvalidatedasevidenceaccording to less formalandmore flexible criteria appropriate for a transitional justice processwhich, liketheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,mustdealwiththeinvestigationofgrave,massive,andsystematichumanrightsviolations.Itisinthiswaythattheevidentiarycriteriausedby the Inter-AmericanCourthavebeenapplied to theJusticeandPeaceProcess.

SurelythereareanumberofquestionsthatariseregardingthisjurisprudentialconstructionbytheColombianCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJustice.Intheconclusiontothissubsection(PartIII.C)Iwillsuggesttwo.CouldthisjurisprudencebetransferredtoinvestigationsintograveviolationsofhumanrightsandIHLcarriedoutintheordinarycriminaljusticesystem?Ifbyvirtueoftheprinciplesofdueprocessandtheguaranteesinherenttocriminalproceedingsthisjurisprudencecannotbetransferredtotheordinarycriminaljusticesystem,wouldthatnotresultinunequaltreatmentintermsofclarificationofthetruthandreparationforthevictimsofsituationsthatarejustasgraveandinvolvethesamesystematicand/ormassivepatterns?WemustrecallthatinColombiatwojusticesystems for investigating grave, systematic, and massive violations of humanrightsandbreachesofIHLoperatesimultaneouslyandinparallel.

2. Ruling of July 31, 2009

Inthesecondrulingofinteresthere,theCriminalChamberwastoruleonseveralmotionsofappealfiledagainstthefirstsentencehandeddownbyaJusticeandPeaceTribunal.TheChamberruledthattherehadbeensubstantialirregularitiesin theprocedure.Thus theChamberdidnot ruleon themotionsofappealbutinsteaddeclaredthepartialnullityoftheproceedings,sendingthecasebacktotheinitialproceduralstages.Beyondthedeclarationofnullity,mostrelevanttotheCriminalChamber’sdevelopingconceptualizationofthetransitionaljusticeprocessaretheargumentsmadetojustifythatdecisionandthewayinwhichtheChamberinvokedinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw.BelowIwillreconstructtheargumentsinthefollowingmanner:(1)argumentsdirectlylinkedtothedeclarationofnullity(whatwecouldcalltheratio decidendi

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of theCriminalChamber’s pronouncement) and (2) general arguments,whichrefertothelogicoftheJusticeandPeaceprocess.

Inrelationtothefirstsetofarguments,theCriminalChamberfoundthattheformulationofchargesandthesentenceinthelowercourthadfailedtoincludetheoffenseofcriminalconspiracy(“concierto para delinquir”).Asaresultofthisomission,thedeclarationbythedefendantMr.WilsonSalazarCarrascaldidnotincludeacceptingresponsibilityforhavingbeenpartofanillegalorganizationandhisentryintoacriminalorganizationforillicitends.IntheviewoftheChamber,criminalconspiracyisasubstantiveelementoftheJusticeandPeaceprocessandthereforeamandatorycomponentintheindictment,theformulation/acceptanceofcharges,andthejudgmentawardingthebenefitofalternativesentencing.24 The omissionof the crimeof criminal conspiracy therefore constituted a cause fornullity.

The Criminal Chamber based this consideration on the criminal policyobjectivesprovidedfor in theJusticeandPeaceLawitself,which“have todowithmassive and systematic human rights violations, whose trial and verdictfocusonthelinktoanillegalarmedgroup”—alinkthatiscapturedinthecrimeofconspiracyandnotunderpunishableconductsthatarecommittedindividually.25 AccordingtotheCriminalChamber,theinvestigationandtrialofisolatedconductswouldnotcorrespondtotheJusticeandPeaceProcessbutrathertotheordinaryjusticesystem:

In the framework of the normative regulation of Law 975 of 2005,the attributed criminal activities involve phenomena characteristicof organized criminality, whose execution and consummation occurwithin the context of internal conspiring of each bloc or front.Basedon thisassumption,constructionof thehistorical truthmust startwithclarifyingthemotivesforwhichtheillegalorganizationwassetup,thechains of command, the group’s criminalmodel, the power structure,theordersissued,thecriminalplansmade,thecriminalactionsthatitsmemberstooktosystematicallyachieveitsobjectives,thereasonsforthevictimizationandtheverificationofindividualandcollectivedamages,inordertoestablishboththeresponsibilityoftheillegalarmedgroupaswellasthatofthedemobilizedindividual.26

24 Theprocedureregulatedin theJusticeandPeaceLawprovidesforvariousphases: theversión libre (voluntarydeclaration)proceeding;thehearingtoformulatetheindictment(basedonwhichtheJusticeandPeaceprosecutorcarriesouthisorherinvestigationandverificationofthefactsprovidedbytheaccused);thehearingtoformulate(andaccept)thecharges;thepublichearingtodeterminethecomprehensivereparation;andthepublichearinginwhichthesentenceishandeddown.

25 RulingofJuly31,2009,at6.26 Id. at 4-5.

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ThisistheframeworkandobjectiveforinvestigationandtrialintheJusticeandPeaceprocess—inotherwords,thetransitionalcriminalprocess.AccordingtotheChamber,theJusticeandPeacemandateforconstructinghistoricaltruthmarksanotherimportantdifferencecomparedtotheordinarycriminalproceedings:transitional Justice and Peace proceedings investigate massive and systematichuman rights violations, whereas ordinary criminal proceedings investigateindividualconduct.Intheformer,individualresponsibilityisessentiallytiedtothestructureofthecriminalenterpriseandthesystematicandgeneralizednatureof its operations. In the latter, the person under investigation takes part in theproceedingsmerelyasanindividual.

Inaddition to theseconsiderationsandarguments, theCriminalChambertooktheopportunityofitsrulingofJuly31,2009torecallsomeoftheguidelinesalready set forth regarding Justice and Peace proceedings. These guidelinesinclude the duty of Justice and Peace prosecutors and magistrates to observeboth internal regulations and those that are part of the constitutional doctrine,aswellastherulingshandeddownbyinternationalbodies“suchastheHumanRightsCommittee, the Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights,and theInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights.”27InvokingthisdutyinrelationtothetransitionalcriminalprocessenabledtheCriminalChambertosuggestthat,giventhe framework of this process and its objective for investigation and trial, theprosecutorsandmagistratesmustapplythecriminalclassificationsthatguaranteecriminal reproachof conduct perpetrated against the civilianpopulation in thecontext of the armed conflict which could be characterized as criminal actsaccordingtonationalorinternationallawatthetimethattheywerecommitted.28 The Criminal Chamber suggested as an example the homicide of a protectedperson,whichwascategorizedasacrimeunderdomesticlawonlyin2000butwascontemplatedassuchinCommonArticle3ofthefourGenevaConventionsof1949andinArticle4ofAdditionalProtocolIIoftheseConventions(1979).TheCriminalChamberapparentlyusedtheseguidelinestoconcludethatinJusticeandPeaceproceedingsthejudicialauthoritiesshouldinvestigateandpunishconducts

27 Id. at 17.28 TheCriminalChamberoftheSupremeCourtexpresslyreferredtoArticle15oftheInternational

CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,whichestablishesthefollowing:1.Nooneshallbesentencedforactionsoromissionsthat,atthetimetheywerecommitted,werenotcrimesaccordingtonationalorinternationallaw.Norshallapenaltybeimposedthatisgraverthanwhatwasapplicableatthetimewhenthecrimewascommitted.Ifsubsequenttothecommissionofthecrimethelawprovidesfortheimpositionofalesserpenalty,thecriminalshallbenefitfromit.2.Nothingintheprovisionsofthisarticleshallpreventthetrialcourtsentencingofapersonforactionsoromissionsthat,atthetimetheywerecommitted,crimesaccordingto thegeneralprinciplesof the lawrecognizedbythe internationalcommunity.

InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,U.N.Doc.A/6316(1966),999U.N.T.S.171,entered into forceMar.23,1976.

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committedbeforetheywerecriminalizedunderdomesticlawiftheywerealreadyconsideredascrimesunderinternationallawatthetimeofcommission.

OtherguidelinesreiteratedbytheCriminalChamberinthisrulingrefertoactions by the prosecution. For the purpose of this analysis, themost relevantare those thatguide the JusticeandPeaceprosecutors’methodologicalplan forinvestigation,whichshouldguaranteethattheinvestigationeffectivelycontributestothehistoricaltruth,inthiscase,inordertoguaranteenon-repetition.AccordingtotheCriminalChamber,theworkingstrategyoftheseprosecutorsmustbebasedontwominimumpresumptions:“(i) thattheJusticeandPeacecandidateisaconfessedtransgressorofthecrimeofaggravatedcriminalconspiracyand(ii)thathisorhermilitancywascarriedoutduringaspecifictimeframeandinspecificplaces.Thecorrelatedstudyistofocusonthedamagescausedindividuallyandcollectivelybythedemobilizedperson.”29AccordingtotheCriminalChamber,followingthisstrategywillleadtheprosecution“toatruththatshallbejudiciallydeclaredandsubsequentlydisseminatedandsanctioned,andbasedonthistherewillbecatharsisinordertoguaranteethenon-repetitionofthistypeofcriminality.”30

According to the jurisprudence established by the Criminal Chamber inthis ruling alongwithwhatwas previously stated,we have on one hand, thattransitionalcriminal justice investigatescrimescommittedbyorganizedpowerapparatuses(orcriminalenterprises)andnotindividualcrimes,andontheother,that this justice should guarantee criminal reproach of conducts that violateinternationalhumanrightslawand/orIHLiftheywereconductscodifiedbytheseinternationalregulatorysystemsatthetimeoftheircommission,evenwhen,atthattimetheywerenotcriminalizedunderdomesticlaw.ThetwoquestionsthatI posed above—regarding whether this jurisprudence can be transferred, andifnot,whether this raisesequalityconcerns—arealsovalidwithregard to thisjurisprudence. Iwill now turn to the conclusions that can be drawn regardingthesequestions.

3. ReflectionsonthisJusticeandPeaceJurisprudence

ThefirstquestionthatIposeiswhethertheJusticeandPeacejurisprudenceoftheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticecanbetransferredtoinvestigationsofgraveviolationsofhumanrightsandbreachesofIHLintheordinarycriminaljusticesystem.Severalconsiderationsmakethistransferseemdubious. First is the criteria for assessing the evidence, which aremademoreflexible and less formal andwhich, in particular, involve a confession and theevidenceofpatternsofcriminality.Transferenceofthesecriteriatotheordinary

29 Rulingof July31, 2009, at 21 (citingCriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourt of Justice,rulingofMay28,2008,No.29560,SpeakerMagistrateAugustoIbáñezGuzmán).

30 Id.

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criminaljusticeprocesswouldweakenthepositionoftheaccusedinrelationtotheevidentiarypoweroftheState,andthequestioniswhetherornotthiswouldmeanignoring the principles of legal guarantees contained in the current accusatorycriminalsystem.

Asecondconsiderationhastodowiththeinvestigationandtrialofconductthatwasnot classifiedasacrimeunderdomestic lawat the timewhen itwascommittedbutwascodifiedunderinternational law(suchasthehomicideofaprotectedperson, as suggestedby theCriminalChamber).The transferenceofthisjurisprudencetotheordinarycriminalprocesscouldclashwiththeprincipleoflegalitythatinthecaseofColombiaisexpresslyrecognizedintheCriminalProcedureCode.31

A final consideration has to do with the Criminal Chamber’s statementabouttheinvestigationofcriminalenterprisesasthedutyoftheJusticeandPeaceauthoritiesand the investigationofmere individualconductas thecompetenceof the ordinary criminal justice system.The question arises as towhether theinvestigation of criminal enterprises responsible for massive and systematichumanrightsviolationsisexclusivelyamatterforthetransitionaljusticesystemandiftheimplicationthenisthattheordinarycriminaljusticesystemdoesnothavetheobligationtocarryoutinvestigationsofthattype.

Idonotconsiderherethesuspensionofthepresumptionofinnocenceandtheguaranteeagainstself-incrimination,inlightofthefactthatintheColombiantransitional process this suspension is based on the demobilized individual’svoluntarysubmissiontotransitionalcriminaljusticeandisaspecificcharacteristicof this process.

If based on considerations relating to the right to due process with fullguaranteesincontextsofnon-transitionalordinarycriminaljusticewedeterminethat such jurisprudencecannotbe transferred,anotherquestion (amongothers)arises—whetherthisresultsinunequaltreatmentintermsofclarificationofthetruthandreparationfor thevictimsofacts thathavethesamegravityandalsorespond to systematic and/ormassive patterns, thereby contravening the sameinternationalstandardsandprinciplesinvokedbytheCriminalChamberinordertoapplydifferentcriteriaintransitionalcriminaljustice

Itcouldbethatthisquestion,andtheconcernsexpressedtherein,wouldbeirrelevantinpost-transitionalscenariosinwhichthereisapresumedrupturewiththepast.Insuchscenarios,atleastonthetheoreticallevelitisexpectedthatcriminaljusticewillfunction,inasocietythatseeksoncethetransitionhasendedtostrengthendemocracyandhumanrights,guaranteeingthefullrangeofdueprocessrights.Inapost-transitionalsociety,it isassumedthattransitionaljusticehasrespondedto

31 CriminalProcedureCode(Law906of2004),art.6,para.1(“Nooneshallbeinvestigatedortriedexcept inaccordancewith theprocedural laws ineffectat themomentof theeventsandwhileobservingtheappropriateformsineachcase.”).

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themassiveandsystematiccrimesofthepastandthatcriminaljusticecandedicateitselftoaddressingthecriminalityofcontextsofpeaceanddemocracy.

However,thequestionisindeedsignificantandrelevantinacasesuchastheColombian one—where not only has the process of transition not finishedbutitisabsolutelypartial(assuming,asIamhere,thepremiseofitsexistence).Additionally, many of the investigations and trials for grave, massive, andsystematic human rights violations continue to be handled by the ordinarycriminaljusticesystem.Theordinarycriminaljusticesystemhascompetencenotonlyovermassive and systematic crimes committed in thepast, by the armedgroupsthathavenotdemobilizedandbyagentsoftheState,butalsoovermassiveandsystematiccrimesthatcontinuetobecarriedoutinthecontextofanarmedconflictthathasnotended.

Howcanorshouldtheseproceedingsbecarriedoutinparallelwithtransitionalproceedings?Canthemoreflexibleandlessformalcriteriaforassessingevidencebetransferredinordertofacilitatetheworkofinvestigationorshouldthecriteriaof ordinary criminal proceedings bemaintained despite the difficulty that thiscauses,inmanycases,intermsofcombatingimpunity?InColombia,themodusoperandiofthoseresponsibleformassiveandsystematichumanrightsviolationsincludeseliminatingormakingitdifficulttoobtainevidenceandterrorizingthepopulationandthevictims.ThisrealityispresentbothinactsfallingwithinthecompetenceoftheJusticeandPeaceauthoritiesaswellasthoseoftheordinaryjurisdiction.Howshouldthesecasesbetreated?Intheordinaryjurisdiction,howcanacorrectbalancebeachievedbetweenontheonehandthefundamentalrightsofthedefendantandontheotherthevictims’fundamentalrightsandsociety’srighttoknowthetruth?

And, inrelationtoconducts thatwerenotclassifiedascrimesat thetimethattheywerecommitted,doesthisexempttheordinarycriminaljusticesystemfrominvestigatingandprosecutingthem?Whatimplicationsdoesthisexemptionhaveregardingclarificationofthetruthandguaranteeingtherightsofthevictimsofthoseconducts?Howcanunequaltreatmentbeavoidedintermsofcriminalreproachforvictimsof thesame typeofconductsduring thesame timeframewho,moreover,frequentlyknoweachother?

Finally, and in relation to the division of investigative tasks betweentransitionalcriminaljusticeandordinarycriminaljustice,whatdoesitmeantosay,astheCriminalChamberhas,thattheinvestigationofcriminalenterprisesis the duty of the Justice and Peace proceedingswhereas the investigation ofindividual conducts corresponds to ordinary criminal justice proceedings? Itcouldreasonablybeassumedthat, if theordinarycriminal justicesystemmustcontinuecarryingoutmanyoftheinvestigationsandtrialsforgrave,massive,andsystematichumanrightsviolationscommittedinthecontextofthearmedconflict,itwouldalsohavetoinvestigatecriminalenterprisesaswellasshedlightonthehistorical truth. Whether it is one set of processes and procedures or the other does

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not inanywaychangethenatureof thegravehumanrightsviolationsor theirsystematicand/orwidespreadcharacter;nordoesitinanywaychangetherightsthat,inaccordancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw,thevictimsofthesetypesofviolationsaswellasthesocietyinwhichtheytakeplacehavetothetruth.Thatbeingthecase,inacontextsuchasColombia,whyshoulditbeconsideredthattheresponsibilitytoinvestigatecriminalenterprisesandtoguaranteeconstructionofhistorical truthandreconstructionof thecollectivememorybelongsonly totransitionalcriminalprocesses?

IdonothaveanswerstothequestionsthatIposehere,butIposetheminordertoexposetheparticulardifficultiesthattransitionaljusticeprocessesmustaddresswhentheyarecarriedout in themidstofongoingarmedconflicts thatcontinue toproducegrave,massive,andsystematicviolationsofhumanrightsand IHL. I do not think that the response is to say that in these caseswe arenot dealingwith transitional processes—this answer is too easy and could bedenyingrealities.NordoIfeelthattheansweristosaythatthosegrave,massive,and systematic violationsof human rightsmustwait for newnegotiations andother applicable transitionalmechanisms in order to be investigated and triedin accordancewith the standards that the Criminal Cassation Chamber of theSupremeCourtofJusticeappliestoJusticeandPeaceproceedings.Inadditiontobeingaresponsethatcouldendupvalidatingunequaltreatmentforvictimsofthesametypeofhumanrightsviolations,itwouldbecontrarytointernationalhumanrightsstandardsinthefieldofinvestigationofsuchviolations.

The Inter-AmericanCourt ruling that is the background to the nucleus oftheCriminalChamber’sjurisprudencethatIhaveanalyzedherewasnotarulingto address transitional processes, but rather grave human rights violations.32 In thissense,IseetheJusticeandPeacejurisprudenceoftheCriminalChamberasdemonstratingadifferentneed—onethathas todowith thewayinwhich, inacontextofactivearmedconflict,itcan(andperhapsshould)harmonizetransitionaland non-transitional mechanisms. In the case of criminal proceedings, thisharmonizationmusttakeintoaccountthewayinwhichinternationalhumanrightsstandards are applied in the different systems, transitional and non-transitional.Giventhattransitionalcriminalproceedingsoperateinarealitythatisnotcompletelytransitional,theycannotoperateinacompartmentalizedfashion.Theymusttakeintoaccountthelinksthatbindthemtotheordinaryproceedingsthatcontinuetodealwiththesametypeofhumanrightsviolationsthattheyareinvestigating.

32 I am referring to the rulingby the Inter-AmericanCourt in theCaseof theRochelaMassacrev.Colombia,Merits,ReparationsandCosts,2007Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.163(May11,2007).Inmorerecentrulings,theInter-AmericanCourthasreaffirmeditsjurisprudenceontheobligationofstatestoassessthesystematicpatternsthatenabledthecommissionofgravehumanrightsviolationsintheirinvestigations,andtodosobasedonevidenceandevidentiarycriteriarelevanttothatrequirement.See, e.g.,CaseofRadilla-Pachecov.Mexico,PreliminaryObjections,Merits,Reparations,andCosts,2009Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.209(Nov.23,2009).

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B. The Criminal Cassation Chamber’s Ruling on the Solicitation to Extradite Mr. Luis Edgar Medina Flórez

OnAugust19,2009,theCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeissuedanopiniondenyingtheextraditiontotheUnitedStatesofMr.LuisEdgarMedinaFlórez,ademobilizedmemberoftheparamilitaryforceswhohadsubmittedtotheprocedureofLaw975of2005.33Theargumentsfordenyingtheextraditionwere:“(i)itviolatesthespiritofLaw975of2005;(ii)itignorestherightsofthevictims;(iii)ittraumatizesthefunctioningoftheadministrationofColombianjustice;and(iv)thegravityofthecrimescommittedbythecitizenforwhich extradition is sought is less than that of the crimes forwhich he isaccusedinColombia.”34Iwillrefertothesefourargumentsbecausetheyareallbasedonthe jurisprudencethatboth theConstitutionalCourtandtheSupremeCourthavebeendevelopingwithregardtothemeaningoftransitionalcriminaljusticeandwithrespecttoguaranteeingtherightstotruth,justice,andreparationinthatcontext.Iwilllookmorecloselyatthelastargumentbecauseitistheonethatrefersmostextensivelytoprovisionsofinternationallaw.

Inrelationtothefirstargument,theCriminalChamberrecalledthattruth,justice and reparation are central tenets of the Justice and Peace Law, which“places particular importance on the rights of the victims.”35 The ChamberthereforeconsideredthatboththeColombiangovernmentaswellasthenationaland international community have an interest in seeing that the grave crimescommittedby theparamilitarygroups“are fullyclarifiedand that thepunitiveconsequences authorized by the laws are imposed.”36 Otherwise, in thewordsof theChamber, thiswould constitute a violation of “society’s right to clarifyprocessesofmacro-criminalitythatmassivelyandsystematicallyaffectthehumanrightsofthepopulation,[whichalso]areconstitutionalrights.”37 Therefore:

[W]hile the judicial authorities are authorized to carry out specialproceedings provided for under Law 975, the demobilized personswho have submitted to this law have the obligation to confess tocrimes committed, indictment hearings are being carried out, and thecorresponding rulings are being issued, the judges and prosecutorshave theunavoidableduty tomake theprinciplesof truth, justiceandreparationprevailinthedomesticcode.38

33 In2008,theColombianGovernmentextraditedtotheUnitedStatesfifteenparamilitaryleaderslinkedtoJusticeandPeaceproceedingsandin2009extraditedmoreoftheseleaders.TheCriminalChamberissuedopinionsapprovingextraditioninthesecases.

34 RulingofAug.19,2009,at23.35 Id. at24.36 Id. 37 Id.38 Id. at25.

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Inrelationtothesecondargument,theCriminalChamberextensivelycitedthejurisprudenceoftheConstitutionalCourtontherightsofvictims,includingpronouncementsrelatedtoexerciseoftheserightsinproceedingsincontextsandmodalities of transitional justice. Pursuant to that jurisprudence, the CriminalChamberstatedthefollowing

Inthefaceofhumanrightsviolations,theStatemustguaranteethevictimseffective legal recourse thatprovidesadequate resultsoranswers; thisamountstosaying,precisely,thatapoorsimulationofjusticeisnotthesamethingasdoingjustice.Inotherwords,weconsiderjusticedoneandaneffectivelegalrecourseofferedonlywhenthosewhohavesufferedthe human rights violation, those who have been victims of crimescommittedbytheparamilitarygroups,ortheirfamilymembers,obtaintruth,justice,andreparation.39

FortheChamber,theexperienceoftheearlierextraditionsofparamilitarieshasshownthatitisnotpossibleforthemtocontinueconfessingtheircrimes,there-byparalyzingknowledgeofthetruthandaffectingtherightsofthevictimsandofsocietytotruthandnon-repetition.Therefore,theSupremeCourtcouldnotaccept

that inaddition to the relative impunity that is imparted in the JusticeandPeaceproceedings, the truthalsobeunderminedby impeding thedemobilized individualswhohave submitted toLaw975 from tellingaboutthecrimescommittedandaskingforgivenessfromthevictimsandthat,alongwith theauthorities,providingguaranteesofnon-repetitionaswell as adequate reparations for the victimswhile respecting theirdignity.40

In relation to the third argument, the Chamber considered, among otherquestions, thatpersonsrequestedforextradition thathavedemobilizedandareconfessing the crimes committed personally or by their criminal organization“mustconcludetheirdeclarationssothattheColombianjusticesystemcanissuethe definitive pronouncements that are expected”41TheChamber also found itunacceptablethatthepeaceprocesspromotedbythenationalgovernmentaimedatdemobilizingtheparamilitaries“becomesubjecttoforeigngovernmentsandtheirgoodwillinordertopermitreconstructionofthetruthforwhichColombiansocietycriesoutsostrongly.”42

Finally,andinrelationtothelastargument,theCriminalChamberconsideredseveral arguments, each of which it supported with reference to international

39 RulingofAug.19,2009,at31-32.40 Id. at 33. 41 Id.42 Id. at 34.

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humanrightslawandinternationalcriminallaw.Thus,itconcludedthatduetothefactthatparamilitarieslinkedtothespecialprocessenshrinedintheJusticeandPeaceLaw

have confessed at least to the crime of belonging to an armed group,which, when examined in light of the criminal objectives of theparamilitary groups amounts to a crime against humanity, there is nodoubt that thegravityofdrugtraffickingpales incomparisonwiththecrimesofgenocide,homicideofaprotectedperson,forceddisappearanceanddisplacement,tortureandothers,committedduringrecentdecadesbymembersofthedemobilizedparamilitarygroups.43

The crimes committed by the paramilitaries are also crimes prosecuted byinternationalcriminalcourts,whichisnotthecasewithdrugtrafficking—makingdrug-trafficking a crime of the second order in the judgment of the CriminalChamber.Undersuchconditions,itisclearfortheChamberthattogiveprecedencetodomesticjusticeinrelationtothetypeofcrimescommittedbytheparamilitaries“shieldstheColombianStatefromthepossibilityofinterventionbytheInternationalCriminalCourt.”44Or,toputitanotherway,astheChamberitselfmanifested:

[A]uthorizing theextraditionofaColombiannational requiredabroadfor the crimeofdrug trafficking,knowing that this samepersonmustalsorespondforthegravestcrimesagainsthumanity,constitutesaformof impunity that the above-mentioned International Court repudiatesandwhich authorizes it to intervene in those states that sponsor suchpractices.45

Tocompleteitsarguments,theCriminalChamberadoptedthejurisprudenceoftheInter-AmericanCourtregardingtheobligationtoinvestigateandtrygravehumanrightsviolationsthatithadrecentlyreiteratedinafollow-upresolutiononcompliancewithitsrulingintheCase of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. In thisresolution,theInter-AmericanCourtstatedthat“inthedecisionsregardingtheapplicationofcertainprocedural concepts tooneperson, theaccusationofserioushumanrightsviolationsmustprevail.Theapplicationofconceptsliketheextraditionmustnotserveasameanstofavor,fosterorguaranteeimpunity.”46

43 Id. at34-35(internalcitationomitted).44 RulingofAug.19,2009,at36.45 Id. (internalcitationomitted).46 CaseoftheMapiripánMassacrev.Colombia,MonitoringCompliancewithJudgment,2009Inter-

Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.122,para.41(July8,2009).In thissamepart,whichiscitedbytheCriminalChamber,theInter-AmericanCourtalsostatedthat:

[B]ased on the lack of agreement as to the judicial cooperation betweentheStatesthatarrangedsuchextradition,itfallsuponColombiatoclarifythemechanisms,instrumentsandlegalconceptsthatshallbeappliedtoguarantee

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This opinion—regarding an extradition request—includes several aspectsdeveloped by theCriminalChamber in its jurisprudence on Justice andPeaceproceedings mentioned above: the significance of these proceedings; thefundamental role that construction of the historical truth has in them; theresponsibilitythattheparamilitariesintheseproceedingshaveinrelationtothatconstruction; theguaranteeof thevictims’ rights in theseproceedings;and theguaranteeofsociety’srighttoknowthetruth.Inrelationtoalloftheseaspects,theCriminalChamber follows theprinciplesandstandardsof internationalhumanrightslawveryclosely.

Inadditiontotheseaspects,anotherconsiderationmeritsspecialattention:thedirectallusiontotheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC).IntheviewoftheCriminal Chamber, the possibility exists that the ICC could intervene in theColombiansituationifitsjudicialproceedingsfailtoinvestigate,try,andpunishtheperpetratorsandthoseresponsibleforcrimesagainsthumanityaccordingtointernationalstandards.ItcouldbeconcludedthatwhentheCriminalChambermakesthesereferencestotheICC,itisdemonstratingthesignificantweightthatthisCourthasonitsconsiderationsandrulingsonconductthatinitsjudgmentamounttointernationalcrimesascontemplatedintheRomeStatute.Inthissense,theweightoftheICCwouldnotbelimitedtorulingsinrelationtocrimesthataretodaythecompetenceofthetransitionalcriminaljusticesystem,butwouldratherextendtocrimesthat,giventheparticularityoftheColombiantransitionalprocess,continuetobeunderthejurisdictionoftheordinarycriminaljusticesystem.InthefollowingsectionIwilladdressthisissue.ItisworthaskingwhethertheCriminalChamberwouldissueasimilaropinioninthecaseofaColombianarmedactor,whose extraditionwas requested andwhowas linked to an ordinary criminalinvestigation for grave,massive, and or systematic violations of human rightsand/orIHL.

III. The Jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber in Justice and Peace as a Basis for its Rulings in the Ordinary Criminal Jurisdiction

Iwill refer here to one single ruling,whichhas enormous importance inrelationtoeffortstocombatimpunityforgrave,massiveandsystematichumanrightsviolations.

thattheextraditedpersonwillcollaboratewiththeinvestigationsintothefactsoftheinstantcase,aswellas,ifapplicable,toguaranteethedueprocess.TheStatemustguaranteethattheproceedingsconductedoutsideColombiawillnotinterfereorhindertheinvestigationsintotheseriousviolationscommittedintheinstantcaseoraffecttherightsofthevictimsrecognizedintheJudgment.

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InitsrulingofMarch11,2009,47theCriminalChamberupheldthegroundsforreviewinvokedbytheProcuratorGeneral’sOfficeinrelationtopreclusionof the investigation of formerArmyGeneralRitoAlejo delRíoRojas for hisparticipation in grave human rights violations. With this ruling the CriminalChamberoverturnedtheAttorneyGeneral’sresolutionofMarch9,2004thathaddecreedpreclusionceasinginvestigationandprosecutionoftheformergeneralforthecrimesofcriminalconspiracy,embezzlementofarmyequipment,andcorruptpracticesbyomission.TheChamberremandedthecasetotheAttorneyGeneral’sOfficeforittoproceedwiththeinvestigationandprosecution.

Inthisruling,theCriminalChamberciteditsjurisprudenceinthecontextofJusticeandPeace,aswellasrelevantdeclarationsmadebyseveralparamilitariesduringthoseproceedings.Thecentralaspectsofthisruling(includingacceptanceof thecompetenceof theProcuratorGeneral’sOffice tobring theaction)arebased on this jurisprudence and on the conceptualization that the CriminalChamberhasestablishedregardingtheJusticeandPeaceprocess.InthisPart,Iwillfocusonjustthreeofthesecentralaspects.Thefirstrelatestoclassificationof criminal conspiracy as a crime against humanity; the second refers to therightsofvictimsofhumanrightsviolationsand,specifically,totherightsthattheyhave inJusticeandPeaceproceedings;andthe third is inrelation to thefactsusedasevidence.

TheCriminalChamber,inthecontextofJusticeandPeace,definedcriminalconspiracy for paramilitary purposes as a crime against humanity.Among itsvariousconsiderationsforarrivingatthatdefinition,itstated:

Taking into account that the crimes committed by the demobilizedparamilitariesincludeforceddisappearance,forceddisplacement,torture,homicideforpoliticalreasons,etc.,andbecausesaidpunishableoffensesare understood as being included within the classification of crimesagainst humanity, that assessment must be extended to the so-calledaggravated criminal conspiracyinsofarasthecriminalagreementwasmadeforthesepurposes.48

Having characterized criminal conspiracy for paramilitary purposes as acrimeagainsthumanityinitsjurisprudenceinthecontextofJusticeandPeace,theCriminalChamberstatedthefollowinginitsrulingreviewingtheresolutionthathadprecludedtheinvestigationofformerGeneraldelRio:

47 Criminal Cassation Chamber, Supreme Court of Justice, ruling ofMar. 11, 2009, No. 30510,SpeakerMagistrateYesidRamírezBastidas.

48 CriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourtofJustice,rulingofApr.10,2008,No.29472,SpeakerMagistrateYesidRamírezBastidas,at18.TheargumentsgivenbytheCriminalChamberinthisrulingarequiteextensive.HereIlimitmyselftopointingoutjustoneofitsconsiderations.

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In so far as themilitary officer on trial has presented his defense foracrimeagainsthumanity [thatofcriminalconspiracy], the immediateconsequenceforthedomesticlegalsystemconsistsinavoidingatallcostimpunity for the crimes allegedly committed and thereby to show theinternationalcommunitythat interventionbytheinternationalcriminaljustice system is not necessary becauseColombia is able to try thoseresponsible for such crimes and to impose the punitive consequencesestablishedundernationalcriminallaw.49

Of theabove-mentionedconsiderations, it isworth stressingnotonly the

commitmentof theCriminalChambertothefightagainst impunityincasesofgravehumanrightsviolationsbutalsoitsinsistenceonceagainonshowingtheinternationalcommunity—asinthecaseofdenyingextradition—thatColombianjudgesarecomplyingwithinternationalstandardsandthat,therefore,interventionbytheICCwouldnotbenecessary.

In relation to the rights of the victims, the Criminal Chamber referredextensively to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, including itsjurisprudenceregardingtransitionaljustice.TheChamberformulatedanumberof considerations on the State’s obligation to guarantee that the victims haveeffectivelegalrecoursethatwouldprovideadequateresponses—thatis,recoursethatguarantees truth, justice,andreparation to those thathavesufferedhumanrightsviolations,ortheirfamilymembers.Inthissense,theChamberconsideredthatinseekingtoharmonizelegalrigorwitheffectingmaterialjustice,itwas

easytoseethattherearehigherreasonstopermitthemotionforreviewifimpunityinaconcreteactionmayendupviolatingtherightsofthevictims,by impeding through res judicata the realization of the constitutionalobjectivesofthecriminalprocess,asitaffectsthelegitimateexpectationsofthevictimsofpunishableconductswithregardtotheirrightstotruth,justice,andreparation.Byimpedingreviewinamatterwhichinvolvesthegravestcrimesagainsthumanity,anabsurdjurisprudencewouldbeerectedinadorationofregulationsforregulations’sake,formforform’ssake,disregardingthesupremeobligationimposedbytheConstitution:todojusticeavoidingimpunity.50 Finally,andinrelationtothefactsthatservedasthebasistodeclaretheappeal

for review valid, the Criminal Chamber accepted as evidence the confessionsmadebyseveralparamilitariesduringJusticeandPeaceproceedings.Injustifyingitsruling,itemphasized,interalia,thefollowing:

49 RulingofMar.11,2009,at36.50 Id. at 47.

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The truth revealed by the demobilized paramilitaries in Justice andPeacemustservetoimposetheircorrespondingsentences,andwhereapplicable,toinvestigateandconvictallthosepersonswhocontributedtotheactivitiesoftheparamilitarygroups,whichattheveryleastmakesthemresponsibleforthecrimeofcriminal conspiracyforparamilitarypurposes. The spontaneous and free declarations made by the demobilizedparamilitariesbecomeanewelementofevidence,totheextentthattheyaretestimonyregardingtheincriminationsthattheymakeagainstthirdparties.Theyrevealnewfactsinasmuchastheyshedlightoneventsunknowntothejudiciaryandbecomerelevantwhenestablishingwhoaccompanied the criminal actions by the paramilitaries andhow theydid so.51

According to the Criminal Chamber then, to the extent that the crimescommitted by the paramilitaries constitute crimes against humanity, it is notpossible for the jurisdiction to maintain itself at a distance from that reality“whennewevidenceandfactsshowthatpublicservantsusedtheirpositionstocontributebyactionandomissiontothepreparationandexecutionofcrimesofthatnature.”52 Therefore:

The presentation of the facts, regulatory references, the declarationsmadebythedemobilizedpersonstoprosecutorsduringversiones libres,thejudicialinterventionsmadeintheJusticeandPeaceproceedings,andtheprogressofthoseproceedingsinaccordancewithwhatwasstatedbytheplaintiffaswellasby the representativeof theMinisterio Público beforethisCourt,aresufficienttofindthattheclaimsbytheProcuratorGeneral’s Office satisfy the requirements to declare the grounds forreviewasjustified.53

Withthisruling,theCriminalChamberclearedthewayforthereopeningofcriminalinvestigationsagainstformerGeneralRitoAlejodelRío.Theenormousimportanceofthisrulingisindisputable;howeverwhatisnoteworthyisnotsomuch thefavorable response to theappeal for reviewbut rather theargumentsused.TherulingisbasedfundamentallyonconsiderationsrelatingtotheJusticeandPeaceLawandonconfessionsmadeduringthespecialproceedingsregulatedby that law.Wemust recall the structural importance that confessionshave intheseproceedings for theCriminalChamberand theconditions inwhich suchconfessions are made.What happened in this case was on the one hand theadoptionofthejurisprudenceoftheCriminalChamberinthecontextofJustice

51 Id. at48-49.52 Id. at49.53 Id. at 50.

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andPeaceregardingthecrimeofcriminalconspiracyforparamilitarypurposesasacrimeagainsthumanity,and,ontheother,thetransference—andacceptancebytheChamber—ofanumberoftheconfessionsmadeintransitionalcriminaljusticeproceedings to a proceeding in the ordinary criminal jurisdictionwithout newfactsand/orevidencehavingbeenproducedormadeknowninthisproceeding.FormerGeneraldelRíohadbeen investigatedby theordinarycriminal justicesystemand—accordingtothecurrentregulatorydesign—cannotbeinvestigatedbythetransitionaljusticesystem.However,thenewevidencethatincriminateshimhadbeenproducedinthetransitionaljusticesystem,and,therefore,hewillbeinvestigatedbasedontheresultsofthatsystem.

Thatbeingthescenario,Ibelieve,inconclusion,thatIamjustifiedininsist-ingonmytwoquestionsabouttherelationshipbetweenthetwojusticesystemsandonthereflectionsthatIhavemaderegardingthem.IaddheretwoadditionalquestionsthatIwillsimplypose:IntermsofcriminalinvestigationsinColom-bia,isanextensiontakingplaceoftheobjectivesoftransitionaljusticebeyondthe transitional criminal process expressly regulated in the Justice and PeaceLaw?Or,pursuanttotheprinciplesofconsistencyandcoherence,istheCriminalChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeinaprocessofhomogenizationofitsjurisprudenceandofalineofprecedents?Ifthisisthecase,aconsequentquestionwouldbe:Howdoes thathomogenizationmodify theconceptualizationand/ortheprinciplesoftheordinarycriminalprocessasithastodatebeenunderstood?These typesofquestionsbringup the topicof the relationshipbetween transi-tionaljusticeandthedomesticlegalorderthatemergesfromthetransition,withtheparticularitythat,inacasesuchasColombia,notonlydothesesystemscoex-istbutthenon-transitionaldomesticlegalordermustcontinuetoaddressgrave,massive,andsystematicviolationsofhumanrightsandIHL.

The Colombian Government’s Formulas for Peace with the AUC: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Political Realism*

Camila de Gamboa Tapias

Thischapterisananalysisofthestrategiesor“formulas”employedbytheÁlvaroUribeVélezadministrationinordertoachievepeacewiththeUnitedSelf-defenseForcesofColombia(Autodefensas Unidas de ColombiaorAUC).Themainobjectiveofthischapteristoshowthatthegovernment’sformulasforpeacecanbeinterpretedasastrategycommontostatesthatguidetheirpoliticaldeci-sionsbasedonpolitical realism. Iwill explainhow incomparativeexperiencewithtransitionaljusticemodels,governmentsthatengageintheseprocesseshaveatendencytousepoliticalrealismasasuccessfulformulatoachievepeace.Presi-dentUribeVélez’sformulasforpeaceareinlinewiththistendency.Thischapteraimstoshowtherisksthatassumingthispostureinpoliticalnegotiationswithanarmedgroupposesforademocracy.

The analysis focuses on three aspects of the formulas for peace used bytheUribeVélezadministrationinrelationtotheAUC.InPartI,IwillanalyzethedraftbillonalternativesentencingandtheJusticeandPeaceLaw(JPL)thattheadministrationsubmittedtoCongress.Iwillalsoexaminethegovernment’sreactionswhentheseformulaswerecriticizedondemocraticgroundsbyavarietyofcivilsocietygroupsandmembersofotherbranchesofthegovernment.PartII suggests that theversionof theJPLapprovedbyCongressandendorsedbythe administration contained a great asymmetry between the treatment givento themembers of theAUC and that given to victims. The analysis seeks toshow that the JPL, as itwas approvedprior to theConstitutionalCourt rulingthatsignificantlymodified itscontents,sought tostrengthen theperpetrators intheprocessattheexpenseofthosecitizenswhowerethevictimsofthecrimes

* AninitialversionofthisarticlewaspresentedattheInternationalSymposiumentitled“DerechosHumanosensociedadesentransición”sponsoredbytheInstituteofPhilosophyandtheInstituteofPoliticalStudiesattheUniversidaddeAntioquiainAugust2007.Thisessayispartofthebookthat I amwriting entitledColombia: Historias de transiciones fallidas, Justicia Transcional y Democracia, andispartoftheresearchprojectentitled“JusticiatransicionalypolíticaspúblicasenelgobiernodeUribeVélez”withintheDemocraciayJusticiaresearchprojectoftheGroupforResearchandPublicLawoftheJurisprudenceDepartment. Universidad del Rosario. IwouldliketothankTatianaRincónandWilsonHerrerafortheirvaluablecommentsonpreviousversionsofthisarticle.IwouldalsoliketoexpressmyappreciationforcommentsbyPablodeGreiff,MichaelReed,JavierCiurlizza,andGabrielAriasduringtheworkshoporganizedbytheICTJinBogotátodiscussthetextsofelevenoftheauthorscontributingtothisbook.

Chapter 2

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committedbymembersoftheAUC,whosepositionwasmuchweaker.Finally,inPartIII,Iapplysomeofthemostimportantpostulatesofpoliticalrealismtoevaluatethegovernment’sformulasforpeaceandcritiquethemfromademocraticperspective.

I. The Administration’s Formulas for Peace Submitted to Congress and Its Reactions and Responses to Criticism

Itisimpossibletomakeadirectanalysisofthegovernment’snegotiationsandagreementswiththeAUCbecausetheseproceedingswerenotpublicandtheonlypeoplewhotookpartinthemwererepresentativesofthegovernmentandtheAUC.Therefore,ananalysisofthepossibleinterestsofthegovernmentandoftheAUCinthenegotiationscanonlybemadebyevaluatingtheproposalsputforthorsupportedbytheadministrationbeforeCongressanditsresponsestothecriticismmadeoftheseproposals.

A. The Draft Bill on Alternative Sentencing and the Justice and Peace Law

Inthecontextofthenegotiationswiththeparamilitaries,theUribeVélezadministrationneededalegalinstrumentthatwouldencourageAUCmemberstodemobilizecompletely.Law782of2002,whichtheadministrationitselfhadpresented inDecember2002and latermodified throughDecree128of2003,made it possible to exonerate fromcriminal responsibility all individuals thatdemobilizedindividuallyorcollectivelyfromanyarmedgroupwithoutholdingany type of criminal trial, as long as prior to demobilization the individualwasnotthesubjectofjudicialproceedingsforcrimesnotsubjecttopardonoramnesty.1Nonetheless,therewasaneedtocreatealegalframeworktofacilitatethe demobilization ofAUCmembers who had committed the gravest crimesaccordingtointernationallaw,includingmanyoftheleadersoftheorganization.

1 AsGustavoGallónhaspointedout,Decree128of2003hasconstitutionaldefectstotheextentthatLaw782statesthatbenefitscannotbeawardedtothosewho“havecommitted”crimesnotsubjecttopardonoramnesty.Thedecreeismuchbroaderandestablishesthebenefitforthosewhohavenotbeen“prosecutedorconvicted”forthesecrimes,goingbeyondthescopeoftheinitiallaw.InColombia,accordingtoGallón“almostnoneoftheparamilitaries(ortheguerrillas)havebeenprosecutedorsentencedforthosecrimesbecauseimpunityinthecountryisveryhighandtheidentityofthemajorityofthecombatantsisunknown.”Thismeansthatthemajorityofthecombatantswhohavedemobilizedremainfreeandhavebeenawardedjudicialbenefitsforcrimeseligibleforpardonoramnesty,withoutbeingsurewhetherornottheycommittedwarcrimesorcrimesagainsthumanity,becausepursuanttoDecree128,itissufficientforthesepeoplenottohavebeenprosecutedorsentencedpriortotheirdemobilization.GustavoGallón,La CNRR: “¿Dr. Jekyll o Mr. Hyde?”,17reVIsta de pensamIento JurídICo(Nov-Dec.2006).

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Thus,theUribeVélezadministrationpresentedtotheCongressoftheRepublicdraftlegislationforStatutoryLaw085of2003,betterknownasthedraftlawonalternativesentencing.2Thedraftbillaimedtorapidlyachievepeacebyawardingextraordinary legalbenefits to individualsorgroups excludedunderLaw782andeffectivelycontributetoachievingnationalpeacewithintheframeworkofformalnegotiationswiththeColombiangovernment.3

InSeptember2003,thefirstlegislativedebatewasheldinCongress,andtheadministration,representedbytheHighCommissionerforPeace,defendedtheinitiative.TheadministrationclaimedthatthelegalframeworkwasnecessarytoencouragethedefinitivedemobilizationoftheAUC.Italsoconsideredthatthedraftlegislationfullysatisfiedinternationalstandardsinthefieldoftransitionaljusticebecauseitguaranteedthevictims’rightstotruth, justice,andreparationandwouldsatisfytheobligationsrequiredbyinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw.4Fromthemomentof theinitialpresentationofthedraftbilltherewerecriticismsfromCongressmembers,diversesocialsectors,andnationalandinternationalorganizations.

The criticisms from these democratic sectors can be summarized in twosubstantivecategories.Ononehand,someofthesenatorsfeltthatthetimingofthedraftlawwasinopportuneinsofarasalegalframeworkwasbeingcreatedtoenabletheAUCmemberstodemobilizewithoutapriornegotiationbetweenthegovernment and theAUC.For some, this situationposed a risk thatCongressmightbeforcedtonegotiatethetermsofthelawdirectlywiththeself-defensegroups.5Second,therewerecriticismsthatthedraftlegislationdidnotguaranteetruth,justice,andreparationandthattheregulatoryframeworkdidnotadequately

2 SeetheexcellentstudyontheenactmentoftheJPLpublishedbytheFundaciónSocial:nIColas palau, fundaCIón soCIal, trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz, elementos para el Control CIudadano al eJerCICIo del poder polítICo(2006).

3 Thelegalbenefitsofthedraftlegislationconsistedinalternativesentencesinsteadofprison,suchasdisqualificationfrompublicserviceorelectedoffice;prohibitionagainstbearingarms;prohibitionagainst residing incertainplaces, etc.Suchpunishmentsdonotfit thegravecrimescommitted.Additionally,thereparationmechanismsprovidedinthedraftlegislation—suchascompensation,communityservice,collaborationininstitutionsdedicatedtosocialworkfortherecoveryofvictims,tociteafewexamples—werefranklyludicrousandtotallydisproportionatetothecrimescommitted.Seearticles6and11ofthedraftlegislation,availableintheGacetadelCongreso436of2003.

4 trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note2,at24.5 SenatorsAntonioNavarroWolffandRafaelPardoobjectedtothetiminginpresentingthelaw.See

trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note2,at26.Itisimportanttopointoutthatconversationswith theAUChadbegun inDecember 2002,when theUribeVélez administration created anExploratoryCommissionforthepeaceprocesswiththeAUC.ThemandateofthisCommissionwastoformulaterecommendationstothegovernmenttoenabletheself-defensegroupstodemobilizeandreincorporateintocivilianlife.TheCommissionpresenteditsrecommendations,baseduponwhichthegovernmentsignedtheSantaFedeRalitoAgreementwiththeAUC.Inthispreliminaryagreement,theAUCcommitteditselftocompletelydemobilizebefore2005andnottocontinueitsmilitaryactions.ThegovernmentcommitteditselftocreategeographiczoneswheretheAUCcouldremaininordertonegotiatetheagreementswiththegovernmentforitsdemobilizationandreinsertionintocivilianlife.

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respecttheinternationaltreatiesontheprotectionofhumanrightsthatColombiahadratified.6

In general, becauseof its generous benefits tomembers of theAUC, thedraftbillonalternativesentencingseemedmorelikeaproposalforimpunityandforgettingsothatAUCmemberscouldberapidlyincorporatedintocivilianlife.Inadditiontosacrificingthevictims’rights,societywouldnottakeresponsibilityforapast inwhichgravecrimeshadbeencommitted—crimeswhichonmanyoccasionshadbeendirectlyorindirectlysupportedbymanysocialsectorsthatbenefitedfromtheexistenceoftheAUC.TheadministrationandcertainsectorsofCongressmadeseveralattemptstosavethedraftbillonalternativesentencingbyintroducingmodifications,butnoneofthesesubstantiallychangedtheunderlyingproblemsofthelaw.Ultimatelythegovernmentdecidedtowithdrawthedraftbill.7 OneofthelessonslearnedbytheUribeVélezadministrationwiththisproposalwastherealizationthatthemoredemocraticsectorsofsocietyandCongresswereunwillingtoawardgenerousconcessionstoAUCmemberswithouttheinclusionoftheprinciplesoftruth,justice,andreparation.Inotherwords,thedemocraticsectorsofsocietyrejectedpeaceproposalsbasedonimpunityandforgetting.

More than eight months passed before another draft bill was presentedto facilitate thedemobilizationof theAUC.During this time,however,certaineventsoccurredinrelationtothenegotiationprocessthatcreatedamorefavorablecontextforpresentingnewdraftlegislation.ThemostimportantinthisregardwastheformalinitiationofnegotiationsbetweentheUribeVélezadministrationandtheAUConJune15,2004.Ratherthantheactualbeginningofnegotiations,thiswasinsteadtheirformalization.8

6 SeeobservationsandrecommendationsfromtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,August28,2003,andthespeechbytheHighCommissionerintheColombianCongress,in trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note2,at28.AlsoseetheexcellentstudybyCatalinaBotero and EstebanRestrepo on the international standards that are applicable in contexts oftransitionaljustice.CatalinaBotero&EstebanRestrepo,Estándares internacionales y procesos de transición en Colombia,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón? Verdad, JustICIa y reparaCIón para ColombIa (deJustICIaed.,2006).See also CatalinaBotero,Derecho penal internacional y justicia de transición: ¿Estamos condenados a repetir incesantemente la historia trágica de la muerteyladoncella?,in JustICIa transICIonal: teoría y praxIs(CamiladeGamboaed.,2006).

7 trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note2,at48-49.8 Duringthisperiodofnegotiations,thegovernmentandtheAUCagreedthatthelatterwouldbe

heardandaccompaniedduringtheprocessbytheCongressoftheRepublic.AUCleadersSalvatoreMancusoandIvánRobertoDuque(aliasErnestoBáez)spokebeforeCongressandjustifiedtheirviolentactionsasa response to theguerrillasand toaweakstate thathad failed toprotect itscitizens.Theyalsostatedthattheyshouldmakereparationsfortheircrimesbutthattheydidnothavetobepunishedwithimprisonment.TheinvitationtotheAUCleaderstospeaktoCongresswassharplycriticizedbydiversesocialsectorssuchasvictims’groups,membersofCongress,thethenUnitedStatesambassadorinColombia,andseveralU.S.Democratsenators,amongothers.Theadministrationdefended the invitation to theAUC leaders andcriticized the internationalcommunity’sintransigentpositionofnotsupportingtheprocess.See trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note2,at65-69.

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In to Society Congress, nine draft bills were presented to create a legalframeworkforreinsertionoftheAUC.HoweverthedebatesinCongressfocusedparticularlyontwoofthesebills:onesponsoredbyRepresentativesRafaelPardoandGinaParody,and theotherpresentedbyRepresentativesMarioUribeandClaudia Blum and supported by the Uribe Vélez administration.9 The formergenerally complied with transitional justice normative standards. Although itawardedratherlenientcriminalsentences,inexchange,itrequiredtheperpetratorstotellthewholetruthaboutcrimescommittedinthepastandsoughttoguaranteethat they would provide comprehensive reparation to their victims. The draftlegislationsupportedbytheadministration,asRodrigoUprimnyandMaríaPaulaSaffonpointout,wasverygenerousinthedeclarationofprinciplesofprotectingtherightsof thevictims;however, thelawdidnot includelegal instrumentstomake these rights effective, so that in fact the draft bill sought a formula forpeacethatwasnotinkeepingwithdemandsforjusticefortheatrociouscrimescommittedbytheAUC.10Aftermuchdebateandefforttoreconciletheinterestsofthetwoproposals,thelegislationsupportedbytheadministrationpassedandbecametheJusticeandPeaceLaw(Law975of2005).

TheConstitutionalCourtreviewedtheconstitutionalityofthelawbyvirtueofthelawsuitsbroughtagainsttheJPLbydiverseorganizationsandcitizenswhoclaimedthatthelawdidnotguaranteetherightsofthevictims.TheConstitutionalCourt’srulings11attemptednotonlytofulfillitsdutytoverifywhethertheJPLwasinkeepingwiththeConstitutionbutalsotorespondtotheargumentsofthosewhofeltthatitviolatedthevictims’rights.RulingC-370of2006foundthattheJPLwasconstitutional;howeveritdeclaredtheunconstitutionalityorconditionedconstitutionalityofcertainprovisions.TheCourtfoundthatintheforminwhichithadbeenapprovedbyCongress,thelawdidnotadequatelyprotecttherightsofthevictims.AsaffirmedbyUprimnyandSaffon,therulingsoughttoachieveabalancebetweentheexigenciesofpeaceandtherequirementsofjustice.Thus,fortheprovisionsinwhichthebalanceinfavorofpeacewouldbedetrimentaltojustice,theCourt’srulinganditsmodificationstothelawsoughttoprovidelegalinstrumentsthat,althoughofferinggenerousreductionsofpenaltiestothearmedactors,wouldatthesametimeseektoguaranteethevictims’rightstotruthand

9 The first draft bill also involved participation by Congress members Rodrigo Rivera, LuisFernandoVelasco,CarlosGaviria,andGermánNavas.ThesecondbillhadtheparticipationofCongressmembersJoseRenánTrujillo,LuisHumbertoGómez,CiroRamírez,GermánVargas,Roberto Camacho, Armando Benedetti, José Luis Archila, Oscar Arboleda, Iván Díaz, andGermánVarón.

10 RodrigoUprimny,MaríaPaulaSaffon,¿Al fin ley de justicia y paz? La ley 975 del 2006 tras el fallo de la Corte Constitucional,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?,supra note6,at204.

11 Inadditiontothemainpronouncement,ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006,No.D-6032,May 18, 2006, in numerous other rulings the Constitutional Court has reiterated its initialpronouncementandruledonotheraspectsoftheJPL.

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reparation.12AftertheConstitutionalCourt’sruling,theJPLlookedmorelikethedraft legislationsponsoredbyCongressmembersPardoandParodywhichhadnotbeenapprovedbytheCongress.

B. Responses and Reactions of the Administration to the Constitutional Court’s Modifications to JPL

In thewake ofConstitutionalCourt rulingC-370, the administration hasissued a series of decrees, some ofwhich ignore themodifications introducedbytheConstitutionalCourt’sruling.Althoughtheobjectivehereisnottoofferadetailedanalysisof thosedecrees,bywayofexample it canbe shownhow,throughthesedecrees,thegovernmenthastheintentiontorevivetheJPLasithadoriginallybeenapprovedbyCongressortomakeitevenmorelenient.13

IwillfirstdiscussDecree4760of2005,whichwasissuedbythegovernmentafter the JPLwasenactedbutbefore theConstitutionalCourthad ruled.Eventhough the JPL had great weaknesses that would prevent the victims fromappropriatelyexercisingtheirrights,insteadofremedyingtheseproblemsDecree4760createdevenmore lenientconditions for theperpetrators.Thisdecree, inadditiontogravelyviolatingvictims’rights,ignoreddecisionsmadebylawmakersandtherebydisregardedthebalanceofpowersbetweenthetraditionalbranchesoftheliberalrule-of-lawstate.14

12 RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulaSaffon,¿Al fin ley de justicia y paz? La ley 975 del 2006 tras el fallo de la Corte Constitucional,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?,supra note6,at205-06.Theauthorsstatethat theCourtnotonlyfocuseditsrulingontherightsof thevictimsbutalsoconsideredotheraspectsofgreatrelevance,suchasdeclaringunconstitutionalArticle70,whichawardedreductionsinsentencestoallofthecountry’sconvicts,andArticle71,whichconsideredthatparamilitarismandguerrillaactivitiesamountedtothepoliticalcrimeofsedition.Id. at207.AlthoughtherulingdeclaredArticle71unconstitutionalduetodefectsofform,theConstitutionalCourt,toavoidhinderingthenegotiationprocesswiththeAUC,specifiedthattherulingdidnothave retroactiveeffects.Thisdebate regarding the typeofcrimescommittedby theAUCwasparticularly intenseafter theSupremeCourt ruled that theactsofAUCmemberscouldnotbeconsideredasseditionbutinsteadmustbeclassifiedascriminalconspiracy.TheCourtreasonedthatpoliticalcrimesarecarriedoutbythosewhoriseupagainsttheStateandnotbythosewho,liketheAUC,weremerelycommoncriminals.Morethan19,000individualswhohaddemobilizedunderDecree128of2002hadbeenfreedbasedontheirstatusaspoliticalcriminals.However,inthewakeoftheSupremeCourtrulingtheywouldbeconsideredcommoncriminalswhomustbetriedpursuanttoColombiancriminallaw.See Los argumentos jurídicos y políticos para un cam-bio penal, la espina dorsal de la sedición,el espeCtador,July29–Aug.4,2007,at3A.SeerulingbytheCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJustice,rulingofJuly11,2007,No.26945,SpeakerMagistratesYesidRamírezBastidas&JulioEnriqueSoachaSalamanca.

13 ThegovernmenthasissuedaroundsixteenregulatorydecreesfortheJPL,includingDecrees4760of2005;2898,3391,4417and4436of2006;and315and423of2007.

14 InanalyzingDecree4760of2005,IfollowcloselythecriticismsformulatedbytheColombianCommissionofJurists,aswellasthosemadebyManuelQuinche.See CCJ, reGlamentando la ImpunIdad a dos manos: ComentarIo al deCreto 4760 de 2005 (Feb.7,2006);ManuelQuinche,La degradación de los derechos de las víctimas dentro del proceso de negociación con los grupos paramilitares,in JustICIa transICIonal: teoría y práxIs, supra note 6.

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First, the decree increased the possibility that the perpetrator would notconfess the truth in the versión libre given to theprosecutor.Oneof themostconsistent criticismsmade bymany sectors when the JPLwas being debatedinCongresshadtodowiththefact that therewasnoobligationinthelawforperpetratorstofullyandtruthfullyconfesstoallthecrimesthattheyhadcommittedasaconditionforobtainingthelegalbenefits.Withoutthisrequirement,itwasverydifficultforthevictimsandforColombiansingeneraltofindoutaboutthecrimesthattheparamilitarieshadcommittedinlightofahighrateofimpunityinthecountrythatpartiallystemsfromtheweaknessofthejudicialsystem.Therequirementthattheperpetratorsconfesstheircrimesinexchangeforgenerousreductionsinsentenceswasunderstoodasajustretributiontosocietyfor theiractionsandallowedthemtodistancethemselvesfromaviolentpast.Priortothedecree,aspointedoutbytheColombianCommissionofJurists(CCJ),therewasapossibilitythatthejudgesandprosecutorswouldinterpretthelawasrequiringdemobilized individuals to fully confess to their crimes; however, the decreeexplicitlyrequirestheprosecutortoadvisedemobilizedindividualsthattheyhavetherightnottoincriminatethemselvesortestifyagainsttheirspouse,permanentcompanion,orfamilymembers.15Theprincipleagainstself-incriminationisusedinordinarycriminalproceedingsasaguaranteethattheaccusedavoidcoerciontoconfess.However,thisprinciplehasnojustificationinapoliticalprocessinwhichreducedsentencesarebeingawarded inexchangefor theconfessionofcrimescommittedaspartofanillegalarmedgroup.16

Second,Decree4760givestheAttorneyGeneralthepowertoapplyaformof prosecutorial discretion (principio de oportunidad)sothatanindividualwhoappearsastheownerorpossessorofassets illegallyacquiredbytheAUCwillnotbetriedasastrawman.17Theargumentputforwardwasthatthisdiscretionalpowerwouldpromotethereturnofthoseillicitlyacquiredassets.AssuggestedbytheCCJ,iftheideaofthisprincipleofprosecutorialdiscretionwastoprotectstrawmen who could not disobey orders from the demobilized individuals, itwouldhavebeenbettertoapplytheconceptofabatementofownership(extinción de dominio)inrelationtotheillegallyacquiredassets;thusexemptingthirdpartiesfromcriminal responsibility.However, the strawmendidnot always act underduressorthreat,andthereforemanyindividualswhowerenotexactlyinnocentwouldnotbeinvestigated.

Following the Constitutional Court rulings that sought to rectify thedeficiencies in the JPL, the government issued various decrees to regulate thelaw.ThegovernmentinvitedcitizenstoparticipateintheprocessviatheOfficeof

15 SeeDecree4760of2005,art.5.16 SeeCCJ,supra note14,at3;RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulaSaffon,¿Al fin ley de justicia y

paz? La ley 975 del 2006 tras el fallo de la Corte Constitucional, in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?,supra note6,at162-63.

17 SeeDecree4760of2005,art.13.

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thePresidentoftheRepublicwebsite,aspartofademocraticexercise—aratherquestionableinvitationinadevelopingcountrywherenoteveryonehasaccesstothismediumandwherethereareothermechanismsfordemocraticparticipationthatwerenotusedby thegovernmentbothwhen thedraftbills foralternativesentencingwerepresentedandduringdebateoftheJPL.Insomeoftheproposals,establishingparamilitarygroupswasconvertedintoacrimeofseditionandthepresumedconnectionbetweentheothercrimescommittedbytheparamilitarieswaseliminated.SomeofthedraftlegislationproposedbythegovernmentsoughttopenalizevictimswhodecidednottoparticipateintheJPLprocessbychargingthemwiththecrimesoffailingtoreportandhidingevidence.

Thegovernment’sproposalswereharshlycriticizedbymanysocialsectorsandhumanrightsdefenders.ThegovernmentfinallyissuedDecree3391of2006,whichfortunatelydidnotincludeanyoftheabove-mentionedproposalsbutdidcontraveneConstitutionalCourtrulingC-370.Tocitesomeexamples,theCourt’sruling established that the benefit of alternative sentences (five to eight yearsimprisonment)couldnotbelowered,andthesentencewouldhavetobeservedinestablishmentswiththesamesecurityasthatof institutionsadministeredbytheNationalPenitentiaryandPrisonInstituteandsubjecttoordinaryregulationsofpenitentiarycontrol.However,Decree3391modifiedvariousaspectsof theConstitutionalCourt’sruling.ThedecreerevivedJPLArticle31,whichhadbeendeclaredunconstitutionalbytheCourt.Thisarticlehadpermittedthe timethatdemobilized individuals had spent in the zones designated by the governmentforthemtoassembleduringthenegotiationprocesstobecountedaspartoftheirprisonsentences.Inthesameway,thedecreeallowedforthecreationofspecialprisonfacilitiesortheuseofnationalmilitaryinstallations,whichdonotprovidethesameguaranteestheCourtattemptedtoensureinitsruling.

Therearealsotwosubstantiveaspectsofthedecreeworthanalyzinghere.Thefirsthastodowiththesubjectofreparation.TheCourtinitsrulingfoundthat when “the State is responsible—through action or omission—or whenthe resources of those responsible are insufficient to pay the cost of massivereparations,theStatemustassumetheresponsibilitythatthisimplies.”18However,Decree3391statesinArticle18(5)thatresourcesfromthenationalbudgetshallbe allocated only as a subsidy19 and not in order to satisfy judicially decreed reparation.Resourcesfromthenationalbudgetareinsteadtobeusedforothertypesofreparationsand“withoutimplyingtheState’sacceptanceofsubsidiaryresponsibility.” As the CCJ correctly establishes, this affirmation on the onehandeludesthehistoricalresponsibilitythattheColombianStatehashadintheestablishmentofparamilitarygroups,andontheotherhand,eliminatestheState’s

18 SeeConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006,§6.2.4.1.12.19 Theconceptofsubsidiary(“residual”) responsibilitywasintroducedbytheConstitutionalCourt

inrulingC-370.

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subsidiarydutytorespondwhentheperpetratorsdonothavesufficientresourcestoprovidedirectreparations.20

In conclusion, it is also important to stress that the decree introduces anelementofrestorativejusticethatwasnotpartoftheruling.ThedecreestatedthatAUCmemberscouldcreate“productiveprojectswithparticipationbyvictimsanddemobilizedindividualsthatwouldallowtheirsentencestobereducedandalsoprovidecollectivelyreparationstothevictims.”21Thecharacterofthisinitiativeinandofitselfcreatesmanyproblemsbecauseitisdifficulttounderstandwhatlegitimacy there could possibly be in having formerAUCmembers use theirownresources—mostlikelyillicitlyacquired—togetthevictimstotakepartinproductiveprocessesjointlywiththeirvictimizersandhavingtheseprojectsbeconsideredaformofcollectivereparationforthecrimescommitted.

II. Unequal Treatment of Victims and Victimizers in the JPL

Oneoftheaimsofusingtransitionaljusticetoachieveanendtoviolenceandatransitiontowardastable,democraticpeaceistoensurethatthepoliticaldecisionsandlegalinstrumentsthatarecreatedforthetransitionareinspiredbydemocratic principles of justice.The goal is to address profound asymmetriesthat existed between those citizenswhowere the victims of violence and theperpetratorsthatcarriedoutthisviolenceandbenefitedpolitically,economically,andsociallyfromtheirprivilegedsituation—whetherinthecontextofarepressivesystem, such as in totalitarian or authoritarian leftist or rightist regimes, or incivil wars and armed conflicts, such as in the Colombian case. The purposeof this section of the analysis is to show that the JPL, as itwas approved byCongresswith the administration’s endorsement,was a transitionalmodel thatdeepened the existing asymmetries between victims and victimizers. Despitethevicissitudesandcomplexitiesinherenttotransitionstowardpeace,ideallyatransitionalmodelshouldbefairinrelationtothevictimsandvictimizerssothatthoseasymmetries—orinstitutionalanddefactoinequalities—thataroseinthepast are effectively transformed through the transitional process. The victims’rightsshouldberecognizedandthevictimsreestablished,orestablishedforthe

20 CCJ,Decreto 3391 de 2006: modifica ley 975, incumple la sentencia C 370 e impide el ejercicio de los derechos de los derechos de las víctimas,available athttp://acnur.org/pais/docs/1766.pdf.AlsoseetherulingbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,CaseoftheRochelaMassacrev.Colombia, Merits,ReparationsandCosts,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.163(May11,2007).Inthisruling,theCourtrecountstheemergenceofparamilitarisminColombiaandrecognizesstatesupportinthesettingupoftheself-defensegroups.

21 See Decree 3391 of 2006, arts. 13, 16 & 17. The JPL establishes that the CNRR (NationalReconciliation and Reparations Commission) and the Fondo de Solidaridad de la Red Social(SolidarityFundoftheSocialNetwork)canpromoteadditionalreparationmeasures,butitdoesnotspecifywhattypeofmeasures.

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firsttime,ascitizensinademocracyonequalstandingwiththerestofsociety.Likewise,theprocessmustensurethattheperpetratorslosetheinstitutionalanddefactopowerenjoyedinthepastandthattheypaytheirdebtstothevictimsandtothepoliticalcommunity.

Iwill analyze two interrelated aspects of the version of the JPL prior totheCourt’sruling:theinstitutionalweaknessoftheColombiancriminalsystemand the wide-ranging concessions awarded to the victimizers. Together thesefactors,attheendofthejudicialprocess,wouldhavestrengthenedthevictimizerseven more in relation to their victims. I will begin by briefly recounting thebenefits awarded to the victimizers within the law in relation to the victims’rightstotruthandreparation.Iwillthendiscusstheinteractionwithinstitutionalweakness,theresultingdenialofvictims’rightsintheJusticeandPeaceProcess,andas a consequence, the injusticeof themodeldefendedby theUribeVelézadministration.22

The JPL granted the perpetrators of grave human rights violations analternativesentenceoffivetoeightyears,andinitiallyalsoallowedthatsentencetobereducedbyasmuchaseighteenmonthsforthetimetheperpetratorshadspentinthezoneofconcentrationreservedtocarryout thenegotiationsbetweentheleadersoftheAUCandthegovernment.23However,asmentioned,thisalternativesentencingdidnotimplyafullguaranteeoftherightstotruthandreparationthatwouldensureabalancebetweenthesacrificesthatthevictimsandsocietywouldhavetomakeinrelationtothelegalbenefitsobtainedbytheperpetratorsintheinterests of political peace.

Thus,intermsoftruth,theJPLwouldnothaverequiredafullandgood-faithconfessionofallofthecrimescommitted;insteaditwouldhavebeensufficientforthedemobilizedpersonstogiveaversión libre narratingthefacts.ThisbroadconcessiontothedemobilizedindividualsmeantthatthetruthintheJPLprocesswasbeingconditionedonthe“goodfaith”ofthedemobilizedpersontotellthetruth.Ratherthanappealingtothegoodfaithofthosegivingversiones libres,inreality;thevoluntaryconfessionwouldremainsubjecttotherationalcalculationoftheperpetrator,whowouldsurelyonlyconfesstocrimesforwhichongoingjudicialproceedingsalreadyexistedorhadculminated,orthoseforwhichtheybelievedtheycouldbeinvestigated.

TheJPLitselfprotectedthisrationalcalculation.First, itestablishedaveryshort timeperiodfor theAttorneyGeneral’sOfficeand theother judicialbodiesto investigate the crimes committed by the demobilized individual (sixty days).Second,itestablishedthatifthemembersofthearmedgroupswhohadreceivedthebenefitsoflaw782of2002ortheJPLwerelaterfoundtohavecommittedcrimes

22 SeethechapterinthisvolumebyDelphineLecombe,A Conflicted Peace: Epistemic Struggles around the Definition of Transitional Justice in Colombia.

23 SeeLaw975of2005,arts.30&31.

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asmembersofthosegroupsandpriortotheirdemobilizationtowhichtheydidnotconfess,theywouldnotlosethelegalbenefitsiftheyacceptedthenewchargesandprovedthattheomissionhadbeenunintentional—whichwouldbeverydifficulttoverify.Ascanbeseen,theprocedurethattheJPLdesignedtorequireperpetratorstotellthetruthwithinthejudicialproceedingswasnotstrictandthereforewasnotaneffectivelegalincentiveforperpetratorstoconfesstheircrimes.24

Withregardtoreparation,theJPLalsoawardedverygenerousconcessionsto the perpetrators by not imposing an obligation to provide comprehensivereparationtothevictims.Thelawdidnotrequiredemobilizedindividualstofullyrevealtheirassetsinordertoprovidereparation;atthesametime,reparationwaslimitedtoillegallyacquiredassetsanddidnotincludethoseacquiredlegally.Itwasalsolimitedtoassetsthatthedemobilizedindividualhadwhentheproceedingsbegananddidnotincludethoseheldbystrawmen.

Likewise,thedefinitionofvictimwashighlyrestrictedbecauseitwaslimitedtovictimsoftheillegalarmedgroupsanddidnotincludevictimsofStateagents,andalsoonlyconsideredthosewhoweredirectlyharmedtobevictims,25 which wasnotinkeepingwiththedefinitionofavictimininternationallaw.26 It also restrictedparticipationofthevictimstothereparationstage,excludingthemfromparticipationinthebeginningoftheproceedings. AsCatalinaDíazhasobserved,theJPLofferedtwopossibilitiesforvictimstoreceivereparationsjudicially:the

24 As iswellknown,onMay13,2008, thegovernmentbydecreeextradited to theUnitedStatesfourteen of theAUC leaderswhohadbeenpart of the JPL.The government has defended itsposition, stating that these leaders were extradited because they failed to comply with theconditionsof the JPL in that theywerenot telling the truth andhadnot turnedover assets toprovidereparationstothevictims.ThisdecisionhasbeenharshlycriticizedbyNGOs,internationalorganizations,andvictims’groups,because theextraditionof these leadershasmeant that thevictimsandsocietyhavebeenleftwithoutknowingthetruthaboutthecrimes,insofarasintheUnitedStatestheseperpetratorsarebeingprosecutedfordrug-traffickingcrimesandnotforthecrimes againsthumanity that they committed inColombia.Additionally, the extraditions haveimpededeffortstodeterminethelinksthattheseAUCmembershadwithColombianpoliticians.TheProsecutoroftheInternationalCriminalCourt,LuisMorenoOcampo,inJuneof2008sentalettertotheColombiangovernmentinwhichherequestedinformationandasked“whethertheextraditionoftheparamilitaryleaderspresentedanyobstacletoinvestigatingthesepoliticians.”CPI enviará fiscal para seguir caso de extraditados a EE.UU.,ElEspectador,Aug.16,2008.TheColombiangovernmenthassaidthattheJPLprocesscanbecontinuedintheUnitedStates,butwiththepassingoftime,thedifficultiesincarryingouttheversiones libresoftheseAUCmemberswhocontinuetobelinkedtotheJPLareevident.Moreover,severalofthemhaverenouncedtheirdesire to continue with the process. See Por ex-jefes de las AUC extraditados, peligran procesos de parapolítica,Caracoltv.com,Mar.14,2009;El primo condenado a siete años y medio de prisión,VerdadAbierta,June3,2009;Mancuso no confesará más,VerdadAbierta,Sept.30,2009.Also,pursuanttothelaw,non-fulfillmentoftheconditionsatanypointintheprocessissupposedtoresultinthelossofthebenefitsawardedbytheJPLandprosecutionundertheordinarycriminaljurisdiction.ThegovernmentdecreethereforedisregardsthecontentoftheJPL.

25 Accordingtoarticle5oftheJPL,thespouse,permanentcompanion,andfamilymembersofthedirectvictim in thefirstdegreeofbloodorcivilkinshiparealsoconsideredvictimswhen thevictimsthemselveshavebeenkilledordisappeared.

26 See RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulaSaffon,¿Al fin ley de justicia y paz? La ley 975 del 2006 tras el fallo de la Corte Constitucional,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?,supra note6,at220.

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first,inrelationtoproceedingsthathadalreadyledtojudgmentsorwerestillunderinvestigationintheordinaryjurisdiction,inwhichthevictimestablishedstandingasacivilparty,andthesecond,aspartofthejudicialproceedingsestablishedbytheJPL,aslongasthevictimcouldidentifyhisorhervictimizerorvictimizers.27 Ifthevictimwasunabletoaccessthesemechanismsthen,accordingtotheJPL,reparationremainedsubjecttothecreationofaVictims’ReparationsFund.ThefundingandreparationspoliciesoftheFundwoulddependonthepoliticalwillandcontingenciesofthegovernment.Therefore,asDíazaffirms,inthefieldofreparation there would be a division between victimswhose cases have beeninvestigatedbythejudicialsystemandthoseunabletoaccessthesystem.28

Therefore,thepossibilityofreparationswasgovernedbyexternalvariablesthatwouldnotdependonorbeunderthecontrolofthevictims,suchasthegreateror lesser effectiveness of the judicial system in having initiated proceedingsagainstthedemobilizedindividualspriortotheJPL;thecapacityoftheregulatoryinstrumentsoftheJPLtoidentifythemajorityoftheperpetrators;theexistenceofresourcesintheReparationsFund;andagain,the“goodfaithoftheperpetrator”tofullyconfesstoallillegallyacquiredassetsinordertoprovidereparations.29

Regarding these profound asymmetries between the rights of the victimsandthebenefitsforthedemobilizedindividuals,theJPLmustalsobeanalyzedinthecontextoftheprofoundweaknessoftheColombiancriminaljusticesystem,whichisgenerallycharacterizedbyinefficiencyandhighlevelsofimpunity.30 The JPLappearsnottohavetakenintoaccountthiscontextofinstitutionalweaknessinherentintheColombiancriminaljusticesystem,andinthissensethelawalsofailedtoestablishmechanismsandprocedurestorespondtotheseproblems.The

27 CatalinaDíaz,La reparación de las víctimas de la violencia política en Colombia: problemas y oportunidades,in JustICIa transICIonal, supra note6,at524-26.

28 Id. 29 ThegovernmentissuedDecree1290of2008,whichcreatedanindividualreparationsprogram

throughadministrativeaction.Thisdecreehasbeencriticizedbecause,eventhoughitopenedupthepossibilityofseekingreparationinanonjudicialmannerthroughtheJPL,itislimitedintermsofwhatanadministrativereparationprogramshouldlegitimatelycontain.ForexampletherelevantperpetratorsareunderstoodtobeonlytheillegalarmedgroupsandnotagentsoftheState.Atthesametime,theresponsibilityoftheColombianStateisbasedontheprincipleofsolidarityandnotonarecognitionthatithasfailedbyactionoromissiontofulfillitsobligationtoprotectcitizensthatarevictimsofpoliticalviolence.Finally,itisaprogramthatfocusesoncompensationandnotonotherelementsthatwouldbenecessarytoensurecomprehensivereparation.Thesamecouldbesaidofthedraftvictims’law,whichwasblockedbytheadministration’salliesinCongress.Theirobjectionstothelawincludedthatitwasfiscallyinconvenient.AmainconcernwasthatinthecaseofthevictimsofStateagents,thelawdidnotrequireproofoftheresponsibilityoftheStatebymeansofajudicialruling,astheadministrationallieshaddemanded.See MaríaVictoriaDuque,El hundimiento de la ley de víctimas,razón públICa, June 22, 2009;RodrigoUprimny,Diez razones para apoyar al Estatuto para las Víctimas(Feb.23,2009),http://www.nuevoarcoiris.org.co/sac/?q=node/291.

30 SeeRodrigoUprimny,CésarRodríguez,&MauricioVillegas,Las cifras de la justicia,in ¿JustICIa para todos? sIstema JudICIal, dereChos soCIales y demoCraCIa en ColombIa 319 (RodrigoUprimny,CésarRodríguez,&MauricioVillegaseds.,2006).

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JPL,asapprovedbyCongress,wasalawcreatedforanextraordinarysituation,due to thegravityandmassivenumberofcrimes that itaimed toaddress.ThisincludescomplexcrimescarriedoutbyorganizationsliketheAUCthatenjoyedgreat influenceintheunderworld,whosepracticeswereacceptedwithincertainsectorsofsociety,andinsomecases,actedwiththeconnivanceofcertainStateinstitutions.

However,theJPLwasbasicallyintendedtobebasedontheinfrastructureof the existing judicial system for ordinary situations.As theweakness of theinstitutionalsystemwasalreadyevidentinandofitself,toimaginethatthissamesystemcoulddealwiththecomplextaskmandatedbytheJPLconstitutedagraveimpedimentforachievingthegoalsoftruth, justice,reparation,andguaranteesofnon-repetition,which the lawclaimedtosatisfy.Areporton theJPLby theInternational Crisis Group described these problems that already afflicted thesystemaswellasLaw975,suchasalackofcapacityinthecriminaljusticesystem’sinfrastructure; insufficientcooperationbetweenthedifferentstateagencies thatparticipateintheprocess;difficultiesineffectivelymonitoringthedemobilizationand reinsertionof themembers of the armedgroups; lackof clarity regardingwhichgovernmentalentitywastodrawupthelistofdemobilizedpersonswhocouldbenefitfromtheJPL;howthislistwouldbecompiledandthemeansforverifyingifindividualsfulfilledtherequirements;insufficientdocumentationandinformationonthegravecrimescommittedbythedemobilizedpersonsforsharingamongthediversestateinstitutionsparticipatingintheprocess;scarceresourcesto protect ex-combatants, witnesses, victims, prosecutors, and judges; and thecreationofaNationalReparationandReconciliationCommissionassignedmanydutiesbutatthesametimelackedthepowerstofulfillthem.31

It is necessary to add that therewas also ahugeasymmetrybetween thedemobilizedAUCmembersandthevictimsintermsofeconomicresources.Thisis because the former had resources and power stemming from their criminalactions,whiletheguaranteesavailabletothemajorityofthevictimswithintheprocess,becausetheybelongtovulnerablegroupswithscarceeconomicresources,dependonthecapacityoftheStateanditsinstitutionstoguaranteethelegitimatedefenseof their rights.Additionally, theJPLestablishedveryshort timeframesfortheprosecutorsoftheJusticeandPeaceUnittoinvestigatewhetherornotthestatementsmadebythedemobilizedpersonsduringtheirversiones libres were true(sixtydays).ThenumberofofficialsintheJusticeandPeaceUnitwerealsofartoofewtodealwiththemagnitudeoftheinvestigations.32

31 InternatIonal CrIsIs Group, latIn amerICan report no. 16, ColombIa: toward peaCe and JustICe? 8-14 (Mar.14,2006).

32 Although certain state institutions havemade great efforts over time to try to respond to theweaknessesoftheJPL,therealityisthatmanyoftheseobstaclespersistandhavebeenexploitedby thedemobilizedpersons,particularly theAUC leaders, as thewrittenColombianpresshasconsistentlyreportedanddiversehumanrightsdefenderorganizationshavedenounced.

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Asestablishedatthebeginningofthissection,amodelfortransitionisfairwithregardtothevictimsandvictimizersiftheasymmetriesorinequalitiesthathavebeengeneratedduetotheconflictaretransformed—whenthevictims’rightsarerecognized,andthevictimizerslosetheinstitutionalordefactopowersthatthey enjoyedas an armedgroup. It also requires thatboth thevictimizers andthesocialsectorsthatbenefitedfromtheiractionspaytheirdebtstothevictimsand tosociety. It isevident that theJPL,as itwasapprovedbyCongress,wasa profoundly unjust law because rather than transforming these asymmetriesbetweenvictimsandvictimizers,ithasinsteadstrengthenedthepositionofthevictimizerstothedetrimentoftherightsofthevictims.

Itmustbepointedoutthatmanyoftheproblemsassociatedwithinstitutionalweaknessandthelackofappropriatelegalinstrumentstoensurethatcrimesareclarified,thatvictims’rightsareprotectedandguaranteed,andthattheperpetrators’power is lost persist despite theConstitutional Court ruling.Also, as analystswhohavefollowedthedemobilizationandreinsertionofformerAUCmembershavepointedout,itiseasytoconcludethatthecriminalstructureshavenotbeendismantled and—as has been denounced by many national and internationalpartiesandorganizations—thesegroupscontinuetocontrolterritoriesandcommitcrimes.33Inthefollowingsection,Iwillanalyzesomeoftheconceptsofpoliticalrealism,elementsthatwillservetodemonstratethatthestrategyusedbytheUribeVélez administrationwith theAUC ismore in linewith the tenetsofpoliticalrealismthanwithanegotiationaimedatmakingatransitiontoamoredemocraticandinclusivesociety.

III. A Critique of Political Realism Based on Democratic Values and the Tendency to Continue to Use the Tools of Realism in Certain Models of Transitional Justice

Idonot intendhere tomakea strict analysisofpolitical realismand itsvariations, nor to defend this theoretical stance, but rather to use some of itselementstoshowhowthisreadingofthepoliticalaspectscanhelptounderstandtheadministration’sformulasforpeace.34InthisanalysisIwilltakeintoaccountcertain elements of political realism developed by Carl Schmitt and Hans J.

33 SeeComisiónNacionaldeReparaciónyReconciliación, InformeNo.1,Disidentes, rearmadosy emergentes: ¿Bandas criminales o tercera generación paramilitar? (Aug. 2007);OAS, Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights,Follow-upontheDemobilizationProcessoftheAUCinColombia:Digestofpublisheddocuments(2004-2007),OEA/Ser.L/V/II.CIDH/INF.2/07(2007);CorporaciónNuevoArcoIris,¿Eldeclivedelaseguridaddemocrática?(2009).

34 Forthoseknowledgeableaboutpoliticalrealismmyexpositionmayseemtooflexibleorlackinginrigor;myintentionhereistoshowhowsomeofelementsofreal politikinordertoexplainthedecisionsoftheUribeVélezgovernmentwithrespecttoitspeacepolicy.

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Morgenthau,35twoofthemostinfluentialauthorsofthisschoolofthought.Iamparticularly interested inanalyzing twoof theconcepts that theydeveloped—Schmitt’s idea of the friend-enemy distinction andMorgenthau’s idea of thenationalinterest—andinanalyzingtheconsequencesofadoptingtheseposturesin the political sphere.

Oneof themost importantaspectsofSchmitt’s theory ishisconceptofthe friend-enemypolitics; to introduce this concept Iwill follow closely theexcellentstudybyEnriqueSerranoGoméz.36Schmittdisagreeswiththeliberalvisionofdemocracybecausehethinksthat,inthisvisionofthepoliticalrealmtheState is subordinated to thediversegroups thatmakeupcivil society. Inthisway,theStatebecomesaninstrumentattheserviceofthediverseprivateinterests that compete amongst each other.According to Schmitt, given thatthedemandsofthesegroupsaredifferentandinmanycasescontradictory,theState loses its sovereign power, and the conflictwhich it ought to control isaggravated.37

ThisState,whichSchmittreferstoasthe“totalState,”endsupinvolvedinaffairsthathavenothingtodowiththepoliticaldomainbutratherotheraspectsofhumanthoughtandactionthatdonotconcerntheState.SchmittconsidersthattheonlywaytoavoidtheStatebecomingsubordinatetootheraspectsofhumanlifeistoclearlydemarcatethepoliticaldomainwithrespecttootherdiversedomainssuchasthemoral,aesthetic,andeconomic.Schmittconsidersthat,justasthesethreeaspectsofhuman lifehave theirowndomains—in themoraldomain thedistinctionbetweengoodandevil,intheaestheticbetweenthebeautifulandtheugly,andintheeconomicbetweenwhatisbeneficialandwhatisdetrimentalorwhatisorisnotprofitable—thespecificdistinctionofthepoliticalrealmisthatbetweenfriendandenemy.

According to Schmitt, this distinction is not a definition of the politicalsphere,butratheracriterionforautonomousdistinctionfromtheotherdomains.38 “Thepoliticalenemyneednotbemorallyeviloraestheticallyugly;heneednotappearasaneconomiccompetitor,anditmayevenbeadvantageoustoengagewithhiminbusinesstransactions.”39Thepoliticalenemyissimplythestranger,the existentially different other, the transgressor of the public order. Schmittdistinguishesbetweentheprivateadversaryandthepoliticalenemy;onlythelatter

35 See e.g.,hans J. morGenthau, esCrItos sobre polítICa InternaCIonal (EstherBarbétrans.,2001)(Englishversion: hans J. morGenthau, polItICs amonG natIons(6thed.,1985));Carl sChmItt, el ConCepto de lo polítICo (1999)(Englishversion:Carl sChmItt, the ConCept of the polItICal (GeorgeSchwabtrans.,1996));CareyB.Joynt&ShermanS.Hayden,Moral and Politics: The Current Debate,XXXICan. J. eCon. & pol. sCI. 354(1955).

36 enrIQue serrano Gómez, Consenso y ConflICto: sChmItt y arendt(2002).37 Id. at21-22.38 sChmItt,supra note35,at56-57.39 sChmItt,supra note35,at57.

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hasthecharacterofenemy.40Inordertoformthefriend-enemyrelationshipinthepoliticaldomain,twoconditionsmustbemet:first,therelationshipmustbeofapublicnature,andsecond,theconflictmusthavethepossibilityofleadingto a war.

This ideaofconflict,ofwanting toeliminate theother, isacharacteristicinherenttothepoliticaldomainthatwillnotbetransformed,andinthissensetheconflictreflectsneitherthegoodnessnortheevilnessofhumannature.41Humanbeingshavenospecificessenceand,althoughtheyrequireasocialordertosurvive,thisordertendstochangeanddependontheresultoftheconflicts.Therefore,thelimitsbetweenfriendsandenemiesarealsotransformedandcanbedeterminedbyfamilyties,ethnicity,aculturalornationaltradition,oracombinationoftheseelements;whatisimportantisthatidentityreflectsandimpliesanidentitythatisdifferentfromthatoftheenemy.42

Asmentioned, forSchmitt the friend-enemydistinction is independentofthemoralone,andit isnotonly independentofwhat ismoralbutprecedes it,preciselybecauseitispoliticsthatestablishesthemoralcriteria.Therefore,thereisnouniversallyvalidmoralorder,ratheritfallstothesovereign—theState—toestablish in thatorderwhat is goodandwhat is evil.Similarly, law is createdbytheStateandwhatcountsaslawiswhattheStatedecidesisvalidwithinthenation.43Inthissense,Schmitthasanantiuniversalistvisionofmoralityandlaw;the validity of amoral and legal order corresponds to an act of power by thesovereign.Inthisperspective,thevalidityofpoliticsandlawarenotbasedontheliberaltheoryofasetofbasicmoralprinciplesthatcannotbemodified44 and that mustserveasanormativeguidefordevelopingpoliticalandlegalprinciples.

Incontrasttotheliberalperspective,Schmitt’svisionofpowerconsidersthatfriendsarethosethatsharethevaluesandrulesadeterminedcontext,where-asenemiesrejectthisorder.AccordingtoSchmitt,itispreciselytheuniversalistversionofmoralitythatpretendstobaseitselfonabsoluteanduniversalvalues,whichmakesrivalsseeeachotheras“absolute”enemiesandasevilcreaturesagainst whom unrestricted violencemay be employed. Schmitt considers theonlywaytoavoidtheunrestraineduseofviolenceiswhenrivalsunderstandthattheyarenotthebearersofauniversaltruth,butratherofapointofviewwitha

40 sChmItt, supra note 35, at 58. Enrique Serrano correctly states that the distinction betweenadversaryandenemy inSchmittcanonlybemadewithapriordistinctionbetween thepublicandprivatespheres,whichSchmittrejects.Asaresult,itisnotveryclearwhatconditionsmakesomeoneapublicenemyorafriend.serrano Gómez,supra note36,at23.

41 sChmItt,supra note35,at87-93.42 serrano Gómez,supra note36,at27.43 sChmItt,supra note35,at95.44 Thesemoral principles are founded on the basic idea of liberalism that all human beings are

equallyfreeasmoralagentsandcitizens. In liberal theory thesemoralprincipleshavediversenames—natural rights, individualandpolitical freedoms,humanrights,etc.—according to theperspectivethatisassumedandthewayitisjustified.

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differentnormativecontent.Inthisway,theygofrombeing“absolute”to“just”enemies,asituationinwhichrivalsarerecognizedasdefendersofadifferentandconcreteorderwithoutuniversalpretensions.Schmittaffirms thatwhen rivalsaccepteachotherasjustenemies,althoughconflictisinevitable,theyrecognizetherighttodeclarewar,toregulateitinordertoimposelimitsontheviolence,and also to declare peace or a truce.45

Given that conflict is inherent to humanity,within theState enmitymustbe limited in order to guarantee peace, security, and order. The State has themonopolyonpowerandthereforethepowertousetherighttowar.Thisaffordsitthepowertomakedecisionsregardingthelivesofitscitizens—whoshouldkillanddiefortheStateand,iftheybecomeinternalenemies,whocouldbekilledbyit.SchmittthinksthatgenerallyinanormalState,totalpacificationisachievedthroughthemonopolyonpower.Hebelievesthatthissamesovereignpower,andnotthecitizen,iswhodetermineswhotheenemiesareandwhothefriendsare,inordertopreventthecitizensfromconvertingtheirprivateadversariesintopublicenemies.SchmittconsidersthattheStateisthusabletoconvertthepeopleintoahomogenouscommunityoffriends.46

Therefore the author does not believe in the liberal postulates of apluralistic democracy, but rather in a democracy inwhich there is completeidentification between those who govern and those governed the sovereignpoweroftheState.Inthisconception,thesovereigntyofthepeoplecoincideswiththatoftheState.Clearly,thosethatareagainstthesovereignwilloftheStateinternallyaredissidentsandmustbecontrolledandreducedtothestatusof criminals through the police state. If the enemy endangers themonopolyof the State, the conflict is decided through civil war. In general, SchmittbelievesthatdomesticallytheStateiscapableofimposingorderandpacifyingsociety,whereas in relationsamongstates there ispluralism (pluriverse) andconsequentlyrivalsandwars.47

HansJ.Morgenthauhaselaboratedamorecontemporaryvisionofpoliticalrealism that has served as a basis for guiding relationships between States,particularlyforUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.Forthepurposesofthissection,Iammoreinterestedinhisconceptofnationalinterestthanhistheoryoninternationalpolicy,andthusIwill introduceseveralelementsthatsupporthisvisionofthepolitical realm.Morgenthaubelieves thathumanbeingsaremotivated toworkintermsoftheirowninterests,andthatthereforethetendencytoseektocontrolpowerisacharacteristicinherenttohumannature.Domesticpolicyiscontrolledby theStatewhereas internationalpolicy,asMorgenthauperceived itwhenhewaswriting,isanarchicandconducivetotheuncontrolledexerciseofpower,as

45 serrano Gómez,supra note36,at29&42.46 sChmItt,supra note35,at75-79.47 sChmItt,supra note 35; serrano Gómez,supra note36,at30,31&48.

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occursinthenaturalstate.Tochangethissituationrequiresmovingtowardsanidealmodelofpoliticalbehavior:arationalforeignpolicy.48

Morgenthau criticizes liberalism for trying to use the same methodsdesigned toachievedomesticpacification—including legalguarantees, judicialmachinery,andeconomictransactions—andtransferringthem“asself-sufficiententities, lacking theiroriginalpolitical functions, to the international sphere.”49 Morgenthauaffirmsthatasuccessfulforeignpolicydependsontwoconditions:thatforeignpolicybedraftedbyaneliteandthatthiseliteactinaccordancewiththelogicofpoliticalpower.Morgenthauunderstandspoliticalpoweras“ameanstoreachthenation’sgoals.”50Todoso,anationmusthavematerialresources,amongwhich he emphasizes the armed forces, and at the same timehave thequalitativeresourcesthatconstitutethehumancomponentofnationalpower—inregardtothenationalcharacterandmorality,thequalityofthegovernment,andparticularlythediplomacy.51

Morgenthau’smost important concept is his idea of the national interest,which he sees as an instrument of analysis and a rational guide for foreignpolicy.52This national interest is objective to the extent that all human beingsactaccordingtotheirinterests.Atthesametimeitistranscendentbecausethereisalegitimatenationalinterestthatisabovetheinfranationalandsupranationalinterests,aswellastheinterestsofothernations.Thenationalinterestcoincideswith or rather istheinterestoftheState,andthisinterestvariesaccordingtotheculturalandpoliticalmedium.ForMorgenthaujustasforSchmitt,politicalandmoralpowerconstitutetwodifferentcategoriessothat,accordingtoMorgenthau,“ethicsintheabstractjudgesactionbyitsconformitywiththemorallaw;politicalethics judges actionby its political consequences.”53Basedon thisdescriptionoftheconceptsoffriend-enemyandnationalinterestdevelopedbySchmittandMorgenthau respectively, Iwill next critique their theoretical perspectives andindicatetherisksthatstemfromdefendingpoliticalrealisminpractice,inordertothenproceedtoanalyzetheUribeVélezadministration’sformulasforpeacewiththeAUC.

48 EstherBarbé,Estudio preliminar,inmorGenthau,supra note35,atXXXIII.49 morGenthau,supra note35,at21.50 morGenthau,supra note35,at2951 EstherBarbé,Estudio preliminar,inmorGenthau,supra note35,atXXXIX.Morgenthauconsiders

thatdiplomacyisthebestmethodtopreservethepeace;however,atthetimewhenhewrites,heconsidersthattheconditionsofworldpoliticsandofwardonotpermitstatestorenouncetheirwar-makingpowerand theirsovereigntyand transfer themtoahigherauthority.morGenthau,supra note35,at560.

52 AsstatedbyFriedrich Meinecke,thisdualcharacterofthenationalinterestasananalyticalandpoliticalinstrumentisfoundintheearlyjustificationsforthetheoryofthemodernState,inthereasonofstatedoctrine,andinthebeginningofmoderndemocracy.CitedinEstherBarbé,Estudio preliminar,inmorGenthau,supra note35,atXLI.

53 morGenthau,supra note35,at54.

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A. A Critique of Political Realism from the Standpoint of Democratic Values

In critiquing political realism, I shall present four general objectionsorganized around the following themes: the anthropological pessimism of theposition;thevisionofdemocracy;powerasanabsolutevalueoftheState;andtheideathatpoliticalpowercreatesmoraldoctrineandlaw.

First, the authors seem to have a vision of human beings as naturallycompetitivebecauseingeneraltheybelievethat,regardlessofthesocial,historical,andpoliticalcontextsinhabitedbyhumanbeings,theirprincipalinterestispower.Ithinkthatratherthanbeingabletocategoricallyaffirmthathumanbeingsarecompetitivebynatureornot,studiesofmoralteachingssincePlatoandAristotleandalsoofcontemporaryauthorsindiversedisciplinesshowthathumanbehaviorisinfluencedbyfactorssuchasfamily,culture,education,socialcontext,andthetypeofpoliticalsystemtowhichindividualsbelong.54

Second, Schmitt andMorgenthau’s vision of democratic systems is alsobiased because it reflects only one aspect of reality—that individuals are onlyinterested in power—thus making it necessary to resort to a political modelthat,recognizingthestrugglesforpowerbetweenindividuals,isabletocreateasystemtowhichallsubmit:theState.Wecouldinsteadconcludethatdemocraticsocieties,bypromotingindividualismandcapitalisteconomiccompetition,havebroughtabout theexistenceofextremelycompetitivebehaviors,which in turngiverisetoacalculatedrationalitythatgeneratesconstantstrugglesforpowerindiversespheresofprivateandpubliclife.However,thisisanaspectthatIwillnotanalyzehere.55

Instead,Iwouldliketopointoutthatademocracyisnotonlycharacterizedby a continuous struggle for power, but also as a space inwhich citizens cancooperatewithoneanother.IagreewithJoyntandHaydeninthesensebothtypesofbehaviorarefoundinademocracy,andthereforetodescribethecitizensofademocraticsystemasessentiallycompetitiveisanarbitraryselectionoffactsthathelps to theoretically justify thevisionofpolitical realismwith respect todemocracybutdoesnotnecessarilydescribereality.56TheirvisionofpowerleadsSchmitt andMorgenthau to defend a democratic system that brings about thedestructionofthefundamentalprinciplesofliberalism.

54 See, e.g.,ClaudIa Card, the unnatural lottery: CharaCter and moral luCK (1996); laurenCe thomas, Vessels of eVIl, amerICan slaVery and the holoCaust (1993); dIana tIetJens meyers, subJeCtIon and subJeCtIVIty: psyChoanalytIC femInIsm and moral phIlosophy (1994); sandra lee bartKy, femInInIty and domInatIon: studIes In the phenomenoloGy of oppressIon (1990).

55 On thenegative effects that an instrumental visionof liberalismcanproduce in a society, seeLaurence thomas, supra note 54; tzVetan todoroV, hope and memory: lessons from the twentIeth Century(2000).

56 Joynt&Hayden,supranote35,at357.

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This leadsme toquestiona thirdaspectof their theory,whichconsiderspoweras anabsolutevalueheldby theState.Karl Jaspers categorically statesthats: “power and force are indeed decisive realities in the humanworld, buttheyarenottheonlyones.Tomakethemabsoluteistoremoveallreliablelinksbetweenmen.”57JaspersexpressedthiswhenevaluatingthedisastrouseffectthatNationalSocialismhadontheGermans.Theabsolutepowerofastateoveritscitizensmakespoliticalactionimpossible.Itpreventstherecognitionofpluralismanddiversity,thebuildingofthepublicspherethroughdialogueanddissidence,andultimately,theguaranteesofahumancommunityinwhichthedignityofallisthefoundationandgoalofthepoliticalsystem.

IncontrasttothevisionofSchmittandMorgenthau,inademocraticpoliticalsystempowerdoesnothaveabsolutevalue;onthecontrary,itisonlylegitimatewhen it guarantees the liberty and equality of themembers of the society. Ingeneral,anytraditionalorcontemporaryliberaldemocraticvisionischaracterizedbycreatingasetofinstrumentstoavoidthearbitraryactionsbytheStateagainstindividuals.58TherightsandguaranteesofthecitizensthatareprotectedbytheConstitution,thelaws,andpublicinstitutionsareabovethepowersoftheState.Inthissense,theStatedoesnothaveabsolutepowerbutratherinstrumentalpower,becauseitsexistenceisonlylegitimateandjustifiedtotheextentthatitguaranteesandprotectstherightsofitscitizens,fulfillsitsobligations,settlescontroversies,facilitatestheabilityofindividualstoachievetheirownlifegoals,anddefendsandpromotesrecognitionofthemostvulnerablegroupsinthesociety.

SchmittandMorgenthauconsiderthattheinterestoftheStateissuperiortothatofitscitizens,andconsequentlytheyviewthecitizensasmereinstrumentsfor fulfilling the ultimate purposes of the State rather than vice versa. In thisperspective, themoralandpoliticalvaluesof individualsmustgivewayto theinterestsof theStatedependingon thecontingentpoliticalcontextat the time.Therefore,thecharacteristicpluralismofademocraticsystemiseliminatedinacompletelyalteredversionofdemocracyinwhichtheinterestsofthegovernmentcoincide with the interests of those who govern—in Schmitt through thecommunityoffriendsandinMorgenthauthroughthenationalinterest.Itisnotclearwhyindividualswho,accordingto theauthors,exclusivelypromote theirowninterestsintheprivatesphere,wouldinthepoliticalspheredecidetocedethem thinking exclusively the interests of theState, and believe that theStateinterestsbestpromotetheinterestsofthecitizens.Theonlyplausibleexplanationof conformity in reality—and not based on the anthropological pessimism ofrealism—istheexistenceofatotalitarianorauthoritarianState,eitherleft-wing

57 Karl Jaspers, the QuestIon of German GuIlt57(1961).58 Thesecontrolsincludethebalanceofpowers,thesupremacyofthelawoverthepowerofthose

whogovern,thepoliticalresponsibilityofstateofficials,andprocessesofdemocraticparticipation,amongothers.

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orright-wing,thatpunishesthosewhodissentandpromotesanideology,whichimposesasingle ideaof thegoodlife througheducationandpropaganda.Thisgenerallyisnot“thebest”forallbutinsteadpromotestheinterestsofthosewhoholdpowerbasedonanideology,areligion,arace,oraclassinterest.

Fourth, political realismconsiders that theStatedefinesmorality and law.AlthoughSchmittandMorgenthauseemtoassertthatmoralityandpoliticsoccupydifferentaspectsofhumanlife,whendefiningtheconceptsoffriend-enemyandnationalinteresttheybothagreethattherearenouniversalmoralcriteria,thatgoodandevilisdefinedbythepoliticalpower,andthattheychangeaccordingtohistoricalcircumstances.Thusfriends,enemies,andnationalinterestarecontingentconceptsand depend upon the interests of those who hold and support power. Therefore thecriteriaprovidedbytheauthorsforguidingpoliticalactionsultimatelydonotprovideany“objective”guidelinesforpoliticalaction,becausethiscantakeawidevarietyofshapesaccordingtotheinterestsofthosewhoholdpower.59

On the other hand, the authors, particularly Schmitt, seem to be sayingthat their relativist concept of powermakes it possible to see the other not asan“absolute”enemytobeeliminated,but ratherasa“just”enemy,given thattheothersimplyholdsacontraryconviction.However,whenpowerisgivenanabsolutevalue,onegroupofinterestshasallofthemeansavailabletopreventtheenemy fromgainingaccess tocontrolof theState,whether throughpolicemeasuresor armedwarfare.Therefore, it isveryunlikely that adversarieswillimposelimitsandregulatetheuseofviolence,war,andtruce.Inacontextliketheoneimaginedbytheauthors,therationalityappliedatalltimesisthatwhichmakesuseofallavailableresourcestoconserveortakepower.Thegoldenruleistonotmakeconcessions to theenemythatcouldbeusedagainstyou.Thehistoryofmodernstatesisplaguedbyexampleswherenotonlytotalitarianregimesbutalsodemocraticregimesinspiredbypoliticalrealismhaveusedthemostquestionableinstrumentsfromaliberalperspectiveto“defeattheirenemies.”60

Tosummarize,thecriteriaoffriend-enemyandofnationalinterestarenotsupportedbynormativeethical-politicalcriteriathatplacepreciselimitsontheuseofpower.Thenotionsof friend-enemyandofnational interest takeon themostvariedmeaningsdependingonthesocialandhistoricalcontingenciesandarejustifiedtotheextenttowhichtheyservetheinterestsofthecommunityoffriends or national interests.

Incontrast,theidealofademocraticsystemhasveryclearethical-politicalfoundations.Moderndemocraciesadoptcertainmoralfoundationsbasedontherecognitionofthemoralandpoliticalequalityoftheirmembers.Thesevaluesare

59 Joynt&Hayden,supranote35,at357.60 The idea of proscribing certain types of conducts during war is based on its humanization;

however,whenthepoweroftheStateisdefendedasanabsolutecriterionthattranscendsthevalueofthemembersofthehumancommunity,violenceandwarhavenolimitsbeyondthosenecessarytoachievetheState’sowninterests.

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reflectedintheirpoliticalinstitutions,legalsystem,andproceduresfordebateandpoliticaldecision-making.Politicalpowerinademocracyisjustifiedbecauseitisviewedasthebestsystemforguaranteeingthemoraldignityofhumanbeings.Inademocraticcommunity, theends inandof themselvesare the individuals,not the State and not even the political community as a whole. The differentpoliticaldecisionsmadebytheState,eitherbypublicservantsorbythecitizens,haveethical-politicalrestrictions:Not everything that is politically possible in a democracy is ethically permissible if, in order to achieve the particular end, it is necessary to sacrifice or endanger the rights and liberties of groups or individuals. In the voluntaristic vision of political realism, this premise is inverted.

As I stated at the beginning of this article, there is a tendency amonggovernmentsinmanycountriesthathaveledatransitiontopeace,toadopttoolsofpoliticalrealism.61Inmanycases,thesepoliticaldecisionsarefarremovedfromtheprinciplesthathavebeenadoptedinthetheoreticaldiscussionoftransitionaljusticeand in thediscourseandnormsof internationalhuman rights law.Thistendencyhasanumberofexplanationsthatgobeyondthescopeofthistext;Iwilldiscuss only a selection of these factors.

Inthelastthreedecadesofthetwentiethcentury,themodelsfortransitionfromrepressiveregimesorfrominternalorinternationalconflictstodemocraticregimeswereveryflexibleintermsofnormativestandards,andtheinternationalcommunityacceptedformulasthat,today,inaccordancewiththedevelopmentoftransitionaljustice,wouldbeunacceptable.Bywayofexample,wecouldmentiontheprocessoftransitioninSpaininthe1970s,whichwasaccompaniedbyalawof general amnesty that impeded trials for human rights violations committedbyanyof thepartiesduring theCivilWarandsubsequentlyduring theFrancodictatorship.62Inthesameway,inElSalvadorin1993,PresidentCristiani,thedaybeforethepublicpresentationofthereportbytheTruthCommission,whichestablishedpersonalandinstitutionalresponsibilitiesforbothpartiesduringtheconflict,publiclystatedhisintentiontoapproveanamnestylaw,whichremainsin effect to this day.63These cases showhowgovernments, armed actors, and

61 IthankPablodeGreiffforpointingoutthattheformulasforpeaceemployedbyUribeVélezarejustoneexampleofamoregeneraltendencytouserealismintransitionaljustice.

62 IthankFelipeGómezIsafortheinsightintothiscaseprovidedduringthesecondworkshopforthisprojectNovember30-December1inBogotá.GómezexplainshowthetransitioninSpainledtoawidespreadforgettingofthevictimsofthecivilwarandoftheFrancodictatorship,andthattherecentmovementtorecovermemory,ledbythevictimsandtheirfamilymembers,culminatedinalawofmemoryin2007inwhichthepoliticalclassdoesnotassumethemostpainfulaspectsof the past.

63 BenjamínCuellarMartínez,inhiscontributiontothisvolumeentitledMaybe Some Day, points outhowtheChapultepecAccordsbetween thegovernmentand theFMLNrecognized that theperpetratorsofgravehumanrightsviolationsfromanysectorshouldbepunishedbythecourtsof justice. Cuellar also describes that the results of the Commission were never sufficientlydisseminated,whichcontributestothecurrentdenialanddistortionofthegraveactsofviolencethatwerecommittedbeforeandduringthearmedconflict.

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groupsinpowerthatarenot interestedintakingresponsibilityfor thepastcancreatetransitionalmodelsthatimpedethepursuitofjustice,truth,andreparationsforcitizenswhohavebeenvictimsoftheviolence,onmanyoccasionsinvokingnational interests of reconciliation and peace.

Today,withthedevelopmentofnormativeandjurisprudentialstandardsinthefieldoftransitionaljustice,Statesmustsubjecttheirdecisionstosuchstandards,particularlyprotectionoftherightsofthevictimsandguaranteesthattheatrocitiesofthepastwillnotberepeated.However,thetendencytousethetoolsofpoliticalrealismpersists. Inpart, itcouldbeargued that thecontexts inwhichpoliticaldecisionsmustbemadeinordertoachievepeacearefarfromideal,andthereforetherealfactualcontextiscrucialinthetransitionfromrepressivegovernments,national,or international conflicts topeace.Mostof the time,peace isnot thefruitofmilitaryvictory,butratherofnegotiationsbetweenforceswithdissimilarintereststhatdonotloseanddonotwishtolosetheirpowerstructuresthroughthepeaceaccords.Frequently,governmentsareinitiatingdemocraticprojectsforthefirsttimeorafterdecadesofundemocraticregimes;thustheinstitutionsareveryweakandthereisnolegacyofdemocraticculture.Asaresult,inordertomaintainitspower,itmustformcoalitionswithgroupsthatoftenvergeonillegalityorareclearlycriminalorganizations.64

Itisevidentthatalthoughthiscontextimposesrestrictionsontheidealsthatsupport transitional justice, these factual conditions cannot serve as an excuseforthetransitionalmodeltosimplybeanagreementamongprivateintereststhatbenefitsthosepoliticalandsocialsectorsthatinthepastheldpowerandthatinthetransitionalmodelseektocontinueexercisingit.Preciselywhattransitionaljustice aims todo is tofind amiddlegroundbetween forgetting andpursuingtotalaccountability,amiddlegroundwhereitwouldbepossibletoguaranteeacertainamountofjustice,truth,andreparationsforthevictimsandmakedrasticinstitutionaltransformations.Thatiswhynoteverymodeloftransitionaljusticeisethicallyandpoliticallyacceptable.Amodel thatsacrificesorendangers therightsandfreedomsofsomegroupsor individuals,whichgenerallymeans thevictimsortheirsurvivors,isunacceptable.Withthesecriticismsinmind,IwillnextanalyzetheUribeVélezadministration’sformulasforpeacewiththeAUCfromthestandpointofthetenetsofpoliticalrealism.

B. Government Formulas for Peace with the AUC from the Standpoint of Political Realism

Afteranalyzing thegovernment’sconduct—presenting the lawonalter-nativesentences,endorsingdraft legislation inCongress thatdidnot respond

64 See in thisbook, theveryconvincingarticlebyPatriciaGossman,entitled Afganistan and the Challenge of Non-repetition of Violence.

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to international standards for transitional justice, and introducing substantialchanges to the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the JPL—several questionsarise:What is thegovernment’s real intention in itspeaceproposalswith theAUC?whyinsistonmaintainingtheregulatoryframeworkoftheJPLasitwaspriortothemodificationsintroducedbytheConstitutionalCourt,andevenonmaking it more lenient? and finally, why concede such generous benefits tothe perpetrators, in effect legitimizing through the judicial process the hugeasymmetrybetweentheperpetratorsandtheirvictims?Inrespondingtothesequestions,thecriteriaofpoliticalrealismenableustomaketwotypesofinter-pretations:oneofwhichgivesthebenefitofthedoubttothegovernmentandtheotheronemorecritical.

ThebenevolentinterpretationoftheformulasforpeacewiththeAUCcouldbe summed up in the following way: The government thinks that to achieve peace, justice must be sacrificed—justice being understood as truth, justice and reparation. This formula takes up one of the main tenets of political realismanalyzedabove,namelyMorgenthau’sconceptofnationalinterest,whichdefendstheinterestoftheStateassomethingthatmustbeimposedaboveanyinfranational,supranational,orforeigninterest.Basedonthis,wecanaffirmthatthegovernmentbelievesthatinColombiatheonlywaytoachieveatransitiontowardsamorestablesocietyinwhichtheillegitimateuseofviolencebytheAUCwouldend,giventheparamilitaries’economic,political,andmoralpoweramongcertainsocialsectors,requiresmakingwide-rangingandgenerousconcessionstoitsmembers.TheStaterecognizesthegreatpoweroftheenemythatcannotbedefeatedbyarmedforceandthusthenationalinterestthatisimposedinordertoavoidcontinuingthewaristhatofsacrificingjusticeinpursuitofpeace.Therefore,basedonthisreadingoftheconflict,iftherearesacrificesthatmustbemade,theymustcomefromthepoliticalcommunityingeneralandfromthevictimsinspecific.

ThisreadingwouldexplainwhythegovernmentinsistsonpreservingtheinitialparametersoftheJPLapprovedinCongressthroughtheregulatorydecreesinwhichgenerousconcessionsaremadetothosethatdemobilizedfromtheAUC,sacrificingtherightsofthevictimsinordertoachievetheprimordialobjectiveof theJPL—toachievepeace.Thisposture isalsoendorsedbyvarioussectorsofColombiansociety.Thisviewofthegovernmentisreflectedinitsdiscourseindiversesettings,inwhichithassaidthattheJPLisnotalawofsubmissiontojustice,giventhattheAUCwerenotmilitarilydefeated;thatpeaceandnationalreconciliationrequiregreatsacrificesandthatthestandardsofinternationallawcanbeanobstacleforachievingthem;andalsothat,fortheretobepeace, thevictimsoftheconflictmustbewillingtoofferasignificantdegreeofforgivenesstotheirvictimizers.65

65 ThistypeofargumenthasbeenputforwardinCongressbytheadministrationandCongressmem-bersthatdefendedthedraftlegislation.See trámIte de la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note2.

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Incontrasttotheprecedingreadingofthegovernment’sformulasforpeace,alessbenevolentinterpretationcanalsobemade.Thisviewcouldbesummarizedinthefollowingway:The guerrillas are the true enemy of peace and the AUC are a lesser evil.Inthissense,thegovernmentandmanysocialsectorsfeelthatthe true enemies have been and continue to be the leftist armed movements,particularlytheFARC.Therefore,thesegroupsaretheonesthatreallyendangerthenationalinterestandshouldthereforeifpossible,bemilitarilydefeatedbytheState.66TheAUCemergedsimplyduetotheweaknessoftheState,whichwasincapableofguaranteeingsecuritythroughoutitsentireterritoryandparticularlyintheareaswheretheguerrillahadterritorialcontrol.ThustheAUCmustnotbeseenasanenemyoftheStateandofsociety,becausetheirinterestistoprotectthestatusquo;soratherthanbeingtreatedasenemies,theAUCmustbetreatedasalesserevil.Thus,therelationshipbetweentheStateandtheAUCwouldnotbe,intermsofSchmitt,oneofadversaries,andinthissense,thenegotiatingconditionsaregenerousandmorelenient.

Conclusion

Inconclusion, thegovernment’sformulasforpeacewith theAUCcanbeviewedasastrategyofastatethatorientsitspeacepoliciesinspiredbypoliticalrealism,asopposedtoamodeloftransitionaljusticeorganizedaroundequitablerightsofthevictims.

Onequestionthatemergesaftermakingthisanalysisiswhetherthevisionofpoliticalrealismhasanypracticalusefulnessinanegotiationwithanillegalarmedgroup—inotherwords,inwhatsenseisknowledgeofpoliticalrealismusefulforagovernment.Idonotintendtomakeanin-depthanalysisofsuchacomplextopichere,butitsufficestonotethatforagovernmentinnegotiationswithanillegalarmedgroup,politicalrealismcanbeimportanttounderstandthelogicusedbythesearmedgroups.—Itwouldbeingenuoustothinkthatbecauseagovernmentisnegotiatingpeacewithanarmedgroup, thearmedgroupinthecourseof thenegotiationsceasestothinkintermsofastrategiclogicandofforce.

TheneedforpardonwasalsoexpressedintheinterviewsinitiallygivenbyLuísCarlosRestrepotothewrittenpressinhisroleasthegovernment’sHighCommissionerforPeace,aswellasinspeeches by theVice-president ofColombia during the international congress on “RestorativeJustice”sponsoredbytheFundaciónAlvaraliceinFebruary2003,andattheRegionalConference“TheLegacyoftheTruth:ImpactofTransitionalJusticeonBuildingDemocracyinLatinAmerica”sponsoredbyICTJinJune2007OntheseoccasionsRestrepoassertedthatinternationalstandardsinthefieldoftransitionaljusticewereanimpedimenttoachievingpeace.

66 Themajorityofsociety,andwithreason,holdsaverynegativeviewoftheFARC,notjustbecauseofthefeelingofhavingbeendeceivedafterthefailureofthepeacenegotiationswiththeAndrésPastrana government, but also because of its atrocious crimes against the defenseless civilianpopulationanditsabsoluteindolenceregardingthecitizensthatithaskidnappedandkept.

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However, being conscious of how armed actors act does not necessarilyimply acting like them. Transitional justice provides sufficient tools to maketheneed for peace compatiblewithdemands for justice.Rather thanbeing anobstacle toachievingpeace, transitional justiceand it’sprinciplesof the rightsto truth, justice,andreparation, isasetof legal,political,andmoral rules thatservetoguaranteeastabletransitionfromwartopeace.Moreover,theColombiancase does not involve aState that is installing a democratic order for thefirsttime—itisnotasituationinwhichthecountrymustbeginfromscratchandmustmakeconcessionsthatinothercircumstanceswouldprobablybeunacceptable.Although Colombian democracy is weak, there are nevertheless democraticinstitutions,someofwhicharequitesolid.Inthissense,thegovernmentdoesnotactinitsownnameorinthenameoftheinterestsofpartofsocietyoreventhemajority;thegovernmentmustactastheguarantorofdemocracy.Inthepresentcontextofconflict,theregulatoryframeworkandthepoliticaldecisionsthatthegovernmentmakesmustbeguidedbydemocraticprinciples,inwhichthereareguaranteesfortheperpetrators,butalsoguaranteesthatthevictimswillhavetheirrightsrecognizedandtheircitizenshipreestablishedunderfairconditions.

Thetoolsof transitional justiceinColombiashouldbetheguaranteeofacreationofstrongerdemocraticinstitutions,whereabreakwouldbemadewiththeviolentpastandtheexerciseofpowerbytheAUC,transitioningtoasituationinwhichhumanrights,trustininstitutions,andtrustincitizensarepermanentlyestablished.Inotherwords,transitionaljusticeshouldbeaprocessofdemocraticmorallearningforthegovernment,thearmedactors,andallcitizens;however,theformulasforpeaceoftheUribeVélezgovernmentasanalyzedinthisarticledo not appear to be fulfilling this objective. Colombian society is once againfailingtotakeadvantageoftheopportunitytomakeadrastictransformationfromthepast,therebyrunningtheriskthatthetransitiontowardspeacecouldendinfailure.

Transitional Justice under Fire:Five Reflections on the Colombian Case

Michael Reed Hurtado*

The application of transitional justice mechanisms in Colombia iscontroversial.Humanrightsorganizationsstresstheincompatibilityofapplyingtools designed for post-conflict situations to Colombia’s ongoing conflict andrepression. They also challenge the fact that the official transitional justicearrangementexcludesanydiscussionofStateresponsibilityorthatofstateagents.Thelegalmechanismsimplementedtodateundertheguiseoftransitionaljusticereferspecificallyandonlytomembersofillegalarmedgroups.Notwithstanding,someColombianofficialsandpublicservantsgosofarastoferventlydefendtheofficial arrangementwith theparamilitaries andproclaim it as a success, evenseekingtoextenditsapplicationtootherillegalarmedgroups.TransitionaljusticeinColombiaisunderfire--bothbecauseitisbeingappliedinthemidstofextremeviolenceandbecauseitsapplicationisthesourceofongoingcontention.

Asacontributiontothetransitionaljusticedebate,thischapterwillofferfivereflectionsontheapplicationofthetoolsoftransitionaljusticeinColombia.Iwillnotanalyzeherethespecificinstrumentsandlawsthathavebeenimplemented.Iwillinsteadfocusonasetofmoregeneralreflectionsaimedatsheddinglightonthebroaderproblemsofconceptualizationandimplementationoftransitionaljustice inColombia, a context defined bywar and drug trafficking.These arepartialreflectionsandinnowayseektoexhausttherealmofdiscussion.

Forthepurposesofthisanalysis,IwilllimitmycommentstotheofficialschemeknownasJusticeandPeace.ImustemphasizethatIlimitmycommentsforthesakeofargumentandnotbecausethearrangementactuallydemarcatesthewholeofthetransitionaljusticefieldinColombia.Infact,fordecades,Colombiansocietyhasemployedmultipleandvariedstrategiestoconfrontandcontestthedenialofatrocities.Thefightagainst impunityandthepursuitof truth, justice,andreparationhaveanabundantandpassionatehistoryintheheartofColombiancivilsociety.ItislikelythatthishistorywillbemoredeterminativeinthefinaloutcomeoftransitionaljusticeinColombiathantheofficialarrangementthatiscurrentlybeingapplied.Nonetheless,giventheprominenceofthedebatearound

∗ IthankCamiloBernalandGabrielAriasforthenever-endingdiscussions,whichhavehelpedmetoarticulatemanyoftheargumentsthatIpresentinthischapter.IwouldalsoliketothankCatalinaUprimnyforher reviewtoanearlierversionof this text inSpanish. TheEnglishversionwouldhavenotbeenpossibleabsentthecorrectionsmadetothetranslationbyAmandaLyonsandafurtherreviewbyMayaIbars.

Chapter 3

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theJusticeandPeaceframeworkandthepolarizationgeneratedbyitsapplication,thischapterwillfocusontheofficialarrangementanditsimplications.

I. An Initial Point for Clarification: Paramilitary Demobilization as a Government Strategy to Regain the Capacity for “Plausible Deniability”

Ingenericterms,paramilitaryreferstoeverythingthattakesplaceoutsideofregularmilitarycontrols,butwhichfulfillsmilitaryfunctions—inotherwords,itisauxiliarytothepurposesofthemilitary.Thetermisusedtorefertoatypeofactivityorstructurethatisundercoverorparalleltotheofficialconductionofaffairsinthesphereofnationalsecurityorpublicorderand,thus,canbedeniedbytheauthorities.1Onenotedexpressionofparamilitaryviolenceistheoperationofdeathsquadsaroundtheworld.2Another is theextensionofparallelarmies,suchasthosethatexistedinColombiainthe1990sandduringthefirstdecadeof this century. Such armies are assigned covert functions during a dirtywar,therebyavoidingastainonthereputationofthemilitaryforces.TheStateneednotsupportthesegroups;itmustsimply“looktheotherway”andguaranteetheirimpunity.3

Undoubtedly,thetermparamilitarycanbeusedtocategorizeawiderangeofactivitiesandstructures.ThisistrueintheColombiancontext,aswellasinother situationsofarmedconflictsand repression.“Paramilitary” isacomplexand dynamic analytical category.The broad range of this term is not a resultof vagueness or conceptual confusion—it derives from the very essence ofthe phenomenon, which is by definition of a concealed and variable nature.Paramilitaryoperationsaresurreptitiousand,thus,notalwaysdecipherable.Thebest formofparamilitarism(fromtheperspectiveof thestatesponsors) is thatwhichcanbedenied.Arepressiveparallelapparatusintendedtobekeptsecretisoflittleuseformaintainingtheregimeifitbecomesanotoriousandpotentiallyembarrassingphenomenon.

1 This is exemplified by the doctrine of “plausible deniability,” coined by theU.S. intelligenceservices in the 1960s. It is an operation that permits the president to deny responsibility forcovertoperationsbyestablishinginformalanddilutedstructuresandchainsofcommandintheintelligenceagencies.

2 Seegenerally bruCe b. Campbell & arthur d. brenner, death sQuads In Global perspeCtIVe: murder wIth denIabIlIty(2000),whichpresentsacomparativestudyontheuseofdeathsquadsinordertobeabletodenystateresponsibilityintheexerciseofviolence;anddeath sQuad: the anthropoloGy of state terror(JeffreyA.Sluka ed.,2000),whichillustratesthisphenomenonthroughcasestudies.

3 JulIe mazzeI, death sQuads or self-defense forCes? how paramIlItary Groups emerGe and ChallenGe demoCraCy In latIn amerICa(2009).

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The paramilitary activity and structures in Colombia have been widelydocumentedandanalyzedinhistory,sociology,andpoliticalscienceliterature,4 as wellasincaselaw,bothnationalandinternational.5Thecomplexityanddiversityofthesegroupsandthewiderangeoftheiractivitieshavebeenevidentsincetheearly1980s.Bytheendofthatdecade,theColombiansecurityservicesagency,theDepartamento Administrativo de Seguridad(DAS),exposedthesecurityforces’activedelegationofsecurityfunctionstoparamilitarygroups,thegroups’linkstodrugtraffickinginterests,theconfluencewithlocalpoliticalinterests(includingtheinclusionofparamilitarystructuresinmunicipalentities),andthefluidityoftheparamilitarystructures.6

Throughout the national territory, different types of paramilitary activitytakeplacesimultaneously,forexample:theperpetrationofselectivehomicidesbydeathsquads;massivecampaignsofviolenceresultinginmassacresandforceddisplacement;localizedpatrollingofcattle-ranchingandagribusinessproperties;processes of military expansion and occupation; the promotion of social andpolitical action in isolated areas; investment and participation in economicactivities (both legal and illegal); and the transformation and, in some cases,reductionofitsarmies.

Beginning in themid1990s, theColombiangovernmentand thepoliticalandmilitaryelites(bothlocalandnational)madetremendouseffortstopromotethethesisofthe“thirdactor”7—inotherwords,todenytheparamilitarynatureoftheirregulargroupsandassimilatethemasathirdplayerintheconflictbetweentheStateandinsurgentforces,completelydistinctfromState-ledeffortsinwarandrepression.Infact,officialsourcesandcertainauthorshaveusedthewide-

4 Some of the most interesting writings include: Carlos medIna GalleGo, autodefensas, paramIlItares y narCotráfICo en ColombIa (1990); Francisco Gutiérrez & Mauricio Barón,Estado, control territorial y orden político en Colombia. Notas para una economía política del paramilitarismo, 1978-2004,in nuestra Guerra sIn nombre: transformaCIones del ConflICto en ColombIa267(InstitutodeEstudiosPolíticosyRelacionesInternacionalesed.,2005);maurICIo romero, paramIlItares y autodefensas, 1982-2003(2003).

5 In the domestic framework it is interesting to analyze the rulings by the Criminal CassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeinrelationtotheparapolítica scandal. See, e.g.,CriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourtof Justice, rulingofDec.3, 2009,No. 374 (sentenceagainsttheex-governorofSucre,SalvadorAranaSus); CriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourtofJustice,rulingofFeb.23,2010,No.56(sentenceagainstex-senatorAlvaroGarcíaRomero). On the internationallevelseeforexampleCaseMapiripánMassacrev.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.134(Sept.15,2005);PuebloBellov.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.140(Jan.31,2006);Ituangov.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.148(July1,2006).

6 See Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), Dirección General de Inteligencia,Información sobre el surgimiento de la autodefensa, suministrada por Diego Viafara Salinas,Confidential,undated;DAS,Organización de sicarios y narcotraficantes en el Magdalena Medio,Confidential,July20,1988;DAS,Información sobre Fidel Antonio Castaño Gil (a. Rambo) y los grupos de justicia privada en el Departamento de Córdoba,Confidential,Apr.4,1990.

7 El tercer actor (“TheThirdActor”) isanofficialpublicationoftheColombianparamilitariesthatwasdisseminatedthroughtheinternet.Itwaspreviouslyavailableathttp://www.colombialibre.comorathttp://www.aucolombia.org.

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rangingnatureofthetermparamilitarytoarguethatitisinvalidasanominativeandexplicatorycategoryfortheviolenceexperiencedinColombia.Theymaintainthatthetermisimpreciseandofnouseindescribingthestructuresandactivitiesof the illegitimate armedgroups thatoperate in the country,which theyasserthave had neither support nor acquiescence of the State.Authorities prefer theexpressionautodefensa (“self-defensegroup”)because it avoidscontaminatingthegoodnameofthemilitaryforcesbyassociationandcharacterizesthesegroupsas a private defense initiative in response to the guerrilla threat,with nothingofficialaboutthem.

Thefabricationofthe“thirdplayer”provoked,interalia,thecreation(inspiredand encouraged by national and regional personalities) of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia(UnitedSelf-defenseForcesofColombiaorAUC).ThiswasaconglomerateoffourparamilitarygroupsthatoriginallyadoptedaconstitutiononApril18,1997,duringtheso-calledFirstNationalConferenceofLeadersandCommanders of Peasant Self-defense Groups, organized by theAutodefensasCampesinasdeCórdobayUrabá(PeasantSelf-defenseGroupsofCórdobaandUrabáorACCU).

Startinginthelate1990s,manifestationsofparamilitarismbegantoemploythe imageof theAUC.Throughmassmedia, especially the Internet, theAUCdisseminatedtheimpressionofthemselvesasanautonomousandhierarchicallystructuredentity.However,therealitywasquitedifferent:theAUCneverwereahomogenousentitynordidtheyeverencompassall theparamilitarisminthecountry. This was confirmed during the subsequent demobilization process ofthe 2000s, where the divisions and lack of control became evident. MultipledeclarationsbytheAUCcommandersthemselvesandbythosewhostudiedtheprocessfurtherconfirmedtheillusionofaunifiedparamilitaryconfederation8. For example,SalvatoreMancusodeclared:

CarlosCastañodraftedtheorganicstructureoftheAUCandtheACCU,anda structurewas setupwithageneral staff,but in reality thiswasnever implemented and existed only inCarlos’writings.A leadershipbodycarriesoutplanning,butintheAUCthisneverhappened.9

Theinternaldivisionsandpowerstrugglesamongandwithintheparamilitarygroupsarewellknown,andtaintedthedemobilizationprocess.Boththeso-called

8 See,forexample,aldo CíVICo, no dIVulGar hasta Que los ImplICados estén muertos: las Guerras de “dobleCero” (2009);alfredo serrano zabala, paraCos202(2009);fundaCIón Ideas para la paz, neGoCIaCIones GobIerno naCIonal, Grupos IleGales armados de autodefensas: reCuento CronolóGICo básICo desde mayo de 2002(Apr.25,2004);león ValenCIa&eduardo pIzarro l., ley de JustICIa y paz(2009).

9 Excerptofthevoluntarydeposition(versión libre)givenbySalvatoreMancusoGómezonDecember19,2006,beforetheJusticeandPeaceUnitoftheAttorneyGeneral’sOfficeinMedellín.

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ElmerCárdenasBlocandtheCentralBolívarBlocwereatthecenterofsignificantpublic scandals provoked by their desires to disassociate themselves from theACCUand toposition themselves as leaders and representativesof thevariedgroups.Otherexamplesarethoseparamilitarieswhodeclaredthattheywerenotpart of the supposed federation and therefore never joined the demobilizationprocess. Hector Buitrago Parada, also known as “Martín Llanos,” continuesto leadaparamilitarygroup thathasoperated inMetaandCasanareforyears.Othercommandersalsoabandonedtheprocessandreturnedtotheunderworld.For example, Pedro Oliverio Guerrero Castillo, better known as “Cuchillo,”actedastherepresentativeoftheparamilitariesofMetaandGuaviareduringthedemobilizationprocess.Afterseveralofthedemobilizationceremonies,Cuchilloreorganizedthegroupsunderhiscommand;heiscurrentlyatlargeandcontinuestocontroltheterritoryhehasbeencontrollingforanumberofyears.

Additionally, several paramilitary groups linked to local agribusinesssectors—suchasthoseinthedepartmentsofCesar,Magdalena,CaucaandValledelCauca—neverevencametothenegotiatingtablewhenparamilitariesfirstgottogetherwiththeelectedgovernment.Thisispartlybecausethesegroupsportraythemselves as vital self-defense initiatives needed to protect private propertyagainstattackbyinsurgentsorcommoncriminals.Butinpractice,theyoperateasprivatejusticeandsecuritybodies.Thesegroupsdelegatepowerbroadlytoalltheirmemberswhooperatewithavastdegreeofdiscretion,inordertorespondtoshiftsinlocaldynamics..Thesearmedstructuresoperateundertheradar;theypatrol,controlandadministerjusticeatthelocallevel,withoutanyofficialcontrol.

Notwithstanding this reality of unwieldy paramilitarism, the UribeadministrationtookadvantageoftheillusoryconceptoftheAUCtodeclaretheendofparamilitarism,withouthaving toaddressstructural issues linked to thephenomenon.TheydeniedtheinherenttiesoftheAUCphenomenontopoliticalandmilitary elites and,more generally, toState action.Uribemadehis desireto negotiatewith the paramilitaries clear from his first presidential campaign.Subsequently,throughemissariesfromtheCatholicChurch,inOctoberof2002someparamilitaryleadersacceptedtoreachanagreementwiththegovernment.ThedemobilizationprocessthenmaterializedthroughanexploratoryphasethatbeganinDecemberof2002andthesigningoftheSantaFedeRalitoAccordonJuly15,2003.

FromNovember2003toAugust2006,thecountrywitnessedtheofficiallyentitled “Proceso de paz con las autodefensas” (Peace Processwith the Self-defenseGroups): 39 collective demobilization ceremonies, the presentation of31,671people,andtherelinquishingof18,051arms.10Demobilizedparamilitary

10 StatisticsreportedbytheOfficeofthePresidentoftheRepublic,OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforPeace.Thediverseofficialreportsshowaslightdifferencein thenumbersrecorded.Thesenumbersincludethelastdemobilizationsfromtheso-calledElmerCárdenasBloc.

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leader ErnestoBáez accused theColombianHighCommissioner for Peace ofhavingconvertedthisprocessinto“arifle-countingarithmeticexercise.”11

Amidst illusions and lies, the country found itself immersed in “a peaceprocess with the self-defense groups.” The core problem with this ostensibleapplicationoftransitionaljusticepeace-makingisthatinrealitythisdoesnothavetheelementsofapeaceprocess;instead,itisaninherentlydefectivearrangementdue to a lack of transparency andmutual accusations of betrayed agreements(between thegovernmentand theparamilitaries).Moreover, therearenosignsintheday-to-dayColombianlifethatwouldindicatethatColombiaisinapeaceprocess.Violentactivityby theparamilitarystructurescontinues tobeevident:hundredsofdeathsattributabletothesegroupsoccurredduringthedemobilizationandpost-demobilization,andmurderscommittedbythesegroupscontinuetoberecorded daily.

TheconceptoftheAUCwasshort-lived:from1997-2003.Itscreationanddismantling fulfilled and continues to fulfill a civic-military purpose that is ofcrucialimportancetotheColombiangovernmentandsecurityforces:toenablethedenialofthecollaborationbetweentheparamilitariesandthemilitary—the“plausibledenial.”12

ThisformaldeclarationoftheendoftheAUCplacesColombiainastateoftotaldenial,bothinrelationtothephenomenonofparamilitarismassuchanditsimplicationsfortheexerciseofpowerinthecountry.13Theofficialdiscoursehasbeenarrangedsoastodeepentheprocessofdenial,usingnominativeconcepts—such as self-defense group, criminal gangs, or seditious actors—to avoid anysubstantivediscussionabouttheinvolvementoftheStateintheperpetrationofcrimes.TheexpressionsofparamilitarismthatweresomehowaccommodatedinthenotionofanAUCduringthedemobilizationprocessarejustsomeofthemostnotorious,buttheydonotamounttoalloftheparamilitarystructuresoractivitiespresentinthecountry.AlongwiththestrategicreservesthatstayedoutsidetheAUC demobilization, there are diverse forms and factions of paramilitarismconcentratedinruralzonesandtiedtothesecurityservicesforagribusiness.

Unfortunately,because thepoliticalcosts(and implicationsoffailure)fortheUribeadministrationwouldbetoohigh,itisunlikelytherewillbeanyofficialacceptance of continued paramilitary activity.Thiswould imply, among otherthings,theruinofthesecuritystrategyadoptedbytheUribeadministrationatthebeginningof itsfirst term.Therefore, thegovernment,alongwithpoliticaland

11 LetterfromIvánRobertoDuque,aliasErnestoBáez,toLuisCarlosRestrepo,HighCommissionerforPeace,ItagüíPrison(Dec.28,2006).

12 See supra note1.Inrelationtotheparamilitaryphenomenon,seeCampbell&brenner, supra note2,whichpresentsacomparativestudyoftheuseofdeathsquadsforthepurposeofdenyingstateresponsibilityintheexerciseofviolence.

13 StanleyCohenhasworkedextensivelyontheprocessofdenialinatrociousregimes.See stanley Cohen, states of denIal: KnowInG about atroCItIes and sufferInG(2001).

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militaryelites,willcontinuetomakeeveryefforttoconcealthecontinuationofparamilitaryactivitiesandtherestructuringofsupposedlydemobilizedgroups.Inthisway,theyseektopreservethedesiredstateof“plausibledeniability.”

Bynotaddressingparamilitarismheadon,thedemobilizationprocessfurtherweakened the already fragmented statepower, formalized someof thepowerfulsectors behind paramilitarism (both at the local and national levels), gave drugtrafficking a political character, and avoided facing the structural problem ofState-perpetrated violence in Colombia. It also created a very unusual situationby implementing transitional justicemechanisms, albeit with limited scope andlanguage. The official transitional justicemechanisms remain place to confrontparamilitarism,butcannotaddressitsessenceorconfrontitstiestoStateviolence.

II. A Transactional Arrangement Gone Bad:14 A Brief History of a Crooked Deal

TheofficialarrangementoftransitionaljusticeinColombiadidnotemergeafteropendebate,negotiationordialoguewithsocietyatlarge.Rather,itderivesfromasecretseriesoftransactionsbetweentheColombiangovernmentandtheparamilitary groups. The irregular shape that the demobilization arrangementtook reflects thisad-hoc formation, as it adopteda legal frameworkcomposedof differing criminal justice elements: Law 782 of 2002 (which grants de facto amnestiesandprovidespardons to thegreatmajorityof thedemobilizedcombatants),andLaw975of2005(knownastheJusticeandPeaceLaw,whichwasintendedasaresidualinstrumenttoaddressthesituationofthoseindividualsthathadoutstandingcriminalcasesagainstthemorthattheywerelikelytofacecriminalchargesforthecommissionofseriouscrimesduringtheirmembershiptotheillegalarmedgroup).Inshort,theperpetratorsthoughtthatthiscombinationoflawswouldallowforbenignandspeedylegalsolutionstotheirproblemsafterdemobilization;likewisethisframeworkappealedtothegovernmentwhoassumeditwouldbe able to close thedeal swiftly and turn thepageofparamilitarism.Experiencehasshownthatneitherpartywascorrect.

14 Transactionalanalysisisusefulforitsexaminationoftheexchangesthattookplaceinadeterminedcontext,how those transactionsshaped theway that thesocialagents interactedand related tooneanother,andhowthesetransactionstookplace.Thisapproachmakesitpossibletofocusonthenegotiationprocess independent from theoutcomeof thenegotiation, and topinpointhowthe dynamic frameworkof interaction andmutual involvementmodifies both the result of thenegotiationand theagents involved in theprocess.Charles tIlly, IdentItIes, boundarIes and soCIal tIes15(2005).Tillydescribeshowthetransactionalapproach,incontrasttosystematicoroutcome-basedapproaches,highlightsthenegotiationprocessesamongindividualsandgroupsinsteadofeitheranomaloussituationsthatariseoutofadeterminedcontext,ortheincentivesandopportunitiesavailabletoindividualswithviolenttendencies.

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Today,years after informal exchangesbetween theparamilitaries and thenationalgovernmentfirstbegan,theresultofthatinitiativeisundeniablydistinctfromwhateachpartyexpectedwouldoccur.Forexample,thepartiessimplydidnotimaginethatthesituationin2010wouldlooklikethis:morethan17,000peopleawaitingapplicationofanamnestyorapardontoresolvetheirlegalsituation;fiveyearswithoutasinglecriminalsentencehandeddownundertheJusticeandPeaceLaw;someof thosebearingthegreatest responsibilityextradited to theUnitedStates; thousandsof paramilitarieskilled; andmore than a hundredpoliticians(at the national and local levels, belonging to theUribe coalition) involved incriminalproceedingsforhavingbeenpartoftheparamilitaryconspiracy.

Thetransactionalprocessbetweenparamilitariesandtheexecutivebranchwasmarkedbyalackoftransparencyandbyconstantcrisis–thethreatofpullingawayfromthenegotiationwaseverpresentandeachof theparties threatentotell theColombianpublicwhatwas in fact transpiringas a formof chastisingtheotherplayer..Fromthebeginningoftheexchangesbetweenthegovernmentand the paramilitaries, all parties operated with deliberate concealment (a farcryfromdiscretion).Theofficialreportsdonotallowforexaminationofwhatwasdiscussed,norisitclearwhoconfrontedwhomduringthenegotiations.Forexample,wehavesubsequentlylearnedthatdrug-traffickingpowerswerebehindthediscussions,butwedonotknowexactlyinwhichpartsortowhatextent.

Instabilitywasevidentinvariouscrises.Examplesofafewofthedestabilizingeventsincludethefollowing:theassassinationofMiguelArroyave(alias“ElArcángel”or“ElHombredelosLíquidos”)inMeta;theappearanceofknowndrugtraffickersintheSantaFédeRalitozone,suchas“LosMellizos”or“Gordolindo”,afterreportedlyhavingboughtanAUCfranchise;theissuanceofanarrestwarrantforDiegoFernandoMurillo (alias “DonBerna”), thepursuit, his resistance and subsequent surrender;the disappearanceofCarlosCastaño and the subsequent disclosure of his allegedassassination; the escapeofVicenteCastaño; thegovernment’s initial rejectionofpresumeddrugtraffickerJuanCarlosSierra(alias“ElTuso”)fromJusticeandPeaceandhislaterinclusionasaparamilitary;andtheassassinationofDanielMejía(alias“Danielito”),whowaspresumablyMurillo’ssecondincommand.

The Justice and Peace Law, addressing the criminal matters of thedemobilization,wasissuedtwoandahalfyearsafterdemobilizationnegotiationswith the paramilitaries had begun. This occurred despite the common sensewarningagainsttheinappropriatenessofdesigningalegalframeworkforcriminalsurrenderwhileconcurrentlynegotiatingdemobilization.RevelationsemergedofanagreementbetweentheparamilitaryleadersandseveralmembersofCongressandotherpoliticians to “re-found” theState, signedon July23,2001.Todate,wehavenewsoffourteenpactsofthistypeindiverseregionsofthecountry. 15

15 See ValenCIa&pIzarro,supra note8,at329-38(describingthenatureofeachofthereportedagreements).

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Theseagreementscastseriousdoubtonhowindependentlythosemembersofthelegislativebranchactedwhenhavingtoapprovealegalframeworkthataffectedthe paramilitaries’ interests. In addition, theCriminalChamber of theSupremeCourtofJusticehascarriedoutinvestigationsonthetiesofvariouspoliticianstoparamilitarism.TheColombianSupremeCourthasinitiatedcriminalinvestigationsagainstapproximatelyeightymembersofCongressfor linkstotheparamilitarygroups,andhassentencedoveradozen.Attheveryleast,thisrealityraisesseriousquestionsastothelegitimacyofthoseCongressmembersthatvotedinfavoroftheJusticeandPeaceLaw.

Operatinginthissituationofcontinuouscrisis,thegovernmentandthepara-militarieswereabletocreateanatmospherethatsuggested,“anythingcanhappen.”thusplaguingtheentireprocesswithinsecurityandirregularity.Thegravestaspectofthiscontextofinstabilitywasthatthebehindthescenestruththateachofthepartiesheldregardingthenegotiationbecameameansforpressureandcoercion.

The accounts and accusations that are thrown around in relation to the content ofthearrangementandtheallegedunfulfilledpromisesexposethebitternessofthepartiesinvolvedintheagreement.Forexample,aletterbyconfessedparamilitaryIvánRobertoDuque (alias “ErnestoBáez”) toLuisCarlosRestrepo, theHighCommissionerforPeace,sentinlate2006whenthepreliminarydeclarationsinthecontextoftheJusticeandPeaceLawwerebeginning,recallsthattheexecutivebranchandtheparamilitariesnegotiatedwaystoavoidhavingtheConstitutionalCourt rule on the application of the Justice and Peace Law. The paramilitaryspokesmanremindsthehighofficialthat:

[T]hereasonsthatyougaveuswereperfectlyclear:therewasaneedtoanticipate theConstitutional Court ruling regarding Law 975 becausetherewouldundoubtedlybesubstantialmodificationstotheoriginaltextasapprovedbytheCongressoftheRepublic.16

In thesameletter,BáezremindsRestrepoof theunfulfilledpromisesandthreatenstorevealtheagreementsifthissituationwasnotcorrected.HegoessofarastoremindRestrepothatparamilitarismhasnotbeendismantledandthatnotall of the leaders are in jail:

Inthisregard,IfindmyselfforcedtoremindyouthatofthefortymajorleaderswithinthefederatedleadershipoftheAUCthatyoumet,19aredetained,whichmeansthatmorethanhalfoftheseseniorcommandersenjoyfullfreedom,includingthehistoricalco-founderoftheAUC.The

16 Letter from IvánRobertoDuque, alias ErnestoBáez, supra note 11.A similar version of thenegotiationistobefoundintestimoniesbyanotherconfessedparamilitary,DiegoRivera,oftheCentralBolívarBloc,intheframeworkofthediscussionofthedecreesregulatingthelaw.See serrano zabala, supranota8,at202et seq.

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same is true ofmore than 500 second-level commanders and around1000 mid-ranking leaders. No one knows better than you that themisnamedemergingcriminalgangsaresimplyparamilitarygroupsthathavebeenreconstitutedbymanyoftheimportantleaderswhofledasfugitivesfromthelackoffulfillment,thefarce,andthedestroyeddreamof peace.17

Thegeneral responseby theexecutivebranch to this typeofstatement issimple: “Criminals cannot be believed.”This categorical view also dominatespublicopinion.Regardlessofwhodeservescredibility,theissuethatremainsisthatno lighthasbeenshedon theopacityand theunderhandeddeal thatwentdownbetweenthegovernmentandtheparamilitaries.

Aggravating this situation, inMayof 2008 and again inMarch of 2009,theColombiangovernmentextraditedseveralhigh-rankingparamilitaryofficersto theUnitedStates tofacedrugtraffickingcharges.Theproblemis that theseindividualspossessthedefinitivenarrativeabouttheorganizedpowerapparatus—namelythesearethemostwell-knownparamilitaries.18TheirextraditionfordrugtraffickingignoredthefactthatthesemenwereconfessedparamilitariesandwereundertheauthorityoftheColombianjusticesystem,andinseveralcaseswereevenundercoerciveproceduralandcustodialmeasures.Theyallfacedchargesintheordinaryjusticesystemand,tovaryingdegrees,werecollaboratingwiththeconfessionalJusticeandPeaceprocess.However,thepossibilityofreconstructingand exposing the structure of the criminal apparatus and themodus operandi ofparamilitarismat thehighesthierarchical levelwasextradited togetherwiththe paramilitaries.All incentives for these individuals to collaborate with theColombianjusticesystemwereeliminated.Infact,theseextraditionshavehadaparalyzingeffectontheColombianjusticesystem.19

TheconcealmentisexacerbatedbytheextremesecrecyoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticehasappliedtothestatusoftheseindividualsintheUSandthesealithasplacedonwhatwouldregularlyconstitutepublicrecord..Promisesby both governments to establish channels for bilateral cooperation have notmaterialized and, despite declarationsof goodwill, these extraditions are ade facto obstacle to investigationsof systematiccrimesperpetrated inColombia.

17 LetterfromIvánRobertoDuque,aliasErnestoBáez,supra note 11.18 Since September 2006 the government has extradited thirty paramilitaries, including twenty-

twoJusticeandPeacedefendants.Inlightoftheinformationthattheycouldhavecontributedincriminalproceedings,theextraditionsofthefollowingareparticularlygrave:SalvatoreMancuso;RodrigoTovarPupo“Jorge40”;GuillermoPérezAlzate“PabloSevillano”;HebertEverVelozaGarcía“H.H.”;DiegoMurilloBejarano“DonBerna”;HernánGiraldoSerna“ElPatrón”;Ramiro“Cuco”VanoyMurillo;andCarlosMarioJiménez“Macaco.”

19 Ofallthosewhowereextradited,onlythreetookpartinvoluntarydepositions(versiones libres),andonlyonehasbeenpartiallyindicted.Therehasbeenminimalrecordedproceduralactivityandatpresent,thecasesareatastandstill.

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Theprosecutionoforganizedcrimeanddrugtraffickingisundeniablyataskthatcannotbepostponed,butitcanbecarriedoutwithoutprejudicingortrumpingtheprosecutionofcrimesamountingtogravehumanrightsviolations.

The extradition of the paramilitaries was one of the final actions of theColombiangovernment that,accordingto theparamilitaries,violatedallof theagreementsthathadbeenreached.20Asanexample,inSeptemberof2009DonBernadeclared:

ManyagreementswerediscussedandfinallyreachedwiththegovernmentofPresidentÁlvaroUribeVélezthroughthenPeaceCommissionerLuisCarlosRestrepoandExMinisterSabasPreteltdelaVega;agreements and commitments that the government has not only totally failed to uphold, but which it has systematically prevented from being revealed so as to prevent the entire country from really knowing what the government negotiated and agreed to; or in otherwords, so that the entireworldwouldneverknowthe intimatedetailsof thenegotiationprocesswiththeColombiangovernment.21

The recorded reactions to and direct effects of the extraditions areillustrative of the unease and derailment of the process. Without takingpositionononesideortheother,thefactisthattheextraditionshavefrozentheinvestigationsinColombiaandburiedthetruthaboutparamilitarismevendeeper.

With the passage of time, the dynamics of the negotiation processbetween the paramilitaries and the government are beginning to cometo light, albeit obscured by a lack of transparency, hidden interests andconflictingversionsofthetruth.Althoughdiscretionispartofallnegotiationprocesses,subsequentlyevaluatingwhattookplaceshouldnotbedisguisedunderablanketof“it’sbetternottoknow,”whichistheofficialattitudethatconfrontsvariouseffortsaimedatuncoveringthetruthtoday.Inaddition,thedemobilizationprocesscontinuestobeseverelydisturbedbyveryhighlevelsofviolenceagainstallofthoseinvolvedinthenegotiation,thuscontributingtofurtherconcealmentofthedeal.

20 RodrigoTovarPupo,aliasJorge40,OpenLettertoMr.EduardoPizarroLeongómez,PresidentoftheNationalReparationandReconciliationCommission(Feb.2009);SalvatoreMancusoGomez,Letter addressed to the Criminal Cassation Chamber, Colombian Supreme Court of Justice,regardingtheJusticeandPeaceProcess,Warsaw,Virginia,NorthernNeckRegionalJail (Aug.25,2009);DiegoFernandoMurilloBejarano,aliasDonBerna,LetteraddressedtotheCriminalCassationChamber,ColombianSupremeCourtofJustice,NewYork,MetropolitanCorrectionalCenter(Sept.17,2009).

21 LetterfromDiegoFernandoMurilloBejarano,aliasDonBerna,supra note20(emphasisinoriginal).

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III. A Gloss on the Demobilization: The Colombian Drug Trafficking Route to Transitional Justice

One of the murkiest aspects of the negotiations with the paramilitarygroupswastheincreasinginclusionofdrugtraffickersintoitsstructuresandtheconsiderationof interestsof thecartels in theagreementwith thegovernment.Althoughpatentlyobvious,itisworthreiteratingthatdrugtraffickingpermeatedparamilitarism and paramilitarism permeated drug trafficking. This fact hassignificant repercussions in terms of how the process of demobilization andsurrenderoftheparamilitariesisanalyzed.Italsohasimportantrepercussionsintheapplicationoftransitionaljusticemechanisms:inColombiasuchmechanismsweredesignedinpartto“launder”crimesrelatedtodrugtrafficking.Theinclusionof drug trafficking in such arrangements is a question that is under-studied intransitionaljusticeandisquiteproblematic.

Muchofparamilitaryactivityfocusedandcontinuestofocusonretainingand,insomecases,enlargingcontroloverthevariousphasesofdrugtraffickinginColom-bia.Formanyyears,theparamilitarystructureshaveprovidedsecurityincocaandpoppygrowingareasandhavedeterminedtheconditionsfortransactionsinzonesofeconomicbonanza,includingsettingthepurchasepriceforbasiccocapaste.

Since itsverybeginning,Colombianparamilitarismhasmixedcounterin-surgentobjectiveswitheconomicinterests,sometimesseamlesslyandsometimesdiscordantly.Itsundercoverandcomplicitrelationshipwithstateagentshasfa-cilitatedbothprivateandpublicaims.Often,thereareconcurrentcontradictionsand coincidences between themotivations and interests of paramilitarism andthoseofitsbackers.Thesecontradictionsareinherentgiventheillicitandconvertnatureofparamilitarism.Theexpressionofprivateinterestsisacharacteristicofparamilitaryforcesthroughouttheworld.22ThetiesofColombianparamilitariestoprivateactorsforprofitaddscomplexityandlayerstotheirstructuresandac-tivities,itdoesnotextinguishthepara-institutionalnature.

TheAUCdisarmamentceremoniesdidnotalter thecocabusiness’sneedfor security in Colombia, nor did they modify themodus operandi of manyparamilitary groups.After the demobilization, paramilitary groups continue tocontrolmuchofthedrugbusiness,includingcontroloverthecrop,laboratories,androutes.Thismanifestationofparamilitarismmaybeoneofthemostextensivethroughoutthecountry.23

22 See as an illustration, Sunil Dasgupta,Paramilitary Forces and Security Reorganization, 12Global seCurIty & CooperatIon Q. (2004); andSunilDasgupta,Understanding Paramilitary Growth: Agency Relations in Military Organization, Paper presented to the Conference onCurbingHumanRightsViolationsbyNonstateArmedGroups,CenterofInternationalRelations,LiuInstituteforGlobalIssues,UniversityofBritishColumbia,Vancouver,Nov.13-15,2003.

23 Alargenumberofgroupsareconcentratedinthesoutheasternpartofthecountrywherecocagrowing,crystallization,andcommercializationforVenezuelaareconcentrated.Inthisregion,

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Drug trafficking was an integral part, perhaps the determining factor, inthesubmissionoftheparamilitarygroups.BeforebeingextraditedtotheUnitedStates, Hernando Gómez Bustamante, known as “Rasguño” or “Don H”, akingpinfromnorthernValledelCauca,reportedthatin2001drugtraffickersandparamilitariesmetatElVergelranchinCartago,ValledelCauca,andnegotiatedapossiblesubmissionen massetotheU.S.justicesystem.Healsospokeopenlytonewscamerasofbusinessdealingsthathisorganizationhadcarriedoutforyearswiththeparamilitaries.Forthedrugtraffickers,theparamilitarydemobilizationprovided an opportunity to politicize their situation and gain leverage for afavorablejudicialoutcomeinexchangefortheirsurrender..

Anillustrativecaseisthatofalias“ElTuso,”JuanCarlosSierraMartínez,whopersistentlydemandedofthegovernmenttobeimprisonedalongwiththeparamilitaryleadersattheProsocialVacationCenterinLaCeja,Antioquia.Themajorityoftheparamilitaryleadersdidnotwishtobedetained,whereasElTusosoughtaticketintothespecialholdingfacility.Hisinterestwasclear:tocamouflageandcategorizehisdrug traffickingactivitywithin the frameworkof the illegalarmedgroupinordertoobtainanalternative(muchlighter)sentenceandtoavoidextraditiontotheUnitedStates.ThegovernmenteffectivelyrecognizedhimasaparamilitarycommanderinAugust2006,afterhavingpursuedhimforyearsasoneofthecountry’smostwanteddrugtraffickers.24

activitybymultiplegroupshasbeendetected,includingthefollowing:paramilitariesledbyPedroOliverioGuerreroCastillo(aliasCuchilloorDidier)inMapiripán(Meta)andinthedepartmentofGuaviare;andseveralgroupsledbyDanielRendón(aliasDonMario)withinfluenceoverroutestowardsVichada.InthesouthwestofthecountryandinthePacificregion,thepanoramaisequallyoverwhelming.Forexample,inthedepartmentofNariño,thestructurecalledtheLibertadoresdel SurBloc has continued operating under the same hierarchical structure andwithmassivepresenceintheterritory.IthasalsoexpandedintopartsofthedepartmentofCauca,mainlyinthemunicipalitiesofArgelia,Bolívar,Balboa,andMercaderes.IthasalsotakencontrolofthecoastalmunicipalitiesofGuapiandTimbiquí(Cauca).ThedepartmentofValledelCaucahasalsoseenanincreasedparamilitarypresenceinthecocazonesofthemunicipalityofBuenaventuraandastrengthening of twomilitary drug-trafficking structures in northernValle delCauca throughtheintegrationofcombatantsfromtheCalimaBloc,knownasLosMachosandLosRastrojos.ItisworthnotingthatthereareseveralindicationsofalliancesbetweenLosRastrojosunderthecommandofWilberVarela(aliasJabón)andthedeclaredleaderoftheBCB,CarlosMarioJiménezNaranjo(aliasJavierMontañezorMacaco),anotoriousmafialeaderoftheEjeCafeteroregion.ThisallianceapparentlyfacilitatedtheexpansionoftheparamilitarystructureofLosRastrojostothedepartmentsofPutumayo,Nariño,andCauca,andtothePacificregionoftheValledelCauca.In theMagdalenaMedio region, drug trafficking has in partmoved towards the northeasternregion ofAntioquia.There are repeated reports of drug trafficking controlled by paramilitarystructures located in Pueblito Mejía (Barranco de Loba municipality) and in Monterrey(Simitímunicipality). In southernBolívar, the authorities of the department have reported theestablishmentofparamilitarystructuresconnectedtodrugtraffickingintheLaMojanaregionofthedepartmentofSucreandintheruralzonesoftheMontecristomunicipality(Bolívar),mainlytiedtotheactivityofcocarefinerswhohavesetupoperationsinthatregion.

24 ElTusoSierrawassubsequentlyextraditedtotheUnitedStatesinMay2008;hecontinuestobeacandidateundertheJusticeandPeaceLaw.

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There are dozens of other cases of cartel leaders that were included asparamilitaries—undeniable given their notoriety. Notorious kingpins, knownnationallyby theirpseudonyms, include:elArcángel,DonBerna, losMellizosMejía Múnera, Macaco, Don Mario, Gordolindo, Cuco Vanoy, and HernanGiraldo.SomehavebeenlinkedtothedrugtraffickingbusinesssincethetimeofPabloEscobar.

The government ceded to the pressure of including drug traffickingcrimesintheconfessionalschemeoftheJusticeandPeaceLawandlawmakersincorporatedaformulathattodatehasshelteredthistypeofcriminalityunderthelightersentencesavailabletoparamilitaries.Article10oftheJusticeandPeaceLawestablishesthatthebenefitofthealternativesentenceisavailablefor:

themembersofanillegalarmedorganizedgroupwhohavebeenormaybeindicted,charged,orsentencedasperpetrators or participants in criminal acts committed during and due to their membership in those groups,aslongastheyareonthelistthattheNationalGovernmentforwardstotheAttorneyGeneral’sOffice(Fiscalía General de la Nación) and satisfy [severalconditionsincluding]10.5.that the group was not organized for the purposes of drug trafficking or illicit enrichment.25

Thelawcouldhavebeendrafteddifferentlytoensurethatthetransitionaljusticeframeworkwouldnotbecomeabenignmechanismfordrug traffickers’surrendertothecriminaljusticesystem.

The Justice and Peace Law, which is claimed to be a transitional justicemechanism,wasdesignedwiththedrugtraffickersinmindandinfactservestomollifythecriminalpenaltiesapplicabletothem.Inclusionofdrugtrafficking-relatedcrimesintheJusticeandPeacesystemhasbeenrathersimple.Drugtraffickersthatconfesssmugglingactivityassertthelinkwiththeparamilitarystructureandtheyhavesatisfiedtherequirementofnothavingorganizedthegroupfor“purposesofdrugtraffickingorillicitenrichment.”Standardshavenotbeenstringentinpractice.Inthisway,evenaconsecratednarco(termed“pure-breed”inSpanishslang)cansubmittotheJusticeandPeacespecialproceedings,testifytoafewatrocities,tiehisdrugtraffickingactivitytotheautodefensas(self-defenseforces),andreceiveanalternativesentenceoffivetoeightyears.Usingthismechanism,hewillhave“laundered”anypendingmatterswiththejusticesystem.

Thearrangementisratheroutlandish,butthisdimensionofthenegotiationandoftheJusticeandPeaceLawisaresponsetooneofthemostobviouscharac-teristicsofparamilitarisminthecountryoverthepastdecades:drugtrafficking.Theinclusionofdrugtraffickingasatopicfordiscussionwasoneofthemost

25 A similar clause is found inArticle 11 of Law 975 of 2005, applicable in cases of individualdemobilization.Italicsaddedforemphasis.

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frenzied(althoughsurreptitious)topicsinthenegotiationsandintheratificationoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw.

Thecruxofthematteristhattheseelementsofthenegotiationandapplicationof the JusticeandPeaceLawwerenotdebatedorpresentedopenly.The legalframeworkofJusticeandPeaceineffectincludedanintricateformuladesignedtomakeitdifficulttoexcludedrugtraffickersfromitspurview.Thechallengeofitsadequateapplicationisinthehandsofthejudicialoperators;untilnow,actiononthisfronthasbeenlimited.26

WhenconsideringcompliancewiththeeligibilityrequirementsestablishedinLaw975(Article10),inthecaseofUberBanquéz,alias“JuanchoDique”andEdwarCobosTellez,alias“DiegoVecino”,theJusticeandPeaceChamberoftheSuperiorCourtofBogotádetermined:

Drug trafficking and the creation of the bloc: The group was notorganizedfordrugtraffickingorillicitenrichment.TheProsecutionstatedthisduringthehearing,addingthatthereisnoevidencetodeterminethattheMontesdeMaríaBlocwascreatedorwasorganizedforthepurposesofdrugtrafficking.However, it is clear that this activity became the main source of financing for the group, an activity that was directly taken up by EDWAR COBOS TELLEZ, in that he was delegated by SalvatoreMancusotocollectthemoneyderivingfromtheexittaxontheillegaldrug,aswellastodistribute50%ofthisincometothefrontsthatwouldneedthesubsidytocovertheirexpensesandtosendtheother50%totheCastañohouse.TheimportanceofdrugtraffickingintheMontesdeMaríaBlocisindisputable:sufficeittonotethatapproximately75%oftheexpensesofeachfrontwassubsidizedwiththismoney....It is thus clear that drug traffickingwas a determining factor for thediverse illegal armed groups, given that the earnings derived fromthis activity is what continues to fuel the internal armed struggle inColombia.However, so far it has not been proven that the Montes de María Bloc under the command of COBOS TELLEZ and/or the Canal del Dique Front had been set up for the purpose of drugs trafficking or illicit enrichment. ItcannotbeignoredthatEDWARCOBOS,infulfillingoneofhisroles,managed the finances deriving from this illicit activity, to the pointthattheUnitedStatesgovernmenthassolicitedhisextradition.UBER

26 The two judicial decisions that have reviewed the legality of the charges against confessedparamilitariesinvolvedindrugtraffickingdonotincludeanadequateanalysisofsuchquestions.See Superior Court of the Judicial District of Bogota, Justice and Peace Chamber, File No.110016000253200680281,SpeakerMagistrateUldiTeresa JiménezLópez (Dec. 7, 2009) (caseagainst Jorge IvánLaverdeZapata, for crimes of homicide and others); SuperiorCourt of theJudicial District of Bogota, Justice and Peace Chamber, File No. 110016000253200680077,SpeakerMagistrateUldiTeresaJiménezLópez(Jan.25,2010)(caseagainstUberEnriqueBanquezMartínezandEdwarCobosTellezforcrimesofhomicideandothers).

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BANQUEZ is also facing charges for drug trafficking.However, the hypothesis demonstrated so far is that both the bloc as well as the front commanded by these defendants used drug trafficking to finance their illegal activities, without prejudice to what the prosecutor’s office might be able to demonstrate in the future.27

This line of reasoning shows the weakness with which the authoritiesapproachthequestionandalsorevealsthecomplexityofreachingaconclusiontoexcludeoneof thecandidates fromJusticeandPeacebecauseof theirdrugtraffickingactivity.

ThetranscendenceofdrugtraffickingwithinthedynamicoftheColombianarmedconflictisundeniable,andtheremustbeacomprehensiveresponsetoitsdiversemanifestations.That responsemust be transparent inclusionof diverseperspectives, such as academia, civil society organizations, and State entities.Thisisacomplexsubject thathasnotbeenaddressedbytransitional justiceinothercontexts(andnotbecauseofalackofnecessity),andisespeciallycrucialinColombia.

The inclusion of drug trafficking in the official transitional justicearrangement, theimplicationsfor theadministrationofcriminal justice,anditsimplicationsforfutureagreementsareallvitallyimportanttopicsfordiscussion.Moreover, such a discussionwouldhelp to shed light on the public reasoningandofficialmotivationsbehind thedecision to includedrug traffickers as partof the demobilization schemewith the paramilitaries.Unless the discussion istackledheadonandwithnoreservations,theimpropernegotiationsthatformedtheJusticeandPeaceLawinahiddenwaywillremainhidden.

IV. An Accommodated Version of Transitional Justice: The Apogee of Denial28

TheendofthearmedconflictinColombiahasbeendeclared.Itisdifficulttoascertainhowsuchaconvolutedbackdropwasfashioned,buttheaffirmationthat Colombia is post-conflict and witnessing a peace process seems to havebecomeestablishedinthenationalmentality.Todisagreewiththisassertionorrecallthatthearmedconflictcontinuesisinterpretedasadissidentactagainsttheauthoritarianwisdomthatinventedthedesiredsituation.Anyonedivergingfromthescriptwillbeeschewed.

27 Bogota, Justice andPeaceChamber, case againstUberEnriqueBanquezMartínez andEdwarCobosTellez,atparas.169,171-72.Italicsaddedforemphasisandinternalcitationsomitted.

28 This Part is based on a previous publication. See Camilo Bernal Sarmiento&Michael ReedHurtado,¿Justicia penal transicional? Negación, reconocimiento y castigo de las atrocidades perpetradas en Colombia, 2nueVa doCtrIna penal 363 (2007).

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Forsometimewehavebeenexperiencingtheeffectsofan intenseuseofnewspeakinthebestOrwellianstyle.Everyday,inpublicdiscourse,inthepress,andwhatisworse,inprivatespheres,correctionofthelanguagethatisacceptableis part ofnational life. Just togive a fewexamples:war is no longerwar, andthecombatantsarenolongercombatants29.Itisabadsign,inanysociety,whencertainwordsareprohibitedorotherwordsthatdonotreflectrealityareofficiallypromoted.Itisaworsesignwhenthereisanofficialefforttoinventexpressionsand euphemisms to ensure thatwhat is prohibited is notmentioned.Linguisticoperationsarenotpartofanextendedhypocrisy,theyareconsciousandprogrammedoperationsaimedatchangingthewaysofrememberingandthinking.

The conscious change in language seeks to modify the forms ofconceptualizingandassumingreality.Theselectionofterminologyisnotneutral;it evokes meaning and instills a certain ideology. “If, as has been suggested,terminologyistheinherentlypoeticmomentofthought,terminologicalchoicescanneverbeneutral.”30Linguisticoperationsinduce“selectiveamnesia. . .byeliminatingcertainelementsofthepastwhilepreservingothers.Thepastmustconformtothepresentinordertoestablishaversionofhistory(amasternarrative)that legitimatescurrentpolicy.”31This involvesacarefullyorchestratedmentaldeception to falsify the past and justify the present.This calculated forgettingleadstoastateofdenialinwhichacknowledgementoftheatrocityisnotsociallyaccepted and injustice is perpetuated.

In diverse national contexts in which atrocities have occurred, such asColombia, societies tend toward processes of denial of the atrocity. Duringtimesofwarandpostwar,“[w]holesocietiesslipintomassdenial—withterribleconsequences,especiallyforvictimsandsurvivorswhofindthemselvesliterallydislocatedfromhistoricaltime.”32Theyarecertainthatsomethinghappenedandthatithappenedtothem,butnooneseemstowanttorememberoracknowledgeit.33Therearemultipleexplanationsthatappearperfectlysimpleanddangerouslyinternalized:“whathappened,happened”;“itisbettertostartfromscratch”;“wemust turn the page”; “the past is uncomfortable, complicated, inconvenient”;“resentmentleadsnowhere”;“nothinghappenedtome”;“whateverhappenedto

29 Theterm“armedconflict”wasofficiallyproscribedbypresidentialorder,andcombatantscanbereferred to narcocriminals(orvariationsthereof).

30 GIorGIo aGamben, estado de exCepCIón: homo saCer II 13(2004).31 Cohen, supra note13,at243.32 Cohen, supra note13,at242.33 Cohen emphasized the distinction between knowledge and acknowledge, alluding to thework

onhistoricalmemory recoverydevelopedbyLawrenceWeschler in regard to thedirtywar inthe SouthernCone and the importance placed on establishing an official truth.See lawrenCe wesChler, a mIraCle, a unIVerse: settlInG aCCounts wIth tortures(1990).Respondingtothequestionaboutthemysteriousandpowerfulvalueofacknowledgmentofthetruth,hestatesthat,“acknowledgementiswhathappenstoknowledgewhenitbecomesofficiallysanctionedandentersthepublicdiscourse.”Cohen, supra note13,at225.

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them,happenedtothemforareason”;or“itisbettertoforget”.Theexpressionsareabundant.

The state of denial ismore than a passiveprocess of forgetting; it is theproduct of a complexpsychological process, both individual and social34. It is a condition that iswidespread and internalized to various degrees. One of itssimplest,butalsomostcommon,manifestationsistheinternalprocessingofnewsaboutmassivedeathsorgreathumansuffering:wesee them,weareawareofthem(forawhile),and(unlesstheyinvolveourdailybusiness)withinminuteswehaveexcisedthemfromourmentalprocess.

Denial implies a conscious process, with individual and collectiveramifications. In the personal realm, it involves a process of selection andperception,duringwhichwedecidewhetherornottobecomeawareofsomething.Itissomethinglike:“Idon’twanttoknowaboutit,thoughIalreadydo”or“Iwish itwouldallgoaway.”Theproblemis thatwedoalreadyknowabout it.In the collective sphere, it is a process that generates social amnesia; throughmechanismsofforgetting,anentiresocietydisconnectsitselffromtherecordofits undesirable past and endsup justifying certain actions or omissions by thesociety or the State. Denial can be the result of an intentional and organizedofficialprocessoraculturalextricationthatoccurswheninformationdisappears,whentheuncomfortableknowledgeisrepressed.

StanleyCohen hasexhaustivelyaddressedthestateofdenialanditsrelationto acknowledgment of atrocities and human suffering in complex politicalcontexts.35 Cohen proposedacharacterizationofdenialbasedonfivedimensionsthat are useful for illustrating the complexities hidden within the process ofdenial.Because they are on point and because they facilitate an interpretationofthesocialandpoliticalprocessespresentintheColombiancase,Iwillbrieflyreviewthedimensionsbelow.36

First,Cohenproposesclassifyingthedenialbasedonitscontent:literal denial, interpretative denial, and implicatory denial. Literal denial is where “the fact or knowledgeofthefactisdenied.”37Itinvolvesafactualdenial;forexample,“thereisnoarmedconflict.”Inthecaseof interpretative denial,thefactsarenotdenied,buttheyaregivenadifferentmeaningthanwhatisapparent.Insuchcases,whatoccurredisnotdeniedbutisinsteadgivenanothernameorthefactsarereclassifiedunderadifferentcategory.Forexample,onedoesnotspeakof“ethniccleansing”butratherof“populationexchange’’;orinsteadof“paramilitarism”onespeaksof“self-defensegroupsasathirdactor.”Interpretativedenialisfertilegroundfortheuseofeuphemismsandtechnical-administrativelanguageinherenttoroutines.In

34 See Cohen, supra note1,at4-5.35 See Cohen, supra note13,at1-20.36 Cohen, supra note13,at7-20.37 Cohen, supra note13,at7.

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implicatory denialneitherthefactsnortheirconventionalinterpretationisdenied.What is inplayare theeffectsor implications (political,moral,psychological,etc.)thatareconventionallyderived.Thiscategoryofdenialdirectlydeniesthemeaningand implicationsofcertainfacts.Forexample, thefactofmassrapesof women in Bosnia is not denied, but the psychosocial implications for thatsocietyandtheimperativeneedtorespondaredenied.IntheColombiancase,thismanifestationisseeninthefrequentdenialoftheeffectsofthevictimization;thevictimizationitselfisnotdenied,butitseffectsareminimized.Uponillustratingthese threemodalities,Cohen concludes that inorder to realize theprocessofdenial,humanbeingsusecognition,emotion,morality,andaction;inotherwords,denial is not an unconscious process.38

Second,Cohen determinesthatdenialcanbea personal, official, or cultural process. The personal processisthemostextendedandinternalized,asmentionedatthebeginningofthisPart.Inthecaseofofficial denial,theauthorstressesthatitinvolvesacollectiveandorganizedprocessinwhichtheStatemakesitimpossibleordangeroustoacknowledgetherealityofthepastorthepresent.Officialdenialcanalsobecarriedoutthroughmoresubtlemeans,aboveallwhenthedenialispartoftheState’sideologicalfacade.Inthesecasesthesocialconditionsthatgaverisetotheatrocitiesjoinedwithofficialdenialstrategiesandgenerateaviciouscircleofself-legitimization.39Ontheotherhand,cultural denial refers to processes that are fueled by the personal and public (or officially constructed) spheres.These are very commonprocesses of denial inwhich societies reach informalconsensusesregardingwhatcanandshouldberememberedandacknowledged.ThistypeofdenialmaybeinitiatedbytheStateandthentakeonalifeofitsown.Themediaplaysaparticularlyimportantroleinsuchprocesses.Onceappropriatelanguagehasbeencreatedinordertoavoidcertaintopics(ortonotthinkabouttheunthinkable),themassmediaplaysitspart,sustainingpre-establishedlanguage,images,andmyths.TheexamplesintheColombiancontextareabundant;themostexplicitandrecurrentisthepresentationofhundredsofextrajudicialexecutionsofinnocentcivilianscarriedoutbystateagentsasdeathsincombat,promotedbyanofficialincentivescale.Thesekillingsarepopularlyknowneuphemisticallyas“falsepositives.”Thattypeofdenial,ifleftuncontested,canaffecttheabilityofsocietiestoidentifythefalsityofcertainofficialdiscourses.

Third, Cohen distinguished between processes of historical denial and contemporary denial. Historical denial involvestheelementsofmemory,forgetting,andrepression.Itcanbetheresultofhighlyorganizedprocesses,ofthepassingoftime, or of the porosity of collectiveknowledge.40 It can alsobe the result of aculturalelementthatalignsitselftohideunseemlyhistorictruths.Contemporary

38 Cohen, supra note13,at9.39 Cohen, supra note13,at10.40 Cohen, supra note13,at12.

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denial, in addition to including complex processes of contradiction about thepresent(literal,interpretative,orimplicatorydenial),includestheinevitablefilterofperceptioninthefaceofagrowingbodyofinformationthatplaguesourdailylife.Forclearlypracticalreasonswehavetoblockoutcertaintypesofinformationthatmake us uncomfortable. Despite these distinctions, Cohen stresses that therelationshipbetweenthepresentandthepastshouldbeseenasacontinuum.Currenteuphemismsandmythsservetoaccommodatethepast;similarly,reinterpretationofthepastservestoillustratethepresent.Forinstance,thedenialofstateinvolvementintheemergenceofparamilitarygroupsisaformofhistoricdenialthathasprofoundconsequencesonhowthisphenomenonisunderstoodtoday.

ThefourthdimensionofthedenialprocessinvolveswhatCohencallsthetriangle of atrocity,whichismadeupofthevictims,againstwhomtheatrocityiscommitted;theperpetrators,whocommittheatrocities;andthebystanders,whoseeandknowwhatisgoingon.41Cohenemphasizesthatthesearenotfixedrolesandthatinthecycleofviolenceanindividualcanplaymorethanoneoftheseroles. For Cohen,eachpersonandgroupofpeople(accordingtotheircollectiveidentity)willexperiencedenialinadifferentway,accordingtotheirroleinthetriangleofatrocity.Hepointsout that thebystandersare the largestgroupandgenerallyinvolverelativelypassivepeoplewhoaremoreconcernedwithlivingtheir livesthanmakinghistory.42However,previousnationalexperiencesshowthatthebystanders’interestordisinterestinsurmountingthestateofdenialisadeterminingfactorintheacknowledgementofthevictims.

For more than four years, Colombian society has been the spectator oftestimonieswithintheJusticeandPeaceconfessionalsystemabouttheperpetrationofatrocities,andthereisnosignofanysignificantsocialreaction.Everydaydozensofparamilitariestestifybeforeprosecutorsdeclaringthattheyhavemurdered,thattheywerenotinvestigated,thattheycontinuedtobrutallymurder,thattheyenjoyedthebackingoftheauthorities,andthattheyfeltjustified,andnoonesaysanything.

InDecember 2006, themedia reported on the first voluntary depositions(versiones libres) by these dark assassins. The stories, full of intrigue andjustifications,revealedthemysteryaroundthemurdersandthepublicwascaptivatedwithacertainmorbidcuriosity.Theshockingnarrativesofchainsaws,crematoryovens,andsoccergamesplayedwithhumanheadsweretoldnonchalantly.Thesedeclarationsappearedonthefrontpagesuntillate2008.Now,forsomereason,withveryfewexceptions,theyarenolongerreportedbythepress.Isitbecausepeoplehavebecomeusedtothedeclarationsortiredofthem?Coulditbethatsocietynolongercares?

AnotherelementfromtheColombiancaseillustratingthedifferenceofper-ceptionbetweenvictimsandnon-victimsisthedichotomyofopinionsregarding

41 Cohen, supra note13,at14.42 Cohen, supra note13,at276.

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thefunctioningofthejusticesystem.Accordingtoasurveyonthechallengesoftransitional justice inColombiacarriedoutby theFundación Social, “whereas 71%oftheaffectedruralpopulationconsidersthatthejusticesystemisnotdoinganythingtouncoverthetruth,63%oftheunaffectedpopulationfeelsthatitis.”43 Thesurveyalso indicatesother reasons forconcernaboutwhether thecountryisfulfillingtheexpectationsofvictims,thosewhoshouldbethesubjectsofthespecial truth, justice,andreparationpolicies.Everythingseemsto indicate thatthevictims’perceptionsarenotaspositiveastheresultsthatareofficiallypubli-cizedandwhichthemajorityofColombiansaccept.Forthemoment,mostoftheColombianpopulationispassiveabouttheatrocitiesandaboutdoinganythingtomeetvictims’expectations.

Finally,Cohenemphasizesaspatial dimensionofdenial,bothphysicalaswellassymbolic.Withthisperspectiveheproposesthataperson’sproximitytotheatrocities, to thevictims,or toaparticularspacewilldetermine thedegreeofdenialandthedesiretoovercomethatstate.Thisrelativelyintuitivecategoryessentiallymeans that there is a directly proportional connection between thedegreeof interestonehas (personalorcollective) ineventsandcircumstancesand the spatial proximity one had to the violence occurring.A large part ofthe violence in Colombia takes place in remote places; thus those spectatorsfar removedperceive thepossibilityof theirbecomingvictimsas remote.Thedistanceincreasesevenfurtherinsymbolicalwayswhenvictimsaredifferentiatedthroughsocialconstructions.Forexample,thelowerthevictim’ssocialstatusorthefarthertheyarefrom“normal,”theeasieritistoignoretheirsufferingandseetheirhumanconditionasbanal.

ThebriefreviewofthesefivecategoriesprovideselementsforexaminingthestateofdenialinwhichColombiansocietyfindsitself44. For the last thirty years (at least)andparticularlyduringthelasteight,ColombiansocietyhasbeenexposedtooperationsaimedatdenyingrealityandtheatrocitiessufferedbythousandsofColombians.Thecountryisimmersedinalongstandingprocessofredefiningtheviolenceexperienced.Theeffectofthestateofdenialisprofoundandincreasinglyinternalized.Massacres, executions,disappearances, tortures, rapes, andmutila-tions,pastandpresent,aredenied.Victims,objectives,methods,techniques,andperpetrators,aswellasjustificationsandcover-upmechanismsarenotdiscussed.Ifthestateofdenialisnottackled,thecountrywillexperiencepeaceinthetrueOrwelliansense:“Warispeace.Freedomisslavery.Ignoranceisstrength.”45

43 fundaCIón soCIal, enCuesta sobre los retos de la JustICIa transICIonal en ColombIa. perCepCIones opInIones y experIenCIas 2008,at188(2009).

44 Beyond what I describe here, there are many other processes of denial involving the literal,interpretative, and implicatory dimensions, aswell as the corresponding personal, social, andculturalprocesses,inrelationtobothhistoricalandcontemporarysituations.

45 ThesearesomeofthepartysloganswrittenonthewallsoftheMinistryofTruthinOrwellianLondon.GeorGe orwell,1984,Part1,Ch.I(PenguinGroup,2003).

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ThestateofdenialinColombiadeepenswiththepassageoftimeandthemultiplemediamessagesthatarebombarded,includingnewsaboutthelifestyleoftherichandfamous,advertising,thelatestsoapopera,orthecurrentrealitytelevisionshow,contributetothedenialprocess46.Thedenialofatrocitiesismadeeasierbytheabundanceofmediamessagesandconstantleapsfromoneaccountormessagetoanother.AcknowledgmentofatrocitiesrecedestoalesserplaneandvictimsbecomeviewedbytheColombianpublicwithboredomandskepticism.

Inprinciple,thetoolsoftransitionaljusticearedesignedandimplementedtoaddressregimesofdenial.InColombia,inlightofthefactthatapartoftheprocessof denial stems from the government and that transitional justicemechanismshavebeendesignedtoavoiddealingwithcertaintopics(suchasthesubjectofState responsibility), the challenges facing the field of transitional justice aregreater.Deconstructing the regime of denial and revealing the truth about theparticipationbystateagentsinperpetratingandcoveringupatrocitiesarependingandcontestedobjectives.

RecallthattheJusticeandPeaceprocessisexplicitlyandintentionallylimitedtotheactionsoftheillegalarmedgroups.Thereisnoroominthestate’sofficialtruth-seekingmechanismstolookintoatrocitiesperpetratedwithintheframeworkofthesystem.Therulesofthetruth-seekinggamearedesignedtosteerclearofanyinvestigationintothestateapparatus.Therefore,denialwillcontinuetobeamechanismforevadingresponsibility.Intheabsenceofaprocessofpoliticaltransition(inwhichtherewouldbeadeepandrealcommitmenttorevealthetruthandacknowledgeallatrocities),hidinglinksbetweentheestablishmentandtheparamilitarystructureswillcontinue tobepartof theofficial regimeofdenial.ConfrontingthisprocessofdenialisoneofthemostintensechallengesthatthefieldoftransitionaljusticefacesinColombia.

V. Transitional Justice Manipulated: The Path to Rights Devalued and Neutralized Victims

What is done in the name of the victims is not necessarily what wouldbenefit themthemost.Andpreciselyfor that reason,muchcaremustbe takenwheninvokingtheirnameandinterests.Inthenameofthevictims,punishmentsaremadeharsher,dueprocessviolationsarejustified,andactsofreconciliationand pardon are carried out without their consent.

TheJusticeandPeaceLawisrepletewithrousingrhetoricabouttherightstotruth,justice,andreparation.However,theprocessofapplyingthelawhasnotresulted in thematerializationofbasiccoreof these rights.On thecontrary, it

46 Cohenalsoaddressestheeffectsofmodernmediaintheconsolidationofthestateofdenial.See Cohen, supra note 13.

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hasgeneratedloweredstandardsjustifiedbyargumentsofpragmatism,necessity,orflexibility. In this framework, applicationof the Justice andPeaceLawhasgivenrisetomutationofthebasiccontentofthevictims’rightstotruth,justice,and reparation. Concepts are replaced by a series of clichés, limited in theirsubstantivecontent,whichleadstoafalsesenseofdefendingvictims’rights.47 The applicationofthelawinvolvesasophisticatedprocessofnamingandredefinitionofthevictims’rights.Inthewordsofonevictim(referringtotruth,justice,andreparation),“forusitisonethingandforthegovernmentitisanother.”

For example, in the one andonly reparationhearing to date resulting fromtheestablishmentofcriminalliabilityundertheJusticeandPeacescheme,thetrialChamber limitedtheavailable judicialreparationviastandardsof“administrativeconvenience”,explicitlymovingdeterminationsofvictims’rightsfromthejudicialtotheadministrativerealm.(Thisprocessisreferredtoas“administrativization of rights”intheSpanishlanguage.)IntheonlyJusticeandPeacesentenceissued,thecourtshowedaninclinationtowarddevaluingtherightsofvictims.48Inthisruling,theChamberacceptedthereparationcriteriaadoptedbytheCouncilofStatebutreducedbeneficiarypaymentsbyhalfandestablishedaceilingoffiftymonthlyminimumlegalwagesformoraldamagesforeachaffectedfamily.49TheChamberjustifiedthedevaluationofexistingcivilliabilitystandardsbasedonpragmaticcriteriarelatedtoeconomicrealities.50Thepragmaticargument,madeintheabstract,ishardlyjustifi-cationfornotfollowingcontrollinglegalnormsoncivildamagesfollowingcriminalliability.51FortheJusticeandPeaceChambertocuttheamountoftheawardinhalfignoresthebasicprincipleoflegalityandputsthevictimsinasituationofinequalityanddisadvantageinrelationtoothervictims.Thevictims’righttoobtainjudicialreparationswithintheframeworkoftheJusticeandPeaceLawisbeingunjustlycon-ditionedoncriteriaofconvenienceratherthanequalityandaccesstojustice.

47 AlessandroBaratta,inhisanalysisofcriminaljusticesystems,capturestheessenceofthismentaloperationthatendsupdevaluatingthecontentofrights.SeeAlessandroBaratta,Política criminal: entre la política de seguridad y la política social, in delIto y seGurIdad de los habItantes 82 (EliasCarranzaed.,1997).Barattastressestheroleofideology,whichhedefinesas“adiscursiveconstructionofsocialfactsthatlendsitselftoafalseawarenessamongtheactorsandthepublic.”Hegoesontosaythat“[i]deologyoperatesbyreplacingconceptswithclichés,orinotherwordswithmentalhabits,corruptingtheclassifyingcalculationwithhiddenandsurreptitiousoperations.Thatiswhyitsformofoperatingbecomesaprincipalinstrumentforlegitimizingandreproducingthesocialreality.”Id.

48 Superior Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá, Justice and Peace Chamber, no.11001600253200680526,SpeakerMagistrateEduardoCastellanosRosso, (Mar.19,2009) (caseagainstWilsonSalazar).ThisrulingwasannulledbytheSupremeCourtonappeal.SupremeCourtofJustice,CriminalCassationChamber,no.31539,SpeakerMagistrateAugustoIbáñez(July31,2009).ThereasonsgivenbytheSupremeCourtinitsrulingdonotrefertotheconclusionsoftheDistrictCourt intermsofdamages; therefore, itmaybeassumedthat itsreasoningwillbethesameinfuturedecisions.

49 Id.para.208.50 Id.para.207.51 CódigoPenal(CriminalCode),Law599of2000,art.97.

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Subjectingtherighttojustreparationtoadministrativeconvenience–andthusdevaluingthecontentoftheright–isfurtherevidencedviatheregulationandinstitutional practice of such administrative reparation determination.ThroughDecree 1290 of 2008, the government adopted “the program of individualreparation through administrative channels for the victims of organized illegalarmedgroups.”

First, this program establishes an equivalency between reparation and areducedcompensationpayment.Byconcentratingallreparationmeasuresintoamonetarypayment,theprogram’sdesignmovesawayfromtherealcontentoftherighttoreparation.Offeringreparationinthiswayleavesoutimportantsymbolicaspectsofparadigmatictransitionaljusticereparationsandagainallowsthestateto avoid acknowledging its official responsibility. It is problematic to promisereparations inacontextofconflictandextremepoverty—as in theColombiancase— consisting of a mass payment of monetary sums without any sort ofsocialsupporttothebeneficiaries.Internationalexperienceemphasizesthat,“itis how individuals perceive that their suffering is being understood, accepted,and acknowledged in the social and political context that is one of the mostimportantfactorsindetermininghowreparationswillbesoughtandaccepted.”52 Reparationsforvictimsinothercountriesundertheframeoftransitionaljusticeinvolvedslow,painful,andcostlymeasuresforthenationalgovernment.Thosegovernmentsthattookonwide-scalereparationsasapoliticalprogramassumed,aboveall,recognitionofallofthevictimsandofofficialresponsibilityfortheirvictimization.53ReparationsinColombiamustgeneratethenecessaryconditionsforofficialrecognitionofvictimsandacknowledgementofresponsibility,andthefurtheranceofsocialcoexistence.

Greatcaremustbetakenwithreparationprocesses,especiallywhendealingwiththeprovisionofsumsofmoneytopeoplewithunmetbasicneeds.Paymentsmust be made, but in such a way that guarantees dignity -- emphasizing theperson’sautonomy,theirself-determination.Whenapersonreceivingmoneyisinasituationofneed,themeasurescomplementarytothecompensationbecomeevenmoreimportantthantheywouldbeabsenttheinfluxofmoney.

Second, thesereducedcompensationpaymentsare thesameas those thattheStateisalreadyobligatedtopayashumanitarianaid,withintheframeworkofLaw418of1997andensuingregime.Manyofthevictimsarefamiliarwiththese payments; they commonly call them “payment for the dead.”Althoughmanyvictimshaveappliedforthispaymentandreceivedit,theyhaveneverdoneso under the banner of reparation.Currently, the executive branch is equating

52 Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and the Macro: A Psychological Perspective on Reparations in Societies in Transition, in InternatIonal Center for transItIonal JustICe, the handbooK on reparatIons576(2006).

53 See generallyPabloDeGreiff,Justice and Reparations,in the handbooK on reparatIons, supra note52.

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humanitarian assistance provided in the past with the process of solidaritycompensationthatitbeganlastyear.Inrecentspeeches,PresidentUribestressedthat Acción Socialhasalreadypaidoutmillionsofpesos to39,000victimsofhomicides.54Thesepayments,whichrepresentanimportantofficialeffort,werelikelyusefultothevictimswhoreceivedthem.Butthepaymentswerereceivedashumanitarianassistanceandnotasreparations.Inrenamingthesesamepaymentsas “reparations”whatwas previously done under the heading of humanitarianassistance,thegovernmentmakestheprocessmurkieranddistortsitsobligationtoassistandmitigatethesufferingofvictimsoftheconflict.

In contextsof armedconflict such asColombia’s, initiating a reparationsprogramshouldgohand-in-handwithimplementingothermeasuresforprevention,protection, and humanitarian assistance for the victims.Mixing the reparationeffortwiththeobligationtoprovidehumanitarianassistancetothevictimsmustbeavoidedatallcost.Thesearetwotypesofverydifferentstateinterventions:humanitarianassistanceistemporaryrelief,whereasreparationmustcontributetoaprocessofindividualandsocialreconstructioninthelongterm.

These two examples, the reduction of the amounts of compensation fordamagesthroughjudicialchannelsandtheequatingofadministrativereparationtooldstandardsofhumanitarianassistance,demonstratetheprocessofdevaluingthevictims’rights.Theyillustratethedistancebetweenwhatisofficiallyofferedandwhatthevictimsexpect.Asanexample,apeasantleaderfromtheAtlanticcoast,inresponsetoaquestionabouthisexpectationswithrespecttotheJusticeand Peace Law, said: “While they speak of reparation and reconciliation, thedisplacedcontinueontheirway,seekingtheirrights.”55

Finally,alongwithdevaluingofthevictims’rights,officialspokespersonsfromtheexecutivebranchandentitieschargedwithreparationandreconciliationin Colombia attempt to neutralize the victims. On several occasions, the aimhas been to transfer responsibility for the success (or failure) of a supposedreconciliation to the behavior of the victims. This transmission of guilt andresponsibilityhasbeenevidentinothercontexts;inhisearlywritingsondenial,Cohenwarnedthattheperpetrators,defendersoftheregime,orordinarycitizensuse neutralization techniques to ignore the victims’ suffering and demand thattheybehaveinaccordancewiththeimposedforgiveness.56

54 President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Address commemorating the beginning of administrativereparationsforvictimsofviolence,Popayán,July5,2009;PresidentÁlvaroUribeVélez,Addressat theawardingofsettlementsforvictimsofviolencethroughadministrativeaction,Montería,July12,2009.ThespeechesareavailableattheWebsiteoftheOfficeofthePresident,http://web.presidencia.gov.co/especial/victimas/index.html.

55 Authorinterview,Sincelejo,Sucre(Apr.12,2007).56 SeeStanleyCohen,Human Rights and Crimes of the State: Culture of Denial,in CrImInoloGICal

perspeCtIVes: a reader 500 (JohnMuncie,EugeneMcLaughlin,&MaryLanganeds.,2001).

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Nationalpublicopinionleadsustobelievethatsocietythinksthataftertheatrociousviolenceperpetratedagainstthevictims,itismoreimportanttofocuson the supposed intolerance of the victims,who stubbornly refuse to forgive.This process not only minimizes the victims’ suffering but also neutralizesthe perpetrators’ responsibility and leads to a cover-up of the past. This typeof manifestation comes from diverse sectors that demand “good” behavior(understoodasobediencetotheobjectivesdeterminedbythegovernment)andattackfreedomofexpressionandtheexerciseofdenunciation.

At the beginning of his mandate as theVice President’s delegate to theNational Reconciliation and Reparation Commission (Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación y Reparación – CNRR), Eduardo Pizarro wrote a newspapercolumn,ostensiblyontoleranceinUganda,expressingtheviewthatthefailureoftheColombianpeaceprocesslayinthehandsofhumanrights“fundamentalists”who demanded too much justice.57Why does the president of theCNRR feelthathemustdiscredit theworkofhumanrightsorganizations thatdemand theapplicationofbasiclegalstandardsassociatedwithtruth,justice,andreparation?His reference to fundamentalist is at best awkward and it is not clear that hisonly intention is to differentiate those who are object of his attack fromrelativistsorrevisionists.Ashisargumentgoes,heblamesthosehedesignatesas“fundamentalists”forcondemningthecountryto“perpetualwar”.Thisdiscourseofhumanrightsfundamentalismwasputforthbyparamilitarycommanders,onlyafewdaysbeforePizarro’scolumn, inanAUCeditorialon thesubject.58 This similaritybetweentheopinionofthepresidentoftheCNRRandtheparamilitariesis,attheveryleast,undesirable.

In yet another instanceof neutralization, Jaime JaramilloPanesso, also amember of theCNRR,wrote in column in theElMundo newspaper, that thegoalsofthosevictims’organizationswhocriticizedparamilitarydemobilization“arenotreparationandreconciliation,butratherpartisanaffiliationandvindictiveandsectarianagitation.”59Incontrastwiththeseaccusationsagainstthevictims’associations,inthesamearticleheaffirmsthattheCNRR’srelationswithwhathe calls the “National Movement of Demobilized Self-defense Groups” are“positive,”“ofmutualrespect,”comprise“levelsofcivic-mindednessandhope.”Hefinishedbyproposingthatitfallbackupontheparamilitariestodeterminethelimitsof“feasiblereparation.”

57 EduardoPizarroLeongómez,El caso de Uganda renueva la discusión del tema de la justicia y la paz,el tIempo,July17,2006;EduardoPizarroLeongómez,La ceguera del fundamentalismo,el tIempo,July17,2006.

58 Commanders of the AUC, Las ‘víctimas de Estado’: un capítulo más de la novela del fundamentalismo humanitario, July 13, 2006, http://www.colombialibre.net/detalle_col.php?banner=Editorial&id=15006.

59 JaimeJaramilloPanesso,LaCNRRenmarcha,el mundo,Aug.13,2006.

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Theopinionsof these twomembersof theCNRRreflectanupside-downworld: theparamilitariesofhopewilldeterminewhatreparationtheywillgivethevictimsofdespairandthevictimsaretobehavethemselvesandstopcausingsomuchagitation.

Theaforementionedexamplesillustrateasadrealityloudlyandclearly:aprocessofneutralizationisbeingcarriedoutagainstthevictims.Ifthetrueintentionof theofficial transitional justicearrangement is todealwithparamilitarism, itmustalsodealwiththerealityoftheseprocessesofneutralization,justification,and normalization, and distance themselves from the clichés of “forgive andforget”.OnemorechallengeofapplyingtransitionaljusticetoolsinColombiaisgivingthevictimsthecentralroletheymustoccupyindeterminingtheappropriatereparationmeasuresandtheirimplementation.

Colombiadoesnothavetheluxuryofignoringthevictimsandtheirdemands.ElieWiesel,asurvivoroftheNaziconcentrationcamps,uponreceivingtheNobelPeacePrizein1986,statedthat“[w]hatall...victimsneedaboveallistoknowthat theyarenotalone; thatwearenotforgetting them, thatwhentheirvoicesarestifledweshalllendthemours,thatwhiletheirfreedomdependsonours,thequalityofourfreedomdependsontheirs.”60

Ihopethiswillcreateanopportunitytoreflect:whatplacedothevictimshave inColombian society and in the search for truth, justice, and reparationbeingimplementedviatheofficialtransitionaljusticearrangement?

A Word in Conclusion: In a Somber Setting, Some Positive Signs

Despite the dark context, there are some signs of positive developments,particularlyderivingfrompublicdebatesonparamilitaryactivitiesandstructures(withvaryingdegreesofopenness)andtherolethatthevictims(bothasindividualagents and in association) have assumed in order to demand respect for theirrights.

Firstofall,thedemandsandclaimsofthevictimsnowhavegreatervisibility,duetoconcertedeffortsofnationalmovements,aswellaslocalmanifestations.Likewise,thereisrecognitionoftheworkofsocialorganizationsandhumanrightsorganizationsthatforyearshavebeendenouncingparamilitarisminColombia.Norcanweunderestimatethesignificantsupportfromtheinternationalcommunityinvalidatingtherightstotruth, justice,andreparation,throughofficialaswellasunofficialinitiatives.

Secondly, therehavebeenlocaldemonstrationsrejectingthetiesbetweenthesecurityforcesandtheparamilitaries.Andevenmoreimportantly,criminal

60 elIe wIesel, nIGht20(2006)(reproductionoftheNobelPeacePrizeAcceptanceSpeechdeliveredbyElieWieselinOsloonDecember10,1986).

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proceedings started against politicians known to have backed paramilitarism.ThesestepsforwardhavemadeitpossibleforthehumanrightsadvocatestobegintouncoverthemultiplelevelsoftheparamilitarystructureinColombiaanditslinkswiththepoliticalandeconomicelites.

Lastly, thedebatesaround theJusticeandPeaceLawhave led toexplicitrecognition of the constitutional value of the victims’ rights to truth, justice,andreparation,andtotheincorporationofthevictims’rightsintheinstitutionalagendasoftheState,ifnottherealizationoftheserightsjustyet.However,theroadaheadfortransitionaljusticeinColombiaisadverse,andwillrequirefacingthegreatestchallengesyetinordertoachievethedesiredgoals:recognitionofthevictimsandoftheirsuffering,andcontainmentoftheregimeofdenialthathasbeeninstalled.

Gendered Transitional Justice and the Non-State Actor

Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Catherine O’Rourke

To date, feminist interventions aimed at shaping the field and scope oftransitionaljusticehaveconcentratedonwideningtherangeofharmsvisibleintheprocessofsocietaltransformation.Tothisend,activatinginternationalaccountabilityanddeepeningdomesticcriminalizationofsexualviolenceintimesofconflictandsocietal repression was an early priority.1Inasimilarvein,thefeministagendahasalsoprioritizedexploring the relationshipofgender to truth-telling, toamnesty,and to peacemaking. More recently, efforts to engender reparations programshavebroughtlightandheattoarangeofharmsexperiencedbywomenthatweretypicallyignoredinpriorprograms,includinglossofthecapacitytobearchildrenorthecostsofbearingchildrenbornofsexualviolation.2Therehavebeeneffortstobringarangeofnon-physicalharms,suchasfamilialseparationorforcednudity,withintheuniverseofharmscapturedbytransitionaljustice.3Increasingfeministattention to the category of socioeconomic harms and their disproportionateimpactonwomen isalsoa featureofcontemporaryanalysis.4Feministcritiquehasconsistently focusedon the tendencyof legalcategories to“privatize”suchharms—toregardthemasapoliticalandunrelatedtotheactsofmass(political)violenceforwhichtransitionaljusticemeasuresseekaccountability—thusleavingabroadrangeofharmsthataredisproportionatelyexperiencedbywomenoutsidethepurviewoftransitionaljustice.Theidentificationofgenderpatternsintermsofwhichharmsarevisibletotransitionaljusticeandwhichareleftuntouchedhasbeenoneofthecentralfeministcontributionstothefield.

Bycontrast,feministinterventionshaveassumedaremarkablynarrowsetofactorsandinstitutionsofresponsibility.Manydevicescommontothetransi-tionaljusticelandscape—amnesty,truth-recovery,internationalcriminaljustice,

1 See Kelly dawn asKIn, war CrImes aGaInst women proseCutIon In InternatIonal war CrImes (1997);FrançoiseKrill,The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law,249Int’l reV. red Cross 337(1985).

2 Ruth Rubio-Marin, The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies, in the Gender of reparatIons: unsettlInG sexual hIerarChIes whIle redressInG human rIGhts VIolatIons 63 (RuthRubio-Marined.,2009);see alsoColleenDuggan,ClaudiaPazyPazBailey&JulieGuillerot,Reparations for Sexual and Reproductive Violence: Prospects for Achieving Gender Justice in Guatemala and Peru,2Int’l J. transItIonal Just. 192,200-01(2008).

3 FionnualaNíAoláin,Sex-Based Violence and the Holocaust: A Reevaluation of Harms and Rights in International Law,12yale J.l. & femInIsm43(2000).

4 ChristineChinkin,TheProtectionofEconomic,Social,andCulturalRightsPost-Conflict,PaperfortheOfficeoftheHighCommissioneronHumanRights’Women’sHumanRightsandGenderUnit(2008),available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women.

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reconstruction, rule-of-law reform, security-sector reform, and reparations—positthestateasthesiteandconduitoftransition.Inthistypology,transitionaljusticeisaprocessbywhichthestateisrenderedcoherentandlegitimate.Femi-nistinterventionsinthefieldoftransitionaljusticehavetendedtoassumethestate;thestateisseenasthelocusforreformandtheentitythatismostcapableof and necessary to delivering transformation forwomen. Examples of suchinterventionsincludeadvocacyfortoughermeasuresofindividualcriminalac-countabilityforsexualviolence,genderanalysisintruthcommissions,policyprescriptionsforreparationsprograms,andadvocacyforprioritizinganendtogenderharmsinsecurity-sectorreform.Wesuggestthatmanyoftheseinterven-tionsassumeafunctionalstateasthesine qua non for successful transition as measuredbyandforwomen.

Wepositthatthissingularfocusonthestatecanobscurearangeofotherimportantactorsrelevanttosecuringtransitionandmayoverestimatetheextenttowhichthestateiscapableofdeliveringonfeministexpectations.IntheColombiancaseandmultipleothercontexts,astate-centricfocusoftransitionaljusticefailstoengagewiththepracticalrealitythatthestatemaybefracturedanddividedandthatnon-stateentitiesplayasmuchofaroleinendingandsupportingconflictasdoesthestate.Inmanycontexts,includingtheColombian,non-stateactorsmayhave“effectivecontrol”ofterritory,mayexercisequasi/state-likefunctions,arerecognizedashavingdefactoautonomy,andarebroughtintopeacenegotiationsand conflict-ending processes on that basis. The imposition of legal norms insuch situationsmay depend on an inconsistent or downgradedmatrix of stateenforcementincompetitionorinparallelwithappropriationoflaworforcenormsby the non-state actor in their spheres of influence.So, prior to any transitiononeshouldnotpresumethatthestatehasbeencapableofenforcinglawinanymeaningfulwaythroughoutitssovereignterritory—quitetheoppositemayinfactbethecase.Wesuggestthatthequalityandextentofstatecapacitytoenforcelegalnormspriortoatransitionandthedegreeandscopeofcontrolexercisedbynon-stateactorsareimportantunderlyingdimensionsthatunderpinthedifficultiesinsecuringlegalaccountabilityintransitionalcontextsingeneral,andforwomeninparticular.Specifically,inthischapterweassertthatgreaterattentionneedstobepaidtosecuringandenforcingaccountabilitymechanismsforgenderedviolationscommittedbynon-stateactors.

This chapter interrogates the framework provided by international law5 for addressing the gendered violence of non-state actors and is intended asa constructive intervention for feminist efforts to enhance accountability forviolenceagainstwomen.Inordertomakethegroundbreakinglegaldevelopmentsofthepasttwodecadesmoremeaningfulforsituationsofongoingviolencewe

5 OurfocusthereforeisonthenatureoftheColombianState’sinternationallegalcommitmentsasopposedtothedomesticcriminalizationofinternationallaw.

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mustpaygreaterattentiontothelimitsofthestate’sreachandconsiderinnovativesolutionstobettercaptureharmsbynon-stateactors.Tothisend,wedrawontheparadigmaticcaseofColombiatoillustratethegapsinaccountabilitythatemergewithrespecttoviolenceagainstwomenandthenon-stateactorinarmedconflict.

Part I will offer a brief introduction to the gendered gaps of negotiatedtransitionwith non-state actors and present theColombian case as exemplary.InPart IIweconsider thegeneral regimeofaccountabilityunder internationalhumanitarian law and focus on how commitments to minimum humanitarianstandards might bring greater accountability measures for ongoing acts ofviolenceagainstwomenperpetratedbyguerrillagroupswhentheapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawiscontested.PartIIIthendealswithimputedstateliabilityfortheviolenceofnon-stateactors.Wefocusonthepersistentviolenceofthenon-stategroupsininternalarmedconflictsituations—particularlyviolenceexperienceddisproportionatelybywomen—andidentifytheattendantcomplexityof holding such groups and individuals accountable during transition. Thissectionconcludesbyexamininghowthehorizontalapplicationofhumanrightsobligationscanbemoreeffectivelyexploited to secure stateaccountability formultipleformsofviolenceagainstwomenwithindemilitarizationzones.

I. Gendered Dimensions of Negotiated Transition

For amore considered appreciationof the capacity and limitationsof thestate,itisimportanttofocusononefoundationalaspectoftheliberal(democratic)state, and a vision that undergirds the “from” and “to” of many transitionalcontexts—namely the public/private distinction. The delineation of public andprivateharmsintransitionaljusticediscoursedrawsonalonggenealogyofpublicandprivatespheresinliberalpoliticaldiscourseandiscriticaltothestructuringof political transformation.This distinction has had important implications forthetypesofharmsretrospectivelyidentifiedintransitionaljusticeaccounting.Incontextswheretransitional justiceis institutedin themidstofongoingconflict,gendereddistinctionsaroundpublicandprivateharmsareembeddedinthepoliticalcompromise that underpins transitional justice. The political compromise thenshapesthelegalandpoliticalarrangementsthatbecomeembeddedandnormalizedinsteady-statetransitionaljustice,asthestatemovestowardsits“new”normal.

Transitionisdefinedasamovementawayfromviolenceandtoward(liberal)democraticstatehood.However, theviolencetobeendedfallswithinanarrowrangeofpublicharmsandtransitionisusuallypremisedontheendingofpubliccommunal violence between (generally) male combatants.6 Paradigmatically

6 See CynthIa CoCKburn, the spaCe between us: neGotIatInG Gender and natIonal IdentItIes In ConflICt(2003).

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transitionshavefrequentlybeenpremisedonthedealthatisstruckbetweenthestateandnon-stateactor(s).Peacedealsandpoliticalcompromisesthatprecedetransitionaljusticeprocessesinevitablyidentifyandprivilegeaparticularsetofactors, acrossboth the state andnon-state spectrum.The exigenciesof endingviolenceoftenmeanthatthefirsttestofpeacenegotiationswillbetheeffectivenessoftheprocessingettingtheviolentactorsaroundatableand,secondly,partytoanagreement.Theveryoutsidersthatweredeeplyinvolvedinviolentactivitiesare rewarded by remaking the state and its structures inways that bring non-stateactors,whosesupportisdeemedindispensableandmustthereforebeearned,intothemainstream.Theviolenceofcourseinvariablyinvolvesharmsdirectedtowardswomen.Hence,the“deal”isoftenadealforboysandnotforgirls,asamatterbothofsubstanceandrepresentation.

These two realities—the gendered categorization of public/private harmsandtheenduringinfluenceofthenon-stateactorintransition—combinetocreateaparticularlyprecarioussecuritysituationforwomen incontextsof limitedorfracturedstatecapacity.While thepeacedealmaytransformrelationsbetweenviolent (generallymale) actors, itwill likely do very little to transform socialrelationswithinzonesgeographicallyandpoliticallycontrolledbyviolentnon-stateactors.Further, thepolitical compromiseat theheartof thepeacedeal isbasedonaclearhierarchyofpublicoverprivateharms.

Suchobservationssuggestaneedtointerrogatethecomposition,capacity,andaccountabilityofthestateintransition.Giventheenduringinfluenceofthenon-state actor, re-establishing the state’smonopoly on coercion is secured inpracticebybringingthenon-stateactorwithin thestate.Theboundariesof thestate are therefore negotiated andnegotiable.The state’smalleable boundariescreateaccountabilitygapsasamatterofprincipleandpractice in internationallaw,which chieflyposits the state as the site andconduit of accountability. Ingeneral,acrossthetwomostrelevantinternationallegalframeworksintransitionalsettings—human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL)7—thereisaregulatorygaporat leastaslimmerbodyofnormsthatapplytonon-stateactors than to stateactors. Inmost functional societies, thisaccountabilitygapbetween the state and the non-state actor, while not irrelevant to the generalefficiency of the rule of law (and with substantial consequences for women),doesnot create amassive lacuna in legal regulation.The samecannotbe saidof transitional societies. In these societies, precisely because the local rule oflawmaybecompromisedordegradedandenforcementof“ordinary”rulesmaybe limited, international legalnormsare frequentlycalledupon tofill thegap.

7 WenotethatasColombiaratifiedtheRomeStatutein2002,thoughexercisingitsdiscretionunderarticle124oftheStatutetopostponeforsevenyearsthejurisdictionoftheCourtoverwarcrimescommittedwithinthecountry.ConsiderationbytheICCmayofferasubstantivefuturerouteforviolenceagainstwomentobeconsidered.

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Equally,theroleandinfluenceofthenon-stateactor(particularlywithrespecttotheinflictionofforce)willbemarkedlyhigher.Thusthepresence,centrality,andlackofcaptureoftheactionsofthenon-stateactorareenormouslysignificant,andinourviewunder-appreciated.

TheColombiancaseisparadigmaticofsuchdilemmasandgaps.Sixdecadesofmulti-actor andmulti-causal violence inColombia set the backdrop to thecontemporaryprocessoftransitionaljusticeinthecountry.Multiplecompetingactorswithbothmilitarycapacityandpoliticalpower,operatinginparallelorinoppositiontotheState,haveunderminedanyclaimbytheStatetothemonopolyoncoercion.Strongregionalvariationsinthecountry,intermsofwealth,ethnicprofile,statepresence,andconflictdensity furthererodeColombianclaims tostatehood.Inaddition,stateinstitutionsaremarkedbyhighlevelsofcorruptionandlowlevelsofpopularconfidence.ConflictviolencehasreinforcedpopularalienationfromtheState.Themultiplicityofviolentstateandnon-stateactorsposes particular challenges to securing accountability for violence againstwomen,aformofviolencethathastraditionallyeludedaccountabilityeveninsettled states.

Colombiaisalsoexemplaryoftheformsandlimitationsofscrutinyrenderedbytheinternationallegalregimeapplicabletothedomainoftransitionaljustice.ColombiaispartytotheGenevaConventionsandProtocolIIaswellofnearlyallcorehumanrights’treaties.Regionalhumanrightsbodiesfrequentlyadjudicateontheapplicabilityofhumanrightsnormstothecountryandtotheconflict.Colombiais therefore exemplaryof the scrutiny renderedby the applicable internationallegalregimesrelevanttothedomainoftransitionaljustice.The“capture”oftheselegalnormscutacrossthestate/non-statedistinction.ThenatureoftheColombianconflictandthestate’sinternationallegalcommitmentsmaketheColombiancaseparticularlyrelevanttoassessingandaddressingthesortsofaccountabilityissuesthatemergeinacontextoftransitioninwhichthearmednon-stateactor(s)hasanenduringpresence.

Below we discuss expanding and capitalizing on humanitarian law’scapture of the non-state actor, the first of our two suggested areas forimprovement.

II. Humanitarian Law Accountability and Minimum Humanitarian Standards: Capturing the Harms of the Non-state Actor

Thefollowingsection(A)describesthenatureofinternationalhumanitarianlaw’s(IHL)treatmentofnon-stateactorscommittinggenderharmsandidentifiescurrentgapsinaccountability.Thesecondpartofthisanalysis(B)presentsthreepossibletargetsforfeministintervention.

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A. Diagnosis of the Gaps and Current State of IHL

Thepanoramaoutlinedbelowrevealsamyriadofharmscommittedagainstwomenbynon-stateactorsinconflictsituations.AlthoughthereissomefoundationinIHLforcapturingtheharmscommittedbynon-stateactorsandgenderedharms,thereareimportantgapsintheframeworkandnorms.Additionally,bothstatesandnon-stateactorsdemonstrateareluctancetoaccept,orinpracticealowlevelofcommitmentto,IHLstandards.Wewilladdresseachprobleminturn.

1.HarmsSufferedbyWomeninConflict

It is generallyunderstood that the experienceof and fall-out fromviolentconflict is particularly extreme formanywomen.8There are numerous conflictharms that are suffered disproportionately or exclusively bywomen, includingforced displacement, penetrative sexual violence, sexual mutilation, forcedpregnancy,sexually transmitteddiseases,sexualdysfunction,and lossofstatus,socialostracism,orculturalpunishmentasaresultofaperceivedlossofpurity.Despiteabroadswatheofresearchontheeffectsofconflictviolencegenerally,9 wehavelittlegooddataontheattributionofresponsibilityforgender-basedharmsasbetweenstateandnon-stateforcesingeneral,andevenlessinformationinthecontextofspecificinternalconflicts.Wealsohavelimitedempiricaldataonwhetherdifferentpatternsoftransgressionmanifestforwomendependingonwhetheritisastateoranon-stateactorperpetratingtheviolenceinquestion.Nonetheless,abroadsweep of journalistic, non-governmental, and anecdotal evidence confirms thatwomenincreasinglyexperiencetraumaticandwidespreadviolationsperpetratedbynon-stateactorsacrossawidevarietyofconflicttypesandlocations.10

ParticularcharacteristicsoftheColombianconflicthavecreatedanacutecri-siswithinthecivilianpopulation,specificallyforwomenandgirls.11Conflictinthecountryrarelyinvolvesdirectconfrontationbetweenthedifferentarmedgroups;rather thesearmedgroupssettle their scoresbyattackingcivilianssuspectedofsupportingtheotherside.Althoughmenarethemostcommonvictimsofsummary

8 See generally the aftermath: women In post-ConflICt transformatIon (Sheila Meintjes,MeredethTurshen&AnuPillayeds.,2002).

9 See, e.g.,women In an InseCure world: VIolenCe aGaInst women faCts, fIGures and analysIs (MarieVlachova&LeaBiasoneds.,2005).

10 Secretary-General,Report of the Secretary-General on Advancement of Women: In-depth study on All Forms of Violence against Women,U.N.Doc.A/61/122/Add.1(6July2006);ElizabethRehn&EllenJohnsonSirleaf,UNIFEM,ProgressoftheWorld’sWomenSeries,Vol.1,Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace Building(2002).

11 UN Special Rapporteur on Violence againstWomen Radhika Coomaraswamy,Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/49, Addendum: Mission toColombia(1-7Nov.2001),U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3(Mar.11,2002).

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executionsandmassacres,violenceagainstwomen,particularlysexualviolencebyarmedgroups,hasbecomeacommonpracticewithinthecontextofaslowlydegradingconflictandalackofrespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw.12

Abductionofwomen,detentioninconditionsofsexualslavery,andforceddomesticlabor,arecharacteristicofthetreatmentofwomenbyparamilitaryforces.13 Survivorsexplainhowparamilitariesarriveinavillage,completelycontrolandterrorizethepopulation,andcommithumanrightsabuseswithtotalimpunity.14 Guerillagroupshavecarriedoutkidnappings, indiscriminateattacksthataffectthecivilianpopulation,andarbitraryanddeliberatekillingsofthosetheyaccuseofsidingwiththeirenemies.Theyaretheprincipalperpetratorsofabductionandforcedrecruitmentofchildren,infringementofwomen’sreproductiverights,andkidnappingforextortionpurposes.15Manyfemalecombatantsinbothguerillaandparamilitary forcessuffer sexualabuseand infringementsof their reproductiverights.Forcedcontraception,sterilization,andabortionareparticularlyassociatedwithguerillagroups.16

Both groups are responsible for forcible displacement of civiliancommunities. Colombia has the largest internally displaced population in thewesternhemisphere,currentlyestimatedatover3.5millionpeople.Themajorityof thedisplaced are female.Thesewomenandgirls are subjected tomanifoldformsofviolence.Internallydisplacedwomenareatmuchgreaterriskofsexualabuse,rape,andbeingforcedintoprostitutionbecauseoftheirparticularsocialandeconomicvulnerability.17

2.Humanitarian Law’s Treatment of theNon-StateActor andGenderHarms

IncontrasttothismyriadofviolentharmsperpetratedagainstColombianwomenbynon-stateactors, there is abias to theaccountabilitydimensionsoftheinternationallegalsystemwhosenormsandmechanismdonot“catch”theseharms.Thisisnotanewobservation,noris itsurprising.WithitsWestphalianroots,theinternationalsystemwasstructuredaroundthecentralityofstatesandstate actors with evident seepage to accountability. International legal norms,specifically in thefieldofhumanrights,giveaclear treatybasisonwhich thecontractingstatecanbeheldaccountableforawidevarietyofviolationsrelated

12 Id.at2.13 Id.at12.14 Id.15 Id. at 14.16 amnesty InternatIonal, broKen bodIes, shattered mInds: torture and Ill-treatment of

women27-28(2001).Forexample,AmnestyInternationalreportsthat,outofagroupof65girlswhohadlefttheguerrillas,allhadhadintrauterinedevicesinserted,someagainsttheirwillandwithoutbeinggiveninformationaboutthedevice.Id.

17 Id.at29.

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to human dignity.18 International humanitarian law also gives a clear basis fortheenforcementofhumanitariannormsthroughthegravebreachessystem,butitisbroadlyaimedatStatesPartiestothetreaties.19Asaresult,mechanismsofaccountabilitywereprimarilydesignedtocapturetheactionsofstateactorscon-sistentwithatraditionalverticalnotionofstateresponsibilityunderinternationallaw.20Withtheemergenceofthenon-stateactorasaparticularthreat,mostnota-blyintheareasofterrorism,thisgapisofincreasingconcern.

TheGenevaConventionsof1949wereprimarilyfocusedontheprotectionofciviliansandhors de combat,viewingthestateastheprimarysourceofthreatto the safety and integrity of such vulnerable groups.21 By 1979, through theAdditionalProtocolstotheGenevaConventions,Statesagreedthatcertainnon-state groups, specifically national liberationmovements and similarly situatedorganizationscouldbeincludedwithintheambitofregulationbythelawsofwar.22 However,theseincludedgroupingswereessentiallyquasi/state-likeor,operatingincontexts(colonialoroccupation)inwhichitwasgenerallyacceptedthatpoliticalshiftswouldheraldachangeinpowertogovernmentsledbythosesamenon-stategroupings.Protocol IIAdditional to theGenevaConventionsof1979expandstheaccountabilityorbitbyregulatingawiderrangeofinternalconflicts,butonmore limited terms.23Asa resulthumanitarian lawhas thecapacity todirectly

18 InternationalCovenantonCivil andPoliticalRights,Dec.19,1966,999U.N.T.S.171,entered into forceMar.23,1976;EuropeanConventiononHumanRights,213U.N.T.S.222,entered into forceSept.3,1953; AmericanConventiononHumanRights,Nov.22,1969,1144U.N.T.S.143,entered into forceJuly18,1978);AfricanCharteronHumanandPeoples’Rights,1520U.N.T.S.217,entered into forceOct.21,1986.

19 See OrenGross,The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,16mICh. J. Int’l l. 783(1995).

20 See J. l. brIerly, the law of natIons49-56(6thed.,1978).21 frItz KahlshoVen & lIesbeth zeGVeld, ICrC, ConstraInts on the waGInG of war: an

IntroduCtIon to InternatIonal humanItarIan law (2001),available athttp://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0793.

22 Protocol1Article1on theGeneralprinciplesand scopeofapplication refers to those“armedconflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation andagainst racist regimes in the exerciseof their rightof self-determination.”ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII),1125U.N.T.S.609,entered into forceDec.7,1978.

23 ProtocolIIArticle1(1)statesthattheProtocolappliestoallarmedconflictswhicharenotcoveredbyArticle1of[ProtocolI]andwhichtakeplaceintheterritoryofaHighContractingPartybetweenitsarmedforcesand dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, underresponsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as toenable them to carry out sustained and concertedmilitary operations and toimplementthisProtocol.Article 1(2) notes that the Protocol “shall not apply to situations of internaldisturbancesandtensions,suchasriots,isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceandotheractsofasimilarnature,asnotbeingarmedconflicts.”

ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII),1125U.N.T.S.609,entered into forceDec.7,1978.

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and indirectlyhold somenon-state actors to account.This is facilitatedby thecapacityofjudicialbodiestoutilizethethreshold,organization,andmembershipcriteriaofhumanitarianlaw,mostoftenintandemwiththeapplicationofhumanrightsnormstotheactionsofnon-stateactorsthatreachthelegalthresholdfortheapplicationofProtocolII.24

Ifhumanitarianlawwereacceptedasapplicablebyallpartiesinaconflict,theremightbesomegeneralagreementbetweenstatesandnon-stateactorsonthenormsthatcannotbeviolatedandmechanismsinplaythatwould,intheory,address accountability.25Thiswould create an agreed ethical and legal contextinwhichbreacheswouldbeunderstoodaslegalviolationspotentiallysubjecttosanction.AsThe Roots of Behaviour in War, anauthoritativeICRCstudy,affirms,acoreelementofpreventingviolationsof thelawsofwar is tofocusmoreonlegalnormsratherthanonunderlyingvalues.26So,astartingpointforpreventionandredressisadvancingcommonagreementbetweencombatants,whetherstateornon-state,ontheapplicabilityofagreedlegalrules.

Weendorse theprinciple thatcreatinggreater leveragerequiringstates toaffirmtheapplicabilityofIHLisasensibleandimportantmechanismtothisend.In tandemwe also support greater efforts to encouragenon-state groupings toadhere to thenormsof theGenevaConventions(CommonArticle3),ProtocolIandProtocolIIwhentheconflictsfallwithintheirlegalthresholds.Significantbuy-inbystates,non-stategroups,andinternationalorganizationsofinfluencetoutilizeandreferencethesenormswouldbeprogressfortheprotectionofciviliansgenerally,andwomenspecifically.

Despitesomeprovisions,existingnormsarenotfullyadequatetoconfrontwomen’s experiences of harm in internal conflict. In general, IHL’s historicalneglectofharmsexperiencedbywomenpointstodeepandgenderedbiasesintheconstruction of the law of war.27Morerecently,therehasbeensignificantnormaugmentation.28However,therootsofsuchadditionshavebeenproblematically

24 ICTY,Prosecutorv.Tadic,CaseNo.IT-97-1-A,Judgment172-237(July15,1999)(includinginteraliaananalysisofthestatusofconflictfindingthattheCommonArticle3wasapplicabletotheconflicttakingplaceintheFormerYugoslaviaatthetimeoftheviolationsinquestion).

25 This speculation is largely theoretical in that few situations of internal armed conflict haveappliedsuchnormsandlittleornoaccountabilityhasbeensoughtintermsofeitherdomesticorinternationallegalprocess.

26 ICrC, the roots of behaVIour In war: understandInG and preVentInG Ihl VIolatIons(2004).27 SeeJudithGardham,Women and Armed Conflict: The Response of International Humanitarian

Law, in lIstenInG to sIlenCes: women and armed ConflICt 109-25 (HelenDurham&TraceyGurdeds.,2005).

28 SeeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryoftheFormerYugoslaviasince1991,U.N.DocS/25704,at36(May3,1993);StatuteoftheInternationalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryofRwanda,U.N.Doc.S/RES/955(Nov.6,1994).

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linkedtotheongoingconnectionmadebetweenwomen’spurityandhonor.29Asaresult,thecaptureofviolations(mostlysexual)excludeorignoremanygenderedharmsthatwomenthemselvesmightarticulateasequallyormoreharmful.

AlthoughIHLenvisagesarelativelybroadrangeofactorsbeing“caught”under its rubric, enforcement provisions are less encompassing.Additionally,substantialpoliticalandlegalobstaclesexisttothewillingnessofstatesandnon-stateactorstoacknowledgetheapplicabilityofIHLnormsandinpracticebuy-intothestandards.Below,weconsiderobstaclestotheapplicationofIHLgenerallyandinthespecificcontextofColombia.

3.StateResistancetotheApplicationofIHLandConsequencesforWomen

Stateshavelongresistedtheapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawnorms to the regulationofongoing internalarmedconflicts.30Stateshave longfelt threatenedbygrantingcombatantstatustopersonswhotheyfeelaremoreappropriatelycategorizedascriminalsorterrorists.Thishasmeantthatattemptstoexpandhumanitarianlaw’sambittoencompassnon-stategroupingshasbeenmetbyameasureofongoinghostilitybystates.Despitethis,wesuggestthatthereisroomforimprovementincompliancewithexistingnorms.

Thesedynamicsapplydirectly to theColombiancontext,where the statehas long-resisted the application of IHL. Given that the historic roots of theconflict31precedethenegotiationoftheGenevaConventions,andmorerelevantlyperhaps theAdditionalProtocols, the regulatory capacityof IHLhashad littleto sayabout (and/orhasnotdeployed toaddress) thehistoric rootsof conflictandtothemethodsandmeansofwarfaredeployedwithinit.Inparallelwiththepracticeofotherstates,Colombiahasgenerallysoughttoeschewtheapplicationofhumanitarianlaw,presumablyonthebasisthatitwouldlimitthescopeoftheStatetotreatinsurgentsandnon-stateactorsascriminalsundertheordinarylegal

29 The 1977DiplomaticConference expanding the protections of the laws ofwar to enumeratedinternalconflictsevidencedpreoccupationwiththefertileandexpectantwoman.TheConferenceacknowledged that women had to be given “special protection” because of their “specialsituation”—including “pregnant women, maternity cases and women who were in charge ofchildrenoflessthansevenyearsofageorwhoaccompaniedthem.”Theonlynotablemovementinthearticleconcernedwith“measuresinfavorofwomenandchildren”wastheinclusionofthephrase“specialrespect”forwomenratherthantheterm“honor.”Also,underArticle75oftheProtocolIrapeis includedunderthegeneralheadingofbeingacrimeagainst“dignity”ratherthan a crime against “honor.” This article also recognized the particular experience of forcedprostitutionbyspecificallyincludingitsprohibition.TheDiplomaticConferencegavelittleofitsattentiontothephysicalviolenceexperiencedbywomeninwar.

30 Examplesinclude:BritaininrelationtoNorthernIreland;MexicoinrelationtotheChiapasregion;RussiainrelationtoChechnya;andTurkeyinrelationtotheNorth-EastofTurkey,wherealargeKurdishpopulationislocated.

31 Theoriginsofthecontemporaryconflictaretypicallylocatedinthecivilwar(La Violencia) of 1948to1964.

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system.Despitethepersistenceoftheconflict,andtheintersectionofemergencylawandhumanitarianlawnormsinthesameperiod,theconflicthasbeenlargelyimmunetotheinfluenceandregulationofIHL.

Presidential peace initiatives in the early 1990s led to the ratification ofProtocolIItotheGenevaConventionsin1995aspartofalargerschemetorecognizeandaddress thepoliticalgrievancesof theguerrilla insurgents. Inpractice, theState’scommitmenttotheapplicationofProtocolIItotheguerrillagroupshaswaxedandwaned,inaccordancewiththefalteringprogressofsuccessivepeaceinitiatives.TheUribe administration insists that the conflict doesnotmeet thethresholdofviolencerequiredtoengageProtocolII32 (which is consistent with the practiceofotherstatesfacedwithinternalinsurgenciesand/ornon-statecollectiveviolence).Nonetheless,itishelpfulthatthetreatyframeworkincludesProtocolII.Recognition leaves space for interaction through the discourse providedbyIHLnormsonaccountabilityandprovidesanormativeframeofreferencefortheviolationscommitted.

In terms of sex-based violence, the potential applicability of Protocol IIis important.ProtocolII includesinitsprovisionofFundamentalGuaranteesaprohibition on rape.Relevant also is that inDecember 1992, the InternationalCommittee for the Red Cross, declared that the provisions ofArticle 147 ongravebreachesoftheGenevaConventionsincludedrape.33Thisgivessomepointof regulatory entry to address the sexual violations experienced bywomen inColombiathroughthelegalprismofProtocolII.

However, state reluctance to concede the application of IHLmeans thata criminalizationmodel is frequently applied (albeitwithgreat tension) to theactionsof thenon-stateactor.Suchamodelgenerallystruggles tobeeffectivegiven ongoing competition over territory, legitimacy, and control of politicalspace.Acriminalizationmodelgenerallyfailstocreateanypoliticalacceptanceoraccommodationofthegenuineissuesofpoliticalandterritorialdisputethatareattheheartofcommunalviolence.

Moreover,intheColombiancase,therelativeimpotenceofthecriminaljusticesysteminthefaceofendemiclevelsofviolenceagainstwomenisreflectedinthestaggeringlevelsofimpunity.34Evenwiththediminutioninthelevelsofconflictviolenceinrecentyears,thecriminaljusticesystemhasstruggledtoestablishthatitisfit-for-purposefortheprevention,investigation,prosecution,andpunishmentof violence againstwomen. Localwomen’s organizations continue to identifymanifoldandsystemicshortcomingsinthecriminaljusticesystem,rangingfromattitudinalproblemsofstaffwhofailtoacknowledgeviolenceagainstwomenas

32 See generallyMikroSossai,The Internal Conflict in Colombia and the Fight Against Terrorism: UN Security Council Resolution 1465 (2003) and Further Developments,3J. Int’l CrIm. Just. 253(2005).

33 InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,Aide-mémoire on Provision of Article 147(Dec.1992).34 See generallySpecialRapporteur:MissiontoColombia,supra note 11.

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aserioussocialharm,andtechnicalissuesaroundtheprosecutors’treatmentanduseofevidenceofsexualviolence.35Evenif thecriminalsystemwerecapableof addressing cases of violence againstwomen efficiently, individual cases inordinary jurisdictionwouldnotnecessarily serve to expose the systematic andstructural characteristics of crimes against women committed as part of theconflict.Criminalizationinthisperspectivefunctionstoblurratherthanhighlighttheneedtoaddressthecausesofconflictbypoliticalnegotiation.

Guerrillagroupshaveonseveraloccasionsacknowledged theapplicationofIHLtotheColombianconflict.In1995,theEjército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) declared that it considered itself to be bound by the 1949 GenevaConventionsandAdditionalProtocolII,36aroundthesametimethattheFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP)madeasimilarcommitment.37 ThisacknowledgementreflectsapatternbysomeestablishednationalliberationmovementstounilaterallyaffirmthattheyareboundbytheminimumstandardsoftheGenevaConventions.BoththeAfricanNationalCongressandthePalestineLiberation Organization havemade such declarations in the past.38 The valueofsuchaffirmationsdoesnotlieintheirformallegaleffectbecauseonlystatescan sign the conventions and become parties.Nonetheless, there is significantsymbolicvalueingainingadherencebynon-stateactors.First,itmayconstituteastatementofcombatantstatusandseektobelietheircharacterizationascriminalsorterrorists.Attheveryleast,itmaysuggestthatsufficientcommandandcontrolcapacityexistswithinanon-stateorganization toenforce theprovisionsof theGenevaConventionsandAdditionalProtocols.Second,atleastintheory,itholdsthe non-state actor to a set ofminimumobligations and suggests that there isagreementonwhatnormsapplytotheconductofhostilities.

Thereis,ofcourse,thedangerthattheapparentacquiescencebynon-stateactorstotherelevanceofIHLthroughminimumstandardsoreventothetreatyprovisionsisnotfollowedinpractice.Soforexample,despitetheFARC’spositionofunilateralcompliancewithIHL,aFARCspokespersoninformedHumanRightsWatchthatFARCguerrillas“considerProtocolIIandCommonArticle3[oftheGeneva Conventions] ‘open to interpretation.’”39 Further, there is compelling

35 See,forexample,CorporaCIón humanas, serIe aCCeso a la JustICIa, la sItuaCIón de las muJeres VíCtImas de VIolenCIas de Género en el sIstema penal aCusatorIo (2008); CorporaCIón sIsma muJer, entre el ConflICto armado y las reformas a la JustICIa, ColombIa 2001-2004 (2005).

36 human rIGhts watCh, war wIthout Quarter: ColombIa and InternatIonal humanItarIan law (1998)(citingLetterfromManuelPérez,releasedtothepressonJuly15,1995).

37 Id. See also FARC Rebels say 3 Americans ‘Prisoners of War’,CNN,Feb.24,2003,http:// www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/02/24/colombia.us.hostages.reut/index.html (discussing

FARC’sofficialpositionthatAmericanhostagestakenduringthecourseofitsconflictwiththeColombiangovernmentareregardedasprisonersofwarunderinternationallaw).

38 See generallyNoelleHiggins,The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National Liberation,Journal of humanItarIan assIstanCe(Apr.2004),http://www.jha.ac/articles/a132.pdf.

39 human rIGhts watCh,supra note 36.

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evidenceofroutinenon-compliancewithIHLbythearmedgroup.40ThedangerintheColombiancontext,asinothers,isthatnon-stateactorswhohavenotbeeninvolvedinthenegotiationsoftreatieslimitingthemethodsandmeansofwarfare,andwhoseoperationsandtrainingarenotsystematicallyinfluencedbytheneedtorespectIHL,maysimplyviewprofessionsofadherencetoIHLnormsashavingpoliticalcurrencybutnopracticalconstrainingeffect.41Voluntaryadherencemaymeanverylittleintermsofgeneralaccountabilityandhavelittleornomeaningfuleffectonthebehaviorofthenon-stateactor.Thisrequirescloseattentionifweare,asthischaptersuggests,toclosethenon-stateaccountabilitygapinsituationsofarmedconflictasameanstobetterprotectwomen’shumanrights.

B. Proposed Areas for Feminist Intervention

In light of the current panorama described above, we now propose threepotential areas for feminist interventions to improve the use of IHL norms toincreaseaccountabilityforandprotectionfromgenderedharms:(1)advocacyforanexpandedconceptionof the thresholdofviolencetest thatmightreflectmoreaccuratelytherealityofcontemporaryconflicts;(2)engagementwithhumanrightsbodiesthatdrawonIHLrulesintheirhumanrightsmonitoringandadjudication;and(3)promotingtheacceptanceofminimumhumanitarianstandardsforallactors.

1.DefiningtheSubjectofIHL:TheThresholdofViolenceTest

Another related and controversial issue is the definition of subject in thefield of humanitarian law.Humanitarian law requires a sufficient threshold ofviolencetobeactivated,42acontrolofterritoryrequirement,andothermeasuresofthedegreeoforganization(commandandcontrolresponsibilitysufficienttodisseminate international humanitarian law) sufficient to don the privilege ofcombatant (and alsoprisoner ofwar) status.When these thresholds testswereconceived,whether in the post-WorldWar II period or the decolonization andColdWarcontextofthelate1970s,particularconceptionsofconflictwereinplay.Concretely,therulesrespondedtotheconflictsofthetime.Inmanyconflictsthe

40 See generally human rIGhts watCh, supra note 36; human rIGhts watCh, beyond neGotIatIon: InternatIonal humanItarIan law and Its applICatIon to the ConduCt of the farC-ep(2001).

41 See human rIGhts watCh, supra note 36.42 ProtocolII,Article1(1):

ThisProtocol,whichdevelopsandsupplementsArticle3commontotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949…shallapplytoallarmedconflictswhicharenotcoveredby[Protocol1]...andwhichtakeplaceintheterritoryofaHighContractingPartybetweenitsarmedforcesanddissidentarmedforcesorotherorganized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise suchcontroloverapartofitsterritoryastoenablethemtocarryoutsustainedandconcertedmilitaryoperationsandtoimplementthisProtocol.

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splinteringofinternalconflictandtheproliferationofarmedgroupsmeanthatthethresholdrequirementsofIHLareill-fittedtothecontemporaryrealityofviolenceandthedisintegrationofthestatethathasaccompaniedit.Therequirementsarealso ill-equipped to address the forms of violence in which targeting womenconstitutesaspecificmethodandmeansofwarfare.

TheproliferationofarmedgroupshascharacterizedtheColombianconflict:innumerable and overlapping guerrilla, paramilitary “self-defense”, and narco-trafficking groups. Itmay be that the threshold of violence sufficient to activatehumanitarianlawapplicationrequiresgreatercontemporarycontextualization—forexamplemultipleandsplinteredviolentactors insumrather than themeasureofone group’s effect on overall violence.43Alternatively, the threshold of violencemeasure could be horizontally calibrated over time as a cumulative test, ratherthanaverticaltestinwhichaconflicthastosatisfyathresholdtestataparticularpinpointmoment.With theviolenceexperiencedbywomensquarely to the fore,what“counts”asviolenceforthepurposeofmeasuringtheintensityoftheconflictdemandsfundamentalrevision,specificallytheinclusionofarangeofactscurrentlyconsideredtofallwithintheprivatesphere.Genderedviolenceneedstobecountedasconflict-relatedor-causedviolence.Ifthisweretobethecase,afulleranddeeperaccountingofgenderedviolencewouldcountintotheassessmentofwhatconstitutesanarmedconflictand—importantly—whatconstitutestheendofanarmedconflict.

Wenote that, in a non-judicial context, a deeper accounting of genderedviolencehasfoundexpressionintheColombiantransitionaljusticeprocess.TheHistoricalMemoryGroup,acreationoftheNationalReparationandReconciliationCommissionestablishedundertheJusticeandPeaceLaw,hasbeenimpressiveinitswillingnesstouseagenderperspectivetochallengetheverytermsofitsowninvestigation.Thus in its report on themassacres experienced by the town ofTrujillo, the terms“before” and “after” themassacres are acknowledged tobemisleadingtermswhenoneconsidersthatgender-basedviolencepervadesnormallife in the town.44 In the section dealingwith thememories ofwomen victimsurvivors,thereportbringsoutwomen’sgender-specificexperiencesofviolenceanddiscriminationwithinfamiliesinthearea,concludingthat:

[M]anyof theaccounts thatemergedabout“before themassacre”andordinary life demonstrate how the lives of women proceeded withinpracticesofviolentmasculinedomination. . . .For them, the“before”doesnotappeartohavebeenanidyllofpeaceandrespectfortheirrightsinthedomesticambit.45

43 ForamoredetailedexpositionofthispositionseefIonnuala ní aoláIn, the polItICs of the forCe: ConflICt manaGement and state VIolenCe In northern Ireland(2000).

44 ComIsIón naCIonal de reparaCIón y reConCIlIaCIón, Grupo de memoría hIstorICa, truJIllo: una traGedIa Que no Cesa220(2008).

45 Id.

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Thissectionalsohighlightstheroleoftheviolenceindeterminingrelationsbetween men and women and the negative constructions of masculinity andfemininity in the community—the privileging of violentmasculinity and “theprofounddevaluationofthefeminine”intheviolentcontextofTrujillo.46

Thus,inaspectsofthetransitionlessclearlydeterminedbytheimperativesof international law,analternativenarrativeofunderstandingtheviolence—anunderstanding inclusive of women’s experiences—has found expression. Theinternationallegalframeworkmustbechallengedtoincludethistypeofprobativeaccountingforgenderedexperienceinordertomoreaccuratelydefinetheviolencetobeincludedinaccountabilityandreformeffortsintheaftermathofconflict.

2.IHLMonitoringandEnforcementbyRegionalHumanRightsBodies

Internationalandregionalpracticeinrelationtotheapplicabilityandeffectof international humanitarian law norms on non-state actors is complex andchallenging.TheInter-Americansystemisgenerallyrecognizedasbeingoneofthemostsophisticatedhumanrightsregimeswithregardtoitsacceptanceoftherelevanceofhumanitarian lawto the interpretationofhumanrights,aswellasitsjudicialacceptancethatinsomeofthecountriesintheregion,humanitarianlawratherthanhumanrightsmaybethemorefittingframeofreference.47Boththe Inter-American Commission and Court have endeavored to negotiate theappropriate exercise of their human rights mandate within the context of theColombian armed conflict. The Commission’s “bullish”48 attempts to enforceinternationalhumanitarianlegalnormsinthe1990swerereined-inbytheCourtin the Las Palmerasdecision,inwhichtheCourtadmittedthatneitheritnortheCommissionwas competent to apply theGenevaConventions.49Nevertheless,theCourtheldthatbothbodiesarecompetenttodrawontheGenevaConventionswhenevernecessarytointerpretaruleofAmericanConvention.50 The Court has reiteratedthispositionseveraltimesinrespectoftheColombianconflict.51

Inthismanner,theCourtandCommissionhavebeenabletoensureameasureofindirectapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawtotheColombianconflict.However,thisindirectapplicationofIHLappliesonlytostateactsanddoesnot

46 Id.at229-30.47 JamesL.Cavallaro&StephanieErinBrewer,Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in

the Twenty-first Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court,102am. J. Int’l l.768(2008).48 This is the categorization of theCommission’s approach in LindsayMoir,Decommissioned?

International Humanitarian Law and the Inter-American Human Rights System,25h.r.Q.182,205(2003).

49 LasPalmerasv.Colombia,PreliminaryObjections,2000Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.67(Feb.4,2000).

50 Id.51 See, e.g., MapiripánMassacrev.Colombia,Merits,ReparationsandCosts,2005Inter-Am.Ct.

H.R.(ser.C)No.134,para.155(Sept.15,2005).

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cover violations of humanitarian law by the non-state parties to the conflict.Accordingly,theInter-AmericanCommissiondecidedinitsThirdReportontheSituation ofHumanRights inColombia (1999)52 that itwould not investigateorhear individualcomplaintsconcerningactsbyarmedoppositiongroups, forwhichtheColombianStateisnotresponsible.

The approach of the Commission to its broader country reporting isnotably distinct from its methodology for reviewing individual petitions. TheCommissiondoesapplyIHLtoarmedoppositiongroupsinitscountryreports.Country reportinghasbeen framedby reference to IHLandhuman rights lawforbothstateandnon-stateactors.Althoughthismethodologydoesnotsuggestanydegreeofequality inaccountabilityandresponsibilitybetweentheentitiesunder review, it is valuable for bringing light and public scrutiny to non-stateactors.Clearly,however,thesereportsdonotprovideindividualswithremediesagainstviolationsofhumanitarianrulesvis-à-vistheseactors.Thedifferentiatedstandingofthedifferentactorsrevealsaccountabilitygaps,includingtheextenttowhichthereareforainwhichviolationscanbedirectlylitigated.Despiteandinresponsetotheselimitations,weemphasizetheimportanceofbothhorizontalaccountability (see below) and the use of humanitarian law as a measure inassessingresponsibilitiesinthecountry-reportingcontext.

3.ThePromiseofMinimumHumanitarianStandards

In thecontextof internalarmedconflictsweareconvinced that thebodyof legal norms best placed to encompass the existing accountability gap ishumanitarianlaw.Inourview,greateracceptancebystatesthatCommonArticle3providesaminimumsetof standardsbywhich theactionsofbothstateandnon-state actors should adhere would be a considerable advance in general,and providemany positives forwomenwho experience violence in situationsof internal armed conflict.We appreciate that the explicit lack of recognitionfor gendered violations in CommonArticle 3 is a limitation. Nonetheless, its“minimum standards” approach and the capacity of interpretative applicationgivesitpotentiallygreaterreachthatanyotheragreedinstrument.ButgivensomeoftheregulatorydifficultiesthatIHLhastraditionallyencounteredweencouragethinkingagainabout thecontribution thatminimumhumanitariancodesmightmake,withaviewtogenderingsuchcodestoavoidduplicationofexistingbiasesindomesticandinternationalcriminallaw.

Whenstateshavebeenunwillingtoapplytreatynorms,andnon-stateactorshaveseenthemselvesasexcludedfromIHLtreatyprovisions,codesofconductforstatesexperiencinghostilitieshavebeenofferedasawayforwardtoensure

52 Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights,ThirdReportontheSituationofHumanRightsinColombia,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102,doc.9rev.1(Feb.26,1999).

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someminimalsetoflegalobligationsareobservedbyallparties.53 These codes are intended tosidestep thefraughtpolitical issuesofconflictstatusandallowbasicregulatoryprovisionstobedeemedrelevantbyallpartiestotheconflict.Wethinkthattheydeservefurtherandmoredetailedattentionasameanstoaddressnormativerulesandaccountability,aswellastofocusattentionontheviolationsexperiencedbywomenasbreachesofhumanitariannorms.Tothatend,however,wealsoacceptthatsuchcodesrequiresubstantiveaugmentationinordertoavoidduplicationoftheproblemof“under-capture”thatweascribetointernationalanddomesticcriminallaw.

Practically, how would the codes be activated? Gasser makes threeobservations on the threshold that should be met in order to trigger theirapplicability: first, the degree of violence exceeds normal times; second, theviolenceisovertnotcovert;andthird, thesituationischaracterizedbygeneralviolationsofthefundamentalrightsoftheindividual.54Meron,commentingonthesuitabilityofaHumanitarianDeclarationon InternalStrifeemphasizes thecharacteristicofcollectiveviolence55asdistinguishinginternaldisturbancesandtensionsfromotherviolentsituations.56Inthissense,webelievesuchcodescanaddressthosemultiplecontexts(Colombiaasrepresentative)wherethestatedoesnotconcedeorconcedesonlyinparttheapplicabilityofhumanitarianlaw,andwherethedomesticcriminallawisinadequatetocapturethenatureoftheharmsandmaybeimplicatedinthebroaderdysfunctionofthestate’sinstitutions.

Thesecodescanserveanumberofusefulpurposes,andwethinktheymaybeanimportanttoolforpolicymakersandgovernmentsincontextswherestatesaccept inpractice (de facto)butnot in law(de jure) thatasituationofarmed

53 HansPeterGasser, A Measure of Humanity in Internal Disturbances and Tensions: Proposal for a Code of Conduct, 28Int’l reV. of the red Cross38(1988). Gasserstatesthattheaimofsuchrulesistoreducehumansuffering,theobjectofthecodebeingbothauthoritiesandnon-stateactorsalike.

54 Id. at 41.55 TheICRCalsoechosthisthemeof“collectiveviolence.”ThePresidentoftheICRChasstated:

Thesituationof the individualcaughtup inviolence inaState,violence thatrangesfromsimple internal tensions tomoreserious internaldisturbances, isacauseofdeepconcerntotheICRC.Asuggestionwasmaderecentlytodrafta declaration of basic and inalienable rights applicable to cases of collectiveviolencewithin theStates, insituations thatwouldnotalreadybecoveredbyhumanitarianlaw.

AlexanderHay,The ICRC and International Humanitarian Law, 23 Int’l reV. of the red Cross 3, 9 (1984).

56 TheodorMeron,Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal Strife, 78 am. J. Int’l l. 859 (1984).Animportantprescriptiveelementofthesecodesofconductisthattheylackonesignificantrequirementoftheirarmedconflictcousin.Thatis,nonecessarydegreeoforganizationisrequiredbythirdpartiesinordertoactivatethecodesinquestion.ThesoleexceptiontothisistheTurku/AboDeclarationwhichwhileprohibitingmurderandviolence to thepersonalsoprovides that“whenevertheuseofforceisunavoidable,itshallbeinproportiontotheseriousnessoftheoffenceortheobjectivetobeachieved.”Turku/AboDeclarationofMinimumHumanitarianStandards, art.7(1990).

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conflict exists.Again, drawing on the Roots of War study,57 we endorse the positionthatnormativereferencepointsarecriticaltopreventingtheviolationofhumanitariannorms.Moreover,thisstudyatteststhatinsituationsofarmedconflict, violations of IHL involve “social and individual processes of moraldisengagement”compoundedbygroupconformityandobediencetoauthority.58 Where formalapplicationof IHLbyallpartiesmayproveelusive,agreementtonormativestandardsmayinitself(particularlywherechainsofcommandinorganizationsadoptandenforce)beapowerfuldeterrencetool.Second,akeyelementinpreventingviolationsliesinensuringthatthebearersofweaponsareproperlytrained.Intheabsenceofagreedtreatyrules,minimumstandardsmayprovidethebackdroptotraining.Ifcodesaretiedtostrictandeffectivesanctionswhetherbythestateorthenon-statemilitarystructures,theypotentiallymitigatetheuseofviolenceagainstwomenasamethodandmeansofwarfare.Third,asthe influenceandvalueof soft lawdeepens,we shouldnotunderestimate theextenttowhichminimumstandardsmaycrystallizeandbecome“hard”bindingnormsovertime.

Even in thecontextofminimumstandards, identificationandagreementontheamountofviolencerequirediscrucial.Thereisnomathematicalequationthatsetsapre-agreedlimitontheamountofacceptableviolenceinanyparticularstate.Self-evidently,culturalpracticesanddevelopmentalandfinancialcapacitymakeanysuchassessmentsubjecttoenormousdisparities.Anobviousstartingpointisadeterminationofthesource(s)ofviolence.Thisrequirescollatingandattributingthesourcesofviolentbehaviorwithineachstate.Oftenthestartingpoint of assessment is the normal levels of criminal activity asmeasured bystatistical indicatorsofviolencewithin that state.Againwe stress theevidentbiasinsuchcollationthatexcludes“normal”levelsofviolenceagainstwomen.Suchstructuraldeficienciesmustbeaddressed inorder toavoidhumanitarianstandardsduplicatingtheexclusionofgenderedharms.Inaddition, thematterbecomesmorecomplexasstatediscretiononwhatistermedcriminalactivityisexercised.

Itisnonethelesssignificantthatthereismovementtowardsadefinitionof“internal disturbances and tensions” thatwouldbe sufficient to apply across arangeofconflicts.Inthiscontext,weemphasizetheimportanceofincludingtherangeanddepthofviolence experiencedbywomenaspart of the calculation.The danger is that narrow definitions, based on ever-present public/privatedistinctions,maymeanthatgenderedpresumptionsaresimplymovedfromonearena to another.

57 ICRC,supranote26,at4.58 ICRC,supranote26,at2.

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III. Imputed State Liability for the Violence of the Non-state Actor

Thekeyissuesaddressedinthissectionfocusonthemeansbywhichtheactions of the non-state actor can be captured by the legal obligations takenonby theStateunder international law.The concept andpracticesof imputedstate liability are critical to addressing the degree and capacity for state legalobligationstocaptureharmscommittedbythenon-stateentity.Weassesstheseissuesbyfocusingonviolenceagainstwomenthroughtheprismofdisarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes that almost invariablyaccompanythepost-conflictprocess.

A. DDR, the Post-Conflict Process, and Gendered Outcomes

TheJusticeandPeaceprocesshasgivenrisetoasetofproblemsinColombiathat are familiar to thosewhowrite and researchmore generally on violenceagainstwomenasitmanifestsattheendofconflict.Processesofdisarmament,demobilization,andreintegrationofcombatantsareincreasinglycentraltoeffortstobuildsustainablepeaceintheaftermathofviolentconflict.59Withoutignoringthepresenceofwomenincombatantforcesortheprominenceofmenincivilianpopulations,thereisneverthelessanoftenunspokengenderpiecetoDDR:namely,thattheprocessinvolvesthereintegrationofalargelymale(former)combatantgroup intoadisproportionately femalecivilianpopulation.Byand large,DDRprocessesaredirectedatsocietiesinwhichtherehavebeensignificantnon-statesources of violence. The gender differential between returning and receivingcommunitiesmeans that, althoughDDR is officially concernedwith ensuringthe conditions that enable former combatants to cease violence and return totheircommunitiesoforigin,DDRcanalsoigniteaseriesofnewchallengesforwomen’ssecuritywithinthecommunity.

Inordertoillustratesomeofthe“new”genderdynamicsofviolencethatcanaccompanyprocessesofDDR,itisinstructivetodrawonempiricalresearchconductedbyColombianwomen’sorganizationsexaminingtheimpactofDDRonthelivesofwomenlivingintherehabilitationandconsolidationzones.Basedonanalysisoftheshort-andlong-termimpacts,suchresearchhasregardedtheprocessofreintegrationunderthetermsoftheJusticeandPeaceLawasathreat

59 See, e.g., U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines (2000); Mats R. Berdal, Int’l Inst. for Strategic Stud., ADELPHI Paper 303,Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts,at9(1996);KImberly mahlInG ClarK, usaId, fosterInG a farewell to arms: prelImInary lessons learned In the demobIlIzatIon and reInteGratIon of Combatants (1996); MarkKnight,Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,41J. peaCe res.499(2004).

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tothesecurityofwomen.EarlyonintheDDRprocess,women’sorganizationsmonitoringthereintegrationprocessinTierralta,Córdobaidentifiedanincreaseinlevelsofprostitution,sexually-transmitteddiseases,andteenagepregnancy.60 Theynoted alarming increases in levels of domestic violence, as relationshipswere forged or reignited between former combatants and members of thecivilianpopulation.61Inthiscatalogueofharmswedirectlyconfrontthematerialconsequences of the public/private distinction in transitional justice. Teenagepregnancy, poor sexual health, and domestic violence fall within the sphereofprivateharms.Perceivedasunrelated to thepublicviolenceofparamilitarygroups,theproliferationofsuchharmsagainstwomendoesnotinformpoliticalcalculationsofcostsandbenefitsinthenegotiationofdemobilization.ThebroaderproblemistheevidentdisconnectbetweentheplanningofDDRprograms—aswellasthebenchmarkingoftheirsuccess—andthelivedexperienceofwomeninthereceivingcommunities.62

Compounding the gendered gaps of a gender-blind DDR process is theweakenedandfracturednatureofthestateoperatinginthebackdroptothenon-statedemobilization.Inthistelling,thelackofcentralstatecapacitytofundamentallyaffectthe“ontheground”experienceofDDR,meansthatourassumptionsaboutthecapacityofthestatetocontrolandpreventviolenceinthetransitionalcontextaresignificantlyundermined.Theweakstatepresencehasmeantthatabsoluteimpunitysurroundstheviolenceexperiencedbywomeninthe“post”conflictphase.

Equally,DDRdoesnotmeanthere-establishmentofthestateorthelegitimacyofitsinstitutions.Thisisdemonstratedinpartbytheongoingevidenceofpoliticalinfluencebyformerparamilitariesgoinglargelyunchallenged.Returningcombatantshavedisplacedcivilianpopulationfrompaidworkandpoliticalleadershipwithinreceivingcommunities.63Leadersofwomen’sorganizationshavebeentargetedforparamilitaryviolenceandassassination.64Inthelonger-term,theDDRprocesshasbeencriticizedbywomen’sorganizationsforinstitutionalizingparamilitaryinfluenceand powerwithin the demobilization zones, such asVillavicencio, southeast ofBogotá.65Thedisarmamentprocesswashighlypartialandlargelyinadequate.Largenumbersof thedemobilizedhave returned to criminal activities.One influentialwomen’sorganizationconcludedthattheongoingeconomic,political,andmilitary

60 CorporaCIón humanas, rIesGos para la seGurIdad de las muJeres en proCesos de reInserCIón de exCombatIente: estudIo sobre el ImpaCto de la reInserCIón paramIlItar en la VIda y seGurIdad de las muJeres en los munICIpIos de montería y tIerralta departamento de Córdoba 67 (2005).

61 Id. at 73.62 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Women, Security, and the Patriarchy of Internationalized Transitional

Justice,31hum. rts. Q.1055(2009).63 CorporaCIón humanas,supranote60,at44.64 CorporaCIón humanas,supranote60,at44.65 CorporaCIón humanas, muJeres entre mafIosos y señores de la Guerra: ImpaCto del proCeso de

desarme, desmoVIlIzaCIón y reInteGraCIón en la VIda y seGurIdad de las muJeres en ComunIdades en puGna(2008).

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influenceof“demobilized”groupswasperpetuatingparamilitarisminthecountry,asyoungmenaspiretothestatusandpowerofparamilitariesandyoungwomenaspiretobewiththem(afactgraphicallyillustratedbythealarmingratesofteenagepregnancyinthearea).66Criminalactivitiesandthelimitationofpoliticalexpressionfallmorereadilywithinthesphereofpublicharmsintransitionaljustice.Evidenceof public harms resulting fromDDR poses challenges to transitional justice inColombia,evenonitsownnarrowlystatedtermsofendingthepublicviolenceofparamilitarygroups.

These results require us to rethink the formand termsuponwhichDDRprograms are negotiated, as well as the basis upon which they are deemedsuccessful.But,morepertinently,theymandatethinkingthroughtheconundrumoflegalresponsibilityforthefailureofDDRandthelocusofresponsibilityfortheviolencethatcontinuesagainstwomenintheaftermathofconflict.Whentheconflict is theoreticallyendedby thestate,but thenon-stateactorcontinues toexerciseviolence,albeitnowinthetheoreticallyprivatesphereofviolenceagainstwomenandnon-politicalcriminality,wheredoeslegalresponsibilitylie?

B. The Non-state Conundrum and the Feminist Response

ThepostureofmanyColombianwomen’sorganizationstowardparamilitaryforces reflects a more general posture of feminists towards non-state actors.Thenon-stateactorisidentifiedasmasculine,andinthecontextofconflictandrepression as portraying hyper-masculine traits,67 as well as an inherent and unreformedpatriarchythatnegativelyimpactsonwomen.Thenon-stateactorisviewedasunpredictableandunconstrained,anditisuncleartofeminists(asitistoothertheoreticalapproaches),68howthenon-stateactoristobeheldaccountableforhisactions,specificallyastheyaffectwomen.Thislackofpredictabilityandstabilitymayexplainfeministunwillingnesstoexpendsignificanttheory,policy,oradvocacyattentiontonon-stateentities.

Connectedly,anydiscussionoffeminismandthenon-stateactormandatesacknowledging the theorizing and policy that has emerged from women’sengagementwithnationalliberationmovements.Inparallel,thestatusofwomenwithin, and the relationship of feminism to, national liberation movementshasseldomled toadirect feministengagementwithsuchentities.69 Ingeneral

66 Id.at52.67 See KimberlyTheidon,Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

of Former Combatants in Colombia,1Int’l J. transItIonal Just. 66(2007);nIra yuVal-daVIs, Gender and natIon (1997).

68 See,forexample,onthechallengeofnon-stateactorstotraditionalapproachestosecuritystudies,SteveSmith,The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,20Contemp. seCurIty pol’y72(1999).

69 See, for example, Gender and natIonal IdentIty: women and polItICs In muslIm soCIetIes (ValentineM.Moghadamed.,1994).

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feminists have identified the complex paradox that frequently results fromwomen’s involvement in national struggles. The involvement of women ascombatants innational liberationsmovements,and themoremundaneworkofwomeninreproducing70andsustainingtheboundariesonwhichsuchmovementsdepend,71hasgivenrisetothislargelynegativefeministassessment.Pragmaticacquiescencetowomen’sengagementisbalancedbyanunwillingnesstoassumethat a reformist agendawill transform suchmovements.As a result reformistattention remainsfirmly focused on the state.Notably the category ofwomencombatants (or even women as tacit supporters of violence) poses particularquandaries theoretically andpractically to this bodyof feministwork.Variousscholarlydisciplinesarepervadedbythe“assumptionthatwomenaregenerallymorepeacefulandlessaggressiveorwarlikethanmen.”72Generallyspeaking,thequantificationofandrationaleforwomen’spoliticalviolencearegrosslyunder-researchedarenasacrossacademicdisciplines.73

Thispaucityofresearchistiedtocomplexsocialconventionsabouttheroleofwomeninthemilitaryapparatusofthestate,oranyrolesthatwomenmayplaywithinnon-statestructuresinconflictedsocieties.Herealso“theprevalentviewofwomenasvictimsofconflict...tendstooverlook,explicitlyorimplicitly,women’spowerandagency.”74Thisblindspottendstoproducepolicyandpracticethatviewswomen as homogeneouslypowerless or as implicit victims, thereby excludingtheparallelrealityofwomenasbenefactorsofoppression,“ortheperpetratorsofcatastrophes.”75Moreover,women’sactiverolesinnationalorethno-nationalmilitaryorganizations isdefinedbydeepambiguity linked to resonantdebatesabouttheidentityofnation,themeaningofcitizenship,andthecomplexinterfacebetweenculturalreproductionandgenderrolesinanysociety.76Nevertheless,thepoorcorrelationbetweenlevelsofwomen’sinvolvementincombatantactivities

70 See generally yuVal-daVIs, supra note 67.71 See,forexample,BegoñaAretxaga’sworkonwomenandnationalisminNorthernIreland:beGoña

aretxaGa, shatterInG sIlenCe: women, natIonalIsm, and polItICal subJeCtIVIty In northern Ireland ix(1997)(“Womenarethebackboneofthestruggle;theyaretheonescarryingthewarhere.”).

72 mIranda alIson, women and polItICal VIolenCe1(2008).73 In the sometimes related sphere of human trafficking, see for example, Report of the Special

Rapporteuronthehumanrightsaspectsofthevictimsoftraffickinginpersons,especiallywomenandchildren,SigmaHuda,21-25,U.N.Doc.A/HRC/4/23/Add.1(2007),whichsentshockwavesthroughthecommunityofpersonsinterestedin,butnotintimatelyknowledgeableabouthumantrafficking,whenitnamedwomenastraffickers.

74 SimonaSharoni,Rethinking Women’s Struggles in Israel-Palestine and in the North of Ireland,in VICtIms, perpetrators or aCtors? Gender, armed ConflICt and polItICal VIolenCe86(CarolineMoser&FionaClarkeds.,2001).

75 ronIt lentIn, Gender and Catastrophe 12 (1997).76 See yuVal-daVIs, supranote59.Seealsotheassessmentofthepositionofthe20,000oddwomen

whofought in theMarxistEritreanPeople’sLiberationFront,whosereturnback intoadeeplypatriarchalsocietyhasbeenfraughtonnumerous levels,JamesC.McKinley,Eritrea’s Women Fighters Long for Equality of War,the GuardIan,May6,1995.

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andthestatusofwomeninpostcolonialstates77bearsoutCynthiaEnloe’sassertionthatnational liberationmovements tend toadoptapositionof“notnow, later”in respect towomen’s equality.78 In parallel, one element ofmurky results forwomeninthepost-conflictcontextisthattheinvolvementofwomeninsecuringliberation/gainingindependencegiveslittleclearcorrelationtoaccountabilityforgenderedviolationscommittedincontributiontothatpoliticaloutcome.

Thislargelynegativefeministassessmentofnon-stateactorshas,inturn,tended to cast the state in the role of “protector,” as the guarantor of liberallegalrightstoequalityandnon-discrimination.Althoughimperfect,thestate’sde jureguaranteesofequalityoffergreaterprotectionandgreater leverageondecision-makingwithinthestatethanwithinanyofarangeofnon-stateactors.But, in simple terms of numerical presence, women remain vastly under-represented within the state;79 and empirical research demonstrates the cross-regional truth thatwomen’spoliticalactivity isconcentratedwithin localcivilsocietyorganization.80Nevertheless,forwomen’smovementsseekingtomakepoliticalgains,theiradvocacyisremarkableconsistentintargetingthestate.Wedonotdoubt thevalueand importanceof thatendeavor.Thestate isandwillremain a legitimate site of feminist activity and feminist gains.However,wesuggest,astheanalysisabovebeginstoexplore,thatintandemfeministsmustalsobeconcernedwiththenon-stateactorandseektoinfluencetheiractionsandinstitutionalstructures.Belowweexplorehownon-stateactors’actionscanbeinfluencedbypursuingstateaccountabilityforgenderedviolenceperpetratedbynon-stategroups.Wesuggestthat,raisingthepoliticalandlegalcoststostatesforpublicandprivateformsofviolenceagainstwomenbynon-stateentitieswillmotivatestatestobetterensurethephysicalintegrityofwomenwhilenegotiatingpoliticalcompromises.

C. Due Diligence as a Method to Influence the Non-state Actor

The privileging of the state is a point of concurrence between feministinterventionsintotransitionaljusticeandtheorganizationofinternationalhumanrightslaw.Statesassumehumanrightsobligationsandaccountabilityforhumanrightsviolationsbytreaty.Traditionally,theseobligationswereunderstoodtogoverntheverticalrelationshipofstatestocitizens.However,thedevelopingdoctrineof

77 FordiscussionofthesedynamicsintheEritreanandColombiancases,respectively,seePatriciaCampbell,Gender and Post-Conflict Civil Society,7 Int’l fem. J. pol.377(2005);luz maría londoño f. & yoana fernanda nIeto V., muJeres no Contadas: proCesos de demoVIlIzaCIón y retorno a la VIda CIVIl de muJeres exCombatIentes en ColombIa 1990-2003 (2007).

78 CynthIa enloe, the mornInG after: sexual polItICs at the end of the Cold war(1993).79 See,forexample,thenumberofwomenintheparliamentsoftheworld,availableatthewebsiteof

theInter-ParliamentarianUnion,http://www.ipu.org.80 See the ChallenGe of loCal femInIsms: women’s moVements In Global perspeCtIVe (Amrita

Basued.,1995).

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duediligencehasintroducedthenotionofhorizontalapplicationofhumanrights,namelythathumanrightsalsobindtherelationshipbetweencitizens.Inpractice,thisaccountabilityisaffectedthroughthestate.Duediligenceobligationsrequirestatestoprotectanindividual’shumanrightsfromviolationsbyanotherprivateindividual.Duediligencedoctrinehasbeenoneofthemostsignificantdevelopmentsinmakinginternationalhumanrightslawrelevanttowomen’sdailyexperiencesofviolence.81Thearticulationofstates’dutiestoprevent,prohibit,investigate,andpunishcrimesofviolenceagainstwomen—predominantlyoccurringwithinhomesandcommunities,atthehandsofprivateactors—hasbeencritical.

Intransitionalcontexts,inwhichthestateisfragileandmasscrimesofviolencemaypersist,therecanbeastruggletomakeduediligenceobligationspertinenttoviolenceagainstwomen.Nevertheless,violentconflictdoesnotexemptstatesfromtheirduediligenceobligations.Andasweexaminehere,animportantbodyoflawexistsforadvancingaccountability,muchofitdirectlyrelevanttotheColombiancontext.WithaneyetowardgenderedviolenceaccompanyingafailedordeficientDDRprocess,wetraceseveralmajorlegaldevelopmentsthat,whenreadtogether,supporttheexpansionofstateaccountabilityfornon-stateactors,including:broaderacceptanceofgenderedharmsintraditionalnormsinduediligencerequirements;extension of state responsibility to non-state actors for public harms; and duediligenceanalysisappliedtoprivateharmsasdiscrimination.

1. CapturingGender-basedViolence

The Inter-American human rights system has been one of the mostprogressiveinitscodificationoftherightofwomentolivefreefromviolence.TheInter-AmericanConventionofBelémdoPará,adoptedin1994,remainstheonlybindinginternationalhumanrightsinstrumentdedicatedtotheprevention,punishment, and eradication of violence against women.82 The Conventionincludes a mechanism for the communication of individual complaints to theInter-AmericanCommission.83While the Inter-AmericanCourt has beenmoreconservative in its jurisprudentialdevelopmentofwomen’s rights to live fromfreefromviolence,84recentdecisionssignalanimportantnewtrajectory.

The 2006 decision concerning the sexual abuse of women detainees inthe PeruvianMiguel Castro-Castro prison has set an important marker in the

81 See RebeccaCook,Accountability in International Law for Violations of Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors,25stud. transnat’l leGal pol’y93(1993).

82 Inter-American Convention for the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence AgainstWomen,“ConventionofBelemdoPara”,June9,1994,33ILM1534,entered into force Mar.5,1995.

83 Id.art.12.84 See PatriciaPalaciosZuloaga,The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of Human

Rights,17tex. J. women & l. 228(2008).

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recognitionofgender-specificformsofinhumantreatment.85Actssuchasbeingsurroundedby security forceswhile required to strip and remainnaked for anextended period, being prohibited from showering, being accompanied to thebathroom by male guards, and denial of post-partummedical attention, wererecognized as constituting “inhuman treatment” in violation of theAmericanConventiononHumanRights.86Given that thesehumanrightsviolationswereperpetratedbystateactors,withinastateinstitution,thedecisioncohereswiththetraditionalstate-centricnatureofhumanrights.

The Statewas found to be in violation of its due diligence obligations toinvestigateallegedcasesoftorture.87Further,inawardingreparations,theCourtmadespecificconsiderationofthedifferenttypesofviolencetowhichthewomenweresubjected.88Finally,thedecisionmarkedanimportantprecedentinestablishingthejusticiabilityoftheConventionofBelémdoPará.WhilethePeruviangovernmentargued that the communications alleging violations of rights guaranteed underthe Convention could only be considered by the Inter-American Commission,89 theCourtfoundtheStateinviolationofitsArticle7(b)obligationtoinvestigateandpunishviolenceagainstwomen.Readtogether,thesedifferentaspectsoftheCourt’s decision reiterate states’ duty to prevent, punish, and eradicate violenceagainstwomen;toinvestigateallegationsoftorture,includinggender-basedformsof sexual torture ofwomen; and to appropriately compensate female victimsofsexualviolence.Thislanguagelaysastrongfoundationfortheapplicationofsuchprinciplesinmanyothercontexts,includinghorizontallytonon-stateactors.

2. ImputedStateLiabilityforParamilitary“Public”Violence

While the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison case concerned directly state-perpe-tratedviolenceagainstwomen,innovativejurisprudencebyinternationalcourtsandtribunalshasincreasinglyfoundthatastatemaybeheldresponsiblefortheactionsofprivateactorswhenitfailstosetappropriateregulatorystandards,en-couragesnon-enforcementoftherelevantlegalnorms,orminimizessanction.90 TheInter-AmericanCourthasledtheinternationalhumanrightscommunityinitsimputationofstateliabilityforviolationsofhumanrightsbyprivateparties.91

Here theCourt’s jurisprudence has specifically addressed theColombianState’s liability for human rights violations perpetratedbyparamilitary groups

85 MiguelCastro-CastroPrisonv.Peru,2006Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.160(Nov.25,2006).86 Id.para.197.87 Id. para. 347.88 Id.para.432.89 Id.para.379.90 See generally andrew Clapham, human rIGhts oblIGatIons of non-state aCtors (2006).91 See especiallyVelasquezRodriguezv.Honduras,1988Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.4(July29,

1988).

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basedonthedegreeoftiesbetweenpartsoftheStateandcertaingroups.92 The paramilitary and political activities of the paramilitaries continue today,93 and the Inter-AmericanCourt has held theColombianState accountable formanyof themost serious public harms of the paramilitaries which occurred duringtheconflict.Forexample,intheMapiripán Massacrecase,theCourtfoundtheColombianStateresponsiblefortheabductions,torture,andkillingscommittedby theparamilitaryorself-defensegroups,due to the“linkbetweenthearmedforcesand thisparamilitarygroup tocommit themassacre . . . conducted inacoordinated,parallelor linkedmanner.”94This linkagealliedwithanemphasison due diligence remains critical to the protection of women in situations ofarmedconflict.TheCourt’sdecisionintheMapiripán MassacrecasecanbereadtogetherwiththeMiguel Castro-Castro PrisondecisiontoimputeliabilitytotheColombianStateforthealarminglevelsofpublicharmsagainstwomen,suchastheassassinationofleadersofwomen’sorganizations,perpetratedbyparamilitaryforces.

3.InternationalHumanRightsLawandCapturing“Private”Harms

Oneimportanttheoreticalframeinexaminingtheviolenceexperiencedbywomen is thepublic/private divide andhow that intersectswith the state/non-state paradigm.The implications forwomen of the public/private divide havebeen well documented by feminist scholars.95 Law’s oversight of the privatedomain is purposely constrained, and that deemed private remains effectivelyout-of-regulatory-bounds.Thedifficultiesofthepublic/privatedivideappliedtothestateandnon-statecontinuumaretosomedegreeself-evident.Regardingtheapplicationof international lawnorms, the state is evidentlyheld to the treatystandardsofhumanrightsenforcementwhenviolationstakeplaceinthepublicsphereandinvolveastateofficial.

Horizontalapplicationofhumanrightsnormshasbeenhighlyrelevant towomenseekingto“catch”violationstakingplaceintheprivatesphere.Inparticular,jurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,96andthegrowingbodyofjurisprudenceoftheCEDAWCommittee,havefocusedontheelaborationofstates’duediligenceobligationtoprevent,prohibit,investigate,andpunishactsof

92 See, e.g.,MapiripánMassacrev.Colombia,Merits,ReparationsandCosts,2005Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.134(Sept.15,2005).

93 GustaVo dunCan,los señores de la Guerra: de paramIlItares, mafIosos y autodefensas en ColombIa(2006).

94 Mapiripán,supranote92,para.123.95 Feminist theoristshavelongarticulatedthat themostpervasiveharmstowomentendtooccur

withintheinnersanctumoftheprivaterealm,withinthefamily.See sally enGle merry, human rIGhts and Gender VIolenCe: translatInG InternatIonal law Into loCal JustICe (2006).

96 M.C.vBulgaria,[2003]ECHR39272/98(Dec.4,2003);Opuzv.Turkey,[2009]ECHR33401/02(June9,2009).

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so-calledprivateviolence,inparticular,domesticviolence.97Importantly,withinthisarticulationofstates’duediligenceobligations,impunityforviolenceagainstwomenhasbeenexplicitlyrecognizedasdiscriminationagainstwomen.Astate’sfailuretorespondappropriatelytoformsofprivateviolencethatareexperiencedoverwhelminglybywomen is inviolationof the state’sobligations toprovideequalprotectionofthelawandisconsequentlydiscriminatoryagainstwomen.

TheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightshasnowjoinedandreaffirmedthisimportanttrajectoryininternationalhumanrightslawandtherightofwomentolivefreefromallformsofviolenceintheCampo Algodonero case.98 The Court forthefirsttimefoundastateinviolationofitsaffirmativeobligationstorespondto violence againstwomen by private actors.The decision concerned three inaseriesofhundredsofunsolvedandpoorlyinvestigateddisappearances,rapes,andmurders of youngwomen in Ciudad Juarez on the U.S.-Mexican border.Significantly,theCourtconsideredthehumanrightsviolationsinMexicowithinthe context of mass violence against women and structural discrimination inCiudadJuarez.TheCourtfoundthatthe“cultureofdiscrimination”againstwomenwithinthecityhadpenetratedtheresponseofStateinstitutionstothealarminglevelsofviolenceagainstwomen,resultinginpoorcriminal investigationsandtheperpetuationofimpunityforsuchviolence.99Noteworthyalsoisthat,drawingonthedefinitionofviolenceagainstwomenofboththeCEDAWCommitteeinitsGeneralRecommendation19andtheConventionofBelémdoPará,theCourtforthefirsttimeheldthatgender-basedviolencecanconstitutediscriminationagainstwomen.100Mexicowasorderedtocomplywithabroadsetofremedialmeasuresincludinganationalmemorial, renewed investigations,and reparationsofover$200,000eachtothefamiliesinthesuit.101

The implications of theCampo Algodonero decision for the Colombiancontextandmorebroadlyaresubstantial.TheCourt’sdeterminationtoconsiderindividualincidentsofviolenceagainstwomenwithinthecontextofmassviolenceagainstwomenandstructuraldiscriminationishighlypertinenttotheColombiancontext. This comprehensive and contextual approach to state complicity inperpetuatingviolenceagainstwomenbyprivateactorsshoulddrawattentionandlegalresponsibilitytotherelationshipbetweentheState’sroleinnegotiatingthe

97 See, e.g.,ATv.Hungary,(CommunicationNo.2/2003),Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Jan.26,2005);AndrewByrnes&EleanorBath,Violence against Women, the Obligation of Due Diligence, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,8hum. rts. l. reV.517(2008).

98 González andOthers (“CampoAlgodonero”) vs.Mexico, PreliminaryConsiderations,Merits,ReparationsandCosts,2009Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.205(Nov.16,2009).

99 Id.paras.399-400.100 Id.paras.395&402.101 Id. PartIX,Reparations.

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termsofdemobilizationofparamilitaryactorsandthealarminglevelsofpublicandprivateharmsagainstwomenwithinthedemobilizationzones.Whilestateactorsmaynotbethedirectperpetratorsoftheseharms,andtherangeofharmsidentified goes beyond the abductions, torture, and killings by paramilitariesaddressed in the Mapiripáncase,theColombianStatehasclearlegalobligationstoprevent,protect,investigate,punish,andcompensateforthefullrangeofpublicandprivateharmsexperiencedbywomenwithinthedemilitarizationzones.

Conclusion: Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and Re-calibrating State Interests in the Negotiation of Transitional Justice

Asweconcludethischapterwecomebacktothepointatwhichtheissuesof accountability are most squarely on the table (or clearly absent from thetable)—namely at the point of negotiation between state and non-state actors.Whileapeacedealmaytransformrelationsbetweenviolentactors,itwilllikelydoverylittleforsocialrelationswithinthezonescontrolledbyparticulargroupsofviolentactors.Apeacedealmayalsodovery little to resolve the legalandstructural ambiguities that pervade prior and continuing overlapping regimesofcontrol thathavecharacterized theconflictednon-stateandstatezones.Theconstructive ambiguity of the peace dealmay in fact incorporate that tensionandrealitydirectlyintonewarrangements.102InColombia,theDDRprocessiswidelyattributedwithlegitimatingparamilitarysocialcontrol,ratherthanendingit.103Moreover it is seenasgiving rise to concern that thede factoblackholeofaccountabilitycreatedbytheparamilitarieshasbeeninstitutionalizedbythecontemporary process.We suggest that political compromises at the heart ofpeacedealsofteninvolveunspokencompromisesaroundprivateharmsand—ineffect—women’ssecurity,asborneoutbytheevidenceofhighlevelsofviolenceagainstwomenwithindemobilizationzones.Thelackofaccountabilityforpriorviolationsagainstwomenandothersmaybepartofthestatedtrade-offfortheendofpubliccontestationbetweenmalecombatants.Moreover,continuedviolenceagainstwomenwillnotbeviewedasunderminingthebasisofthe“deal”itselfandwill be entirely incidental to its perceived success or failure.Howdoweaddressthisreality?

Wearenotnaiveinpresumingthatgenderislikelytomoveeasilytocenterstageinsuchprocessesanddominatethe“deals”thataremade,despitethedictatesofgendermainstreamingandUNSecurityCouncilResolution1325.Nonetheless,

102 ChrisitineBell&KathleeenCavaunaugh,Constructive Ambiguity or Internal Self-Determination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation and the Belfast Agreement, 22fordham Int’l L.J.1345(1999).

103 See, e.g.,CorporaCIón humanas,supranote60,at67.

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inordertoaddresstheclearlacunaeingenderedaccountabilitywesuggestsomeroutesforward.Thefirstisthatfeminists,policymakers,andothersneedtopaymoreattentiontonon-stateactors,notonlyasperpetratorsofviolencebutratherasentitiesofcontrolandoversight.Inthislattercapacity,closeattentionneedstobegiventothemodalitiesofholdingthenon-stateactoraccountable,individuallybutalsobyaffirmingcommandandcontrolresponsibilitiesbycommandersfortheirsubordinates.Second,werevisitoldbutimportantterritoryinaffirmingtheimportanceofholdingnon-stateactorsaccountableunderexistinghumanitarianlawnorms—specificallyCommonArticle3oftheGenevaConventionsapplicabletonon-internationalarmedconflicts.Third,weencouragegreaterwillingnesstoconsidertherelevanceofminimumhumanitarianstandardstointernalconflicts,particularlyifsuchstandardsweretobegender-proofedandavoidthegenderedgaps thatproliferate treaty standards.Minimumstandardsmightprovide somebuy-infromnon-stategroupings,andthereisimportantprecedentforsuchsoftlawnormscrystallizingtoconstitutehardandbindingrules.

Finally,inthearenaofhumanrightsobligationswearguethatifduediligenceobligations are brought to bear on states for violence againstwomen in thosezonesofcontrolcededtothenon-stateactor,thenlegalandreputationalcoststostatescouldbemadehigherforcompromisesmadewhennegotiatingwithnon-stateactors.Thismightprompttherecalibrationofinterestsinnegotiatingthesedealsinthefirstplace.Thiscouldmeanthatthereductionofpublicharmsisnotsoreadilytradedforthepersistenceorexacerbationofarangeofprivateharms.Indeed,thecrediblethreatofimputedstateliabilityforprivateharmsperpetratedby paramilitary actors could mean that the material and symbolic benefits ofinclusion (within the state) would, in a meaningful way, be made subject toprinciples of non-violence andnon-discrimination againstwomen. In sum,weurgegreaterattentiontothenon-stateactorandgreaterattentiontothecapacityofhumanrightsandhumanitarianlaw,aswellastransitional“deals,”toholdsuchactorsaccountableforgenderedharmscommittedduringarmedconflict.

Challenges for Transitional Justice in Contexts of Non-transition: The Colombian Case

Felipe Gómez Isa*

Whatisknownastransitionaljustice,orjusticeoftransition,hasdevelopedvertiginously over the last three decades, becoming a fertile field for rich andthrivingacademicreflection,1theemergenceofNGOsandresearchandconsultancycenters,2 thegrowingattentionon thepartof the internationalcommunity,3 and theadoptionof increasinglysophisticated legaland institutionalstandards,bothdomesticandinternational.4Thecontextsinwhichthemechanismsoftransitional

1 Ofthevastandprolificscientificproduction,someofthemostrelevanttitlesareneIl J. KrItz, transItIonal JustICe: how emerGInG demoCraCIes reCKon wIth former reGImes(1995);rutI G. teItel, transItIonal JustICe (2000); martha mInow, between VenGeanCe and forGIVeness(1998);rama manI, beyond retrIbutIon (2002);Chandra leKha srIram, ConfrontInG past human rIGhts VIolatIons: JustICe Vs. peaCe In tImes of transItIon (2004);atroCItIes and InternatIonal aCCountabIlIty: beyond transItIonal JustICe (Edel Hughes, William A. Schabas & ArmesThakur, eds., 2007);transItIonal JustICe In the twenty-fIrst Century (Naomi Roht-Arriaza& JavierMariezcurrena ed., 2006); JaVIer ChInChón, dereCho InternaCIonal y transICIones a la demoCraCIa y la paz: haCIa un modelo para el CastIGo de los Crímenes pasados a traVés de la experIenCIa IberoamerICana (2007). There is a journal dedicated exclusively to the field oftransitionaljustice,International Journal of Transitional Justice.

2 OneofthecentersofreferenceistheInternationalCenterofTransitionalJustice,withitscentralbranchinNewYork,andofficesinplacesasdiverseasCapeTown,Brussels,Jakarta,Katmandu,Kinshasa,Beirut, andBogotá (www.ictj.org).Likewise, there are also theOxfordTransitionalResearchGroup,theTransitionalJusticeInstituteoftheUniversityofUlsterinIreland,andtheCenterfortheStudyofViolenceandReconciliationinCapeTown,SouthAfrica.

3 ProofofthisgrowinginterestisthestudyoftheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations,The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies,U.N.Doc.S/2004/616(Aug.23,2004).TheOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)hasalsobeenincreasinglyinvolvedinaspectsrelatingtoprocessesoftransitionaljustice,suchasinthecaseoftheparamilitarydemobilizationinColombia.Inthiscase,inFebruary2004theOASGeneralSecretarysignedanagreementwiththeColombiangovernmenttomonitorthedemobilizationprocess.TheOASwouldprovidetechnicalsupportfortheverificationofthecessationofhostilities,thedemobilization,thedisarmament,andtheinitiativesforreintegrationofthedemobilized.Tothisend,theMisión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia, MAPP/OEA, wasestablished,whichhasfollowedthedevelopmentsofthepeaceprocesswith theAUCvery closely.See Inter-AmericanCommission ofHumanRights, Informe sobre la implementación de la Ley de Justicia y Paz: etapas iniciales del proceso de desmovilización de las AUC y primeras diligencias judiciales,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129,Doc.6(Oct.2,2007).

4 See Felipe Gómez Isa, El derecho de las víctimas a la reparación por violaciones graves y sistemáticas de los derechos humanos,37el otro dereCho11(2007).

* Althoughtheresponsibilityforthecontentofthispaperisexclusivelymine,IamgratefulforthetimelycommentsmadeonpreviousversionsbyGustavoSalazar(UniversidadJaveriana,Bogotá),CarlosMartínBeristain(internationalconsultant,Bilbao),GiuliaTamayo(AmnestyInternation-al,Madrid),PablodeGreiff(ICTJ,NewYork),MichaelReed(ICTJ,Bogotá),GabrielArias(ICTJ,Bogotá),andJavierChinchón(UniversidadComplutense,Madrid).

Chapter 5

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justice operate are often extremely complex situations in which political andopportunisticconsiderationsfrequentlytakepriority,andthecategoricalsuccessesthatcanbehelduparefew.

Despite this,what iscertain is that inbothacademicandpoliticalcirclesthere is an increasing sense of inevitability in terms of turning to transitionaljusticemechanismsinordertotackletheprocessofdemocratictransitionafteranauthoritarianordictatorialperiodorwhenemergingfromaconflictriddledwithgraveandsystematicviolationsofhumanrights.Inthissense,wecanassertthatatleasttoacertainextenttransitionaljusticehashadsomeepistemic success—it is placed at the center of discussions on processes of political transition and conflictresolutionandthereisacertainrecognitionofitsusefulnessindealingwithuncomfortablelegaciesofthepast.

Paradoxically, this relative epistemic successhasbeen accompaniedby a“scantadvanceinthetheory”5oftransitionaljustice,whichmeansthatwestillcannotproperlyspeakofanewconceptualparadigm.Wearestillhostagesofanepisodic,partial,andveryfragmentedtheoreticalconstruction.Thisconstructionbegan in the1980s in theheatof the transitions todemocracy in theSouthernCone;6 continuedwith the cases of conflict-resolution following the extremelyprolonged conflicts in CentralAmerica; reached its pinnacle in SouthAfricanpost-apartheid; andhas recentlybeenextended toother contexts inAfricaandAsia.7Thisparticularevolutionhelpstoexplainwhyboththebasicconceptualtoolsandthemechanismsofapplicationoftransitionaljusticehavecontinuedtoevolveastheyhavebeenappliedinnewcasesandinnewcontexts—revealingoneoftheinherentcharacteristicsoftransitionaljustice,itsversatility.Thenormsandmechanismsoftransitionaljusticecannotbeabsolutelyuniformandmonolithic;theymustbesufficientlyversatileandflexibleinorder toadapt to thedistinct,complex,andvariedcircumstancesinwhichtheymustnecessarilyoperate.

Likewise, the experience of transitional justice to date shows that thosewhohavedesignedandsteered theprocessesof transitionhavenormallybeenpoliticalactorswithanagendaandintereststhattheywishtopreserveandprotectabove all else. Such actors generally count on a power structure that supportstheir aspirations. Despite the fact that we have legal standards in the field oftransitionaljusticethatareincreasinglyelaborateandbearingacertaindegreeof

5 PablodeGreiff,Una concepción normativa de la justicia transicional,inJustICIa y paz: ¿Cuál es el preCIo Que debemos paGar?22(AlfredoRangel,ed.,2009)(“escasoavancedelateoría”).

6 SomedatethebeginningofthefieldbacktotheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheSecondWorldWar,whenmechanismsof transitional justicewere applied in connectionwith theNurembergandTokyoprosecutionsandinreparationpoliciesinFranceandpost-fascistItaly.SeeMargalidaCapellà,Represión política y Derecho Internacional: una perspectiva comparada (1936-2006),in represIón polítICa, JustICIa y reparaCIón. la memorIa hIstórICa en perspeCtIVa JurídICa (1936-2008)164-74(MargalidaCapellà&DavidGinardeds.,2009).

7 AsolidhistoricalanalysisoftransitionaljusticecanbefoundinJon elster,ClosInG the booKs: transItIonal JustICe In hIstorICal perspeCtIVe(2004).

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coercion,wemustrecognizethatingeneralithasnotbeenthesestandardsleadingtheway. Instead, thedifferentactors involvedhaveattempted toaccommodatetheirinterestsandobjectivesstrategicallywithinthenormativeandinstitutionalframeworkoftransitionaljustice.Thispoliticalstrategicuseoftransitionaljusticediscoursetolegitimizethepursuitofone’sownagendaissomethingthatwefind,toagreaterorlesserdegree,inherentinallprocessesoftransition.

Ontheotherhand,thewidespreadconvictionastotheeffectivenessofapplyingtransitionaljusticeconceptsandmechanismshasmeantexpandingtheinstancesinwhichtheyareappliedtocontextsthatarenot,strictlyspeaking,transitional.8 There isanincreasinglymarkedpressuretoamplifythespectrumoftransitionaljustice’sapplication,whichcouldendupaffectingbothitsbasicconceptualcharacterandtheverynatureof themechanisms. In thisvein, transitional justicediscourse islendingitselftosituationsofopenconflict,wherethereisnocredibleexpectationofpeaceinthenearfutureandwherethepeaceprocessesarepartial,limitedtoonlyoneoftheactors,suchasinthecaseofColombia.9

Thisexpansionofthediscourseisalsoaffectingdemocratictransitionsthattookplacewithapreferenceforforgettingandnotaddressingtheabusesofthepast,suchasinthecaseofSpain.Now,decadeslater,differentactorsareturningtotransitionaljusticediscourseandpracticeasawayofdefinitivelyclosingthebookonatransitionwhichtheybelievetobeunfinished.10Atthesametime,thereisaresorttotransitionaljusticebyspecificgroupsdemandingrecognitionoftheirhistoricrolesandreparationsfor theirsufferingover thecourseofahistoryofinjustice.11Thisincludesindigenouspopulations,12afro-descendents,13 and other subaltern groups.14 Finally, it is also being asked whether transitional justiceshouldaddressnotjustthemostgraveviolationsofcivilandpoliticalrights,asithasuntilnow,butwhetheritsscopeoughttobewidenedtoincludeaspectsrelated

8 See JordiBonet&RosanaAlija,Impunidad, derechos humanos y justicia transicional,53Cuad-ernos deusto de dereChos humanos 110 (2009).

9 See ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón? Verdad, JustICIa y reparaCIón para ColombIa (RodrigoUprimnyetal.ed.,2006).

10 See paloma aGuIlar fernández,polítICas de la memorIa y memorIas de la polítICa: el Caso español en perspeCtIVa Comparada(2008).

11 See, e.g., Jana thompson, taKInG responsIbIlIty for the past: reparatIon and hIstorICal InJustICe (2002);polItICs and the past: on repaIrInG hIstorICal InJustICes (JohnTorpey ed.,2003);elazar barKan, the GuIlt of natIons: restItutIon and neGotIatInG hIstorICal InJustICes (2000);reparatIons: redressInG past wronGs(GeorgeUlrich&LouisseK.Boserupeds.,2003);responsabIlIdad hIstórICa: preGuntas del nueVo al VIeJo mundo(ReyesMateed.,2007).

12 FelipeGómezIsa,El derecho de los pueblos indígenas a la reparación por injusticias históricas,in la deClaraCIón sobre los dereChos de los pueblos IndíGenas157-91(NataliaAlvarez,DanielOliva&NievesZúñigaeds.,2009).

13 afro-reparaCIones: memorIas de la esClaVItud y JustICIa reparatIVa para neGros, afroColombIanos y raIzales(ClaudiaMosqueraRosero-Labbé&LuizClaudioBarceloseds.,2007).

14 Theterm“subaltern”wascoinedbyAntonioGramscibuthasbeendevelopedinaveryinterestingwaybythoseoftheso-calledfieldofsubalternstudies.See, e.g.,subaltern studIes(RanajitGuha&GayatriChakravortySpivak,eds.,1985).

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todevelopment,15socialjustice,16oreconomic,socialandculturalrights,17 all of whichareessentialingredientsforaprocessoftransitiontoreachasatisfactoryconclusion.

Wemustrecognizethatthesepressurestoextendthescopeoftheapplicationof transitional justicediscoursenecessarilyobligeus toundertakeasystematicreconsiderationoftheepistemologicalandconceptualsuppositionsuponwhichtransitionaljusticehassofarbeenbased.Theyrequireustobepermanentlyalertregardingthesuitabilityornotofthesetheoreticalsuppositionsineachindividualcaseand,aboveall,oftheirpossibleimpactsontheconceptsandmechanismsoftransitional justice.

The objective of this chapter is to analyze the use and application oftransitionaljusticediscourseinthecaseofColombia.PartIanalyzesthecontext,thediscoursesemployed,andtheimplementationofthemechanismsoftransitionaljusticeinthiscontext.IwilltheninPartIIattempttoextractsomeconclusionsonwhether theprogressive amplificationof the rangeof transitional justice tonon-transitionalcontextsisanadequatestrategyornot,andwhatthebenefitsandpossiblerisksarethatwerunwiththisstrategy.Forthis,Iwilllookatthevictimsaspoliticalactors;responsestoofficialdiscourse; theright totruth; theroleofnormativestandards;andpossibleimpactonfuturepeaceprocesses.

I. Transitional Justice Discourse in Colombia President Álvaro Uribe Vélez assumed the presidency in 2002 and

immediatelyannouncedhispolicyofdemocratic security.18Fromtheendofthatsameyearaprocessofdialogueandsubsequentdemobilizationofparamilitariesbegan, which has led to a reported 31,671 members of these illegal groupspromisingtodemobilizeandrelinquishtheirweapons.19Uribe,andthepoliticalsectors that support him, from the beginning sought to create away tomake

15 SeetheinterestingreflectioncoordinatedbyPablodeGreiffandRogerDuthie,intransItIonal JustICe and deVelopment: maKInG ConneCtIons (PablodeGreiff&RogerDuthieeds.,2009).

16 rethInKInG transItIonal aGendas: eQualIty and soCIal JustICe In soCIetIes emerGInG from ConflICt(GabyOréAguilar&FelipeGómezIsaeds.,forthcoming2010).

17 James L. Cavallaro & Sebastián Albuja, The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commissions in Latin America and Beyond, in transItIonal JustICe from below: Grassroots aCtIVIsm and the struGGle for ChanGe121-41(KieranMcEvoy&LornaMcGregoreds.,2008).

18 AninterestinganalysisofthedifferentimplicationsofthisnewpolicysetoutbyPresidentUribecanbe found insostenIbIlIdad de la seGurIdad demoCrátICa (AlfredoRangeled.,2003).See also ConflICto y seGurIdad demoCrátICa en ColombIa: temas CrítICos y propuestas (Fundación Socialed.,2006).

19 ThesearetheofficialfiguresmanagedbytheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforPeace.SpeechbyLuizCarlosRestrepo,HighCommissionerforPeace, Desmovilización de las Autodefensas: Balance de un proceso, attheSimposiodeEvaluaciónyBalance:DosañosdeLeydeJusticiayPaz,UniversidadSantoTomás,July25,2007.

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thisprocessaseasyaspossible.Severalof thedeclarationsof thegovernmentrevealedthattherealwilltoseekjusticewaslargelyconditional.InthewordsofthePresident,theprocessshouldtrytoseek“asmuchjusticeaspossible,andasmuchimpunityasnecessary.”20Thisdeclarationof thePresident’s intentionsisreflectedintheprocessofnegotiatingdemobilizationwiththeparamilitarygroupsandcontinuestobeseentodayintheimplementationofthetransitionaljusticemechanismsdesignedtoaccompanythisprocess.Inthisgameofintentions,wecannot forget the forceful pressure exerted by the paramilitaries themselves,21 withtheirdemandsofnotbeingsenttoprison,avoidinganypossibleextraditiontotheUnitedStatestobeprosecutedfortheircrimes,andretainingasignificantpartoftheassetsacquiredbytheirillicitactivities.22

Transitional justice discourse was notably absent in the initial stages ofthisprocessofdemobilization.Thedraftbillofalternativesentences23 that the governmentpresentedin2003tofacilitatetheprocessofdemobilizationwasabillthat,withvaguereferencestorestorativejustice,inrealitysoughttoguaranteeimpunityforthedemobilizedparamilitaries.Duetotheavalancheofcriticismsfrompoliticalsectorsandhumanrightsorganizations,aswellasfrominternationalorganizationsthatwerefollowingtheprocess,thebillhadtobewithdrawn.24

In this complex scenario, the government began towork on a new draftlawthatsuggestedaradicalchangeofstrategy,asitfullyassumedthediscourseof transitional justice. This important change in discourse could be seen inboththegovernmentandtheprincipalparamilitaryleaders.Bothwentfromanabsoluterejectionofthemeresthintofcriminalpunishmentandcompletesilenceonvictims’ rights to theadmissionof thepertinenceoffindinganequilibriumbetween thenecessities of peace and thedemandsof justice,25 which is as we knowoneoftheessentialdilemmasfacedbyalltransitionaljusticeprocesses.

Duringthisprocess,theColombianStatedidnothavecompletefreedomtomaneuver,astherewasafairlypreciseandsophisticatedframeworkestablishedboth by international human rights law and by Colombian legislation, andlikewise by both domestic and international jurisprudence. This frameworksuggests fundamentally that in accordance with international law there is noroom for impunity for grave crimes, such as those committedby thedifferent

20 El as bajo la manga de los Uribistas,el tIempo,Feb.13,2005(“tantajusticiacomofueraposible,ytantaimpunidadcomofueranecesaria”).

21 LeónValencia,Los caminos de la alianza entre los paramilitares y los políticos,in parapolítICa: la ruta de la expansIón paramIlItar y los aCuerdos polítICos(MauricioRomeroed.,2007).

22 GustaVo dunCan,los señores de la Guerra 353(2006).23 ProyectodeLeyEstatutaria85de2003,GacetadelCongreso436(Aug.27,2003).24 Theprocessofnegotiation,withthedifferentproposalsandpointsofview,isverywellanalyzed

in GabyOré Aguilar,El derecho a la reparación en la desmovilización de los paramilitares colombianos,2005anuarIo CIp 263 (2005).

25 RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulaSaffon,Usos y abusos de la justicia transicional en Colombia,in JustICIa y paz,supranote5,at176-77.

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actors in the Colombian armed conflict. The international framework, aswellasalltheinternationaltreatiesratifiedbyColombia,issummarizedintheBasic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,passedinDecember2005bytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly.26 These Principles set out clear guidelines for transitionaljusticeprocesses,whichshouldalwaysrespectanessentialnucleusofrightstojustice, truth, comprehensive reparations to the victims of grave violations ofhumanrights,andguaranteesofnon-repetition.

Throughtroubledandcontroversialnegotiations,andwithintensecriticismfrom diverse sectorswho considered that thiswas another attempt to adopt alegalumbrellaofdisguisedimpunity,theColombianCongressfinallypassedtheJusticeandPeaceLawinJune2005.27

Thefirstpointofcriticismisthattheprocessofnegotiation,demobilization,andreinsertionofthemembersoftheparamilitarygroups,likethedesignofthenormativeframeworktofacilitatethisprocess,hasbeenunilaterallydirectedfromthehighestpostsoftheexecutivepower—withoutanytransparencyandwithouteffectiveparticipationof thevictimsoftheviolence.28Thevictims’absencehasbeen criticized as one of the principle weaknesses of the process.As RodrigoUprimnyhas correctly asserted, “it seemsethically andpoliticallyquestionablethatitshouldbeonlythearmedactorswhonegotiatethepeaceandagreeonthedesignoftransitionaljustice,giventhatthesedonotrepresent(infact,theyoppose)theinterestsoftherestofsociety.”29Ifwereallywanttoadvancealongthepathofpeaceandreconciliation,itwouldbeappropriatefor“alltheactorsinvolvedintheconflict,andnotjustthearmedactors,toparticipateactivelyinovercomingit,”30 thus lendingthenecessary legitimacyto theprojectandassuringthesupportofColombiansocietyandthatoftheinternationalcommunityasawhole.

Ontheotherhand,thelawathandfullyadoptsthediscourseofhumanrightsandvictims’rightsthatbelonginaschemeoftransitionaljustice,purportingtoreachabalancebetweenpeaceandjustice.Thelawconcedesgeneroussentencingbenefitstotheparamilitarieswhodemobilize,withthestatedintentionthatthiswouldfacilitatesignificantadvancesintermsofthevictims’rightstotruthandreparation, aswell as establishguaranteesofnon-repetition forhorrificcrimes

26 U.N.Doc.A/RES/60/147(Mar.21,2006).27 Law 975 of 2005, Diario Oficial nº 45.980 (July 25, 2005). The law, passed on June 22, was

approvedby thePresidentof theRepublic andbecame lawon July25.For adetailed analysisoftheJusticeandPeaceLawinlightofinternationalstandards,seeFelipeGómezIsa,Justicia, verdad y reparación en el proceso de desmovilización paramilitar en Colombia,in ColombIa en su laberInto: una mIrada al ConflICto87(FelipeGómezIsaed.,2008).

28 MabelGonzálezBustelo,Las encrucijadas de Colombia,91papeles de CuestIones InternaCIonales 113(2005).

29 RodrigoUprimny,Introducción,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?,supranote9,at35.30 RodrigoUprimny,Introducción,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?,supranote9,at35.

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attributedtoparamilitarism(e.g.massacres,torture,disappearances).Aprinciplecriticismmade of the law itself is that it fails to specify themechanisms andinstrumentsnecessarytoeffectivelyimplementtheseprinciples—asdemonstratedbytheenormousdifficultiesintheapplicationoftheJusticeandPeaceLawanditslimitedachievementstodate.31

TheColombianConstitutionalCourtitself,whichdeclaredseveralprovisionsof the JusticeandPeaceLawunconstitutional inMay2006,32 has accepted that the framework of transitional justice is perfectly applicable to the Colombiancontext.Initsdecision,theCourtacceptedtheconstitutionalityofthemeasuresofalternativesentencingestablishedinthelawsolongasitiseffectivelyemployedasaninitiativetowardsatisfyingtherightstotruth,reparation,andguaranteesofnon-repetition. Certainly the Court’s judgment very significantly amended keyelementsoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw,33convertingitintoaninstrumentwithmorepossibilities toensure that theprocessofdemobilizationasawhole leadsto theeffectivematerialization of justice, truth, and reparation for the victims.As theInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRightshaspointedout,thisdecisionoftheCourtshouldbemadethe“cornerstone”34formanagingthedemobilizationprocess,asitintroducessignificantandfundamentalchangestotheJusticeandPeaceLaw.

Inanycase,therealizationoftheseobjectivesdoesnotexclusivelydependontheintegrityofadiscourseandalegislativeframeworkthatismoreorlessinaccordancewithinternationalstandardsontransitionaljustice.Itultimatelyanddecisivelydependson thewill andcapacityof theColombianState tomodifya situation that has led to the establishment of paramilitarism as an authenticeconomic, social, military, and political power35 in vast regions of Colombia,inwhich thepresenceof theStatehasbeen residual and theenormouswealthgeneratedbydrugtraffickingitsfundamentalnutrient.36

What underlies the criticisms regarding the application of a transitionaljustice scheme in Colombia is the danger that the process, under the formal

31 See HumbertodelaCalle,Castigo y perdón en el proceso de justicia y paz con los paramilitares,in JustICIa y paz,supranote5,at110.

32 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006,No.D-6032,May18,2006.33 See JorgeIvánCuervo,Estándares internacionales de verdad, justicia y reparación. La aplicación

de la Ley de Justicia y Paz,in JustICIa transICIonal y experIenCIas InternaCIonales: a propósIto de la ley de JustICIa y paz50(JorgeIvánCuervo,EduardoBechara&VerónicaHinestrosaeds.,2007).

34 Statement of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Application and Scope of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia,OEA/Ser.L/V/II125,Doc.15,para.51(Aug.1,2006).

35 ForMauricioRomero,oneoftheprincipalspecialistsontheparamilitaryphenomenoninColombia,the consolidation of the self-defense groups in the 1990s is the result of an entire process ofredefinitionoftheregionalpowerbalancesandaresponsetothepotentialchangesthatcouldcomefromapossiblenegotiationwiththeguerrillas.maurICIo romero, paramIlItares y autodefensas 1982-2003,at33etseq.(2003).See also alfredo ranGel, el poder paramIlItar (2005); CorporaCIón obserVatorIo para la paz, las Verdaderas IntenCIones de los paramIlItares(2002).

36 Fernando Cubides, Narcotráfico y guerra en Colombia: los paramilitares, in VIolenCIas y estrateGIas ColeCtIVas en la reGIón andIna377(GonzaloSánchez&EricLaireds.,2004).

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disguise of prosecutions and victim’s rights to justice, truth, and reparation,will end up becoming a process that grants impunity and does not effectivelydismantletheparamilitarystructuresofeconomicpowerandsocialcontrol,thuscontributinginsteadtothelegalizationandinstitutionalizationofparamilitarismanditsconsolidationasapoliticalproject.Forsome, it isanauthenticprocess of simulation37 inwhich, by appropriating the discourses of human rights andtransitionaljustice,atitsheartseekstolegitimizethehighlevelsofimpunityandtheabsenceofanyeffectivereparationtothevictims,whichsofarhavebeenthecostsoftheparamilitarydemobilizationprocess.

If this is thecase,and therearesufficient indicators toshowthat it isso,wewouldfindourselvesfacingwhatRodrigoUprimnyandMaríaPaulaSaffonhave termed the “mere rhetoric” and“manipulativeuse”of transitional justicediscourse,38whichcouldendupgreatlyharmingtheintegrityandconsistencyofthebasicconceptsandmechanismsoftransitionaljustice.Ifthisisdeemedtobewithintheapplicablenormativeandinstitutionalstandards,itcouldcontributetoanevengreaterdegradationofprocessesoftransitionaljustice39 and to particular instruments becoming unusable or tainted for cases inwhich there are in factconditionstoapplythemechanismsinaminimallyhonestway.

Incontrast,othersectorshavepraised the legal frameworkofJusticeandPeaceLawas the “most exacting and rigorous of anypeace process in recentdecades.”40 Such observers assert that in the transitional justice process inColombiaratherthanmanipulation,whatweareseeinginsteadarethedifficultiesofapplicationderivedfromtheenormouscomplexityoftheColombianconflict.One pervasive opinion of this kind is that defended by the political analystPlinioApuleyo,41whoargues that theestablishmenthasnotusedmanipulativemaneuverstomoldtransitionaljusticetorespondtoitsowninterests,assomehavemalevolentlyclaimed,42butthatratheritisthecomplexityofColombianreality

37 hernando ValenCIa VIlla, la ley de JustICIa y paz de ColombIa a la luz del dereCho InternaCIonal de los dereChos humanos9(2005).

38 RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulaSaffon,Usos y abusos de la justicia transicional en Colombia,in JustICIa y paz, supra note5,at186-87.

39 SeeManuelFernandoQuincheRamírez,La degradación de los derechos de las víctimas dentro del proceso de negociación con los grupos paramilitares,in JustICIa transICIonal: teoría y praxIs 489(CamiladeGamboaed.,2006).

40 AlfredoRangel,Prólogo,in JustICIa y paz, supra note5,at12.Obviously,thegovernmentdefendsthispositivetakeonthedemobilizationprocessinlightoftheinternationalstandardsinthefieldof transitional justice. This is exemplified by Frank Pearl, High Commissioner for Peace andReintegration,intheclosingspeechoftheInternationalCongressonDDRinCartagenadeIndias,May4-6,2009:“TheJusticeandPeaceLawisoneofthemostambitioustransitionaljusticelawsintheworld.Thegovernmentcouldhavebeenlessambitious,butwedecidedtobevisionaries.”

41 PlinioApuleyo,El dilema colombiano: justicia y paz,in JustICIa y paz,supra note5,at258.42 Thisauthormakesreferencetothe“legalwar”thattheFARCandtheELNarealsocarryingout

usingcollectivesoflawyersandhumanrightsNGOsineffectastheirpoliticalarminordertotrytoerodethelegitimacyandthecredibilityofthegovernmentinitspolicyoftransitionaljustice.Apuleyo,in JustICIa y paz,supra note5,at258.

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thathasobligedthemechanismsoftransitionaljusticetoadapt.ForApuleyo,theColombiangovernmenthasshownmorethansufficientproofofitswilltocarryouttheprocessofdemobilizationbasedontheparametersoftransitionaljustice,butdismantlingtheparamilitarystructuresisnotaneasytask.

What these different visions of how transitional justice is operating inColombiashowisthatthediscourseoftransitionaljusticecanbeusedindifferentways andwith differentmotives on the parts of the various actors in a givenprocess, something that tends to be aggravated in situations of conflict. PlinioApuleyo’saccusationaboutthecollusionofcertainhumanrightsdefensegroupswithguerrillagroups43assumesaqualitativeleap,becauseinthiswaythedebatesaroundtransitional justicebecomepartof theverydynamicof theconflictandnotsomethingcompletelyremovedfromit.Thismakesitverydifficulttodebatetransitionaljusticewithaminimumofrationality,impartiality,andevensecurity,44 giventhat,deepdown,eachactorsuspectsthatthepositionsoftheotheractorsformpartoftheirstrategyintheframeworkoftheconflict.

In linewith this, inColombiawe have for some time beenwitnessing astrategic competition, what Delphine Lecombe calls “epistemic struggles,”45 between the different actors over the meanings and ultimate objectives oftransitionaljustice,aswellasovertheuseofthevariousmechanismsitofferstoattempttoemergefromtheconflict.ThisdelicatesituationthattransitionaljusticefacesinthecontextoftheColombianconflictobligesustoemploya“cautioususe”46oftransitionaljusticelanguage—ausethatisdevoidoftheslightesthintofingenuity,thatisfullyconsciousofthecomplexcircumstancesinwhichitmustoperate,andthatexposesanyintent(fromwhereveritmightcome)tomanipulatethestandardsofinternationaljusticeforanyobjectiveotherthanpeace,justice,andthedefenseoftherightsofthevictims.

BelowIwillanalyzethisstrategiccompetitiononthepartofthedifferentactorsinthelightofoneofthemeasurestakensuddenlybyPresidentUribeintheframeworkoftheprocessofdemobilizationoftheparamilitaries—theextradition

43 Apuleyo,in JustICIa y paz,supra note5,at258.44 ThisqualitativeleapthatIhavementionedhascontributedtoturningmanyhumanrightsdefenders

intotargets.ThisgravesituationhasledtotheemissionofacommuniquéonthepartoftheUNSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-Generalonthesituationofhumanrightsdefenders,HinaJilani,theSpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutions,PhilipAlstonandtheSpecialRapporteurontheindependenceofjudgesandlawyers,LeandroDespouy,declaringthattheyare“deeplyconcernedbyrecentdevelopmentsinColombiaindicatingthedeterioratingsituationofhumanrightsdefendersinrecentmonths,inparticularthekillings,harassmentandintimidation of civil society activists, trade-union leaders and lawyers representing victims.”Press Release,UnitedNations,“End violence against defenders in Colombia”, the call of UN experts(Apr.30,2008).

45 See her interesting contribution in this book entitledA Conflicted Peace: Epistemic Struggles around the Definition of Transitional Justice in Colombia.

46 RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulaSaffon,Usos y abusos de la justicia transicional en Colombia,in JustICIa y paz, supra note5,at227(“usocauteloso”).

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totheUnitedStatesonMay13,2008offourteenparamilitaryleaderstobetriedfordrugtrafficking.Asstatedabove,oneoftheparamilitaryleaders’conditionstoparticipateinthedemobilizationprocesswastheguaranteeofnotbeingextraditedtotheUnitedStates.ThiswascriticizedbysomeNGOssuchasHumanRightsWatch,whoarguedthatbyacceptingthisconditionthegovernmentwouldloseanimportant,powerfultoolforensuringeffectiveparamilitarydemobilization,47 stronglylimitingtheDamoclesswordthatthegenuineapplicationoftheprincipleofuniversaljurisdictionmightrepresent.TheJusticeandPeaceLawof2005makesnoexplicitreferencestothefigureofextradition.Itavoidsdoingsobyusingan“astute stratagem”48—the inclusion ofArticle 71,which declared the crime ofbelongingtoanillegalarmedgroupapoliticalcrimebyqualifyingitassedition.AsArticle35ofthepoliticalConstitutionofColombiaof1991establishesthatextraditioncannottakeplaceforpoliticalcrimes,thiseffectivelyeliminatedthepossibilityofextraditinganyparamilitariesadmittedundertheJusticeandPeaceLaw.Fortunately,theConstitutionalCourtofColombiadeclaredthisArticle71ofthelawtobeunconstitutional.49

Regardless, the Uribe administration publicly guaranteed that theparamilitaries, if theycompliedwithall the requisitesof theJusticeandPeaceLaw,would not be extradited.50 Despite this promise, surprisingly in the veryearlymorningofMay13,2008fourteenmembersoftheparamilitaryleadershipwereextraditedtotheUnitedStates.Thissurprisingturnofevents51hasprovokedconflictingreactionsamongthedifferentactorswithregardtothegovernment’sreal motives behind these extraditions. According to the administration andsupporters,52theextraditionisaresultofthescantcollaborationoftheparamilitaryleaders toward making real advances in demobilization and guaranteeing thevictims’rightstojustice,truth,andreparation.53

Accordingtoothersectors,includingthosethatcondemnedtheinitialpactofnon-extradition,theMay2008extraditionsarepartofapoliticalstrategicmove

47 human rIGhts watCh, smoKe and mIrrors: ColombIa’s demobIlIzatIon of paramIlItary Groups 9-10(Aug.2005).

48 ValenCIa VIlla,supra note37,at13.49 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006.50 On July 9, 2006, the thenMinister of Interior and Justice, Sabas Pretelt, declared that those

paramilitarieswhofulfilledtheconditionssetoutintheframeworkoftheJusticeandPeaceLawwouldseetheirextraditionorderscancelled.Sabas Revela ‘Secreto’ De Extradición, el tIempo,July9,2006,at4.

51 This decision,which has been called “opportunistic and sudden,” surprised all, including the“paramilitarycommanders,thecountry,andevenstateofficials.”JaimeH.Diaz,Mensis terribilis: de la lógica de la cosecha a la del reloj,21datos y ComentarIos de Coyuntura ColombIana2(2008).

52 Apuleyo,in JustICIa y paz,supra note5,at260-67.53 PresidentUribe declared in this respect: “Iwill not allow a few criminals to put the state up

againstthewall.”Extradición de 14 jefes ‘paras’ se comenzó a planear desde que ‘Macaco’ fue enviado a E.U., ElTiempo.Com, May 14, 2008, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4163692.

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or “jugada política”54 on thepartof thegovernment inorder todistance itselffromtheparamilitaryleadersandavoidthecontinuedrevelationofcomplicitiesbetweenparticularpolitical andeconomicareaswith thecrimescommittedbyparamilitarisminwhathasbeentermedthe“parapolitics”scandal.55ThesedoubtsregardingthetruemotivesoftheextraditionshaveledRodrigoUprimnytowonderwhythingswerenotdonetheotherwayaround.If,inthegovernment’sjudgment,theparamilitaryleaderscontinuedtodirectcriminalparamilitarynetworksfromprisonanddidnotcollaborate sufficiently, it shouldhavesought tohave themdeprivedofthegenerousbenefitsoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw.Theycouldthenbeprosecutedinaccordancewithordinarylegislation,whichwouldinvolvemuchmoreseveresentencesfortheirgravecrimes.Then,oncetheyhadservedtheirsentence inColombia, they couldbe extradited to theUnitedStates.Uprimnyconcludeshisreflectionwithanenlighteningquestion:“Whyprosecutethemfirstfordrugtraffickingwhenitisobviousthatkillingpeopleismuchmoreseriousthanexportingcocaine?”56

Wherethereissomeconsensusisinthefactthatextraditionscouldaffectthevictims’rightstotruthandreparationbecauseintheUnitedStatestheextraditeesarebeingtriedessentiallyforcrimesrelatingtodrug-trafficking.Inthisrespect,IvánCepeda,oftheMovementofVictimsofStateCrimes(MOVICE),emphasizedinresponsetotheextraditionsthat“extraditingtheaccusedimpliesinhibitingtherightsofsocietyandofthevictimstotruthandjustice.Itshouldbedeterminedwhethertheseextraditionsaretheresultofapactofsilenceandimpunitymadebehindthebackofsociety.”57

Aswe can see, actions are susceptible to different interpretations in thecontextofthestrategiccompetitionovertransitionaljusticediscourse,astrategiccompetition that continues to evolve and adapt as the actors turn to differentmeasuresoftransitionaljustice.

Despitealltheprecautionswithwhichwemustapproachtransitionaljusticediscourseanditsapplicationinanon-transitionalcontextsuchasofColombia,and despite all the attempts at manipulating and devaluing the standards onthepartofthedominanthegemonicrhetoric,asdescribedbelow,thediscourse

54 Alejandro Aponte, Colombia: un caso sui generis de la justicia de transición, in JustICIa transICIonal en IberoamérICa97(JessicaAlmqvist&CarlosEspósitoeds.,2009).

55 Theex-paramilitaryleaderDiegoMurilloBejarano,alias“DonBerna,”inaletteraddressedtotheSupremeCourtofJusticeonSeptember17,2009,arguesthathisextraditiontotheUnitedStateswasastrategyonthepartoftheColombiangovernmenttokeepquiethislinkswithgovernmentofficials, military agents, and politicians. He writes: “There are many political, military, andeconomicsectorsofpeoplethatstillholdimmensemarginsofpowerandinfiltration...whoareinterestedinkeepingthetruthoftheirparticipationhidden.”DiegoFernandoMurilloBejarano,aliasDonBerna,LetteraddressedtotheCriminalCassationChamber,ColombianSupremeCourtofJustice,fromNewYork,MetropolitanCorrectionalCenter(Sept.17,2009).

56 RodrigoUprimny,¿Y por qué no se hizo al revés?,el espeCtador,May27,2008,at29.57 IvánCepeda,No es el fin del camino,CambIo,No.776,May15-21,2008,at25.

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continues to offer enoughpositive elements tomake itworth confronting therisksthatthesekindsofprocessesentailincontextsofconflict.

II. Defense of the Application of Transitional Justice, Conscious of the Risks

A. The Victims as Political Actors

OneprimaryobservationthatresultsfromanalyzingtheapplicationofthenormativeandinstitutionalframeworkoftransitionaljusticeisthatforthefirsttimeinthehistoryoftheColombianconflict,thevictimshavecometooccupyarelevantplace in thepublicscene.This isdespite the initial intentionsof thegovernmentandtheparamilitaryleaderswho,asmentionedabove,resistedtakingnoticeofthem.Untilveryrecently,thevictimswere“theghostsoftheconflict;nobodysawthem,andfewspokeofthem.”58 The invisibility ofthevictimshasbeen something thathas characterized themajorityof the attempts at conflict-resolutionortransitiontodemocracyafterperiodsofdictatorship.59

Oneofthevirtuesoftransitionaljusticediscourseisthatitputsthevictimsthemselves,andtheirrights,intothecenterofthedebate.60Itfocusesonprovidingthevictimswith“asenseofrecognition,notonlyasvictims,butasholdersofrights.”61Wemustrecognizethatinthisrespect,importantstepshavebeenmade;wehaveadvancedonaroadofnoreturn,inwhichthevictimswillbe,unavoidably,necessarytravelcompanions,as“exceptionalhistoricwitnessesandthesubjectsofjustice.”62Fromnowonitwillbetotallyunthinkablethatvictimsshouldnotbepresentindebatesaboutpeaceandjustice.ThetumultuousdebatesaroundthedraftVictims’Lawisjustoneexampleofthis.63Thevictims’growingpublicpresence,theconsolidationofsomeoftheirorganizations,thechannelingofresources,andthe establishment of transnational networkswith other internationalNGOs64 havebeenforsomevictimsahopefulprocessesofempowerment. This could contributedecisivelytoencouragingtheirparticipationandgeneratingasense

58 Sergio Jaramillo,Presentación, in Cuadernos del ConflICto: JustICIa, Verdad y reparaCIón en medIo del ConflICto6(FundaciónIdeasparalaPazed.,2005).

59 SeeReyesMate,memorIa de ausChwItz: aCtualIdad moral y polítICa(2003).60 MauricioGaborit,Memoria histórica: revertir la historia desde las víctimas,in el dereCho a la

memorIa 195(FelipeGómezIsaed.,2006).61 DeGreiff,in JustICIa y paz, supra note5,at47.62 IvánCepeda&ClaudiaGirón,Testigos históricos y sujetos de justicia,in JustICIa transICIonal:

teoría y praxIs, supra note39,at375.63 The so-called Mesa de Víctimasorgroupofexperts for thisdraftbill isacoalitionofvictims

groups,humanrightsorganizations,andorganizationsof internationalcooperationsuchas theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP).

64 Uprimny&Saffon,in JustICIa y paz, supra note5,at206.

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of ownershipoftheprocess,whichisseenasfundamentalfromtheperspectiveofmanyvictims themselves.65The challenge is to ensure these processes takeplacewithoutanytypeofdiscrimination66andthattheyreachthegreatestpossiblenumberofvictims,withoutbeinglimited,asoftenhappens,tothosevictimswhohaveaccesstosupportingorganizationsandarepolitically correct at a particular moment.67

B. Toward a “From Below” Response to the Official Rhetoric

Asecondpositiveaspect,stronglylinkedtotheemergenceofthevictimsaspoliticalactors,hastodowithhowthevictimsthemselveshaveappropriatedthediscoursesofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrightsandoftransitionaljusticetoradicallyquestiontheofficialrhetoricofthepeaceprocess.IntheopinionofMOVICE,68oneofthemostrepresentativevictims’groups,theofficialdiscoursehas reduced the peace process with the paramilitaries to a limited process ofhandingoverofweaponsandreinsertionintocivilianlife,withoutgoingintobasicquestionssuchasrealguaranteesoftherightstotruth,justice,andreparation,orthestrengtheninganddeepeningofdemocracyinthecountry.Thediscoursesoftransitionaljusticehaveservedascatalyzingstrategiesofresistance(s)from below,69 which attempt to counteract the powerful official rhetoric.70 The progressiveempowermentofvictimshasledtothevictimsthemselvesdevisingalternativestrategiesoftruth,justice,andreparation,71beyondtheofficialframeworkssuch

65 KieranMcEvoy&LornaMcGregor,Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy and Praxis,in transItIonal JustICe from below, supra note17,at9.

66 Principle25oftheBasic Principles and Guidelines,supranote26,stipulatesthatthe“applicationandinterpretationoftheseBasicPrinciplesandGuidelinesmustbeconsistentwithinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlawandbewithoutanydiscriminationofanykindoronanyground,withoutexception.”

67 Onthedifficultiesthatvictimsandtheirorganizationsencounterinreparationprocesses,consulttheextraordinarycasestudyundertakenbyHeidiRomboutsonRwanda,VICtIm orGanIsatIons and the polItICs of reparatIon: a Case study on rwanda(2004).

68 Itscomposition,history,andprincipleobjectivecanbefoundattheorganizationswebsite,http://www.movimientodevictimas.org.

69 This new epistemological perspective analyzes the processes of creating and applying norms associalprocessesinwhichnotonlythepoliticalandlegaleliteparticipatebutalsolocalactorsfrombelow.See, e.g.,balaKrIshnan raJaGopal, InternatIonal law from below: deVelopment, soCIal moVements and thIrd world resIstanCe (2003); law and GlobalIzatIon from below: towards a CosmopolItan leGalIty(BoaventuradeSousaSantos&CésarRodríguez-Garavitoeds.,2005);sally enGle merry, human rIGhts and Gender VIolenCe: translatInG InternatIonal law Into lo-Cal JustICe (2006); the InternatIonal struGGle for new human rIGhts(BobClifforded.,2009).

70 SeetheanalysisofamemberofMovimiento de Hijos e Hijas por la memoria y contra la impunidad (Movement of Sons andDaughters forMemory and against Impunity), JoséDaríoAntequeraGuzmán,Contribuciones hacia la reivindicación social de un derecho a la memoria,37el otro dereCho 65 (2007).

71 Onthis,seethetwofrom below experiencesanalyzedbyCatalinaDiaz—oneonlocalprocessesofvictim-recognition,truth-seeking,andpropertyrestitutioninMedellín;theotheronlocalrecon-ciliationprocessesineasternAntioquia.CatalinaDíaz,Challenging Impunity from Below: The

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as the Justice and Peace Law or the National Reparation and ReconciliationCommission(CNRR)createdbythatlaw.Thistrendcanbeseen,toagreaterorlesserdegree,inmosttransitionaljusticeprocesses.Initiatingtheseprocessescansetoffcertainsocialforcesthatbegintotakeoverthereinsandapproachtruth,justice,andmemoryasprocessesofsocialconstruction,72 and as “part of a societal democratizationprocessandanopportunityforthesocialforcesthathavebeenexcluded,persecuted,andstigmatizedtoparticipateinpubliclife.”73Inthisway,spacesaregeneratedfor“resistance to therepression (inboth thepoliticalandpsychicsenses)ofthepast.”74ThisisoneoftheobjectivesofMOVICE’sprojectColombia Nunca Más.ThisprojectisworkingtocreateaCenterofMemoryandDocumentationthatwouldservethedoublefunctionofasecurityarchiveandapublicspacefortruthandmemory.

Inthiscontextofemergingmemoryinitiatives,interestinginteractionsarisebetweentheprocessescomingfromaboveandtheprocessesemergingfrombelow,inthecaseoftheAreaofHistoricalMemoryoftheCNRRforexample.Becauseof the dynamics since its creation, the personality and enormous intellectualprestigeofitsCoordinator,historianGonzaloSánchez,andthecollaborationofabroadgroupofexperts,75theHistoricalMemoryAreahasobtainedaconsiderabledegreeofautonomyfromtheCNRR—whichissomewhatdiscreditedintheeyesofthevictims—andiscontributingtothegenerationoftruthandmemoryspacesfor the victims as amechanism of empowerment.76As theArea of HistoricalMemory itself emphasizes, its mission is “to develop an integrated, inclusive

Contested Ownership of Transitional Justice in Colombia, in transItIonal JustICe from below,supra note 17.

72 AnaGonzálezBringas,Madres-Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo: la construcción social de la memoria,in el dereCho a la memorIa, supra note 61. See also Natalia CarolinaMarcos, La memoria insurgente de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo en la lucha por los derechos humanos,anuarIo de aCCIón humanItarIa y dereChos humanos87(2008).

73 IvánCepedaCastro,Ocho propuestas para la no repetición de los crímenes atroces y el despla-zamiento forzado en Colombia,in tIerra y desplazamIento en ColombIa: CrIsIs humanItarIa por el Control del terrItorIo 147 (TaulaCatalanaperlapauielsdretshumansaColombiaed.,2006).

74 IvánCepedaCastro&ClaudiaGirónOrtiz,Justicia y Crímenes contra la Humanidad,in Cursos de dereChos humanos de donostIa-san sebastIán85(JuanSoroetaed.,2004).

75 The research team includes, among others,AbsalónMachado,ÁlvaroMachado, IvánOrozco,RodrigoUprimny,AndrésFernandoSuárez,PilarGaitán,MaríaVictoriaUribe,FernánGonzález,LeónValencia, JorgeRestrepo,MaríaEmmaWills,AnaMaríaGómez, JesúsAbadColorado,PilarRiaño,andMarthaNubiaBello.

76 Forexample,theMemory Week,oneoftheArea’sinitiativesinthisregard,seekstogivevisibilitytothesuppressedmemoriesofthevictimsandgivethemavoice,inordertocontributetodemocratizingmemoryprocesses.InSeptember2008thefirstMemoryWeektookplacesimultaneouslywiththelaunching of theArea’s first case-study report, on the emblematicTrujillomassacre,área de memorIa hIstórICa, truJIllo: una traGedIa Que no Cesa(2008).IntheframeworkofthesecondMemoryWeek,celebratedinSeptember2009,awholecollectionofactivitieswascelebratedfortherecoveryofmemories,amongwhichwasincludedthepresentationofthesecondreportononeofthemostatrociousmassacresperpetratedbytheparamilitaries.área de memorIa hIstórICa, la masaCre de el salado: esta Guerra no era nuestra (2009).

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narrativeintunewiththevoicesofthevictimsabouttheoriginandtheevolutionoftheinternalarmedconflictinColombia.”77

TheconclusionwecandrawhereisthatinColombia,eveninacontextofconflict,whichclearlyisnotthemostfavorablefortheemergenceanddevelopmentofthesetypeofinitiatives,interestingprocessesofrecoveryanddignificationofmemoriesofsufferingarebeingcarriedout.AndsuchprocesseshavetobepartofthereconstructionofthetruthabouttheColombianconflictandthegraveaffrontstodignityithasproduced—andwhich,unfortunately,continuetoday.

C. Some Advances in the Right to Truth

The right to truth is fundamental, for the victims of grave violations ofhumanrightsandforColombiansocietyasawhole.It iscrucialbothtomovetowardclarifyingtheindividualcasesofhumanrightsviolationsandtounravelthefactorsthathavecontributedtotheemergence,development,andconsolidationofthephenomenonofparamilitarism.Fulfillingtheseconditionswillpermitusto determine if the demobilization process is really progressing, orwhether itis ameremask to cover the de facto legalization ofwhat has been called the“successfulparamilitaryproject.”78

With respect to the right to truth,wemust recognize that the JusticeandPeaceLawwasfarfromwhatwouldhavebeendesirable.ThiswasamajorfocusofthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtinMay2006,whichmadeamendmentsbasedontheincreasinglydevelopedinternationalstandardsonthesubject.79 Once again,despitepromisingformulationsofprinciple,80mechanismsformakingthisrighteffectiveturnedouttobecompletelyinappropriateandinsufficient.81

Afirst criticism is that the law contemplates exclusively a judicial truth,withoutexplicitlyanticipatingotherformsoftruthreconstructionandhistoricalmemory—suchasanon-judicialtruthcommissionforexample,82anextremethatwasonthetableduringtheprocessofnegotiatingtheJusticeandPeaceLaw.

Oneofthemosteffectivewaysofbeingabletoguaranteetherighttotruth,inbothindividualandcollectiveaspects,wouldbe“tomaketheversiones libres publicinsuchawaythatboththedirectvictimsandtheirrelatives,andsocietyasawhole,couldhearthedeclarationsoftheJusticeandPeaceparticipantsand

77 ÁreadeMemoriaHistórica,CNRR,Narrativa y voces del conflicto. Programa de investigación (Aug.2008),available at http://www.memoriahistorica-cnrr.org.co.

78 HéctorLeónMoncayo,Colombia: los territorios de la guerra. El impacto de la reinserción en la economía mundial,in tIerra y desplazamIento en ColombIa,supra note74,at43.

79 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006.80 See, e.g.,Law975of2005,arts.1,4,7&15.81 RodrigoUprimny&MaríaPaulSaffon,Derecho a la verdad: alcances y límites de la verdad

judicial,in ¿JustICIa transICIonal sIn transICIón?, supra note9.82 la ley de JustICIa y paz,supra note37,at12.

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knowthetruth.”83Itisclearthatatthispoint,withtheenormouspublicitygiventothefirstversiones libres(voluntarydepositions)andtheparapoliticsscandal,Colombiansocietycannolongerdenytheenormousatrocitiesthatarecomingintothepubliclight,andthecomplicitiesofhighpoliticalofficialsandalliesoftheadministration.

Inmyopinion,themedia,andparticularlythewrittenpress,areplayingaveryimportantrolebybringingthegraveeventstothewiderpublicthroughthenews,althoughwemustbeconsciousofthelimitationsofwrittenpressintermsofreachingallcornersofacountrylikeColombia.Ontheotherhand,thereareexpressionsofabsolutealarminlightofthe“apathyonthepartofsocietyinthefaceoftheconfessionsofthemostfearedassassins...whichshouldtranscendmereshockandleadtorage,fury,andshame.”84Likewise,therehasalsobeenheavy criticism that some of the demobilized paramilitaries are using theirversiones libres tojustifytheircrimesasactionsofwarintheframeworkofanarmedconflict,85andeventojeeratthevictims—whichismakinga“mockeryofthecountry”86andaboveall,ofthevictimsoftheirhorrendouscrimes.

83 GustaVo Gallón, mIChael reed & CatalIna lleras,anotaCIones sobre la ley de JustICIa y paz: una mIrada desde los dereChos de las VíCtImas 58(2007).Inthisrespect,itisimportanttorecognizetheenormouspublicitythattheCNRRisgivingtotheversiones libres,includingthetimeline,with the intentionofencouraging thevictimsandsociety ingeneral topayattention.Forthisinformation,whichisconstantlyupdated,seetheCNRRhomepage,http://www.cnrr.org.co.Initially,manyoftheversiones libreswerebroadcastbytelevision,togetthemostpublicitypossible. However, this publicity has been limited by a sentence of the Constitutional Court,which has prohibited the direct transmission bymassmedia of the Law 975 versiones libres. ConstitutionalCourt,rulingT-049/08,No.T-1.705.247,Jan24,2008.

84 GermánUribe,Las tumbas del terror,semana,Oct.20,2008,available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-opinion-on-line/tumbas-del-terror/107044.aspx.Forthiscolumnist:

It is time that the awareness and knowledge of such aberration and injusticeobligesallofustocommit—andthattheinvestigatingunits,legaljournalists,columnistsandeditorsofthepress,alldotheirparttoo—inordertomakesurethatthisdramaofmassgravesdoesnotendupbecomingonemoredismaltwen-ty-first-centuryanecdoteinthebloodyhistoryofColombia.

GermánUribecites,alongthesamelines,theharshwordsoftheanthropologistMaríaVictoriaUribe,whosaidthat“Bogotásocietydoesnotgiveadamnthattheyfound15corpsesinSucre.”Id. ThispessimismseemstobecorroboratedbythedishearteningpublicopinionpollinSemana magazine,whichsuggeststhatasignificantpercentageofColombiansocietydoesnottotallyrejectthe atrocities carriedout by theparamilitaries, nor their proven links to state agents.La gran encuesta de la parapolítica,semana,May5,2007,available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/gran-encuesta-parapolitica/103020.aspx.

85 AsLeónValenciaemphasizes,certainpowerfulandveryinfluentialsectorsofColombiansocietyconsidertheparamilitariesas“saviors”andbelievethatthecountryowesthemadebtforhavingwonsomuchlandfromtheguerrilla.LeónValencia,Prólogo,in parapolítICa, supra note21,at8.

86 AsaneditorialinthenewspaperEl Tiempopointedout,RodrigoTovarPupo,alias“Jorge40”,usedthebeginningofhisversion libre“tostatethathedoesnotremembermanythings,tonegatethemajorityofthecrimesattributedtohim,andtoclaimthatthehorrorsandmassacresforwhichheisresponsiblewerelegitimateactsofwar.”Una burla al país,el tIempo,July11,2007.Ontopofthis,continuestheeditorial,“thefamiliesofthevictimsofthelonglistofcrimesagainsthu-manityhecommitted(including200massacresand800disappearances)aredenouncingthreatstellingthemnottoattendthehearingsorpresentdemands.”Id.

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D. The Role of Normative and Institutional Standards

AsIhavereiterated, transitional justicerelies todayonlegal instrumentsandaninstitutionalframeworkthatserveasalimitforactorswhoarenegotiatingpeace.Although thecapacity that theyhave toorientatepeaceprocesses suchasthoseinColombiashouldnotbeoverestimated,wemustrecognizethatsuchstandardscanoperateas“virtuousrestrictions,”87whichcanimposeintractablelimits onpolitical negotiations.AsRodrigoUprimnyandMaríaPaulaSaffonhave correctly emphasized, “if they are clear, and appear very difficult tomanipulateorevade,thelegalstandardscanreduceuncertaintyanddiminishthespectrumofpossibleresultsofapeaceagreement,makingiteasiertoreachanacceptablecompromisebetweentheinterestsofantagonisticactors.”88Althoughitisdifficulttoprovewithcompletecertainty,speculatingIhavetheimpressionthat normative standards have played a relatively important role during thegovernment’sprocessofshapingandadaptingitsresponseduringthesuccessivestages of the peace process since the initial presentation of the draft law onalternativesentencesin2003.

Regardless,wefaceasituationofpermanentebbandflowon thepartofthe government, as demonstrated by its passing of various regulatory degrees.Thesedecreesseektoreturn,whereverpossible,tothecontentoftheJusticeandPeaceLawasitwasbeforetheConstitutionalCourt’srulingofMay2006.89 This continuous tactic of thegovernmentmeans thatwemust bepermanently alertandmaximizeprecautions against any intent todistort the standards regardingjustice,truth,andreparation.Althoughwemustbeconsciousthatwearemovinginverycomplexandslipperyterrain,astheColombiancasemakesclear,atsuchjuncturesmost important is todefend inall casesaminimumnucleusof legalstandardsnotsusceptibletonegotiation:“Oneof themainadvantagesofusingthe transitional justice paradigm resides in its capacity to introduce objectivecomponentsintoprocessesoftransition,basedonlegalinternationalnormsandprinciples that channel a particular conception of justice.”90

Inthisway,somesupranationalinstitutions,suchastheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsandtheInternationalCriminalCourt,canandinfactdoalreadyfunctionas“virtuousrestrictions.”TheInter-AmericanCourthasissuedseveraljudgmentscondemningtheColombianStateforcomplicityoromissionincasesofmassacrescommittedbyparamilitarygroups.91This ismakinganenormous

87 Uprimny&Saffon,in JustICIa y paz,supranote5,at207.88 Uprimny&Saffon,in JustICIa y paz,supranote5,at209.89 On this, see Camila de Gamboa Tapias’s text in this volume, The Colombian Government’s

Formulas for Peace with the AUC: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Political Realism. 90 JordiBonet&RosanaAlija,supra note8,at125.91 Caseofthe19Tradesmenvs.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.109(July5,2004);Case

ofMapiripánMassacrevs.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.134(Sept.15,2005);Case

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contributiontotheguaranteeofindividualandcollectiverightstotruthregardingtheatrocitiesofparamilitarismand the roleplayedby theState.Likewise, theCourt’sjudgmentsareveryrelevantintermsofthevictims’rightstojusticeandreparation,92 clearly establishing the principle that guaranteeing peace cannotinvolveboundlessimpunity.Inthissense,theInter-AmericanCourtmaintainsthatthestandardofreparationithasestablishedmustbetheframeofreferencefortheCNRR,“notonlytoprotecttheColombianprocessfrompotentialinternationallawsuitsbeforetheCourt,buttoassurestandardsthatpermittherestorationofthedignityofthevictims.”93

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has also paid attention to theprocess of demobilization, prosecution, and punishment of the paramilitariesinColombia.ColombiasubmitteditsratificationoftheStatuteofRomeonthePermanentInternationalCriminalTribunalonAugust5,2002,whichcameintoforce beginningNovember 1, 2002.94A relevant event relating to the possiblecompetence of the International Criminal Court over crimes committed inColombiacameaboutonMarch2,2005,whentheICCProsecutor,LuisMoreno-Ocampo,sentanofficialcommuniquétotheColombiangovernmentrequestingmore information95 regarding how the State was responding to reports of thecommissionofnumerous,gravecrimesagainsthumanityfromNovember2002onwards.Similarly,theProsecutorshowedgreatinterestinthedifferentdraftlawsthatwerebeingdebatedtofacilitatethedemobilizationoftheparamilitarygroups,askingtheColombiangovernmenttokeephim“informedofadvancesmadeinthisrespect.”96

ofPuebloBelloMassacrevs.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.140(Jan.31,2006);CaseofItuangoMassacrevs.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.149(July1,2006);CaseofLaRochelaMassacrevs.Colombia,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.163(May11,2007).

92 AninterestinganalysisoftheInter-Americansystemfromtheopticofvictims’rightstoreparationcanbe found inCarlos martín berIstaIn, dIáloGos sobre la reparaCIón: experIenCIas en el sIstema InteramerICano de dereChos humanos (2008).

93 Cuervo,in JustICIa transICIonal y experIenCIas InternaCIonales, supra note33,at17.94 RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.183/9U.N.T.S.90, entered

into force July1,2002.TheColombiangovernment,using theprerogativeconcededbyArticle124oftheRomeStatute,madeadeclarationatthemomentofratificationinvirtueofwhich“foraperiodofsevenyearsaftertheentryintoforceofthisStatutefortheStateconcerned,itdoesnotacceptthejurisdictionoftheCourtwithrespecttothecategoryofcrimesreferredtoinarticle8.”ThismeansthattheInternationalCriminalCourthasnoauthorityforthecommissionofwar crimes inColombianterritorypriortotheexpirationofthedeclaration—November1,2009.TheTribunaldoeshavecompetenceovergenocide(Article6oftheStatute)andcrimesagainsthumanity(Article8)beginningin2002,thedateinwhichtheRomeStatutecameintoforceinColombia.

95 Article15.1oftheStatuteofRomepermitsthattheProsecutor“mayinitiateinvestigationspropriomotuonthebasisofinformationoncrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.”TheFiscalhastoanalyzethetruthoftheinformationreceived,inorder,accordingtoArticle15.2,“additionalinformationfromStates,organsoftheUnitedNations,intergovernmentalornon-governmentalorganizations,orotherreliablesources....”

96 LetterfromtheICCProsecutorLuisMorenoOcampototheColombianAmbassadortotheICC,GuillermoFernandezdeSoto(Mar.2,2005).

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TheICCProsecutorintendstofollowverycloselythecrimescommittedinthearmedconflictinColombia,andtheresponsesoftheState,whichwasconfirmedbyhisfirstofficialvisittoColombiainOctober2007.Inthisvisit,theProsecutormadeaveryrevealingdeclaration:“IamuptodatewiththelegalprocessesinColombiainconnectionwithcrimesthatcouldfallundermyjurisdiction.Ifollowthe cases andprocedures, and I verify that they are fulfilling their function.”97 Inprinciple,acorrectapplicationof theJusticeandPeaceLawwoulddeprivetheInternationalCriminalCourtofcompetenceovertheparticipatingindividualsandthecrimescoveredbythelaw,giventheprincipleofcomplementaritythatgovernsinternationalcriminaljustice.

However,asHernandoValenciahascorrectlyemphasized,totheextentthatthe applicationof the Justice andPeaceLawwere tobeonly the “appearanceor simulationof justice,”98 the ICCwouldhave jurisdictionovergenocideandcrimesagainsthumanity(andforcrimesofwarfromNovember1,2009onwards).Article17oftheRomeStatuteregulatestheconditionsofadmissibilityofcases.Specifically,theCourthasto“determineunwillingnessinaparticularcase. . .having regard to theprinciplesofdueprocess recognizedby international law. . . .”99 Inorder togaugewhetherornot there really is thewill todo justice,Article17outlinesasetofcircumstanceswhichmustbeconsidered.Thatistosay,ifthestateis unwilling or unabletocarryouttheinvestigationorprosecutionofthoseallegedtoberesponsible,thecompetenceoftheInternationalCriminalCourt would come, subsidiarily, into play. Fundamentally, the objective is toavoidimpunityforcrimesabhorrenttotheconscienceofhumanityandthathaveaffectedthousandsofvictimsinColombia.Internationalcriminaljusticecaninthiswaybeaveryimportanttooltocomplementtheeffortsofasocietytopursuejusticeandguaranteevictims’rightstotruthandreparationofthevictims.100

E. Clear Guidelines for Future Peace Processes

Wemust begin this consideration by recognizing that in previous peaceprocessesinColombia,crimesagainsthumanityhaveneverbeenprosecuted,thevictimizershaveneverbeenrequiredtoconfess,evennegligibly,tothetruthoftheircrimes,norhavethevictimsandtheirrighttoreparationsbeentakenintoconsideration.101Thecurrentprocessofparamilitarydemobilization,launchedin

97 Corte Penal Internacional Le Sigue La Pista A La Parapolítica, el tIempo,Oct.21,2007,available athttp://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-2698429.

98 HernandoValenciaVilla,Colombia ante la Corte Penal Internacional,4heChos del CalleJón8(June2005).

99 RomeStatute,art.17(2).100 ElizabethOdioBenito,Posibles aportaciones del Estatuto de Roma a los procesos judiciales en

las sociedades en transición,in JustICIa transICIonal en IberoamérICa,supra note 55.101 AlfredoRangel,in JustICIa y paz, supra note5,at13.

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2002,evenwithallthelimitationsandabusesonthepartofthegovernmentandtheparamilitaryleadersdiscussedabove,isattempting,atleastformally,tomaketherightstojustice,truth,reparationandguaranteesnon-repetitionprevail.Theprocessisbynomeansover,andwemustwaitareasonableperiodbeforewearereallyabletogaugethedegreetowhichthediscourseoftransitionaljusticehasoperatedasamerelegitimizingcoverforintentionsofguaranteeingbroaddosesofimpunityandfailingtorecognizethevictims’rightstoanauthenticreparation,orwhetheritreallyhascontributedtoopeningbothofficialandunofficialspacesforjustice,truth,andreparation.

The result from this overall process, and from an international contextinwhich the principles of transitional justice operate increasingly as limits toimpunity,isthatitisveryunlikelythatfuturepeaceprocessesinColombiawillbeabletoshirktheminimumdemandsoftransitionaljusticediscourse.Thisprocesscan contribute to establishing clear guidelineswhen approaching future peacenegotiationswiththeillegalarmedgroups,whetherparamilitarieswhohavenotyetbeendemobilizedorguerrillagroups.AsJorgeIvánCuervohaspointedoutinthisrespect“thesuccessoffuturenegotiationswithotherillegalarmedgroups,and,ingeneral,ajustanddignifiedpacificationofthecountry”dependsonthesuccess and consolidation of this process.102

Therefore, I assert that, despite all the limitations of seeking to apply atransitional justice scheme in a non-transitional context characterized by thepersistence of a bloody conflict, there arewell founded reasons to defend theuseof transitional justicediscourse.Cautionwillhave tobeexercised,but theeventualbenefitsthatcanbederivedwithregardstojustice,truth,andreparationmakeitworththerisks;risksthat,ontheotherhand,areindeedinherenttoanyprocess of transitional justice.

Conclusion

Fromtheanalysisdrawnfromthissui generismodeloftransitionaljusticewecanextractsomeconclusionswhichmaybegenerallyhelpfulforapproachingthesekindsoftransitionsthatfalloutsideofthetraditionalframeworkoftransitionstodemocracyortransitionstopeace.

First,despitealltheproblemsraisedbythiskindoftransitionthatdepartsfrom the orthodoxy of transitional justice discourse, I believe the practice ofcontinuingtoapplythisdiscoursetobejustified.Wemustbeverycautious,andexerciseprecautions,butIamconvincedthatthepositiveaspectsclearlyoutweightheriskswemayrun;risksthataccompanyanytransitionaljusticeprocess.

102 Cuervo,in JustICIa transICIonal y experIenCIas InternaCIonales, supra note33,at56.

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Oneofthemostpositiveaspectsofapplyingthetransitionaljusticeschemeistheprogressiveemergenceofthevictimsassocialandpoliticalactors,whichisundoubtedlyanecessarypartofanytransitionaljusticeprocess.Theirgreatervisibility,thecreationofassociationsandorganizationsthatlegitimatelyrepresenttheirinterestsandspeakintheirname,andthechannelingofagreaterquantityof resources in their favor, havemade interesting processes of empowermentpossible.Ontheotherhand,whentheexpectationsgeneratedarenotfulfilledbytheState,orifsomevictimsfeeldiscriminatedagainst,feelingsoffrustrationcanarisewhichcanendupunderminingcivicconfidence,oneof theobjectivesoftransitional justice.

Likewise, we must recognize that the victims and civil society are theonesthathavegivenastrongpushtotheprocessofextendingthediscourseoftransitionaljustice.Inthissense,interestingprocesseshavebeentriggeredfrom below for the generationof alternative spaces of truth, justice, and reparation,withaprotagonistroleforthevictimsthemselves.

Another important element associated with these processes is theunstoppable presence of truth and memory. Once the processes begin, thedifferentactorsbegininitiativesthat,inonewayoranother,contributetobringinglighttotheabusesofthepastandgivingavoicetothevictims.Theprocessesof transitional justice are accompanied by artistic, literary, cinematic, anddocumentaryinitiatives,whosesoleobjectiveistocontributetotheemergenceofvarioustruthsandmemoriesofapastthatresistsbeingforgotten.

Finally, theprogress thathasbeenmade towarddevelopingnormativeand institutionalstandards in thefieldof transitional justicehasmeant that therights to truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition have beenverypresentintheColombiancase.Todayitissimplynotpossibletoskirttheserightswhenaprocessoftransitionaljusticeisbeingdebated,althoughitspracticalimplementationislargelyconditionedbythecontextinwhichitisapplied.

For all this, and formany other reasons thatmust remain for anotheroccasion,itseemstomeunavoidablethatweapplythediscourseoftransitionaljustice to theseprocesseswhichdepart from the classicmolds, thoughalwaystryingtoremainconsciousofthecontextandthedifficultiesandbarriersthatsuchacontextimposes.

A Conflicted Peace:Epistemic Struggles around the Definition of Transitional Justice in Colombia

Delphine Lecombe

Law 975 of 2005, the Justice and Peace Law, introduced the norms oftransitional justice (victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparation, and guaranteesof non-repetition) in Colombia to accompany the demobilization process oftheparamilitarygroups thatwasnegotiated in2003.Despite thegovernment’sinvestment in the “grammar” of transitional justice, victims’ organizationsandhuman rightsdefenders continue toquestion and criticize its policies as amanipulationofinternationalstandards.InJune2009,afteralmosttwoyearsofdiscussionanddespitethemobilizationofagroupofexpertstoprovidetechnicalinput for a victims’ law,1 the senators alliedwith PresidentUribe blocked thepassing of the bill. They rejected the cost of themeasure and the fact that itincludedequalbenefitsforvictimsof“terrorists”andthoseofstateagents.2

The story of the victims’ law is emblematic of the tensions that continueto surround theapplicationof transitional justice in theColombiancontextandit permits a diagnosis: six years after thefirst debates around the draft law foralternative sentences, the power balance between the national government andthevictims’organizationstiedtotheinternationalhumanrightsnetworksfavorsthe coalition of Uribe allies. The diffusion of the “international standards” oftransitional justice to State institutions is far from a success.The high numberof keymembers of the international community that attended the InternationalDisarmament,Demobilization,andReintegrationCongress,organizedbytheOfficeof thePresident inMay2009,revealedthecapacityof thenationalgovernmenttodisseminateitsowninterpretationof“transitionaljustice.”Thedemobilizationprocess of the paramilitaries in Colombia has been accompanied by epistemicstruggles—strugglesaboutthemeaningandimplicationsoftransitionaljustice.TheobjectiveofthischapteristounderstandwhatconditionsgeneratetheepistemicstrugglesaroundtransitionaljusticeinColombia;howthisismanifested;andwhateffectssuchstruggleshaveonkeyconceptsoftransitionaljustice.

1 Acoalitionofvictims’andhumanrightsorganizations—FundaciónSocial,Vivalaciudadanía,International Center for Transitional Justice, among others—supported by internationalcooperation agencies—including theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme—supported theinitiativeoftheLiberalSenatorJuanFernandoCristo.

2 See PresidentÁlvaroUribe,SpeechattheSeminar“Poverty,Development,andMDG,”UniversidaddelaSalle(June18,2009),available at http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2009/junio/18/07182009.html.

Chapter 6

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ThischapterstartsfromthehypothesisthattheepistemicstrugglesthatareinherenttotransitionaljusticearereinforcedinColombiabythecontextofwar.Itwillbeshownthattransitionaljusticefunctionsasan“ambiguousconsensus”3 thatspansamultitudeofinstruments.Thisleadstoepistemicstrugglesreinforcedbytheinternationalpowerstructureandbythenationalcontextofwar.

Thisstudyseekstoanalyzethedynamicsinplay,inthesocialandpoliticalfield,inthedefinitionoftransitionjusticeinColombia.Forthis,thereflectionisbasedonthetheoreticalframeworkofcognitiveanalysisthathasbeendevelopingsincethe1970sinNorthAmericanpoliticalscience,andmorerecentlyinEurope.Thistypeofanalysisbeginswiththeobservationthatchangesinpublicpolicyarealwaysaccompaniedbyachangeinthenormativeframework.Suchanalysisisdedicatedtoquestioningtheroleofexperts,ideas,symbols,andbeliefsinthedynamicsofthecreationofthepolitical.4CognitiveanalysishashadanimportanttechnicaldevelopmentinFrance,whichthischapterwillincorporate.Itisfocusedon themechanisms throughwhich the interests of actors are expressed in theideas that they espouse.5TheinterestofthischapteristoapplytheseinnovativeanalyticaltoolstothestudyoftransitionaljusticeinColombia,toolsthathavenotbeenregularlyappliedtothisfield.

PartIstudiestheendogenousfactorsoftransitionaljustice.Itwillbeshownthatindependentlyofthenationalcontextofongoingarmedconflict,transitionaljusticetendstogenerateepistemicstrugglesbecauseofitshistoricalconstructionofdiverseinstrumentsandthefactthatitfunctionsasan“ambiguousconsensus.”Part II emphasizes the role of the Colombian political context in generatingepistemicstruggles.Thefocusisonthecapacityofthenationalgovernmenttocompeteintheprocessofproducingthetransitionalmodel.PartIIIwillconcludebydescribingtheeffectsoftheepistemicstrugglesontheconceptsandinstrumentsof transitional justice.

I. The Endogenous Factors that Generate Epistemic Struggles

BeforeanalyzingtheColombianpoliticalcontextinparticular—namelytheabsenceofpolitical transition—it isnecessary tostudywhytransitional justiceitselfleadstocompetitiveusesofitsconcepts.Thisphenomenonisrelatedtothehistorical construction of transitional justice and the fact that it functions as an “ambiguousconsensus.”

3 BrunoPalier,Gouverner le changement des politiques sociales, in etre GouVerné, etudes en l’honneur de Jean leCa 175 (PierreFavreed.,2003).

4 PeterM.Haas,Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in KnowledGe, power, and InternatIonal polICy CoordInatIon(PeterM.Haased.,1992).

5 PierreMuller,Esquisse d’une théorie du changement dans l’action publique, Structures, acteurs et cadres cognitifs,55reVue françaIse de sCIenCe polItIQue155,170(2005).

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A. Transitional Justice is a Fragmented Historical Construction

Transitional justicedoesnothaveapre-existingtheoreticalstructurethatmight serve as a basis for its social and political manifestations. It is not aconcept,6 nor a paradigm.7What is today called transitional justice originatedininstrumentsdesignedbypoliticalactorsaccordingtotheirparticularinterestsandthepoliticalandlegalobligationsthattheyfacedatthetime.Itisinseparablefrom its uses by national political actors—representative governments orhumanrightsdefenders.TransitionaljusticehasitsoriginsinthetransitionstodemocracyoftheSouthernConeofLatinAmericaninthe1980sand1990s,incontextswherethejusticesystemwasunavailableinlightofamnestylaws.TheArgentineNationalCommissionontheDisappearanceofPersons(CONADEP)and the Chilean Rettig Commission were established in contexts of politicaltension,and theysought tocombine the interestsof themilitary inprotectingtheamnestyfromwhichtheybenefitedandtheinterestsofthenewgovernmentsinmaintainingthepeace.Transitionaljusticethereforedoesnotemanatefromsupposedly disinterested theoretical spheres but rather as a response to thedemandsandinterestsofpoliticalandsocialactors.Asaresult,thepoliticalusesof transitional justice8arenotuniquetotheColombiancontext.

Thepoliticalconfigurationsofthecountriesthathavecomeoutofconflictinthelasttwodecadeshavegeneratedagreatdiversityofinstrumentsincludednowadaysundertheumbrellaof“transitionaljustice.”Truthcommissionsaside,examples worthmentioning include administrative reparationmechanisms forvictims(forexample,theProgramofIntegralReparationandAttentioninHealthandHumanRightsinChile),thereinsertionprogramsfordemobilizedcombatants(theUN’screationofanewpoliceforceinKosovo),andreconciliationmechanisms(forexample,the“reconciliationcommunities”inEastTimor).Buttransitionaljusticecoversjudicialinstrumentsaswell.Inthelastdecade,transitionaljusticehas been institutionalizing the area of international law,where the importanceof the struggle against impunity has been emphasized.9 The judgments of theInternationalCriminalTribunalsforRwandaandfortheformerYugoslavia,aswellastheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,10havefocusedonvictims’rightto

6 SandrineLefranc,La justice transitionnelle n’est pas un concept,in mouVements, VérIté, JustICe, réConCIlIatIon, les dIlemmes de la JustICe transItIonnelle 61-69(2008).

7 PabloDeGreiff,Una concepción normativa de la justicia transicional,in JustICIa y paz, ¿Cuál es el preCIo Que debemos paGar?23(AlfredoRangeled.,2009).

8 RodrigoUprimny&MariaPaulaSaffon,Usos y abusos de la justicia transicional en Colombia,in JustICIa y paz, supra note7,at159.

9 ReportofDianeOrentlicher,independentexperttoupdatetheSetofprinciplestocombatimpunity,Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity, U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2005/102(Feb.18,2005).

10 CatalinaBoteroMarino&EstebanRestrepoSaldarriaga,Estándares internacionales y procesos de transición en Colombia,in entre el perdón y el paredón. preGuntas y dIlemas de la JustICIa transICIonal19(AngelikaRettberged.,2005).

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aneffectivelegalrecourseandtheneedforlegalmechanismstoaccompanytruth-seekingandreparationmeasures.Thenormativeandtheoreticalefforttointegratethediverseinstrumentsoftransitionaljusticeisaveryrecentphenomenon,11 one thatmustnothideorignorethefragmentedoriginofthefield.

Thus, transitional justice leads to epistemic struggles in the theoreticalandnormativeconstructionbasedonitsempiricalmanifestationstodate.Thevaried origins of transitional justice allow it to function as an “ambiguousconsensus.”

B. Transitional Justice as an “Ambiguous Consensus”

ForaforeignobserverthatdiscoverstheColombianpoliticalpanorama,itcanbeverysurprisingtonotethatactorswithtremendouslydifferentinterests(forexamplethenationalgovernmentandrepresentativesoftheMovementofVictimsofCrimesoftheState(MOVICE)usethesamelanguage—thesameslogansoftherighttotruth,justice,andreparation—theessenceoftransitionaljustice.

ThehypothesisdevelopedhereisthatinColombiatransitionaljusticehasserved as an “ambiguous consensus.” Studying the security sector reforms inFrance,BrunoPalierobservesthat“tobeviable,aninnovativemeasurehastobesufficientlypolysemousinordertoobtainvotesfromdiscrepantinterests,tobringtogethercontradictoryinterpretationsbasedonthebroadestpossibleconsensus.”12 AlthoughtheColombiancontextdoesnotcorrespondtothepastexperiencesoftransitional justice, the vastmajority of advocates for peace did not reject onprincipleitsimplementationinthecountry.

Thefirstfactorthathelpstoexplainthebroadrecognitionofthenecessityoftransitionaljusticeinacountrythathasyettoknowtransitionisthattransitionaljusticedefendscausesthatgarnerconsensus.Therightsofvictimsofviolencetotruth,justice,reparations,andnon-repetitionofthecrimesthattheyhavesufferedaremottosthatoriginateintheethicalfieldandwhichdonotallowforeasycoun-terarguments.Moreover,even thoughmuchhasbeenwrittenabout transitionaljusticeduringthelastdecade,itremainsdifficulttoofferaprecisedefinitionoftheconceptsandinstrumentsincluded.Therefore,theexpertstendtoofferaquitebroaddefinitionoftransitionaljustice,referringtotheobjectiveswithoutgoingintothedetailsorthedebateonthemostopportuneinstrumentstoreachthem.ThisisthecaseoftheUnitedNationsforexample,whichstipulatedthat“transi-tionaljustice...comprisesthefullrangeofprocessesandmechanismsassociatedwithasociety’sattemptstocometotermswithalegacyoflarge-scalepastabuses,

11 DianeOrentlicher, Independent Study on best practices, including recommendations, to assist States in strengthening their domestic capacity to combat all aspects of impunity,U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2004/88(Feb.27,2004);DeGreiff,supra note 7.

12 Palier,supra note3,at174.

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inordertoensureaccountability,servejusticeandachievereconciliation.”13How-ever,“justice”and“reconciliation”areverybroadnotions,whichhavemultiplemeaningsandlendthemselvestocontradictoryinterpretations.Thus,the“truth,”“justice,”and“reparation”thatMOVICEdefendsdonothavethesamemeaningsasthosepromotedbytheColombiannationalgovernment.

In this way transitional justice functions as an “ambiguous consensus.”Countingonconsensualanduniversalvalues,thispolysemousandpolymorphousnotioncanadaptitselftodistinctpoliticalandculturalcontexts.Thesecharacteristicssurelyexplainthesuccessofitsdiffusionacrosstheworld.Ineffect,transitionaljusticeemergesastheindispensablenormativeanddiscursivetoolinpost-conflictcontexts, aswell as contexts of ongoing conflict.This is the additional factorthatexplains theepistemicstrugglesand theadoptionofacommondiscursivefaçadebythelargemajorityofthosethatinterveneinthefieldofhumanrightsinColombia.However,ifitisinfactcorrectthatthereareendogenousfactorsoftransitionaljusticethatgeneratestrugglesoverthedefinitionofits“essence,”itremainsnecessarytohighlightthepoliticalfactorsoftheColombiancontextthatfosterthephenomenon.

II. Factors that Reinforce Epistemic Struggles: International Structure and Internal Armed Conflict

ThisPartwillexplorethatargumentthatepistemicstrugglesaroundtransitionaljustice are reinforced by theColombian political context.Themobilization of an“epistemic community” that advocates for the implementation of internationalstandardsoftransitionaljusticeinColombiahashadalimitedimpactattheleveloftheState.Effectively,thepolicyofthenationalgovernmentbenefitsfromaninternationalpowerstructurethatprivilegesit.Moreover,atthenationallevel,thearmedconflictconditions the participation of the government in the definition of Colombiantransitional justice. In effect, the need to adapt the instruments to theColombiancontextopensaspaceforcompetitionoverthedefinitionofthe“bestpractices”andnormstoimplement—acompetitioninwhichthegovernmentknewtoinvest.

A. The Transitional Justice “Epistemic Community” before the International Power Structure

Thedemobilizationofparamilitariesopenedanever-before-seenpoliticalconfiguration inColombia: by the beginningof this century, the international

13 TheSecretary-General,Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,para.8,U.N.Doc.S/2004/616(Aug.23,2004)(citedinDeGreiff,supra note 7).

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community already rejected offering to demobilized illegal armed groups thetypeof amnesties thathadbeenoffered in the1980s.TheSantaFédeRalitoagreements,outsideofanylegalframework,createdascenariomarkedbytheuncertainty of which instruments to implement and their implications.14 AsPeterM.Haashastheorized,acontextofuncertaintycreatesademandonthepartof theStateandtheorganizations involvedinareform.InColombia, theparamilitarydemobilizationcreatedademandon thepartof theStateand thehumanrightsorganizationsforexpertiseininternationalpracticesofemergingfromconflict. ThediffusionoftransitionaljusticebeganwiththedebatesaroundthedraftlawforalternativesentencesandcontinuedwiththeproposedJusticeandPeaceLaw.

An “epistemic community”15 of lawyers, international law experts, andhumanrightsadvocates16formedduringthistimeandpresentedanamicuscuriaebriefbefore theConstitutionalCourt inorder to influence theamendingof theJusticeandPeaceLaw.ThisepistemiccommunityofinternationalorganizationsandColombianorganizationsconnectedtointernationalnetworks(CEJIL,ICTJ,CCJ) is tied to academic circles, state actors (Constitutional Court), politicalleaders (such as Rafael Pardo), and victims movements, and is supported byinternationalcooperationactors(includingtheUnitedNations,EuropeanUnion).Theysharethebeliefthattherightsofthevictimstotruth,justice,reparations,andtheguaranteeofnon-repetitionconstitutethebaseofthebestpracticestoemergefromarmedconflict.17Theyalsosharetheknowledgeofinternationalnormsandthebeliefintheirsuperiority.

It is interesting to note that the epistemic struggles in 2005 between theColombiangovernmentandthisepistemiccommunitycontinuemuchthesamemorethanfouryearslater,intheframeworkofthedebatesontheproposedVictims’Law.Thesedebatescenteronthedefinitionof“victim,”theroleoftheColombianStateinreparations,andtheeffectiveparticipationofthevictimsintheprocess.ThemembersoftheColombiantransitionaljustice“epistemiccommunity”alsosharearepertoireofadvocacyactivities,suchasrights-basedmobilizations,lobbyingbefore relevant institutions, and knowledge-production through publicationsandconferences.Theepistemic struggleswith respect to transitional justice inColombiaarehighlytechnicalandemphasizetheroleof lawyers.Theheartofthecompetenceoftheepistemiccommunity—itsexpertiseinlegalnorms—can

14 Haas,supra note4,at15.15 Haas, supra note 4, at 16. Peter M. Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of

professionalswithrecognizedexpertiseandcompetenceinaparticulardomainandanauthoritativeclaimtopolicy-relevantknowledgewithinthatdomain....Theyhave‘asharedsetofnormativeandprincipledbeliefs,’‘sharedcausalbeliefs,’‘sharednotionsofvalidity’and‘acommonpolicyenterprise.’”Id. at 3.

16 ExamplesincludeCenterforJusticeandInternationalLaw,InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice,ColombianCommissionofJurists,etc.

17 SeeOrentlicher,supra note 11.

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representanobstacleatthemomentofmobilizingtheorganizationsofvictimsoftheconflict.Thus,theorganizationofregionalhearingstogarnersupportintheregionsfortheproposedVictims’LawincludedthedistributionofflyersdesignedbythememberorganizationsofthetechnicalexpertsgrouptoexplaintheVictims’Lawtothenon-expert.

However,thedefeatoftheproposedVictims’Law,theepistemiccommu-nity’smostrecentparliamentarybattleofinteresthere,revealsthatthediffusionofitsnormsat theleveloftheStatewaslimited.AccordingtoPeterHaas, theimpactofanepistemiccommunityonagovernmentisconditionedbythepowerstructuresatthenationalandinternationallevel.18

Regardingtheinternationalpowerstructure,organizationsofinternationalcooperation(forexample,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),International Organization for Migration (IOM), Deutsche Gesellschaft fürTechnischeZusammenarbeit(GTZ))contributeimportanttechnicalandfinancialsupporttothetransitionaljusticepolicyoftheColombiangovernment.Itappearsthat theColombiangovernment’sadoptionof thetransitional justicenormativeframework and implementation of several measures—such as the NationalReparationandReconciliationCommission,theadministrativereparationsdecree,orareinsertionprogramfordemobilizedcombatants—havebeenreceivedbytheinternational community as guarantees of the respectability of the ColombianState.ItmustbementionedthatColombiacontinuestobeastrategicallyoftheUnitedStates in a region not onlymarked by internal armed conflict but alsobydrug-traffickingandregionaltensionswithVenezuelaandEcuador.Withtheagreement signed that allows theUnited States to use sevenmilitary bases inColombian territory, there is a clear sense that there are international politicalintereststhatprivilegethenormativestancetakenbytheGovernmentoverthatoftheepistemiccommunity.

Wewill now turn to thepower structure at thenational level andhow itconditionsthegovernment’sparticipationintheepistemicstruggleswithrespecttotheadaptationoftransitionaljusticetothenationalcontext.

B. The Interests of the State in War

ThecontextofwarisrelatedtothecapacityoftheColombiangovernmenttocompeteintheproductionofideasandtoolsoftransitionaljusticeinColombia.Thedecisiveelementinthenationalpowerstructureisthatthegovernmentisanactorinthearmedconflict.Duringthe1990shumanrightsorganizations,bothnationalandinternational,denouncedtheresponsibilityoftheArmedForcedinmassacrescommittedby theAutodefensas Unidas de Colombia, aswas confirmed in the

18 Haas,supra note4,at7.

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sentenceof theInter-AmericanCourtonSeptember15,2005in theMapiripánCase. Adopting the transitional justice normative framework to organize thedemobilization of the paramilitaries gave the government the opportunity tolegitimize its policy at the international level, and neutralize the “boomerangeffect”19generatedbythedemandsofvictimsofstateagentsattheinternationallevel.However,theconceptsoftransitionaljusticearenotcompletelycompatiblewith the Democratic Security policy, a pillar of President Uribe’s campaign.Therefore,thegovernmenthasadoptedtheimplementationoftransitionaljusticeinsuchawaysoasnottodelegitimizetheDemocraticSecuritypolicy,basedontherepresentationofastatethreatenedbyirrationalactsbyterroristgroupsandprotectedby itsArmedForces.Theprincipleofnon-discriminationofvictims,demandedbythetransitionaljusticeepistemiccommunityinColombia,questionstherepresentationsof“victim”and“victimizer”asunderstoodintheDemocraticSecuritydoctrine.Accordingtothisconceptualization,it istheStatethatisthevictimof terrorist attacks.The soldierskilled incombatare thevictimsof theguerillaanddignifiedbytheirdevotiontoprotectingtheNation.20

Theproblemofbestowingthesamerightstoallvictimsoftheconflictisthatitthreatensthisrepresentation,offeringthepossibilityofinvertingthecategories:notonlytheArmedForcesbutalsotheStateitselfbecomepotentialvictimizers,andinthesameway, theguerillas,whomthegovernmentdeniesstandingasapoliticalactor.TheproposedVictims’LawwasrejectedbythePresident’salliesbecauseof this.TocalluponthevocabularyofPeterHaas, thenationalpowerstructure comes from theongoingarmedconflict, and limits the impactof thetransitionaljusticeepistemiccommunityinthehighestspheresofthestate.

Theprimacyofthewarcontextatthenationallevel,aswellasthesupportbyasegmentoftheinternationalcommunityfortheimplementationoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw,explainswhythegovernmenthasbeensoactiveintheepistemicstrugglesaroundtransitional justice.Thefollowingsectionanalyzes theeffectsof the implementation of transitional justice instruments and concepts in theColombiancontext.

III. The Effects on the Instruments and Concepts of Transitional Justice

Thegovernment’sroleintheepistemicstrugglesaroundtransitionaljusticematerialized in the creation of institutional instruments such as the National

19 marGaret KeCK & Kathryn sIKKInK, aCtIVIsts beyond borders: adVoCaCy networKs In Inter-natIonal polItICs (1998).

20 President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Speech at the International Congress on Disarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration(May6,2009).

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Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR), and more recently theSecretariat forTransitional Justice.The latter is quite new and thereforemoredifficulttoanalyze.Therefore,thefollowingdiscussionfocusesonthedescriptionoftheCNRRastheproductofaverypartialtransferenceofthemodeloftruthandreconciliationcommissions(TRCs).Then,thesecondsectionwillstudytheeffectoftheepistemicstrugglesontransitionaljustice,basedonananalysisoftheaforementionedInternationalCongressofDisarmament,Demobilization,andReintegration(ICDRR)heldonMay4-6,2009.

A. The CNRR: A peculiar Commission

Ofallofthemeasuresassociatedwithtransitionaljustice,theTRCscontinuetobethemostemblematicinstrumentforthevictims’righttotruth.Duringthelastthreedecades,truthcommissionswerecreatedinmorethanthirtycountries.Inpoliticalscience,theterm“policytransfer”isusedtodescribetheprocessesofdiffusionandadaptationofamechanisminacountryotherthantheoneforwhichitwasdesigned.21TheColombiancontextin2005didnotpresenttheconditionsperceived tobe favorable for the implementationof aTRC.Asa resultof theongoingconflictandtheabsenceofapoliticaltransition,theimplementationoftheJusticeandPeaceLawwasnotaccompaniedwiththecreationoftheemblematicinstrumentoftransitionaljustice.However,thelawcreatedaninstitutionthatinnameisnotsodistantfromtheTRCs,butwithdifferentattributes.Theliteratureabout institutional transfer tells us that mechanisms that are transferred arerarelydonesoinanidenticalform,butratheraresubmittedtointernallogicsofappropriation.22TheCNRRisthefruitofaverypartialtransferoftheTRCmodel,withtransformationsandstruggleswithintheorganization.

As its name suggests, the National Reparation and ReconciliationCommissiondoesnothavethetaskofclarifyinganddisseminatingthetruthaboutcrimesperpetrated.Itdoesnothavethemandateto“collectindividualstatements,organize public hearings and undertake case investigations and thematicresearch.”23Instead,themandateoftheCNRRisquiteheteroclitic.ItischargedinpartwiththetaskoffollowingtheJPLprocessandmakingrecommendations,and then also with important executive functions such as “guaranteeing theparticipationofvictimsintheprocess”(Article51-1)and“promotingnationalactsofreconciliation”(Article51-8).Theimprecise,heteroclitic,anduniquecharacter

21 See daVId p. dolowItz, polICy transfer and brItIsh soCIal polICy: learnInG from the usa? (2000).

22 ThierryDelpeuch,L’analyse des transferts internationaux de politiques publiques : un état de l’art, researCh In QuestIon, No. 27 ( Dec. 2008), http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/question/qdr27.pdf.

23 PriscillaHayner,Truth Commissions: A Schematic Overview,88Int’l reV. red Cross295,295(2006).

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of the CNRRmandate provoked its members to specify it, leading to “do-it-yourself”improvisationsintheheartoftheinstitution,whicharetransformationsandinterpretationsoftheTRCmodel.

ThepeculiarityoftheCNRRinlightoftheTRCmodelmanifestsitselfintheinternaldivisionoflaboroftheCommission.TheCNRRismadeupoffivethematicareas:justice,reparations,reconciliation,DDR,andhistoricalmemory.Itisinterestingtonotehowsuchanorganizationcreatesatransformationoftheconstitutivenormsoftransitionaljustice.Ofthefourintrinsicrightsofvictimsinthefightagainstimpunity,referencestotherightstojusticeandreparationcanbefoundinthestructureoftheCNRR.Therighttonon-repetitionofviolenceistranslatedinto“DDR,”whilethe“righttotruth,”whichinitiallywasthoughtto be absent from the Commission’s mandate, is translated into the area of“historicalmemory.”

The context of war makes truth-seeking a judicial activity tied to theversiones libresoftheJusticeandPeaceparticipants.However,the“HistoricalMemory Group” has taken the task upon itself, without having assumed it completely.24TheGrouphasassumedatasksimilartothatofatruthcommission,with investigation projects around human rights violations, based on victimtestimony.25 Thus, the HistoricalMemory Group, which was created througha particular internal statute of theCNRR, reveals that because of the contextofongoingarmedconflict, theabsenceof truth-seeking in themandateof theorganization, and broad governmental representation in the Commission, keynormsoftransitionaljusticearenegotiatedandreformulated.TheadaptationtotheColombian context has led to “do-it-yourself” improvisations that dependontheresourcesoftheactors:inthecaseofGonzaloSánchez,CoordinatoroftheHistoricalMemoryGroup, his academic authority and legitimacy and hiscapacity to mobilize human resources (the members of the area and humanrights organizations) have allowed him to be relatively independent from theCommissionandtocreateaspaceforthevictims’truth.However,theongoingconflictdoesnotallowhimtospeakof“truth”butinstead“historicalmemory,”andwithoutthesymbolicstampofa“truthcommission.”

The “DDR” area is the translation of the victims’ right to non-repetitionof the crimes perpetrated. This constitutes one of the main impacts of theimplementation of transitional justice in the demobilization of paramilitaries.Theabsenceofapolitical transitionand thecontinuanceof thearmedconflictmakeguaranteesofnon-repetitionintheformofstatereformimpossible.Forthegovernment,assumingsuchreformswouldcorrespondwithacknowledgingthe

24 InterviewwithGonzaloSánchez,CoordinatoroftheHistoricalMemoryWorkingGroupoftheCNRR,Bogotá(Mar.29,2007).

25 See truJIllo, una traGedIa Que no Cesa, prImer Informe de memorIa hIstórICa de la ComIsIón naCIonal de reparaCIón y reConCIlIaCIón(2008).

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faultsinthestateapparatus—astrategythatisirreconcilablewiththepoliciesofastateinwar.ThecreationoftheCNRRthenisaproductofaverypartialtransferof the truthcommissionmodel: it isascenarioof tensionbetween the internallogicsofaconflictcontext(impossibilityofcreatingaTRC,interestofthestateincontrollingit),andtheinfluenceoftheTRCmodeldefendedbysomeofitsmembers,asafunctionofitsresources.TheCNRRissubjecttoimprovisation:composedbygovernmentrepresentativesandactorsthataretryingtoimplementthe inherited standards of truth commissions. It is in thisway that theCNRRcontributestotransformingtheconceptsoftransitionaljusticeinordertoadaptthemtoacontextofongoingarmedconflict.

B. The Conceptual Effects of the Transference of Transitional Justice

to a Conflict Context

While sectors of victims’ and human rights organizations criticized theimplementation of the Justice and Peace Law in 2005, the President, alongwiththeCNRRPresident,EduardoPizarro,stressedtheprogressivenessof theprocessincomparisontoforeignexperiences.26Thisdiscourseaimedatinsertingthe Colombian experience into the international network of “best practices”for emerging from conflict really took shape in the Office of the President’sorganizationoftheFirstInternationalCongressonDisarmament,DemobilizationandReintegration(ICDDR),heldinCartagenaonMay4-6,2009.AlmostalloftheinternationalcooperationactorscontributingtotheJusticeandPeaceprocessparticipated in theCongress, in addition to foreign experts.Also presentweredemobilized guerilla andAUCmembers,who presented art and handiwork inboothsnotfarfromtheprincipalorganizations—theCNRR,theHighCouncilonReintegration(Alta Consejería para la Reintegración),theUnitedNations,andtheInternationalOrganizationforMigration.“TheJusticeandPeaceLawisoneofthemostambitioustransitionaljusticelawsintheworld.Thegovernmentcouldhavebeenlessambitious,butwedecidedtobevisionaries.”27ThesewordsfromtheHighCommissionerforPeaceandReintegrationdemonstratethattheICDDRispartofthevoluntarypolicyoftheColombianStatetoactontheinternationalconceptsandpracticesofpeace-building.TheCartagenaeventoffersascenariotostudytheconceptualusesbeingemployed.

TheJusticeandPeaceprocesshasitsoriginsintheprivatenegotiationbetweentheleadersoftheAUCandthegovernment.TheSantaFédeRalitoAgreements

26 “Iwanttothankeveryoneforthisgreateffort.Thisgreateffortthathasgivenusanovellegalframework,whichwillbegintobeseenbytheworldassomethingthatraisesthestandards,assomethingthatcreatesdoctrine.”PresidentUribe,SpeechinauguratingtheNationalReparationand Reconciliation Commission (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.cnrr.visiondirecta.com/09e/spip.php?article266.

27 ClosingspeechfortheICDDR,Cartagena(May6,2009).

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were determinative for the Justice and Peace Law, placing the demobilizedcombatants—and not the victims, whowere absent from the negotiations—atthecenteroftheprocess.ThroughthewindowoftheCNRRstructure,itcanbeseenthattherightofthevictimstonon-repetitiontranslatesinColombiaintoanemphasisonDDRasopposedtoreformsoftheState.TheICDDRisamanifestationof the government’s uses of the principles of combating impunity.OnemightseethecentralitygiventoDDRandthevictimizersinthegovernmentalrhetoricoftransitionaljusticeasbeingincompatiblewiththeinternationalstandardsthatprivilegetherightsofthevictims.TheICDDRrevealsthatthegovernmenttendsto neutralize such contradiction by abolishing the distinction between victimsandvictimizers.ThisconceptualoperationallowsforplacingatthecenteroftheColombiantransitionaljusticepolicy(other)“victims”:theparamilitaries.

DuringhisclosingspeechattheCIDDRonMay6,2009,PresidentUribestated: “There is no total reparation. I say this before actors (demobilizedcombatants)thathaverealizedtheywerevictims.”Alittlelater,inthemiddleofhis speech,FrankPearl, theHighCommission forPeace,mentionedawomanfromCúcutathathehadmetafewdaysearlierwhohadconfessedtohimthatshewaswillingtoforgive,“becauseforgivenesswouldliberateherandshedidn’twant her daughter to livewith the fearwithwhich she had lived.”That sameafternoon,respondingto thecriticismthat thedemobilizedcombatantshadnotbeengiventhechancetospeakduringtheCongress, theorganizingcommitteechangedtheagendaandimprovisedapanelofdemobilizedcombatants.

Five demobilized combatantswere given the chance to speak, includingademobilizedwomanfromtheAUCandademobilizedFARCmember.Boththanked the national government and the High Council for Reintegration(ACR).LuzMeri,oneofthedemobilizedcombatants,thankedtheinternationalcommunityandsaid,withavoicechokingbacktears:“Wecannotbuildpeacealone.Ifwefallseventimes,weneedyoutohelpusgetupseventimes.”Herintervention provoked a lot of emotion from the audience and several peoplecametotheirfeetapplauding.

Later, between Frank Pearl and Uribe’s speech, the demobilized womanfromtheFARC,SaraMoralesPadilla,toldthestoryofhowshehadbeenrecruitedasatwelve-year-old,thatshewasthevictimofmanyabuses,andhowshehadtwo children while in the guerilla. She thanked the “immense support of theACRandtheeducationandpsycho-socialattentionprojects,”whichhadallowedher tobetterherselfand today to takecareofand loveherchildren.LuzMerifinallypresentedtheproject“CantaConmigo,”whichunitesthecommunityanddemobilizedcombatantsasoneunifiedvoiceaskingforpeace.Itwasexplainedthatwiththisprojectthedemobilizedareaskingforforgivenessandshowingthatthey want peace and reconciliation.

The three testimoniesdescribedhere revealhow thefinal segmentof theICDDRconsecratedvictim status for the demobilized.Belonging to an armed

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groupwashardlytouchedoninthetestimonies,andwhenitwas,itwasforthepurposeofemphasizing that itwas involuntary (Sara) in nature,or inorder toexpressregretandthesufferingandemotionalconditionofthevictim(LuzMeri).Itisinterestingtonotetheextenttowhichthelexicalfieldofthevictimstransferstothedemobilized:LuzMerireferredtotheneedtomakethereintegrationprocessaparticipatoryprocess(“thisprocessisours”)andonewhichwouldallowthem“tobevisible,”needsusuallyvindicatedbyandforthevictims.

Finally, theabolitionofboundariesbetweenvictimsandvictimizerswasaccompaniedwiththefigureofforgivenessthatwasaskedfor(Sara)andgiven(in Frank Pearl’s anecdote). The ICDDR closed with the “Canta Conmigo”song, sang by the demobilized of various armed groups andmembers of thecommunitiesthatarerecipientsofACR’sprogram.

Thefinalconceptualoperationthat legitimatesDDR’scentralpositioninthe adaptation of Colombian transitional justice is the causal linkmadewithreconciliation. It is not coincidental that the ICDDR closed with the “CantaConmigo” song, interpreted by demobilized individuals and “members ofthe community that has reintegrated” (note that they are not referred to as“victims”)—indistinguishablefromoneanotherbecause theyallworeawhitet-shirtwiththelogooftheprogramandtheACR.

The transitional justice policy developed by the Colombian governmentthereforedoesnotconsiderthenotionofreconciliationastheresultofthelongprocessofimplementingjusticeandreparationmeasures,butratherassomethingtoactivelyfoster.TheCNRR,whichincludesareconciliationareathatseekstobringtogethergroupsofdemobilizedandgroupsofvictims,declared2009the“yearofreconciliation.”

The implementationof transitional justice in a contextofongoingarmedconflict thus has effects on the conceptual structure of post-conflict norms. Inthe caseofColombia, the implementationof the Justice andPeaceLawcamealongwith a normativemutation that allows for legitimizing the centrality ofthe demobilized in the process.The right of the victims to non-repetitionwastranslatedintoDDR,legitimatedbytheabolitionoftheconceptualboardsbetweenthevictimsandthevictimizers.Acausallinkbetweenthesuccessfulreintegrationofthedemobilizedandthereconciliationtendstoexcludetheepistemicpanoramaofthethemesofjustice,truth,andreparation.

Conclusion

ThetransferoftransitionaljusticetotheColombiancontexthascomewithanormativemutationofitsconceptsandmechanisms.Theconceptsof“victim,”“truth,”“reparation,”“reconciliation,”and themechanismof truthcommissionwinduptransformedbythestrugglesthattakeplacetodefinewhatshouldbe

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transitionaljusticeinacontextofconflict.Thischapterhasdescribedtheprocessthroughwhichsuchtransformationstakeplace.First,theepistemicstruggleswithrespect to theadaptationof transitional justice to theColombiancontexthavetheirorigins in thehistorical constructionand the fact that transitional justicefunctions as an “ambiguous consensus.”The international standardsdefendedinColombiabytheepistemiccommunitythatmobilizedin2008insupportoftheVictim’sLawhadlimitedimpactonthehighestspheresofthegovernment.Effectively, since 2003, the power structures—both international and national(armed conflict)—fueled the capacity and interest of the national governmentincompetingintheproductionofconceptualframeworksfortheadaptationoftransitionaljusticetotheColombiancontext.

This phenomenon led to the National Reparation and ReconciliationCommission,averypartialtransferenceoftheemblematicinstrumentoftransitionaljustice.InMay2009,theICDDRofferedthegovernmentascenariotospreaditsrepresentationoftheColombiantransitionaljusticeprocess:aprocesscenteredontheDDRprogramsthatwouldleadtothereconciliationbetweendemobilizedcombatantsandmembersofthecommunitiesthatreintegrated,indistinguishablevictims of the same conflict. The Colombian case illustrates that the transferof this conceptual and institutional framework to a country with a politicalstructure distinct from the post-conflict context leads to appropriations tied tothe internal political dynamics.Thus, this chapter suggests further questioningof the transferablecharacterofpost-conflict“bestpractices”:Cantheconceptsandmechanismsoftransitionaljusticebeadaptedtoeverypoliticalcontext?Incontextsofconflict,aretherenotunpredictableorcounterproductiveeffectsforthosethatadvocatefortransference?Finally,doestheColombiancasenotinfactrevealthelimitationofthenormativeconstructionoftransitionaljustice?

A Model of Justice for Democracy

Iván Cepeda Castro

Crimesagainsthumanityaresocialprocessesandnotjustsuccessivedisparateevents.Atatimewhenantheinternationaljusticesystemisbeingconsolidated,thelimitsimposedbythecasuisticviewofcriminallawareprogressivelygivingwaytoanalysesandtypologiesthatexaminethesocio-historicandsocio-politicalcontextinwhichcrimesagainsthumanityhavemanifestedthemselves—typologieswhere thesemanifestationsareunderstoodassocialpractices.Thisperspectiveconceptualizes genocide, forced disappearance, and torture as a set of diverserelationshipsthatmakeuptheso-called“technologiesofpower.”1

Thisimpliesadualunderstanding:ontheonehand,focusingoncriminalityasanexpressionofpolitical,economicandsocialrelationships;andontheother,conceivingofitasasystemofrelationshipsandnotmerelycriminalacts.Forceddisplacement, for example, implies the uprooting of entire populations andusurpationthroughactsofterror.Atthesametime,itinvolvesdestructionofthematerialbasesandlifeprojectsofthevictimcommunities,complexprocessesforlegalizingtheusurpedproperties,creationofadiscourseandanimaginedsocialrealitythathidesorlegitimizestheland-stripping,etc.

Theanalysisofthisgeneralapproachshedslightoncertainaspectsofthecriminaldefinition.First,contrarytowhatisfrequentlyasserted,crimesagainsthumanityarenot“crimesofthepast.”Theirdurationintimeandtheirprolongedeffectsextendbeyondthecommissionofthespecificacts.Someofthesecrimes,suchasforceddisappearanceorforceddisplacement,arecrimesthataredeemedcontinuous.Inothers,thesurvivingvictimssufferprolongedeffectsthatarenotlimitedtotheactualactthattakeslifeorviolatesintegrity.Reaffirmationofim-punity, exploitation, legalizationofpowerderived fromcriminality, and socialstigmatizationarejustsomeofthevisibleconsequencesofregimesofatrocities.Thus,itisacontradictionintermstocatalogthevictimsofaneventthatoccurreddecadesagoas“victimsofthepast.”Thatexpressionwouldseemtosuggestthatthecriminalactswerelimitedtothecommissionofadeterminedactioninwhichsomeparticulardamagehasbeencaused.Sight is lostof the relationships thatareestablishedaspartofthehumanrightsviolationandtheeffectsofthenew“correlationofforces”thatiscreatedwiththeuseofmassviolence.Inthisway,referringtothe“crimesofthepast”alwayscreatesasenseoftemporalextinction

1 For examples of this kind of sociological studies, seedanIel feIersteIn, el GenoCIdIo Como práCtICa soCIal (2007); naomI KleIn,the shoCK doCtrIne (2008).

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oftheconsequencesaswellasoftheviolentpracticesthemselves,evenwhentheycontinuetobeperpetratedunderotheroridenticalmodelsofconcealment.

Second,thosenewrelationsbetweenthevictimsectorsandtheperpetratorsectors are varied—domination, conquest, control, repression, extermination,invasion,aggression,forcedintegration—however,theyallinvolverelationshipsof force and power inwhich “the victims”—or the victim social sectors—arethe subordinates of the relationship and “the victimizers”—or the “victimizersectors”—playthedominantrole.Thedetailsineachcaseofthesetypesofsocialtiesdependon thestateofdevelopmentof thepoliticalandeconomicmodels.Genocides,tomentionjustoneexample,differaccordingtothehistoricalphasesofmaturityoftheStateandtheinstitutionalsystemsinasociety.Somesociologiststhatstudygenocidalpracticeshaveclassifiedtherelationshipsthatareestablishedaccordingtowhetherthenation-state,initsmodernmeaning,isjustbeingborn,hasbeenconsolidated,orneedstotransformandmaintainitself.Ineachofthosephases, the exterminationof groups inaugurates or helps tomaintain a certainclassofsocialnexusattheserviceofcolonization,revolution,ortransformationofthepoliticalandeconomicmodels.2

AnothercharacteristicthatenablesustounderstandthedefinitiontowhichIamreferringisthattheperpetrationofsystematiccriminality,asitsnameindicates,involves theemergenceandactionofapparatuses, structures,and institutions.Systemcrimesimplyhighlycomplexoperationsintermsofconspiring,designingplans,indoctrinatingthosethatwillexecutetheplans,andsuccessfullycarryingouttheoperations.Italsoimpliestheexistenceofoperationalguidelines,patterns,andprotocols.Itsconceptionanddirectionpresupposesahierarchy,achainofcommand,andanauthorityatthetopthatconceivesofthecriminalplansandisalsoresponsibleforverifyingtheirexecutionandinitiatingthemachineryofdeath.3

Lastly, crimes against humanity require cultural, institutional, andlegal frameworks that create hegemonic interpretations within the collectiveimagination. Thecontinuityofthesepowerrelationshipsovertimeissupportedbyapermanentstateofimpunity,animpositionoftheofficialversionofhistory,asocialsegregationofthesurvivingvictims,andincontrast,sociallegitimacyforthe perpetrators. The types of political and historical discourse that shape such representationsdenytheexistenceofmassivecrimes,theirperpetrators,andtheirvictims (adistortionof realityknownasdenialism); reduce thestateofaffairs

2 See furtherIvánCepeda,Genocidio y régimen político: Consideraciones sobre la tipología del genocidio contra la Unión Patriótica,in esCrIbIr la VIda Con mIl manos 33 (CorporaciónColectivodeAbogadosJoséAlvearRestrepoed.,2009).

3 Onthis,itisworthnotingrecentjurisprudentialdevelopmentscomingfromthetrialofPeruvianex-president Alberto Fujimori. In Colombia, jurisprudence on this matter is beginning to bedevelopedinrecentrulingsbytheHighCourts.See, e.g.,CriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourtofJustice,No.32672,Dec.3,2009.

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in an attempt to convert it into somethingbanal; justify the causes that led tothe execution of the crimes; or openly defend and incite hatred.4These formsof discourse arise in systems of open impunity—characteristic of dictatorialregimes—or in more subtle variations of impunity that are covered up usingmodels of forced integration in which the victims must accept conditions ofapparent“reconciliation” inwhich formalacknowledgementof responsibilitiesmasks the continuationof the subordinate conditionof thevictims’ sectors—asituationcharacteristicofformallydemocraticsocieties.

One of themain consequences of thisway of conceiving crimes againsthumanityis thatwemustscrupulouslyquestioncertainconceptsof justiceandreconciliation schemes that are put into practice during so-called transitionalperiods.Likewise,suchanunderstandingmustenableustocomprehendmeasuresfortruth,justice,andreparationinadifferentway.

Fromthatperspective, in thecurrentColombiancontext thereareat leastfive criteria for evaluating the scope of themodel of justice in relation to therightsofthevictimsandofsociety.5Asaresultofeffortstocombatimpunity,thefollowingachievementsshouldbeattained:(1)satisfactorystandardsofjusticeand, particularly, prosecution of those bearing the greatest responsibility formassivehumanrightsviolationsandgravebreachesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;(2)fulldissolutionofparamilitarystructuresandtheirpoliticalandeconomicbases; (3) non-repetition of the crimes against humanity that were committedand complete eradication of this type of crime from society; (4) a substantialandverifiablechangeinthesituationof thevictimsandof thevictims’sectorsthroughcomprehensivereparation,andparticularly,restitutionofusurpedlandsand territories;and(5) theemergenceofahistoricalnarrativeandacultureofmemoryinaccordancewiththerealityofthespectrumofviolencethathastakenplaceinthecountryoverthelasthalf-century.

CertainofficialapproachesseektocreatetheimpressionthatColombiaisinthemidstofaninitialpost-conflictstage,inwhichaprocessoftransitionaljusticeisbeingcarriedout.Inreality,theprocessoftruthandjusticebeingimplementedinthecountryconfrontstwodifferent,perhapsevencontrarypositions:onethatseekstolimittherights,ofthevictimsasmuchaspossible—amodelofjusticefor“reconciliation(PartI)”;andanotherbasedontheconsiderationsoutlinedintheintroductiontothistext—amodelofjusticefordemocracy(PartII).Iwillrevieweachofthesemodelsinturnbelow.

4 Onthistopic,seeIvánCepeda,La legitimación social del genocidio contra la UP,in demoCraCIa o ImpunIdad 78 (FundaciónparalaInvestigaciónylaCulturaed.,2005).

5 Thesecriteriaarethefruitofinternationalpractice,jurisprudence,andnorms,whichhaveesta-blishedaseriesofminimumstandardsinrelationtotherightstotruth,justice,andreparationwithregard tocrimesagainsthumanity.See, e.g.,BasicPrinciplesandGuidelineson theRight toaRemedyandReparationforVictimsofGrossViolationsofInternationalHumanRightsLawandSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLaw,U.N.Doc.A/RES/60/147(Mar.21,2006).

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I. The Model of Justice for “Reconciliation”

Thefirstof theseconceptionshasbeenadoptedbythegovernmentunderPresidentUribeandistheresultofprogressiveadaptationsofthelegalframeworkof the so-calleddemobilizationprocessof theparamilitarygroups.Essentially,thismodel allows the structures of the criminal apparatuses to bemaintained,throughametamorphosisthatpermitsthemtoretaintheirfunctions.Itproposesasystemofjusticeaimedexclusivelyatpunishingthesecond-levelperpetratorsandleavingthosewiththegreatestresponsibilityformassivecrimesinimpunity.Atthesametime,thismodelcreatescompensationprogramsthroughhumanitarianassistancethatarepresentedtothepublicasmeasuresofauthenticreparationforthevictims,anditputsforthaninterpretationofhistorythatdistortsorsimplifiesthecharacteroftheviolenceanddeniesthecriminalityoftheState.6

Attheheartofthismodelisanotionofforcedreconciliation,whichobligesthevictimstoacceptformalactsofrepentanceandcontextsinwhichtheimbalanceofpowerinthesocietyismaintained.Incircumstancesinwhichthesocialcontroloftheaggressorsovertheirvictimsismaintained,thevictims’acceptanceofthisorderanditsrulesimpliespubliclylegitimizingtheimposedcoexistence.Orinotherwords,itiscontinuityofthesamebutwithanewpubliclegitimacyforthedispossessionofthepoliticalandlegalattributesofthevictims.

Intermsofjustice,thenormativeframeworkthatsustainsthemodel—theapplication of Laws 782 of 2002 and 975 of 2005—does not permit criminalprosecutionofthosebearingthegreatestresponsibilitybecausethemethodologyof the investigation does not correspondwithwhat is necessary for clarifyingmacro-criminalityanddealingwithcriminalapparatusesthatincludeinstitutionalstructures.Lookingatthecurrentlyavailablejudicialanddocumentaryinformation,it is clear that the real organizational chart of State criminality in Colombiacontains complex structures, in which the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)andotherparamilitaryorganizationshavebeenmerelyadivisionofthiscriminalapparatus.Nonetheless,currentinvestigationsdonotrigorouslytakeintoaccountthesystematiccharacterofthecrimes,thepatternsinwhichtheyhavebeen committed, or the chains of command and commission, and they fail toadequatelyanalyzethecontexts.7

6 ThismodelisreflectedinthewaythatthegovernmenthassoughttomaintainthemaximummarginofimpunityintheapplicationofLaw782of2002andLaw975of2005(theJusticeandPeaceLaw),withitsrespectiveregulatorydecrees.PartofthissameeffortaretheextraditionoftheprincipalparamilitaryleaderstotheUnitedStatesasaprovenmechanismtoobstructjudicialproceedingsinColombia;theadministration’sdiverseproposedregulationsthatguaranteeimmunityforCongressmemberslinkedtotheso-called“parapolítica”scandal;anditsinitiativesfor“reform”aimedatseverelyrestrictingthecriminaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtofJustice.

7 In the versiones libres (voluntarydeclarations)madebyparamilitaries linked to theJusticeandPeaceLaw,morethan3900privateindividualsandpublicservantshavebeenmentioned,includingaround140membersofthesecurityforcesandmorethan200politiciansorentrepreneurs.

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Regardingtheinabilitytoguaranteethedismantlingofthecriminalstructures,theproblemisnotlimitedtothedemonstratedpersistencetheparamilitarygroupsthat—despitehavingadoptedothernames—continuetoperpetratediversetypesof violence.8 As has been widely documented, this stems from the fact thatthepolitical and economicbases, bothof paramilitarismand sectors that havesponsoredit,remainessentiallyintact.9

ThemeasuresdesignedasalternativestomitigatetheabsenceofreparationandlegalrecoursecorrespondtotheneoliberalconceptionthatthegovernmentofPresidentÁlvaroUribehasappliedinthefieldofattentiontosocialdemands.Theyareprogramsthatreplacetheguaranteeoftherightsofpersonsandcommunitieswith thepaymentof subsidiesof awelfare andhumanitarian characteror thatconfuse State provision of these services to the populationwith processes forreparation.10As iswell known, one of the consequences of this policy is thatcrucialquestionsforproducinganauthentictransformationinthelivingconditionsofmillionsofpeople are in factmade invisible.True transformativemeasureswouldincludelandrestitution,cessationofallformsoflegalizeddispossession,reparationofdamagescausedbymultinationalcompanies,creationofdemocraticspacesforcitizenparticipationinzonesofparamilitarycontrol,andeliminationof the paramilitary groups and their links to official, political, and economicspheres.

II. The Model of Justice for Democracy

The Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado (National MovementofVictimsofStateCrimes,MOVICE)isawide-rangingnetworkofcommunityorganizationsthatdemandtherighttoidentifythemselvesasvictimsofviolencefromStatesectorsandparamilitarygroupsandmaintainthatformsof extermination have been used in Colombia in the past and continue to be

In relation to those incriminated in the Justice andPeace confessions, very few investigationshavebeenopened.TheJusticeandPeacesystemhasmanyotherfundamentalproblems,suchasitsineffectivenessatsheddinglightonthecrimesconfessedbyparamilitariesintheprocessandtheimpossibilityofensuringreparationforthevictimsthroughjudicialmeans.See moVImIento naCIonal de VíCtImas de Crímenes de estado, sIn JustICIa y sIn paz (2010).

8 See Human Rights Watch, Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia (2010). AccordingtotheColombianCommissionofJurists,fromJuly2002toJune2008theparamilitarygroups committed more than 4600 acts of sociopolitical violence. Comisión Colombiana deJurístas,Violaciones de derechos humanos y violencia sociopolítica en Colombia,available at http://www.coljuristas.org/Portals/0/vida_96_08.pdf.

9 Regardingthepoliticalbasesforparamilitarism,seethecomprehensivestudyCorporación Nuevo Arco Iris, Parapolítica: La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos (2007).

10 TheColombianConstitutionalCourthasclearlyestablishedthedifferencebetweenhumanitarianassistance,theguaranteeofsocialrights,andmeasuresforcomprehensivereparation.See Consti-tutionalCourt,rulingT-085of2009,Feb.16,2009,SpeakerMagistrateJaimeAraújoRentería.

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usedtoday.Forthisreason,thecoalitionhasopposedthemodelbasedonforcedreconciliation,aconceptioninwhichthestatedpoliticalgoaloftheprocessesofjusticeandnon-repetitionofcrimesisdemocracy.

Thisstanceofoppositionisbasedonthesuppositionthatitisunfeasiblethat democracy will emerge from a process of artificial reconciliation. Incontrast,itispossiblethatvoluntaryoptionsforreconciliationcouldarisefromasituationofauthenticsocialdemocratization.Thisobjective—democracyinallofitsexpressionsastheresultofanauthenticsocialchangethatcontributestoward the eradicationof crimes against humanity—couldbe servedby therights to truth, justice, and reparation, understood in a transforming sense.Theyshouldbeprocesseswithapublicanduniversalcharacterthatgeneratethe mutation of the political and economic power structures and whoseessencewouldnot be limited to the appearanceof being “humanitarian”or“reconciliatory.”

Thisconceptionpresupposes,ofcourse,therecognitionthatthevictimsareindividualandcollectivesubjectsofpoliticalaction.Thevictimshavelosttheircitizenshiporsufferedfromitsseverelimitationastheresultofvariedformsofviolence.The infringementof their libertiesdemands themovementfor rights,which is expressed through diverse proceedings and lawsuits brought againstState and transnational authorities, through public mobilizations, and throughcommunicationsstrategiesaimedatreversingthissituation.

The substance of these types of legal, political, and communicationsactions is based not only on the precepts contained in domestic law, theConstitution,andinternationalhumanrightstreaties.Theconditionofhavingbeenaffectedbyextremeactsofviolenceimpliesavitalexperienceshapedbytheimpactofthetrauma.Thisbeingthecase,thevictimsconceivethesocialrealitywiththesensitivityandreflectionthattheyhavederivedfromthefirst-handknowledgeofhaving lived through such atrocities.The life storiesofthosewhohavesufferedfromviolencealsogiverisetotheirconvictionandstrengthtoopposewarandmassivecrimes,todemandjusticeand,assubjectsofmemory,tospeaktowhattheyhavegonethroughandthatwhichtheydonotwish to see repeated.Testifying inpublic canbecomea laborof socialpedagogythat,basedontheethicalconvictionoftheneedforpeaceandthemoralauthorityderivingfromtheinjusticesuffered,servesasanexampleforsociety.Thatiswhythevictims’wordsaresosignificantinsituationswheretheaimistoputanendtothespiralofviolenceortobreakaspiralofchronicimpunity.

Alongtheselines,thefirstachievementthatsectorsthathavebeenthetargetsofaggressionsforlongperiodsoftimemustmakeispreciselytherecognitionofthataggression,oftheirstatusasvictims,andthestatusofperpetratorsforthosethathaveplannedandcarriedoutthecriminalacts.InColombia,afundamentalaspect of that demand has been to seek acknowledgement of the existence of

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State criminality, of its systematic character, and of those bearing the greatestresponsibilityasgovernmentofficialsandemployeeswithcommandcapacity.11

Recognizing the existence of State criminality in the Colombian contextprovidesasolidbaseforthehistoricalinterpretationoftheviolence,onewhichcontrastsofficialversionsthatseektodiluteStateresponsibilitybydenyingtheexistenceofthearmedconflict,bydenyingtheideaofthe“waragainstcivilians,”andbyexcludingtheconcentrationofwealthandpowerasacauseofmassivecrimesandgenocide.Inthatkindofinterpretation,thehistoryofsociopoliticalviolenceandofthearmedconflictisreplacedbyexplanationsthatonlytakeintoaccount drug trafficking—which is treated as separated from thegenealogyofpoliticalpower—and“terrorism”asfactorsoftheviolence.

The devastating consequences of State crimes are, in the context of thisconception, thematerial proof of their existence. Genocide for socio-politicalreasonshasbeenusedtosystematicallyeliminatepoliticalopposition,tradeunionmovements, peasant communities, indigenous peoples, and Afro-descendantcommunities.OneexampleoftheseexterminationsisthegenocideperpetratedforovertwentyyearsagainsttheUniónPatrióticapoliticalmovement.Additionally,aspreviouslystated,forceddisplacementhasbeenastrategydevelopedtousurplargeswathsoflandandtocontrolextensiveterritorialzones.Theresulthasbeento placemillions of people inmiserywhile depopulating entire regions of thecountry.Inordertodisplacecommunitiesinparamilitaryincursions,massacreshavebeenusedinruralandurbanzonesaspublicspectaclesofterror.Thepracticeofmassive forced disappearances has also been employed, usingmass gravesandclandestinecemeteries.Inthisgeneralcontext,otheratrocitieshaveocurred:extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrarydetentions and imprisonment, sexualviolations,etc.

Conclusion

MOVICE has proposed eight strategies employing an appropriateconceptualizationofwhatcanandshouldbeamodelofjusticefordemocratictransformation. The framework of the proposed strategies identified firstthe need to articulate clear concepts regarding State criminality, its structure,andmechanisms of acting. It also puts forward the task of building a block

11 ThedemonstrationsofMarch6,2008promotedbyMOVICEconstitutedaninauguralmomentforsocialrecognition.MOVICEmaintainsthatinColombia,inthepastandinthepresent,formsof extermination have been and are being committed; these are expressed in criminal actionsandpatternsplannedandexecutedbysectorsandinstitutionsoftheStateapparatus.SomeofthecriminalformsoriginatingfromtheStateoverthelasthalf-centuryincludegenocideforpoliticalandsocialmotives,crimesagainsthumanity,warcrimes,gravehumanrightsviolations,andgravebreachesofhumanitarianlaw.

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of community andvictimorganizationswith thepower andcapacity towieldpoliticalinfluenceinthecountryandtocontributetobringingaboutthechangesrequiredbyanauthenticprocessoferadicationofcrimesagainsthumanityandgenocide.Thisagendaincludesalltheareasinwhichparticipationbythevictimscouldhavesocialinfluence.

A alternative land registry is set out as an alternative aimed at gatheringaccurateinformationonthemagnitudeofdispossession,inordertodemonstratethe agrariancounter-reformbeingcarriedoutbydestroying rural communitiestoguaranteetheaccumulationoflands.Thisinstrumentcombinestechnicaldatagathered by specialists with participative research in which the dispossessedcommunitiesbecomesubjectsofmemoryandsourcesofinformation.

Citizens’hearings for truth are eventsheld inpublic spaces andwith thepresence of judicial authorities, in which hundreds of cases are documented.Thesehearingsenablethevictims’communitiesinmarginalruralandurbanzonestodenounceeventsthathavenotbeeninvestigatedbythejudicialsystem.Atthesametime,theymakeitpossibletotestifytoandpubliclydisseminatetherealityofthoseevents.

These types of strategies include promoting draft legislation with wide-rangingdebatebysocialorganizations;humanitarianinitiativesaimedatachievingahumanesolutiontothearmedconflict;proposalsforsocialmemorythatreshapethe cultural hegemony; and designing guarantees of non-repetition aimed atdismantlingtheparamilitarygroupsandtheirpoliticalinfluence.

Obtaining political and economic power for the victims’ sectors andweakening the power base of the perpetrators’ sectors is a necessary goal forbuildingademocraticState.Inthissense,truth,justice,andreparationbecomerightsthatwhenexercisedgobeyondsurmountingprivateandindividualsufferingandbecomeauniversalundertaking.

Civil Society in the Colombian Transitional Justice Framework

Gabriel Arias

That set of nongovernmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and

arbitrator between major interests, can, nevertheless, prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.1

Theobjectiveof thischapter is toexplore thedynamicsofColombiancivilsocietyinlightofthepolitical-legalprocessthatbeganwiththeagreementsoftheÁlvaroUribeVélezadministrationandtheseniorcommandersoftheparamilitarygroupsin2002,andwhichiscurrentlybeingcarriedoutmainlyintheframeworkofthecriminalproceedingsofLaw975of2005.Thislawproposesthedemobilizationandreintegrationofillegalarmedgroupsinordertoattainpeacewhilesatisfyingthebasicprinciplesoftransitionaljustice—namely,toguaranteeforthevictimstherightstotruth,justice,reparation,andnon-repetition.PartIofthischapterwillexplainthebackgroundrelevanttothecurrentdynamicsofColombiancivilsociety.Theanalysiswillfocusonthreecentralthemes:theparticipationofcivilsocietyinthetransitionalcontext(PartII),theinfluenceofinternationalcooperationonthecivilsocietyagenda(PartIII),andtheroleofthemediainthetransitionalsetting(PartIV).

InadditiontomyownexperiencewithColombiancivilsociety,thereflectionspresentedinthischapterarebasedoninterviewsthatIconductedforthisprojectwithavarietyofmembersofColombiancivilsocietyaswellasrepresentativesofinternationalcooperationagenciesfromSeptembertoNovember2009.

I. Background

Tospeakofcivilsociety2 inColombia is to refer toaquestion that isasabstractasitiscomplex—becauseofitsvariedcompositionandvastlydifferent

1 ernest Gellner,CondItIons of lIberty, CIVIl soCIety and Its rIVals5(1994).2 Thepurposeofthisreflectionisnottoofferanessayontheconceptofcivilsociety.Fortheobjectivesof

thisanalysis,Ibeginfromtheelementalbasisofunderstandingcivilsocietyasanetworkofassociations,independentoftheStateorgovernmentalsector,andwhicharegroupedtogetheraccordingtocertainidentitiesinordertorealizeparticularpublicobjectives.Inthisway,civilsocietyservesasabalancetotheexcessesofpower.Forthemajorityofthewritersonthisissue,civilsocietyservestheroleofintermediarybetweentheindividualandtheStateand,asaconsequence,exercisesasocialpower.

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positions,aswellas the fact that thedetrimentalconsequencesof the internalarmedconflictaffectallsectors.Thelogicofthearmedconfrontation,inwhichanyone can be the enemy, has penetrated the entire society. It has thereforefragmentedsocietyinsuchawaythatithasbeendifficulttoconstructcollectiveidentitiesandstrugglesaroundcommongoals.Thissituationbecomesevenmoreevidentwhenanalyzedinthecontextofthetransitionalframeworkpromotedbythewell,knownJusticeandPeaceLaw.

InordertoanalyzeColombiancivilsociety,itisimportanttofirstreferencetheevolutionofour internalarmedconflict,as ithasaffectedallof thesocial,political,andeconomicstructuresofthenation.Second,wemustrecognizethatthedifficultiesforbuildingacivilsocietyanditsundeniablefragmentationalsohavetodowiththenotoriousdifferencesbetweenthelocalorregionallevelsandthenational level.Colombia is a countryof at leastfivemajor regions,whichgeneratesdynamicsof themostvariedkind.Suffice it to say forourpurposeshere that at the local level civil society is invigoratedmore as a force againsttheviolentactors,whileatthenationallevelitoperatesmoreasanexerciseofpoliticalchecksandbalances.

Inourcountry, likeinmanycountries inLatinAmerica,civilsocietybegantohaveagreaterprominenceattheendofthe1960sandmainlyinthe1970s,asacounterweight todemocraticandStatecrises. InColombia, therewasa lossofStatelegitimacygiventhegrowingnumberofviolentactorsthatonewayoranotherreplacedtheStateinvariousregionsofthecountry.Guerrillasandparamilitarygroupspositionedthemselvesthroughoutthecountry,mainlyintheregionsfurthestfromtheurbancenters—theregionswheretheinstitutionalismwasmostprecarious.

Thelossofcredibilityintheestablishmentmadeitsothatacivilsocietyinformation,focusedondenouncinghumanrightsviolations,increasinglybroadenedthescopeandreachofitsactivities.Thisexpansionincludedtheeventualcreationof regional and national networks designed to demand State compliance ofobligations to respectandguaranteehuman rights. In thiswaya sectorofcivilsociety was created and strengthened, whose principal sphere of interventionfocusedonhumanrights,denouncingviolationsanddemandingprotection.3

Different associations and organizations were created around commoncauses or identities, such as being victims of the forced disappearance, forceddisplacement,discriminationagainstwomen,ordiscriminationbasedonethnicityorsexualorientation.Atthesametime,collectivesinterestedinpromotingthenewand extensive rangeof fundamental rights andprotectionmechanisms for suchrightsalsoemerged.

3 Examples include theFundación Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos (Foundation CommitteeofSolidaritywithPoliticalPrisoners)andtheComité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos(PermanentCommitteefortheDefenseofHumanRights)createdin1973and1979,respectively.

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As a consequence of the intensity and worsening of the internal armedconflict,therewasalsotheemergenceofvictims’organizationscomingtogetheraround the identity of their victimizer—as victims of the guerrilla or of theparamilitarygroups.Thesegroupsbegandemandingtheirrightsandseekingtohaveavoiceinthepoliticaldebatesofthecountry.ItwasinthissettingthatthedifferentstancesoftheColombiancivilsocietybegantoalign—eitheranattitudeofopenoppositiontotheStateoroneofcollaborationanddefenseoftheState.4

Animportantsegmentofcivil societysawanegotiatedend to thearmedconflictasthepathtopeace,andasaresultimportantorganizationswerecreatedthat prioritized peace efforts in their public agenda.5 A variety of political,economic, and civil society sectors pressured the different administrations toinitiatedialoguewiththearmedactorstoseekanegotiationthatcouldbringanend to theconflict.Several failedattempts in this respect,suchas thoseof theBelisarioBetancurandVirgilioBarcogovernments,1982-1986and1986-1990respectively,andfilledthenationallandscapewithsharpskepticism.Theresultofthesefailureswastheprevalenceinpublicdiscoursethatmilitarydefeatoftheenemy(theguerrilla)wastheonlyalternative.

Consequently, in the 1990s, andmainly in the administration of ErnestoSamper, the military strategy was reactivated and the civil population wasbroughtintotothearmedconflictthroughprivatesecuritycooperatives,calledCONVIVIR (PrivateSecurityandVigilanceCooperatives).6Thedismantlingofthesegroupswasorderedin1997,howeverthepolicycreatedalastingarmyofthousandsofciviliansorganizedinto“self-defense”groupslocally.ManyofthesegroupswouldlaterseektoorganizenationallyundertheumbrellaparamilitarygroupcalledtheUnitedSelf-defenseGroupsofColombia(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia–AUC).

Theadoptionofanewconstitutionin1991establishedaparticipatoryandpluralistSocialState.Constitutionalstatuswasgiventomechanismsofdemocraticparticipation, strengthening the role that civil society was already exercising.FollowingthenewConstitution,weseeasocietywithgreaterinteractionaroundthedifferentissuesofcollectiveinterest—asocietythatisincreasinglyinterestedincreatingmechanismstostrengthentheweaknationaldemocracy.

Thenationalgovernment’sdialogueswiththeRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–FARC)guerrillagroupwereresumedduringtheAndrésPastranaadministration.Theentirecountrywasaspectatortoyetanotherfailedattemptatreachinganegotiatedsolutiontothe

4 Onthis,seetheanalyticaloverviewinMauricioRomero,Paz, reformas y cambio en la sociedad civil colombiana,in soCIedad CIVIl, esfera públICa y demoCratIzaCIón en amérICa latIna: andes y Cono sur331(AldoPanfichied.,2002).

5 See maurICIo GarCía, CInep, moVImIento por la paz en ColombIa 1978-2003(2006).6 ForabriefdescriptioninEnglishoftheCONVIVIR,seeHuman Rights Watch, Breaking the Grip:

Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia 46-47 (Oct.16,2008).

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armedconflict.ItwasinthiscontextthatÁlvaroUribetookofficeforhisfirsttermin2002.Justbeforethismoment,thehighestleaderofthenationalparamilitaryumbrellagroup,theAUC,hadannouncedthedissolutionoftheorganization.Butafewmonthslaterthenewleadersoftheparamilitarygroupsdeclaredpubliclythere-establishmentoftheorganizationandtheirintentiontoseekapeaceagreementwith the new administration.This led to the signing of thewell-known SantaFedeRalitoAccordinmid-2003.Inthisaccord,thegovernmentcommittedtoseeklegalmechanismstoresolvetheconcernsofpendingandpossiblecriminalchargesfor theparamilitaries,who in turncommitted todemobilizewithin thefollowingtwoyears.

Inobservanceofwhatwasagreedwiththeparamilitaries,inAugust2003the Uribe administration presented Congress with a draft bill of alternativesentences to provide a substitute for imprisoning the demobilized individuals.ThislegislativeprocesseventuallyculminatedonJuly25,2005withtheapprovalofLaw975(theJusticeandPeaceLaw).ThedraftlawwasdiscussedpracticallybehindcloseddoorsinthepresidentialpalaceCasadeNariñobecauseofpressurefromtheparamilitarygroups.Moreover, thebillpassed inaCongresswhereahighpercentageoftherepresentativeshadbeenelectedwiththelocalsupportoftheperpetratorsinquestion.7

In response to how the law of reduced sentences for the criminals wasnegotiated,discussed,andapproved,asectorof thecivilsocietyhasdedicateditselftovindicatethecountry’srighttoknowthetruth.

The Justice and Peace Law emerges then as a complementary legalmechanismtotheprecedinglegalframeworkofamnestiesandpardons(Law782of2002,Decrees128and3360of2003)whichforavarietyofreasonscouldnotbeappliedtoex-combatantsallegedtohavecommittedcrimesagainsthumanity.Withthislegalbackdrop,thedemobilizationprocessofmorethan30,000armedmen began at the initiative of their commanders. It must be emphasized thatalthoughthedemobilizationoftheself-defensegroupswasnecessary,thisisnotinitselfsufficienttoattaintheobjectivessetoutintheJusticeandPeaceLaw—onthefaceofthelawitseekstoreachpeacewhileguaranteeingtherightstotruth,justice,andreparation forthevictims,andforthesocietyasawhole,avictimofcrimesagainsthumanity.

7 Forexample,ashasbeenwidely reported,at the timeof thedemobilization talksparamilitarycommander SalvatoreMancuso declared thatmore than 35% of theCongress represented theinterests of the paramilitaries. Subsequently, in the so-calledparapolítica cases, the SupremeCourtofJusticehasopenedcriminalinvestigationsagainst,andinsomecasesalreadyconvicted,approximatelyone-thirdoftheCongressmembersofthattimeforallegedtiestoparamilitarism.

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II. Civil Society Participation in the Transitional Context8

Anydiscussionofa transitionalcontext inColombiamusthaveLaw975and theÁlvaroUribeVélez administration as a point of reference, given thattheconceptof“justiceintransition”hadnotbeenpreviouslyintroducedinthecountryonanygrandscale.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsuchlegislationiseffectivelymotivating the change from a persistent scenario of human rights violationstowardoneofrespectandguarantees,northattherearebasesbeingbuiltforapeacefulsolutiontotheconflict—muchlessdoesthismeantosuggestthatthereisadvancementontheroadtowardspeaceandtheconsolidationofatruedemocracy.ForthesereasonswhenIspeakofa“transitional context” or “transitional justice,” itmustbeunderstoodthatIdosowithquotationmarksbecauseofmyhighlevelofskepticisminthisregard.

Despitetheseobservations,InotethataccordingtotheinterpretationbytheSupremeCourtofJustice,byvirtueoftheJusticeandPeaceLawthecountryfindsitselfinatransitionalcontext.9Moreover,transitionaljusticeisundoubtedlyapartofthepublicagendaanddiscoursetoday.

The approval of this legal framework made evident, once again, thefragmentationofColombiancivilsociety.Ineffect,asectorofthehumanrightscommunity, aligned with the politics of the new government, unconditionallybackedthelegalframeworkwithoutconcernforthefateoftherightsofthevictims.Anothersector,however,analyzedtheregulationinlightofinternationalhumanrightstandardsandthebasicprinciplesoftransitionaljusticeandindefenseofthevictimsandsocietyasawholeledavocalrejectionofthecamouflagedpardon.

For example, a few days after the lawwas approved, theMovement ofVictims of State Crimes (Movimiento de Víctimas de Crímines de Estado –MOVICE)10proposedthatpublicservantsapplythe“unconstitutionalexception”totheJusticeandPeaceLawandrefusetofollowit.Thisstancehadthesupportof severalnationalNGOsandnumerousEuropeanorganizations,whichbegantoexertpressureondifferentsectorstounderminesupportfortheapplicationofthislaw.ThisadvocacywascarriedoutintheframeworkofthealliancebetweenthissectorofColombiancivilsocietyandtheEuropeanorganizationstodemandrespect for human rights inColombia.This advocacy culminated in a lawsuitbeingfiledbeforetheConstitutionalCourt.“Theconstitutionalitychallengethatinitiatedthecurrentprocesswasinterposedbyagroupof105Colombiancitizens,

8 Fromthispointforward,inreferringtocivilsociety,Iwillmainlybespeakingofthesectorsthatworkinthehumanrightsfieldandthosethatadvocateforpeaceandstrengtheningofdemocracy,withoutreferencetotheothersectors,suchaslaborunionsorbusinesses.

9 See, e.g., CriminalCassationChamber,SupremeCourtofJustice,rulingofMarch12,2009,No.31320,SpeakerMagistrateSigifredoEspinosaPérez.

10 See Movimiento de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado Home Page, http://www.movimientodevictimas.org.

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actingintheirownnameorasrepresentativesofdiverseorganizations,againstLaw975of2005.”11Thisjointactiondemonstratesthealignmentofanimportantsectorofcivilsocietyagainstanexecutiveinitiativethatcountedonthebackingofthelegislativebranch.

It is not an easy task to determine quantitatively or even in approximatepercentage levels howmany or which sectors of the Colombian civil societyorganizationshaveassumedamorecontentiousrolewiththegovernmentinthistransitionalperiod,andhowmanyorwhichsectorsplayamorecollaborativerole.DespitethisIdaretoassertthatinourcountry,althoughanincreasingnumberofcivilsocietyorganizationsareformingandactinginthepublicarena,thereisinfactlesscivilsociety.Bythis,Irefertocivilsocietythatactswithmore-or-lesshomogenouspositionsandservesasabalanceofpoweragainstthehomogenousdiscourseofthegovernment.Thebulkofourcivilsocietyhasnotonlyaligneditselfwiththelanguageofthegovernmentbutdefendsittotheextreme.Perhapsthisisbecauseasignificantpartoftheorganizationsthathaveemergedinthelastdecadehavedonesoonofficialimpulseandfinancing,thusblurringtheessentialnatureofcivilsociety.ThisisalsoatestamenttothefactthatinColombiathepoliticalandsocialfusetogetheraroundtheextremistviewsandlanguageimposedbythenationalgovernment.

IntherelationshipoftheUribegovernmentwithapartofthehumanrightscivilsocietythereisagreatinconsistency:ononehand,aninvitationtodialogueandcooperation,andontheother,condemnationandstigmatization.Thefollowingsectionwillexplorethisdynamicfurther.

A. Building Conditions for Working Together

Paradoxically,undertheUribeadministration,astrategicprocessofalliancebeganbetweenthenationalgovernmentandColombiacivilsocietyaroundtheinternational cooperation agenda. Such proximity began to consolidate withthe so-called London-Cartagena-Bogota process, a tripartite government/civilsociety/internationalorganizationsdialogueaboutcooperationstrategies,mainlyinthefieldsofhumanrights,democracy,andpeace.

TheLondonDeclaration(2003)12becameafirstframeofreferencein thegovernment/civil society/international community relationships.Based on this,progress toward theNational Plan ofAction inHumanRights was proposed.The Cartagena Declaration (2005)13 was aimed principally at reaffirming the

11 ConstitutionalCourt,rulingC-370of2006,No.D-6032,May18,2006.12 The London Declaration is reproduced in English, in undp, de londres a CartaGena y a

boGotá: estrateGIa de CooperaCIón InternaCIonal12(2007),available athttp://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/6031.pdf.

13 Id. at 17.

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processbegun inLondon.Prior to thesemeetings therehadbeenDeclarationsofConsensusfromColombianCivilSocietyOrganizations,14 which represent an importantachievementofcoordinationatthenationallevelforColombiancivilsociety.Thiswasreceivedfavorablybytheinternationalpartners and the national government.

Finally,thethirdinternationalconferenceonColombiawasheldinBogotáinNovember2007.Duringthismeeting,theColombiangovernmentannounceditsadherencetotheParisDeclaration15asameanstostrengthentheharmonizationand alignment of international cooperation. The third conference was a morepolitical scene than theprevious encounters,whichhad revolvedmore aroundcooperationandthethematicissues.InBogotáhowever,Colombiancivilsocietycommunicated to the international community that the cooperation projectsextendedtothegovernmentareusedforwarandnotforpeaceorthepromotionofhumanrights.ThedomesticcivilsocietycriticizedUribe’s“DemocraticSecurity”policyasincapableofresolvingtheinternalarmedconflict.

Though this interinstitutional setting of dialogue continues, particularlywith regard to the creationof theNationalPlanofAction forHumanRights,thedifferent parties havedistanced themselveson substantialmatters.This isdue on one hand to the contradictory and inconsistent positions of the national government, and on the other, the inflexibility of a certain sector of non-governmental organizations, which have increased their advocacy around thejusticiabilityoftheState’shumanrightsobligations.

B. A Dynamic of Checks and Balances

Inthepastyears,thehumanrightssectoroftheColombiancivilsocietyhasbeenincreasinglystrengtheningmechanismsofcoordination,whichhaveallowedittoconsolidatemorehomogenouspositionsthat,atthesametime,strengthenitsinteractionwiththegovernment.Infact,severalplatforms—thematicgroupingsofhuman rights organizations16—have been designed and implemented to advancethe political dialogue not only with the government but also with internationalcooperation agencies. An important number of the organizations tied to suchstrategieshavebeenexercisingaroleofrepresentingvictims,notonlyinthejudicialsetting—criminalanddisciplinaryproceedings—butalsointhepoliticalsphere.

14 Id. at24.15 ParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness:Appropriation,Harmonisation,Alignment,Resultsand

MutualAccountability,Mar.3,2005,available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.

16 Currently there are three platforms: the Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination, whichworksmostlyintheareaofcivilandpoliticalrightsandwasthefirstofitskind;theColombianHumanRights, Democracy, andDevelopment Platform; and theAlliance of Social and Like-MindedOrganizations.

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Thegovernmentasserts,mainlyontheinternationalstage,thatthereisanopeningforcoordinationwithColombiancivilsocietyorganizations,butthisdoesnotplayoutinthesamewayatdifferentlevelsoftheadministration.Thedialogueandconsensustakesplaceatthelowandmiddlelevelsoftheadministration,butatthehighestanddecision-makinglevelstheposturetowardcivilsocietyhasbeenantagonisticand,ingeneral,closed.Itisintheambiguousspacesofthepoliticalgame that ties andmechanisms for relating, coordinating, and cooperating are formed;thespaceswheredecisionsaremadeareslowtorespondandgenerallynotinterestedinactuallyadoptingthemeasures.

Thus,thatsectoroftheColombiancivilsocietyonwhichIhavefocusedisperceivedtobestrengthenedinrelationtothegovernment,whichpresentsitselfasassumingopenandflexiblepositions.Nevertheless,mostof the time this isonlyapoliticalparodyofeloquentambiguities.

C. “Carrot and Stick” Politics

Theperiodoftimethatisthemainfocusofthisanalysishasbeencharacterizedbyconstantandreiterateddefamatoryanddiscreditingstatementsabouthumanrightsdefendersandsocialleaders—theirharassment,persecution,andstigmatization—bythePresidentandVice-presidentandallthewaydown.Whentakentogether,onehastheimpressionthatthiscouldbeagovernmentalstrategy,giventhattheyhaveengagedinthisbehaviorconsistentlythroughouttheyears.

There is increasingpolarizationbetween the sectorof theColombiacivilsocietythathasappropriatedtheofficialdiscourse—thatthereisnointernalarmedconflictbutratheraStatestruggleagainstterrorism—andtheothersectorofthesamesociety,whichrecognizestheexistenceoftheconflictanditsdevastatingconsequencesforthecivilpopulation.Thispolarizationrevealsaninherenttensionofarmedconflicts:you’re either with us or against us.Thisfuelsthephenomenonof defamatory anddiscrediting remarks, in public andprivate settings, againstthosewhochallengeandsetthemselvesapartfromthegovernment’shegemonicdiscourse.

In fact, there are a handful of organizations and individuals who havebeen suffering political persecution, in differentways, formaintaining criticalandindependentpositionsagainsttheprocessthatisbeingcarriedoutwiththeperpetratorsintheframeworkofJusticeandPeace.Stigmatizationandjudgmentsoftheactivitiescarriedoutbytheseorganizationsandindividualsarepartofthegovernmentalagenda.17

17 The defamatory remarks have been widely published. Regarding a march organized by civilsocietyorganizationstohonorthevictimsofparamilitarism:

[T]hepresidentialadvisor,Mr. JoseObdulioGaviria . . . assured thatneitherhenor“presidentUribe,willparticipate in themarchonMarch6th”because

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Ontheotherhand, inexceptionalcases, thegovernmenthasshownitselftobeopentodialogueandtotheconstructionofconsensuswiththeagendasofthehumanrightsplatforms,perhapsmotivatedonlybythepoliticalagendasofinternationalcooperationagenciesandsomeembassies.Thiscreatesasenseofuncertainty in thepublicatmosphereabout theadministration’s true intentions,producingevenmoredistrustinthehumanrightsmovements.

It is precisely this lack of trust that has eroded dialogue and has causedthe human rights community to seek more support and endorsement frominternational organisms, so that they can denounce and exercise the necessarypressure.Thequestionthenis,towhatextentshouldthissectorofcivilsocietymaintaindialoguewithagovernmentthatislackingintermsofdemocracy,whichdisrespectstheSocialState,andstigmatizeshumanrightsdefendersandoppositionleaders,categorizingthemasterrorists?Sofar,noneofthepartieshaveleftthenegotiationtablebecauseofthehighpoliticalcoststhiswouldbring,despitethefactthatmanyoftheactorsareawarethatitcouldverywellbea“dialogueofthedeaf”withcertaindividendsinthepurelypoliticalsetting.

accordingtohimitis“organizedbytheFARC[ArmedRevolutionaryForcesofColombia]....I,personally,willnotparticipateasIdidwithsuchenthusiasminthemarchorganizedagainsttheFARC,”saidMr.Gaviriawhilealsoaddingthat“itisunlikelythatColombiansocietywillparticipateinsuchactionwhenwearemarchingpreciselyagainstthoseorganizingit.”

FIDH, Press Release, El gobierno descalifica el homenaje nacional a las víctimas delparamilitarismo, la parapolítica y los crímenes deEstado, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a5247.pdf.

One of the main pillars of the National and International Campaign for the Right to DefendHumanRightsis,“puttinganendtosystematicstigmatization:thepublicdeclarationsofthehighgovernmentofficials,includingthePresident,tendtodisqualifyhumanrightsworkandstigmatizehumanrightsdefendersasalliesoftheguerrilla,puttingtheminasituationofevenhigherrisk.”Declaration,Colombia: Defensores de Derechos Humanos Bajo Amenaza, available at http://www.colombiadefensores.org/downloads/Declaration.pdf.Formoreonthecampaign,visithttp://www.corporacioncompromiso.org. See also, Statement of Rep. James McGovern, House ofRepresentatives,Sept.10,2003,available athttp://colombia.indymedia.org/mail.php?id=5807:

Overthepastfewmonths,onepublicattackafteranotheragainsthumanrightsdefendersandorganizationshasbeenmadebytheveryhighest-rankingmembersofColombia’s government andmilitary, culminating thisweek in statementsbyPresidentUribehimself.OnMonday,September8th,PresidentUribe,inaspeechtoColombianmilitarypersonnel,attackedhumanrightsorganizationsas“politickersat theserviceof terrorism.”PresidentUribestated thathumanrights groups in Colombia are “terrorist agents and cowards who hide theirpoliticalideasbehindhumanrights.”Thesehighlyinflammatoryanddangerousremarks came on the same day as some 80 human rights groups released areportcriticalofsomeofPresidentUribe’ssecuritymeasures,which, intheirview,haveincreasedrepressionagainstthecivilianpopulation.ThereportwasissuedbysomeofColombia’smostrespectedhumanrightsgroups,includingtheColombianCommissionofJurists,theConsultancyforHumanRights,andtheJesuit-affiliatedCenterforPopularEducationandInvestigation.

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D. A Perspective Focused on the Victims of Human Rights Violations

ThetransitionalprocesspurportedbyLaw975insertedintothepublicagendathetraditionaldebatebetweenjusticeandpeace—theneedtoreachbothendswithouttheobviousdetrimentoftheother.Intermsofgraveandsystematicviolationsofhumanrights,howsevereofasentenceshouldtheperpetratorsendureinexchangefor their reincorporation into society in through a peace-building process?Howmuchimpunityare,thevictimsandsocietyasawholewillingtobearinexchangefortheperpetiatorscontributiontofavorableenvironmentsforpeace?

These and other similar questions may have answers in the theory oftransitional justice, but many times they have not been successfully resolvedbyconcretesocieties,theColombiancivilsocietyasacaseinpoint.RecallthattheJusticeandPeaceLawwasdiscussedbehindthecountry’sbackandwithoutenoughpublicdebateforthecountrytobeinformedabouttheshadyagreementsreachedbetweentheperpetratorsandthelegislativeandexecutivepowers.

Therepresentationof therightsand interestsof thevictims isnotnewintheColombiannationalsetting.Nonetheless, since thenewcriminalprocedurecodescameintoeffectand,inparticular,sincetheapplicationoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw,theroleofthevictimsinthejudicial,political,andsocialcontexthasacquiredincreasedimportance.

Withoutadoubt,inthepoliticalexerciseofdialoguebetweenthenationalgovernment and the human rights sector of the Colombian civil society, thevictimsarethefocalpoint.Somevictimsadvocateforthemselvesforthedefenseandguaranteeof theirmost legitimateaspirations.Thegovernmentasserts thatthe State as awhole seeks to ensure the dignity of the victims and highlightsthat free legal counsel isprovided.However, in fact, this service is absolutelyinsufficient relative to the demand and it suffers fromobvious difficulties thatmake true legal assistance impossible. In response, several organizations havededicatedthemselvestostrategiclitigationinthejudicialreviewandcontrolofLaw975,representingthevictimsandsociety.

Although numerous victim groups and associations have emerged, theygenerallyhavenotreachedthelevelofmaturitynecessarytoparticipateintheoftenhighlytechnicaljudicialandpoliticalsphereswithfullautonomyandindependence.The organizations defending human rights continue to be their most frequentchannelofdialoguewiththerelevantinstitutionsinthetransitionaljusticesetting.

The landscape becomesmore complexwith the increased emergence ofassociationsofvictimsfromoneparticulararmedgrouporanotherintheconflict.Giventhissituation,thedisperseuniverseofColombiacivilsocietytodayhasdifferentassociationsof:victimsoftheguerillas,victimsoftheparamilitaries,and victims of State violence. There are also a number of associations ofperpetrators—guerrillasaswellasparamilitaries.Allofthesegroupsdenouncetheroleofpoliticalofficialswiththedifferentcriminalorganizations,whichhave

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insertedthemselvesintothepoliticalequation.Thegroupsnotonlyappropriatethe discourse of transitional justice but also vindicate their aspirations anddemandsthroughavarietyofdifferentmechanisms.

TheJusticeandPeaceLawconditionedthebenefitofthealternativesentencefortheperpetrators,asaninstitutionalexchangefortheirdemobilization,ontheguaranteeofvictims’rightstotruth,justice,andreparation.However,nearlyfiveyears after the expeditionof the law, the investigations ledby theprosecutionhavenotcapturedthegeneralizedandsystematicnatureofthecriminalconduct.Consequently,thetruthproducedbytheprocessisnotonlysignificantlyreducedbutalsocompletelypartialandfragmented.

Theonlyfinalsentencethathasbeenissuedwasannulledandremanded,18 whichmakesitclearthatjusticeisnotbeingdoneeither.Moreover,atthetimeofthiswriting,therewerenomorethanfivecasesthatcouldbeconsideredadvancedprocedurally—andthesecasesinvolveindividualsthatweremiddle-orlow-levelmembersoftheparamilitarystructures.NoneofthecasesinthemoreadvancedproceduralstagesincludeanyofthehighestAUCcommandersorleaders—themajorityofthesewereextraditedtotheUnitedStates,andtheothersarenotco-operatingintheirproceedings.Finally,theonlyreparationjudgmentthathadbeenissuedwasintheabovementionedsentenceandwasalsoannulled.Consequently,todatenovictimhasreceivedreparationintheframeworkoftheLaw975judicialproceedings.

Thisdevastatingrealityforthevictimsisaggravatedtotheextentthattheyareinstrumentalized,bothbythegovernmentaswellasbysomeColombiancivilsociety organizations. On one hand, the government—anticipating the failureof theJusticeandPeacecriminalproceedings—haslaunchedanadministrativereparationspolicy,playingontheprecarioussocialandeconomicconditionsofthevictims,undoubtedlyaseriousaffronttothevictims’dignity.Meanwhileontheinternationalstage, thegovernmentproclaimssupposedgreatachievementsin thevindicationof the rightsof thevictims.On theotherhand, someof theorganizationsofthedifferentgroupsincontention,forthesakeofdefendingtheirinterests,arenourishingthemselvesfromtheinternationalcooperationagencies.I emphasize that this is not the case of all of the organizations that representvictims,butthisphenomenonwasdetectedintheseriesofinterviewsconductedfor this analysis.

Toconcludethissectionit isusefultoanalyzethestancesofsomeofthehumanrightsorganizations that radicallyopposed thepassingofLaw975andcondemned thegovernment for its dialoguewith theperpetrators.First, as the

18 OnMarch 19th, 2009, the first sentence from the Justice and PeaceChamber of the SuperiorTribunalof theBogotaJudicialDistrictwas issuedagainstWilsonSalazarCarrascal,alias“ElLoro.”However,theCriminalCassationChamberoftheSupremeCourtofJusticedeclaredthissentencenullinitsrulingofJuly31,2009,No.31539,andremandedthecasebacktothebeginningstagesoftheproceeding.

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JusticeandPeacecriminalproceedingshavebeentakingplace,theseorganizationshavebeengraduallyincorporatedintotheprocess.Today,notonlydotheymonitorcloselytheproceedingsandtheprocessasawhole,buttheyalsointervenedirectlyaslegalpartiesrepresentingtherightsandinterestsofparticularvictims.

Second, despite an initial unwavering stance against dialogue with theringleadersof theparamilitarygroups, todaysomeof theseorganizationshavevisited those leadersof theAUCwhowereextradited to theUnitedStates forcharges related to drug-trafficking. The explanation given for this change inposition is the need to seek mechanisms for these individuals to fulfill theircommitmentassumedundertheJusticeandPeaceProcesstorevealthetruth.

Thesetworealitiesareverycontroversial,tosaytheleast.Theseinterventionsby civil society have been judged quite critically,mostly because of the highpoliticalcostsofthistypeofturnaround,whichmayactuallybeconvertingthemintoinstrumentsofthepolitical-legalprocessofJusticeandPeacethattheyoncecriticizedsointensely.Thoughthemotivationsarticulatedforchangesofpositionscanbesupportedbyforcefularguments,thereisasensethatitisalsotheresultofalackofcleardefinitionintheirmissions.ThiscontributestoaclimateofmistrustagainstinstitutionalactionaswellasactionsoftheColombiancivilsociety.

E. The Proposal of an Official Truth Commission

OnSeptember 21, 2009, the SupremeCourt of JusticeCriminalAppealsChamber, in a procedural ruling on a Justice and Peace criminal proceedingencouragedthenationalgovernmentto:

[C]all on themain social forces—representations of the three branchesof government, victims’ organizations, human rights organizations andothercivilgroups—inordertostudyandconsiderthecreationofatruthcommission,which,paralleltothecriminaltrialsthatcontinueinlightoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw,wouldhelpestablishthetruthaboutthepast.19

Intheconsiderationsleadinguptothispronouncement,theSupremeCourtofJusticerecountedthelegalfoundationoftherighttotruth(Article7ofLaw975)asarightofthevictimsandofthesocietyasawhole,anditreiteratedthecorrespondingdutyoftheState.TheCourtalsoreferencedtheinterpretationsoftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsontheissue—analyzingtherelevantarticleoftheAmericanConvention—aswellastheinterpretationsofspecializedbodiesoftheUnitedNations.Next,theSCJhighlightedtheobservationsoftheConstitutionalCourtaboutthescopeoftheright totruthinlightoftheJustice

19 Criminal CassationChamber, SupremeCourt of Justice, ruling of Sept. 21, 2009,No. 32022,SpeakerMagistrateSigifredoEspinosaPérez.

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andPeaceLawandthenassertedthatthetruthcommissionwouldbeasuitablemechanismtocomplementthelimitedtruthsthatarebeingproducedintheJusticeandPeaceproceedings.

There have been few sectors of the Colombian civil society that haveactually spoken out regarding the invitation made by the Supreme Court ofJustice.Thoughthematterwasreferencedindictum,andtheinitiativereferencedisoneofanofficialcharacter,humanrightscivilsocietymustnotsitoutofthepublicdebatethatshouldbehadoversuchaninitiativebecausethisdebateandanalysiscouldbeaverypositiveexercise.Idonotsuggestthatcivilsocietymustrespondaffirmativelyoutright to the call from theCourt, but rather thatmanypedagogicalproposalsnationalandregionalcouldbegeneratedtoencouragethesocietyasawhole toparticipatedirectly in theexplorationofargumentsas towhetherornotthesemechanismsoftransitionarerelevantornot.Undoubtedlythe lackof reactionon thepartofcivil society to theCourt’sproposal reflectsa lamentable indifference toward the fateof theJusticeandPeaceprocessandtowardalternative instruments that couldcontribute to thepursuitofhistoricaltruthregardingthesystematicviolationsthatthecountryhassuffered.

III. The Influence of International Cooperation on the Civil Society Agenda

Iwilldiscussthistopicbrieflyandhesitantlyduetothedifficultiesofattainingprecise informationabout thestances,projects,objectives,andpurposesof theinternationalcooperationagentsthatinteractintheColombianscene,specificallyby supporting different sectors of the Colombian civil society. A number ofinterviews with key protagonists in this area and my years of professionalexperiencewithdifferentaspectsofinternationalcooperationarethebasisofthefollowinganalysisthatIofferfordebate.

The first thing that can be noted is that there is a common internationalcooperationscenarioanditcanbedividedinfourcategoriesofprojects:humanrights, strengtheningdemocracy, searching for peaceful solutions to the armedconflict, and generating resources and development. Another generalizedcharacteristic is that the vastmajority of the cooperation agencies are foreigngovernmentsand, toamuchsmallerdegree,privateorganizations.Infact,youcaneasilycountaboutthirtyStatesthatmakeupthegreatestpercentageofthecooperation,whichhavefewerresourcesincomparisonhavefewerresources.

This aspect is relevant for the analysis here because in light of theParisDeclaration international cooperation must be focused primarily through thegovernments,whichmeansthatthecooperationforsocialorganizationsmaybegradually reduced to some extent.Thismay be a possible explanation for thegrowingphenomenonofco-optationofColombiancivilsocietyorganizations.In

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order toassure theiradministrativesustainability,organizationsmaybenefitbyaligningwiththeofficialdiscourseoftheColombiangovernment,thusalienatingthemselvesfromtheessentialpillarsoftheirownnature.ThequestionthenarisesastowhetherthereisasectoroftheinternationalcooperationthatstrategicallyseekstoneutralizethenaturalmissionoftheColombiancivilsocietyorganizations.Idonothaveenoughinformationtoansweronewayoranother,butIposethequestiontoprovokereactionsandfurtherdebateontheissue.

Nonetheless,onemustrecognizethattheresourcesprovidedbyinternationaldonorstothedifferentColombiancivilsocietyorganizationsareveryimportant,andwithoutsuchresourcesthemajorityofthemwouldnotexist.

Regardingcooperationinthefieldofhumanrights,weseethatagoodpartoftheresourcesarebeingdirectedtotworelatedsectors:one,toorganizationsthathavebeenadvancinglegalrepresentationstrategiesinfavorof thevictimsand,two,directlytothevictims’organizations.

Withrespecttotherepresentationofthevictims,intheJusticeandPeaceproceedingsweobservethatanimportantnumberofvictimshavegrantedpowerof attorney to the lawyers enrolled with the Public Defender’s Office of theOfficeoftheOmbudsperson(Defensoría del Pueblo).StatisticsreportedbytheInterinstitutionalJusticeandPeaceCommitteeindicatethatnearly60,000victimshave turned to this state organ to receive free legal representation in theLaw975criminalproceedings.20Asmallernumberofvictimshavegrantedpowerofattorneytopersonallawyersoftheirchoosing,themajorityofthemfromhumanrights non-governmental organizations and a very small fraction, lawyers thatworkonacontingencyfee.

This is an important dynamic because for the vast majority of victims,precarious financial situations mean that the only option is to turn to publicdefenders for legal counsel, despite the fact that many victims report feelingthat they are not effectively represented. In light of this, several organizationshavesoughttofillthegaps,buttheydonothaveenoughlawyerstorespondtothedemandoflitigatingintheJusticeandPeaceprocess.Thus,thechallengeisenormous—notjustfortheStatewithregardtoitsobligationtoprovidequalitypublicdefense,butalsoforcivilsocietyandcooperationagencieswhosetaskitistofurtherthefullguaranteeoftherightsofthevictims.

Thedirectsupporttothevictims’organizationshasalsoincreasednotablysincetheintroductionoftheJusticeandPeacelegalframework.ItisimportanttoemphasizethatsincethepassingofLaw387of1997,whichregulatestheintegralassistanceforthepopulationforcefullydisplacedbytheviolence,organizationsof internally displaced persons grew at an alarming rate—disorderly andwithfew references of inter-institutional coordination as part of belonging to civil

20 As of January 2010, theOffice of theOmbudsman has a total of 190 attorneys that representvictimsintheJusticeandPeaceproceedings.

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society.This samephenomenonhashappenedwith the JusticeandPeaceLawthe emergence of numerous victims’ associations motivated, it seems, by theexpectationsofjudicialoradministrativereparation.

Importantfinancinghasbeengrantedaroundthesetwoaxes.Oneofthepeopleinterviewedforthisanalysis,whoworksforaninternationalcooperationagency,indicated thealarmgeneratedby theenormousquantityof requests forprojectfinancing to assist victims, to legally represent victims, to strengthen victims’associations,andtogenerateresourcesforvictims’basicneeds.Theintervieweenotedwithsomeconcernthatitseemedthatalloftheprojectsrotatedaroundthevictims,whichcouldleadtoacertainexploitationorinstrumentalizationandhavethecounter-intuitiveeffectofdoublyaffrontingtheirdignity.

Inthissense,itisfittoaskwhatmeasuresthedonatingagenciesaretakingtoeffectivelystrengthenthevictimsandnotfallintotheingenuityofprovidingresourcesintendedfortheirbenefitbutwhichinsteadmaygetlostinthegrowthofadministrativeandbureaucraticbodies.

The human rights community faces a related challenge of ultimateimportance:todemonstrate,withverifiedsources,thatitsroleinrepresentingtheinterestsandaspirationsofthevictimsisbeingcarriedoutinasatisfactoryandeffectiveway,andpreciselyasareparationmeasure.

Lastly,Ipointoutwithcertaindiscomfortthatfacedwiththeadministrativeand logistical challengesof implementing the institutional structureof JusticeandPeace, theState hasmadenoteworthy efforts. Itmust be recognized thatwere itnot for internationalcollaboration, thesituationwouldbemuchworsethanitistoday.PublicservantsconsultedabouttheroleofforeigndonorsforthedevelopmentoftheLaw975criminalproceedingsconvincinglyindicatedthattheJusticeandPeaceframeworkissustainedingoodmeasurebytheresourcesfrominternationalcooperation,somuchsothatwithoutthemthesystemwouldcollapse.

Is there not an evident risk that this international cooperation, at least inrelationtothedevelopmentofJusticeandPeace,mayhavetheunintendedeffectofsupplantingtheStateitself,andwithitdiluteitsobligationsemanatingfrominternational human rights instruments? The question, without an answer fornow,isposedtoinvitetherealizationofarigorousstudyinthisregard,giventheconnotationsandeventualconsequencesof theanswer,and toprovokegreaterattentionandanalysisfromtheColombiancivilsocietyonthismatter.

IV. The Role of Mass Media in the Transitional Period

InNovember2003,whenthefirstmassivedemobilizationsoftheparamilitarygroupsbegan, themassmediafloodedthecountrywithinformation.ThesamethinghappenedwiththeapprovaloftheJusticeandPeaceLawin2005andwith

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thelastdemobilizationsandsurrenderofweaponsin2006.Duringthreeyears,thefocusofnationalmediaattentiongravitatedaroundthesesituations.

Subsequently, toward the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007,whenthe first versiones libres of the perpetrators submitted as candidates for thealternativesentenceonLaw975bythenationalgovernmentbegan,themediaagainsaturatedthenationalnewswiththestoriesoftheircriminalacts.Muchofthisreportingwasmorefocusedonsensationalismasopposedtoprovidingobjective information or generating discussions about what the society andinternationalcommunitywaswitnessing.

Nevertheless,thetransitiongraduallybegantoloseimportanceinthefrontpagesofthenewspapersandthemainheadlinesoftelevisionnews.Thestoriesabouttheterrifyingwaysthatpeopleweretortured,disappeared,orkilledstoppedbeing so shocking and, consequently, lost journalistic importance. Nowadays,judicialpronouncementsarecoveredsporadically,anditwouldseemthatpublicopinionhas forgotten that criminals involved ingravehuman rightsviolationscontinuetobetried;itseemstohavebeenforgottenthatthisprocessispursuingthe truth about the paramilitary violence of the past decades and intending toprovidereparationstohundredsofthousandsofvictims.

This brief panorama as to how the media has managed the transitionalexperienceofJusticeandPeaceposestwoimportantquestionsfor theanalysishere:Isitonlywhatisreflectedinthemediathatisofnationalimportance?Whodeterminesthemanagingofnationalandregionalpublicopinion?

ThoughsomeofusbelievethatLaw975isnottheoptimalinstrumentforareal transitioninthecountry,withoutadoubtthecriminalproceedingsbeingcarried out in Justice and Peace are very significant because several hundredperpetratorsarebeingprosecuted.TheseproceedingsmaybeabletoleavecertainbasestoreconstructthetruthaboutparamilitaryactionsandtheirclosetiestotheState,andbecausesomepercentageofthevictims—althoughveryminimal—mayreceiveadegreeofreparation.

With the exceptionof a fewopinionmedia outlets and columnists, oftencommonlyreferredtoas“alternative,”themajorityofthemedia,especiallythemassmedia,hasgenerallybeenignoringtheJusticeandPeacedevelopments.Thishasunfavorablyimpactedpublicopinionastotheimportanceoftheseproceedings.Theimportanceremainsforthedirectvictimsandforthoseinvolvedinthehumanrightsfield,butforthemajorityofthepopulationtheissueoftransitionisnotofanyrelevance.

Inthissense,weneedtorecognizethesocialandpoliticalpowerofthemedia—itscapacitynotonlytoinformbutalsotoformopinion.Unfortunatelyfor Colombia, opinion is lead by the owners of the media, who generallyecho theofficialdiscourseof thegovernment.These considerationshelp toexplainwhy themediawas so prolific in reporting on the demobilizationsoftheparamilitarygroupsbutconverselydonotdomuchtorevealthemost

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recentconfessionsfromperpetratorswhodirectlyimplicateStateofficialsinthecriminalenterprise.

Undoubtedly, any transitional process in the world requires an objectiveand independentmedia that reportson thedevelopmentsof theprocess,whichdisseminatesopenlytothepublicthetruthsbeingreconstructedintheprocess,andwhichemploysalanguagethatrespectsthedignityofthevictims.Inthisway,themediahasanimportantroleintheconstructionofhistoryandconsequently,inthereconstructionofmemory.Unfortunately,inColombiawecannotcountonthistypeofmedia;thevastmajorityisfundamentallyorientedatreproducingtheofficialdiscourse.Giventhissituation,oursocietyisnotasinformedasitshouldbeaboutthedevelopmentofJusticeandPeaceanditis.Inthissensethesocietyasawholeiscontributingtolimitingtherighttoknow,whichisarighttheentiresocietysharesalongwiththedirectvictims.

Therearesomeexceptionalmediaoutlets—whichingeneralreceivesupportfrom international cooperation agencies—that struggle tomaintain the societyobjectivelyinformedabouttherealtrajectoryofJusticeandPeace,itsprogress,thetruthsbeingconstructed,andthejudicialdecisions.Nevertheless,thereachofitsinfluenceisveryrelativeandisineffectlimitedtothesphereoftheColombianhumanrightscommunity.

Conclusion

Tofinalize these preliminary considerations about the role ofColombiancivil society in the transitional framework, I reiterate that it is difficult tofindanalyticaldocumentsaboutthisquestion—notjustinthetransitionalframework,butmoregenerallyabouttheroleplayedbyColombiancivilsociety.Writingthischapterhasledmetorealizetheimportanceofgeneratingaprocessofreflectionandanalysisregardingtherolethatcivilsocietyplays—aswellasregardingtheideal role it should play—in the Colombian transitional dynamic. Surely thisprocesswouldproduceinterestingresultsthatwouldgiveColombiancivilsocietytoolsinordertomoreactivelyandpurposefullyinterveneandparticipateinthishistoricperiod.IofferthefollowingclosingthoughtsasacontributiontowhatIhopewillbethebeginningoffurtherdialogueandreflection.

Thebasicunderstandingofcivilsocietyisasamultiplicityofassociations,independentofthegovernmentalorStatesector,whichdirecttheireffortsarounda common cause. However, Colombian civil society finds itself completelyfragmentedintoamultiplicityofsectorsandinterests,manyofthemopenlyincompetition.

If the spectrum of analysis is reduced to only that sector that identifiesitselfaroundthehumanrightscause,wealsofindmarkedpolarizations:betweenthose stances that are decisively collaborative in nature with the government

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and those thatmaintain a critical judgment. In the former, there are segmentsthat—appropriating the official language—do not recognize the existence andconsequencesof an internal armedconflict.The latter, under theguidelinesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,recognizetheexistenceofcombatantgroupsthatdisputesocialandterritorialhegemonies.Forthefirstgroup,themainproblemcanbeboileddowntoaStatestruggleagainstterrorism;fortheothers,underlyingtheongoingarmedconflictarenotonlypoliticalproblems,butprincipallysocialandeconomicones.Suchdifferentiationsaredeterminingfactorsatthemomentthesegroupsoutline theirmissionsandactivities, aswell as at themomentofproposingalternativesolutionstothecomplexproblemsthatthecountryfaces.

The fragmentation and greater distancing of sectors of the human rightscivilsocietydoesnotcorrespondinastrictsensetothearrivalofthistransitionalproposal.Rather,therootsofthisphenomenoncanbefoundintheattitudesinresponse to the official denialist discourse toward human rights violations, tothe internal armed conflict, and to the State’s role in generating the criminalstructuresofparamilitarism.Inthissenseitisreasonabletoassertthattheprocessof co-optationof a large sectorof civil societyby thecurrentgovernmenthasbeendevastating,tosuchanextentthatthelinebetweenofficialandsocialareremarkablyblurry.

This extreme polarization has increased the defamatory and discreditinglanguage,theharassment,andthepersecution.Thishasbeentosuchanextentthatthevastmajorityofthespokespersonsofthecriticalwingofthehumanrightscivilsocietyhavebeenattackedintheirprofessionalandpersonalintimacy,throughillegalwiretapping,arbitrarymonitoringandinvestigations,andevendirectdeaththreats.

In light of all this, human rights civil societyhas before it a tremendouschallengetoreclaimitsessentialnature—notsimplycontentiousorcollaborative,butasaheterogeneousbutautonomousbodythatmakesproposalstomaximizethepotentialoftheJusticeandPeaceframework;thatmakesrecommendationsregardingnon-officialmechanismsof truth-seekingandmemory-recovery; thatinvigoratesthesocietyasawholetofindrealexitstrategiestotheinternalarmedconflict;andthatcontributestothestrengtheningoftheSocialStateandtheruleoflaw,asopposedtotheemptyconceptofdemocracythatwehavetoday.

Part II:

Comparative experience

Uganda: Pursuing Peace and Justice in the Shadow of the ICC

Michael Otim & Marieke Wierda

Uganda’sstruggleforpeaceandjusticeconsumeddecadesbutonlyrecentlybecamesubjectofintenseinternationalinterestwhenUgandabecamethefirstcasetobeinvestigatedbytheICC.TheestablishmentoftheICC,whichcameintoforcein2002,wasseenbymanyasagreatstepforwardinthefightagainstimpunity.ButtheUgandancasebeforetheICCsoonhighlightedsomeofthedifficultiesofpursuingjusticeinongoingconflict,aswillbeshowninthischapter.

Part I describes the complex origins of the conflict, its humanitarianconsequences,andhowthis isreflectedinpositionsonconflictresolution.Theopeningofan investigationinJuly2004bytheProsecutorof theInternationalCriminalCourtagainstseniorLRAleadersgaverisetofearsthatpeacecouldnolongerbeachieved.Nonetheless,themosthopefulnegotiationstodatebetweentheGovernmentofUgandaandtheLRAtookplaceatJubabetweenAugust2006andNovember2008.AnumberofAgreementsweresignedaspartofthisprocess.However,aFinalAgreementwasnotachieved,causingsometospeculatethattheICCwastheobstacle.PartIIofthischapterwilldiscusstheJubanegotiations,theimpactoftheICC,andthecontentoftheAgreementonAccountabilityandReconciliation.

PartIIIanalyzesthecurrentstateofaffairs.EventhoughtheFinalAgreementwas not signed, the otherAgreements under Juba introduced a comprehensiveframeworkfortransitionaljusticethatcouldplayaconstructiveroleinUganda.Butcurrently,theframeworkisbeingunevenlyimplemented,withanemphasisoncriminaljusticeandtheestablishmentofaWarCrimesDivisioninJuly2008,aswell as legislation that allows international crimes to be tried domestically.UgandaalsoseemstobereadyingitselfforacomplementaritychallengebeforetheICC.ThisscenarioisevaluatedinPartIV.

Finally, in Part V, we turn to the question of how victims and affectedcommunitiesviewtheseissues.PublicperceptionsoftheICCandothertransitionaljustice issues in theNortharecomplexbut indicate that there isdemand foracomprehensive approach to justice, tackling the causes and consequences ofthe conflict throughmeasures such as truth-seeking and reparations.Uganda’sexperienceyieldsnotidylessons,anditsstrugglewithpeaceandjusticeisnotyetover,butfuturestepstowardshouldtakeintoaccountthisbroaderpoliticalcontextandtheviewsofthemostaffectedpopulations.

Chapter 9

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I. Background

A. The Conflict between the Government of Uganda and the LRA

On June 29, 2007, the rebels of the Lord’s ResistanceArmy (LRA) andtheGovernmentofUganda (GoU) signedanAgreementonAccountabilityandReconciliation,followedbyanAnnexureonFebruary19,2008,whichformthebasisofpursuingtransitional justiceinUgandatoday.ThesedocumentsformedpartofalengthynegotiationwiththeLRA.Thepeacetalks,mediatedbyDr.RiekMachar,beganinJuly2006inJuba,SouthSudanandconcludedwithoutafinalagreementinearlyDecember2008.TheLRAleaderJosephKonyrefusedtoappeartosignthefinalpeaceagreement,citingconcernsoverarrestwarrantsissuedbytheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)againstthreeoftheLRA’ssurvivingleaders.

The Juba peace talks, discussed further below, were supposed to end abrutal conflict that lasted over twenty years inNorthernUganda.The conflictstarted out as a rebellion by theUganda People’sDemocraticArmy (UPDA),comprisedmostlyofArmyofficerswhohadbeendefeatedandhadfledthecapitalcityKampalawhenUganda’scurrentPresidentYoweriMuseveni,leaderoftheNationalResistanceArmy/Movement(NRA/M),tookpowerin1986.1Remnantsof the rebelswhodid not surrender under the 1988peace accordbetween theUPDAandNRAovertimetransformedintoahighlystructuredrebelarmyanddurablemovementwithcult-likequalities,called theLord’sResistanceArmy.2 JosephKony,theelusiveleaderoftheLRA,wasinspiredbyawomannamedAliceLakwena.LakwenahadpreviouslyformedtheHolySpiritMovement(HSM)intheNorth.Thismovementenjoyedsignificantpublicsupport,butwasdefeatedatJinjainlate1987.TheLRAcontinuestofollowparticularpracticesandrituals,andJosephKonyiswidelybelievedtoholdspiritualpowersbyhisfighters.

IncontrasttotheHSM,theLRAmanagedtogarnerlittleopensupportforitscauseanditturnedincreasinglyagainstthecivilianpopulationoftheNorth,manyofwhombelongedtotheAcholitribe.WithfinancialandmilitarysupportfromKhartoum,andbyusingSouthSudanasasafehavenandlaunchpadforitsoperations, theLRAprovedsuccessfulmilitarily.TheLRAwagedacampaignwithfrequentuseofterrortactics.Civilians,oftenaccusedofcollaboratingwiththegovernment,wereitsmaintarget,andatrocitiesincludedkillings,abductions,and horrific mutilations such as the cutting off of limbs, ears, noses, or lips.AlthoughtheatrocitiesoftheLRAareoftenportrayedassenseless,theviolence

1 YoweriMuseveni,leaderoftherebelNRA/M,tookpowerafterafive-yearprotractedwarinLu-weroTriangleagainsttheOboteIIGovernment.HeoverthrewtheTitoOkelloMilitaryJuntainJanuary1986.

2 ThenameisthoughttobeaparodyontheNationalResistanceArmy/Movement.RuddyDoom&KoenVlassenroot,Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The Lords Resistance Army in Northern Uganda,98afr. aff.98(1999).

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wasdeliberatelyaimedatinstillingterror,violatinglocalvaluesorpowerstructures,swelling their ranks through abductions, and reinforcing internal cohesion. Itisestimatedthatupto75,000peoplewereabductedduringthe twentyyearsofconflict.3AftertheLRAwasattackedbytheUgandanarmy,knownastheUgandanPeople’sDefenseForces(UPDF),inSouthSudanpursuanttoOperationIronFistin2001,theLRAsteppedupitsattackskillinghundredsofinnocentciviliansinthenorthandnortheastofthecountry,stoppingonly200kilometersfromKampala.

Theresultinghumanitarianconsequencesofthetwenty-yearconflictwerecatastrophic.4Approximately1.8millionpeopleintheNorthbecameInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)andlivedincampswherethelivingconditionsweredreadful.In2005,theWorldHealthOrganizationestimatedanexcessmortalityrateof1,000perweekfortheAcholiregion.5

Basic needs of the IDP population were provided for by humanitarianorganizationssuchastheWorldFoodProgramme,ratherthanbylocalorcentralgovernment.The dire humanitarian situation led to an unraveling of the socialfabric in Northern Uganda and to highly degrading social consequences. Forinstance,theinternationallypublicizedphenomenonof“nightcommuting,”wherescoresofchildrenwouldwalkintotownsatnightfromthesurroundingareas,wasfirstpresumedtorelatemainlytoinsecurityandfearofabduction.However,upondeeperanalysis,aidagenciesreportedthatnightcommutingmayhavebeenaresultofthebreakdowninfamilylifeandaninabilityofparentstocarefortheirchildren.Anotherillustrationistheplightofchildmotherswhoreturnedfromcaptivityafterhavingbeenabductedandforced intomarriage toseniorcommandersandwhoborechildrenforwhomtheycouldnotclaimapaternalline.Thesearebutsomeofthecomplexsocialconsequencesofthisprotractedconflict.

The dire nature of the humanitarian catastrophe had two immediateconsequences:(1)itlentincredibleurgencytoresolvingtheconflictinordertoenable people to return to their homesteads andvillages and resume a normallife,whichinduecoursewouldpresumablyallowforrepairingthesocialfabric;and(2)intheNorthitgaverisetosignificantresentmentagainstthegovernment,which was seen to be failing both in resolving the conflict and in protectingcivilians. The government took measures, such as imposing strict curfews,whichhadavery immediateeffectonpeople’sability topursue theirordinarylivelihoods.Manyofthesemeasureswereseenasdegradingandtosomeextent

3 phuonG pham, patrICK VInCK & erIC stoVer, berKeley-tulane InItIatIVe on Vulnerable populatIons, abduCted: the lord’s resIstanCe army and forCed ConsCrIptIon In northern uGanda (2007).

4 ThisaspecthasbeenhighlightedparticularlybyUNUnder-SecretaryGeneralJanEgeland.See Briefing by Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator,2-6,U.N.Doc.S/PV.5331(Dec.19,2005).

5 who, health and mortalIty surVey amonG Internally dIsplaCed persons In Gulu, KItGum and pader dIstrICts, northern uGandaii(2005).

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vengeful andpunitive against theAcholi people.The relationshipbetween theUPDFandthepeopleintheIDPcampswasalsostrainedbyboththefailuretoprotectthepopulationagainstattacksbytheLRAandtheUPDF’sownexcessesorundisciplinedbehaviortowardthelocalcommunities.

B. Diverging Views on How to Resolve the Conflict

Views on how to resolve the conflict have always differed a great dealbetween the national level and the local community. Resentment against thegovernmentandtheUPDFonthelocallevelsometimestranslatesintoambivalenceamong theAcholi towards the LRA. However, themore fundamental groundforthisambivalenceisthefactthattheLRAiscomposedlargelyofkidnappedrelativesandchildrenoftheAcholi(andrecentlyalsoothertribes).Indeed,duetothewidespreadnatureofabduction,includingofchildren,andtheferocityofindoctrinationwithintheLRA,thelinebetweenvictimandperpetratorhasbecomeblurred. Although the crimes committed by the LRA have been consistentlycondemnedbyNortherners,thisrealityinfluencesopinionsregardingthewaytodealwiththecrimes.

Thegovernmentresponsetotheviolencehasbeentwo-foldandcontradictory:military confrontation and sporadic negotiations. For most of the twenty-yearconflict, thegovernmentopenlypromotedamilitarysolutionandhaswagedanoffensivewaragainsttheLRA—anapproachforwhichithasbeenabletogarnerconsiderableforeignmilitaryassistance.Increasingly,thewarintheNorthbecameamoney-making venture, particularly for certain seniormilitary figures. In thepost-September11world,thegovernmentsucceededingettingtheLRAonthelistofterroristorganizationsmaintainedbytheU.S.government.PresidentMusevenihasusuallyfavoredamnestyasafallback.Thegovernmenthasalsosporadicallypursued negotiations—mainly under the auspices ofBettyBigombe, anAcholiwomanandGovernmentMinister,whoatgreatpersonalriskmadeseriousattemptstomeetwiththeLRAin1994andagainin2004.Herattemptswerewidelyadmired,butbythesummerof2005theywereseenasdestinedforfailure.

ViewsontheconflictandhowitshouldberesolvedwerethereforealwaysdrasticallydividedbetweenNorthernUganda,wheretheconflictwasplayingout,andtherestofthecountry,whichwasgenerallyprospering.6IntheNorth,religiousandtraditionalleadersincreasinglymobilizedtotrytofindpeacefullocalsolutionsto the conflict, involvingdialogue and a focus on reintegrationof formerLRAcombatants.7 Theywere soon joined by coalitions of humanitarian and human

6 ThedividinglineisoftensaidtorunneatlyalongtheNile.7 Examples includetheAcholiReligiousLeadersPeaceInitiative(ARLPI)andtheCivilSociety

Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU). See barney afaKo, ConCIlIatIon resourCes, reConCIlIatIon and JustICe: mato oput and the amnesty aCt(2002).

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rightsorganizations.ThesecoalitionswereveryvocalaboutthecontinuedneedfordialogueandtheneedtousetraditionalAcholiceremoniestodealwithLRAcrimes.ArelatedinitiativewasthepassageofacomprehensiveAmnestyActin2000.TheAmnestyActisuniquebecause:(1) itwasinitiatedbyaffectedgroupsandwassupportedbyacountrywideconsultationpriortocomingintoforce;8and(2)theamnestycontinuestoenjoyacertainlevelofsupport,includingamongpopulationsmost affected by the violence.9The amnestywas also passed in recognition ofthe fact that throughoutUganda’sviolenthistory since independence, justice inthedomesticcourtshasnotbeenarealoption.Theamnestywasconstruedasagesturetoreachouttothosewhohavebeenabducted,toenticethemtochooseapathalternative to theLRA.10Theonus for eligibility is low: reportersundertheAmnestyAct are required to renounce the insurgency and are then eligiblefor reintegration—they are not required to divulge information about atrocitiesor toparticipate inanyotherkindof justiceprocess.AnAmnestyCommissionhandsoutcertificatesandreintegrationpackages.SeveralseniorLRAcommandersandnumerousrank-and-filehavebenefitedfromamnesty,butithasnotledtoanunravelingoftheLRA.

Another approachpromotedby traditional and religious leaders and civilsocietyactivists in theNorth is theuseof traditionalceremonies toreintegrateformerLRA.TheseceremoniesareapartofAcholitraditionsandencompassawidearray,rangingfromthesimplecleansingceremoniestothemoreelaborateceremonyoftheMato Oput.MatoOputreferstothe“bitterroot.”Itinvolvesanextendednegotiationbetweentheclansoftheperpetratorandthevictimtoarriveat a common version of events; an agreed compensation; and a reconciliationceremonythatculminatesinthemutualdrinkingofthecrushedbitterroot.TheMatoOputismuchpublicizedanddebatedbothlocallyandinternationally.

Inspiteofeffortsbycivilsocietygroups,thewarinNorthernUgandalongremainedaforgottenconflict.11UntiltheappointmentofJoaquimChissanoasUNSpecialEnvoyoftheSecretary-GeneralonLRAaffectedareasinlate2006,itwasnotontheagendaoftheSecurityCouncil.NewsoftheLRAonlyoccasionallybroke through toWesternmedia outlets, and if so, always in very rough lines

8 Unlikemanyotheramnesties,thisamnestywasnotrequestedbythosewhowouldseektobenefitfromit.

9 ICtJ & human rIGhts Center, unIVersIty of CalIfornIa-berKeley, forGotten VoICes, a populatIon-based surVey on attItudes about peaCe and JustICe In northern uGanda (2005);ConCIlIatIon resourCes & QuaKer peaCe & soCIal wItness, ComInG home: understandInG why Commanders of the lord’s resIstanCe army Choose to return to a CIVIlIan lIfe(2006).UgandahadseveralamnestiesbeforetheAmnestyActof2000,includinganamnestystatutein1987,butitexcludedgenocide,murder,kidnapping,andrape.

10 The Preamble of the Amnesty Act reads in part: “it is the expressed desire of the people ofUgandatoendarmedhostilities,reconcilewiththosewhohavecausedsufferingandrebuildtheircommunities.”

11 See lIu InstItute for Global Issues, “the hIdden war, the forGotten people”: war In aCholIland and Its ramIfICatIons for peaCe and seCurIty In northern uGanda(2003).

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where themain attentionwas on the horror ofLRAatrocities and the lack ofclarityoftheirpoliticaldemands,withlittlein-depthanalysis.

Thesefactorsarisingfromthebackgroundtotheconflict,andinparticulartheNorth-SouthdivideinUganda,areveryimportanttounderstandingsomekeycomponentsofthedynamicsinNorthernUganda.First,theyhelptoexplaintheinitialquitenegativereactionstotheinterventionoftheICCinUgandaamongaffectedpopulations,whichwillbebrieflyexplainedinPartII.Second,theyhelptoexplainthewidespreadsupportfortheJubaprocessdescribedinPartIII,whichwasseenasthemosthopefulchancetoresolvetheconflicttodate.TheseverehumanitariancrisisgaveimpetustotrytomaketheJubatalkssucceed.Thosewhowiththebenefitofhindsighthaveexpressedgreatskepticismabouttheprocessandwhether thenegotiationswere takingplace ingoodfaithshouldnotforgetthisdynamic.

Thisbackgroundalso affects currentdevelopments.Supporting the arrestwarrants is seen as effectively promoting a military solution to the conflict,particularlyaftertherecentmilitaryoperation(OperationLightningThunder)thatstartedtowardtheendof2008.ThediscussionsaroundestablishingaWarCrimesDivisionandtheInternationalCriminalCourtActdescribedbelowcanbeseenasanindicationthatthegovernmenthas“won”theconflict.

C. Initial Opposition in the North against the ICC Intervention

ItisagainstthisbackgroundthattheattentionoftheinternationalcommunitysuddenlywasfocusedonUgandain2003-2004.Thisattentioninvolvedamuchpublicized visit by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(UNOCHA)ChiefJanEgelandtotheIDPcamps,duringwhichhedeclaredthatUgandawasthe“worsthumanitariancrisisintheworld,”12 and also the increased attentionoftheICContheconflict.TheICCProsecutorfirstdeclaredhisinterestin Uganda following the Barlonyo massacre on February 21, 2004 in Lira,NorthernUganda,andformallyannouncedtheopeningofanICCinvestigationinJuly2004.

AsasignificantamountofliteratureexistsontheoppositiontotheICCintheNorththereasonswillnotbefullyexploredhere.13Theoppositiongenerallystemsfromthreesources.First,manyintheNorthfearedthatICCinvolvementwouldmakeapeacedealwiththeLRAimpossible.Therewasmuchdebateonthispointpriorto,during,andafterJuba.Second,somealsosawtheICCitselfas

12 Uganda Conflict “Worse than Iraq”, bbC news, Nov. 10, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3256929.stm.

13 Fortwoopposingviewsonthis,seetIm allen, trIal JustICe: the InternatIonal CrImInal Court and the lord’s resIstanCe army (2006);RefugeeLawProject,Peace First, Justice Later,WorkingPaper17(July2005).

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arbitraryandlackinginlegitimacy.PeopleintheNorthhadnotheardabouttheCourtwhentheGovernmentofUgandasignedtheRomeStatute.14 There was a sensethatthe“Western-stylejustice”thattheICCsoughttoimposeshouldnottrumplocalmechanisms.Thisdebatewasverycontroversialandresultedfromavastoversimplificationofacomplexsituation.Itisultimatelynothelpfultosug-gestthatitisaneither/orsituationbetweenthestarkalternativesofafewtrialsinTheHagueorelseAcholitraditionalceremonies.

Finally,therewasalsoastrongsensethatthisspecificICCinterventionwasnotimpartial.TheannouncementofUganda’sreferral,whichwasmadeatajointpressconferencewithPresidentMuseveni,gaverisetoperceptionsthattheCourtwas siding with the Government—a perception that has proved very difficulttoundo.InUganda, thepoliticalskillsofPresidentMuseveniareadmiredandrespectedevenbyhisopponents,andmanysubsequentlyassumedthathewasinthedriver’sseatratherthantheICCProsecutor.Thosewhocontesttheimpartialityof the ICCalsopoint to the fact that the ICChasnotopenedan investigationintotheUgandanarmy(UPDF)orforthecrimeofforceddisplacement.SomearguedthatconditionsinthecampswerekillingfarmorepeoplethantheLRA.Proponentsalsopointtothefactthatintheabsenceofanabilitytoenforcearrestwarrants,theICC’srelianceonstatecooperationtiltsitinthatdirection.

Althoughfarfromuniform,thefactthatoppositioncamefromthepeoplein the North, who were essentially the victims of the conflict, was a shockto the ICC and supporters of international justice and posed a considerablepoliticalchallenge.The ICCrespondedbyadoptinga low-profileapproach inits investigationandbycloselymonitoring theongoingBettyBigombepeaceprocess,onlyissuingarrestwarrantsafteritseemedthattheprocesswasmoribundinOctober2005.15Atthattime,peoplecouldnothaveanticipatedthatthemostsignificantnegotiationswereyettocome.

II. The Juba Peace Process

A. The Negotiations

Inlate2005,theLRAsurprisedtheworldbymovingtoGarambaNationalParkinDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).ThiswasmostlikelyaconsequenceoftherealignedpoliticalsituationinSouthSudanaftertheComprehensivePeaceAgreementsignedbetweenNorthandSouthSudan.Inearly2006,seniorLRA

14 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,U.N.T.S.90,enteredintoforceJuly1,2002[hereinafter“RomeStatute”].

15 Decisionon theProsecutor’sApplication forUnsealingof theWarrants ofArrest, ICC-02/04-01/05(Oct.13,2005).

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militaryleaderssuchasVincentOttifirstmadeoverturestoopenadialogue.Inthecourseof2006, theVicePresidentofSouthSudanRiekMacharofferedtomediate,andonAugust26,2006theLRAandtheGovernmentofUgandasignedthefirstCessationofHostilities(CoH)agreement.16

ThetwoandahalfyearsofnegotiationknownastheJubapeacetalkswerefraughtandsufferedseveralchallengesandsetbacks.TheCoHAgreementwascontinuouslybreachedandtheLRAdisrespecteddeadlinestoassemble.BecauseoftheICCarrestwarrants,seniorLRAmilitaryleaderscouldnotcometoJubatonegotiateinperson.Instead,theywererepresentedbyadelegationcomposedofexiledAcholiintheDiaspora,whooftenbroughttheirownpoliticalagenda.17 Anumber ofmeetings between the LRA, the delegation of theGoU, and themediator had to be arranged in remote locations near Garamba Park. WhenmisunderstandingsarosebetweenKonyandhisnegotiatorshefiredanumberofthedelegationleaders,includingitschairman,MartinOjul.

In addition there was also a significant difference in vision among theparties.TheGovernmentofUgandaperceivedthenegotiationsmainlytobeanopportunity to give a “soft landing” to theLRA and to reintegrate them backintoUgandansociety,thuseliminatingthesecuritythreatthatexistedthen.18 The LRAontheotherhand,soughttoraiseissuesrelatingtotherootcausesoftheconflict in theNorthandheldouthopesthat theywouldbewelcomedbackasliberators.19TheLRAreceivedfinancialandhumanitarianassistancethroughoutthe negotiations, an issue that is still controversial. Probably themost serioussetbacktothenegotiationswastheLRA’sexecutionofJosephKony’ssecondincommand,VincentOtti,inOctober2007.Whilethiswillcontinuetobeamatterofspeculation, therearethosethatbelievethat thiswasa turningpointfor thenegotiationsasOttiwasseenasaproponentofthepeaceprocess—whereasmanydoubtwhetherJosephKonywaseverinterestedinconcludingthetalks.

TheagendaattheJubapeacetalkswasarrangedtocoverfiveagendaitems:(1)CessationofHostilities;(2)ComprehensiveSolutions;(3)AccountabilityandReconciliation;(4)DDR;and(5)AFormalCeasefire.Initially,thenegotiationsstartedwith issuesof accountability, but theseproved socontentious that theywerequicklydeferred.Inthefinalanalysis,agreementswerereachedonallagendaitemsaswellasvariousAnnexures,butaFinalAgreementwasnotreached.

16 ForanextensiveanalysisontheJubapeacetalks,seeInternationalCrisisGroup,Peace in Northern Uganda,AfricaBriefingNo.41(2006).

17 Id.18 DavidClarke,Uganda Rebels Not Serious about Peace—President,reuters,Nov.20,2006.19 See“LRAPositionPaperonAccountability,TruthandReconciliationintheContextofAlternative

Justice System for Resolving the Northern/Eastern Ugandan and Southern Sudan Conflicts,”presentedinJuba,SouthSudan,Aug.19,2006.

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B. Impact of the ICC Arrest Warrants on the Juba Peace Process20

Inyears tocome,debatewillcontinue toaboundas towhether thearrestwarrantswerethemostsignificantfactorthatbrokedowntheJubaPeaceProcess.Inthissense,internationaljusticeinUgandaposedarisktothepursuitofnationaljustice.Thisisaverycomplexissueonwhichitmaybeimpossibletobestrictlyempirical.Itisverydifficulttopinpointasinglecauseforthebreakdownofthetalks; rather,multiple factors led to thisoutcome.Analystsalsoargueabout towhatextentthearrestwarrantsservedtobringtheLRAtothenegotiatingtable.TheLRAcertainly sought touse the talks to rid themselves from theproblemof the ICC arrestwarrants.But again, a variety of factors contributed to theirparticipationinthetalksanditisnotpossibletopointtotheICCarrestwarrantsasthesingle,oreventhemainfactor.

Whatisclear is that theICCarrestwarrantshadaparticularlysignificantimpactonthecontentofthenegotiationandtheAgreementonAccountabilityandReconciliation.21Inthecourseofthenegotiations,theLRAconsistentlydemandedthatthearrestwarrantsberemovedasaconditionforsigningafinalagreement.ThegovernmentinsteadtookthepositionthatitwouldapproacheithertheICCortheSecurityCounciltohavethearrestwarrantshaltedifandwhentheLRAsignedthefinalagreement.

Anumberofinformal,off-the-recorddiscussionstookplacewiththeLRAleadershipduringthecourseofthenegotiations,inordertoexplaintothemthenatureandconsequencesof the ICCarrestwarrants.During thesediscussions,itwasalsoexplained to theLRA thatameasureofaccountabilitywouldneedtoaccompanyanyfinalsettlement,andthatneither theaffectedpopulationnortheinternationalcommunitywouldabidebyanagreementthatwasseentogiveanotheramnestyoramere“slaponthewrist”fortheLRAseniorleaders.Thereligious,traditional,andothercivilsocietyleaders,whohadbeengivenformalobserverstatusbytheMediator,playedacriticalgo-betweenroleinsomeofthesediscussionsdirectlywiththeLRAleadership.

ThedisputeoverthearrestwarrantscametotheforewiththediscussionsonAgendaItem3,onAccountabilityandReconciliation.Aday-longworkshoponAccountabilityandReconciliationwasheldatJubaonJune1,2007.Theworkshopaddressedanumberoftopicsincluding:(1)traditionaljusticeinAcholiandotherNorthernareas;(2)internationalstandardsandpracticesontransitionaljustice;and(3)theUgandanConstitution,theUgandanlegalsystem,andnationalinstitutions

20 See alsoMariekeWierda&MichaelOtim,Understanding Juba, in pal wranGe, the Interna-tIonal CrImInal Court and the Juba peaCe proCess or Global law and loCal frICtIon (Fountain Publishers,forthcoming2010).

21 Agreement onAccountability andReconciliation between theGovernment of theRepublic ofUgandaandtheLord’sResistanceArmy/Movement(June29,2007)[hereinafter“Agreement”].

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suchastheAmnestyCommissionandtheUgandanHumanRightsCommission.AllofthesetopicswouldeventuallybereflectedintheAgreementitself.

ThediscussiononinternationalstandardsatJubawentbeyondadiscussionof the obligations of Uganda under the Rome Statute. Instead, it addressedcurrenttrendsintransitionaljusticearoundtheworldandtheimpactoftheRomeStatute having entered into force.Onemajor conclusion of theworkshopwasthat transitional justiceprocessesat thedomestic levelhaveabetterchanceofbringinglong-termtransformationtoaparticularsocietyandconsequentlythatanationalsolutionshouldbepursued.

ThemostrelevantprovisionsoftheRomeStatuteforthediscussiononthearrestwarrantsweredeemedtobeArticles17-19,whichlayoutthecomplementarityframework,ratherthanArticles5322 or 1623,bothofwhichhadbeenapartofthediscussionsprior to Juba.Participantsdiscussed the fact that national criminalproceedings were most likely to meet the complementarity threshold.24 The ColombianJusticeandPeaceLaw(2005)wasexaminedasapossiblemodelasit provides some guidance on the issue, particularly in terms of its provisionslinkingjusticetotruthandreparationsandonreducedsentences.Article17oftheRomeStatuteissilentontheexactrequirementsforpunishment.25

ThediscussionsofJune1,2007formedthebackbonefordetailednegotiationson theAgreement onAccountability andReconciliation,whichwas signedonJune29,2007.ThechoicetopursueanationalsolutionpavedthewayforthetalkstoproceedwellbeyondAgendaItem3,asittheoreticallyprovidedforawaytodeal with the arrest warrants.

Followingthis,therewasaperiodofintenseconsultationsinNorthernUgandawherepeopleinvariouslocationswereaskedtheirviewsonthemechanismsthatshouldbeputinplacetoimplementtheprinciplessetoutintheAgreement.TheGovernmentandLRAconsultationswereheldseparately.Althoughsomeaspectsoftheconsultationprocesshavebeencriticized,thevisitsoftheHeadofUganda

22 Article 53 of theRome Statute states that the Prosecutormay discontinue an investigation orprosecutionifproceedingisnot“intheinterestsofjustice.”Someofitsdecisionsaresubjecttojudicialreview.WhatismeantbythisphrasehasbeenthesubjectofintensedebateincludingintheUgandansituation.In2006,theOfficeoftheProsecutorpublishedanInternalPolicyPaperthatclarifiesthattheexpressioninterestsofjusticedoesnotequaltheinterestsofpeaceandthatArticle53wouldonlybeusedinexceptionalcircumstances.

23 Article16providesthattheSecurityCouncilmayrequesttheCourttodeferaninvestigationorprosecutionforatwelve-monthrenewableperiod,actingunderChapterVIIoftheU.N.Charter.

24 ThiswouldhavetoincludetheopeningofaninvestigationforthesameactsandconductchargedintheICCarrestwarrants,andareversalofthegroundsonwhichthereferralwasmade,whichwasaninabilitytoarresttheLRA.Inotherwords,theLRAwouldhavetodisarmandcomeontoUgandansoil,includinginparticulartheLRAleaders.

25 Thisisnottosuggestthattheissueofpunishmentisirrelevant.Intermsofwillingness,pursuanttoArticle17(2),theCourtmayexaminewhether“theproceedingswereorarebeingundertakenorthenationaldecisionwasmadeforthepurposeofshieldingthepersonconcernedfromcriminalresponsibilityforcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.”Adisproportionatelylowsentencemaybesaidtobeintendedtoshieldaperpetrator.

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GovernmentDelegation,MinisterRugunda, to remoteareassuchasWestNilewerequiteimportanttocreatingasenseofownershipintheoutcomeofthetalks.Following theseconsultations, anAnnexure to theAgreementwasdraftedandsigned in February 2008.26 The contents of thisAgreement andAnnexure arediscussedinthefollowingsection.

Towardtheendofthetalks,therewereintensiveeffortstoclarifywiththeLRAwhatwasbeingproposed,particularlyregardingtherelationshipbetweenthe proposedWar Crimes Division and traditional justice.27 In final meetingsbetweenJosephKonyandreligiousandtraditionalleadersinNovember2008itwasclearthattheLRAseniorleadershipdidnottrusttheprocessandthattheywerenotinclinedtodemobilize.

C. The Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation: A Framework for Transitional Justice in Uganda

AnimportantdecisionthatwastakenatJubawasthatnosinglemechanismwould suffice to meet all justice needs, but rather that multiple mechanismswouldbeneeded, includingnewandpre-existingones.TheAnnexure laysoutthe mechanisms that will form part of an “overarching justice framework.”28 The Agreement foresees a comprehensive and integrated approach includingformaljustice,traditionaljustice,truth-seeking,reparations,andtheAmnestyandUgandanHumanRightsCommissions.

Acornerstoneof theAgreement is found inArticle4.1whichstates that“[f]ormalcriminalandciviljusticemeasuresshallbeappliedtoanyindividualwho is alleged to have committed serious crimes or human rights violationsin the course of the conflict. Provided that, state actors shall be subjected toexistingcriminaljusticeprocessesandnottospecialjusticeprocessesunderthisAgreement.”TheAnnexurespecifiesthat“aspecialdivisionoftheHighCourtofUgandashallbeestablishedtotryindividualswhoareallegedtohavecommittedseriouscrimesduringtheconflict.”29ThesepartsoftheAgreementwereseekingtolaythefoundationforapossiblecomplementaritychallengeandweredirectlyinfluencedbytheRomeStatute’sinsistenceoninvestigationandprosecution.

ThroughouttheAgreement,onecanseetheinfluenceoftheRomeStatutebutalsoofotherinternationalhumanrightsinstruments.Thereareprovisionstoreflect internationalconventions, suchas theConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of

26 Annexure to theAgreementonAccountability andReconciliation (Feb.19, 2008) [hereinafter“Annexure”].

27 FinalReport,Workshop on Accountability and Reconciliation in Uganda: Juba Peace Talks(May6-7,2008).

28 Agreementart.5.2.29 Annexureart.7.

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the Child,30andalsodevelopmentsontherightsofvictimsininternationallaw.31 Forinstance,onreparations,theAgreementnotesthat“reparationsmayincludearangeofmeasuressuchas:rehabilitation,restitution,compensation,guaranteesofnon-recurrenceandothersymbolicmeasuressuchasapologies,memorialsandcommemorations.Priority shallbegiven tomembersofvulnerablegroups.”32 This language borrows from the definition of reparations encompassed in theBasic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,adoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyoftheUNin2005.33

In terms of truth-seeking, the JubaAnnexure refers to a “body” whosemandateshallbean“inquiryintothepastandrelatedmatters.”Itavoidstheterm“commission”althoughmanyofthelistedfunctionsresembleremarkablycloselythoseordinarilyassignedtotruthcommissions.

The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation also designatestraditional justice as a “central part of the framework for accountability andreconciliation.” It recognizes the diversity of mechanisms available, makingspecificreferencetoCulo Kwor,Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc, and Tonu ci Koka.34 Importantly,thesevariousapproacheshavecommonelementsthatemphasizeanegotiatedprocessofarrivingatamutuallyacceptedversionofevents,followedbyreconciliationandreparationstorestoretherelationshipbetweentheaffectedclans.UndertheAnnexure,theGovernmenthasanobligationtoexaminethesemechanisms “with a view to identifying the most appropriate role for suchmechanisms.”35 To combat concerns that suchmeasuresmay be coercive, theAnnexure specifies that participation in thesemechanismswill be voluntary.36

30 Forinstance,theAgreementprovidesfora“gendersensitiveapproach”andisexplicitthatimple-mentationwill“recognizeandaddressthespecialneedsofwomenandgirls”andprotectthemaswellasencourageandfacilitatetheirparticipation.Agreementart.11.TheAgreementrecognizesthespecialneedsofchildrenandtheneedtorecognizetheirviews,encourageandfacilitatetheirparticipation,promotereparationsforthem,andprotectthem.Agreementart.12.

31 TheAgreementgivesadefinitionofvictimsthatreadsasanelaboratedversionofthedefinitionofvictimsfoundinRule85oftheRulesofProcedureandEvidenceoftheICC:victimsare“personswhohaveindividuallyorcollectivelysufferedharm,includingphysicalorpsychologicalinjury,emotionalsufferingoreconomic loss,asaconsequenceofcrimesandhumanrightsviolationscommittedduringtheconflict.” Agreementart.6.1. TheAgreementstatesthattheGovernment“shall promote the effective and meaningful participation of victims in accountability andreconciliationproceedings”andthatvictims“shallbeinformedoftheprocessesandanydecisionsaffectingtheirinterests.” Agreementart.8.2.

32 Agreementart.9.1.33 See, e.g., Agreementart.12(v).34 Agreementart.3.1.Foramore in-depth lookat thesemechanisms,seeerIn baInes, JustICe &

reConCIlIatIon proJeCt, roCo wat I aCholI: restorInG relatIonshIps In aCholIland: tradItIonal approaChes to JustICe and reInteGratIon(2005).

35 Annexureart.20.36 Annexureart.22.Severalreportshavenotedthediversityofopinionsregardingtraditionalrec-

onciliationceremonies,includingJustICe & reConCIlIatIon proJeCt & QuaKer peaCe & soCIal

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Manyquestionsareleftopen,includingwhetherthesesystemsoughttobecodified.TherearealsooutstandingquestionsaboutwhetherMato OputinAcholiwouldsufficetoredresscrimesotherthanmurder.Representationofwomenoryouthremainsanotherconcern.37TheAnnexurespecifiesthattheimpactonwomenandchildrenshouldbeconsidered.38

The Juba Agreement provided the beginnings of a transitional justiceframeworkthatcouldbebuiltonintheUgandancase.Regrettably,itspotentialhasbeenstifledbythefailuretoreachafinalagreement.

III. The Current Situation in Uganda

A. Legal Status of the Juba Agreement

As mentioned elsewhere,39 in a curious way the Juba process wassimultaneously a failure and a success. The renewed fighting with the LRAduringOperationLightning–ThunderonDecember14,2008and theatrocitiescommittedbytheLRAinthefinalmonthsof2008haveeliminatedthepossibilityofacontinuednegotiationinUganda—makingafinalsettlementwiththeLRAseemmoreelusivethanever.40Atthesametime,relativepeacehasreturnedtoNorthernUgandaandIDPreturnistakingplaceonafairlywidespreadbasis.Thegainsderivedfromthispeacefulperiodaredeemedbymanytobepermanent.

Nonetheless, the non-signature of the Final PeaceAgreement has left acomplexlegalsituation.SeveralagreementshadbeensignedbytheLRAalongtheway,butitwasclearthattheLRAdidnotintendtoliveuptotheseobligations.TheGovernmenthoweverpledgedimplementation.Themediator,Dr.RiekMachar,alsourgedimplementationforconfidence-buildingwiththeLRA,foraddressingunderlyinggrievances,andforthebenefitsthatwouldaccruetoconflict-affectedcommunities.41ThemediatoralsoarguedthattheAgreementsreachedinJubaare

wItness, sharInG the burden of the past: peer support and self-help amonGst former lord’s resIstanCe army youth(2008).

37 JustICe and reConCIlIatIon proJeCt, the CoolInG of hearts: CommunIty truth-tellInG In aCholIland(2007).

38 Annexureart.20.39 Wierda&Otim,supra note20.40 It isestimated thata thousandcivilianswerekilledby theLRAin theaftermathofOperation

LightningThunder,hundredswereabducted,andaround200,000displaced.SeeRonaldAtkinson,Revisiting ‘Operation Lighting Thunder’,the Independent,June9,2009.ThefiguresgivenbytheICCarehigher:with1250killings,2000abductionsand300,000displacementsinCongoaloneand80,000displacedand250killedintheCentralAfricanRepublic(“CAR”).SeeICC,TheOfficeoftheProsecutor,OTP Weekly Briefing Issue 26,Mar.1,2010.

41 ReportandRecommendationsoftheChiefMediatorofthePeaceProcessbetweentheGovernmentoftheRepublicofUgandaandtheLRA(June16,2008),available at http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace_agreements/Machar_Report_1.pdf.

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legallyvalidandnotprovisionalinstruments.Theywereallsignedorinitialedbybothparties.

B. The War Crimes Division and International Criminal Court Bill/Act

Intheaftermathofthenon-signatureofthefinalagreement,theGovernmentofUgandasetupaWarCrimesDivision(WCD)oftheHighCourtofUgandaasrequiredbytheAnnexure.42Mostrecently,onMarch10,2010,ithasalsopassedintolawtheInternationalCriminalCourtBill.Priortothat,intheabsenceofotherlegislation,itwasnotclearwhyLRAcombatantsshouldnotcontinuetobenefitfromtheamnestywhichcontinuestobeinforce.DuringtherecentfightingwiththeLRAtherehavebeenanumberofarrests,includingthatofCoronelThomasKwoyello.KwoyelloisnowchargedbeforetheGuluMagistratesCourtoncountsofkidnapwithintenttomurder.ThismaybecomethefirstcasebeforetheWarCrimesDivision.

Untilrecently,thelegalbasisforthejurisdictionoftheWarCrimesDivisionwasunclear.SomearguedthatthelegalbasisliesinUganda’ssovereignrighttotrycrimescommittedonitsterritoryorbyitsnationals.OthersarguedthatwhiletheconstitutionoftheWarCrimesDivisionwaspossiblebyadministrativeact,throughtheJudiciary,furtherlegislationwouldberequiredbeforeitcanbegintofunction.

A difficult issue for debate is whether the JubaAgreement prevents theWarCrimesDivisionfromtryingstateactorsorwhetheritcantryanyonewhocommitscrimeswithinitsjurisdiction.Article4.1statesthat“[s]tateactorsshallbesubjectedtoexisting criminal justice processes and not to special justice processes underthisAgreement.”43Thisiswidelyinterpretedtorefertothemilitarycourtsmartialunderwhich theUPDFareordinarily liable.But it isnotentirelycleartowhatextent theWarCrimesDivision isboundby theAgreement.However,politically,itishighlylikelythattheWarCrimesDivisionwillinthefirstinstanceconcernitselfwithcrimescommittedbytheLRA,evenifitsmandatemaynotberestrictedtotheLRA.

FourUgandanjudgeshavealreadybeenappointedtotheCourt.Anumberofthesejudgeshaveinternationalexperienceandsomepriorexposuretosimilarmechanisms. The suggestion has also been made to request the addition ofinternational judges to the bench, preferably from other common-law,Africancountries.Thiscouldbehelpfulinfurtherbolsteringtheperceivedindependenceof the Court.

Increasingly, discussion on the required legislation centered on the draftInternational Criminal Court Bill of 2006. Discussions were advised by an

42 Annexureart.7.43 Agreementart.4.1(emphasisadded).

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internationalorganizationcalledthePublicInternationalLawandPolicyGroup(PILGP). The gist of this initiative has been to amend the previously tabledInternationalCriminalCourtBillinordertocriminalizethecrimesfoundintheRomeStatute(warcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,andgenocide)aswellastoaddsomeprovisionsthatcovertheoperationsoftheWarCrimesDivision.44Asaresult,someofthediscussionsdriftedincreasinglyawayfromthepurposesofJubaandcenteredonICCimplementation.

IntermsofthesubstantivelawthattheWarCrimesDivisioncouldapply,threeoptionswereonthetable:

• Geneva Conventions Act, 1964.There is somedifficulty in applyingthis Act, in that it criminalizes only grave breaches of the GenevaConventions,whicharewidelyrecognizedonlytoapplytointernationalarmedconflict.ItisnotclearthattheLRAconflictcanbeclassifiedasinternational.AnargumentcouldbemadethattheprovisionsofCommonArticle 3, also included in this national legislation, sufficiently definethecrimes inUgandan lawsoas tocriminalizewarcrimes in internalarmedconflict.Nonetheless,thefactthatviolationsofCommonArticle3probablyarepunishableundercustomaryinternationallawonlybecameveryclearwiththecreationoftheadhocInternationalCriminalTribunalsin1993and1994.

• International Criminal Court Bill 2006.As described above, whilethisBilloriginallydealtmostlywithcooperationwith the ICC, recentamendments expanded it to implement Rome Statute crimes. TherewasmuchargumentabouthowfarbacktheBillcouldgoandwhetherapplyingittotheLRAconflictwouldviolatetheUgandanConstitution’sprohibitiononretroactiveapplicationofthelaw.45Somearguedthatthe“underlyingacts”ofcrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes,suchasmurder,abduction,orrapehavebeenprohibitedunderUgandanlaw,andthatonthatbasis,itwouldnotbeunfairtoconvictpeopleofwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity.Othersarguedthat theunfairnesscausedbyretroactiveapplicationcanbecuredinotherways,suchasthroughmitigatingsentences.

• Domestic criminal law. As mentioned, the Ugandan Penal Codecontainsanumberofoffensesthatcouldberelevanttotheconflict.Some

44 Theseprovisionswerelateromitted.45 ConstItutIon of the republIC of uGandaart.28(7):“Nopersonshallbechargedwithorconvicted

ofacriminaloffencewhichisfoundedonanactoromissionthatdidnotatthetimeittookplaceconstituteacriminaloffence.”Ontheotherhand,Article15(2)oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsstatesthattheprohibitiononretroactivityshallnot“prejudicethetrialandpunishmentofanypersonforanyactoromissionwhich,atthetimewhenitwascommitted,wascriminalaccordingtothegeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbythecommunityofnations.”

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havearguedthatitisnotsatisfactorytousethesechargesastheydonotadequatelydescribethewidespreadorsystematicnatureoftheconductinquestion.TheJubaAgreementstatedthattheCourtshouldfocuson“themostseriouscrimes,especiallycrimesamounting to internationalcrimes.”

OnMarch10,2010,theLegalandParliamentaryAffairsCommitteepassedtheInternationalCriminalCourtAct,incorporatingtheRomeStatutecrimes,anddatedit2002.

Some contentious issues in respect of theBill now appear resolved. Forinstance, there was a lot of discussion on the age of criminal liability. TheRome Statute puts the age of individual criminal responsibility at eighteen.UnderUgandan law, theageofcriminal liability is twelve.TheICCAct2010seemstoleavethisissuetoUgandanlawratherthanadoptingtheRomeStatutethreshold.46

Likewise,theissueofthedeathpenaltyunderwentmuchdiscussion.Anearlydraftproposalstated:“Thepenaltyforacrimeagainsthumanityisimprisonmentfor the remainder of the convicted person’s life or a lesser term of years, orotherpenalties as the courtmay impose.”The ICCAct2010 seems toupholdlifeimprisonmentasthemaximumpenalty.AsincountriessuchasRwanda,thiscreatesthecomplexitythatoffendersaccusedunderUgandanlawforlessseriousoffensesfacethedeathpenalty,whereasoffendersappearingbeforetheWCDwillnot.Inanycase,thereferenceto“alternativepenalties”thatwasfoundinJubaseemstobeoffthetable.

Itisalsonotclearwhatwillhappenwithlesseroffenders.DuringtheJubatalks, thepresumptionwasthatthenumbertriedwouldbesmallandthatmostof theLRAwouldnotbe tried.Since Juba, thishasbecomeconsiderably lessclear. TheDirectorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has already established aSpecialUnitstaffedwithanalystsandothermultidisciplinaryfunctions.ItisnowanticipatedthatcapturedLRAcouldbetried,eveniftheyarecomparativelylowin thehierarchy.TheJubaAgreementalsoemphasized the rightof individualsto cooperate with criminal proceedings through confessions, disclosures, andprovision of information. The Agreement stipulated that cooperation will berecognized in sentencing.47Relevant information for thispurpose includes thatconcerning the individual’s own conduct, details onmissing persons, and thelocation of landmines or unexploded ordinances or other munitions.48 These provisionsarenotreflectedintheInternationalCriminalCourtAct.

46 Atthetimeofwriting,apublicversionoftheInternationalCriminalCourtActwasnotyetavailable.

47 Agreementart.3.6.48 Annexureart.15.

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C. Prioritization of Formal Criminal Justice

In August 2008, the Government assigned the task of “developing andmanaging an effective transitional justice system for Uganda” to its Justice,Law and Order Sector (JLOS). JLOS represents a multi-donor approach todevelopingthejusticesectorasawhole.ATransitionalJusticeWorkingGroupwasestablishedunder thechairmanshipofJusticeJamesOgoola, thePrincipalJudge.Itiscomposedoffivesubcommittees:(1)formalcriminaljurisdiction;(2)truth-seeking;(3)traditionaljustice;(4)theintegrationofformalandotherformsofjustice;and(5)issuesoffunding.Thesesubcommitteesareworking,albeitatdifferentspeeds,andproducingpositionpapers.

Inpractice,leavingtransitionaljusticesolelytoasectorusedtodealingwithformaljusticehasmeantunequalimplementationwithanemphasisoncriminaljustice rather thanonother justicemeasures.Moreover,Ugandahas rushed toputtheWarCrimesDivisionandICCActinplacebythetimeithoststheRomeStatuteReviewConferenceinMayandJune2010inKampala,whichhasfurtheraccelerated the implementation of criminal justice measures over other, morevictim-orientedapproaches.

Asmentioned,theICCActeffectivelyonlydealswithcriminaljusticeanddoesnotaddressthequestionofintegrationbetweentheformalandinformaljusticesystems,suchastraditionaljustice.Acentralquestionremainsastowhethertheformal and traditional justice systems should be conceived of as parallel—i.e.functioningindependentlyandwithlittleinteraction—orashavingintegratedkeyfunctions,includinginvestigationsorsentencingmechanisms.

Therearesomeriskstoassociatingtraditionaljusticetoocloselywithformaljustice. If formercombatants think that theirparticipation in traditional justiceceremonieswillsomehowbeusedtopursueformaljustice,itmayhaveachillingeffectontheirwillingnesstoparticipate.Ifmorepeoplearelikelytoparticipatein traditional justice than informal justiceproceedings, itmaybe important todisassociate traditional justice from formal justice. In the context ofNorthernUgandaitisimportanttoacknowledgethatthetraditionaljusticesystemislikelynecessarytodealwithseriouscrimes,possiblyinlargenumbers.Severaloptionshavebeendiscussed in termsof the integrationofformaland informal justice,includingusingtraditionaljusticeastheentrypointtoformaljustice;49usingit

49 Somehavearguedthatthetraditionaljusticesystemshouldformanentrypointforallreturnees,sothateachwillfirstgototraditionaljusticebeforebeingstreamlinedtoothermechanisms,andthataninvestigationaspartoftraditionaljusticeshoulddeterminewhereareturneegoesnext.However,participationintraditionaljusticeshouldremainvoluntary,meaningthatnobodycanbe forced into it.Also, the investigations conductedby theSpecialUnit of theDPPare likelytoproceedquiteindependently.Inthissense,itisnotrealistictoconceiveoftraditionaljusticecarryingoutaso-called“classificationofthecrimes”asanentrypointtoanintegratedsystem.

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forthepurposeofinvestigations;50allowingtraditionalleaderstoattendthetrialsas“assessors”asispermittedtolaypersonsunderUgandanlaw;allowingLRAreturneestoundergotraditionaljusticeaftertheygothroughformaljustice;andtakingthewillingnesstoundergotraditionaljusticeintoaccountforsentencingpurposes.

ThesequestionsaroundtraditionaljusticestillhavetobeaddressedbytheTransitionalJusticeWorkingGroup.However,thedebatehasincreasinglyfocusedontechnicalaspectsofbothUgandanandinternationallaw,anditisdominatedbyadifferentsetofactorsthanthosethatwereinvolvedinJuba.Lawyersandtechnocrats have come to play an important role, whereas the politicians andcommunity-levelleaderspreviouslyinvolvedhavebecomeincreasinglyabsent.The forumfor thecurrentdiscussion isKampala,withaview toengaging theinternationalcommunityinadvanceoftheRomeReviewConference.Overall,thelegislativechangescurrentlyinplaceeliminatesomeoftheflexibilityindealingwithrebels,whichmightcomplicateanyfutureattemptsatnegotiations.

IV. ¿Challenging Complementarity?

A crucial part of Uganda’s attempt to put in place domestic measurescurrentlyistobeabletoeventuallychallengecomplementaritybeforetheICC.While currently the question is theoretical, it is also a political issue and hassparkedintenseinterestinandoutsideofUganda.Althoughthearrestwarrantsremain in place, Ugandamaintains the right to challenge the admissibility ofthecaseagainst thethreesurvivingLRAleadersunderArticle19of theRomeStatute.UgandaisentitledtodothisbecausetheRomeStatuterequirestheICCtodefer tonationalproceedingswhere statesare“willingorablegenuinely toinvestigateorprosecute.”51ComplementaritymaybechallengedbyastateoranindividualaccusedofcrimesbeforetheCourt.Article19statesthatinprinciplecomplementaritycanonlybechallengedonce,withsomeexceptions.ThisbasicallymeansthatUgandashouldonlychallengewhenitismostlikelytosucceed.

50 Ingeneral,thecriminalinvestigationofseriouscrimesisadistinctprocess,involvingconsiderationsthat shouldbedifferentiated from fact-findingor investigations thatmay takeplace as part oftraditionaljustice.TheDPPisrequiredtocarryouttheseinvestigationsinanindependentmanner,usingamethodologythatismulti-disciplinaryinnature—i.e.employinginvestigators,analysts,lawyers,expertsongenderissues,etc.Heislikelytobemostinterestednotonlyinthecrimesthemselvesbutalsointhecommandstructures,formsofliability,evidenceofthementalstateoftheperpetrator,etc.Thesecrucialdifferenceswouldseemtopointtotheadvantagesofproceedinglargelyseparatelyinthecaseofinvestigations.However,traditionaljusticeceremonieshaverealpotentialtocontributetotruth-seeking.Itmaybenecessarytodevisewaysinwhichinformationrevealedcanbecapturedandusedforothertransitionaljusticeprocesses.

51 RomeStatuteart.17.

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Complementarity is oftenmisunderstood, both because it is procedurallycomplicatedandhasnotyetbeenclarifiedinthejurisprudence.SomecommentatorstaketheviewthattheCourtwilllookatawiderangeoffactors,includingwhetherthedeathpenaltyapplies;whetherthereisadequatevictimparticipationorwitnessprotection;thelevelofcapacityofthelegalsystem;andwhetherthetrialcomplieswithinternationalfairnessstandards.TheysuggestthattrialsatthenationallevelwouldneedtobesimilarinstandardsandprocessasthoseattheICC.However,whilesomeoftheseissuesmaybeaddressedasgoodpractice,thisisnotwhattheRomeStatuteactuallysays.TheRomeStatutesetsalowerthreshold,namelywhether “due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its nationaljudicialsystem,theStateisunabletoobtaintheaccusedorthenecessaryevidenceandtestimonyorisotherwiseunabletocarryoutitsproceedings.”52Thismeansthatintermsofability,theCourtgivesconsiderabledeferencetonationallegalsystems.

Intermsofwillingness,theCourtmayexaminewhether“proceedingswereor are being undertaken or the national decisionwasmade for the purpose ofshieldingthepersonconcernedfromcriminalresponsibilityforcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.”53Forinstance,adisproportionatelylowsentencecouldbe an indicator of this.Other factorsmay be undue delay, ormore generally,whether “the proceedings were not or are not being conducted independentlyorimpartially,andtheywereorarebeingconductedinamannerwhich,inthecircumstances, is inconsistentwith an intent to bring the person concerned tojustice.”54

Thereareavarietyoffactorsthatmaymakeacomplementaritychallengemorelikelytosucceed.First,intermsofwhatisknownaboutthepracticeoftheICConcomplementaritytodate,itisclearthatUgandawouldneedto open an investigation in thosecases inwhichitwants tochallengeadmissibility.In theabsenceofnationalproceedings,underthecurrentjurisprudenceoftheCourtthecaseremainsadmissible.Furthermore,theICChasstatedintheLubanga case that “nationalproceedings[must]encompassboththe person and the conduct which is thesubjectof thecasebeforetheCourt.”55 It is not yet clear if this standard wouldbefollowedhere,but inorder to increase the likelihoodofasuccessfulchallenge, national prosecutors should examine the existing arrest warrantsagainstLRAleadersandtrytofollowthemascloselyaspossible,includingtheformsofparticipationinthecrimes.Themoreadvancedanationalproceeding,themorelikelyitmaybetosuccessfullychallengeadmissibility.

52 RomeStatuteart.17.3.53 RomeStatuteart.17.2(a).54 RomeStatuteart.17.2(c).55 Prosecutor v. ThomasLubangaDyilo,Decision concerningPre-TrialChamber I’sDecision of

10February2006andtheIncorporationofDocumentsintotheRecordoftheCaseagainstMr.ThomasLubangaDyilo,AnnexI,para.31,ICC-01/04-01/06(Feb.24,2006)(emphasisadded).

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Second,Ugandawouldneedtoarguethatthegroundsonwhichitfirstmadethereferralnolongerapply.Whenitmadethereferralitarguedthatitwasunabletoarrest theLRAbecause theywereoutsideof its territory.TheICCPre-TrialChamberfoundthatthecasewasadmissible,andnotedthat“theGovernmentofUgandahasbeenunabletoarrest...personswhomaybearthegreatestresponsi-bilityforthecrimeswithinthereferredsituation.”56Ugandawouldneedtodem-onstratethatithastheabilitytoobtaincustodyofthepersonsinquestion.57

Third,Ugandawouldneed toensure that itdoesnotappearunwillingbyhavinginplaceanalternativesentencingregimethatallowsfordisproportionatelylowsentences.UnderthecurrentICCAct,thisisunlikelytooccurasthecurrentdraftdoesnotincludealternativepenalties.

SomearguethattheUgandanlegalsystemlacksindependenceandimpartialityandthatitshouldnottrytheLRA.However,aspreviouslymentioned,Ugandawouldnotneedtodemonstrateindependenceandimpartialityonasystem-widebasisbutonlyinthecasesathand.TheadditionalinternationalscrutinyontheWarCrimesDivisionwillbehelpfulinthisregard.

Thematterremainsundecided.OnFebruary29,2008,pursuanttoitsproprio motupowerstoexaminewhetherthecaseremainsadmissibleunderArticle19(1)oftheStatute,thePre-TrialChamberaskedtheGovernmentofUgandaforfurtherinformationonrecentdevelopments.InitsMarch27,2008filing,theGovernmentofUgandastated:“ThespecialdivisionoftheHighCourtisnotmeanttosupplanttheworkoftheInternationalCriminalCourtandaccordingly,thoseindividualswhowereindictedbytheInternationalCriminalCourtwillhavetobebroughtbeforethespecialdivisionoftheHighCourtfortrial.”TheProsecutorhadarguedina submissionofNovember18,2008 thathehadnot identifiedanynationalproceedingsandthatthereforethecaseremainedadmissible.TwoNGOs,Redressand the UgandaVictims Foundation, submitted observations on the legal andfactualbackgroundoftheimplementationoftheAgreementandtheAnnexure.OnMarch10,2009thePre-TrialChamberissuedadecisionthatheld:

Pending the adoption of all relevant texts and the implementation ofall practical steps, the scenario againstwhich the admissibility of theCasehastobedeterminedremainsthereforethesameasatthetimeof

56 ICCPre-TrialChamberII,WarrantforArrestforOkotOdhiambo,para.27,ICC-02/04-01/05-56(July8,2005)(internalcitationomitted).

57 There is some ambiguity about the extent ofUganda’s legal obligations towards the Court inanticipationofachallenge.Forinstance,doesUgandaremainboundbyitsobligationstoenforcethearrestwarrants,orhowwillnon-enforcementbeperceived?Article95oftheRomeStatutestatesthat“[w]herethereisanadmissibilitychallengeunderconsiderationbytheCourtpursuanttoarticle18or19, therequestedStatemaypostponetheexecutionofarequestunder thisPartpendingadeterminationbytheCourt....”ItmaybethatUgandawouldbeentitledtopostponetheexecutionofthearrestwarrants,butitisnotentirelyclearwhetherthiscouldbedonebeforeachallengeisbrought.

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theissuanceoftheWarrants,thatisoneoftotalinactiononthepartoftherelevantnationalauthorities;accordingly,thereisnoreasonfortheChambertoreviewthepositivedeterminationoftheadmissibilityoftheCasemadeatthatstage.58

TheAppealsChamberupheldthePre-TrialChamber’sdecisiononSeptember16, 2009.59 An actual challenge to the admissibility of the case will remaintheoreticalforsometimetocome,but thedecisionlendsimpetustoputtinginplacetheWarCrimesDivisionandInternationalCrimesBillassoonaspossible.

V. The Views of Affected Populations60

TheUgandantransitional justicedebatehasgone throughhighsand lowsintermsofinvolvingthosewhohavebeenmostaffectedbytheconflict.Intheinitialstagesof theprocess,opinionsof theaffectedpopulationon transitionaljusticewere studiedmore extensively inNorthernUganda than inmanyotherpartsoftheworld.Asignificantnumberofsurveysandotherstudieshavebeencarriedoutonvariousaspectsof transitional justice.Keystudies include thosebytheUNOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights61 and a report on truth-seekingproducedbytheGuluDistrictNGOForumandtheLiuInstitute’sJusticeandReconciliationProject.62AlotofthesewereinitiatedduetoheightenedinterestbecauseoftheICCinterventioninUganda.

AsurveycalledForgotten Voiceswasconductedby theBerkeleyHumanRightsCenterandICTJin2005,aconsiderableperiodbeforeJuba.63Thissurveywas repeated in2007 ina report entitledWhen the War Ends, at theheightoftheJubapeaceprocess.64Bothofthesewerelarge-scale,representative,affected-populationsurveyswithapproximately2500respondentseach.Whensurveyed

58 Prosecutor vs. Kony et al, Pre-TrialChamberDecision on the admissibility of the case underarticle19(1)oftheStatute,ICC-02/04-01/05-377(Mar.10,2009).

59 Prosecutor vs. Kony et al,AppealChamber,JudgmentontheappealoftheDefenceagainstthe“Decisionontheadmissibilityofthecaseunderarticle19(1)oftheStatute”of10March2009,ICC-02/04-01/05-408(Sept.16,2009).

60 See alsoWierda&Otim,supranote20.61 unohChr, maKInG peaCe our own: VICtIms’ perCeptIons of aCCountabIlIty, reConCIlIatIon

and transItIonal JustICe In northern uGanda(2007).62 JustICe & reConCIlIatIon proJeCt, supra note 37. Other examples include oxfam, brIefInG

paper, the buIldInG bloCKs of sustaInable peaCe: the VIews of Internally dIsplaCed people In northern uGanda(2007);human rIGhts foCus, fosterInG the transItIon In aCholIland: from war to peaCe, from Camps to home(2007).

63 ICtJ & human rIGhts Center,supranote9.64 ICtJ & berKeley-tulane InItIatIVe for Vulnerable populatIons, when the war ends: a

populatIon-based surVey on attItudes about peaCe, JustICe, and soCIal reConstruCtIon In northern uGanda(2007).

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in2005,amajorityofrespondents(66%)saidthattheyfavored“hardoptions”indealingwithLRAleaders, includingtrials,punishment,or imprisonment.Only22% preferred options such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and reintegration.In2007, this statistichad reversed,with54%preferring softoptionsand41%preferringhardoptions.ThismayindicatethatduringtheheightofJuba,peopleweremorewilling to compromise on justice issues. The survey has not beenrepeatedsincetheendofJuba,butitcouldbethattheperiodofrelativecalmthathasprevailedinUgandasincethenwouldchangetheseperceptionsonceagain.

WhileanumberofthestudiesonNorthernUgandaused“peace”and“justice”intheirtitles,thegoalcouldneverbetodeterminewhetherpeoplewouldprioritizepeaceorjustice.Aswouldbethecaseanywhere,thepeopleofNorthernUgandawantboth.Still,somesignificantfindingsemergedfromthestudies.Mostvictimssupportcomprehensiveapproachestojusticethatalsoinvolvemeasuresforvictims,suchasreparationsortruth-seeking.Fromtheresearchworkthathasbeendone,itisclearthatpeoplealsodonottakeaneither/orapproachtodifferentjusticeoptionsbutwantanapproachofmultiplemechanisms.InUganda,wherethedebatehadbe-comeverypolarizedbetweentheICCandtraditionaljustice,thiswasasignificantfindingthatlentfurtherlegitimacytotheapproachtakenatJuba.65

Another important factor that emerged from the survey work is thatknowledgeoftheICCincreasedconsiderablyovertheyears.In2005,only27%ofrespondentshadheardoftheICC,whereasin2007thisnumberhadincreasedto60%.AmongthosewhohadheardoftheICC,manyexpressedsupport,therebychallengingtosomeextentthenotionthattheNorthwasuniversallyopposedtoit.Ontheotherhand,quantitativemethodologieswerenotnecessarilyeffectiveat testingwhether people understood theCourt. For instance, in 2007 55%ofrespondentswhohadheardabouttheICC(32%ofthetotal)stillthoughtthattheCourthadthepowerofarrest.OutofthosewhohadheardabouttheCourt,76%tooktheviewthatpursuingtrialsatthattimewouldendangertheJubatalks.

Besides revealing thevariedandchangeablenatureof localopinions, theresearch and subsequent consultations that formed a part of the Juba processassistedtofilloutthemenuofoptionsincludedintheJubaAgreement.Aconcreteimpactoftheconsultationsandtheresearchhasbeenthefocusonvictims’issuessuchasreparationsintheAgreementandAnnexure,andparticularlytheinclusionofatruthcommissionintheAnnexure.Butasmentioned,inthecurrentdebatesthese issueshave increasinglyslippeddown the listofpriorities.Currently theviewsoftheaffectedpopulationsareindangerofbeingneglectedinthewidertransitional justice process.

65 Sometimes the dichotomy between the ICC and traditional justice ismischaracterized as onebetween“Western-styleretributivejustice”and“Africanrestorativejustice.”ThisstarkdichotomybothneglectstherestorativeaspectsoftheICC,includingitsprovisionsforvictimparticipationandreparations,andtheretributiveaspectsoftraditionaljustice.

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Conclusions

Uganda’ssearchforpeaceandjusticehasattractedmuchattentionoverthelastfewyears.Ugandaisoneofthefirstcountriestogothroughafull-fledgedpeaceprocessunderthescrutinyoftheICCanditssupporters.Whileitmaybetooearlytodrawsweepingconclusions,afewtentativeonesarepossible.

For instance, while the arrest warrants of senior LRA leaders were acomplicatingfactorintheJubatalks,negotiationsdidnotproveimpossibleandproceededsomewaybeforetheybrokedown.ThischallengestheperceptionthattheICCitselfisanobstacletopeace.

Ontheotherhand,thepressureofthearrestwarrantswascarefullyutilizedatJubainordertonegotiateasolutionthatwouldseektoachieveacomprehensiveapproachtojusticeatthenationallevel.ThiswaspossiblebecauseUgandahadsomethingtooffertotheLRA:thealternativeofatrialatanationallevel,whichwouldhavenotresultedinimpunitybutwhichmayhaverenderedissuessuchaspenaltiessubjecttofurthernegotiationandmitigation.Thiswillnotnecessarilybethesameinothersituations.

AfurtherlessonfromUgandaisthattheinvolvementoftheICChashadthe tendency toskewthe justicedebateawayfromcomprehensive transitionaljusticesolutionsandtowardscriminaljustice.TheupcomingReviewConferencein Uganda has impacted the speed with which certain justice measures havebeenputinplace.WhileitisappropriatethatUgandadevelopsitsownabilitytoinvestigateandprosecuteinternationalcrimes,itshouldnotneglectaseriesofwiderconsiderationsthatmaybeatstake.

Thesewiderconsiderationsincludethepoliticalcontext.Forinstance,currentmovesshouldnotresemblevictor’sjusticeorelsetheymayfurthercontributetotheNorth-Southdivide.Second,futurenegotiationsmaystillbenecessarybutarecomplicatedby therecent legislativeproposals in theInternationalCrimesBillwhichdeviatefromtheJubaAgreement.Finally,peopleinNorthernUgandacontinue to desire a comprehensive approach to justice, which incorporatesmeasuressuchastruth-seeking,reparations,andculturallysensitiveapproachessuchastraditionaljustice.SincethepeopleoftheNorthhavebornethebruntofthisconflict,avictim-centeredapproachtojusticedemandsthattheirviewsareadequatelyconsidered.

The Impact of Hybrid Tribunals: Current Practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia

Olga Martin-Ortega & Johanna Herman*

A newmodel of justice administration emerged at the end of the 1990sthroughthedevelopmentofhybridorinternationalizedcourts.Thesecourtsarecomposedofamixtureofinternationalanddomesticstaffandapplyacombinationofnationalandinternationallaw.Now,tenyearsafterthefirsthybridtribunalswereestablished,theSpecialPanelsinTimor-Lestehavefinishedtheirwork,theSpecialCourtforSierraLeoneisenteringitsfinalstages,andtheinternationaljudgesandprosecutorsprograminKosovohasbeenhandedfromtheUNInterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to the European Union. TheExtraordinaryChambersintheCourtsofCambodia(ECCC)andtheWarCrimesChamber(WCC)intheStateCourtofBosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)arefullyoperationalandthishybridmodelhasbeensuggestedformanyothersituationswhereforvariousreasonsnationalprosecutionscannottakeplaceinaccordancetointernationalstandards,suchasNorthernUganda,Kenya,Liberia,orDarfur.

ThischapterlooksattheECCCandtheWCCandexaminestheirpracticeinlightoftheexpectationsthathybridtribunalshaveraisedintermsofpeacebuilding.Thischapterwillfocusparticularlyonthetribunals’impactontherebuildingofthe rule of law and the strengthening of public institutions in the countries inwhichtheyoperate,aswellasonthepublic’sperceptionoftheirwork.Itconsidersthe problems and ongoing challenges of the tribunals so far, in order to drawsomelessonsfortheirfutureworkandforthatofotherpotentialtribunalsinpost-conflictsettings.Theinformationandanalysisincludedherearedrawnfromfieldresearch conducted inBiH andCambodia duringAugust andSeptember 2009bytheauthors.Thisresearchincludedinterviewswithnationalandinternationalstaff at the courts,members of the judiciary and legal profession, staff of theUnitedNations,EuropeanUnion,internationalorganizations,anddonors,aswellasmembersofnationalandinternationalnon-governmentalorganizations.

PartIwillintroducebrieflythemodelofhybridtribunalsandtheirpotentialrole in transitional justiceandpeacebuildingefforts. InPart IIwewill lookat

* Weacknowledgethesupportreceivedfromtheresearchproject“JustandDurablePeacebyPiece”(no.217488),fundedbytheEU’s7thFrameworkProgramme,toconductfieldworkinBosniaandHerzegovinaandCambodia inAugustandSeptember2009.Formore information,visithttp://www.justpeace.eu.WearegratefultoChandraLekhaSriramandIvaVukušićfortheircommentstoearlierversionsofthischapter.

Chapter 10

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theestablishmentandworkoftheWCCandECCCandpresenttherule-of-lawcontext in each country. Part III evaluates thework of each court and reflectsuponwhethertheymaximizetheirpotentialpositiveimpactonthedomesticlegalsystemthroughcapacity-buildingandhowtheyaffectthepublic’sperceptionofruleoflaw.PartIVreviewstheriskfornegativeimpacts,andintheConclusionwesummarizethelessonsthatmightbedrawnfromthisanalysis.

I. Hybrid Tribunals and Peacebuilding Activities

Peacebuilding and transitional justice often take place within the samecontext and timeframe since they both concentrate on the post-conflict periodandtheneedsofarecoveringsociety.Analysisof thecomplicatedrelationshipbetweenthetwofieldshastraditionallyput theminoppositionintheso-called“peacevs. justice”debate.This discussion emphasizes thepotential disruptiveeffects that pursuing accountability in a post-conflict environment could haveonetheadvancementstowardspeace.However,agrowingpracticeandliteraturehighlightsthecomplementaritiesbetweentransitionaljusticeandpeacebuilding.1 Both ultimately aim to establish the basis for a democratic society compliantwithhumanrightsstandards,capableofwithstandingsocialtensionandavoidingtherepetitionofatrocities.This linkbetweentransitional justice initiativesandpeacebuildingactivitiesismoreexplicitregardingactivitiestorestoreoftheruleoflawandisexploredfurtherbelow.2

Since thegrowthofmulti-dimensionalpeaceoperations in the1990s, theinternational community now carries out a number of peacebuilding activitiesafter conflict to reconstruct both physical infrastructure and social structures.Peacebuildingeffortsfocusonanumberofactivities,includingthedisarmament,demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; security sector reform,repatriation of refugees; election monitoring; human rights protection; andreform or strengthening of government institutions. The rule of law has beena focus forpeacebuildingsince theearly1990sand ishighly important toUNefforts,asdemonstratedbythe2004Secretary-Generalreport,The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.3 Rule-of-law

1 See, e.g.,ChandraLekhaSriram,OlgaMartin-Ortega&JohannaHerman,Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding Strategies: Considerations for Policymakers,PolicyBrief,JustandDurablePeace,No.2,July2009,available athttp://www.justpeace.se;WendyLambourne,Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence,3 Int’l J. of transItIonal Just. 28 (2009).

2 This linkhasbeenacknowledged in theUNSecretary-General’s report,The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UNDoc.A/2004/61(Aug.23,2004).However,althoughtheyoftenoverlap,itshouldnotbeassumedthattransitionaljusticeactivitiesautomaticallysupportrule-of-lawprogrammingorviceversa.

3 Id.

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programmingaims toguarantee a justice and security system that is effective,professionalized,andcompliantwithhumanrightsstandards.4Activitiesdependon the particular country context but can include electoral assistance; reform,restructuring,andrebuildingofpoliceandlawenforcementservices;strengtheningoflegalandjudicialsystems;andreinforcementorrebuildingoftheprisonsystemand facilities.5Thenatureoftheactivitiesundertakenmeansthatrule-of-lawworkispartofalong-termstrategythatinvolvesawiderangeofactorsandsectors.

Hybridtribunalsfulfilloneofthemostimportantgoalsoftransitionaljustice—to achieve justice after conflict by prosecuting perpetrators of the most seriousviolationsofhumanrights.6Theyalsohavethepotentialtopositivelyinteractwithpeacebuildingactivities,particularlyrule-of-lawpromotionandjusticesectorreform.7 Hybrid tribunalsdevelopedasa response toboth thecostanddistanceof theadhoctribunalsandtheimpunityorbiasperpetuatedbydomesticprosecutions.Thesetribunalshavenotfollowedoneparticularmodel,howeverallarelocatedwithinthecountryinwhichtheatrocitiestookplace;havelocalandinternationalstaff;useasetofsubstantiveandproceduralnormsbasedonbothnationalandinternationalstandards;andarefinanciallysupportedinwholeorpartbytheinternationalcommunity.

Themixofinternationalanddomesticcomponentshasbeenseenasbettersuitedtoaddresstheneedsofcountriesemergingfromconflict8andashavingthepotentialtoachievethe“bestofbothworlds”intheattempttopromotejusticeafter conflict.9 The international element is thought to guarantee expeditiousprosecutions, impartiality, expertise, and compliancewith international humanrights standards and international criminal law.10 That they take place wheretheatrocitieswerecommittedprovidestheadvantagesofnationalstaffthatarefamiliarwiththelanguage,territory,andsocialbehaviorofthoseinvolvedinthetrialsandgreateraccessibilitytoevidenceandwitnesses.11

4 Onthedefinitionofruleoflawinthecontextofpeacebuilding,seeChandraLekhaSriram,OlgaMartin-Ortega&JohannaHerman,Promoting Rule of Law: From Liberal to Institutional Peace-building,in peaCebuIldInG and rule of law In afrICa: Just peaCe?, (ChandraLekhaSriram,OlgaMartin-Ortega&JohannaHermaneds.,forthcoming2010).

5 RobertPulver,Rule of Law, Peacekeeping and the United Nations, in peaCebuIldInG and rule of law In afrICa, supra note 4. In addition to criminal justice, peace operations engage in awiderangeofnon-criminalmatters,fromconstitutionalreformandlandtenuretocitizenshipandidentificationprocesses.Id.

6 Onhybrid tribunals ingeneral,seeChandra leKha srIram, olGa martIn-orteGa & Johanna herman, war, ConflICt and human rIGhts 195-213 (2009).

7 LauraA.Dickinson,The Promise of Hybrid Courts,97am. J. Int’l l. 307 (2003).8 Chandra leKha srIram,GlobalIzInG JustICe for mass atroCItIes: a reVolutIon In aCCountabIlIty

80(2006).9 BethDougherty,Right-sizing International Justice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court

for Sierra Leone,80 Int’l aff.311(2004).10 Antonio Cassese, The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against

International Criminality, in InternatIonalIzed CrImInal Courts: sIerra leone, east tImor, KosoVo and CambodIa6(CesareRomano,AndréNollkaemper,&JannKleffnereds.,2004).

11 Id.

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Fromatransitionaljusticeperspective,prosecutionsthattakeplacewithintheframeworkofahybridtribunal,andthereforeincompliancewithinternationalstandards,couldmakeanimportantcontributiontosocialreconstructionwithinapost-conflictsociety.Argumentsonthebenefitsofprosecutionsrangefromtheirroleinestablishinganofficialrecordofthecrimescommittedbytheindividualsontrialandotherfactspertainingtotheconflict;exoneratingwholecommunitiesof responsibility by individualizing guilt, and having a cathartic effect for thevictims.12However,somecommentatorsarguethatthereisnosufficientempiricalevidencetobackupsuchclaims.13Equally,trialscouldbedestabilizingpoliticallyifspecificcommunitiesorgroupsfeeltargetedbytheprosecutionsorifvictimsdonotfeeltheirgrievancesarebeingredressed.14

Fromapeacebuildingpointofview,thesetribunalshaveapotentialpositiveimpactonthedomesticjusticesystemandhumanrightscomplianceofnationalpublicinstitutions.15Advocatesarguethathybridtribunalshavethepotentialtoimpactnationaljusticesystemsbystrengtheningnationaljusticeinstitutionsandencouraging fairer processes.16 Furthermore, they could produce a significantspill-over effect, contributing to the promotion of democratic legal training oflocal staff.17 Capacity-building of national staff and the provision of betterfacilitiesandincreasedfinancialresourcesmayensurethatstandardsareraisedaftertheinstitution’sworkhasfinished.Theymayalsobeabletocontributetobroaderprogramsof legal reformin thecountry.18Theiractivitydoesnotonlyassurevictims,formerperpetrators,andthegeneralpublicthattherewillnotbetotalimpunityforthosethatareresponsibleforperpetratingwarcrimes,butalsoholding proceedings impartially and in compliancewith the law could have ademonstrationimpactonpurelydomesticproceedings.Thismayincreasepublictrustinjusticeandnationalinstitutionsandreinforcethedemocraticprocess.19

12 See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 1000 yale l.J. 2537 (1991); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59l. & Contemp. probs. 81 (1999);Michael P. Scharf,Trading Justice for Peace: The Contemporary Law and Policy Debate,in atroCItIes and InternatIonal aCCountabIlIty: beyond transItIonal JustICe 251(EdelHuges,WilliamA.Schabas&RameshThakureds.,2007).

13 See, e.g.,erIC stoVer & harVey weInsteInG, my neIGhbor, my enemy(2004).14 See, e.g.,Orentlicher,supra note12;Landsman,supra note12.15 OHCHR,Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts,

U.N.Doc.HR/PUB/08/2,at1(2008);JaneStromseth,Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies?,1haGue J. rule of law 87(2009).

16 JaneStromseth,Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?,38 Geo. J. Int’l l. 251,266(2007).

17 Cassese,supranote10,at6.18 Stromseth,Justice on the Ground, supranote15,at94-97.19 Stromseth,Justice on the Ground,supranote15,at92-94.

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But,asthischapterhighlights,itisimportanttorememberthelimitationsofinternationalizedcourtsandnotsetunrealisticgoalsorexpectations.20 What manycommentatorsseemtoforgetisthatfirstandforemost,theoverallobjectiveof these courts is to carry out criminal prosecutions. If their limitations arerecognizedandrealisticobjectivesset,hybridcourtsmaybeabletocontributetothebroaderstrategyofrule-of-lawpromotion—especiallywiththewiderangeofresourcesandexpertisethatisavailabletothem.21

II. The Hybrid Tribunals in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia and the Rule-of-Law Context

A. The Establishment of the Tribunals

The establishment of the WCC emerged from a firm decision of theinternationalcommunitywith theagreementofnationalauthorities,22 while the developmentoftheECCCwasamuchlongerandmoredifficultprocess.Theyare both national institutionswith international support; however, theWCC isconceived toultimatelybecomea fullyoperationalnational institutionwithoutany international presence.23Incontrast,theECCChasathree-yearmandate,withinternationalinvolvementthroughout,anditsjurisdictionislimitedtothosemostresponsibleforthecrimesoftheKhmerRouge.

Prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bosnia andHerzegovina(BiH)takeplaceatthreelevels:theICTY,theWCC,andnationalcourts—bothatthecantonalanddistrictlevel.24Togethertheywillhandleseveralthousandsofcases.TheICTYisscheduledtoceaseoperationsin2013.25Aspartof its completion strategy, the ICTY has been transferring its functions to thenational courts, including six cases concerning ten accused toBiH.TheWCCwasestablishedbothasaresponsetotheneedtoclosetheICTYandthefactthatpurelynationalprosecutionhadpreviouslycreatedseriousproblemsintermsof

20 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability, supranote16,at221-22.21 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability, supranote16,at221-22;Stromseth,Justice on the Ground,

supranote15,at94;OHCHR,supranote15,at2.22 Agreement between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http://www.hjpc.ba/secr/app-dept/app-mat/pdf/NewRegistryAgreementeng.pdf.

23 Id. The original agreement established the Transitional Council to advise and coordinate thetransitionoftheRegistryintonationalinstitutions(art.4)andprovisionstointegratetheRegistrystaff and property (art. 7).

24 TheDaytonPeaceAgreementestablished thecurrent territorial andadministrativedivisionofBiHintotwoentities,RepublikaSrpskaandtheFederationofBiH,andtheautonomousdistrictofBrčko.Eachentityhasitsowngovernmentalandjudiciarystructure.TheFederationofBiHisdividedintencantons.

25 See ICTY,Completion Strategy, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016.

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international justice standards and potential destabilization and aggravation ofethnic tensions in the country.26ItwascreatedaspartoftheCriminalDivisionoftheBiHStateCourt—itselfahybridinstitutionconceivedtobecomefullynationalover the courseoffiveyears.TheWCCwasofficially inauguratedonMay9,2005,openingforitsfirsttrialinSeptemberthatyear.TheultimatenationalnatureoftheWCCisaninnovationincomparisontothehybridpanelsinneighboringKosovoortheSpecialCourtofSierraLeoneandwasintendedtoensuregreaterdomesticownershipoftheinstitutionandthewarcrimesprosecutionprocess.

TheStateCourtwastobecomeafullynationalinstitutionfinancedbythenationalbudgetbyDecember2009.However,manycalledfortheinternationalmandateandsupporttobeextended.ThiswasmainlyduetoperceivedrisksfortheCourt, both frompolitical attacks and from the uncertainty over financingof activities. The issue became a highly charged political one with the HighRepresentative taking the executive decision to impose this extension. ThemandateofinternationaljudgesandprosecutorsattheWCChasbeenextendeduntilDecember2012.27

Theestablishmentof theECCCtookmanyyearsofdifficultnegotiationsover the nature of international participation.Prior to the establishment of theECCC therehadbeen fewattempts at justice forKhmerRougeperpetrators.28 Thequestionofaccountabilityforhumanrightsabuseswasnotreallyaddresseduntil 1997when a UN-appointed Group of Experts released its report on theaccountabilityforcrimescommittedduringtheKhmerRougeperiod.ThegroupfoundthatduetotheproblemsintheCambodiandomesticjudicialsystem—suchas government interference, corruption, and lack of capacity—an internationalcriminaltribunalwouldbethebestoption.29ThereportalsostatedthatthebestlocationwouldbeoutsideofCambodia.30

However,PrimeMinisterHunSenwantedtolimitinternationalinvolvementinatribunalandtheRoyalGovernmentofCambodia(RGC)refusedtocooperatewithanyformoftribunaloutsideofthecountry,leadingtoaperiodofdeadlock

26 Domesticwar crimes prosecution in the early post-war yearswere tinged by fears of partiality,especiallyinmono-ethnicterritories,wherenationalcourtslackedindependencefromthedominantnationalisticpoliticalpartiesandarbitraryarrestswerecommon.See, e.g.,human rIGhts watCh, JustICe at rIsK: war CrImes trIals In CroatIa, bosnIa and herzeGoVIna and serbIa and monteneGro (2004);osCe mIssIon to bIh, war CrImes trIals before the domestIC Courts of bosnIa and herzeGoVIna: proGress and obstaCles (2005).ThislackofimpartialitypromptedthecreationofasystemofICTYsupervisionovernationalprosecution,theso-called“RulesoftheRoad.”

27 OHR,Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Law on Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 19/09,OfficialGazetteofBosniaandHerzegovina,No.97/09(Dec.14,2009).

28 In1979PolPotandIengSarywerefoundguiltyofgenocidein absentiainwhathaswidelybeenconsidered a show trial that failed to follow due process. See SuzannahLinton,Putting Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers into Context,11sInGapore y.b. Int’l l. 211(2007).

29 U.N.,Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/135,paras.178-79,U.N.Doc.A/53/850,S/1999/231Annex(Mar.16,1999).

30 Id. para 171.

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in negotiations.31 Finally, the suggestion of a hybridmodel seemed to strike acompromise.32However, theUN and theRGChad very different opinions onthe hybrid tribunal, which set the scene for a further seven years of fraughtnegotiations.TheRGCwantedamajorityofCambodian judgeswhile theUNwantedaninternationalmajority.33TheUNhopedtoavoidasituationwheretheCambodianjudgescouldpotentiallyignoretheinternationaljudges,inordertoevadeanysortofundueinfluenceorinterferencebythegovernment.

FollowingaproposalfromtheUnitedStates,alldecisionswouldbemadeonthebasisofasupermajority.34ThesupermajorityrulemeantthatatleastoneforeignjudgewouldhavetoagreewiththeCambodianjudgesandtherewouldatleastbeabasiclevelofconsensus.TheUNwasstillnothappywiththis,butultimately,followingpressurefromanumberofmemberstatestocompromise,theAgreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic KampucheawassignedbytheUNandtheRGCinJune2003andapprovedbytheNationalAssemblyandSenateinOctober2004.

B. Composition and Functioning of the Tribunals

As these brief histories demonstrate, themotivations behind each hybridtribunalarequitedifferent,andthisisreflectedintheircomposition.TheWCCaimstoguaranteethatdomesticprosecutionisuptointernationalstandards,butitispartofawiderstrategyandanumberofhybridinstitutionsdesignedtostrengthentheruleoflawandbuildnationalcapacity.35Asexemplifiedbythesupermajorityrequirement,with theECCCaprimaryconcernwaspossiblereplicationof theproblemsofthedomesticsystem,suchaspoliticalinterferenceandcorruption.

TheWCC has five first-instance court panels and two appellate panels,composedbythreejudgeseach.Theinitialcompositionofthechamberswasoftwointernationaljudgesandonenationaljudge,whowasoftenthepresidentofthechamber,butin2008thischangedtooneinternationaljudgeandtwonationaljudges.This transitionwas planned from the beginning.36As of January 2010

31 Thomas Hammarberg, Efforts to Establish a Tribunal against the Khmer Rouge Leaders:Discussions between theCambodianGovernment and theUN13 (Paper presented at seminarorganized by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Committee forVietnam,LaosandCambodiaontheProposedTrialagainstKhmerRougeLeadersResponsibleforCrimesagainstHumanity,Stockholm,May29,2001)(onfilewithauthors).

32 Id. at 16.33 Id.at19.34 Id.at22.35 OtherhybridinstitutionsincludetheOrganisedCrime,EconomicCrimeandCorruptionChamber

oftheStateCourt,theHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC),theConstitutionalCourt,andthenow-extinctHumanRightsCommission.

36 OHR,war CrImes Chamber proJeCt, proJeCt ImplementatIon plan: reGIstry proJeCt report 8 (2004).

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thereareforty-onenationaljudgesandseveninternationaljudges.Internationalprosecutorsontheotherhandhavefromtheoutsetbeentheminorityinrelationto national prosecutors, although theHead of theSpecialDepartment forWarCrimesoftheOfficeoftheProsecutor(OTP)andDeputyChiefProsecutorwasuntil recently an international.37ThecompositionofboththeWCCandtheSpecialDepartmentoftheOTPrepresentsthemainthreeethnicgroupsinthecountry.38 TheRegistrywasoriginallyaseparatebodyunderinternationalleadership,whichwouldlaterbeintegratedintheStateCourtandiscurrentlycomposedbynationalstaff.Finally,theDefenseOffice,OKO,hadaninternationaldirectoranddeputydirectoruntilMay2007whenanationallawyertookovertheroleofdirector.

TheECCC’sPre-TrialChamberandTrialChamberbothhavefivejudges(threeCambodianand two international).For these twochambers to reachanaffirmativevote,fourjudgesarerequiredtomakea“supermajority.”TheSupremeCourtChamberhassevenjudges(fourCambodianandthreeinternational)withfivevotesrequiredfora“supermajority.”Inadditiontothetwoco-prosecutors(one Cambodian and one international), there are also two co-investigatingjudges (oneCambodian and one international).TheDefence Support Section(DSS),OfficeofAdministration,andVictimsUnithaveamixofinternationalandCambodianstaff.39

The ECCC’smandate is “to bring to trial senior leaders of DemocraticKampuchea and thosemost responsible for the crimes and serious violationsof Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom andinternationalconventionsrecognizedbyCambodiathatwerecommittedduringtheperiodfrom17April1975to6January1979.”40TheECCCbeganoperationinFebruary2006andsinceithasaverydifferentmandatetotheWCConlyalimitednumberofaccusedareon trial.Whilst theWCChas jurisdictionoveragreatnumberofcrimes—ithascompetenceoverthecrimescontainedintheCriminalCodeofBiH,whichspecificallycriminalizescrimesagainsthumanity,genocide,andwar crimes, inCambodia onlyfive individuals are on trial in theECCC.TheWCChas pronounced seventy verdicts, half of them in second instance,fromSeptember2005toFebruary2010,and118accusedhavecasespending.41

37 Alltheinternationalprosecutors,includingtheHeadoftheSpecialDepartment,lefttheOTPinDecember2010eventhoughtheirmandatehadbeenextendedatthelastminute.

38 TherehavebeencomplaintsthatthereisanoverrepresentationofBosniaksamongcourtstaff.ThefactthatmorestaffareofBosniakorigincouldbeexplainedindemographicterms,astheyarethemajorityofthepopulationinSarajevo,andtherearenoprovisionstosubsidizethemovefromotherpartsofthecountryofcourtstaffortheirfamilies.

39 The Defence Support Section is headed by an international: the Victims Unit is headed bya Cambodian national: and the Office of Administration has a Cambodian Director and aninternationalDeputyDirector.

40 Law on the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004,Ch.I,art.1.

41 DataprovidedbyPublicInformationandOutreachSection(PIOS)toauthorsinFebruary2010.

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ThisisverysignificantincomparisontothenumberofcasesdealtwithbytheICTY.42InBiHthereseemstobeanintentiontoprosecuteasmanyperpetratorsaspossible,withtheNationalWarCrimesProsecutionStrategystatingthat6000ofthemremainedunderinvestigationin2008.43However,inCambodiathereiscontroversyregardingattemptstoincreasethenumberofprosecutions.ThecaseofKaingGuekEavor“Duch”isknownascase001andtheotherfouraccused,IengSary,IengThirith,KhieuSamphanandNuonChea,willbetriedatthesametimeincase002.44

An interesting fixture of both tribunals is that they combine elements ofprocedure of both civil and common law jurisdictions. In BiH the reform oftheCriminalProceduralCodeintroducedelementsofcommonlaw,suchasthechange froman inquisitive criminalprocedure to an adversarial one, thereforeshiftingtheresponsibilityofmarshallingacasefromtheinvestigativejudgetotheprosecutor.Ithasalsomeantotherchangessuchastheintroductionofpleaagreementsorcrossexaminationofwitnesses,whichwerecompletelyunknownintheBosnianlegalsystem.InCambodiatheset-upoftheECCChasreflectedthedomesticcivillawsystem,andcertainelementshavebeenusedforthefirsttimeinahybridtribunal,whichmakethiscourtparticularlyunique.Theseincludethepresenceoftwoinvestigativejudges(inadditiontotwoprosecutors)andthepossibility forvictims toparticipateasparties civilesduring the trialor tofilecomplaints.TheECCCisalsoinnovativeinthatitcanawardcollectiveormoralreparationstothevictims.

C. The Rule of Law in BiH and Cambodia

ThewarinBosniahadasignificantimpactonthejusticesystem;therelocationofjudgesandprosecutorsdistortedthepriorethnicdistributionofprofessionalsandthenumberofjudgesdoubledbecauseofpoliticallyorethnicallyinterested

42 TheICTYhasindicted161personsandconducted120proceedingsin89casessince1993.ICTY Key Figures,http://www.icty.org/sid/24.

43 AccordingtotheBosnianNationalWarCrimesProsecutionStrategy,approvedinDecember2008bytheCouncilofMinistersofBiH,thereare10,000suspects,ofwhom6000remainunderactiveinvestigation.Itsfirstobjectiveistoprosecutethemostcomplexandtop-prioritywarcrimescaseswithinsevenyearsoftheadoptionofthestrategyandtherestofthecaseswithinfifteenyears.National War Crimes Strategy adopted by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 28 December 2008,reproduced in morten berGsmo et al., forum for InternatIonal CrImInal and humanItarIan law, the baCKloG of Core InternatIonal CrImes Case fIles In bosnIa and herzeGoVIna Annex2(2009).

44 DuchwastheheadoftheS-21prison,wherethousandsofpeopleweretorturedandkilled.Heis indictedwithcrimesagainsthumanityandgravebreachesof theGenevaConventions. IengSary,formerDeputyPrimeMinisterandformerForeignMinister;hiswife,IengThirith;KhieuSamphan,PresidentduringtheKhmerRouge;andNuonChea,thesecondincommandtoPolPotandknownasBrotherNumberTwo,haveallbeenchargedwithcrimesagainsthumanity,warcrimes,andjustrecentlygenocide.

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appointments.45Attheendofthewar,notonlywasthereamassivebacklogofcasesbut the judiciaryhadbecomean instrumentof ethnicdiscriminationbyimplementinglawsinabiasedandpoliticallyinfluencedway.46Theinfluenceofnationalisticpoliticalpartieswasnotoriousbeforeandafterthewaronsectorsofthejudiciaryandtheprosecution,whichwereopentocorruption.47Therefore,judicialinstitutionswerehighlydistrustedbythegeneralpublic.

Thepromotionofruleoflaw,evenifneglectedintheearlystagesofpost-conflict reconstruction inBiH,hasnowbeenon the internationalagendasince1998,whentheUNJudicialSystemAssessmentProgrammewascreated,andmoresystematicallysince2002whentheHighRepresentativepresenteditsstrategyforthereformofthejusticesector.48Themostimportantreformsincludedvettingandreappointmentofjudicialstaff, theestablishmentofindependentbodiesfortheappointmentandreviewofjudgesandprosecutors,thepassingofnewCriminalandCriminalProcedureCodesatthestatelevel,thepassingofalawonwitnessprotection,andtheestablishmentoftheStateCourtwithjurisdictioninthewholeofBiH.TheHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)wasestablishedasthestatebodyinchargeofappointmentanddisciplineofjudgesandprosecutors,includingtheinternationalssince2006.TheWCCwascreated,asaSectionoftheStateCourt,aspartofthiswiderjudicialreformofthecountry—inparticulartheeffortstoprovidethejusticesystemwiththetoolsandcapacitytoprosecuteandcarryoutwarcrimestrialsaccordingtointernationalstandards.49Therefore,theestablishmentoftheWCCwasnotexclusivelycreatedaspartoftheICTYcompletionstrategy.

Overthepastfifteenyears,Cambodiahasenteredaperiodofstabilitywithstrongeconomicgrowth.ThehugeamountofinternationalsupporttoCambodiaisreflectedinthe$5billiondisbursedbetween1991and2002.Despiteallthisforeignassistance, therearestillongoingpoliticalcrises:a lackofdemocracy,widespread corruption, a legacy of impunity, and a precarious human rightssituation.FollowingthedevastationcarriedoutbytheKhmerRouge, thelegalprofession in thecountrywasdecimated.50Very littlewasdoneuntil theRGCestablishedalegalandjudicialpolicyin1998focusingonstrengtheningjudicial

45 UNDP,EWSSpecialReport, JustICe and truth In bIh. publIC perCeptIons 8 (2006);MichaelH. Doyle, Too Little, Too Late? Justice and Security Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in ConstruCtInG JustICe and seCurIty after war248(CharlesT.Called.,2007).

46 Doyle, supra note 45, at 248; InternatIonal CrIsIs Group, europe report no. 127, CourtInG dIsaster: the mIsrule of law In bosnIa & herzeGoVIna(Mar.25,2002).

47 UNMIBiH-Judicial Assessment Programme, Political Influence: The Independence of the Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina,ThematicReport9 (Nov.2000).

48 OHR,Jobs and JustICe: our aGenda(2002).49 OHR,supra note 36. 50 rebuIldInG CambodIa: human resourCes, human rIGhts, and law 69 (Frederick Brown ed.,

1993).

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independence, justice, trust,andrespect for the law.51PrimeMinisterHunSenstatedthatruleoflawwouldbeapriorityfortheRGCinordertoestablishstrong,sustainablepoliticalpowerinsociety.52TheCouncilforLegalandJudicialReformwasestablishedin2002tomonitortheimplementationofthepolicyandprogramofjusticereform.53AplanofactionforimplementinglegalandjudicialreformwasadoptedinApril2005withthefollowinggoal:“Theestablishmentofacredibleandstablelegalandjudicialsectorupholdingtheprinciplesoftherightsoftheindividual, theruleoflawandtheseparationofpowersinaliberaldemocracyfosteringprivatesectorledeconomicgrowth.”54However,despitethesestrategiesand goals successiveUNSpecial Representatives of the Secretary-General onHumanRightsinCambodiahavecriticizedtheRGCforitspoorrecordonruleoflawandverylittleoftheirrecommendationshavebeenimplemented.55In2006theHighCommissionerforHumanRightsstatedthatcourtreformwasthemostimportantareainthecountryrequiringprogress.56

Although a great amount of resources have been devoted to rule-of-lawpromotion,57therearesevereproblemswithindependenceofboththeprosecutionandthejudiciary.Forexample,itiswellknownthatjudgesacceptbribesorhavetosubmittopoliticalinterference.Theproblemswithinthejudiciaryareemblematicwithinpost-conflictCambodiaandinherenttothewiderpoliticalsystemwherepowerisbasedonpatronage.58Thereisalsoaseverelackofmaterialandhumanresources.59Withsuchfundamentalproblemswithinthelegalandjudicialsector,thereisawidescopeintermsofworktoimpacttheweakruleoflawinthecountry.Infact,mostdonorsjustifytheirfinancialsupporttotheECCCbyclaimingthatitwillimprovetheruleoflawinCambodia.60

51 CouncilforLegalandJudicialReform,OfficeoftheCouncilofMinisters,Bulletin:LegalandJudicialReform,No.01,Oct.-Dec.2008,at8.

52 Id. 53 Id. at 4.54 Id. at 3.55 See, for example,U.N.HumanRightsCouncil,YashGhai,Technical Assistance and Capacity-

building: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for human rights in Cambodia, A/HRC/7/42 (Feb.29,2008);peter leupreCht, speCIal representatIVe of the seCretary-General for human rIGhts In CambodIa, ContInuInG patterns of ImpunIty In CambodIa(Oct.2005).

56 YashGhai,supra note55,para.8.57 There aremanyactivedonors in the rule-of-law sector.TheProgramonRights and Justice is

fundedbyUSAIDandimplementedbytheEast-WestManagementInstituteandtheAmericanBarAssociation,http://www.ewmi-praj.org.TheCambodiaCriminalJusticeAssistanceProjectisanAusAidprojectimprovingservicedeliveryacrossthelegalandjudicialsectors,http://www.ccjap.org.kh.UNDPhasanAccesstoJusticeprojecttobridgethegapbetweentheformalandinformaljusticesystems,http://www.un.org.kh/undp.

58 KheangUn,The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia, in beyond demoCraCy In CambodIa95(JoakimÖjendal&MonaLiljaeds.,2009).

59 Id. at 75.60 Forexample,Japan,thebiggestdonortothetribunal,statesthattheECCCprocesswillpromote

democracy,theruleoflaw,andgoodgovernanceinCambodia.EmbassyofJapan,Japanese Assis-tance for the project to enhance judicial process of the ECCC,Japanese oda news,June17,2008.

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III. Hybrid Tribunals’ Impact in BiH and Cambodia

A. The Impact of the WCC and ECCC on the Domestic Justice Systems

1. GeneralImpactontheJusticeSystem

Asystematicapplicationofthelawandcoherentjurisprudentialdevelopmentarekeytoestablishingregularizedproceduresandimplementingnormsinafairway.Inthissense,theStateCourtinBiHisplayingasignificantroleindevelopingnew judicial practice under the reformed criminal laws and procedures of thecountry,referredtoabove.Intheopinionoftheauthors,thishashadapositiveimpactinthejudiciaryasawholeandhasimprovedtheperceptionregardingtheapplicationrulesandproceduresinanimpartialandprofessionalway.However,suchimpactisdiminishedbythefactthatitisaveryspecializedcourtwithitsowncompetencesandthereforeunabletointeractonaday-to-daybasiswiththerestofthejudicialdomesticsystem.Also,theWCCappliesdifferentCriminalandCriminalProceduresCodesthantherestofthecourtsdointheprosecutionofwarcrimes.WhilsttheWCCappliesthenewreformedcodesthecantonalanddistrictcourtsapplythecriminalcodeoftheFormerYugoslavia.Additionally,tensionsandcompetitionover jurisdictionandresourceshavearisenwithrespect totheentitycourtsthatareinvolvedinprosecutionofhumanrightsviolationsduringtheconflictatthelocallevel,whicharetheonlyoneswhichwouldneedtohaveaworkingrelationshipwiththeWCC.61

InCambodia,theECCCfacesarealchallengeintryingtochangethecultureof theCambodiandomestic legalsystem.Thepoliticizednatureof the judicialsystemmeans thatmost judges are perceived to serve the interest of politicalparties.62Thereislittlelegalreasoninginvolvedinjudges’decisions,whichtendtobeveryshort,andtrialsofevenseriousoffensesmaylastonlyanhour.Therefore,manyinternationalobserversreportedthatjustgettingbasicmessagesacrosstothedomestic systemof fair trialprinciples, rightsof thedefense, andhow theprosecutionshouldpresentacasewouldbearealachievement.Inaddition,itwasreportedthatthelackoftraditionofwrittenlegalculturemeanttheexampleofthedraftingoflegaldocumentsattheECCCcouldhaveanimportantimpact.

Two issues however could diminish this potential positive effect. First,the ECCC and the national judicial system are not even comparable in termsof resources, which is relevant for assessing whether elements of the Court’sworkcouldbetransferredtothedomesticsystem.Forexample,theMinistryofJusticehas1%of theECCC’sbudget to run twenty-fivecourts in the country

61 BogdanIvaneševIć,ICTJ, the war CrImes Chamber In bosnIa and herzeGoVIna: from hybrId to domestIC Court(2008).

62 KheangUn,supranote58,at88.

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anditisdifficulttoenvisionhowreplicatingpracticessuchascomputerizedcasemanagementcouldbetransferredtothedomesticsystem.Second, thereportedlackofpoliticalwilltoimprovetheruleoflawonthepartoftheRGCinordertocontinueitscontrolofthejudiciaryisasignificantobstacletoanyprogress.63 This fundamentalblockattheexecutivelevelmeansthatanyattemptsbytheECCCtoimpacttheruleoflawmaymakesomepositivechangebutwillbeunabletobuilda“ruleoflawculture,”whichrequiresstructuralchange.64

The impact of the two tribunals on the national justice system has beensignificantlydifferentinbothcountries.However,bothexperiencesdemonstratethe difficulties in changing the legal culture or trying to form a “rule of lawculture.”65Equally,theyshowhowanyattemptsbyhybridcourtstoengagewiththe(re)buildingoftheruleoflawneedstoberealisticandnecessarilylimitedinscope,ratherthanexpecttoimpact“ruleoflaw”inabroadmanner.

2. Capacity-buildingandTraining

InbothBiHandCambodiaitwashopedthattheexperienceoftheinternationaljudgesandlawyers,someofwhomhaveworkedatotherinternationaltribunalsor courts of the highest levels in their own countries,would contribute to thetrainingofthejudicialandlegalprofession. Capacity-buildinganditsimpactonthedomestic system is anargumentput forth forhybrid tribunals ingeneral.66 Thiscouldpotentiallybedoneintwocomplementaryways:(1)theinternationalstaffsharesskillsandknowledgewiththenationalstaffwithintheCourtthrougheverydayworkingpracticesandspecificdepartmentalorinstitution-onlytraining,and(2)theinternationalstaff,andtheCourtasaninstitution,trainorengagewiththejudicialandlegaldomesticactorsoutsideof theCourt.Weexplorebothofthesemethodsbelow.

a. Capacity-building and Training within the Institution

Developing professional capacity in judicial institutions takes place boththroughformaltrainingandeverydayactivitiesandinteractionbetweenstaff.InBiHthepresenceofinternationalstaffhasbeenparticularlyimportantintermsofcourtmanagementandimplementationofthespecificfiguresthathavebeenintroducedanew in theBosnian legal system.Thegeneral feeling is that therehas been a joint learning process rather than a direct teaching exercise from

63 TaraUrs,Imagining Locally-motivated Accountability for Mass Atrocities: Voices from Cambodia,7 sur–Int’l J. hum. rts. 61 (2007).

64 Id.65 Jane stromseth, daVId wIppman & rosa brooKs,Can mIGht maKe rIGhts? buIldInG the rule of

law after mIlItary InterVentIons310-16(2007).66 Dickinson,supranote7,at307.

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internationals to locals. Nevertheless, some resentment has been expressed inthefactthatsomeoftheinternationalstaffthemselvesdidnotnecessarilyhavetrainingininternationalhumanitarianlawandinternationalcrimes.67

TheCourtnowhas itsownJudicialEducationCommittee,composedofsixnationalsandtwointernationals,withcompetenceovertheeducationalneedswithin the Court.68TheestablishmentoftheJudicialCollegemeantanimportantimprovement in training.69 Itwas createdon the initiative of two internationaljudgesin2006,andconsistsofannualspecializedworkshopsoutsideofSarajevowherejudges,legalofficers,andothercourtstaffcanworkandsocializetogether,promotingbothknowledgeexchangeandteam-building.TheissuescoveredbytheCollegesincludeefficiency,credibilityofwitnesses,andjurisdictionoftheCourt.Itisthenationalstaffthatselectsthetopicsofmostinterestfordiscussion.Thishasbeenanimportantexerciseofhandingoverresponsibilityfrominternationalto national staff.70TheDefenseSection,OKO,hasalsocarriedouttrainingbothforthedefenselawyersactingbeforetheCourtandmorewidely.

Early on at the ECCC there were training courses on internationalhumanitarianlawforjudgesandprosecutors.71TheECCChasalsobeenassistedbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative(OSJI)andtheAsianInternationalJusticeInitiative (AIJI),72 including training for national and international staff of theOfficeofCo-InvestigatingJudgesandOfficeofCo-Prosecutorsandtrainingoninternationalcriminallaw.73Importantly,attheearlystagestheytrainednotonlynationals,butalsointernationaljudges,asfewofthemhadexperiencewithotherinternationalizedtribunals.74TherehasalsobeenagreatdealoftrainingfortheDefenceSupportSection.

67 InBiH,threejudgeshadworkedasprosecutorsattheICTY,andoneotherjudgehadworkedwiththeUNMIKpanelsinKosovo.

68 InternationaljudgestooktheinitiativetocreateaJudicialEducationCommitteetotakeovertheorganizationoftheJudicialCollege.ThecommitteewasendorsedbythePresidentandsetupin2008,withinternationalJudgeWhalenasitsChair.Itmeetsregularlytodiscusstheeducationalneedsofthecourt,screensthemanyrequestsforfundingandtrainingoffersbydonors,developscriteria for who should attend trainings offered offsite and internationally, and also overseeseducationforthelegalofficers.

69 TheJudicialCollege,modeledaftertheVermontJudicialCollege,startedundertheimpulseofJudgeFisherandwaslatertakenoverbyJudgeWhalen.

70 In 2009 nationals took responsibility for the development and implementation of 50% of theprogram. In 2010 and 2011 the plan is to have internationals responsible for only 25% withnationalstotallyresponsiblefortheCollegein2012.

71 TrainingwascarriedoutinassociationwithUNDP,theRoyalSchoolofJudgesandProsecutors,andtheBarAssociationoftheKingdomofCambodia.

72 AIJIaskedtheECCCtocomeupwiththekeyissuesthatneededtobecoveredandthenbroughtin people from around theworldwith the corresponding expertise.TheOSJI also produced ahandbookoninternationalcriminallaw.

73 aleJandro Chehtman & ruth maCKenzIe, CapaCIty deVelopment In InternatIonal CrImInal JustICe: a mappInG exerCIse of exIstInG praCtICe,Annex19(Sept.2009).

74 Oftheseveninternationaljudges,onlyonejudgeandtworeservejudgeshadpreviouslyworkedatinternationalizedtribunals—UNMIK,ICTR,andICTY.

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Prosecution of war crimes is an exceptional practice of which very fewpersonnel have the required skills; therefore formal training may need to beaddressednotonlytonationalbutalsointernationalstaff.Itisofcoursedesirablethatinternationalstaffhavepreviousexperienceandknowledgeofinternationallaw, but if they do not have such a background training needs to be formallyorganized in that area as well as in the national laws and procedures, as hashappenedinbothcourts.Another insightfrombothcountries is thatanoverallstrategy for mentoring and in-house training is worth considering at the set-up stage and appropriate resources should bemade available to this end. It isessentialthatthenecessarybudgetfortrainingbeprovided,aswellasestablishingasystematicidentificationofthetrainingneedsoftheorganization.

The BiH case shows that dependency on ad hoc donor support fororganizing training can generate difficulties. On two occasions the CourtJudicial Education Committee refused funds from a donor who imposeda format of the Judicial College which the Committee considered was notconducive toachieving theexpected results.Asaconsequence, in2008 theJudicialCollege tookplace in-houseand itwas reported to theauthors thatthe experiencewas frustrating for judges and other court staff. In 2009 theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)hadtourgentlysupplyitsown funds to finance it in its original format outside of the capital and theeverydayworkingenvironment.

At the ECCC, the lack of systematic planningmeans that the individualdepartmentsdifferastowhattheyprovideforstaff.ForexampletheDSScarriesoutanumberofinitiatives,suchasweeklybriefingsforallstaffoninternationaljustice issues and trainings for the lawyers and case managers within DSS.75 However, other departments are not as well organized and such activities aredependentontheinitiativeoftheparticularheadofdepartment.

Observing both cases it is clear that the structure of tribunals can eitherhelporhinder theexperienceofnationalstaff.Ensuringaproductive,workingrelationship between national and international staff has been a challenge forotherinternationalizedtribunals.Forexample,theSpecialCourtforSierraLeonehasbeencriticizedfor itsfailuretoshareresponsibilitiesbetweeninternationalandnationalstaffandforinsufficientlyintegratingnationalstaff—withonlyafewSierraLeoneansinpositionsofhighresponsibility.76

75 ThemandateofDSS isquitebroadcomparedwithother tribunals. “The roleof theDSS is toensurefairtrialsthrougheffectiverepresentationoftheaccused.TheSectionisresponsibleforprovidingindigentaccusedwithalistoflawyerswhocandefendthem,andforprovidinglegalandadministrativesupporttolawyersassignedtoworkoncases,includingthepaymentoffees.TheDSSalsoactsasavoiceforthedefenceatoutreacheventsandinthemedia,liaiseswithothertri-bunalsandNGOs,runstrainingcoursesandorganisesaninternshipprogramforyounglawyers.”See DefenceSupportSection,http://www.unakrt-online.org/07_defencesupport.htm.

76 thIerry CruVellIer, ICtJ & sIerra leone Court monItorInG proGramme, from the taylor trIal to a lastInG leGaCy: puttInG the speCIal Court model to the test 30-33(2009).

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InBiH,thishasbeenlessofanissuesinceitwasalwaysdesignedtogiveaprominent role to thenational judges, shift thecompositionof thechamberstogivenationalsgreatercontrol,andthereforeincreasethesenseofownershipof the process. 77Ingeneraljudgesarereportedtohavegoodrelationshipswitheachotherandthereisacollaborativespiritofworking.AttheECCC,thesplitbetweenthenationalandinternationalsidemeansthathowtheyworktogetherdependsontheparticularcircumstances.Forexample,theworkontheproposedadditionalprosecutions(seebelowPartIV)wasonlydonebytheinternationalprosecution side, which is a lot of work for only half the department to do.However, staffwithin theDefenceSupportSection report that theyworkverywell together.EventheOfficeofAdministrationisstructuredin thissplitway,withCambodian staff reporting to theCambodian head and international staffreportingto the internationaldeputyheadof theoffice.Thisstructuredoesnotnecessarily facilitate integrationwhere it is not being actively promoted on aparticulardepartmentinitiative.78

Theaimofcapacity-buildingandtrainingbythetribunalsismostimportantlytohelpthenationalstaff.Inthisway,itcanbesaidthatbothcourtshavebeensuccessfulwith theirvarious initiatives. Internationalandnationalstaff inbothcourtsreportedtotheauthorsthatthenationalstaffhasbecomemoreconfidentandabletocarryouttheirwork.Althoughdoubtshavebeenraisedoverwhetherthe national staff in BiH has embraced the new working practices fully andwhethertheystilllackcertaincasemanagementcapacities,somemembersofthenationalstaffhaveexpressedtheviewthattheyarereadytotakeoverandthattheexperienceandknowledgeoftheinternationalsisnolongerneeded.InCambodia,itwasnotedthattheCambodianPresidentoftheCourthasbecomemuchbetterattakingchargeduringproceedingsandrunningthetrial.TheauthorswereinformedthatwhentheECCCfirstbeganitsworktherewasagapbetweenthenationalandinternationaljudgesintermsofknowledgeandexpectationsbutthatthereisnowacommonlanguageandtheirworkshouldbetermed“collaborative”ratherthancapacity-building.

77 Internationalprosecutors,onthecontrary,haveplayedamorevisiblerole.AsIvaneševićexplainstheyhavearguedmostof theRule11biscasesandhave jointlyprosecutedwith theirnationalcounterpartscomplexcasesrelatedto thegenocideinSrebrenica.IvaneševIć,supranote61,at11-12.

78 United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT), which represents theinternationalsideofthecourt,carriedoutanumberofexpertassessmentsandauditsthroughout2007,includinganevaluationontheECCC’scapacityforjudicialproceedings.Thefinalreportwasleakedtothepress,withnewspaperreportsstatingthatthedividednatureofthecourtwasdetrimentaltothefunctioningofthecourt.See, e.g.,ErikaKinetz,Another Delay for Justice?,newsweeK web exClusIVe,Oct.6,2007,http://www.newsweek.com/id/42429.

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b. Capacity-building and Training by the Institution to External Domestic Actors

Buildingthecapacityofnationalstaffwithintheinstitutionisperhapstheminimumthatcanbeexpectedfromthe twocourtsandfromanyhybridcourtingeneral.Ensuringthatnationalstaffmembers“learnonthejob”comesfromhaving good relationships between nationals and internationals, which is anobviousgoalforbothcourts.

However,theengagementwiththebroaderjudicialandlegalcommunitiesoutsideof the institutionshasbeenmixed.Thiswasa criticismof theSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,whichhasreportedlyhadminimalimpactonthenationaljudiciary,mainlydue tobeingseparated fromnational legal institutions.79 This couldbeseenasamissedopportunity,especiallywheretheneedsofthejudiciaryatnational levelwere soapparent, both in termsof resources andcapacities.80 TheexperienceoftheWCCandtheECCCdonot,atfirstglance,seemtohaveimproved upon this in terms of engagement with the wider domestic justicesystem.Thisreinforcestheneedforfutureinternationalizedtribunalstohaveamorecoherentstrategyonhowtointeractwithdomesticinstitutionstomaterializethealleged“spill-over”effectintermsofcapacity-buildingoftheinternationalinvestmentinmaterialandhumanresources.81

InBiH thisdeficiencyhasbeenbalancedoutby the fact that rule-of-lawreform in the country has included the development of specific institutions toundertake such tasks and several programs assure funding for it. The HJPCcoordinatescentralcomponentsofsupporttothejudiciary,andspecificjudicialand prosecutorial training centers have been set up to undertake capacity-building in both entities, including inwar crimes prosecution.82Thismakes itlessimportantthattheWCCortheStateCourt,ingeneral,participateindirectcapacity-buildingtotherestofthemembersofthejudiciaryandmoredifficulttoassertanyimmediateimpact.Newinitiativesareemerginghowever,suchasthe2009conferenceforentitycourtstaff inwhichnationalStateCourt judgespresentedworkshops onwitness protection andothermatters addressed in thepreviousinternalJudicialCollege.

79 CruVellIer,supra note76,at35-37.80 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability,supra note16,at266.81 SimilartotheotherinternationalizedtribunalsboththeWCCandECChavereceivedgreatsup-

portfromtheinternationalcommunity,bothintermsofmaterialandhumanresources.InBiHdonorspaynotonlytheinternationallawyersandprosecutorsbutalsoanarrayofinternationallegalofficersandinternsthatsupporttheworkoftheStateCourt,andtheWCCinparticular.InCambodia,UNAKRTprovidestechnicalassistancetotheECCCandistheinternationalsideoftheECCC.Foranorganizationalchart,seehttp://www.unakrt-online.org.

82 Fundinghasbeenprovidedforspecifictraininginthisarea,forexample,thethree-yearprogramfromUNDP(2008-2011)on“BuildingCapacitiesofCantonalandDistrictProsecutorsandCourtsinBiHtoProcessWarCrimes.”

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InthecaseofCambodia,theinteractionoftheCourtwiththewiderdomesticjusticesystemhasbeenquiterestricted.TheSupremeCouncilofMagistracyhastheauthoritytoappointjudgesandprosecutorstotheECCCandsomeobserversstate that that has been the extent of the interaction.Theremay beways fortheECCCtoengagewiththeRoyalSchoolforJudgesandProsecutorsor thenationaltrialchamber,butthesearestillattheideastage.83

Inbothcasesthebodiesinchargeofthedefensehaveplayedanimportantroleincapacity-building.InBiH,OKOsupportsdefensecounselactingbeforethe Court but also organizes trainings for other defense counsel, which areconsidered to have had important repercussions. In Cambodia, DSS has alsocarriedout trainingforother lawyers, trainingseveralhundredbetween2006-2008.84DSShasalsoconductedoutreachpresentationstotheNGOcommunityon defense rights and the context, structure, and laws relating to the ECCC.DSS’smandateincludestraining,andthedepartmentinterpretedthisobligationbroadlytomeanthattheycouldtrainlocallawyerstoo.Thisisahighlyimportantdevelopmentinbothcourts,sinceacriticismofotherinternationalandhybridtribunalsisequalityofarms,85andoftenrightsofdefenseareneglectedinapost-conflictcontext.Thisworkbythedefensesectionscanprovideagoodbasisonwhichtobuildknowledgeof theserightsandcontribute toacrucialaspectofstrongerruleoflaw.

Finally, it is important toconsider thecontribution that thenationalstaffcurrentlyworkingatbothcourtscouldhavewhentheyreturntotheirpreviousjobsorundertakenewones.Inthisregarditwouldbeimportanttoassessthelonger-term effect of training of national legal officers and trainees workingalongside international judges and international legal officers, given that theyarethefuturejudgesandprosecutors.However,inorderforcapacity-buildingofnationalstaffwithinthetribunaltohaveanimpactonthedomesticsystemthe“braindrain”needstobeavoidedwithformercourtstaffactuallystayinginthecountry.86Whethernational lawyers, judges,andprosecutorswillreturntothedomesticjudicialsystemwiththeirnewlyacquiredskillsisaquestionthatwillneedtobetakenupinthefuture.87

83 Ideas suggested to theauthors includedusing the judgmentsanddetentionordersat theRoyalSchoolforJudgesandProsecutors,bringingthenationaltrialchambertowatchthejudgmentfortheDuchtrial,andsomeprivateuniversitiesmaytakethejudgmentstodiscussinclass.

84 Thiswas supported by the International BarAssociation, British Embassy, andUniversity ofBerkeley.

85 Cassese,supra note10,at10.86 Onthepotentialimpactsofbrain-draininSierraLeonesee,ChandraLekhaSriram,Wrong-sizing

International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone, 29fordham Int’l l.J. 472, 502-03(2006).

87 InBiHtherehasbeenconcernovertheincentivefornationalstaffstayingattheCourtaftertheinternationalshaveleftgiventhecontinuouspoliticalattacksandthelackofeconomicsupportfortheirrelocationtoSarajevo.

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B. Improving Understanding of the Rule of Law and Trust in Institutions

Conflictendedinbothcountrieslessthantwentyyearsago,butthesituationineachisquitedifferent.MostofthepopulationinBiHhasbeenaffectedbytheconflict.Manypoliticiansactivetodayplayedaroleduringtheconflictandpoliticaldiscourse isverypolarizedwithconstantappeals tounderlying resentments.Agenerationofyoungprofessionalshasbeenparticularlytraumatizedbytheeventstheylivedasteenagers;whilsttoday’syoungerpeopleseemdisaffectedtowardsthepast.Cambodiaontheotherhand,wasinconflictuntilthemid1990s,buttheKhmerRougeperiod,onwhichtheECCCisfocused,endedin1978.Sixty-eightpercentofthepopulationisunderthirtyandhasnomemoryorknowledgeoftheatrocitiesperpetratedbytheKhmerRouge.88Itwasthereforeobviousfromquiteearlyonthataconcertedoutreachstrategywouldbeneededtoensurethatyoungpeoplewhowerenotaliveduringtheperiodwouldfeelengaged.

TheICTYandICTRwerecriticizedfor their lackofoutreachand itwashopedthatthehybridtribunalswouldbeatanadvantagebecauseoftheirlocationsinsidetherelevantcountries.89ItisthereforeimportanttoevaluatetheWCCandECCCtoseewhethertheyhaveimprovedupontheperformanceoftheadhocandother internationalized tribunals.Theultimategoalof these tribunals is toprosecutethoseresponsibleforthemostseriouscrimesandtorenderjusticefortheirvictims.Buttheycanhaverelatedeffectswithregardtothetrustofthewiderpopulationintheirworkbothasjusticeinstitutionsandmorebroadlyaspublicinstitutionsandrepresentativesoftheruleoflaw.

First, theworkof these institutions can send thepowerfulmessage thatnewsafeguards are inplace andoldpattersof impunity andexploitationareno longertolerated.90Second,theycangeneratedemandfromsocietyforaccountabilitynormsandproceedings.91Theextenttowhichboththevictimsandthewiderpopulationperceivetheinstitutionsaslegitimatedependsbothontheirtransparentandaccountableinternalfunctioningandtheircapacitytodemonstrateandconveythisaspectoftheirwork.92

InBiHtheCourthashadtoactinanenvironmentofdistrusttowardsthejudiciaryasawholeanddisillusionmentovertheworkoftheICTY.93 The presence

88 phuonG pham et al., u.C. berKeley human rIGhts Center, so we wIll neVer forGet: a populatIon-based surVey on attItudes about soCIal reConstruCtIon and the extraordInary Chambers In the Courts of CambodIa2(2009).

89 See, e.g.,MirkoKlarin, The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugosla-via,9J. Int’l CrIm. Just. 89(2009);VictorPeskin,Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme,3J. Int’l CrIm. Just. 950 (2005).

90 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability,supra note15,at262.91 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability,supra note15,at264.92 See Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability,supra note15,at263.93 In aUNDP surveypublished in 2006,most people responded that theydistrusted the judicial

systemoverall;almosthalfbelievedinneitherthelawsnorthejudgesapplyingthem,andtwenty

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oftheinternationalstaffhasbeenessentialtoprovideanauraoflegitimacy.94Evenif theStateCourt iscriticizedbygroupsthatattempttopoliticallymanipulateitseverydecision,aswillbediscussedbelow,theauthorsweretoldthatthereisageneralperception that this isan independentandimpartial institution.InCambodia,therearesignsthatthereissomeimpactfromtheworkoftheECCConcommunicatingtheimpartialityandeffectivenessoftheinstitution.Arecent2009opinionsurveybytheHumanRightsCenterattheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley found that 87% of those who had some knowledge of the ECCCbelievedthatitwouldrespondtothecrimescommitted,95comparedtoonly36%thatrepliedthattheytrustedthenationalcriminaljusticesystem.96

The role of outreach is crucial in terms of public perception and isconsideredmoreandmoreanimportantcomponentofprosecutorialinstitutions.FollowingtheexampleoftheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,bothcourtshaveasectiondevotedtoPublicAffairsorInformation.97TheStateCourtincorporatedoutreachaspartofitsbudgetfromthebeginning,inclearresponsetothelessonslearnedfromtheICTYexperience.98TheStateCourthasaPublicInformationandOutreachSection(PIOS),andtheOTPhasitsownpublicrelationsdepartment,calledthePressOffice,whoseworkislimitedtorelationswiththemedia.99 It has beenpointedouthowever,thattheoutreachoftheWCChasnotbeenaseffectiveasitcouldbe,bothduetothelackofstaffinPIOSresultinginalimitedcapacitytoimplementcertainactivities100andinternalbattlesfortheextra-legalfunctionsof the Court.101

The Public Affairs office of the ECCC has Public Information, MediaRelations,andOutreachdepartments.SincetheECCCissofarawayfromPhnomPenh,thereisasecondPublicAffairsofficetheresothattheCourtismoreaccessible

percentofthoseinterviewedexpressedfaithinthelawbutnotinthejudges.PublicperceptionsoftheICTYanditsperformancedifferedgreatlybetweenthetwoentities;butevenintheFederationasignificantsegmentofthepopulationconsideredthatithasnotdoneagoodjobbutwasnece-ssary.TheStateCourtfaced,beforeitstarteditswork,thedifficultchallengeofapopulationnotparticularlyconfidentinitsabilitiesandasignificantfractionconsideringthatitwouldnotmakeany difference. undp, supra note45,at15-16.

94 IvaneševIć,supranote61,at11.95 phuonG pham et al.,supra note88,at3. 96 phuonG pham et al.,supra note88,at4.97 TheSpecialCourtforSierraLeonehasadedicatedoutreachsectionstaffedbySierraLeonean

nationalsandanetworkofDistrictOutreachOfficers.See raChel Kerr & JessICa lInColn, the speCIal Court for sIerra leone: outreaCh, leGaCy and ImpaCt - fInal report11(Feb.2008).

98 LaraNettelfield,Localizing War Crimes Prosecutions: The Hague to Sarajevo and Beyond, in CourtInG demoCraCy In bosnIa and herzeGoVIna: the haGue trIbunal’s ImpaCt In a postwar state(LaraNettelfielded.,forthcoming2010).

99 InformationonthedifferentdepartmentsoftheProsecutor’sOfficeisavailableatitshomepage,http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba.

100 Id. 101 ThefactthattheCourtSupportNetworkproject,referredtobelow,lostfinancialsupportfromthe

Registryatonepoint,illustratesoneoftheseobstacles.Nettelfield,supra note98.

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tothepublic.Thisisaninitiativethatcouldbereplicatedinothercountrieswhererelevantbecauseitprovideseasieraccesstocourtstaff.BoththePIOSatWCCandPublicAffairsofficeatECCCaimtocommunicatewithnationalandinternationalmediaandthegeneralpublictoencourageawiderunderstandingoftheirworkandageneralawarenessofitsimportance.Thecourtshavetriedtouseanumberofreportsandpublicationstoexplaintheirworktothepublic.InBiHPIOSproducesabookletontheweeklyactivitiesandtheRegistrypublishedabrochurein2007oftheworkoftheCourt,bothinEnglishandBosnian.102Courtroomaudiorecordingsareavailableuponrequest.ThePublicAffairsofficeattheECCCproducesacourtreporteverymonthandhaspublishedabookletexplainingtheworkoftheCourt.103 Ithasalsodistributedpostersacrossthecountryclarifyingwhowillbeprosecutedandthefactthatbothinternationalandnationaljudgeswillhavetoagree.104 The PublicAffairsofficehasalsoproducedliteratureforthosewhovisitthetrial,bothinKhmerandinEnglish.TheseinformationsheetsdescribethebackgroundtotheDuchtrialandalsoincludephotosofallthelawyersandjudgesinvolvedwiththetrialandtheirbios.Thereareweeklypressbriefingsandsometimestheaudioisavailableonline.

1. Media,CivilSocietyandGeneralPublicEngagement

Thevariousstrategiesofopeningthecourtstothegeneralpublic,suchasproducingpublications andproviding recordingsneed to take into account thechallengesofreachingthepopulationandtheneedsofthepublic.Issuessuchastheliteracyrateofthepopulation,theaccessibilitytothelocationofthecourts,andthegeneralawarenessofthelegalproceduresneedtobeaddressedwithspecificmediaoutreachstrategies.SimilartotheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,whichengagedwithradioandevencarriedouttrainingtopromoteeffectivereportingoftheCharlesTaylortrial,105boththeECCCandWCChavebuiltrelationshipswiththemedia.

InBiH,themainstreammediahasnotpaidgreatattentiontothetrialsandinterestinwarcrimesreportingisdecreasing.106Themainstreammediatendsto

102 TheEnglishbrochure,The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Registry 2007,isavailableathttp://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/brosura/brosura_eng.pdf.

103 The English publications of the Public Affairs office are available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/publications.aspx.

104 Posterslogansare:“EverydecisionmusthavethesupportofbothCambodianandInternationaljudges”;“Everyonecanbeinvolvedintheprocess”;“It’stimefortherecordtobesetstraight”;and“OnlytheseniorKhmerleadersandthosemostresponsibleforcommittingseriouscrimeswillbetried.”Theposterseriesisavailableathttp://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/publications.poster.aspx.

105 Kerr & lInColn,supranote97,at16-17.106 This seems to be a regional trend, with commercial media in Croatia and Serbia also losing

interest. See Decreasing Interest in War-crimes Reporting, BIRN,Sept.3,2009,http://www.bim.ba/en/1/40/21972.

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focus only on scandals that undermine the credibility of theCourt.Theworkof a specialized organization that reports on the trials, the Balkan InitiativeReportingNetwork(BIRN)ofBiH,hasmadeasignificantcontributiontopublicinformationonthefunctioningoftheStateCourtingeneralandontheindividualtrialsinparticular.ThroughitsJusticeReportprogramitcoverseverysingletrialbeforetheWCC.Ithasstartedaradioprogram,RadioJustice,andaTVshow,TVJustice,tobringtheworkoftheWCCclosertothepublic.107BIRNhasalsoorganizedtwoconferencesinSarajevoontheroleofthemediareportingonwarcrimes.ThelatestoneonTransparencyoftheCourtsandResponsibilityoftheMediawasattendedbyregionalrepresentativesofcourtsprosecutingwarcrimes,publicinformationoffices,internationaldonorsandorganizations,themedia,andcivil society.Even if themediahasopenaccess to theCourt, therehavebeencomplaintsaboutthelackofavailabilityofjudgesandprosecutorsforcommentaswellaslackofaccesstodocuments,videorecordings,andphotographs.108

InCambodia, there are a numberof initiatives carriedout byNGOsandinternational organizations to ensuremedia coverage.TheAIJI andEast-WestCenterprepareaweeklyreport“Duchontrial”thatisbroadcasttotwotothreemillion people onChannel CTN everyMonday during lunchtime.109TheAIJIalsoproducedathree-parteducationalprogramcalled“TimeforJustice”,whichwaswidelyshownbeforethetrialstarted.110ThereareanumberoforganizationsmonitoringandprovidingexpertcommentaryontheDuchtrialandtheECCCingeneral.Amongthese,theCambodiaTribunalMonitorandOSJIarethemostac-tiveinprovidingsummariesofproceedingsandlegalanalysis.111

Importantly, both courts have had to rely upon the work of NGOs tomaximizetheirimpactduetolackofresources.Theirexperienceshowsthatsuchrelationshipsshouldbedevelopedearlytoensureafruitfulengagement.AtaveryearlystageinBiH,theStateCourtapproachedseveralNGOstoestablishanetworkofcivilsocietyorganizationswiththepurposeofcreating“suchaclimatethatwillbemotivatingforallcitizensacrosscommunitiesandinwhichcitizenswillrelatetothejudicialsysteminBiHwithatrust,whichthiscountryenormouslylacks.”112 Thenetworkhas four regional informationcenters,whichwork independently

107 ForJusticeReportandTVJustice,seehttp://www.bim.ba.108 See,forexample,Public Outreach Section Letter, BIRN,postedOct.28,2009,http://www.bim.

ba/en/1/40/23238, where the Association of Court Reporters states that the selectiveness thattheCourtshowsinprovidingphotographstothereportersunderminestheircapacitytoprovideinformationtothegeneralpublicabouttheproceedings.

109 ExamplesofthebroadcastsareavailableattheTimeForJustice,Cambodiawebsite,http://forum.eastwestcenter.org/Khmer-Rouge-Trials.

110 Id. 111 CambodiaTribunalMonitor,http://www.cambodiatribunal.org;OSJI,http://www.soros.org.112 WebsiteofCentre forCivil Initiatives (CII), http://www.ccibh.org (follow“PresentActivities”;

“TheCourtBiHSupportNetwork”).TheCIIisinchargeoftheCourtSupportNetworkinformationofficeinMostar.

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oftheCourtandserveasalinkwithcitizens.Itiscomposedofextremelyvariedorganizations.113 There is however no public information on specific activitiesundertaken,whichmakestheimpactofthisinitiativeverydifficulttoassess.

InCambodia,theCenterforSocialDevelopment(CSD),anationalNGO,heldanumberofcommunityforumstoinformthepublicabouttheCourt.114ManystaffmembersfromtheECCCwerepresentattheseevents,notjustfromPublicAffairs, but alsoDSS staff and international or national co-prosecutors.OtherNGOs such asAssociation for HumanRights andDevelopment in Cambodia(ADHOC)andtheDocumentationCenterofCambodia(DC-Cam)havecarriedoutsimilaroutreachactivities.115

However,therehasbeencriticismthattheECCChasreliedtoomuchuponexternalactivitiesratherthancarryingoutitsownactivities.ThePublicAffairsoffice has been unable to carry out a comprehensive strategy due to financialconstraints.However, itgainedadditional staff in2009andadditional fundingforoutreach,which shouldhelp to improve itswork in the future.Even if theinitiatives at both courts showgoodpractice, they alsounderline that it is notenoughfortheoutreachsectionstomerelyrelyonNGOstocreateandpromotepublicawarenessandpositiveengagement.Specificactivitiesandinitiativesarenecessarysothatcivilsocietyandthegeneralpublicareengaged.

The public’s interest in the work of the WCC and ECCC has beensomewhatdifferent.Publicengagement is important as it allowspeople to seethe accountability in action, improvesunderstandingof theprocess, andcouldpotentially stimulate demand for fair trials. For this reason, it is important tothinkabouthowtoopenthecourtroomdoors,bothphysicallyandvirtually,andpromoteattendanceandengagementfromearlyon.Bothcourtshavebeenquitesuccessfulinsettingupwebsitesandkeepingthemuptodate,andtheresourcesavailablethereareveryvaluable.116TheECCChasalsonowsetupaFacebookand Twitter account.117

InBiH,thepromotionofattendancetothetrialsbythegeneralpublicwasnotreallyconsidered.TheCourtiscompletelyopentothepublicandthescheduleoftheongoingtrialsisupdateddailyinthewebsite.However,Bosniansocietyhas

113 Id.AsIvaneševićstates,thereisnorestrictiononmembershipandtheNGOsvaryconsiderably,fromsocialwelfareproviderstovolleyballteams.IvaneševIć,supranote61,at36.

114 Duetointernalmanagementproblemswithintheorganization,thesestoppedmid-2009andfutureactivitiesseemeduncertain.

115 Under its Khmer Rouge Trials and International Criminal Court program, ADHOC providesinformation on the ECCC and ICC nationwide. DC-Cam holds meetings under its VictimParticipation project, which briefs communities on the proceedings and developments of theECCCaswellastheirrighttoparticipate.

116 AsNettelfieldpointsoutinrelationtotheBiHStateCourtwebsite,theinformationismoreup-to-datethanthewebsitesofthecourtsofWesternnations.Nettelfield,supra note98.

117 ECCCFacebookpage,http://www.facebook.com/krtribunal;ECCCTwitteraccount,http://twitter.com/krtribunal.

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notdemonstratedapressinginterestinfollowingthetrials,andthegeneralpublicis rarelypresent in the trials.Mostdays theonlyattendance isBIRNreportersandOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operation inEurope(OSCE)warcrimesmonitors,andoftentherearemoreforeignresearchersthanlocalcitizens.118 On manyoccasions,thelimitedinterestofthegeneralpublicinthetrialsinBiHhasbeenblamedonfatigueoftheBosniancivilsocietywithwar-relatedthemes.119

InCambodia,althoughthebeginningof theDuchtrialwasnotverywellattended,bytheendofAugust2009over20,000peoplehadattendedthehearings,whichisveryhighcomparednotonlytoBiHbutalsotootherinternationalizedtribunals. TheinitiallackofattendancewaspartlyduetothelocationoftheCourt,whichissixteenkilometersoutsideofPhnomPenh.However,afewweeksintothetrialbusestotheCourtwereorganizedandwidelypublicizedbythePublicAffairssection.Currently,courtsessionsareattendedby500people,withmanygettingupintheearlyhoursofthemorningtoreachtheCourt.120

Similarprogramscouldbeimplementedtoencourageattendancebothforother internationalized courts and truth commission hearings. However, it isimportanttorememberthatafullcourtroomisnotenough.BeyondthepeopleattendingthetrialsinCambodia,around20%ofthepopulationiswatchingtheTVprogram“DuchonTrial.”121Althoughthisisarealachievement,thereisstillalargeproportionofthepopulationwhomaynotreallyknowwhatisgoingonorbekeepingupwithdevelopments.ThisdemonstratesthechallengesposedbyayouthfulpopulationaswellasverypressingdailyneedsinCambodia,suchaspovertyandcurrenthumanrightsabuses.122

It is too early to properly assess the impact of the outreach strategy ineithercountry;however,theexperiencesofar,intheseandothercourts,showshownecessaryitistohaveastrategyinplaceearlyandtoberealisticabouttheresourcesavailable.Ifthisisnotdone,outreachactivitieswillnotstartintimetohavethefullimpactthattheycouldpotentiallyhave.

118 See Nettelfield,supra note98.119 IvaneševIć,supranote61,at33.120 For theclosingstatements in theDuchtrial, forwhich therewaswide interest, themajorityof

seats were allocated to the parties civilesandthegeneralpublic,andtherestwasdividedbetweennationalandinternationalNGOrepresentatives,media,anddiplomats.See ECCC,Invitation to attend the Closing Statements in the “Duch” Trial, 23-27 November 2009,http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/145/Invitation_to_Closing_Statements_Eng.pdf.

121 ChristopheShay,Cambodia’s Trial of the Century, Televised,TIME,Sept.11,2009.122 Cambodiaranked131outof177countriesinthe2007HumanDevelopmentIndexandremains

oneofthepoorestcountriesinAsia.See UNDP,HumanDevelopmentReport2009:Cambodia,http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_KHM.html,(reproducingCam-bodia’shumandevelopmentindex2007).

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2. PublicPerceptionsofTruth

Theworkofthecourtsislimitedintermsofestablishinganarrativeoftheconflict that could serveas a sharedbasis forpeaceand reconciliation inbothcountries.Itisoftenpointedoutthatinternationaltrialsfailintermsofassistingnational reconciliation.123Ingeneral,theoutcomeofacriminaltrialintermsoftruthisrestrictedtotheneedsofthecase,whichcanbeunsatisfactoryforvictimsand society as a whole. Furthermore,inbothCambodiaandBiHtheapproachtoaccountability forpastatrocitieshasso farbeen limited toa retributive justicemodel. Complementary transitional justice activities, especially truth-seekingones,arenotofficiallypromotedorrecognizedandhavecomemainlyfromcivilsocietygroups.

InBiHallofthetruthfindinginitiativeshavebeenledbycivilsocietyandonlyundertakeninalimitedmannerbypublicauthorities.Therehavebeentwofailedinitiativestoestablishatruthandreconciliationcommission.124 There is currently a regional proposal (RECOM) on the table led by civil society organizationsfrom Serbia, Croatia, and BiH, which is gathering a significant amount ofsupport.However,untilrecentlywidersocietyhasbeenquitereluctanttoacceptinitiativesofthissort,withcertainvictimsassociationsstronglyopposed.125 This oppositionisgroundedinapunitiveapproachtowardsjusticeandsuspicionoverthepossibilityofamnesties.126Thewordreconciliationisoftenavoidedanditisconstantlysuggestedthattheredoesnotexistonesingletruth,butratherthree.Itisencouragingthatthelatestconsultationsseemtoshowamoreextendedsupportforthepossibilityofestablishingaregionaltruthcommission.127

Other initiatives have beenmore limited fact-finding efforts. Some havecomefrompublicauthorities:theCommissionforInvestigationoftheEventinandaroundSrebrenicabetweenJuly10-19,1995(SrebrenicaCommission),whichhadtobeestablishedin2003bytheRepublikaSrpskaauthoritiesinresponsetoaresolutionof theHumanRightsChambersofBiH;andtheStateInstituteforMissingPersonsin2008insubstitutionofthreeseparatepublicbodiesthathadbeenundertakingthesetasksonthebasisofethnicity.128Amongthecivilsociety

123 Sriram,Wrong-sizing international justice?,supra note86,at497.124 Thefirstinitiativewaslaunchedbyacoalitionthatincludedagreatnumberoforganizations.In

1997and2000adraftLawon theTruthandReconciliationCommissionwassubmitted to theParliamentaryAssemblyofBiHbutwasneveradopted.In2005asecondinitiativewaspushedtorevivethedraftlaw,butalltalksrelatedtosuchinitiativeweresuspendedinMarch2006.See undp, transItIonal JustICe GuIdebooK for bosnIa and herzeGoVIna 26-28(2009).

125 Id.at28.126 Id. 127 NatašaKandić,The RECOM Initiative: From a Non-Governmental Challenge to a State Pro-

gramme,in european InteGratIon and transItIonal JustICe: from retrIbutIVe to restoratIVe JustICe In the western balKans 107 (DenisaKostovicovaed.,2009),available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Forum3.pdf.

128 UNDP,supra note124,at31.

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initiativesaninterestingexampleistheeffortsbytheResearchandDocumentationCentre of Sarajevo to create the most comprehensive database of events thatoccurredduringandafterthewar,fromsitesofmassacrestoattacksofbuildings,displacements,concentrationcamps,etc.129

InCambodiatherehasbeennoofficialtruthcommissionprocess;howeveranumberofNGOshavebeencarryingoutinformalprogramsformemorializationandreconciliation.DC-CamfirststartedasYaleUniversity’sCambodianGenocideProgramtoconductresearch,training,anddocumentationontheKhmerRougeregimeandisnowrunbyCambodiannationals.Itswiderangeofactivitiesandprominenceinthefieldhasledtoitbeingcalledan“unofficialtruthproject.”130 DC-Camaims to record andpreserve the historyof theKhmerRouge regimeforfuturegenerationsandtocompileandorganizeinformationthatcanserveaspotentialevidenceinalegalaccountingforthecrimesoftheKhmerRouge.131 It hasthelargestcollectionofprimarydocumentsontheKhmerRouge.132

AsmallerbutnolessinterestinginitiativeisbytheorganizationYouthforPeace(YfP)—theYouthforJusticeandReconciliationprojectstartedin2007.133 YfPcarriesout“Understand,Remember,andChange”workshopswheretherootcausesofgenocidearediscussed, lookingatboth internal andexternal factorstoexamine themobilizationof theKhmerRouge.Following theseworkshops,YfP facilitates discussion within the community, where youth listen and askquestions.Thisprovidesaspaceforsurvivorsandvictimstotelltheirstories.Thishasbeenasuccessfulprojectwithgoodresponsefrombotholderandyoungerparticipantswhoweregrateful for the learning and sharing experience,134 with somecommunitiesstatingthattheywanttocompilethestoriesoftheirvictims.

Thereisincreasingworkbeingdoneonmemorialization,withvisitsorganizedbyNGOstothesitesoftheKillingFieldsandTuolSlengortotheprisonS-21,whicharecurrentlyvisitedmorebytouriststhanbyCambodians.135Importantly,DC-Camhasbeenworkingongettinga textbookon theKhmerRougeperiodintroduced,whichiscurrentlygoingthroughthegovernmentapprovalprocess.136 Thisisveryimportantbecauseuntil2000therewasonlyoneparagraphonthewholeKhmerRougeperiodinhighschooltextbooksandeventhisdisappeared

129 SeetheResearchandDocumentationCentreofSarajevoWebsite,http://www.idc.org.ba.130 LouisBickford,Unofficial Truth Projects,29hum. rts. Q.1020(2007).131 DC-Camwebsite,HistoryandDescriptionofDC-Cam,http://www.dccam.org.132 Thearchivehasover155,000pagesofprimaryKhmerRougedocumentsandmorethan6,000

photographs. 133 SeeYouthforPeaceHomepage,http://www.yfpcambodia.org.134 MarkChannsitha,“EvaluationReportforYouthforPeace”(2008)(onfilewithauthors).135 louIs bICKford, ICtJ, transformInG a leGaCy of GenoCIde: pedaGoGy and tourIsm at the KIllInG

fIelds of ChoeunG eK13(2009).136 ForinformationontheDC-CAMGenocideEducationProject,seehttp://www.dccam.org/Projects/

Genocide/Genocide_Education.htm.

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after2002.137TheGenocideEducationprojectwillalsotrainaround3000teachersinhowtousethebook.Thismaygosomewaytoensurethatyoungpeoplehaveknowledgeandcareabouttheperiod.

These initiatives show that there is space and need for other transitionaljusticemechanisms and that prosecutions and a hybrid tribunal alone are notenough. It also showshow important it is to conceive theprosecutionactivityinthecontextofawidertransitionaljusticestrategytoprovidecomplementarymeanstodealingwiththepast.Hybridcourtsandnationalprosecutioningeneralhaveabetterchanceofimpactingpublicperceptionsoftruthandawarenessoftheneedforreparationsandmemorializationwhenaccompaniedbybothofficialandcivilsocietyinitiatives.

IV. Hybrid Tribunals’ Potential Negative Impact on the Rule of Law

It should not be assumed that the courtswill only have a positive impact.Theexperienceofbothcountriesdemonstratesthattherecanbepossiblenegativeeffectsthatthecourtsmustaddressbeforetheybegintounderminetheirwork.InCambodia,therehavebeenanumberofproblemswiththeECCCthatmayactuallyhave a negative impact on thepublic perceptionof rule of law.Therehas beena widely publicized controversy regarding alleged kickbacks. Cambodian staffreportedthattheyhadtogiveapercentageoftheirsalarytotheirsuperiors.138 This wasreportedwidelyintheinternationalpressfollowingtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative’sworkonthesubject.AnauditcommissionedbyUNDPfoundseveralproblemsinhumanresourcesmanagement,withsalaryinflationandunnecessarycreationofposts(althoughitdidnotinvestigatethekickbacksclaim).139Negotiationsbetween the UN and the RGC to tackle these problems stalled and allegationsof corruptioncontinued togatherpress interest.140Furthermore,donorswithheldfundingfromtheECCCuntiltheissuewasresolved.Finally,inAugust2009arangeof anticorruptionmeasureswere agreedupon, including the establishmentof anIndependentCounselorwhowillbeavailabletohearallcomplaintsofcorruption.141 Nevertheless,theOSJIstillarguedthatbetterprotectionwasneededforstaff.142

137 Id.138 OSJI, PressRelease,CorruptionAllegations at theKhmerRougeCourtMustBe Investigated

Thoroughly,Feb.14,2007.139 UNDP,AuditoftheHumanResourcesManagementattheExtraordinaryChambersintheCourts

ofCambodia,ReportNo.RCM0172,June4,2007.140 Onproblemswithnegotiations, seeSethMydans,Corruption Allegations Affect Khmer Rouge

Trials,n.y. tImes,Apr.9,2009.Forgeneralcoverageofcorruption,seeThe Court on Trial,the eConomIst,Apr.4,2009.

141 PressRelease,OfficeofLegalAffairs,JointStatementonEstablishmentofIndependentCounselloratExtraordinaryChambersinCourtsofCambodia,U.N.Doc.L/3146(Aug.12,2009).

142 OSJI,PressRelease,NewAnticorruptionMeasuresatKhmerRougeTribunalAreInsufficient,Aug.17,2009.

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Withtheseproblems,itisunclearwhethertheECCCisprovidingtheexpecteddemonstrationeffectthatpublicinstitutionsshouldbetransparent.IfaUN-backedinternationalizedcourtisunabletoovercomecorruptionthenthiscouldactuallyunderminepublicperceptionofinstitutionsandraiseskepticismthatthingswillneverchange.However, therecouldbeapositiveimpactindemonstratingthatproblemsexistedbutwereaddressedproperly.A2008auditfoundthatmostoftheproblemsinthe2007audithadbeenresolved.Asmentionedabove,thesurveybytheHumanRightsCenterattheUniversityofCalifornia,BerkeleyshowsthatthemajorityofthosewhoknowabouttheECCCbelieveinitspotentialtoprovidearesponsetothecrimescommittedandtwo-thirdsbelievedthatthejudgeswouldbefair/theECCCwouldbeneutral.143ThequestionofhowtheCourtisperceivedrequiresfurtherinvestigationastheECCCcontinuesitsworkincase002andafollow-upsurveyiscurrentlyplanned.

ThecontroversyoveradditionalprosecutionsalsohasthepotentialtolimittheimpactoftheCourt.InDecember2008,theCambodianCo-ProsecutorCheaLeangopposedformerInternationalCo-ProsecutorRobertPetit’ssubmissionofanadditionalsixsuspectsforprosecution.Leangstatedthatfurtherinvestigationsshouldnotproceedbecauseofthepastinstabilityofthecountry,thespiritoftheagreementbetweentheRGCandtheUN,andthelimiteddurationandbudgetofthe Court.144PetitfiledaStatementofDisagreement for thePre-trialChambertodecideonthismatter.InSeptember2009itwasannouncedthatthepre-trialjudgeshadnotreachedadecisionastheyfailedtoobtainasupermajority.145 In suchacase,theInternalRulesprovidethatthesubmissionproposedbytheCo-Prosecutorautomaticallymoves to thenextstage,which isan investigationbytheCo-InvestigatingJudges.TheconsiderationsofthePre-trialChambershowedthatthethreeCambodianjudgesagreedwithLeangwhilethetwointernationaljudges found Leang’s reasoning insufficient.146 It remains to be seen whethertheCambodianhalfofthetribunalcooperatesif theadditionalprosecutionsgoforward.PrimeMinisterHunSenhas stated that these additionalprosecutionswouldleadtoacivilwarwithhundredsofthousandsofdeaths.147 The reputation oftheCourtrestsonwhethertheprosecutionsareabletogoforwardandwhetherit is perceived that theCambodian side ismaking decisions based on politicalinterference.

143 phuonG pham et al.,supra note88,at39.144 ECCC,PressRelease,OfficeoftheCo-ProsecutorsintheExtraordinaryChambersintheCourts

ofCambodia,StatementoftheCo-prosecutors,Jan.5,2009.145 ECCC,PressRelease,Sept.2,2009.146 ECCC,AnnexI:PublicRedactedVersion.ConsiderationsofthePre-trialChamberregardingthe

DisagreementbetweentheCo-prosecutorspursuanttoInternalRule71,Disagreementno.001/18-11-2008-ECCC-PTC,Aug.18,2009.

147 CheangSokha&RobbieCorey-Boulet,ECCC ruling risks unrest: PM,phnom penh post,Sept.8,2009.

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Thereisariskthattrialscouldbecounterproductiveiftheyareperceivedasbiased.148Courtsmaybevulnerable topoliticalattacksandaccusationsthatcanundermineboththeirprosecutorialactivityandthewiderimpactintherebuildingoftheruleoflawinthecountry.InBiH,politicians’attemptstousetheworkoftheCourttofurthertheirownagendasputtheStateCourtatriskofbeingperceivedaspartial.SerbianpoliticalleadershavebeenveryvocalintheirrejectionoftheCourtarguingthatithasfocusedmorestronglyontheprosecutionofSerbs.ThefactthattheStateCourtislocatedinaformerdetentionfacilityforSerbsduringthewarhasnothelpedtorefutetheirargumentsthat“itisaCourttocondemnSerbs.”149

In linewith the discourse of Serb political leaders, Serb victim associationshaveledprotestsagainsttheCourtandseveraldemonstrationshavetakenplaceinfrontofthebuilding.Theirattacksalsounderminepublicopiniontowardsjudgesandprosecutorsatthestatelevel.Theaccusationsoflackofintegrityandprofessionalismimpactpeople’sperceptionoftheirwork,theveryconstitutionalityoftheexistenceoftheCourtandOTP,andmorewidelythejudicialreformsundertakensofar.150

Therefore public outreach work is crucial to explain to society how theprosecutorialprocessworks.TheeffortsbytheCourtsofardonotseemtohavebeenable tocounterbalance thepoliticalattacks.TheWCCcannotchange therealitythatBosniaksconstitutedthemajorityofvictimsduringthewar.Bosniakorganizationswerealsoveryactiveduringandafterthewaringatheringevidenceabout the crimes, which has inevitably resulted in a predominance of casesconcerningcrimesagainstBosniaks.151TheWCCcoulddomoretoexplainnotonlytheprosecutorialstrategybutalsowhycertaincasesdoordonotprogress.

ThelessonforBiHisalsoapplicabletofuturecourts.Publicoutreacheffortsneed to pay more attention to the impact that specific trials could have on theaffectedcommunitieswherethecrimeswerecommittedorwherethevictimsandperpetratorscurrentlyliveandtrytopre-emptpoliticalmanipulationbyfacilitatinginformationinanaccessiblelanguage.Furthermore,itisalsoimportanttotakeotherkindsofprotectivemeasurestopreservethereputationoftheinstitution—toshieldjudgesfrompoliticallymotivatedclaimsofbiasorevencorruptionandtoprotectthetribunalsandthejudicialsystemsasawholewhentheyarevulnerabletopoliticalattacks.In thissense,mechanismstosafeguardthe independenceof the judiciaryshouldbestrengthened.InthecaseofBiH,protectiveproceduresagainstdefamationofjudges,forexamplewithintheHJPC,wouldnotonlypreservetheirindependence,butalsocontributetothepublic’sperceptionoftheStateCourtasanimpartial,non-politicallymotivatedinstitutionandtothestrengthofthejudiciaryasawhole.

148 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability,supra note15,at263.149 FortheinitialprotestsregardingtheuseofsuchalocationandtheCourt’ssuccessindealingwith

them,seeNettelfield,supra note98.150 OECD,Mission toBiH,Universal Periodic Review of Bosnia and Herzegovina “Stakeholder’s

submission”(2009),availableviahttp://www.lib.ohchr.org.151 IvaneševIć,supranote61,at34.

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Conclusions

This chapter has explored the impact that both theWCC andECCC arehavingandcouldpotentiallyhaveontheruleoflawintheircountries.Aswehaveargued,expectationsforhybridtribunalsmustberealistic—theycannottransformnationalinstitutionsandproceduresorconjureupsystemsgovernedbytheruleoflawontheirownbutrathermustbeconsideredaspartofthebroaderstrategyconcerningthesector.

TheexperiencesinbothCambodiaandBiHshowthatexpectationsshouldalsotakeintoaccountthepoliticalcontextthathasshapedthetribunalsandinwhichtheywillhavetodeveloptheiractivities.Althoughastrengthofhybridtribunalsisthattheycanbeadaptedtosuitaparticularnationalcontext,asStromsethstates,theyalsowillbe“shapedbypoliticalnecessityandcompromise.”152Inaddition,hybridtribunalsalonecannotbeconsideredenoughtoimpacttheruleoflawincountries.TheBiHexperienceshowsthatinsertingtheworkofthehybridcourtswithinawiderrule-of-lawreformstrategycanallowthecourttofulfillsomeofthebroader expectations for its impact, such as capacity-building in thewiderjustice sector.

Both courts have had to overcome difficult challenges to successfullycarry out trials. From our analysiswe can conclude that despite contributionsto accountability, in both cases more concerted efforts are needed to engagewith the domestic judicial actors in order tomaximize the impact on the ruleoflaw.Similarly,althoughsomelessonsregardingoutreachhavebeenapplied,moreengagementispossible.Toachieveconstructiveengagement,ouranalysishighlightsthatthenecessaryobjectivesandcompetencesmustbereflectedintheinstitutional mandate and budgetary provisions. In future hybrid tribunals thenecessaryprovisionsshouldbemadeandaccompaniedbytheappropriatehumanand economic resources in order to maximize the capacity-building potentialofinternationalstafffromtheoffset.Therelianceonadhocinitiatives,alwaysvulnerabletochangesinfundingpriorities,underminestheirfullpotential.

Beyondtheeffectonruleoflaw,thereisaquestionofhowmuchimpacthybridtribunalscanhaveintheabsenceofothertransitionaljusticeinitiatives.Inbothcountriesotherinitiativeshavebeenneglected,mainlyduetopoliticalsensitivityandlackofprioritization.ThefactthatanumberofcivilsocietyinitiativesinbothBiHandCambodiaaretryingtopromotealternativesdemonstratesthatthereissupport and a need for truth-seeking and reconciliation activities. Equally, theworkofthecourtsinisolation,withoutawidertransitionaljusticestrategywitha multi-faceted approach, is limited in terms of their possible contribution tobroaderreconciliationprocessesinthecountry.

152 Stromseth,Pursuing Accountability,supra note15,at263,280.

Domestic Legal Process and International Judicial Systems: The Argentine Case

Leonardo Filippini

Astheeditorsofthisvolumesuggest,manydiscussionsabouttransitionaljustice raise the concern that the international legal framework, within thechallenging context of overcoming a conflictual past,may lead to undesirablesituations.ThisconcernwaspresentintheseminalexchangebetweenCarlosNinoandDianeOrentlicherontheoptionsanddutiesoftheArgentinestateshortlyafterresumingademocraticpathinthewakeofthelastmilitarydictatorship(1976-1983).1 Orentlicher argued in favor of an international duty to punish humanrightsviolations,assuming,inpart,thatinternationalpressurewouldstrengthenthenewdemocraticgovernment.Ontheotherhand,Ninobelievedthatastrong,internationallyimposeddutytocriminallyprosecutewouldhavedestabilizedtheaccountabilityprocessandincreasedpolarizationbetweenhumanrightsgroupsand themilitary.ForNino, an internationalduty toprosecuteallhuman rightsviolations committed under the previous regime could prove excessive for agovernmentthatmuststruggletoreestablishdemocracy.2

Nevertheless,IassertthatthecaseofArgentinahasnotrepresented,anddoesnotrepresenttoday,afataldilemmabetweenthenecessarydomesticflexibilityformaneuveringandtheinternationalarena’sconceptionofcertainsolutionstotheproblemsof transition.Therewasno internationalpressureof thescopeorintensitythatNinocriticized,northepotentialnegativeresultsthatheforesaw.Neitherdidinternational lawposesucharigidmoralor legalframeworksoasto render it unusable or clearly incompatible with the needs of theArgentinecommunity.Instead,internationallaw,itsinstitutions,anditspoliticalinfluenceandpressurehaveofferedvaluableinstrumentsfortheArgentinetransition.Ithasbeenattimesasourceofpressureandattimesaspaceforrefreshingdebatethatisopentothethoughtandactionofdemocraticforces,somethingdeniedonthedomesticlevel.

Since the reestablishment of democracy, Argentine jurisprudenceparticipates inwhatAnneMarieSlaughterandothershavelabeled judicial

1 SeeDianeF.Orentlicher,Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,100yale l.J.2537,2548-49(1991); CarlosS.Nino,The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context,100yale l.J.2619(1991);DianeF.Orentlicher,A Reply to Professor Nino,100yale l.J.2641,2641-43(1991).

2 Carlos s. nIno, JuICIo al mal absoluto: los fundamentos y la hIstorIa del JuICIo a las Juntas del proCeso(1997).

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cross-fertilization;3 that is,Argentine courts’ penchant for borrowing non-authoritativeelements(orclearlyauthoritativeforsomeobservers),andtheirfrequentcitationofcourtdecisionsfromthestrongestwesterndemocraciesaswellasofjurisprudencefrominternationalcourts.Therehasbeenhabitualuse of international law in the adjudication of individual cases, includingholdings that declare national laws unconstitutional for being contrary tointernational law.4Thesetendenciesarecontemporaneouswiththegrowingimportanceofinternationallawthroughouttheglobe.5

During Argentina’s transition, there has been increasing transnationalinfluence,interaction,anddialogue.Weobserveaprogressionstartingfromthejoint ratification of several international human rights instruments during theearlieststagesofdemocracy(1983to1985)andcitationtothosecommitmentsin Supreme Court decisions, to eventually establishing the supremacy ofinternational law over national laws—first through judicial action, and thenthrough constitutional reform in 1994. Since 1994, theArgentineConstitutionexpresslyestablishesthat“treatiesandconcordatsarehierarchicallysuperiortolaws”andover teninternationalhumanrights legal instrumentsnotonlyenjoy“constitutionalstatus”6(e.g.superiorityoverthelegalcodes),butalsothesamehierarchical status as the articles of the Constitution itself.

Inthefirstdecadeofthiscentury,thisprocessofprogressiveabsorptionandprioritization of international norms has proved a key factor in certain concretedecisionspertainingtothedemocratictransitionprocess.Mostimportantly,ithasledtheSupremeCourt,beginningin2004,torevisetheentirelegalframeworkoftheprevioustwodecadesinlightoftheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallaw;primarilywithregardtocriminalprosecution,butalsoonissuespertainingtomemory,truth-seeking,vettingofpublicservantsinvolvedinpastcriminalacts,reparationspolicies,andidentificationofthesonsanddaughtersofthedisappeared.

Thepathtakenatthebeginningofdemocracypavedthewayforwatersheddecisionstwodecadeslaterinfavorofthedomesticapplicationofhumanrightslawinresolvingsensitivemattersrelatedtotransition.ThisprocessofintegratinghumanrightsintodomesticlawisnotsomuchthedistinctivesealofaparticularsetofSupremeCourtJustices,butrathertheevolution—maybenotinevitable,butforeseeable—ofthefirstdemocraticadministration’sdecisiontolinkthedemocratictransitionprocesstothemainhumanrightstreaties.Theinternationalbiasofthe

3 See anne-marIe slauGhter,a new world order(2004).4 Thisdescriptionisadequateat leastwithregardto internationalhumanrights law.Astoother

rulesofinternationallaw,suchasinternationaleconomiclaw,thesituationcanvary.5 AsOonaHathawaywarns,internationallaw,longtheprovinceofdiplomacy,todayappliesnot

onlytotheinteractionbetweenstates,butalsototheactionsofstateswithintheirborders.Asofthestartofthetwenty-firstcentury,over100,000internationaltreatiesregulatemattersfromtaxesandbusinesstransactionstotheprohibitionoftorture.OonaHathaway,International Delegation and State Sovereignty,71law & Contemp. probs.115(2008).

6 Const. arG.art.75,para.22.

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Argentinedemocratictransition,whichisstillpresenttoday,isneitheranoveltynoracompletedeparturefrompreviousdoctrine.Instead,itisacharacteristicofstatepolicythatalldemocraticadministrationshavegenerallyupheld.

Thefateofdemocraticstabilitywasentrustedin1983,inpart,tointernationalhumanrights law.Fromthenon,despite tensionsandfailures tocomplywithinternational guidelines, the various political forces in charge of the nation’sdestiny chose to consistently maintain an open and receptive stance towardsinternationalhuman rights law. In recentdecades, eachof theadministrationssignedthemainhumanrightstreatiesanddeclarationsthatemergedduringtheirterms; theyhaveallbeenconcernedwithmaintaininga relationship that is atleast decentwith international oversight bodies; and, none has found seriousincompatibility between those international agreements and the constitutionalframework.

Thereferencetoforeignandinternationallawisapracticethatdidnottrulystartin1983.Fromaveryearlystage,Argentinejurisprudencehasdrawnuponforeigncase law including,paradigmatically, thatof theSupremeCourtof theUnited States ofAmerica on certain constitutional clauses.What can be seenstarting in1983 isan intensificationof thispractice.From the1980s to today,therehasbeenagradualandsteadyincreaseintheArgentinecourts’opennesstoincorporateanduseforeignandinternationallaw.Today,theArgentinejudicialsystemisreceptiveandattentivetolegaldevelopmentsbeyonditsborders.

In terms of the democratic transition, international law’s presence isevident. Inter-American human rights law has a particularly notable role.TheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights (IACHR)visited thecountry in1979,inthemidstofthemilitarydictatorship—amovethatenjoyedgreatsupportamong the human rights community. It is probably notmere coincidence thatRaulAlfonsín, the president during the democratic transition, was among thepoliticians thatmetwith thevisitingcommissioners.Hemayhaverealized thedemocratizingpotentialofthevisitandoftheinternationalsupportnetworks.TheCommission’s report changed theparadigmaticgeneralunderstandingof state-sponsoredterrorism.Itprovedtheviolationsthatthemilitarygovernmenthidandpermanentlydiscreditedthetheoryofsimpleexcessiveuseofforce.Thereportthusdefinitivelyconsolidatedthecondemnationofsystematicrepression.

This close relationship with the Inter-American system from the verybeginningofthepathtowardsdemocracyhascontinuedtotoday.Inthe1980s,theIACHRreceivedcomplaintsofunsatisfiedreparations,andin1992,itissueditsreportNumber28,condemningthe“ImpunityLaws.”Sincethen,theIACHRhasactivelymonitoredthedomesticprocess.Inrecentyears,givenitsincreasingvolumeofcaselaw,theInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights(IACtHR)joinedthe network of regional influence. The repudiation of the Full Stop (“Punto Final”) andDueObedience (“Obediencia Debida”) laws (together referred toasthe“ImpunityLaws”),aswellasthepardonsgrantedbyex-PresidentCarlos

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Menem,areanchoredintheprinciplesandrulesoftheinter-AmericansystemandconsistentwiththeholdinginBarrios Altos.7

In the following sections, Iwill suggest some ideas about the possiblecausesof this tiebetweeninternational lawandtransition, itsmanifestationsandtheformsofinteraction,anditsvalueasintermsofeffectivecontributiontothepursuitofjustice.Aswewillsee,theinternationalsystemhasnotstifledthedomesticcommunity’spoliticalskillinproposingitsownsolutions.Argentinaoffers an example of a society that deems the rationale and procedures ofinternationalhumanrightslawtobesuitable,andthereforedecidedtomodelandevenmodifyitsowntransitionalnormsinlightoftheprinciplesofjusticeandpoliticalconsiderationsbetterreflectedininternationallawthaninthedomesticlegalsystem.TheArgentinesocietyunequivocallyrecognizedthatcertainrulesofinternationallawmayreflectitsownconvictionsabouttransitionaljusticebetterthancertainnationallawsadoptedamidstantidemocraticpressures.

I. Possible Tensions between International Principles on Transition and the Domestic Experience

Beforegoing intomoredetailabouthow international lawand itsorgansbehave and interact with the democratic transition process, I will clarify twopoints,whichraisequestionsabouttheassertionthatthegrowingevolutionandacceptanceofinternationallawcoexistsharmoniouslywiththeconsolidationofdemocracy inArgentina: tensionsaround theconceptof reconciliationand thereopeningofcriminalprosecutions.Nonetheless,asIwilldescribe,neitherofthesesituationsisimportantenoughtochangethescene.Imentionthesephenomenainorder to provide amore accuratedescriptionof this case and, of course, torecognizethelimitationsinevitableinallgeneralizations,includingtheonethatI shall defend.

A. Reconciliation

The first source of tension is that the accumulated internationalexperiencewiththeideaofreconciliation—unlikethatofotherinternationaldevelopments related to memory, justice, and truth—always faced strongresistancefromthelocalhumanrightsmovementinArgentina.Eventoday,many find that framing the Argentine problem in terms of conflict andreconciliationignoresthemostimportantfringesofthedomesticprocessandleads toanerroneoushistoricalaccountingof thenatureof theviolenceof

7 See BarriosAltosv.PeruCase,2001Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.75(Mar.14,2001).

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thepastanditsperpetrators.Itwouldbeunthinkablethataninstitutionlikethe Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which received greatsupportfromtheinternationalcommunity,couldeverexistunderthatnameinArgentina.

Ofcourse,theremaynotbearealconflictbetweencertainimperativesofinternationallawthatmayfallunderthecategoryofreconciliation—broadlyspeaking, directing group actions towards peacebuilding or establishingcertainlimitstocriminalprosecution—andnationalneedsandassessments.This is the case even if we recognize a certain degree of discrepancy atthe national level. Nevertheless, the term reconciliation—regardless ofwhat itmay entail in the international debate on transitions—was used indomesticdebates largely in thecontextofdemands toprevent thecriminalprosecutionoftheresponsiblepartiesandwasoftentoutedbycertainpeopleand institutions.8This predictably resulted in the lack ofmeaningful localdebate around a possible conception of reconciliation, including its scopeand implications, or about the possibility of learning from other nationsundergoingmoreelaborateprocessesoftransitionbuiltuponreconciliation orothersimilarconcepts,suchasSouthAfrica.9

The high degree of receptivity that we witness toward internationalinitiativesthatdealwithtruth,justice,andmemory,becomesentrencheddistrustwhenitcomestoreconciliationinitiatives—thiswithoutafulldiscussionofthenature of the concept.Reconciliation does not operate as a useful concept ornormativeidealtostimulatedebateorencourageactionbutratherasaninflexiblelabelthatisverydifficulttodisentanglefromtheestablishedpositionsofcertainopiniongroupsorevenfromacertainreligiousconnotation.10

It is possible to frame or interpret someArgentine events in light of theideaofreconciliation;IdonotbelievethattheArgentineexperienceis,infact,impervious to the very idea of reconciliation, or at least some of its possibleinterpretations.However,itisfutiletoseekahistoricalandpoliticalunderstandinginvoking this termwithout paying attention to the full semanticweight that itcarries.NeitherwoulditbecorrecttointerpretitsmentioninArgentinehistory,withoutconsideringhowitisused.Internationallaw’snotionsofmemory,truth,andjusticehavecertainlybeenmuchmoreuseful.Thesenotionshaveallowedustoshareideasandconsiderdisagreementswithacommonunderstandingofwhateachtermsinvolves.Reconciliation,aswellasanyinternationalattemptinthat

8 Forexample,theCatholicChurch,orsectorsofit,hasrepeatedlyalludedtotheideaofreconciliationinpublicstatementscriticizingthecriminalprosecutionofserioushumanrightsabuses.See, e.g.,MarianoObarrio,Pide la Iglesia al Gobierno que deje atrás el pasado (TheChurchAsks theGovernmenttoLeavethePastBehind),dIarIo la naCIón,May16,2004.

9 Inthisvein,therearefrequentnon-criticalandmisinformedreferencestotheSouthAfricancase.10 Albeit with many references to the local situation, the news article by Horavio Verbitsky,

Castagnazos,DIarIo,May23,2004,at12,canbeviewedasanexampleoftheuseoftheterm.

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vein, leavesuswith thinresults. Itdoesnotofferasharedplatform,butratherclosesdowndebate.11

B. International Law, the Constitution, and the Invalidation of the “Impunity Laws”

A second, more recent situation that may also complicate the idea thatinternational law has favorably upheld theArgentine transition process is thedebategeneratedbythereopeningofthecriminalprosecutionsofhumanrightsviolations.TheseprosecutionshadbeenhaltedbytheFullStopLaw(1986),theDueObedienceLaw(1987),andthepardonsgrantedbyex-presidentCarlosMenem(1989-1990).Formany,thedecisiontoreopenprosecutionsinaccordancewithinternationalcommitmentswasaplausibledecisionthatwasmorallydefensibleandcompatiblewiththeConstitution.However,somecriticshavequestionedthereopeningoftheseprosecutionsonanumberofgrounds.Oneoftheirrelativelyrecurrentarguments is that international law’sdemand that trialsbeconductedis both aflawed solution and unconstitutional. For thosewho share this view,internationallawisasourceofundueinterferenceinthecountry’sconstitutionaldevelopment.

OnJune14,2005,theSupremeCourtofArgentinadeclaredtheFullStopandDueObediencelawsunconstitutionalintheSimóncase,12andthusrevokeditsprior Camps doctrine,13whichhadupheldthevalidityofthoselaws.TheCourtineffectdefendeditsdecisionbynotingtheevolutionofArgentinejurisprudenceintermsofitsacceptanceofinternationalhumanrightslaw.14ManycommentatorspointedoutthenumerousreferencestointernationallawintheCourt’sdecisionand its intervention in thecourseof the transition.CarolinaFernándezBlancohighlightedthatSimónwasdecided“basedalmostexclusivelyonargumentsof

11 In a somewhat similar sense, see LesleyMcEvoy, Kieran McEvoy, & KirstenMcConnachie,Reconciliation as a Dirty Word: Conflict, Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland,60J. Int’l aff.81(2006).

12 CorteSupremadeJusticiadelaNación,CSJN,RecursodehechodeducidoporladefensadeJulioHéctorSimónenlacausaSimón,JulioHéctoryotross/privaciónilegítimadela libertad,etc.,CausaN°17.768,S.1767.XXXVIII(June14,2005).

13 CorteSupremadeJusticiadelaNación,CSJN,Camps,Decision310:1162(1987),establishedtheconstitutionalvalidityoftheLawofDueObedience.Avarietyofdecisionsthatfollowedcitedandapplied this precedent. See, e.g.,Decisions:311:401,816,890,1085&1095;312:111;316:532&2171;321:2031.

14 ThePresidentoftheCourtexpressedthat“sincetheamendmentoftheNationalConstitutionin1994,theArgentineStatehasundertakenaseriesofconstitutionaldutiesinlightofinternationallaw, and, especially, the inter-American legal framework. These duties have been furtherconsolidatedandclarifiedintermsoftheirscopeandcontentaspartofanevolutionthatclearlylimitsdomestic law’sauthority tocondoneoromit theprosecutionofevents like thesub lite.”CorteSupremadeJusticiadelaNación,CSJN,RecursodehechodeducidoporladefensadeJulioHéctorSimónenlacausaSimón,JulioHéctoryotross/privaciónilegítimadela libertad,etc.,CausaN°17.768,S.1767.XXXVIII(June14,2005).

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InternationalLaw;”15accordingtoMaríaJoséGuembe’sinterpretation,theevolu-tionofdomesticandinternationallaw“forced”thejudgestorevisetheirinitialposition;16and,PabloParentiobservedthatthedecision’sarguments“dealmainlywithinternationallawanditspossibleapplicationbyourcourts.”17

Critics denounced that the highest court had erroneously applied rules ofinternational law and mistakenly interpreted the constitutional limits on suchapplication.18TheNationalAcademyofLawandSocialSciencesconcludedthat“[t]hejudicialdoctrinethatassignsprimacytohumanrightstreatiesandinternationalnorms...entailsabreach...ofthemandateofjudicialprecedenceintheArgentinelegal system . . . .”19TheconstitutionalistGregorioBadenipointedout that theSupremeCourtmustnot accept an authority superior to itself on constitutionalmatters.20 Some even wrote that with respect to human rights, “a stalwartinternationalist andunilateral approachhas become fashionable.”21Reflecting adifferentperspective,CarlosRosenkrantzwarnedthattheissuewithadecisionlikeSimónisnotwhetherinternationallawhasbecomepartofArgentina’slegalsystemorwhetherArgentinashouldhonoritscurrentinternationalobligations,butratherthe decision served a reminder that collective self-governance requires looking“deepinsideinordertofindsolutionsthatcanbeseenasthereconstructionoftheprinciplesthatmakeusthepoliticalcommunitythatweare.”22

Forallofthesecriticsapparently,thedecisiontoinvalidatethe“ImpunityLaws”wouldrestrictorinterferewithdomestictendenciesthatshouldgenerallybemorepoliticallyintrospective,morerigorousininterpretingtheConstitution,and less influenced by arguments created by the international community.Aswecansee, this isnotaboutrelivingNino’sfears, forpolitical instabilitydoesnotseemtobelinkedtotheuseofinternationallaw.Atthecurrentpointinthetransition,whatcriticsarequestioning is thequalityof theprocedures through

15 CarolinaFernándezBlanco,La relación entre derecho internacional y derecho interno en el caso ‘Poblete’,in nueVa doCtrIna penal 595 (2005).

16 María José Guembe, La reapertura de los juicios por los crímenes de la dictadura militar argentina,3reVIsta InternaCIonal de dereChos humanos sur121(2005).

17 Pablo Parenti, La relación entre Derecho Internacional y Derecho Penal nacional: El caso “Simón”- Algunas observaciones sobre la aplicación del derecho internacional por la mayoría de la Corte en el fallo “Simón”,in el sIstema penal en las sentenCIas reCIentes de la Corte suprema (DanielPastored.,2007).

18 See, e.g., EzequielMalarino,La cara represiva de la reciente jurisprudencia argentina sobre graves violaciones de los derechos humanos: Una crítica de la sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación de 14 de junio de 2005 en el caso Simón,eldIal.Com,Sept.14,2009.

19 NationalAcademyofLawandSocialSciences,Dictamen de la Academia Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Buenos Aires sobre los Tratados Internacionales y la Supremacía de la Constitución Nacional,Aug.25,2005,http://www.academiadederecho.org.ar/declaraciones.htm.

20 GregorioBadeni,El caso ‘Simón’ y la supremacía constitucional,la ley, suplemento penal,July2005,at9.

21 EnriqueDíazAraujo,Internacionalismo salvaje,JurIsprudenCIa arGentIna,2005-III-898.22 CarlosF.Rosenkrantz,Advertencias a un internacionalista (o los problemas de Simón y Mazzeo),

8reVIsta JurídICa de la unIVersIdad de palermo213(Sept.2007).

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whichcertainholdingshavebeenreached.ThereopeningoftrialsinpartraisedquestionsabouttheverylegitimacyofinternationallawasabasisforArgentina’scollectiveagreements.

I,ontheotherhand,tendtothinkthattherearenoinsurmountableobjectionsthatrequireustodistrustinternationallaw’sauthoritytocontributetoresolvingissuessuchasthecriminalprosecutionofpasthumanrightsviolations.NordoIbelievethattheConstitutioninvalidatestheadoptedapproach,orthatthereopeningofthecasesisasignalthatweshouldchangeourassessmentofthegeneralsynergycreatedinArgentinabetweentheinternationalsphereanddomesticlegalprocess.Contrary to the critics, Ifindabsolutelynoempirical support for the assertionthat theArgentinecase representsacleardistinctionbetween internationalanddomesticlegalprocesswithrespecttohumanrights.AlthoughIwilladdresssomeofthecriticismsfurtherbelow,IwillnotrepeatheremorepreciseobservationsthatIhavemadeelsewhereregardingseveralofthecriticisms.23

Forthepurposesofthisreflection,itsufficestonotethat therearevoicesofdissentthathonestlyclaimtofindtensionsstrongenoughtorequireustotalkaboutcontrastsbetweendomesticlegalprocessandinternationallaw.Theywouldresponddifferentlytothequestionsposedbytheeditorsofthisvolume.However,inthecompanyofmanyothers,Ibelievethatsuchcontrastsdonotatallhavetheintensityperceivedbycritics.24

II. Permeable and Impermeable Legal Communities

Aninitialreactionwhendealingwithacommunitythatisverypermeablewithrespecttointernationallawistoaskwhatgivesrisetothiscondition.Whatleadsalegalcommunitytohavegreaterfaiththanothersintheabilityofinternationallaw’srulesandprinciplestosolveadifficultdilemma,suchasthatpertainingtoa transition?Whydosomelegalcommunities,relativetoothers,moreintentlystudycomparativeexperiencesasasourceof inspiration forsolving theirown

23 LeonardoFilippini,La definición de los crímenes contra la humanidad en el fallo “René Jesús Derecho” de la Corte Suprema argentina, in JurIsprudenCIa penal de la Corte suprema de JustICIa de la naCIón 316(LeonardoPitlevniked.,2008);LeonardoFilippini,El prestigio de los derechos humanos – Respuesta a Daniel Pastor,in teoría y CrítICa del dereCho ConstItuCIonal. tomo 1: demoCraCIa1207(RobertoGargarellaed.,2008);LeonardoFilippini, El derecho internacional de los derechos humanos no es un préstamo - Reflexiones sobre la crítica a los préstamos de Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, 8(1)reVIsta JurídICa de la unIVersIdad de palermo191(2007).

24 Toputtheimportanceofthiscontrastinperspective,seeVíctorAbramovich,Editorial,2nueVa doCtrIna penal 1 (2007);MartinBöhmer,Préstamos y adquisiciones: La utilización del derecho extranjero como una estrategia de creación de autoridad democrática y constitucional,in teoría y CrítICa del dereCho ConstItuCIonal: tomo II. dereChos(RobertoGargarellaed.,2008);JavierDeLuca,Punitivismo y Derechos Humanos: El caso de Argentina(Apr.2009); PabloF.Parenti,La jurisprudencia argentina frente a los crímenes de derecho internacional,18lateInamerIKa analysen61(2007).

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problems?Whatmakesa judge seriouslyconsideremulatingacolleague fromanother jurisdiction insteadof takingnewunexploredapproaches?Allof thesequestions, insomewayoranother,are inevitablyconnected to thequestionofinternationallaw’splaceinthelegallifeofasocietyintransition.

GiventhatdiversetheoriescompetetoexplainthebehavioroftheState—andinparticular,ofthejudgesandoperatorsofthejudicialsystem—itprovesuselesstoaimfordefinitiveanswersthatpredicttheinfluenceofaprinciple,atreaty,oran international court decision.25Forexample,OonaA.Hathaway,inherresearchon the ratification of human rights treaties, has highlighted the importance ofconsideringthebenefits,intermsofinternationalreputation,thatastatebelievesitwillgainbysigningatreaty.Inheropinion,thisisafactorthathelpsexplainastate’sdecisiontoratifyaninternational treaty.26Otherresearchestablishesarelationshipbetweenthenatureofthelocalpoliticalstructureandthepermeabilityof thatstructurevis-à-visaninternationalsystemoflawsandprinciples.Thereis a tendency to associate political systems that guarantee respect for politicaland civil libertieswith greater acceptance of international oversight regimes.27 Andrew Moravcsik states that the need to strengthen a democratic transitionincreasesthelikelihoodofascriptiontoaninternationalhumanrightsprotectionregime.28Other authors have applied the tools of economic analysis of law tointernationalhumanrightssystems.29Partoftheliterature,incontrast,highlightsthevalueoftheprinciplesthatshapeaninternationalsystemasareasontoadheretosuchasystem.30Others,suchasHaroldH.Koh,emphasizethedynamicsoftransnationallawinnorm-creation,ortheparticularroleoftransnationaladvocacynetworks.31Wecouldgrosslysimplifythematterandassumethatastatemolds

25 See e.g., oona a. hathaway & harold honGJu Koh, foundatIons of InternatIonal law and polItICs (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Prospectus, in the ImpaCt of InternatIonal law on InternatIonal CooperatIon: theoretICal perspeCtIVes (EyalBenvenisti&MoseHirsch eds., 2004);BethA. Simmons,Compliance with International Agreements,1ann. reV. pol. sCI. 75(1998);BethA.Simmons, International Law and International Relations: Scholarship at the Intersection of Principles and Politics,95a.s.I.l. proC. 1(2002);José alVarez, InternatIonal orGanIzatIons as law-maKers (2005);RobertO.Keohane,International Relations and International Law: Two Optics,38harV. Int’l l.J. 487(1997).

26 OonaA.Hathaway,Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,72 u. ChI. l. reV. 469(2005).

27 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6eur. J. Int’l l. 503 (1995);Simmons,Compliance with International Agreements,supra note26,at83.

28 AndrewMoravcsik,The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,54Int’l orG. 217(2000).

29 JaCK l. GoldsmIth & erIC a. posner, the lImIts of InternatIonal law (2005).30 Simmons,Compliance with International Agreements,supra note26,at87.31 HaroldHongjuKoh,International Law as Part of Our Law,98am. J. Int’l l. 43(2004);HaroldHongju

Koh,Transnational Legal Process,75neb. l. reV. 181(1996);HaroldHongjuKoh,Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,106yale l.J.2599(1997);KathrynSikkink,Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America,47Int’l orG. 411(1993);marGaret KeCK & Kathryn sIKKInK, aCtIVIsts beyond borders: adVoCaCy networKs In InternatIonal polItICs (1998);alIson brysK, the polItICs of human rIGhts In arGentIna: protest, ChanGe, and demoCratIzatIon (1994).

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itselfaccordingtointernationallawoutofinterestorconviction.Moreconcretely,astateseesinternationallawasanobstacleorvehicleforitsinterestsoritbelievesin respecting thenormsbasedon some intrinsicquality, suchas, for example,beinganexpressionofjusticeortheresultofademocraticpact.

At the timewhen the Inter-AmericanCommission prepared for its 1979visit to the country, it is very likely that themilitary junta’s acceptanceof theCommission’smandatecanbeexplainedbyeconomicincentivesthatthepromiseofcreditofferedandexternalpressurefromPresidentCarter’sadministration.32 However, after democracy’s return andpossibly even today, the acceptanceofexternalsourcescouldbeexplainedbyanothertypeofinterest,whichismostlikelyrelatedtothequestforinternationalrecognitionincertainforaorthereputationalinterestsofanewdemocraticgovernmentthatmustenditsinternationalisolationbyjoiningtheinternationalcommunityofdemocracies.33

Nevertheless, Ibelieve that theArgentinecase isbestexplainedby thosetheoriesthatassociatethepositionofinternationalandforeignlawwiththeverynature of the rules and values. Thismeans, more concretely, that the relativepositionofinternationalandforeignlawcanbeexplainedbythemoralauthoritybehindtheveryprinciplesthatarereflectedintherulesofinternationallaw.Atleastinthecontextofthetransition,itishardtodenythatjudgesandthewiderlegalcommunitygreatlyadheretointernationalhumanrightslaw’scoreelements.Justasglobalcondemnationofgenocidecanbefundamentallyexplainedbythegenuineaversionthatthiscrimeprovokes,itispossibletogivecredencetothemoralthesestoexplainwhycertaincommunitiesintransitionmayfindinthesenorms,whichprohibitthemostbasicoffensesagainstanindividual,areflectionoftheirownconvictions.

Obviously,ourpositionasobserversoftheseexplanationsaffects,inpart,ourjudgmentoftheirlegitimacy.Ourviewsastothecorrectwaytoevaluatethedynamicsof this interaction also say something about thekindof relationshipthat is established—for example, of adhesion, cooperation, or subordination.Furthermore,wemayjudge,inavarietyofways,thelegitimacyofthereferencetoanduseof international law to theextent thatwearecapable tounderstandwhatdrives it.For a communityofmoderate international stature andwithoutchancesofgloballeadership,suchasArgentina,therewillalwaysbeasensethatitdoesnothavetotalfreedomincreatingitsownoptions,butratherthatitcanonlychoosefromthelimitedarrayofpossibilitiesthathavebeendefinedbyotheractors.

32 IaIn Guest, behInd the dIsappearanCes: arGentIna’s dIrty war aGaInst human rIGhts and the unIted natIons 174 (1990);brysK,supra note32,at54;marCos noVaro & VICente palermo, la dICtadura mIlItar (1976–1983): del Golpe de estado a la restauraCIón demoCrátICa 290(2003);MariaLuisaBartolomei&DavidWeissbrodt,The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina 1976–1983,75mInn. l. reV. 1009(1991).

33 Moravcsik,supra note28.

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III. Manifestations of International Justice in the National Ordinary Jurisdiction

AsprofessorHitterssays:

Sometimeago,itwouldhavebeenunthinkableformostscholarsoflegalstudies, and of international law in particular, to imagine that judicialdecisions, that the pronouncements, guidelines and reports issued byjudicial and quasi-judicial bodies . . . could “intrude” in the veins ofdifferentcountrieswithsuchforcesoas tomanage tonoticeablyaltercertainlocalnorms,includingthoseofaconstitutionalnature.34

Argentinahasbeenreceptivetointer-Americanhumanrightslawandtoitsbodies’decisionsanddoctrine.Since1983,thegeneraltendencyhasbeen,albeitwithfluctuations,towardgreaterresponsivenesstotheinter-Americansystem’sinstitutions.

Onewaytoanswerthequestionofhowinternationallawinfluencesjudicialpracticeistoobservethewayinwhichinternationallawismanifestedinthelegalsystem’sroutineactivities—namely,throughtherecognitionofnormsandtheirconcreteapplicationinadjudicatingacase.

Withregardtonorm-recognition,wecanquicklyconcludethattheArgentinelegalsystemeasilyrecognizesapplicableinternationallaws.Aswehavealreadystated, according to Argentine constitutional law, international treaties havesupremacyoverthedomesticlegalcode.Moreover,theSupremeCourthasstatedthatIACtHRjurisprudenceispersuasiveauthorityininterpretingthescopeoftheState’sobligations.Thesameprinciplehasbeenestablished,inageneralsense,withregardtotheinterpretationofhumanrightstreatybodiesintermsoftheirrespectiveprovisions.Thus,theArgentinelegalsystemhasrecognizedprinciplesfromreportsfromtheCommitteeAgainstTortureandothersimilarbodies.ThejurisprudenceoftheInternationalCriminalCourtandtheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslaviaisrecognizedasaguideforthedefinitionsofinternationalcrimesandotherelementsofinternationalcriminallaw.Normsofcustomary international lawarealso regularlycited inArgentine jurisprudenceon State obligations, although there is no rigorous method for doing so. AstheProcuratorGeneral stated in theSimón case,notonly treaties,butalso thecustomarynormsandgeneralprinciplesoflawareanintegralpartofthedomesticlegalsystem,togetherwiththeConstitutionanddomesticlaws.

However,therecognitionofallpossibleapplicablerulesisnotexhaustive.Sometimesitisdifficulttodiscernaconsistentthreadguidingjudicialpractice.

34 JuanCarlosHitters,¿Son vinculantes los pronunciamientos de la comisión y de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos? Control de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad,la ley, Sept.17,2008.

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Thiscanbeseeninrelationtointernationalcriminaltribunalsandalsoinotherareas,suchasinternationallawpertainingtoeconomic,social,andculturalrights.Argentine jurisprudence easily recognizes international obligations that shouldshapejudicialinterpretation;however,Argentinecourts’areoftennotexhaustiveintheirexaminationofinternationallegalissues,nordotheyemploytherigorthatshouldbeexpectedofajudicialcommunitythathasdecidedtoadoptanoutlookthatopentopenetrationbyinternationallaw.

Weobservethesameopennessandfluiditywithrespecttotheabsorptionofinternationalrulesintheadjudicationofcases.Internationalnorms—customary,treaty, and jurisprudential—appear and are often applied without the slightestadaptation to theconcretecases.Domestic law functionsasa loose sieve, andit is not unusual to find decisions in which the holding is directly borrowedfromaninternationalstandard.Thisisthecaseevenindecisionsthatinvalidatecongressional laws.We can identify, individually or jointly, the various usesof international law:direct application; as an interpretative tool for construingdomestic laws; a complement to the domestic legal code; consideration ofinterpretationsbytheinternationalhumanrightsinstitutionsindefiningthescopeofpactsanddeclarationsandshapingconstitutionalandlegalhermeneutics;and,finally,thedomesticexecutionofdecisionsprofferedbyinternationaljudicialandquasi-judicialinstitutionsinparticularcases.

Ofcourse,thesedifferentusesaredeterminedby,inter alia, thedomesticlawthatregulatesinternationallaw’sincorporationintothedomesticlegalsphere,theextenttowhichrightsestablishedintreatiesaretoberecognized,theconsiderationof the dispositive nature of certain conventions, and the superior hierarchy ofagreements.35IntheArgentinecase,theSupremeCourthasinterpretedarticle75,paragraph22oftheConstitutiontorequirejudgestoapplyinternationalhumanrightsnormsinadherencetothejurisprudenceoftheinternationaltribunalsthathavejurisdictionover theapplicationofsuchlaws.Moreover, theConstitutionestablishestheconstitutionalstatusofhumanrights treatiesandthesupremacyofallinternationaltreatiesoverdomesticlaw.Still,intermsoftheapplicationofinternationalrules,thecaselawisnotentirelyconsistent.

IV. Threats Posed by International Justice to the Transition Process

The Argentine case does not suggest that international justice poses athreat to theprocessofnational transition.Despite thestrong imperative tonethat characterizes certain international principles, international human rights

35 See la aplICaCIón de los tratados sobre dereChos humanos en el ámbIto loCal: la experIenCIa de una déCada(VíctorAbramovich,AlbertoBovino,&ChristianCourtiseds.,2006).

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lawhasundoubtedlyoperatedalways,inthiscommunityatleast,asasymbolicpressureaimingfortruth,justice,andmemory.Ithasneverbeenaseriousthreattothenecessarybalanceforbuildingdemocraticstability.Internationaljusticedoesnotaffectthecurrentprocess,nordiditevernegativelyimpactperiodsoftheArgentinehistorywherethetransitionprocessgrosslyignoredanypossibleinternationalrestriction.Eventhecriticsofthecurrentreopeningofcriminaltrialsagreewiththisobservation,forinternationaljusticehasneverbeenadestabilizingfactor.TheInternationalCriminalCourt—theglobalinstitutiontodaythatholdsa directmandate over criminal prosecution—lacks temporal jurisdiction overthehumanrightscrimesofArgentina’spast.Theprimaryinteractioncontinuestobewiththeinter-Americansystem,whichlacksthejurisdictiontoprosecuteindividuals.Thepredominate opinion,which is naturally held bymost courtsand the Supreme Court, is that regular engagement with international legaldevelopmentsnourishesdebateand ispartof thehistoricalprogressionof thenational process.

Asmentionedabove, themost important deviation today is perceivedbythosewho,fromacriticalperspective,believethattheArgentineSupremeCourtdecisions that follow the IACtHR’s jurisprudence produce political and legalconsequences that affectdemocratic transition.For thosewho thought that the“ImpunityLaws”sealedafinishedprocess,theinfluenceofinternationallawhas,fromtheirperspective,underminedthesystem’slegalcertainty—theirrevocableclosing of criminal investigations into state-sponsored terrorism should berespected.ThisistheviewofDanielPastor,forexample,whobelievesthat“forbetterorforworse,”themattershouldbeconsidereddefinitivelyclosed.36

Themain objection is that this international legal influence has resultedintheabandonmentofcertainbasiclegalprinciplesofArgentineconstitutionalandcriminallaw,suchasres judicata, theprohibitionagainstdoublejeopardy,the guarantee of specificity in defining crimes, and the exclusive authority ofCongresstomakecriminallaw,etc.Furthermore,criticsalsoclaimthatvictims’rightshavebeenexpandeddisproportionatelyattheexpenseofthedefendant,37 andthatthisoccursundertheguiseofreinstitutingtheruleoflaw,whichshouldeffectivelyestablishcertainethicallimitsontheState’srangeofaction.Another

36 DanielPastor,La deriva neopunitivista de organismos y activistas como causa del desprestigio actual de los derechos humanos,1nueVa doCtrIna penal73(2005).ThisexpressionissimilartothatusedbyanotherArgentineprofessor,PabloManili;hesaysitisso“whetherwelikeitornot”.PabloManili, Sobre la inconstitucionalidad de la ley 25.779, 70 reVIsta aboGados 46 (2003).Still,Manili,unlikePastor,believesthat,“[w]hetherwelikeitornot,thelawsknownas‘fullstop’and‘dueobedience’were,atthetime,perfectlyconstitutionalandwidelyrecognizedaspoliticallylegitimate.”Id.AccordingtoPastor,wiselegalscholarssuchasDavidBaigun,JulioMaier,andMarceloSancinetti,without takingapositionon thematter,hadproved that itwaspossible toarguethattheselawswerelegallyflawed.Pastor,supra, at 114.

37 Ezequiel Malarino, Jurisprudencia latinoamericana sobre derecho penal internacional – un resumen,18lateInamerIKa analysen191(2007).

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criticismisthattheArgentineSupremeCourthasrecognizedelementsofbindingprecedent in IACtHR’sdecisions incaseswhere theArgentineStatewasnotaparty.There areobjections to theBarrios Altos doctrine and its application as precedentwithoutpriorevaluationofthefactualdifferencesbetweenthePeruvianandArgentinecases.38Thecentralargumentofthiscriticismisthatinternationallawsendsusdownaslipperyslopeandleadstothewaningoftheruleoflaw.However,evenamidstsuchskillfulargumentation,itdoesnotseempossibletospeakofinternationallawasathreatinthesenseofbeinganintrusionthatcouldexacerbateasituationofviolence.Intheworstcase,criticsclaimthatinternationallawisabadinfluence,andexpresstheirdisapprovalofthedogmaticchoicetobedeferential to international law.

We can reaffirm the inability of international justice to truly pose athreat by taking a careful look at the arguments of those who criticize theArgentinecourts’opendialoguewith international justice.Thesecriticspaylittle attention to what international bodies have done, and continue to do,in relation toArgentina. Instead, they concentrate on theArgentine courts’response to the stimulus created by international law.With this in mind, Iconsider that the idea of international justice as an intrusion or a source of undueinfluenceonlocalactorshasbeendisprovedbytheveryargumentsofthosewhoputforththeobjection.Thosewhoclaimundueinfluenceorerrorininternationallaw’sinfluenceinArgentinadirecttheircriticismonlyatthedomestic judicial authorities who drive the legal process though their ownautonomousdecision-makingpower.

V. The Influence of International Oversight or Judicial Institutions on Domestic Actors

AsMargaretKeckandKathrynSikkinkobserved,theinter-Americansu-pranationalforumhasservedasasoundingboxorplaceforgrievancesforthosecitizenswhohavebeenblockedfromdomesticchannelsofaccessingjustice.39 Theinternationallegalsystemhasoperatedinthiswayasanalternativeforumfordomesticpolitics,inwhichthosewhoweredeniedaccesstojusticeintheirhome jurisdiction could seek recognition of their personal dignity. Still, thislevelofminimalconsiderationoftenfailstohaveanyeasilyvisibleimpactforalongtime:anexampleofthelackofimmediateresultsistheIAHRCReport28/92,whichdeterminedthatcertainlawsandpardonswereinconsistentwith

38 Leonardo G. Filippini,Algunos problemas en la aplicación del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en el fallo Simón de la Corte Suprema Argentina, in JudICIalIzaCIón de Crímenes de sIstema (MichaelReedHurtadoed.,2008).

39 marGaret KeCK & Kathryn sIKKInK, aCtIVIsts beyond borders (1998).

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theAmericanConventiononHumanRights.Itisdoubtfulthatthisreporthadanydecisiveinfluenceontheresumptionofcriminalprosecutionsin2003.

In theArgentine jurisprudence, however, there has been a strengtheningof the argument that certain solutions are needed in order to avoid theState’sinternational liability.This is especially true after the constitutional reform of1994.Justifyinganargumentwiththisrationaleiscommoninthetechnicaljargonofinternationalpubliclaw.However,ithasbeenperceivedasanargumentinfavorofinternationallaw’sauthorityandisnotparticularlypersuasiveatthelocallevel.This is howmany norms of international lawwere immediately incorporated,andalsohowdomesticlegalanalysishasbeenfosteredbytheexperienceoftheinternationalbodies.

TheInternationalCriminalCourt,inparticular,hashadamoderateinfluenceover thedomestic legal process.Therewas, andhas continued tobe, a strongacademicinterest,whichintensifiedduringthedebateovertheimplementationoftheRomeStatute.Thisgeneratedadebateontheclassificationofcertaincrimes.ThesedebateshaveprovedtobeavaluablecontributiontointerpretingArgentinecriminal lawat the timeof thestate-sponsored terrorism.These interpretationsandrulesareappliedintoday’scriminalcases,withampleexamplesofreferencestotheICC,ICTY,andtheICTRinnumerousjudicialopinions.

Theestablishedpracticeof looking to internationalcriminal tribunalshasbroughtaboutaninteresting,albeitlimited,outcome—debateoverthepossibleexpansion of criminal prosecution to members of armed organizations thatactedwithout State support. In response to certain public statementsmade byLuísMorenoOcampo40 and the interpretations of some authors, a new schoolofthoughtarose.ContrarytocriteriaestablishedbytheSupremeCourtandtheProcuratorGeneral,thisnewlineofthinkingsupportstheideathatArgentinahastheinternationalobligationtoprosecutecrimescommittedbytheguerrilla,eitheraswarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,orinvirtueofinternationalnormsaboutterrorism.41Theissue,however,hasbeenresolvedinvariousjudicialdecisions.Today,itseemsunlikelythatthispositionwillbemodified.

Ontheotherhand,therehavebeenfewproblemswiththeincorporationofinternationalnormsandjurisprudenceinthetermsofinternationalcriminallaw.Theonlyexceptionshavetodowiththenon-applicabilityofstatutesoflimitationstocertaincriminalprosecutionsandthenullityofthe“ImpunityLaws,”which,aswehavealreadyseen,hadbeenthemostdebated.Law26.200incorporatedthecriminalprovisionsoftheRomeStatuteintothedomesticlegalframework.Moreover,recentjurisprudenceon the reopeningof trials hasbeen incorporating the international

40 Las FARC pueden ser investigadas por “crímenes de lesa humanidad”,dIarIo perfIl,Mar.16,2008.

41 EmilioJ.Cárdenas,JavierVigoLeguizamón&CarlosA.Manfroni,el terrorIsmo Como CrImen de lesa humanIdad(2009).

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tribunals’jurisprudenceonmattersoftruthandcriminaljustice.Accordingtosomecritics,therehasbeenadegreeofmanipulationorinappropriateapplicationofsuchjurisprudence.Itendtothinkthat,althoughtherearesomeproblems,theArgentinacourts’legalinterpretationhasbeenproventobeconsistent.

VI. Foreign and International Jurisdictions

Alongwith the inter-American system’s relevance in theArgentine criminaljusticesystem,itisalsoworthnotingthatothercountrieshavegenerallyandconsistentlyfollowedasimilarlineofestablishingcriminalliabilityforArgentinestate-sponsoredterrorism.Inthisway,thesecountriesexertedpressureonArgentina,fundamentallymoralorsymbolic.ThishasallowedforcontinuityofthedenouncementsoutsideofArgentinaagainstthecountry’sclosedcriminaljusticesystem.

Among the earliest examples is theU.S.,which beginningwith the caseof Peña Irala v. Paraguay, thepathwasopenedforsomecivilcasesinvolvingArgentineperpetrators.Inthe1990s,numerousextraditionrequestsintheJosef Schwamberger and Priebkecases ledtheFederalChamberofLaPlataandtheSupremeCourtofJusticerespectivelytoissueopinionssupportinginternationalcooperationincriminalmattersandthenon-applicabilityofstatutesoflimitationsto crimes against humanity.While the “Impunity Laws” were in effect, thereweretwoimportantcasesinSpainagainstAdolfoScilingoandRicardoMiguelCavallo,whowaslivingatthetimeinMexico.

Both cases drew attention to the matter, and allowed the human rightscommunitytorallyaroundconcretepetitions.TheArgentinepoliticalenvironmentatthetimewashesitanttoauthorizetheseextraditions.Bythebeginningofthiscentury,theadministrationofthen-PresidentFernandodelaRuareceivedrequeststo cooperate with judicial processes in foreign jurisdictions, if theArgentinegovernment preferred not to address issues of impunity. There were criminalcasesagainstmembersoftheArgentinemilitaryinSpain,Italy,Sweden,France,andGermany.In thefirstcase,universal jurisdictionwasinvoked.In theothercases, jurisdictionwasbasedon the fact that theparticularvictims in thecasewerecitizensofthosecountries.42

Infact,thereopeningoftrialssince2003hasbeenenabledontwolevels:on the national level through the nullity of the “Impunity Laws” and on theforeignlevelthroughtherepealadecreebyex-PresidentdelaRuathatdidnotauthorize extradition in thementioned cases.Coincidentally, two transnationalsituationsprovided theopportunity for theArgentineSupremeCourt to definethecurrentdirectionofcriminalprosecution.TheArancibia Clavel(2004)case,

42 See, for example, theopinionat that timeofVíctorAbramovich,La decisión, en manos de la Justicia,dIarIo la naCIón,July15,2003.

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whichinvolvedamemberoftheChileansecretpolice,wastheprecursortomanyof the concepts that supported Simón (2005).Then in theLariz Iriondo (2005)case,whichinvolvedanextraditionrequestforamemberoftheETA,theBasqueseparatistterroristgroup,theArgentineSupremeCourtofJusticeestablisheditspositiononthescopeoftheconceptsofterrorismandcrimesagainsthumanity.

It is also worth mentioning the current international cooperation in theextraditionofthoseindictedintheArgentinecriminaljusticesystem.Theextraditionsmadeimportantcontributionstothedomesticcriminaljusticesystem.Consider,forexample,theextraditionfromSpainofformerTripleAagentRodolfoAlmirón43 or theextraditionfromUruguayofManuelCordero.44Similarcontributionshavebeenmadethankstothecooperationofindividualcitizensofothercountries,suchasthedenunciationofArgentinepilotJulioAlbertoPochforhisparticipationinthe“deathflights,”45claimsthatwerelatersupportedbySpanishandDutchauthorities.Thiscooperationnotonlyfacilitatesconcreteactionbythecriminaljusticesystemandtheadvancementofparticularcases,butalso,inacertainsense,servesasanimplicitendorsementofthecurrenttrajectoryofArgentinejudicialprocess.

Incontrast,thelegaltendenciesintheLatinAmericanregion,whileobserved,most likely have little impact on the transition process or judicial interventionvis-à-vis international law.There is a strong academic interest in developmentsinColombia,particularlywithrespecttotheroleofthatcountry’sConstitutionalCourtintheprotectionoffundamentalrightsandtheoperationoftheJusticeandPeaceLaw.ThereisalsointerestindevelopmentsinUruguay.InthecaseofChile,thePinochetcase,whichtookplacewhiletheimpunitylawswereineffect,madean especially important contribution to the legal community’s incorporation ofthe these issuesandprovokedcarefulobservationofdevelopments inSpain, theUnitedKingdom,andChile.Arguably,Venezuelapresentsthesamechallengesasother countries in terms of inter-American integration on human rightsmatters,particularly in light of its strong criticism of the inter-American system. TheBrazilianexperience,whichisdifferentfromthatoftheSouthernConecountries,doesnotseemtohaveaparticularly important impact,althoughcertaincriminalcasesrelatedtoOperationCondorseemtocoherewiththeapparentlygeneralizedtendency throughout the region. Finally, the Central American cases are readprimarilythroughthedevelopmentsoftheInter-AmericanCourtandCommission.

ItisdifficulttoconcludewhethertheactivitiesofinternationaljudicialbodiesanditsmembersdefineArgentina’sperceptionsoftransitionaljustice.Thereisnoempiricalmaterialthatwouldallowustoreachsuchaconclusion—wecanonlyspeculate.Mostnotably,thevisitoftheIACHRin1979gaverisetoarelationship

43 Almirón, sin excusas,dIarIo páGIna/12,Apr.1,2008;AlejandroRebossio,Rodolfo Almirón, jefe de los asesinos de la Triple A,el país,June13,2009.

44 Manuel Cordero fue extraditado a Argentina,el país,Jan.23,2010.45 “Deathflights”referstotheArgentinemilitarydictatorship’sexterminationpracticewheredisappeared

detaineesweredrownedbybeingthrowndefenselessintothewatersoftheRíodelaPlata.

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that exists today.The IACHR, alongwith the IACtHR, is the institutionwithpossiblythestrongestassociationtothedemocratictransitionprocess.

VII. The Challenge of Legal Reasoning

TheArgentinecaserevealsthevalueofcourts’legalreasoningeffortswithregardtocollectiveperceptions.Judgingfrommanyoftheinterpretations,inthetoneandcontentsofrecentdecisions,morethoughtfullegalreasoningindecisionsthatincorporatedinternationallawwouldhaveledtoamorefavorableperceptionofdomesticapplicationofinternationallaw.Themainperceptionunderlyingthecomplaintsofthehighestcourtisthatdomesticapplicationofinternationallawhastakenplacewithoutadequateconsiderationofitsvalueandpossibleconse-quences.Accordingtothislineofthought,ithasbeensaidthatcourtsreserveamarginofdiscretion,whichisbothinconvenientandinappropriateintheadjudi-cationofcases,particularlycriminalones.Moreover,theavoidanceofsubsequentinternationalliabilityisnotasufficientlypersuasiveargumentinordertojustifydomesticapplicationofinternationalstandards.

Inthisvein,criticsquestionArgentinecourtsonthefollowinggrounds:ap-plicationoftherulesofcustomaryinternationallawthathasnotbeenreinforcedbyconsistentpracticeintheinternationalcommunity;unjustifiedexaggerationoftheauthorityofinter-Americancaselaw;erroneousinterpretationofinternationalcourts’holdingsanddecisions;and,finally,applicationofinternationalruleswith-out any constitutional review, thus granting these rules impregnable authority. Idisagree,asdoothers,withsucharadicalcharacterizationofthestateandqualityofArgentinejurisprudence.Thereareinconsistencies,errorsincitation,andweak-nesses in certain arguments that couldprobablybebasedon sounder reasoning.However,IdonotfinditproblematictoreadallofthiscaselawasbeingcompatiblewithArgentina’shistoryofconflict,constitutionalvalues,andprinciplesofjustice.Still,thisdebatepersistsinthelegalcommunity.Insomecases,thisviewonlyaimstoweakentheprocessofjustice,thusrevealingitstotallackofconcernforlaworjustice.However,somebelievethatthereisarealdisconnectbroughtaboutbyjudg-eswhotakeacourseofactionthatdefiesthepredominantlegalunderstanding.

Thecourts’logicalshortcutsandweakargumentsinsupportofcertaindeci-sionsdonotreflectthenecessaryeffort,andhavethusunderminedthepersua-sivecapacityoftheirholdings.AdecisionasforcefulasorderingtheresumptionofaseriesofcriminaltrialspertainingtoapainfulchapterofArgentinehistorydemandedmoreeffortinlogicalreasoningandexposition.This,atleast,wouldhaveminimizedthelikelihoodthatdiscussionsonthetendenciesofArgentinejusticewouldberifewithdoubtsregardingtherolesofjudges.

Thisfactorshouldbegivenseriousconsiderationinthecreationofcommonagreementsonthelawfulnessofcollectivedecisions.Thedefendersofestablished

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practices, predominant routines, or habitual interpretationsmight react with acertaindegreeofdistrustwhenfacedwithdecisionsthatopenlyproposeadifferentorientationinthewayinstitutionsshouldreacttothedemandsoftransition.

Acknowledgingthenthattherearediverseformsoflegalreasoning,somedoubts remain:what extent canwe speak of profound disagreements, such asdiscrepanciesbetweentheConstitutionandinternationallaw?Ontheotherhand,towhatextentwouldthisbeadifferenttypeofdisagreement,sayanepistemicdisagreement,thathastodo,instead,withthefrictioncausedbyanovellineofreasoningthatisintroducedintoalegalcommunitythatisaccustomedtoadifferentorientation?TheArgentinecaseillustratessomeoftheproblemsassociatedwithbothtypesofdisagreement.

VIII. International Law in Context

Fromadifferentperspective,anotherquestionarises,quitenaturally,abouthowtoaccuratelycharacterizetheproblemofnationaladoptionofinternationallaw’snormsandprinciplesinacontextofdeeppoliticalandsocialchange,suchastransition.Howmuchofthetensioncomesfromtheinternationaljurisdiction-transition pair, and howmuch, truly, does it correspondwith the very tensioncausedbyjudicialinterventioninasocialproblem?TheideathatIproposehereisthatmanyofthedebatesthatarisehavenottodowithinternationallawandtheworkingsof its institutions,but ratherwith the legalassimilationofhighlysensitivematters,forwhichmanymaydefendapoliticalsolution.

Conceivingaproblemasanissueofrightsgenerallyimpliesthattheinterestsatstakearesocritical“thatothergoalsandpreferencesmustbesubordinatedtothem . . . .Rights are interests thatdeserve special andpreferentialprotectioninpublicagendasandpolicies.”46Judicialinterventionsclearlyexhibitastrongdoseoflegalisminfacingcertainmatters.Thisimplieslimitingcertainpossibledefinitionsoftermsinadiscussion,limitingavailableproceduresandremediesat hand, circumscribing policies, limiting discretion, and imposing lines ofargument.

Theinternationallawoptionhasenabledjudgestobecomeinvolved,bywayoftheirdecisions,inasocialprocessthatwouldotherwisehavefewerprinciplesandrulesof reference.Wegenerallydonotexpect judges toplaywithpurelypolitical rules. However, international law,with its array of norms related totransition,expandedthesphereofjudicialreview.Asaresult,judgescanmovethroughthepoliticalandsocialarena—notaspurelypoliticalactors,butratherstillwithintherealmofthecapacityconferreduponthembylaw.

46 MarceloAlegre,Pobreza, Igualdad, y Derechos Humanos,6(1)reVIsta JurídICa de la unIVersIdad de palermo 176 (2005).

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AtleastinArgentina,thereisadebatepreciselyontheflexibilityandpowersinherentintheserules.Thereisagenuineproblemwithinternationallaw—ithaseffectivelybeenusedbyjudgestoactivatetheirjurisdictiontoresolvecasesthattraditionallywerenotviewedasjusticiable.Thispeculiaritythatinternationallawseemstohaveofferedus—namelytheexpansionofjudicialpossibilities—maybeanecdotalifwethinkaboutthismattermoregenerally,andconsiderforexample,otherpossiblejudicialinterventionsinsociety’stransformativedisputes.

Thenon-textualistjudicialinterpretationofconstitutionalclausesonequalityforexample,ledtolegaladvancementsontopicsofraceanddiscrimination.Ajudicialdefensethatismorecommittedtoeconomic,social,andculturalrightscoincidedwithadoctrinethatvigorouslyassurestheirjusticiability.Theideaofthejudicialbranchasarefereeinpoliticalprocessesopensthepossibilityofgreaterjudicialpresenceinareasthathavetraditionallybeenstrictlyassociatedwiththepolitical sphere.There aremanyexamplesof this.All of these interpretations,along with calls for the implementation of transitional measures endorsed byinternational law,havebeen supportedand rejectedby schoolsof thought andpoliticalmovements.Whenweconsiderthewidearrayofjudicialinterventionsassociated with changes in value paradigms or significant modifications toexistingones,wealsofindchangesintheunderstandingofthejudicialrole.Thisunderstandingcanfosteramoreactiveormorelimitedapproachtoproceduralmatters,oritcanprovideconceptualsupporttonewwaysofunderstandingthescopeofcertainrights,suchastherighttoequality.

Therefore my hypothesis—which I believe merits greater discussion, atleast in legal communities like that ofArgentina—is that much of the attentionpaid to international law’s relationshipwith the domestic legal process truly andfundamentallyreflectsrivalformsofunderstandingthesubstantivemattersatstake.Theexpectantandhighlyrespectfulviewofpastinstitutionaladjustmentshasbeenassociatedwithnationalist theses,while the revisionist and skeptical viewof thevalueofconsolidatingunjustsolutionsadvancedbasingitselfoninternationalhumanrightslaw.Whathasalwaysbeenatstake—possiblytheonlythingthatisatstake—isthetensionbetweenthesetwoperspectivesofthesolutionof1980sand1990s.

TheevolutionofinternationallawasaframeworkofreferenceforvaluesandprinciplesofjusticewasmoreorlessconcurrentwiththeArgentinetransition.Internationallawhasalwaysbeenassociatedwiththeclamorofthehumanrightsmovement,startingwiththewatershedmomentmarkedbytheIACHRreportin1980.Atthesametime,thismovementservedtostrengtheninternationallawitself.Generallyspeaking,advocatesontheothersideofferedinterpretationsregardingthepossibilities for judicial intervention. In the1980s, theyargued that itwasimpossibleforcivilcourtstojudgecasesthatfellwithinmilitaryjurisdictionortoreviewthemilitary’sself-amnesty.Theirexplanationforthiswasthecriminallawprincipleofleniencyrequiringapplicationofthemostfavorableinterpretationofthelawtodefendants.Thissamelineofthoughthasbeenappliedmorerecently

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againstanykindofrevisiontothe“FullStop”and“DueObedience”lawsandagainsttheapplicationofrulesofinternationalhumanrightslaw.Theforegoingthussuggeststhattheappealofinternationallawwasnotsomuchitscapacitytotranscendborders,butratheritscapacitytoauthorizejudicialinterventionsintothepoliticalcontextoftransition.

Furthermore,theArgentinecaserevealsthatitstransitionwasnotdefinedfrom the outside through the application of international laws that are foreignto the country’s legal community.On the contrary, these foreign laws evolvedalongsidethetransitionprocessandreflected,atanygivenpoint,theaspirationsofjusticeofthosewholedthetransitionprocess.Pressuresfrom the outside were almost always linked to the efforts of amember of the domestic community.Similarly, in thefirstyearsofdemocracy theaspirations for justicemanifesteditself in legal constructions such as the supremacy of civil jurisdiction overmilitary jurisdiction and the thesis of perpetrator by means (autoría mediate)for leadershipinarepressiveapparatus.Later, itappearedasa justificationforintenselegalmonism.Aremainingtaskistofigureoutwhenwecantrulyspeakof a fundamental problem in the application of international law vis-à-vis theConstitutionand,ontheotherhand,whenweembarkuponthisdiscussionsimplybecausethereisanunderlyingissueofgreaterimportance.

Conclusion

It isdefinitelypossible to suggest that theuseof international law in theArgentinecasereflectsalegalviewthatrecognizestheexistenceofprinciples,notnecessarilypositive,thatweapplyinresolvingdifficultcases.47Itispossiblethatwewhounderstandthatthelawcanbenomorethanaspaceformoraldiscoursetendtobelesscriticalofthetransnationalapplicationoflawsandmorepronetoacceptthemasmanifestationsofuniversallyplausiblerulesandprinciples.

International law in the context ofArgentina’s transition seems to havepermittedthemanifestationofelementsofjusticethatwereabsentordeniedintheblack-letterlaw,butthatwerealiveinthecountry’slegalcommunity.Internationallawthusmayhavetriggeredamoraldiscourseandexpressed,throughstandardlawsandholdings,astrongmoraljudgmentcondemningimpunity.However,thishasnot impliedacompletedenialof thevirtueofpositive lawvis-à-vismoralreasoning.ThelegaldecisionsoftheArgentinetransitionarenotbasedonmeremoralprinciple,butratheruponrecognizedrules,holdings,andrespectedtextssuchastreatiesanddeclarations,whichhavenourisheddomesticlegalnormswithanotionofjusticethatwouldhavebeenotherwiseabsent.

47 See, e.g.,MaríaLourdesSantosPérez,Una filosofía para erizos: Una aproximación al pensamiento de Ronald Dworkin,26doxa 347 (2003).

Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, and Exceptionalism in South Africa

Howard Varney*

Duringthemid-1990sextraordinarymeasureswereinvokedinSouthAfricafor the purpose of nurturing the nation’s passage from a divided, violent, andoppressivepasttoapeacefulanddemocraticfuture.Thesemeasuresinvolvedthepartialsuspensionoftheruleoflaw.Theprocesshasbeencreditedwithhelpingto facilitateSouthAfrica’s successful transition and create “themiracle of therainbow nation.”1The apparent success of thiswell publicized and celebratedexperienceseemstohaveinspiredothercountriestoresorttosimilarmeasures.2 Someofthesecountrieshavebeeninvolvedingenuinetransitions,whileothershaveremainedinthegripofarmedconflict.

Countries have been quick to emulate the South African experiencewith someadopting themodeluncritically.Sighthasbeen lostof the fact thattransitionaljusticetoolsoftruth-seeking,reparations,justice,andamnestyplayedafairlylimitedroleintheoverallschemeofthetransitioninSouthAfrica.Theywerebutasmallpartofamuchlargerpackageoftoolsandinstruments.Thekeyto thesuccessof theSouthAfrican transition layfirstly in theagreements thatwere struckbetween former conflictingparties, followingyearsofpainstakingnegotiations.Thegluethatheldthetransitionalprogramtogetherwasthepromiseofanewconstitutionbasedagreeduponprinciplesthatwouldprovideenforceablerightsforall,includingminorities.Accountabilitywouldberequiredfromthosewielding public power. Independent institutionswould be establishedwith the

1 SvenLunsche,A Celebration of Miracles and Rainbows,fInanCIal maIl,May7,2004; JustinCartwright,The Rainbow Nation’s Miracle Turns a Little Rusty, the Independent,Apr.11,2004.

2 Forexample,KenyahaspassedalawthatincludesachapteronamnestythatiscopiedinlargepartfromSouthAfrica’sTRCAct(PromotionofNationalUnityandReconciliationAct34of1995).Nepalhasabillfortheestablishmentofatruthcommissionwhichincorporatesaprogramoftruthforamnesty.Indonesiapassedalawfortheestablishmentofatruthcommissionwhichofferedamnestyinexchangefortruth,althoughtheentirelawwasstruckdownasunconstitutionalbytheIndonesianConstitutionalCourt in2005.TheCommunityReconciliationProgrammeattachedtotheEastTimoreseCommissionforReceptionandReconciliation(CAVR)allowedforgrantingimmunityagainstprosecution in relation to lessseriousoffenses inexchange for truthand theperformance of an act of reparation. Colombia’s Justice and Peace Law makes provision forperpetrators togivea“freeversion”ordisclosureof the truthforpurposesofgainingreducedprisonsentences.AcivilsocietyorganizationinUganda,inconsultationwiththegovernment,hasdrawnupadraftNationalReconciliationBillthatincludesthegrantofamnestyinexchangeforfulldisclosureinrespectofoffensesthatdonotconstituteinternationalcrimes.

Chapter 12

* IexpressmygreatappreciationtoEdwardJeremy,internattheCapeTownofficeoftheICTJ,forcarryingouttheinitialresearchforthispaper.

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authoritytoholdpublicpowerresponsible.Thehighlyparticipatorynatureoftheconstitution-buildingprocesslaidthefoundationforthebeginningsofajustanddemocraticsociety.

Theeffortstodealwiththepast,namelytruth-seeking,conditionalamnesty,and reparations played a significant—but not central—role in SouthAfrica’stransition.Perhaps themost striking featureof the transitional justiceprogramwastheofferofan“insurancepolicy”toperpetratorsforallsidestouse,incasethey faced prosecution.3Thisinsurancepolicywasintheformofaconditionalamnesty:truthforamnesty.Shouldaperpetratorfacecriminalprosecutionorcivilaction,heorshecouldcashinthe“insurance”bydisclosingdetailsoftherelevantcrimesandgainanimmunityagainstalllegalconsequences.Thispolicypersuadedmany,particularlythoseintheformersecurityforces,toremaincommittedtoapeaceful transitionandnot return to arms.Thiswas the singlemost importantbenefitoftheSouthAfricanamnestyprogram.Itprobablyjustifiedthelimitedbutserioussuspensionoftheordinarycriminaljusticeprocess.

WhilemostSouthAfricansarelikelytoagreethatthepartialsuspensionoftheruleoflawwaswarranted,ithastobeaskedhowthisexceptionalmeasurehasimpacteduponthesystemofcriminaljustice.ThispapersuggeststhattheimpacthasbeenadeleteriousoneandthatSouthAfricaisstillstrugglingtodealwiththe ramifications of a policy of officially sanctioned impunity. Suchmeasureshave tended to takeon a life of their own, regardlessof temporal restrictions.Moreover,thishascreatedacultureofentlitementforperpetratorstospecialorlenienttreatmentwhichpersiststothepresentday.

InpartI,thischapterwillbrieflysetouttherelevantbackgroundtoSouthAfrica’stransitionandthemeasuresemployedtoaddressthepast.Itwillreviewthesporadicandlimitedattemptstobringperpetratorscriminaljusticeduringthe life of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC or Commission)andpost-TRC.Part II thendealswith the steps takenby theState to furtheraccommodateperpetratorsthroughmeasuresthatcloselyresembledtheTRC’sconditional amnesty. These included amendments that were made to SouthAfrica’s prosecutionpolicy and the introductionof a special dispensationonpoliticalpardons.Thissectionalsodealswiththeeffortsofcivilsocietytostoptheimplementationofthesemeasures.ThechapterthenassessesinPartIIIthecurrentstateofpost-conflictjusticeinSouthAfricaandconcludesthatvictimsarenoclosertojustice.PartIVexplorestherelationshipbetweentransitionaljustice measures and the criminal justice system, as well as the seepage ofsuch exceptional measures into the criminal justice system. It is proposedthat exceptional or lenient measures introduced to assist perpetrators of thepastoutsideofa transitionalperiodought tobe testedagainstmoreexacting

3 Theamnestywasalsoavailabletopersonsthathadalreadybeenconvictedofpoliticallymotivatedcrimes.

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standards.ThischaptersuggeststhattheexceptionalmeasurespursuedbytheSouthAfricanauthoritiesfailtocomplywithsuchstandards.

I. Background

South Africa’s apartheid era was characterized by political violenceand human rights violations, including massacres, killings, torture, lengthyimprisonment of activists, and severe economic and social discriminationagainst black SouthAfricans. Until the dying days of apartheid rule, SouthAfricawasacountryinwhichviolationsofhumanrightswerecommonplace.TheTRCfoundthattorturewascarriedoutasstandardpracticeagainstpoliticaldetaineesbymembersoftheSouthAfricanPoliceanditsSecurityBranch,andthat such practices carried the official approval of the political leadership.4 TheCommission receivedmore than22,000complaintsalleging incidentsoftorture.5 AccordingtotheTRC,humanrightsgroupsestimatedthatmorethan73,000securitydetentionstookplacein thecountrybetween1960and1990.TheCommissionfoundthatitwasestablishedpracticefortorturetoaccompanya detention, whichwas invariablywithout charge or trial.6 The CommissionfoundthattheformerStateperpetuatedimpunitybytoleratingandsanctioningthe practice of torture.7

A. Amnesty for Truth

In 1994, prior to the election of NelsonMandela as SouthAfrica’s firstdemocratically electedPresident, an interimConstitution8 was adopted for the purpose, as set out in the preamble, of “the promotion of national unity andthe restructuring and continued governance of SouthAfrica while an electedConstitutionalAssembly draws up a final Constitution.” The postscript to theinterimConstitutionreflectedtheoutcomeofthenegotiatedsettlementbetweentheformerconflictingparties.Inordertoachievetheobjectivesofnationalunityandreconciliationtherewouldbenopursuitofvictor’sjustice,butneitherwouldtherebeablanketamnestyforperpetrators.Thepostscriptauthorizedalimitedamnestywith“afirmcut-offdate”forpoliticallymotivatedoffenses“[i]nordertoadvance...reconciliationandreconstruction....”Itaccordinglycontemplated

4 truth and reConCIlIatIon CommIssIon of south afrICa report, Vol.6,§5,Ch.2,paras.16-17,25-49 (Mar.21,2003).

5 Id. para.22.6 Id. para.24.7 Id. paras.25-49.See also InterIm truth and reConCIlIatIon CommIssIon report,Vol.2,Ch.3

(1997).8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.

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theestablishmentofmechanisms,criteria,andprocedures,allregulatedbylaw,throughwhichamnestywouldbegrantedordenied.

TothisendthePromotionofNationalUnityandReconciliationAct34of1995(“theTRCAct”)incorporatedthegrantingofamnestyforpoliticaloffensescommittedwithinaspecifiedperiodwhenfulldisclosurewasmadeandcertainother criteria met (“the amnesty criteria”). In total, the Amnesty Committeereceived7112applicationsforamnesty,ofwhich849weregranted,5392wererejected,and871werewithdrawn.9TheAmnestyCommitteeoftheTRCwoundupitsworkandpublisheditsreportin2003.

B. Obligation to Follow-Up

OnOctober 29, 1998, and in compliancewith theTRCAct, the interimTRCReportwashandedtoPresidentNelsonMandelaandsubsequentlytabledinParliament.Itcomprisedfivevolumesofapproximately2250pages.AsubstantialportionofVolume5dealtwithvictimsofgrossviolationsofhumanrights.TheCommission specifically called for the investigation and prosecution of thoseperpetratorswhohadrefusedtoapplyforamnesty.10

In its Final Report dealing with the work of theAmnesty Committee,releasedonMarch21,2003,theCommissionstressedthattheamnestyprocessshouldnotbeseenaspromoting impunity. Ithighlighted theneedfor“aboldprosecutionpolicy” in thosecaseswhereamnestyhadnotbeenappliedfor inorder “to avoid any suggestion of impunity or of SouthAfrica contraveningits obligations in terms of international law.”11 The Commission called uponthe State, and in particular theNational ProsecutingAuthority, to investigateunsolveddisappearancecases.12

ThephilosophyunderpinningtheTRCanditsamnestyprocesswasaonce-and-for-all process of limited duration. Itwas amanifestation of a deliberatepolicy tocontain theprocessand tofinalize itwithina limitedperiod,so thatthenationcouldputthepastbehinditandmoveon.IndeedtherewasnothingintheconstitutionalandstatutorydesignoftheTRCprocessthatcontemplatedtheextensionoftherightsofperpetratorstoamnestyorimmunityfromprosecution.Itwasspecificallyenvisagedthatcriminalinvestigationsandwhereappropriate,prosecutions,wouldtakeplacewhereperpetratorswererefusedamnestyorhadfailed to apply for amnesty.This lay at the heart of the compact struckwithvictims.

9 fInalTRCreport, supra note5,Vol.6.10 InterIm trC report,supra note8,para.14.11 fInalTRCreport, supra note5,Vol.6,§5,Ch.1,para.24.12 fInalTRCreport, supra note5,Vol.6,§5,Ch.4,para.94.TheTRCrecordedsome1500cases

of disappearances. Id. para.52.

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Suchafar-reachingprogramrequiredaseverelimitationofthefundamentalrightsofthevictimsofhumanrightsviolations.Thesesacrificeswereauthorizedforthespecificobjectiveoffacilitatingapeacefultransitiontowardsademocraticorder.Mostvictimsacceptedthenecessaryandharshcompromisesthathadtobemadeinordertocrossthehistoricbridgefromapartheidtodemocracy.Theydidsoonthebasisthattherewouldbeagenuinefollow-upofthoseoffenderswhospurned theprocessand thosewhodidnotqualify foramnesty.TheStatewasaccordinglyrequiredtotakeallreasonablestepstoprosecutedeservingcasesinrespectofoffenderswhowerenotamnestied.

C. Criminal Justice Activity during the Life of the TRC

AtthetimeofthestartoftheSouthAfricanTruthCommissiontherewasnodedicatedbody in thecriminal justicesystem taskedwith investigatingandprosecutingpolitical crimesof thepast.Certainlynobodyexpected the taintedpolice to fill this role. This enormous task fell to two small ad hoc criminalinvestigations,onebasedinPretoriaandtheotherinDurban.Adhoc,becausetheprosecutionswerenotintendedtospecificallycomplementtheTRCprocess.IftheamnestyofferedbytheTRCwasregardedasthe“carrot”toincentivizedisclosures,theseinvestigationswerenotintendedtoprovidethe“stick.”Rather,theywereintended to address specific situations, see below.Therewas unfortunately nodedicatedandparallelcriminalinvestigationestablishedatthetimeoftheTRCtoprovidethenecessary“stick”orthreatofactualprosecution.

ThePretoriainvestigation,setupinearly1994undertheTransvaalAttorneyGeneral,wastaskedwithcleansingtheSouthAfricanPoliceofdeathsquads.TheDurban initiative, the InvestigationTaskUnitestablished in late1994,had thetaskofinterveninginthebloodyNatalconflict.Itattemptedtobookthosebehindtheorganizedhitsquads,orchestratedbytheSouthAfricanmilitaryandactingunderthecoverofthehomelandpolice.13Atthetimeofthesetwoinvestigationsthesuspects inquestionwieldedconsiderablepower. Itwas feared that if theywerenotchallengedandexposed,theymayplayfuturedestabilizingroles.14

Bothinvestigationsfacedenormousodds.ThePretoriainquiryachievedameasureofsuccesswiththeconvictionofColonelEugenedeKock,commanderof a police death unit.15ItwastheconvictionofdeKockthatleddirectlytothe

13 MelanieLue,A Short History of the Establishment of the ITU: Making Enemies - Dismantling KwaZulu Natal’s Hit Squads,in CrIme & ConflICt(1996).

14 HowardVarney, “TheRole of theFormerState inPoliticalViolence:OperationMarion:ACaseStudy,”(Mar.1997)(unpublishedreportsubmittedtothePresidentandtheTRC,onfilewithauthor).

15 EugenedeKock,formerheadofthecounter-insurgencyunit,Vlakplaas,wasconvictedinAu-gust1996onsixcountsofmurder,aswellasscoresoflessercharges,andwassentencedtolifeimprisonmentinOctoberthatyear.SeeMikeHanna,South African apartheid assassin jailed for life,Cnn.Com,Oct.30,1996,http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9610/30/s.africa/index.html.FerdiBarnard,amemberoftheSouthAfricanDefenceForce’sCivilCo-operationBureau,wasalso

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applicationsforimmunityagainstprosecutionofseveralseniorpoliceofficials.However,thePretoriainvestigationfailedtopursuetheseinvestigationstoreachthoseresponsiblefortheplanningandauthorizingofsuchatrocities,namelythegeneralsandthepoliticalleadership.

The Durban investigation focused on the roles played by the military insupporting the Inkatha andKwaZulu Police hit squads.16Whereas the Pretoriainquiry received the enthusiastic support of the Transvaal Attorney General,the Durban investigation did not experience the same support from the NatalAttorneyGeneral.TheNatalAttorneyGeneraldeclinedtoprosecutekeycasesonquestionablegrounds,andhedeliveredaperfunctoryperformanceintheonecasehedidprosecute,theMalantrial.ThecaseagainsttheformerMinisterofDefence,MagnusMalan, and several other senior ranking officers17 for the murders ofthirteenpeopleinanattackonatownshipnearDurbanendedinthecontroversialacquittalofallaccused.18Tocompoundtheproblems,thecourthearingthecasefailed to consider properly themass of evidence,whichnot only includedoralevidenceofhitsquadmembersandmilitaryofficersbutalsoauthenticatedmilitarydocumentsthatdirectlyreferredtotheuseof“hitsquads.”19Asaresultofthefailureofthiscase,veryfewmembersofkeyperpetratororganizations,themilitaryandtheInkathaFreedomParty(IFP),approachedtheTruthCommissionforamnesty.

Thelasttrialofanynotetotakeplacebeganin1997againstmilitaryColonelWouterBasson,headofanotoriouschemicalandbiologicalunitandpopulationcontrolproject.Bassonwasaccusedofforty-sixcountsofpoisoninganti-apartheidactivists. InApril 2002,Bassonwas acquitted by a Pretoria court following afailedattemptbytheprosecutiontohavethepresidingjudgeremovedfromthecaseonthegroundsofbias.WhiletheSupremeCourtofAppealconfirmedtheacquittal,theConstitutionalCourtpartlyreversedthisdecisionin2005byholdingthat crimescommittedoutside the territorial jurisdictionofSouthAfricacouldbeprosecutedwithinthedomesticcourts.Thisopenedthedoortofreshcharges

convicted in1998onvariouscounts, including twomurder charges.He received two life sen-tences.GideonNieuwoudt,WynandduToit,andMarthinusRaswerealsoconvictedin1996forthemurdersofthe“Motherwell4”andsentencedtobetweentenandtwentyyearsinprison.

16 TheDurbaninitiativealsoinvestigatedallegationsofhitsquadactivitybytheAfricanNationalCongressinthetownofRichmondintheKwaZuluNatalmidlandsandsecuredseveralmurderconvictions.

17 Altogetherthereweretwentyaccused.TheaccusedincludedtheformerMinisterofDefence,twoformerChiefsof theformerSouthAfricanDefenceForce(SADF),anumberofseniorofficersofMilitary Intelligence, theChief of Staff Intelligence, a security branch colonel, the deputysecretary-generaloftheInkathaFreedomParty,andsixInkatharecruits.ThesesixweremembersoftheSADF-trained“offensive”groupofOperationMarion,whowereallegedtohavecarriedouttheactualmassacreinKwaMakhutha.

18 State v. Peter Msane and 19 Others 1996, CaseNo.CC1/96,Durban&CoastLocalDivisionoftheSupremeCourt.

19 See HowardVarney& JeremySarkin,Failing to Pierce the Hit Squad Veil: A Critique of the Malan Trial,10 s. afr. J. CrIm. Just. 141(1996).

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beingpreferredagainstBassoninrelationtooffensesthathadtakenplaceoutsideSouthAfrica;however theNationalProsecutingAuthorityhasnotpursedsuchchargestodate.20

TherewasnostrategicplantoinvestigateandprosecutecrimesofthepastinSouthAfrica,notwithstandingthetruth-for-amnestyformulathatdemandedthattherebeacoordinatedcriminaljusticeresponse.Itwasnotenoughtosanitizeacriminalinvestigationfromacorruptpoliceforcethatwasunabletoinvestigateitself and its former masters. The same sanitization ought to have happenedwiththeprosecutionservices.Moreover,thecompositionofthejudiciarywasadebilitatingfactor.ThehandlingoftheMalancasebythecourtraisedquestionsastowhethersuchpoliticallysensitivecasesshouldbetreatedasnormalcriminalcasestobeallocatedtojudgeswhowereill-suitedtoadjudicatesuchmattersorwhether they shouldhave insteadbeenheardby specially appointedpanelsofrespected,independent-mindedjudges.

D. Post-TRC Developments

In2002,whentheTRChadfinallyconcludedtheamnestyprocess, theCommission submitted thefinal twovolumes of its report and handedovera list of 300 names to theNational ProsecutingAuthority for investigationandprosecution.Little action inpursuitof justicehas takenplace since thehandingoverofthislist.InthesameyearPresidentThaboMbekiexercisedhisexecutiveauthorityundertheConstitutiontopardonandreleasethirty-threeformerliberation-movementfighters.Governmentspokespersonsclaimedthateachpardonhadbeengrantedonacase-by-casebasis,butseriousallegationsof political bias were leveled because only members associated with theliberationforceswerepardonedwhereasnoneassociatedwiththeright-wingappearedtohavebeenconsidered.21AccordingtotheDepartmentofJustice,thesepardonedprisonershadappliedforamnestyundertheTRCsystembuttheir applications had been rejected. The former chairperson of the TRC,ArchbishopDesmondTutu,labeledthepardonsas“thethinedgeofageneralamnestywedge.”22

Thegrantingofthesepardonsledtoanumberofpardonapplicationsfromperpetrators associated with the apartheid order. In 2003, some 384 prisonersmadeapplicationsforpresidentialpardonsclaimingthattheyhadbeenconvictedofpoliticallymotivatedoffenses.Theywereallassistedintheprocessingoftheirapplications forpresidentialpardonsby the InkathaFreedomParty,whichhad

20 S v Basson 2005(1)SA171(CC);S v Basson2007(3)SA582(CC).21 South African Justice Minister Defends Controversial Presidential Pardon,BBCmonItorInG

afrICa,May22,2002.22 JohnBattersby,Pardons Make a Mockery of TRC,sunday Independent,May19,2002.

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beenalignedwiththeformerapartheidgovernment.TheTRCfoundthatInkathaFreedomPartymembersandsupportershadcommitted themosthumanrightsviolations.23TheMinisterofJusticefailedtoprocesstheirapplicationsforpardonsclaimingthattherewasnopolicyinplacetodealwithrequestsfor“politicallymotivated”offenses.24

InMarch2003theNationalProsecutingAuthorityestablishedthePriorityCrimesLitigationUnit(PCLU)topursue,amongothercases,mattersemanatingfromtheTRCprocess.Followinganauditofthe300cases,thePCLUindicatedthat justoverhalfof thesecasescouldnotbeprosecuted,but that twenty-onecases,with some further investigation,were ripe for immediateprosecution.25 However, theunitwas rendered impotentby the failureof theState toassignit investigatorsor to compel thepolice toprovide investigationofficers.Lessthan a handful of prosecutionswere taken forwardbetween2002 and2004.26 Theonlysignificantprosecution,thatofthreesecuritypoliceofficerswhoweredeniedamnestyforthemurderofthreeactivists,hasstalled.27FromNovember2004toDecember2005theNationalProsecutionAuthorityimposedaneffectivemoratorium on prosecutions of apartheid era cases on the pretext that a newpolicywas being developed for suchmatters. Civil society groups expressedtheirdisquietat thefact that thismeant thateveryday thatpassedduring thiseffectivemoratoriumsawcrimesprescribedintermsofSouthAfrica’sstatuteoflimitations.28Theypointedoutthattheprejudicesufferedbyaffectedvictimsandcommunitieswasirreversible.

Following the implementationofanewpolicy in2005(discussedfurtherbelow)theeffectivemoratoriumwasliftedbutdidnotresult inanysignificantprogramofprosecutions.TheonlymatterofnotetotakeplacewasonAugust17,2007whenapleabargainagreedtobetweentheStateandtheformerMinisterof Law and Order,Adriaan Vlok, the former police commissioner, and threeotherswas confirmed by theHighCourt.The accused had been chargedwiththeattemptedmurderofanti-apartheidactivist, theReverendFrankChikanein1989.Thepleabargainwasroundlycriticizedfor thelightsentencesagreedto(suspendedsentences)andthefactthattheaccusedwerenotrequiredtodisclose

23 InterIm trC report, supra note8,Vol.2,Ch.5,para.279.24 Chonco and Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another,T.P.D.

Caseno.21224/2007.25 AntonAckerman,Prosecutions Emanating from Conflicts of the Past,presentationat theICTJ

“DomesticProsecutionsandTransitionalJusticeConference”,May16–19,2005,Magaliesburg,SouthAfrica.

26 SeeCarnitaErnest,Reconciliatory Justice: Amnesties, Indemnities and Prosecutions in South Africa’s Transition,in after the transItIon: JustICe, the JudICIary and respeCt for the law In south afrICa12-14(CentrefortheStudyofViolenceandReconciliationed.,2007).

27 The case of The State v.Nieuwoudt and Two Others inrelationtothe“Pebco3”murdershasbeensuspendedpendingtheoutcomeofajudicialreviewoftheTRC’sAmnestyCommittee’sdecisiontodenytheperpetratorsamnesty.

28 CriminalProcedureAct,No.51of1977,§18.

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informationonhit listsandhit squads thatcouldhavebeenusedagainstotherseniorsecurityofficers.29

II. Dealing with “Political” Crimes

Theresponseofthegovernmenttocallsfromvictimsforjusticeandfromperpetratorsforleniencywastocreatean“AmnestyTaskTeam”inearly2004.Theteamwasrequiredtoconsiderandreporton,amongotherthings,“aprocessofamnestyon thebasisof fulldisclosureof theoffencecommittedduring theconflictsofthepast.”30Thenameofthistaskteamsuggesteditspriorities.ThisteaminturnrecommendedthecreationofaDepartmentalTaskTeamcomprisingmembers of the Department of Justice, the IntelligenceAgencies, the SouthAfricanNationalDefenceForce,theSouthAfricanPoliceService,CorrectionalServices,theNationalProsecutingAuthority,andtheOfficeofthePresident.Itsfunctionsweretoconsidertheadvisabilityofcriminalproceedingsforoffensescommittedduring theconflictsof thepastandmakerecommendations to theNational Director of Public Prosecutions—to consider cases appropriate forparoleorpresidentialpardon.Theworkofthesetaskteamspavedthewayforthegovernment’spolicyonexpanding theambitof impunity forperpetratorsthrough a new prosecution policy and a special dispensation on politicalpardons.

Thejustificationforthesemeasuresappearedtobeanendeavortodealwith“unfinished business” of theTRC.31 Such unfinished business included givingthemanyperpetratorsthatdidnotapplyforamnestyduringthelifespanoftheTRCanopportunitytocomeforwardanddisclose.Therewasaviewthatthereweremanyoffendersthatwishedtoapplyforamnestybutwerepreventedfromdoing so by leadership figures in various factionswho played a “gatekeeper”roleandintimidatedlower-order individualsfromcomingforward.Therewereothersthatapparentlydidnothavesufficientinformationandlackedlegaladvicetomakeamnestyapplications.Itwasarguedthatbycomingforwardnow,suchperpetratorswillcontributetobuildinggreaterknowledgeofthepast.Theremaybesomereluctanceonthepartofthegovernmenttospendvastsumsofmoney

29 See ole bubenzer, post-trC proseCutIons In south afrICa(2009)foranaccountofallpost-TRCprosecutions,aswellaconsiderationastowhetherSouthAfricahasviolatedinternationallawbynotinstitutingprosecutionsandbackgroundinformationonsecretconsultationstheSouthAfricangovernmentconductedwithformerapartheidgeneralsonthequestionofpost-TRCprosecutions.

30 Report: Amnesty Task Team,whichwasclassified“secret”anddisclosedduringtheproceedingsinthematterofNkadimeng & Others v The National Director of Public Prosecutions & Others,T.P.DCaseNo.32709/07.

31 SeethestatementofPresidentThaboMbekiquotedinChristelleTerreblanch,New Deal ‘Stops Short of General Amnesty’,IOL,May182003.

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prosecutingcrimesofthepast.32Finally,thereappearedtobeaconcernthatthepopulationatlargewouldnotacceptprosecutionsofliberationforcemembersandothersthatwereinvolvedintheresistancetoapartheid.

Civilsocietygroupsvoicedtheirconcernatindicationsthattheproposedpolicywouldamounttoarerunofthetruth-for-amnestyprocedureoftheformerTRC.Thegroupsurgedthegovernmenttocirculatetheproposedamendmentstotheprosecutionpolicyagencysothattheyandotherinterestedgroupsandindividualscouldprovidecommentandinput.Notwithstandingtheirearlywrittenrepresentations,theamendedpolicywasissuedinlate2005withoutsuchconsultation;atleastnotwiththecivilsocietygroupsrepresentingtheinterestsofvictims.

A. Amendments to the Prosecution Policy

OnDecember1,2005theNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions(NDPP)effectedchangestotheProsecutionsPolicyundersection179oftheConstitution(theamendedpolicy).Theamendedpolicypermitted theNDPP toemploy thesameamnestycriteriaasthoseusedbytheTRCwhendecidingwhetherornottoprosecuteoffendersinvolvedintheconflictsofthepast.VictimsandcivilsocietygroupsviewedtheamendedpolicyasanextensionoftheTRC’samnestyregimeundertheguiseofprosecutorialdiscretion.

The additional criteria included whether the perpetrator had made fulldisclosure;hisattitudetowardreconciliation;thedegreeofindoctrinationtowhichtheperpetratorhadbeensubjected;ashowingofremorse;anda“willingnesstoabidebytheConstitution.”Prosecutorswerealsorequiredtodescendintomattersofhighpoliticalpolicyanddeterminewhether aprosecutionwouldcontributeto “nation-building through transformation, reconciliation, development andreconstructionwithinandof”SouthAfricansociety.

Theamendmentstothepolicycontemplatedtheprosecutorsbeing“assisted”in their determinations by officials from theNational IntelligenceAgency, thedetectivedivisionoftheSouthAfricaPoliceServices,theDepartmentofJusticeandConstitutionalDevelopment, and theDirectorate of SpecialOperations (aunitwithintheofficeoftheNDPP).Ironically,theamendedpolicydeclaredthatthe“[g]overnmentdidnotintendtomandatetheNDPPto,undertheauspiceofhisorherownoffice,perpetuatetheTRCamnestyprocess.”33

The amendments accordingly allowed for the granting of an effectiveimmunityfromprosecutionevenincaseswheretherewassufficientevidencetoobtainaconviction;thecrimeinquestionisserious;thevictimwasinfavorofaprosecution;andtheapplicantdidnotapplyfororwasnotgrantedamnestyat

32 See the statement of Frank Chikane published in Christelle Terreblanche & Edwin Naidu,Apartheid Henchmen Take Up Offer of Indemnity,IOL,May112003.

33 See Nkadimeng & Others,T.P.DCaseNo.32709/07.

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theTRC.Moreover,theamendedpolicydidnotallowvictimstoseethe“truth”disclosedbyperpetratorsasthewholeprocesswastooccurbehindcloseddoors.

Acourtchallengewaslaunchedin2007tohavetheamendedpolicystruckdownasunconstitutional.Thecasewasbroughtbythewidowsofthe“CradockFour,”whowere abducted andmurdered by security police, and the sister ofNokuthulaSimelane,whowasabducted, tortured, anddisappearedby securitypolice.Theyweresupportedbythreecivilsocietyorganizations:theKhulumaniSupportGroup,theInternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice(ICTJ),andtheCentrefortheStudyofViolenceandReconciliation(CSVR).

TheapplicantsclaimedthattheamendedprosecutionpolicyallowedtheNationalProsecutingAuthorityto“re-run”theTRCamnestyprocessandgranteffectiveimmunitiesfromprosecutiontothosewhohadfailedtomakeuseoftheamnestyprovisionsoftheTRC.Itwasarguedthatthisnotonlyerodedtheintegrityof theTRCprocess, but it alsoundermined the ruleof lawand theindependenceoftheofficeoftheprosecutingauthority.Inaddition,itinfringedthe human rights of the victims, including their rights to life, dignity, andequality.Furthermore,thepolicyamendmentswerearguedtobeinbreachofinternational law.

ArchbishopDesmondTutufileda supportingaffidavit inwhichhestatedthattheattemptsbytheStatetopromoteimpunity

representedabetrayalofallthosewhoparticipatedingoodfaithintheTRC process. It completely undermined the very basis of the SouthAfricanTRCwhichprovidedatruthforamnestyformulaforaspecificand limited timeperiod.Aboveall, it stoodas abetrayalof allSouthAfricanswhoembracedthespiritoftruthandreconciliationinordertomovebeyondthebitternessofthepast.34

In its judgment inDecember 2008, the PretoriaHighCourt declared thepolicyamendmentsunconstitutionaland“arecipeforconflictandabsurdity.”Thecourtfoundthatthepolicyamendmentsamountedtoa“copyorduplication”or“copy-cat”oftheTRCamnestyprocess.Thiswasunlawfulbecause“whenthereissufficientevidencetoprosecute,the[NDPP]mustcomplywithitsconstitutionalobligation.”Thecourtfurtherfoundthat“manyofthecriteria...werenotrelevantforthepurposeofdecidingwhetherornottoprosecute.”Thecourtrejectedthesubmissionthatthepolicyamendmentsdidnotallowforanimmunitysincethevictimscouldstillbringaprivateprosecution.Accordingtothecourt,“crimesarenotinvestigatedbyvictims.Itistheresponsibilityofthepoliceandprosecutionauthoritytoensurethatcasesareproperlyinvestigatedandprosecuted.”35

34 SupportingaffidavitofDesmondMpiloTutu,Nkadimeng & Others,T.P.D.Caseno32709/07.35 Judgment,Nkadimeng & Others,T.P.D.Caseno.32709/07.

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B. Special Dispensation on Political Pardons

InNovember2007,then-PresidentThaboMbekiannouncedinajointsittingofbothhousesofParliamentthatheintendedtoestablishaspecialdispensationonpoliticalpardonsinordertoaddressthe“unfinishedbusiness”oftheTRC.Inearly2008hecreatedamulti-partyPardonsReferenceGroup (PRG) to solicitandconsiderapplicationsforpardonsforpoliticallymotivatedcrimescommittedbefore June 1999.36 The written parameters for Reference Group state that—because theTRC’samnestyprovisionshave lapsed—thePresident is invokinghis pardon powers.37UnliketheTRChowever,thePRGwascomprisedonlyofpoliticiansanditexcludedanyinvolvementofthevictims.Moreover,allofitsproceedingswere conducted secretly andnone of the applications for pardonshavebeendisclosedtovictims,interestedparties,orthepublic.

CentraltotheTRCprocesswastheacknowledgementofvictims.Butthespecialpardonsprocessgavenovoicetovictimswhatsoever.Thiswasnotamereoversighton thepartof theReferenceGroupand thePresident.ThePRGwasaskedonseveraloccasionstopermitvictiminputanditspecificallyrefusedtodoso.ThePRGalsorefusedanofferbyacivilsocietycoalitiontofacilitatevictiminput in thosecaseswhere theyhadrecommendedpardons.ThePRGhasalsodeclinedtodisclosewhichcasesitisrecommendingtothePresident.38

Pardon applicants include former PoliceMinister,Adriaan Vlok, formerCommissionerofPolice,JohanvanderMerwe,andagroupofright-wingersthatviciously attacked black people inKuruman in 1995; and a right-wingerwhobombed a supermarket inWorcester on Christmas Eve of 1996. Four peoplediedintheWorcesterbombing,twoofwhichwerenine-year-oldchildren.TheWorcesterbomberclaimsthathewasaprisonerofwar,eventhoughheattackedciviliansandhiscrimewascommittedmorethantwoyearsintoSouthAfrica’sconstitutionaldemocracy.Alistofsome121namesofprisonersandconvictedpersons recommended for presidential pardon was compiled by the PardonsReferenceGroup,throughaspecialpardonsprocess,andhandedovertointerimPresidentKgalemaMotlantheinMarch2009.39

36 PressRelease,Presidency,CommencementofPresidentialPardonsPeriod,Jan.16,2008.37 TermsofReferenceforPardonsReferenceGroup,publishedbytheDepartmentofJustice&Cons-

titutionalDevelopmentandavailableathttp://www.info.gov.za/events/2008/tor_pres_pardon.pdf.38 See thebackgroundsection to the foundingaffidavitofH.M.vanderMerwe in thematterof

CSVR & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others,CaseNo.15320/09,NorthGautengHighCourt.

39 Annex“I”tothefoundingaffidavitofPaulSnaidintheapplicationofRyanAlbuttforleavetoap-pealtotheConstitutionalCourt.Evenfromtheincompletelistofthoserecommendedforpardonit isapparent that therewassomethingseriouslyremisswith theprocess.Thoserecommendedfor pardon included an offender convicted for twenty-onemurders andfifteen attemptedmur-ders;anoffenderconvictedfornineteenmurdersandfourteenattemptedmurders;atleastsixteenoffenderseachconvicted for fourormoremurders;offendersconvicted, inaddition tomurderandattemptedmurder,forcrimessuchaskidnapping,robbery,arson,housebreaking,theft,and

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CourtactionwaspromptedbyPresidentMotlanthe’sdecisiononMarch13,2009not topermitvictim inputor lift theblanketof secrecyunderwhich thepardonsprocesshadbeenconducted.WhenthePresidentindicatedthatheplannedtogoaheadwiththepardonsprocess,acoalitionofcivilsocietyorganizations40 approached theHighCourt asamatterofurgency foranorder restraining thePresidentfromissuingpardonsunderthespecialdispensation.41

ThecoalitionarguedthatnotonlywasthepardonsprocessunconstitutionalbutitalsoviolatedthespiritandlegacyoftheTRC,whichupheldtherightsofvictims tobeheardbefore amnestywasgranted toperpetrators.Lawyersfor the coalition claimed that, since the President chose to impose specificcriteriaforthequalificationforapardon—namelydisclosureandtheshowingofapoliticalobjective—hewasobligedtoensureafairprocesstodeterminethat thecriteriaweresatisfied.Aone-sidedprocess, inwhichonlytheviewsofperpetratorsareheard,canneverdeterminewhetherthecriteriahavebeenmet.Thisrenderedtheprocessnotonlymanifestlyunjustbutalsoarbitraryandunconstitutional.42

In April 2009, the North Gauteng High Court issued an interim orderrestrainingthePresidentfromgrantinganypardonsundertheSpecialDispensationforPoliticalPardonspendingfinaldeterminationof the legalproceedings.TheCourtalsoorderedthatthePresidentandtheMinisterofJusticeprovidethecivilsocietycoalitionwithalistofprisonersrecommendedforreleasebythePardonsReferenceGroup.TheCourt found that that thePresidentwasbound to abidebyhis“lawfulpubliccommitment”thatthepoliticalpardonsprocesswouldbeconductedin“anopenandtransparentmanner,uniformlyandinstrictcompliancewithpre-determinedproceduresandcriteria”andthattheprocesswouldaccordwith the principles, values, and criteria of the TRC process, particularly itsamnestyprocess.43

The presiding judge held that this “commitment accords with the basicvaluesandprinciplesenshrinedintheConstitution”andthatvictimsshouldbeheard prior to the release of prisoners on pardon.Moreover he found that thePresidentmusthaveconsideredallrelevantinformationfromanyinterestedpartybeforemakinghisdecision.44

unlawfulpossessionofexplosives,weapons,andammunition.Thissuggeststhattheseoffenderswerenotpoliticaloffendersbutratherhabitualcriminals.Thishighlyirrationaloutcomewasnotsurprisinggiventhatnobodywasallowedtoconfirmorrebutclaimsmadebyperpetratorsthattheircrimeswerepoliticallymotivated.

40 The ICTJ, CSVR, Khulumani, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, the South AfricanHistoryArchive,theHumanRightsMediaCentre,andtheFreedomofExpressionInstitute.

41 NoticeofMotion,CSVR & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others,CaseNo.15320/09,NorthGautengHighCourt.

42 Applicant’sheadsofargument,CSVR & Others,CaseNo.15320/09.43 JudgmentandOrderofSeritiJ,Apr.28,2009,CSVR & Others,CaseNo.15320/09.44 Forthejudgmentandcourtdocuments,seehttp://ictj.org/en/news/features/2563.html.

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ThePresident and one of the right-wing interveners in the case took theHighCourt decision on appeal to the Constitutional Court.45 Thiswas arguedonNovember 11, 2009 and judgment is awaited. The outcome has importantimplicationsforvictims’rightsinpardonsandamnestyprocesses.

III. The State of Post-Conflict Justice in South Africa

Asmatters stand, theperpetratorswhoapplied forpoliticalpardons retaintheir convictions and criminal sanctions pending the outcome of this case.Prosecutors may no longer employ amnesty-type criteria for the purposes ofdeclining toprosecutedeservingcases.TheNationalProsecutionAuthorityhasagreed to pursue the cases handed to it by theTRC.However, prosecutors arestrugglingwithresourceconstraintsandthepolicehave,todate,declinedtoassignpoliceinvestigatorstothecases.Soinreality,notwithstandingthecourtvictories,victimsarenoclosertojustice.Victimsmaybeforcedtoapproachthecourtsagaintoreviewtheinactionofthepoliceandprosecutorsandcompelthemtoact.

The Constitutional Court in the BassonmattermadeveryhelpfulholdingsinregardtotheobligationsoftheStateinrespectofthecrimesofthepast.TheCourt asserted that:

There can be no doubt that the use of instruments of state tomurdercaptiveslongafterresistancehadceasedwould,inthe1980s,asbeforeandafter,havegrosslytransgressedeventhemostminimalstandardsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw....Suchmeansofwarfareareabhorrenttohumanityandforbiddenbyinternationallaw.46

Most significantly the Court confirmed that the National ProsecutingAuthority represents the community and is obliged under international law toprosecutecrimesofapartheid:

[T]heState’sobligationtoprosecuteoffencesisnotlimitedtooffenceswhichwerecommittedafter theConstitutioncame into forcebut alsoappliestoalloffencescommittedbeforeitcameintoforce.ItisrelevanttothisenquirythatinternationallawobligestheStatetopunishcrimesagainst humanity andwar crimes. It is also clear that the practice ofapartheidconstitutedcrimesagainsthumanityandsomeofthepracticesoftheapartheidgovernmentconstitutedwarcrimes.47

45 Ex parte Ryan AlbuttinthematterbetweenCSVR & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others CCT54/09.

46 SvBasson2005,(1)SA171(CC),paras.179-180.47 SvBasson2005,(1)SA171(CC),para37.

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SofartheringingwordsoftheConstitutionalCourtseemtohavefallenondeafears.Fewcaseshavebeenbroughtintermsofdomesticcriminallaw,letaloneinternationallaw.AccordingtotheheadofthePCLU,theprosecutingunitdealingwiththe“TRCcases,”thereareseveralobstaclestobringingprosecutions.Theseincludethelackofinvestigativecapacitywithinhisunit;thefactthattheSouthAfricanPoliceServices arenotkeen to takeon thecasesdue to “thepoliticaldimensionsattachedtothem,aswellastheheavyworkload”;theprescribingofcertaincrimes; the introductionofnewguidelines for theprosecutionof casesarising from theTRC process in the amended policy (now struck down); andthepassageoftime,especiallyinrelationtoillnessordeathofperpetratorsandwitnesses.48

ThedesignoftheTRCprocesswasnevermeanttoclosedownprosecutions.TheTRC itself called for robustprosecutionsof themostdeservingcasesandevensubmittedalistofsuchcasestotheprosecutingauthority.However,SouthAfrica’spoliticalelitehasshamefullycloseddownandeffectivelystoppedsuchprosecutionsforcingvictimstoresorttothecourtstoprotecttheirrights.

IV. The Relationship Between Transitional Justice and the Criminal Justice System

TheTRC representedwhatDesmondTutu described as a “thirdway,” acompromisebetweenNuremberg-styleprosecutionsontheonehand,andblanketamnestyornationalamnesiaontheother.49InSouthAfrica,this“thirdway”—aconditionalamnestyoftruth-for-amnesty—waslargelyaresultofapoliticalcom-promisereachedinthelatterstagesofthetransitionfromapartheid.

Thesuccessofthisdesignrestedentirelyonprovidingperpetratorswithanincentivetocomeforward.Thisincentivedependedlargelyontheperceptionof the threat of a criminal investigation, prosecution, and conviction. Theequation was a simple one: the greater the threat, the greater the incentive.Theconverseappliedwithequal force.Once this equationwasagreedupon,thetruthprocesswasinextricablytiedtothecriminalprocess.Littleattention,however,wasgiventothecreationofadedicatedparallelcriminalinvestigationandprosecutionofpoliticaloffenders,withmostresourcesdevotedtosettinguptheTruthCommission.

Instead of recognizing that there ought to have been an umbilical cordbetween the criminal justice process (“the stick”) and the truth commissionprocess(“thecarrot”),theTRCtendedtopresentitselfasanalternativetocriminalprosecutions.Asidefromthepoliticalimperatives,amnestywasfurtherjustified

48 Ackerman,supra note26.49 desmond tutu, no future wIthout forGIVeness30(1999).

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onthebasisthatcriminaljusticemechanismswouldhavebeendifficulttopursueduetoacompromisedjudiciary,destructionofrecords,andconcernsthatholdingtrialswouldbetoodisruptivetosocietaltransition.50TheunsuccessfulattemptstoconvictWouterBassonandGeneralMagnusMalantendedtosupportthisview.The amnestyprocessmeant investigations and court caseswere inmost casessuspended pending completion of the process. Sadly the vast majority of thesuspendedcaseswerenotrevivedandthecontinuedpassageoftimemakestheirrevivallesslikely.

Moreover,theTRCactuallyexpressedapreferenceforasomewhatlimitedapproachtoprosecutions:“whereamnestyhasnotbeensoughtorhasbeendenied,prosecution shouldbe consideredwhere evidenceexists that an individualhascommittedagrosshuman rightsviolation. . . . considerationmustbegiven toimposingatimelimitonsuchprosecutions.”51AudreyChapmanandHugovanderMerwehavecriticized theTRC’s“morallyambiguous”stanceonamnesty,arguingthat“[i]nsteadofviewingtheamnestyprocessasanecessaryevil thatwassaddledthroughtheconstitutionandtheTRCact,thecommissionactivelydefendeditsmoralityandpresenteditasaspaceforcontrition,reconciliation,andtruthrecovery.”52

Thepost-TRCpoliticaldevelopmentsdescribedinthischapterhavegivenrise to legitimate concerns that a culture of impunity in respect of politicallymotivatedcrimeshaspermeatedthecriminaljusticesystem.Withinthelastfiveyears, the SouthAfrican government has attempted to implement a series ofmeasures that risk furtherbolstering thegrowingpoliticsof impunity inSouthAfrica.TheeffectivererunningoftheTRCamnestyprocessundertheguiseofprosecutorialdiscretionandthepresidentialpardonprocesssuggestthatamnestyhasbeendecoupledfromitsexceptionalcontextandincorporatedintotheordinarycriminaljusticesystem.

A. Testing Exceptional Measures Outside of Transitions

This chapter has suggested that a strong justification is needed for thesuspensionofthenormalcriminaljusticeprocess,eveninatransition.Thequestionthenarisesastowhatkindofjustificationisrequiredfortheincorporationofsuchexceptionalmeasureswithinasocietythathascompleteditstransition.Isuggestitfollowsthatsuchmeasuresshouldbetestedagainstamoreexactingstandard.Amorecompellingjustificationshouldbedemanded.Moreover,thebenefitsof

50 AudreyR.Chapman&HugovanderMerwe,Reflections on the South African Experience, in truth and reConCIlIatIon In south afrICa: dId the trC delIVer? 296(AudreyR.Chapman&HugovanderMerweeds.,2008).

51 fInal trC report, supra note5,at309.52 AudreyR.Chapman,Perspectives on the Role of Forgiveness in the Human Rights Violations

Hearings,in truth and reConCIlIatIon, supra note51,at84.

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suchmeasuresshouldbecommensurablyhigherthanonewouldhaveexpectedduringtheactualtransition.53

SouthAfrican author and journalist Jonny Steinbergmade the followingperceptiveobservationconcerningthepossibilitiesofasecondamnestyin1999:

[I]ntheAZAPOcase,54 the Constitutional Court did not need to speculate. IthadbeforeitinblackandwhitethenegotiatedtermsofSA’stransitionto democracy. It knew of an agreement between the protagonists thatconstitutional democracy would never be born unless justice wassuspended. Ruling against amnesty thenwould have been a rash andarrogant betrayal of thosewhomade constitutionalism itself possible.Butthatwasthen.

ItmaybethatwhatisworryingMbekiisthequestionofgovernance.SAwouldbeamoredifficultplacetogoverniftrialsaboutapartheideradeeds hit the court rolls every year. Perhaps such trialswould indeedproduce a political culture that looks backwards rather than forwards.Perhaps it would make it harder to reconfigure the political terraininto shapes undreamedof under apartheid.PerhapsMbeki’s dreamofgovernmentbybroad-basedconsensuswouldwitheranddie.

Yet if this is the casewe are no longer bartering justice for thefutureofconstitutionaldemocracy,butforconvenience.Wearesayingthatsuspendingjusticeisnotaconditionoftheneworder’ssurvival,butaconditionofmakingiteasiertomanage.Ifthatisthecase,itisnotatallclearthatthebarterisanacceptableone,forwearenolongersuspendingthe rule of law in order to protect its posterity; its posterity is already as sureasitcanbe.55

Whena transitionhasended theassessmentof thesuspensionof theruleof lawmayno longerbe testedagainst former transitional imperatives.56Suchmeasures canonlybe tested against themore stringent standardsdealingwithlimitations of rights, which are normally spelt out in a constitution.57 In the

53 JonKlaaren&HowardVarney,A Second Bite at the Amnesty Cherry? Constitutional and Policy Issues,3s. afr. l.J. (Nov.2000)(republishedwithapostscriptinthe proVoCatIons of amnesty (CharlesVilla-Vicencio&ErikDoxtadereds.,2003).

54 AZAPOvPresidentoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica1996(4)SA671(CC).55 JonnySteinberg,Amnesty Quandary Looms for Judges,busIness day,June8,1999.56 However,differentconsiderationsmayverywellapply in relation to the testingofexceptional

measuresinasocietythathasyettoundergotransitionandisstillinthegripofconflict.57 ThetestundertheSouthAfricanConstitutionof1996issetoutinsection36:

TherightsintheBillofRightsmaybelimitedonlyinoflawofgeneralapplicationto the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open anddemocraticsocietybasedonhumandignity,equalityandfreedom,takingintoaccountallrelevantfactors,includingthenatureoftheright;theimportanceofthepurposeofthelimitationthenatureandextentofthelimittherelationbetweenthelimitationanditspurpose,lessrestrictivemeanstoachievethepurpose.

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firstplace thereshouldbenoretreatfromprotectionsandchecksandbalancespreviously provided for, such as full disclosure; an independent and impartialadjudicationoftheproportionateassociationofactstopoliticalobjectives;afairdegreeoftransparencyandopenness;strongvictims’rightsofparticipationandconfrontation;andanattenuatedrighttoreparations.58

Any new amnesty or leniency would need to meet a higher standard inrelationtotruth.WhileJonKlaarensuggeststhatthereisaformofhumanrightstruth thatpersistswithinandwithout transitions, the truth-for-amnestybargainwouldhavedifferentpricesdependingonthecontext.59Anon-transitionaltruth-for-amnestymeasurewouldneedtomeetahigherlevelofdisclosureoftruthinordertobejustified.Thespecificproceduresofanynewlegalframeworkwouldneedtobejustifiedsolelyonthebasisofwhetherornottheywillprovideforthefulldisclosureofinformationsuchthatitadequatelycompensatesextinguishingtherightsofthevictims.60

B. South Africa Fails the Test

TheexceptionalmeasuresintroducedinSouthAfricafollowingthetransitionfailonallcounts.First,nocompellingjustificationisprovided.WhileSouthAfricafacesmanyseriouschallengesitcannotbesaidthatapplyingtheruleoflawtothosewhodeclinedtoparticipateintheTRCamnestyprocesswillthreatenthenewconstitutionaldemocraticorder.Suchmeasuresarenottakentoensurethesurvivaloftheconstitutionaldemocracybutratherforthesakeofexpedience.

Second,insteadofretainingandstrengtheningtherightsofvictims,thenewmeasuresdoawaywiththem.Indeedthemeasuresarecontemptuousofvictims’rights and needs. The imperative of delivering the truth is also disregardedgiven thatbothprocesseswere largelysecretanddisclosurerequirements lessdemanding.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the exceptionalmeasuresemployedduringSouthAfrica’stransitionhavetakenonalifeoftheirown.Inthepost-transitionalphase,thesemeasuresnowdictatethehandlingofawholeclassofcrimes,theso-calledpoliticalcrimesofthepast.

Itwassubmittedonbehalfofvictimsinthecourtchallengesdescribedabovethatcertainimpactsofsuchmeasureshavebeenalreadydetected.Theseinclude

58 Klaaren&Varney,supra note53,at588-89.59 Klaaren&Varney,supra note53,at588-89.60 See AZAPO, 1996(4)SA671(CC), para.20.

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thegenerationofapublicperceptionthatthereareveryseriouscrimesthatarenot taken seriously by the prosecuting authority and the State, namely crimescommittedduringtheconflictsofthepast,includingmurder,torture,andforceddisappearances;wherecrimesarecommittedwithapolitical agenda there is astronglikelihoodthattherewillbenoconsequences;thecommissionofcrimesisaccordinglyalegitimatepoliticaltool;andshouldpoliticallymotivatedconflictariseagain,thoseinvolvedneednotbeconcernedabouttheconsequencesoftheiractions.61

Whiletheremayhavebeenstrongjustificationfortheuseofanexceptionalmeasure such as conditional amnesty, SouthAfrica is still grappling with thefallout.Thissuggeststhatsuchmeasuresshouldonlybeusedasanabsolutelastresort.Anadditional consideration is theappetite andcapacityof a country toprosecutecaseswithvigorforpurposesofvalidatingtheconditionalamnesty.Inmostpost-conflictandpost-authoritariansituations,prosecutingauthoritieslackskills, resources,and infrastructure topursuesuchcases.Prosecutorsareoftenpoliticallymanipulatedtodropsensitivematters.Thisoutcometendstoundermineordiscredittheentiretruthandreconciliationprocessandaddsconsiderablytothetraumaofvictims.

The actual impact outside of the class of political crimes has yet to bedetermined,butitispossiblethatthedoctrinesbehindsuchmeasureshaveseepedinto thecriminal justice systemmoregenerally.Thismay serve to explain theleniency thathasbeenaccorded to seniorpoliticalfigures.62There isnodoubtthatperpetratorsofpoliticalcrimeshavecome toexpect lenient treatmentandthat such expectationsmay have been assumed bymany in the political elite.This is regardlessof the fact that theirmisdemeanorshavenothing todowithpoliticalstruggle.Acultureofentitlementtolenienttreatmentwill takerootinSouthAfricaunlessfirmstepsaretakentorespecttheruleoflaw.

61 SeeRuleofLawsection:Applicants’HeadsofArgument,Nkadimeng & Others,T.P.D.CaseNo.32709/07.

62 See, e.g., MichaelTrapido,If Zuma Immunity is Speculation Convene Arms Deal Inquiry, thouGht leader,Jan.19,2009;andrew feInsteIn, after the party: a personal and polItICal Journey InsIde the anC (2007).

Power of Persuasion:Impact of Special War Crimes Prosecutions on Criminal Justice in Bosnia and Serbia

Bogdan Ivanišević

ThispaperexaminestherelationshipbetweentwosetsofcriminaljusticeinBosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)andSerbia:transitionaljustice(“extraordinary”)measures and regular (“ordinary”) criminal justice. The “spill-over effect” oftransitionaljusticemechanismsuponordinarycriminaljusticehasbeenmodestinbothcountries.However,one should refrain fromconcluding from this thatthe power of special transitional justicemeasures to affect ordinary justice isinherently weak. Each context is different, and the prospects for long-termimpactinBiHdifferfromthoseinSerbia.Additionally,ittakestimeforeffectsoftransitionaljusticetobefelt.InBiHandSerbiaalike,moretimeisneededforfinalconclusions.

Inthisexaminationofspecial(transitionaljustice)measuresinthefieldofcriminalprosecutionsinBiHandSerbia,thenotionsof“special”and“transitional”arenotusedinterchangeably.Somemeasuresofcriminaljusticecanbeappliedina“special”manner,withoutbelongingtotherealmoftransitionaljustice.Forexample,prosecutions fororganizedcrime inbothcountries contain importantspecialfeatures,buttheyarenotmeasuresoftransitionaljusticeastheyaddressongoing violations of the penal code by private individuals rather than massviolationsofhumanrightscommittedinthepastbypersonswithsomemeasureof state or quasi-state power.Conversely, the judiciary in a given country cancontribute to transitional justice while operating under altogether “ordinary”rules.CantonalanddistrictcourtsinBiH,whichfordecadesfunctionedmuchinthesamewaythattheydotoday,areacaseinpoint.

For these reasons, this paper proceeds on the understanding that in theBosnianandSerbiancontextspecialmechanismsoftransitionaljusticeinthefieldofcriminalprosecutionsarelimitedtothefollowing:(1)theInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY);(2)the“hybrid”WarCrimesChamberoftheCourtofBiH(BWCC)andtheSpecialDepartmentforWarCrimesintheBiHProsecutor’sOffice(SDWC);and(3)theOfficeoftheWarCrimesProsecutorinSerbiaandtheWarCrimesChamberoftheDistrictCourtinBelgrade.

These institutions operate within the framework of transitional justice,becausetheirpurposeis toprosecutewarcrimescommittedin thepast.But inwhat sense are they special?WhileitisquiteobviousinthecaseoftheHague-basedinternational adhoctribunal,itmaybelessobviousinthecaseofthetwo

Chapter 13

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Bosnian institutionsand theSerbiancounterparts.The latter, in contrast to theICTY,arelocatedintheregionforwhichtheydispensejusticeandtheircreatorsenvisagedthemtobeinstitutionsoflongduration.TheBWCCandtheSDWCinBiHarespecialbothbecauseofthecrucialroleplayedbyforeignjudgesandprosecutorsandtheirdetachedplaceinthecountry’scriminaljusticearchitecture.TheCourtofBiH,ofwhichtheBWCCisapart,hasitsownexclusiveappellatechamber.TheCourtdoesnothavesuperiorjurisdictionoverthecourtsofotherjurisdictions in the BiH. Similarly, the BiH Prosecutor’s Office cannot issuebindinginstructionstootherprosecutorsinthecountry.InSerbia,theWarCrimesChamber of theDistrict Court in Belgrade and theOffice of theWar CrimesProsecutorare integrated into theordinarystructures—but theyhaveexclusivecompetencyoverwarcrimescases,andthusaspecialcharacter.

Asmentionedabove,organizedcrimetrialsinbothcountriesare“special”inseveralimportantaspects.Thepowertoprosecuteortryoffenseswithelementsoforganizedcrimeresidesinspecialstructuresinthepolice,prosecutorialoffices,andcourtchambers.Furthermore,inSerbiatheapplicablecriminalprocedurerulesinmattersrelatingtoorganizedcrimediffertoacertainextentfromtherulespertainingtoordinarycrimes.BothinBiHandinSerbia,organizedcrimeprosecutionsarealsophysicallyseparatefromtherestofthejudiciary.Theytakeplaceinspeciallyconstructedbuildingsthathousethejudgesandprosecutorsfororganizedcrimeandwarcrimes.Becauseorganizedcrimetrialsfalloutsideofthescopeoftransitionaljustice,thischapterwillexaminethemalongwithothersegmentsof“ordinary”criminaljustice—warcrimestrialsbeforeordinarycourts(inBiH)andallothercriminaltrialsbeforeordinarycourts(inBiHandinSerbia).

Thedifferentareasofordinarycriminaljusticehavebeenaffectedtosomedegreeby thepracticesdevelopedwithin theframeworkof transitional justice.Examplesofpositiveeffectsinclude(1)thetrialsinBiH,includinginnon-warcrimecases,haveemployedamoreefficientcriminalproceduremodeledontheICTYprocedure;(2)someelementsofICTY-likeadversarialprocedurehavebeengraduallyintroducedintothemainlyinquisitorialcriminalprocedureinSerbia;(3)prosecutorsandjudgesintheordinarystructuresinBiHthatdealwithwarcrimeshaveincreasinglyusedICTYjurisprudence;(4)prosecutorsandjudgesintheordinarystructureshavetoacertainextentusedthe“bestpractices”developedbytheBWCCandtheSDWC;(5)thenumberofwarcrimesprosecutionsbeforeordinarycourtsinRepublikaSrpska,oneofBosnia’stwoconstituentparts,hasincreased;and(6)witnesssupportmechanismsinnon-warcrimescasesinSerbiahavebeenextended.

Atthesametime,therelationshipbetweenthetwoframeworksofjusticeinBiHhasnotbeen tension-free. Inparticular, theuseofdifferentsubstantivelawshasledtosignificantdiscrepanciesinsentencing.SuchtensionsarelargelyabsentinSerbiaastherehasbeenscarceinterconnectionbetweenthetwotracksof justice.

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Part I of this chapter begins by presenting the origins of the specialprosecution structures in BiH and Serbia, and Part II briefly describes thestructures themselves. Part III presents someof the positive effects of boththe ICTYand thenational-level structureson theordinary jurisdiction.Thetensions experienced and possible negative effects are analyzed in Part IV.Finally, Part V concludes by reflecting on whether there is a tendency forthe special measures to be normalized into the ordinary judicial systemand considering the overall contribution of transitional justice in these twoparticular cases.

I. Special—But Less Urgent than the Organized Crime Counterparts

Special structures for the prosecution of war crimes in BiH and Serbiawereestablishedaftersimilarmodelshadbeenintroducedfortheprosecutionoforganizedcrime.Thechronologicalpriorityofthelatterstructureshaslimitedthepotentialimpactofthespecialwarcrimesprosecutionsontheprosecutionsfororganizedcrime.

Theestablishmentof the ICTY in1993was a consequenceof a lackofcommitmentbythegovernmentsintheregiontoprosecutewarcrimes.By2003-2004, when the special mechanisms in BiH and Serbia were established, theauthoritieshadbecomemorereceptivetodemandsforprosecutionbutstilldidnotconsideritapriority.Decision-makersinbothcountriesconsideredtacklingorganizedcrimethetaskofprimaryimportance.Thepushforspecialprosecutionofwarcrimescamefromtheoutside—theICTY,intergovernmentalorganizations,andtheUnitedStates.

A. BiH: ICTY Added Special Prosecution to the Reform Plate

InBiH,theOfficeoftheHighRepresentative(OHR)wastheeffectiverulerofthecountryinthefirstdecadeaftertheendofthewar,whichhadlastedfrom1992 to1995.1TheOHRendeavoredearlyon topush forwardcomprehensivereformoftheBosnianjudiciarytoassurejudicialandprosecutorialindependenceandcompetence.Thereform’skeyobjectivewastocurbrampantcorruptionandorganizedcrime—themajorobstaclestopoliticalandeconomicreconstructionof

1 TheDaytonPeaceAgreement,whichendedthearmedconflictinBiHinNovember1995,createdtheOHRtorepresenttheinternationalcommunityinBosnia.In1997,theOHRwasendowedwithspecialpowers,commonlyreferredtoastheBonnpowers,includingthecapacitytoimposelaws.Thepowersof theOHRexemplified the statusofBiHasade factoprotectorate: internationalauthoritiescarriedoutnation-buildingandforeignsoldiersguaranteedsecurity.

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thecountryravagedbywar.2AnineffectivejudiciaryandoutdatedlawsinBosnia’stwo“entities”3—theFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina(FederationofBiH)and Republika Srpska—made successful prosecutions for corruption, moneylaundering,andothereconomiccrimesextremelyrare,ifnotaltogethernonexistent.4 Asasteptowardtheeffectiveprosecutionoforganizedcrime,inMarch2003theOHRcreatedaSpecialDepartment forOrganizedCrime,EconomicCrimeandCorruptionintheProsecutor’sOfficeofBiH.5ThefirsttrialsfororganizedcrimestartedinMay2003,twoyearsbeforetheBWCCbecameoperational.6

Thematuringapproachofdecision-makerstotacklingorganizedcrimeinBiHcoincidedwiththecrystallizationofthe“completionstrategy”fortheICTY,basedinTheHague.7InJuly2002,theUnitedNations(UN)SecurityCouncilendorsedajointreportbythePresident,Prosecutor,andRegistraroftheICTY,whichenvisagedthetransferofcasesinvolvingintermediary-andlower-levelaccusedtocompetentnationaljurisdictionsasthemostefficientwaytoallowtheTribunaltocompletealltrialactivitiesintimelymanner.8Thepreviousyear,inNovember2001,thethenChiefProsecutoroftheICTY,CarladelPonte,arguedinaspeechattheUNthatBosniashouldhaveamoreactiveroleintryingwarcriminals.9

TheprioritiesoftheOHRandtheICTYconvergedduring2002.InJulyofthatyear,thethenPresidentoftheICTY,JudgeClaudeJorda,toldtheSecurityCouncil that a Chamber with special jurisdiction to try serious violations ofinternational humanitarian law shouldbe establishedwithin theCourt ofBiH.

2 See Sebastian van deVliet,Addressing Corruption & Organized Crime in the Context of Re-establishing the Rule of Law, in deConstruCtInG the reConstruCtIon: human rIGhts & rule of law In postwar bosnIa and herzeGoVIna205,228-30(DinaFrancescaHaynesed.,2008);FidelmaDonlon,Rule of Law: From the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina,in deConstruCtInG the reConstruCtIon, supra,at 257, 275-76.

3 AsaresultoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement,BiHconsistsoftwomain“entities”ofroughlythesamesize: theFederationofBosnia-Herzegovina(mainlycomposedofBosniaksandBosnianCroats)andRepublikaSrpska(mainlycomposedofBosnianSerbs).Eachentityhasitsowngovernment,parliament,andjudiciary.TheBrčkoDistrictisaseparatepoliticalentitywithautonomousstatus.

4 InternatIonal CrIsIs Group, eur. rep. no. 127, CourtInG dIsaster: the mIsrule of law In bosnIa & herzeGoVIna27(2002).

5 Formoreinformation,seethedescriptionofthedepartmentsonthewebsiteoftheProsecutor’sOfficeofBiH,http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba.

6 Rt.Hon.PaddyAshdown,HighRep. forBiH,Speech to the InternationalRescueCommittee,“BrokenCommunities,ShatteredLives”,(June20,2003)(“Justlastmonth,thisnewChambertookonitsfirstcase—thebiggesthumantraffickingtrialinBosnia’shistory.”).

7 In July 2002, the UN Security Council endorsed a strategy to end all first-instance trials by2008 and all appellate proceedings by 2010. See Press Release, Security Council, SecurityCouncilEndorsesProposedStrategyforTransfertoNationalCourtsofCertainCasesInvolvingHumanitarianCrimes in FormerYugoslavia,U.N.Doc. SC/7461 (July 23, 2002). In 2003 and2004,twoUNSecurityCouncilResolutionsmandatedcompletionofallinvestigationsbytheendof2004andallfirst-instancetrialsbytheendof2008.SeeS.C.Res1503,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1503(Aug.28,2003);S.C.Res.1534,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1534(Mar.26,2004).

8 SeePressRelease,SCEndorsesProposedStrategy,supra note 7. 9 InternatIonal CrIsIs Group,supranote4,at32.

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JordaunderscoredthattheplanhadthesupportoftheICTYProsecutor,theHighRepresentative,and themembersof thePresidencyofBiH.10During2003and2004, theOHR,ICTY,andBosnianofficialsdraftedanewCriminalCodeandCriminalProcedureCode,arevisedLawontheCourtofBiH,aLawontheOfficeof the Prosecutor ofBiH, a Law on theTransfer ofCases, and aLaw on theProtectionofVictimsandWitnesses.Thefinalpackageoflegislationwaspassedin November and December 2004.11 TheWar Crimes Chamber was officiallyinauguratedinMarch2005andbecameoperationalinMaywiththeappointmentofthefirstinternationaljudgesbytheHighRepresentative.12

B. Serbia: State of Emergency Gave Birth to Special War Crimes Prosecution

After the removal of Slobodan Milošević from power following streetprotests inOctober 2000, the continued strength of organized crimepresentedafundamentalobstacletothedesireofthenewSerbiangovernmenttoradicallytransformSerbia’s political and economic system.Someof themost powerfulgangswerecreatedduringthe1990sbyindividualslinkedtoMilošević’ssecretservices and involved in wartime atrocities in BiH, Croatia, and Kosovo.13Atellingexpressionofthepoweroforganizedcrimecamewiththeassassinationof theAssistantHeadof thePublicSecuritySectorof theSerbianMinistryofInterior,BoškoBuha,inJune2002.14

Duringthesameperiod,Serbiawasunderpressurefromtheinternationalcommunityto improveitscooperationwiththeICTYandtolaunchcredible

10 PressRelease,ICTY,AddressbyhisExcellency,JudgeClaudeJorda,PresidentoftheInternationalCriminalTribunal for theformerYugoslavia, to theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (July26,2002),http://www.icty.org/sid/8080.

11 William W. Burke-White, Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina,46Colum. J. transnat’l l.279,336-37(2008).

12 Id. at338.13 InJohnMueller’sinterpretationofthearmedconflictsintheformerYugoslavia,“theviolence

seems to have been the result of a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic, andoften distinctly nonideologicalmarauderswere recruited and permitted free rein by politicalauthorities.” John Mueller, The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’, 25 Int’l seCurIty 42, 43 (2000).AccordingtoMueller:

[A]groupofwell-armedthugsandbulliesencouragedby,andworkingunderrough constraints set out by, official security services would arrive or bandtogether in a community. Sometimes operating with local authorities, theywould then take control and persecutemembers of other ethnic groups,whowouldusuallyfleetoareasprotectedbytheirownethnicruffians,sometimestojointheminseekingrevenge.

Id. 14 Thetrialagainstfourmembersoftheso-called“Maka’sGroup”resultedinacquitalforlackof

evidence in2004.Theheadof thegroup,ŽeljkoMaksimović-Maka, hasbeen a fugitive fromjusticesincetheassassinationofGeneralBuha.

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domesticwarcrimesprosecutions.MuchlikeinBiH,theneedtoinitiatedomesticprosecutionsgainedimportancewiththeestablishmentofacompletionstrategyfortheICTY.TheSerbiangovernmentrecognizedatwofoldbenefitinconductingcredible war crimes trials domestically: officials hoped that such trials couldimprove the image of the country internationally and lead to the transfer ofICTYcases toSerbia, therebyrenderingunnecessarytheunpopularpracticeofsurrenderingSerbiannationalsfortrialsabroad.15

InJuly2002,theSerbianparliamentenactedalawcreatingspecialstructuresforfightingorganizedcrime.16ThelawprovidedfortheestablishmentofaSpecialProsecutor’sOffice for the suppression of organized crimewithin theDistrictPublicProsecutor’sOfficeinBelgrade.ItalsovestedtheBelgradeDistrictCourtwithexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionfortheterritoryoftheRepublicofSerbiaincasesconcerningspecificcriminaloffensesthatincludetheelementoforganizedcrime.17 “Offencesagainsthumanityand international law”werealso includedinthelawonorganizedcrime.Thejudicialstructurescreatedtofightorganizedcrime,inotherwords,weregiventheauthoritytoprosecuteandtrywarcrimesas well.

The July 2002 lawonly brieflymentionedwar crimes because the keyinternational organizations in Serbia—the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Development Program(UNDP),andtheCouncilofEurope—aswellastheinfluentialU.S.embassyinBelgrade,arguedthatwarcrimesprosecutionsrequiredseparatelegislationandtheestablishmentofspecialstructures.TheSerbiangovernmentresistedthisapproachfearingthatthehighprofileofaspecialmechanismmightantagonizetheSerbianpublic,whichgenerallydidnotsupportwarcrimesprosecutions.18 The authorities preferred instead to subsume war crimes under the broaderlabelof“organizedcrime.”19Asacompromise,theJuly2002lawonorganizedcrimereferredtowarcrimes,butittiltedheavilytowardaddressingtraditionalforms of organized crime: counterfeiting and money laundering; the illicitproductionandsaleofnarcotics;illicittrade,includingarms,ammunition,andexplosivesubstances;humantrafficking;robbery;aggravatedtheft;offeringandacceptingbribes;andextortionandkidnapping.20Theinternationalcommunity

15 InterviewwithaformermemberoftheOSCEMissiontoSerbia(Nov.2009).16 LawonOrganizationandJurisdictionofGovernmentAuthorities inSuppressionofOrganized

Crime,OfficialGazetteoftheRepublicofSerbia,No.42/02,July18,2002.17 Id.arts.4&12.18 This resistance arguably comes from discomfort stemming from the fact that Serb forces

committedbyfarthemost—andthemostserious—warcrimesinthearmedconflictsinthe1990sintheformerYugoslavia.TheICTYjurisprudenceprovidesabundantevidencecorroboratingthisclaimregardingtheshareofresponsibility.

19 InterviewwithaformermemberoftheOSCEMissiontoSerbia(Nov.2009).20 The offenses are enumerated in Article 2(3) of the Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of

GovernmentAuthoritiesinSuppressionofOrganizedCrime,supra note 16.

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continuedtoadvocatefortheenactmentofspeciallegislationconcerningwarcrimes.

OnMarch4,2003,theSerbiangovernmentappointedaSpecialProsecutorfor Organized Crime.21Amajor arrest operation against themembers of keycriminal groupswas planned formid-March.The criminals, however,movedfirst.OnMarch12,2003,membersoftheso-calledZemunclan,namedaftertheBelgradesuburbwheremostofthemlived,assassinatedSerbianPrimeMinisterZoran Djindjić. Some perpetrators were also active members of the SpecialOperationsUnitoftheSerbianpolice,acreationofthewarsinCroatiaandBiH.Thisunithadbeenconsideredthebesttrainedandequippedamongtheofficialarmedformationsinthecountry,anditsmembersresentedthenew,pro-Westerngovernment.

ByApril2003,theMinistryofJusticehadcometoaccepttheintroductionofaspeciallegislationonwarcrimesprosecutions.ThechangeofattitudelikelyreflectedthepreoccupationoftheauthoritiesinfightingDjindjić’sassassinsunderthe conditions of a state of emergency; the government disbanded theSpecialOperations Unit and arrested hundreds of criminal group members. Ongoingresistancetointernationalpressuretoestablishseparatewarcrimesprosecutionsstructuresthereforewasanunnecessarydistraction.OnJuly1,2003,twomonthsafterthestateofemergencywasended,theSerbianparliamentadoptedtheLawon Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in ProsecutingPerpetratorsofWarCrimes.22ThelawenvisagedestablishmentofanOfficeoftheWarCrimesProsecutorfortheTerritoryoftheRepublicofSerbia.OnJuly23,VladimirVukčevićwaselectedWarCrimesProsecutor.23

II. Relevant Structures for War Crimes Prosecutions in BiH and Serbia

TherearethreelevelsofrelevantstructuresforprosecutingwarcrimesintheBosniancontext:theICTY,domesticspecialstructures,andordinarydomesticcourtsandprosecutorialoffices.ThelastgroupisabsentfromtherelevantwarcrimesprosecutionstructuresinSerbiabecausetheDistrictCourtinBelgradeandtheOfficeoftheWarCrimesProsecutorfortheTerritoryoftheRepublicofSerbiahaveexclusivejurisdictionoverwarcrimes.

21 Glavni akteri suđenja(“Trial’sMainActors”),polItIKa,May6,2007.22 The lawwas published in theOfficial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia,No. 67/2003, July 1,

2003.23 See Website of theOffice of theWar Crimes Prosecutor, http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_

trz/O_NAMA_ENG.HTM.

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A. Special Structures in BiH

TheWarCrimesChamberwithintheCourtofBiHtriesthemostcomplexwarcrimescasesadjudicatedbytheBosnianjudiciary.Lesscomplexcasesfallwithin the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in BiH’s two entities and in theseparateBrčkoDistrict.TheWarCrimesChamberhastheultimateauthoritytodeterminethecomplexityofacase.

WarcrimescasesreceivedbycantonalprosecutorsintheFederationofBiHanddistrictprosecutorsinRepublikaSrpskabeforeMarch1,2003fallundertheirjurisdictionrespectively;howevertheWarCrimesChamberoftheCourtofBiHcandecidetotransfersuchcasestotheStateProsecutor’sOffice.CasesreportedaftertheMarch2003legislationcameintoforcefallundertheexclusivejurisdictionoftheCourtandProsecutor’sOfficeofBiH.TheCourtcanhoweverdecidetotransferacasetoacourtintheFederationofBiH,RepublikaSrpska,orBrčkoDistrict.Thelocalcourtshaveplayedaroleinadjudicatingwarcrimes.In2006,forexample,theyissuedsixteenfirst-instancejudgments;in2007,thenumberrosetonineteen.24

TheCourtofBiHdoesnothavesuperiorjurisdictionoverthecourtsintheFederationofBiHandRepublikaSrpska,anditsjurisprudenceisnotbindingonthe cantonal and district courts. BiHdoesnothaveasupremecourt,sodecisionsof the trialpanelsat theCourtofBiHarereviewedby theAppellateChamberalone.TheBiHProsecutor’sOfficelackscoordinationwiththeentityprosecutoroffices,andcannotissuebindinginstructionstocantonalanddistrictprosecutors.IthasdevelopedbettercooperationwiththeICTYProsecutorandprosecutorsinneighboringcountriesthanwiththecantonalanddistrictprosecutors.25

B. Special Structures in Serbia

As described above,26 the Law on Organization and Jurisdiction ofGovernmentAuthoritiesinProsecutingPerpetratorsofWarCrimeswasenactedonJuly1,2003.ThelegislationestablishedthespecializedWarCrimesChamberof theDistrictCourt inBelgradeand theOfficeof theWarCrimesProsecutorin theTerritory of the Republic of Serbia as the two agencieswith exclusiveresponsibilityforwarcrimescases.TheWarCrimesChamberwassetupinOctober2003,andtheOfficeoftheWarCrimesProsecutorbecamefullyoperationalinJanuary2004.ThelegislationalsomandatedaspecialdetentionunitandaspecialWarCrimesInvestigationServiceintheMinistryofInterior.27

24 BogdanIvanIševIć,ICTJ,TheWarCrImesChamBerInBosnIaandherzegovIna:FromhyBrIdTodomestIC Court29(2008).

25 Id. at 30-31.26 See supra PartI.Special—ButLessUrgentthantheOrganizedCrimeCounterparts.27 BogdanIvanIševIć,ICTJ,agaInsTTheCurrenT—WarCrImesProseCuTIonsInserBIa2(2007).

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VestingexclusivecompetenceforactinginwarcrimesmattersinspecializedagenciesinBelgrademeantthat,incontrasttotheBosnianmodel,local(“ordinary”)prosecutorsandjudgesinSerbiahadnoroletoplayinwarcrimesprosecutions.This separation limits thepotentialof specialmeasuresof transitional justice’simpactontheordinarycriminaljusticesystem.ThegovernmenthasnotgivenanyhintsthatitmightextendjurisdictioninwarcrimescasestootherdistrictcourtsinSerbia.ConsideringthatnumerousperpetratorsofthewarcrimescommittedinBiH,Croatia,andKosovonowliveinSerbia,andthatresourcesof theWarCrimesChamberandWarCrimesProsecutor’sOfficeare limited, therewouldbeplentyofworkforcourtsandprosecutorsatthedistrictlevel.Thetwospecialinstitutionscouldserveasamodelfromwhichtheotherscouldlearn.Butforthisscenariotomaterialize,policymakersinSerbiamustconsiderprosecutionofwarcrimesagoalofparamountimportance,whichtodatehasnotbeenthecase.

III. Positive Effects of Special Measures of Transitional Justice on the Ordinary Criminal Justice System

SpecialmeasuresoftransitionaljusticehavehadseveralpositiveeffectsontheordinarycriminaljusticesysteminBiH,whiletheimpactinSerbiahasbeenminimal.TheimpactoftheICTYhasbeengreaterthantheimpactofthedomesticspecial prosecution.

A. Contribution of the ICTY

Thepositive impactof the ICTYon theordinarycourts inBiHhasbeentwofold.First,allBiHcourtsuseahybridcriminalproceduremodeledinpartontheICTY,whichhasbroughtimprovementscomparedtothepurelyinquisitorialprocedure used before. Second, the ordinary courts on occasion interpret themunicipalsubstantivelawwiththehelpofICTYjurisprudence.

TheState-levelCriminalProcedureCodefromMarch2003,andtheidenticalcodesinRepublikaSrpska(July2003)andtheFederationofBiH(August2003),represent amarkeddeparture from the procedures governing criminal trials intheprecedingdecades.Theearlier,purelyinquisitorialsystemwasreplacedbyahybridone,withaprevalenceofadversarialelements.TheICTYproceduralruleswere not theonlysourcethatthedraftersofthenewcriminalprocedureconsulted.AlsoimportantwasthelegislationintheBrčkodistrict,whichwasalreadyusingan adversarial proceduremodeled on Italian and ICTYpractice. In any event,lessonslearnedattheICTYdidplayasignificantrole.

The chart below (Adversarial and Inquisitorial Aspects of Criminal Proceedings (ICTY, BiH, Serbia))presentselementsofthenewcriminalprocedurein BiH. The distribution of adversarial and inquisitorial elements mirrors the

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distribution at the ICTY. The adversarial elements include: the abolishmentof the position of investigative judge, instead putting prosecutors in charge ofinvestigations; themainly passive role of the judges, with dominant roles forthe twoparties in a trial; a strictorderof casepresentation; theprohibitionoftrials in absentia; the use of plea bargaining; the possibility for the defendanttotestifyunderoath;and,thereducedroleforvictimsincriminalproceedings.Theelementsoftheinquisitorialpracticearethefollowing:theabsenceofstrictrulesofevidence;thejoiningoftrialandsentencingphases;andbroaderrightsofappealforbothparties.

Havinginvestigationsconductedbyprosecutorshasbeenamajorproceduralimprovement.Cantonalanddistrictprosecutorssharetheviewthatthismodelhasledtomoretime-efficientinvestigations.28

TheuseofpleabargainingbyBiHordinarycourtsisanothernoveltywhich,onbalance,hasbeenbeneficial.Pleabargaining is frequent innon-warcrimestrials,asaprincipalmeansofexpeditingcriminalprosecutions.IntheSarajevoCantonalCourt, for example, of the total ninety-eight criminal cases resolvedin2007,inthirty-fourcasestheaccusedpleadedguiltyfollowinganagreementwith the prosecutor.29 In the Bijeljina District Court, in 2008, convictions intwenty-threecases—outofthetotalthirty-two—resultedfrompleaagreements.30 ProsecutorsinorganizedcrimecasesattheCourtofBiHalsomakefrequentuseofpleaagreements.In2006,suchagreementswerethebasisofthirteenconvictionsbefore theChamber forOrganizedCrimeandCorruptionof theCourtofBiH,out of twenty.31In2008,thenumberofpleaagreementsinthecasesoforganizedcrimereachedtothirty-six.32

Inwarcrimesmatters,pleabargainingisstillasensitiveissuebecausemanyBosnians consider the sentences inappropriately low given the gravity of theunderlyingcrimes.Ofthethirty-ninefinalverdictsreachedbeforecantonalanddistrictcourtsbetweenMarch2006andJune2009,fourinvolvedpleaagreements.33

28 Prosecutor’sOfficeofUnsko-SanskiCanton,“IzvještajostanjuitokovimakriminalanapodručjuUnsko-sanskogkantonau2007.godini”(“ReportonCrimeDevelopmentsintheUnsko-SanskiCanton in 2007”), Bihać, Feb. 2008, at 2, http://ww.tuzilastvousk.com.ba/izvjestaj/2007.doc;Telephoneinterviewwithacantonalprosecutor(Nov.2009).

29 TadijaBubalovic,Novela Zakona o kaznenom postupku Bosne i Hercegovine od 17.6, 2008. godine (“Amendmentsof17June2008totheCriminalProcedureCodeofBosniaandHerzegovina”),8praVo I praVda419,439fn28(2008).

30 DistrictCourtofBijeljina, Izvještaj o radu Okružng suda Bijeljina za 2008. godinu(“ReportontheActivitiesoftheBijeljinaDistrictCourtin2008”),at9,Jan.28,2009.

31 HighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncilofBiH,Godišnje izvješće za 2006. godinu (Annual Report for 2006),at96,Jan.-Dec.2006,http://www.hjpc.ba/intro/gizvjestaj/pdf/VSTVGI2006hr.pdf.

32 HighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncilofBiH, Godišnji izvještaj za 2008. godinu (Annual Report for 2008),AnnexIII,Jan-Dec2008,http://www.hjpc.ba/intro/gizvjestaj/pdf/8dioTuzilastva.pdf.

33 MarkoPantić,sentencedbyTuzlaCantonalCourtinJune2006totwo-and-a-halfyearsinprison;IvicaMlakić,NoviTravnikCantonalCourt,March2007(sixyears);GoranKalajdžija,BanjaLukaDistrictCourt,June2008(twoyears);and,ŽeljkoMitrović,SarajevoCantonalCourt,March2009(two years).

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ICTYdecisionssometimesinformthereasoningofthecourtsinRepublikaSrpska,whilethecourtsintheFederationofBiHhaverefrainedfromsuchpractice.This is a surprising development, given theBosnian Serb public’s unfavorableviews of the ICTY and the generally positive perceptions of the ICTY in theFederationofBiH.TheSupremeCourtofRepublikaSrpskahasoften invokedargumentsbytheICTYAppealsChamberaboutthecriteriafordeterminingtheexistenceofanarmedconflictandthenexusbetweentheactoftheaccusedandtheconflict,requiredtoturnaninfractionofcriminallawintoawarcrime.34DistrictcourtsinTrebinjeandBanjaLukaalsodonotshyawayfromreferringtotheICTYjurisprudence,includingonissuessuchasthedefinitionoftorture,35theexistenceofanarmedconflict,andthenexusbetweenthedefendant’sactandtheconflict.36

InSerbia,theimpactoftheICTYonthenon-transitionaljusticeprosecutionsmaterializedinAugust2009withtheadditionofafewadversarialelementstotheCriminalProcedureCode.Thecodeappliestoalltypesofcriminalproceedings.The adversarial elements include plea bargaining and a strict order for casepresentation.37ThepracticesbeforetheICTYhaveplayedaroleintheadoptionoftheseinnovations.38

Chart: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Aspects of Criminal Proceedings (ICTY, BiH, Serbia)

The following chart summarizes procedural rules governing war crimestrialsinBiHandSerbia.BeforetheenactmentofchangesinBiH,bothcountries

34 See, e.g.,SupremeCourtofRepublkaSrpska,CaseNo.118-0-Kz-K-06-000,JudgmentofFeb.22,2007,at4-5.

35 TrebinjeDistrictCourt,CaseNo.015-0-K-06-000010,JudgmentofJuly13,2007,at14(referringtotheICTYTrialChamberdecisionintheKunarac case).

36 TrebinjeDistrictCourt,CaseNo.015-0-K-08-000003,JudgmentofNov.4,2008,at19;TrebinjeDistrictCourt,CaseNo.K-6/05,JudgmentofDec.9,2005,at8-9.

37 LawAmending theCriminalProcedureCode,OfficialGazette of theRepublic ofSerbia,No.72/09,Aug.31,2009,art.74(introducingChapterHHa(pleaagreements));arts.87&88(amendingArticles328and331(orderofcasepresentation)).

38 TelephoneinterviewwithamemberoftheformerworkinggrouptodrafttheLawAmendingtheCriminalProcedureCodeoftheRepublicofSerbia(Dec.2009).PleabargaininghasnotbeenusedinthetrialsfororganizedcrimeinSerbiabecauseitwasnotinthelawpriortoAugust2009.Theonlyrewardmechanismhasbeenwithdrawalofchargesagainstso-calledwitness-collaborators,i.e.indictedmembersoforganizedcriminalgroupsthatagreetocooperatewiththeprosecution.Iftheprosecutorandthesuspectagreeonthearrangementandthesuspecttestifiestruthfully,the2002CriminalProcedureCodeobligedtheprosecutortowaivethechargesagainstthewitness-collaborator.Thisschemewasnot,however,adirectorevenindirecteffectoftransitionaljustice.ThechapteroftheCriminalProcedureCodethatincludestheprovisionsonwitness-collaboratorswastakenprimarilyfromsimilarItalianlegislation.UndertheCriminalProcedureCodeasamendedinAugust2009however,thewitness-collaborator’scooperationresultsina50%reductionoftheminimumsentenceinsteadofdismissal.Innon-defined“exceptionalcircumstances,”thecourtcanfreetheaccusedfromservingthesentencedespiteconviction,iftheprosecutorsorequests.LawAmendingtheCriminalProcedureCode,art.124(amendingChapterXXIXa(Article504t)).

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used the same inquisitorialmodel.As thechartdemonstrates,BiHnowusesahybridmodel,firstdevelopedattheICTY,inwhichadversarialelementsprevail.

ICTY BiH Serbia

INQUISITORIAL

Judges’advanceknowledgeofwitnessstatements

*

Activeroleofjudges

* In part (orderingpresentation of additional evidence)

* In part (orderingpresentation of additional evidence)

*

Investigatingjudge *

No jury trial * * *Trialsinabsentiaallowed *

No strict order of case presentation

*(beforeAugust2009)

Victimscanparticipate in trial *

Nopleabargaining *(beforeAugust2009)

Defendant’stestimonyunder oath not possible

*

No strict rules of evidence * * *

Trialandsentencingphases joined * * *

Broaderrightsofappealbybothparties * * *

ADVERSARIAL

Mainlypassiveroleofjudges * *

Nojudges’advanceknowledgeofwitnessstatements

* *

Prosecutorialinvestigation(noinvestigatingjudge)

* *

Dominantroleoftwoparties * *

Trialsinabsentianotallowed * *

Pleabargaining * *

*(afterAugust2009,forcrimespunishableupto12-years’imprisonment)

Defendantcanbe(cross-)examined,under oath

* *

Strictorderofcasepresentation * * *(afterAugust2009)

Victimsconsideredmainlyaswitnesses * *

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B. Contribution of National Special Mechanisms

AlthoughtheBWCCandtheSDWCstandapartfromtheordinaryjudicialstructureinBiH,theyhavemadethemselvesfeltintherestofthejudiciary.Thetwo agencies share their task—prosecution of war crimes—with segments oftheordinaryjudiciary.DuetothehighprofileoftheCourtofBiHandtheBiHProsecutor’s Office, some practices developed by the BWCC and the SDWChaveresonatedamongthecantonalanddistrictcourtsandprosecutorialoffices.Thatsaid,theState-levelwarcrimesprosecutionshavehadalesserimpactthantheICTY.TheimpactcanberecognizedthroughtheincreasednumbersofwarcrimesprosecutionsinRepublikaSrpska,adoptionofbestpracticesbycantonalanddistrictjudgesandprosecutors,andimprovementsintheCriminalProcedureCodepromptedbythedevelopmentsbeforetheBWCC.

ItistemptingtoconcludethattheworkoftheBWCCandtheSDWCcontributedtoanincreaseinprosecutionsinRepublikaSrpska.Onlytwowarcrimestrialshadbeen completed in the entityprior to the establishmentof theBWCC inMarch2005.39In2005,courtsinRepublikaSrpskarenderedfourfirst-instancejudgments,andin2006thenumberrosetosix.40DebatessurroundingtheestablishmentoftheBWCCmayhavehadaroleintheintensificationofeffortsinRepublikaSrpskatobringwarcrimesuspectstojustice.(IntheFederationofBiH,dozensofwarcrimeshadbeentriedannuallyintheyearsprecedingitsestablishment.)

OneformofimpactistheadoptionoftheBWCC’sandSDWC’sbestpractic-es;butintheabsenceofempiricalresearchonthematteritisdifficulttoassesstheextentofthispractice.AcurrentmemberoftheSDWCsaidthat,inherearlierroleasacantonalprosecutorinZenicashedraftedmotionsforpre-trialdetentionusingSDWC’s“impeccablyargued”motionsasamodel.41Itmaywellbethatsuchoccur-rencesremainlimitedtoisolatedinitiativesofindividualpractitioners.Therearenoregularchannelsofcommunication,suchastrainings,throughwhichtheState-leveljudgesandprosecutorssharetheirexperienceswithcolleaguesintheentities.

TheCriminalProcedureCode(2003)underwentchangesin2007and2008,withsomeoftheimprovementsstemmingfrombestpracticesasdevelopedbytheBWCC.Thecriminalprocedurecodes in theFederationofBiHandRepublikaSrpskaadoptedtheidenticalamendmentsafewmonthslater,sothesolutionswhichtheCourtofBiHreachedfirstarenowpartofthebindinglawintheentities.42

39 Human Rights Watch, A Chance for Justice? War Crime Prosecutions in Bosnia’s Serb Republic 15-16(Mar.2006).

40 Thefiguresarebasedontheexaminationofthefirst-instanceverdictsinRepublikaSrpskamadeavailabletotheauthorbytheOSCEMissioninBiH.

41 InterviewwithamemberoftheSDWC,Belgrade(Nov.2009).42 LawAmendingtheCriminalProcedureCodeofRepublikaSrpska,OfficialGazetteofRepublika

Srpska,No.119/08,Dec.18,2008;LawAmendingtheCriminalProcedureCodeoftheFederationofBiH,OfficialGazetteoftheFederationofBiH,No.9/09,Feb.11,2009.

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InJuly2007, theHighRepresentative imposedamendments to theCode,including provisions that allowed for expanded use of non-custodialmeasurestoensurethepresenceoftheaccusedduringthecriminalproceedings.Priortothat, entity andBrčko district prosecutors and judges interpreted theCriminalProcedure Code as authorizing the use of non-custodial measures whencircumstancesindicatedonlythatthedefendantmightflee.Suchlessrestrictivemeasureswerenotavailablewheretherewereothergroundssupportingpre-trialdetention—circumstances indicating that thedefendantmightdestroy, conceal,alter or falsify evidence, or influence witnesses, accessories, or accomplices,or repeat the criminal offense; or, if the criminal offensewas punishable by asentenceofimprisonmentoftenyearsormore,andthemannerofcommissionortheconsequenceofthecriminaloffenserequiredthatcustodybeorderedforthereasonofpublicorpropertysecurity.43

TheAppealsChamberoftheCourtofBiHfirstdepartedfromthatpracticeinNovember2006,inawarcrimescase,byorderingthereleaseoftheaccusedinfavorof lessrestrictivemeasures(housearrestandprohibitionofcontactorinterferencewith individualswhomightappearas theProsecutor’switnesses),although the prosecutor had requested detention based on the threat to publicsafety or property.44TheJuly2007amendmentsclarifythatthecourtcanorderoneormoreofthealternativemeasures45“whenthecircumstancesofthecasesoindicate.”46Thiscoversgroundssuchas the threat topublicsafetyorproperty,and circumstances indicating that the defendant might continue with criminalactivitiesorinterferewiththecourseofjustice.

ThepracticeoftheCourtofBiHhasledtoanotherlegislativechangethatenhances the protection of defendants’ rights. June 2008 amendments to theCriminalProcedureCodemandateassignmentofcounseltothesuspectduringthedeliberationontheprosecutor’smotionforpre-trialdetention.47 In the earlier versionoftheprovision,thesuspecthadtohavecounsel“immediatelyafterthedecisionorderingdetentionhasbeenmade.”TheCourtofBiH,however,practicedappointingacounselafterreceivingprosecutor’smotionforpre-trialdetention,evenintheabsenceofthelegalobligationtodoso.48

43 Thebasesforsuchdetentionpolicieswerefoundinarticles126and132oftheCriminalProcedureCode,OfficialGazetteofBiH,No.36/2003,Dec.21,2003.

44 SeeCourtofBiH,PressReleaseCustodyterminatedforZoranJanković,Nov.30,2006,http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?id=295&jezik=e.

45 The alternative prohibitivemeasures include: prohibition from performing certain business orofficialactivities;prohibitionfromvisitingcertainplacesorareas;prohibitionfrommeetingwithcertainpersons;orderstoreportoccasionallytoaspecifiedbody;and,temporarywithdrawalofthedriver’slicense.

46 Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia andHerzegovina,art.4,July9,2007(introducingnewArticles126ato126g).

47 LawAmendingtheCriminalProcedureCodeofBosniaandHerzegovina,OfficialGazetteofBiH,No.58/08,July21,2008,art.11(amendingArticle45(2)).

48 InterviewwithamemberoftheHumanRightsDepartmentintheOSCEMissioninBiH.

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MorecontroversialistheoriginoftheprovisionoftheJune2008amendmentsthat introduced the so-called status conferences. The conferences provide theparties and the panel the opportunity to consider the trial plans of the prosecution and thedefense. International judges introduced this procedure in theworkoftheBWCCin2006—despitetheinitialabsenceofanyexplicitprovisionintheCriminal Procedure Code—to increase the efficiency of the proceedings. TheinnovativeprocedurewasbasedonthepositivepracticeoftheICTY.49 The June 2008amendmentstotheCriminalProcedureCodeexplicitlyprovideforstatusconferences,50andidenticalprovisionsweresubsequentlyenactedinthecriminalprocedurecodesofRepublikaSrpskaandtheFederationofBiH.51 On the other hand,twowarcrimesprosecutorsintheentities—oneintheFederationofBiH,theotherinRepublikaSrpska—havesaidthatthecourtsinwhichtheyservehadbeenholdingstatusconferenceforyears,unrelated to thepracticeat theCourtofBiH.Accordingtotheprosecutors,statusconferencesstemfromthelogicofthe adversary system and the frequency of caseswith a significant number ofwitnesses.52Theintroductionofstatusconferencestothelegislationthusappearstoreflectdevelopmentsinbothspecialandsomeordinaryprosecutionsalike.

InSerbia,thepracticesdevelopedbytheOfficeoftheWarCrimesProsecutorand theWarCrimesChamber inBelgradeonly cursorily touched theordinaryjusticesystem.AtaconferenceheldinDecember2008inBelgrade,representativesoftheMinistryofJusticeexpressedpubliccommitmenttoestablishingwitnesssupportunitsinordinarycourts.TheinspirationforthiscamefromtheworkoftheVictimandWitnessSupportUnit in theWarCrimesChamber.53Thisunit,establishedinJune2006,interactswithwitnessesbeforetheirarrivalinBelgrade,arranges for their travel and accommodation there, offers encouragement andbasicexplanationsabout the trialbefore theyenter thecourtroom,andhandlesotherpracticalmatters.54 In2007, theunitextendeditsservices towitnesses inorganized crime trials, which are held in the same building housing theWarCrimesChamberandOrganizedCrimeChamber,aswellastootherdepartmentsoftheBelgradeDistrictCourt,housedinaseparatebuilding.Implementationoftheplantoestablishwitnesssupportunitsinotherordinarycourtsremainsataninceptionstage.55

49 IvanIševIć,supra note24,at12.50 LawAmendingtheCriminalProcedureCodeofBosniaandHerzegovina,supra note46,art.68

(introducingnewArticle233a).51 Law Amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Republika Srpska, supra note 42, art. 79

(introducingnewArticle241a);CriminalProcedureCodeoftheFederationofBiH(consolidatedversion)(onfilewiththeauthor),art.248a.

52 Telephoneinterviewwithacantonalprosecutor(Nov.2009);Telephoneinterviewwithadistrictprosecutor(Nov.2009).

53 InterviewwithanOSCEofficial,Belgrade(Nov.2009).54 IvanIševIć,supra note27,at21.55 InterviewwithanOSCEofficial,Belgrade(Nov.2009).

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IV. Tensions and Negative Effects of the Use of Transitional Justice Initiatives

Theanalysissofarhasmainlyfocusedonthepositiveeffects,albeitlimited,ofspecialmeasuresof transitional justiceontherationaleandoperationof theordinarycriminal justicesystem.However, therearealso tensionsbetween thetwo tracksof justice.Theproblem ismorepronounced inBiH than inSerbia,becausethepotentialfortensionsisgreaterwhentwostructurescoverthesamefield(warcrimesprosecutions),astheydoinBiH.Warcrimescontinuetobetriedbeforeregular—cantonalanddistrict—courts, inadditiontotheBWCC.Whileallcourtsapplyidenticalprocedures,cantonalanddistrictcourtsapplyonesetofsubstantivepenalcodes,andtheBWCCappliesanother.Thisdifferencehasbeenasourceofmajorfriction.InSerbia,incontrast,ordinaryjusticeandtransitionaljusticecriminalprosecutioninitiativesareforthemostpartseparated.56

The political climate in Republika Srpska, the half of BiH with a Serbmajority,alsodiscouragesprofessionalalliancesbetweenjudgesandprosecutorsat the Republika Srpska and State levels. The nationalistic PrimeMinister ofRepublika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has been campaigning fiercely against theCourtofBiHandtheBiHProsecutor’sOffice,blamingtheirinternationaljudgesandprosecutorsforplottingagainstRepublikaSrpskaleadershipinordertobreakitsoppositiontothecentralizationofStatepower.ThevotesoftheSerbmembersof theBosnianparliamentweredecisive in itsOctober2,2009decisionnot toextendthemandatesoftheinternationaljudgesandprosecutorsintheCourtofBiHand theProsecutor’sOffice.57OnDecember14,2009,however, theHighRepresentativeforBiHimposedamendmentstotheLawonProsecutor’sOfficeofBiHandtheLawonCourtofBosniaandHerzegovina,extendingthemandatesofinternationaljudgesandprosecutorsuntilDecember31,2012.58

A. Overlapping Exceptional and Ordinary Measures—A Threat to the Rule of Law in Bosnia?

TheCourtofBiHappliesthePenalCodeadoptedattheStatelevelin2003.DistrictandcantonalcourtsusethePenalCodeoftheformerSFRYugoslaviaastheapplicablelawatthetimeofthecommissionofthecrimes.Thisdifference

56 TheonlysignificantexceptionisthepoweroftheSupremeCourt,thehighestjudicialinstitutioninthecountry,todecideonappealsagainstthedecisionoftheWarCrimesChamberoftheBelgradeDistrictCourt.

57 See Lack of Support for International Judicial Personnel, balKan InVestIGatIVe reportInG networK - bIrn,Oct.2,2009.

58 DecisionEnacting theLawonAmendments to theLawonProsecutor’sOffice ofBosnia andHerzegovina,Dec.14,2009;DecisionEnactingtheLawonAmendmenttotheLawonCourtofBosniaandHerzegovina,Dec.14,2009.

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hasbeenasourceoftensionbetweenthetwolayersofjustice,withsomelocalpractitionersresentingwhattheyconsideraretroactiveapplicationoflawbeforetheState-levelinstitutions.OnlytheCourtofBiHhastriedindividualsforcrimesagainsthumanityandappliedthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility.InMarch2007theConstitutionalCourtofBiHruledthatthecountry’sPenalCodepermitstrialandconvictionofapersonwhoseactofomissionwasprohibitedunderthegeneralprinciplesof international law,even if theconductdidnotconstituteacriminaloffenseundermunicipallawattherelevanttime.59 Cantonal and district courtshaverefrainedfromdoingso.

SignificantdiscrepancyexistsinthesentencingattheStateandentitylevelsasaresultoftheapplicationofdifferentlaws.ThemaximumpenaltybeforetheCourt of BiH is forty-five years imprisonment, in contrast to twenty years inRepublikaSrpska andfifteen years in the Federation ofBiH.TheBWCChasalreadyimposedseveralprisonsentencesofaroundthirtyyears,allfarexceedingthemaximum allowed in the entities. On average, sentences delivered by theCourtofBosniaandHerzegovinainwarcrimescaseshavebeenalmostdoublethelengthofthosedeliveredbycantonalanddistrictcourts.60 The Constitutional Court found that imposing penalties under the Penal Code of BiH instead ofthePenalCodeoftheformerYugoslaviawasinaccordancewiththeEuropeanConventionofHumanRightsand,accordingly,with theConstitutionofBiH.61 However,theaccusedbeforetheCourtofBiHhavelaunchedhungerstrikesontwooccasionsinprotestagainsttheapplicationofthePenalCodeofBiH—firstin January2007andagain inSeptemberof thatyear.Thediscrepancies in thepunishmentsandmoregenerallytheapplicationofdifferentlawsconcerningwarcrimesremainacrucialchallengefortheBiHjudiciary.

B. Decreased Role for Victims

TheapplicationoftheICTY-likeprocedure,inwhichtheadversarialaspectsprevail, has reduced the role of the victims in criminal trials in BiH.VictimsparticipateintheICTYproceedingsaswitnessesonly.62InBiH,victimsparticipate

59 ConstitutionalCourtofBiH,ApplicationNo.AP-1785/06(AbduladhimMaktouf),DecisiononAdmissibilityandMerits,para79,Mar.30,2007.

60 See osCe mIssIon In bIh, moVInG towards a harmonIzed applICatIon of the law applICable In war CrImes Cases before Courts In bosnIa and herzeGoVIna8(Aug.2008).

61 ThecourtreasonedthatthesanctionsprescribedbythePenalCodeoftheformerYugoslaviaforperpetratorsofwarcrimeswereinadequateandfailedtoprotectvictims.Thislackofprotection“doesnotcomplywiththeprincipleoffairnessandtheruleoflaw,embodiedinArticle7oftheEuropeanConvention,andwhich...allowthisexemptionfromtherulesetforthinparagraph1of thesameArticle.”ConstitutionalCourtofBiH,ApplicationNo.AP-1785/06(AbduladhimMaktouf),para.78.

62 See Claude Jorda& Jerome deHemptinne,The Status and Role of the Victims, in the rome statute of the InternatIonal CrImInal Court: a Commentary (AntonioCassese,PaolaGaeta&JohnR.W.D.Joneseds.,2002).

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aswitnesses,butadditionallytheycanmakecompensationclaimsduringthetrialas injured parties.63AprovisionintheBiHCriminalProcedureCodeallowsforthecourttoassignlegalrepresentationtowitnesses,includingvictim-witnesses,incircumstances inwhich“it isobviousthat thewitnesshimself isnotable toexercisehisrightsduringthehearingandifhisinterestscannotbeprotectedinsomeothermanner.”64 In practice, victims are almost never represented.Mostwitnessesseemunawareofthepossibilityofengaginglegalrepresentation,andnosystemisinplacetoprovidesuchrepresentation.65Priorto2003,inthecivillaw system, victims could continue the proceedings as private plaintiffs if theprosecutordecidednottopursuethecharges.Now,theCriminalProcedureCodeofBiHonlygivesvictimstherighttolodgeacomplainttothesameprosecutorwhodecidedtodiscontinuetheproceedings.66

Serbia has left the criminal procedures largely intact, and victimscan participate in the proceedings in significant ways, in person or throughrepresentatives.At the pre-trial stage, they can propose that the investigatingjudgetakecertaininvestigativeactions,andtheycancontinuetheproceedingsasprivateplaintiffsiftheprosecutordecidesnottopursuethecharges.Atthetrialstage,victimscanquestionwitnesses, introduceevidence, inspect thecasefile,andmakeclosingarguments.

V. ¿Is There a Tendency to “Normalize” the Special Measures?

The“exceptional”mechanismsoftransitionaljusticehaveperformedbetter,on average, than the rest of the criminal justice system inBiH and Serbia. Itwould be beneficial for these societies if the specialmeasures became part oftheordinarycriminaljusticesystem.Thishasbeenachievedinpart,throughtheintroductionofICTY-likeelementsintotheproceduralcodesinBiHandtheuseofwitness support servicesbeforeordinary courts inSerbia.But there is littleindicationthatthespeciallycreatedinstitutionswillbecomefullyintegratedpartsofthedomesticjudiciariesintheforeseeablefuture.

Creators of the BWCC and the SDWC have from the start planned forthe evolution of the hybrid bodies into fully domestic institutions. But evenwiththedepartureofforeigners,theBWCCandtheSDWCwillmaintaintheirspecialcharacteriftheyremainplacedoutsidetheordinaryjusticesystem.This

63 TheCriminalProcedureCodedefinesaninjuredpartyas“apersonwhosepersonalorpropertyrightshavebeenjeopardizedorviolatedbyacriminaloffence.”CriminalProcedureCode,OfficialGazetteofBiH,No.36/2003,art.20(h),Dec.21,2003.

64 Id.art.84(5).65 IvanIševIć,supra note24,at21.66 CriminalProcedureCodeofBosniaandHerzegovina,OfficialGazetteofBiH,No.36/03,art.216

(4),Nov.21,2003.

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extra-ordinarystatuswillbedifficulttochangebecauseofthepeculiarpoliticaldynamicsinthecountry.Inthepasttwoyears,theleadershipofRepublikaSrpskahasbeenpursuinganincreasinglysecessionistcourse.AsState-levelinstitutions,the BWCC and the SDWC are among the targets of frequent attacks by theBosnianSerbleaders.Thisisnotafavorableenvironmentforintegrationofthetwoinstitutionsintheordinaryjusticesystem.

InSerbia,“normalization”ofthespecialmeasureswouldrequireadecisionbythegovernmenttoremovetheexclusivejurisdictiontotrywarcrimesfromtheWarCrimesChamberoftheBelgradeDistrictCourt.Asexplainedabove,67 thereisnoindicationthattheauthoritiesarereadytomoveinthatdirection.Theyappeartobesatisfiedwiththecurrent—modest—numbersoftheprosecutions,forwhichtheWarCrimesChamberandtheSpecialProsecutor’sOfficesuffice.

Conclusion: Contribution of Transitional Justice Measures to Strengthening the Domestic Judicial System and a Rule-of-Law Culture

Whilestilllimited,theimpactoftransitionaljusticemeasuresontheordinarycourtsinBiHhasbeenpositive.ItwouldnowbeinappropriatetoemploytheharshassessmentsthatroutinelydescribedtheBosnianjudiciarypriortothereformsof2003-2004.In2002,theInternationalCrisisGroupdescribedtheBosnianjudiciaryas“highlypoliticised,war-inflated...nationallydivided,financiallydependentand institutionallydeficient.”68According to theOSCE, theprosecutionofwarcrimesintheimmediatepost-warperiodsufferedfrom“ineffectualinvestigations,excessiveandsystematicdelaysintheresolutionoftrialsanddubiousdecisions,compoundedbya lackofpublic faith in the judicialsystem.”69AsWilliamW.Burke-Whitehasnoted,until2003,cantonalanddistrictcourtsinthetwoentities“didnotwanttosubjecttocriminalprosecution”individualsoftheirownethnicgroup.70

Since 2003, the professionalism of judges and prosecutors has arguablyimproved.WarcrimesprosecutionsbeforeordinarycourtsinthetwoentitiesandtheBrčkodistrictarenowconductedbeyondstrictethniclines.Instarkcontrasttothepre-2003period,somecourtsinRepublikaSrpskaregularlytrywarcrimessuspects,usuallyofBosnianSerbethnicity.Theoperationofthecriminaljusticesystemasawholehasbecomemoreefficient.

67 See supra PartII:RelevantStructuresforWarCrimesProsecutionsinBiHandSerbia.68 InternatIonal CrIsIs Group,supra note4,at37.69 OSCE,war CrImes trIals before the domestIC Courts of bosnIa and herzeGoVIna: proGress

and obstaCles4(Mar.2005).70 Burke-White,supra note11,at315.

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Atleastsomecreditforthemeasuredprogresscanbeattributedtotheworkofspecialjudicialandprosecutorialbodiesinthefieldoftransitionaljustice.71 In particular,theapplicationoftheICTY-modeledprocedureandthedemonstrationeffectofICTYjudgmentshavepositivelyimpactedtheworkofthejudicialandprosecutorial agencies inBiH’s two entities. It shouldbenoted, however, thatthe bulk of the ICTY’s efforts to bolster domestic capacity has been directedat domestic special structures—the BWCC and the SDWC—while impact onordinary structures has been largely incidental.TheState-level structures—theBWCCandtheSDWC—havehadlessereffectonordinarystructures.

The impact of special mechanisms has been most evident where theinternationalcommunitywasinapositiontodirectlyshapethecriminaljusticesystem,suchasintheintroductionofthenewcriminalprocedureinBiH,inwhichtheICTYandtheOfficeoftheHighRepresentativeplayedakeyrole.Whengivenachancetodecideontheirownwhethertofollowthebestpracticesdevelopedbyspecialstructures,domesticlawmakersandpractitioners,showedlessinclinationtodoso,asseen,forexample,inthescantuseofICTYandBWCCjurisprudencebycantonalanddistrictjudgesandprosecutorsinBiH.

The limitations of positive contributions derive in part from the lack ofstructurallinksbetweenState-levelinstitutionsandthoseattheentitylevels,aswellas theabsenceof sustainedeffortsby the ICTYandState-levelbodies totransfer know-how to judges and prosecutors in the entities. The professionalpride of practitioners in the ordinary “track” and a certain aversion to foreigninfluence might also inhibit the impact of special structures—although thesefactorsaredifficulttocorroboratewithspecificexamples.EasiertodemonstrateistheadverseeffectofthepoliticalclimateinRepublikaSrpskaandofthescarcefunding available to judiciaries in the two entities. For example, cantonal anddistrictcourtsdonothaveaccesstotheuseofvideo-links—astandardpracticeattheCourtofBiHandtheICTY—andsophisticatedmeasuresofwitnessprotectionandvictimsupportremainunusedattheentitylevel.

ComparedtoBiH,theimpactoftransitionaljusticemeasuresinSerbiahasbeenmoremodest,asevidencedby theprevalenceof inquisitorialelements inthecriminalprocedureandthelackofreferencestoICTYjurisprudenceintheSupremeCourt’sjudgmentsinwarcrimesmatters.Internationallawmakersand

71 The comprehensive “vetting”of ICTY judges andprosecutors, carriedoutbetween2002and2004bytheHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncilofBiH,hasalsocontributedtoprogress.Approximately30%oftheincumbentsthatappliedfortheirpositionswerenotreappointed.Thevettingofthejudiciaryreducedthenumberofunqualifiedindividualsinjudicialpositionsandenhancedethnicdiversityinthecourtsandprosecutorialoffices.SeeICTJ,CaseStudySeries,Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Developments in Transitional Justice(Oct.2004),http://ictj.org/images/content/1/1/113.pdf; Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutor’s Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina,in JustICe as preVentIon: VettInG publIC employees In transItIonal soCIetIes(AlexanderMayer-Rieckh&PablodeGreiffeds.,2007).

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practitionershavenotdirectlyshapedthecontoursoftheSerbiancriminaljusticesystem,whichmayaccountfortheresilienceofordinaryjusticetotheinfluenceofspecialmechanisms.Inaddition,theexclusivejurisdictionoftheDistrictCourtinBelgradetoadjudicatewarcrimescreatesaparamountstructuralobstacletothe application of ICTY andDistrictCourt know-how throughout the Serbianjudiciary.

In spite of the application of transitional justice measures in BiH andSerbia, informalconstraints that shouldensuresociety’s respect for the ruleoflawandpreventthearbitraryexerciseofgovernmentpowerremainweakinbothcountries.Specializedstructureshavenotsignificantlyincreased the willingness of society to fight impunity for war crimes, as evidenced in the high level ofsupport for indicted,orevenconvicted,warcriminalsamongpopulationswithsharedethnicity.WhenNaserOrić,aBosniak,wasreleasedfromtheICTYafteraTrialChamberconvictedhimtotwoyearsinprisonforcrimesagainstBosnianSerbs,severalthousandpeoplegreetedhimattheSarajevoAirport.72 (Oric was eventuallyacquittedonappeal.)TenthousandpeoplewelcomedTihomirBlaškićatafootballstadiumatKiseljak,BiH,aftertheTribunal’sPresidentgrantedhimearly release.73 Blaškić had been convicted to nine years in prison for crimesagainstBosnianMuslims. In Serbia, a 2009 opinion poll showed that 56%ofrespondents believed Bosnian Serb General RatkoMladić to be not guilty ofthecrimesallegedbytheICTYprosecutor(incontrasttothe22%thatbelievedhimtobeguilty),and64%opposedhissurrendertotheICTY(against25%thatfavoredit).74

The ethno-nationalistic lenses through which these societies perceiveaccountabilityforwarcrimesencourage,inturn,theauthoritiesandthejudiciarytokeep thenumbersofwarcrimesprosecutions low. InSerbia, thereweresixfinal convictions from2003 to2009.75BetweenMarch2006and June2009, atotalofthirty-ninefinaljudgmentsinwarcrimescasesfromallcantonalcourtsintheFederationofBiH,districtcourtsinRepublikaSrpska,andtheBrčkoBasicCourt.76ThesignificantlyhighernumbersinBiHarenotimpressiveconsidering

72 Naser Orić Returned to BiH/Further Reaction on his Verdict,ohr bIh medIa round-up,July2,2006.

73 Blaškić nije htio Thompsona na doceku u Kiseljaku(“BlaškićDidNotWantThompsonToBeattheWelcomeCeremonyinKiseljak”),VJesnIK,Aug.6,2004.

74 osCe mIssIon to serbIa, Ipsos – strateGIC marKetInG & belGrade Center for human rIGhts, InformIsanost I staVoVI prema hasKom trIbunalu I sudJenJIma za ratne zloCIne u srbIJI“KnowledgeandAttitudevis-à-vistheHagueTribunalandWarCrimesTrialsinSerbia”14(2009).

75 StatementbyIvanaRamić,BelgradeDistrictCourtSpokesperson,atapublicpresentationoftheresultsofthepublicopinionpoll,Knowledge and Attitude vis-à-vis the Hague Tribunal and War Crimes Trials in Serbia,Belgrade,Dec.8,2009.

76 Thefigureisbasedontheauthor’sexaminationofallfirstandsecond-instanceverdictsinBiHintheperiodMarch2006toJune2009,notincludingtheverdictsattheCourtofBiH.Tencantonalcourts in theFederationofBiH,fivedistrict courts inRepublikaSrpska, and theBrckoBasicCourt,havejurisdictiontotrywarcrimescases(inadditiontotheBWCC).

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that therearealmost10,000knownwarcrimessuspects in thecountry.77 Only theworkoftheSDWCandtheBWCChasledtoanimpressivenumberoffinaljudgments before the Court of BiH—thirty-one betweenApril 2006 and June200978—primarilydue to theheavy involvementof foreigners in theoperationof the twoinstitutionsandtheunparalleledfinancialsupport receivedfromtheinternationalcommunity.

Specialstructures,inotherwords,arenotapanaceafortheimperfectionsof the criminal justice system as a whole. Nonetheless, these structures haveinjected,directlyorindirectly,ameasureofprofessionalismandrespectabilityintheoperationoftheordinarycriminaljusticesysteminBiHand,onalesserscale,inSerbia.Inviewoftendenciesoverthepastperiod,itislikelythatintimethepositiveimpactofthespecialstructureswillgrow.

77 NationalWarCrimesStrategy,documentadoptedbyBiHCouncilofMinistersonDec.29,2008,at9-10,figures1&2(onfilewiththeauthor).

78 Thefigureisbasedontheauthor’scompilationofthedataavailableatthewebsiteoftheCourtofBiH,http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e,andthewebsiteJusticeReport,maintainedbytheBalkanInvestigativeReportingNetwork-BosniaandHerzegovina,http://www.bim.ba/en/197/?tpl=95.

Honduras: Transition to Democracy

Rigoberto Ochoa

Honduras is characterized by a strong authoritarian tendency, in whichthe traditional model of powerful individuals representing power groups andexcercising and excessive influence on political decisionmatcing remains adetermingfactor.Since1980,Hondurashasheldpresidentialandparliamentarianelectionsatregularintervals.Itstransitionprocesshasbeenlongandtheprincipalchangeshavefocusedoninstitutionalcreationandreform,aimedatpeacefullyreducing the influenceof themilitary in thegovernment,aswellas increasingtheparticipationofcivilsocietyandthepromotionofhumanrights.Thepoliticalsystem rests on the power of two traditional parties—National and Liberal.Representativedemocracyhaserodedandthereisverylowcredibilityandtrustinthepublicinstitutionsandtheirleaders.1

The exchange of political interests and favors among the primarygovernmentalactorsanddecision-makershasserved todiscredit thesystemofchecksandbalances,andconsequentlynopower-balanceexists.Theformalandinformal political power groups undermine the foundations of rule of law byseekingtoinfluencethejudicialpower,whichisunabletoexerciseeffectivelegalcontrolovereconomic,political,andfinancialforces.

Fromthisperspective,thischapter(PartI)seekstohighlightthecommonthreadthatconnectsauthoritarianism,transition,andtheconsolidationofelectoraldemocracy in Honduras—the latter of which is vigorously restrained by theinstitutionsthatholdamonopolyontheuseofforceandarms.Theseinstitutionshavedefinitivelyconsolidatedastheultimateforceinthepoliticalregime.

InPart IIof thischapter Iexplore theprocessof institutional reformthatwas implementedfollowingthereturn toformaldemocracy,especially judicialreform, and show that despite theirmodernizing character the reformsdidnotmakeanysignificantprogressforjudicialindependenceandthereforeposednorisk for the interestsof thepowergroups that enjoyprivilegesandcontrol thejudicialsystem.

Finally, in Part III, I seek to outline the situation’s complexities withrespect to guarantees of non-repetition.As a conclusion I propose guidelinesfor the country’s development of transitional justice to contribute to nationalreconciliation,truth,punishmentofthoseresponsibleforhumanrightsviolations,andreparationstovictims.

1 See undp, demoCraCy In latIn amerICa184(2004).

Chapter 14

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IthanktheICTJforthisinvitationtoparticipatewiththecontributionofthisarticleandfortheconfidencethatithasdepositedinmetotakeonthisanalysis,whichaimstofosterknowledgeonatopicthat ishasbeenlittlestudiedinthecountry.

I. Honduras: From Authoritarianism to Electoral Democracy

A. Authoritarianism2

In1957, theLiberalPartymade adealwith themilitary:RamónVilledaMoraleswouldbeelectedPresidentoftheRepublicand,inexchange,theArmedForces would enjoy autonomy. This political arrangement became the centralfactorinthemilitary’sriseasakeypoliticalforceinHonduras,apositionwhichwould be continually ratified by a succession of military regimes and coupsd’état.Thiscontextgaverisetoanewpoliticalandinstitutionalframework,withanewPoliticalConstitutionin1957.Italsoledtoastateinvolvedinplanningthedomesticeconomy,amodelthatbegantoreplacetheoldstructuresoftheliberaloligarchicstate.

Duringthisperiodneweconomicgroupsemerged.ThesegroupsexpressedtheirintereststhroughtheideologicalrenewaloftheLiberalPartyandencouragedprocesses of industrialization and economic diversification. This generatedpolitical and social dynamics that stimulated the modernization of the State.However,thisalsosparkedoppositionfrombananacompaniesandthelocallandowners,whofearedstructuralchangesin landtenure.Thesesectors thusalliedthemselveswiththeArmedForcesintheirquesttoregainpowerandblocktheprogressofreform.Thisalliancebroughtaboutamilitarycoupin1963,whichcontributedtoconstitutingthemilitaryasthehegemonicpowergroupwiththelastwordintheHonduranpoliticalregime.

The consolidation of the military regime continued to the point that inApril1965theleaderofthecoup,GeneralOswaldoLópezArellano,waselectedPresidentoftheRepublicwiththesupportoftheNationalParty.Priortothis,inthesameyear,theElJuteMassacretookplaceintheYoroprovince.ThismassacrewasdirectedbymembersofthemilitaryagainstapeasantmovementemergingfromtheHondurasNationalFederationofPeasants.

In 1971 the military regime ended briefly with the election of theNationalistcivilleader,RamónErnestoCruz,asPresident.However,in1972therewas anothermilitary coup, again ledbyLópezArellano,whoadoptedthereformistpoliciesofthebusinessandlabororganizationsanddesigneda

2 See generally marVIn barahona, honduras en el sIGlo xx: una síntesIs hIstórICa(2005).

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nationaldevelopmentplan.Oneof thecentralpillarsof thisplanwasa landreform policy.Again, the traditional oligarchic forces—through agriculturalandcattle-raisingassociations—opposedthereformprocessandclaimedthatsuch policies were populist and demagogic; but they never questioned thede facto nature of the regime. In February of 1972, anothermassacre—theTalanquera Massacre in the Olancho province—took place. This massacreagainwaseffectivelycarriedoutbymembersofthemilitaryagainstagroupofpeasantsinordertorepressthemovementfightingforland.

OnApril 9, 1975 aWallStreet Journal article denouncedGeneralLópezArellano’s acceptance of a bribe from a banana company in exchange for apromisenottoincreasetaxesonbananaexports.Followingthis,hewasforcedtoresignandwassubstitutedbyGeneralJuanAlbertoMelgarCastro.InJune1975,theMassacreofLosHorcones tookplace in theOlanchoprovince,carriedoutagainstapeasantgroupandmembersoftheCatholicChurch.

In1978,thecountrywasgoingthroughaninternalpolitical,economic,andsocialcrisisalongwiththeerosionoftheArmedForces’rule,whichintensitiedfrom1978to1980duringtheMilitaryJuntaGovernmentcommandedbyGeneralPolicarpoPazGarcía.Duringthisperiod,amongmanyotherviolationsofhumanrights,themilitaryattackedtheEmpresa Asociativa Campesina de Isletas (Isleta Peasants’Cooperative),theJesuitpriestJamesFrancisCarneywasarrestedanddeported,andthecountrysawthefirstcaseofforceddisappearance.

On the other hand, external factors favoring democratization and thepromotion of human rights were determining factors in the turnabout in thepolitical situation inHonduras. Such factors include the election ofDemocratJamesCartertothepresidencyintheUnitedStatesofAmericain1976andthevictoryoftheSandinistaRevolutioninNicaraguain1979.Theseeventsinfluencedthecountry’spathtowardsdemocracy.

In thiscontext,PolicarpaPazGarcíaof theMilitaryJuntaGovernment—backedbytheUnitedStatesandsupportedbythetraditionalpoliticalpartiesandeconomicgroups—heldelectionsin1979inordertochoosethedeputiesoftheNationalConstitutionalAssembly.ThisAsseemblywasresponsibleforelectingaProvisionalPresidentin1980,adoptinganewPoliticalConstitution,andholdinggeneralelectionsin1981foranewpresidentforthe1982-1986term.TheNationalConstitutionalAssemblyadoptedthenewConstitutionoftheRepublicin1981and, paradoxically, electedGeneral PazGarcía asProvisional President of theRepublic.

B. Restricted Electoral Democracy

The two-party system—set up by the traditional Liberal and Nationalparties—didnotevolveandchangeinthe1980sinordertobetterfacethenewchallengesofdemocracy.Thissystemmappedontothegeneralstateofcrisisin

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theCentralAmericanregion,wherepoliticalcloutwasproppedupbyoldformsofauthoritarianism,oftenreferredtoinLatinAmericaascaudillismo or caciquismo. Thenewpoliticalparties—theChristianDemocraticPartyandtheInnovationandUnityParty—wereincorporatedintopoliticalandelectoralprocessesbutwithoutanychanceofreachingpowergiventheirsmallsocialbases.

The continuity ofmilitary power until January 1982 allowed theArmedForces to reestablish its leadership, justify its actionswith a national securitydoctrine,andconsolidateitsroleintheregionalcontextofCentralAmerica.Forexample, theHonduranmilitarypointed to the1979 triumphof theSandinistaRevolution (the external enemy) and pressure from the local subversion (theinternalenemy)inordertojustifytheuseofHonduranterritoryasacenterforU.S.militaryoperations.

Hondurasenjoysaspecialgeo-strategicpositioninCentralAmerica,borderingwiththreeothercountriesintheregion:ElSalvador,Nicaragua,andGuatemala.This,alongwiththediscourseabout“internalandexternalsubversion,”servedasajustificationforstrengtheningthemilitaryinstitutionasapillarofthemilitaryandpoliticalalliancesbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheCentralAmericanregionandasaninternalguardianoftheincipientHondurandemocracy.Together,thiscontextensuredthemilitary’spositionasthedefactopowerinthecountry.

TheLiberalPartywonthe1981elections,andonJanuary27,1982,RobertSuazoCórdovaassumedthepresidency.Atthesametime,GeneralGustavoÁlvarezMartínezbecamethenewleaderoftheArmedForces.ThisfactopenedthewayfortheimplementationoftheU.S.political-militarystrategyforCentralAmerica,whichinvolvedamilitarycampaignagainstNicaragua’snewgovernmentandtheinsurgencyinElSalvador.Onthedomesticlevel,theHonduranpolitical-militaryorganizationsdidnotposeathreattothecontinuedauthorityofthemilitaryandtheweakcivilgovernment.3

The implementation of the national security doctrine also involved thecreation of the Association for the Progress of Honduras (APROH), a civilintervention in which U.S. interests converged with those of businesses,politicians, public servants, union leaders, guild leaders, andmilitaryofficials,amongothers.Itspurposewastoprovideguidelinestotheexecutivebranchintheareasofeconomics,politics,ideology,andsecurity.TheassociationalsofullysupportedGeneralÁlvarezMartínez,atleastuntilMarch31,1984,whenÁlvarezwasarrestedandexiledfromthecountrybyagroupofmilitaryofficials.HewasreplacedbyGeneralWalterLópezReyes,whobecamethenewheadoftheArmedForces.ThegovernmentthendeclaredtheAPROHillegalandhaditdissolved.4

3 MarkRosenberg,El indicador hondureño, militares y demócratas en la américa central,in hondu-ras: pIeza ClaVe de la polítICa de estados unIdos en CentroamérICa 90 (VíctorMezaed.,1986).

4 marGarIta oseGuera de oChoa, Centro de doCumentaCIón de honduras, honduras hoy: soCIedad y CrIsIs polítICa26(1987).

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WiththeContadoraDeclarationinJanuaryof1983,5theMinistersofForeignRelations of Colombia,Mexico, Panama, andVenezuela expressed their deepconcernabouttheforeigninterventioninCentralAmerica’sconflicts,warnedofthedangerofincorporatingtheseconflictsintoeast-westColdWarconfrontation,andidentifiedtheneedtoeliminatetheexternalfactorsthatservedtoexacerbatetheconflicts.Theseministerscalledon theCentralAmericancountries toeasetensionsthroughdialogueandnegotiationinordertoestablishthefoundationforaclimateofpeacefulcoexistenceandmutualrespectamongstates.

In October of 1984, the new military leadership set up an InvestigativeCommissiononDisappearances,whichpresentedareporttoPresidentRobertoSuazoCórdova.6However,henevermadethisreportpublic.Althoughthereportwaseventuallypublishedin1985,theCatholicChurchconsideredittobeajoke.7 ThissituationevidencedonceagaintheState’slackofpoliticalwilltorecognizeandprotectvictims’rightstotruth,justice,andreparations.8

Inthegeneralelectionsof1985,theLiberalcandidateJoséAzconaHoyowaselectedpresidentandtookofficeinJanuary1986.Atthattime,thepresenceoftheillegal“Contra”forcesintheeasternregionofHondurasledtonumerousharmstopeopleandtheirproperty.The“Contra”modusoperandiincludedtheft,robbery,rape,andkidnapping,evengoingsofarastoplacelandminesthroughouttheregion.ThisbroughtaboutthedisplacementofthousandsofHonduransfromtheareaalongtheborderwithNicaragua.

InMay 1986, the Presidents of theCentralAmerican countries revisited thedialogueaboutpeaceanddemocracy.TheMay1986EsquipulasDeclaration9expressedthesePresidents’intentionstocreatetheCentralAmericanParliamentandtosigntheContadoraDeclaration,whichwaspromotedbyOscarArias,PresidentofCostaRica.

In June 1986, theMinisters of Foreign Relations of the various CentralAmericancountriessignedtheContadoraDeclarationforPeaceandCooperationinCentralAmerica.10Indoingso,theyrecognizedthegravesituationthatprevailedin theregion,characterizedby theerosionofpolitical trust,borderskirmishes,thearmsrace,illegalarms-trafficking,thepresenceofforeignmilitaryadvisors(amongotherformsofforeignmilitarypresence),aswellastheuseofpartsofcertainStates’territoriesbyillegalarmedgroupsinordertoattackanddestabilizeothercountriesintheregion.

5 DeclaracióndeContadora(ContadoraDeclaration),Jan.9,1983,available at http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/2513.pdf.

6 Nada dice el informe militar sobre los culpables de los desaparecidos,dIarIo tIempo,Oct.18,1984.

7 See La Iglesia califica de “burla” Informe sobre los desaparecidos, dIarIo tIempo,Oct.19,1985.8 SeeVelásquezRodríguezv.HondurasCase,Inter-Am.Ct.H.Rts.(ser.C)No.4,para.180(July29,

1988).9 EsquipulasDeclaration,May25,1986,available at http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/2529.pdf.10 ContadoraDeclarationforPeaceandCooperationinCentralAmerica,June6,1986,available at

http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/1566.pdf.

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The governments of the region made substantive commitments to thefollowingissues:easingofintra-regionaltensions,nationalreconciliation,humanrights,electoralprocessesandparliamentarycooperation,militarymaneuvering,military weapons and forces, foreign army bases, terrorism, rebel groups andsabotage,communicationsystems,refugees,andeconomicandsocialconcerns.

It is thanks to this process that tensions in the regionbegan to dissipate,a political aim establishedwith the signing of the EsquipulasAgreement II,11 whichpresentedthe“ProcedureforEstablishingaStrongandLastingPeaceinCentralAmerica.” This consisted of eleven points: 1) national reconciliation,whichintegratestheissuesofdialogue,amnesty,andtheNationalReconciliationCommission; 2) call for a cessation of hostilities; 3) democratization; 4) freeelections;5)commitmenttoendsupportforillegalarmedforcesandinsurrectionmovements;6)commitmenttorefrainfromusingnationalterritorytoattackotherstates;7)negotiationsonmattersofsecurity,verification,control,andrestrictionson arms; 8) refugees and displaced people; 9) cooperation, democracy, andfreedominordertoachievepeaceanddevelopment;10)internationalverificationandoversight;and11)timetableforfulfillmentofcommitments.

In Honduras, the Catholic Church supported the National ReconciliationCommission.OnNovember 3, 1987, the government ofAzconaHoyo legallyestablished the Commission, and it was presided over by Monsignor HéctorEnriqueSantos.OnNovember4,1987,theNationalCongressapprovedAmnestyDecree199-87forpoliticalcrimesandrelatedcommoncrimes.

In the1989generalelections, theoppositioncandidate fromtheNationalParty, Rafael Leonardo Callejas emerged victorious, and he took office asPresident in January 1990.Thismarked the beginning of a newphase for thecountry,dominatedbyefforts tomodernize theStatewithin thecontextof theexpansionofneo-liberalism.Followingtheeaseofeast-westtensionsin1989andthenewagreementsintheCentralAmericanregion,aprocessofpoliticalopeningtookplace,whichhadbeenprecededbyAmnestyDecree3090E.Thispoliticalopening led to: the return in January andMay 1991 of leftist politicianswhohadbeeninexile;anotherAmnestyDecree,number87-91ofJuly1991;andtheestablishmentin1993oftheDemocraticUnificationParty(UD),whichbroughttogetherfourpoliticalorganizationsthatdidnothavelegalrecognitionatthetime.Theseeventsgaverisetoapoliticalagendaorientedtowardsthedemilitarizationof theState, the strengtheningof the justice sector, and the implementationofa Structural Economics Adjustment Program, which impacted positively theeconomicandsocialrightsoftheHonduranpopulation.

Within the contextofmodernizationof theState, in June1992PresidentCallejasissuedanExecutiveDecreefortheCreationoftheNationalCommission

11 EsquipulasAgreementII:ProcedurestoEstablishaStrongandLastingPeaceinCentralAmerica,Aug.7,1987,available athttp://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/2530.pdf.

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fortheProtectionofHumanRights,withtheNationalReconciliationCommissionas the consulting body. By December 1993, the Commission presented itsPreliminaryReport12onthedisappearedinHondurastitled“TheFactsSpeakforThemselves.”Thisreportrevealedthesystematicpracticeofforceddisappearancesduring the1980s—apractice that thepoliticaland judicialauthoritiesallowed,eitheractivelyorbyomission.

In terms of justice, one of the main problems had to do with constantjurisdictionaldisputesbetweenordinaryandmilitarycourts.Thiswasduetotheuseofmilitary jurisdictionasaspecial forum,suchthatallcrimes involvingamemberofthemilitary—evencommoncrimes—weretriedinmilitaryforums.ThisdidnotchangeuntilMarch1993,whentheNationalCongressinterpretedArticle90oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicdeclaringthat“inthecaseofjurisdictionalconflict as towhether a crime belongs to the ordinary criminal jurisdiction ormilitarycriminaljurisdiction,ordinaryjurisdictionshallprevail.”13

In 1993CarlosRobertoReinawas elected President of theRepublic fortheperiodfrom1994to1997.Thetendencytowardsthedemilitarizationofthepublic administration strengthenedwith the transferenceof several institutionsandcompaniesthathadpreviouslybeenunderthecontrolofthemilitarytothecivil sphere.Among thesewere theHonduranTelecommunications Company,theMerchantNavy, theNationalGeographicalInstitute,andtheDirectorateofMigrations.Other importantmeasureswere taken:mandatorymilitary servicewasabolishedand, in itsplace, avoluntary schemewas setup; the repressiveNational Directorate of Investigations (NDI), which was subordinate to thePublicSecurityForce(PSF)branchoftheArmedForces,wasdisbanded;and,theCriminalInvestigationDirectorate(CID)wascreatedaspartofthenewOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral.

In1997,theLiberalPartycandidateCarlosFloresFacusséwaselectedforthe 1998-2002 term. The demilitarization agenda sought to bring themilitaryinstitutionundertheCentralPublicAdministration,byeliminatingtheSuperiorCounciloftheArmedForcesandcreatingtheBoardofCommanders.InSeptember1998,theNationalCongressundertookanimportantconstitutionalreformtothechapterontheArmedForces,whichwasrenamed“OnNationalDefense.”Thisreform,ratifiedinJanuary1999,eliminatedtheautonomythemilitaryhadenjoyedforoverfortyyears.ThefigureoftheChiefoftheArmedForcesdisappearedandwasreplacedbythecivilSecretaryofDefense,withintheexecutivebranch.Public

12 ComisionadoNacional para laProtecciónde losDerechosHumanos (NationalCommision fortheProtectionofHumanRights),Loshechoshablanpor símismos, InformePreliminar sobrelosdesaparecidos enHonduras (1994) (English translationbyHumanRightsWatch&CEJIL,TheFactsSpeakforThemselves:ThePreliminaryReportoftheNationalCommissionerfortheProtectionofHumanRightsinHonduras(1994)).

13 CongresoNacionalde laRepública(NationalRepublicanCongress),Decree58-93,LaGaceta,No.27-059(June2,1993).

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securitywasremovedfromthemilitary’sresponsibilities;in1998,theNationalPoliceLawwasadopted,andtheinstitutionwastransferredtotheSecurityOfficeoftheSecretariatofState,undertheExecutive.

Theconstitutionalreformestablishedawiderangeofobjectivesthatwentbeyondtheusualgoalsofpreservingterritorialintegrityandnationalsovereignty.Theseobjectives included:guarantee thefreeexerciseofsuffrage, thecustody,transport,oversightofelectoralmaterials,andsecurityintheelectoralprocess;provide logistical support and consulting in communications and transport;combatillegaldrugtrafficking;effectivelyhandlenaturaldisastersandemergencysituations; and establish programs for the protection and conservation of theecosystem.The reforms provide for cooperation in combating terrorism, armstrafficking,andorganizedcrime,aswellasineffortsrelatedtoliteracy,education,agriculture,environmentalprotection,publicroadwayservices,communications,health,landreform,andotherareasofnationalinterest.14

In 2001, the Nationalist candidate Ricardo Maduro Joest was electedPresidentoftheRepublicfortheperiodof2002to2006.InSeptember2001,therepresentativesofthefivepoliticalpartiessignedthe“ManifestoofthePoliticalPartiestotheHonduranPeople”andthe“NationalAgreementonTransformationforHumanDevelopment in the21stCentury,”whichaimedto:1)separate theNationalRegistryofPeoplefromtheNationalElectoralTribunal;2)incorporatetheelectoral instrumentsofplebisciteandreferenduminto theConstitution;3)regulateelectoralcampaigns;4)authorizetheformationofpoliticalalliances;5)introducenewwaystoelectcongressionalrepresentatives;6)abolishathefigureofpresidentialappointeeandreplaceitwithaVice-President;7)regulatepoliticalfinancing;and8)approveanewLawonElectionsandPoliticalOrganizations.

The passage in May 2004 of the new Law on Elections and PoliticalOrganizations proved an important step in the advancement towards thedemocratization of the electoral and political system, thus leaving behind theregulatory framework of the previous six electoral processes in 1981, 1985,1989,1993,1997,and2001.

Finally, in 2005, the Liberal candidate Manuel Zelaya won the generalelections,andassumedthepresidencyinJanuary2006.

From thebeginningof his administration,PresidentZelaya increased thebudget for theArmedForces,assigning it importantfinancial resourcesfor theprotectionofnationalforests.HealsograntedtheArmedForcesthetemporaryadministrationoftheelectricitycompanyandputitinchargeofbuildingthecom-mercialterminalofthePalmerolaAirport.Inordertocarryoutthe“cuarta urna”referendumtoconsultthepublicastothecreationofaNationalConstitutionalAssemblytodraftanewConstitution,PresidentZelayainvolvedthemilitaryin

14 ConstItutIon of the republIC,arts.272&274.

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thecustodyanddistributionoftheballotsandballotboxes.Threedayspriortotheevent,however,themilitarydecidednottosupportthisprocess.

ItisinthiscontextthattheconstitutionalorderinHondurasbrokedown.AtdawnonSunday,June28,2009,around5:00a.m.,inthe3CaminosneighborhoodofthecityofTegucigalpa,militarytroopsviolentlystormedintotheresidenceofPresidentManuelZelaya,capturedhim,andtookhimtoanAirForcebase,fromwhichhewasthentakenbyairtoSanJosé,CostaRica.

Theseizureofpowerbyade factogovernment, following thearrest andexpulsionbothfrompowerandfromthecountryoftheconstitutionallyelectedPresidentoftheRepublic,broughtwithitthegravestpoliticalandinstitutionalcrisisHondurashasseeninthirtyyears.Thisfracturedthepoliticalsystemaswellasthedemocratictransitionwhichhadbegunin1979withtheNationalConstitutionalAssembly. These events have interrupted the continuous and constitutionallyendorsedalternationofpowercontemplatedinthePoliticalConstitutionof1982andconfirmedtheerosionofthecountry’sdemocraticinstitutions.

Althoughthisarbitraryactionwasastepbackwardsinthecountry’shistoryofcoupsd’état,the“removal”and“substitution”ofPresidentZelayawasdefendedbyvarioussectorsandpublicinstitutions,includingcivilauthoritiessuchastheSupremeCourtofJustice,theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,theNationalHumanRightsCommission,theProcuratorGeneral’sOffice,theCongressionalmajority,andthedefactogovernmentitself.Throughnumerousstatements,thesesectorsdefendedPresidentZelaya’sremovalasa legalandconstitutionalmeasurethatwasnecessarytosafeguarddemocracyandtheruleoflawagainstaPresidentthathaddefiedthejudiciaryandunderhandedlyattemptedtoamendtheConstitutiontoallowhisreelectionforasecondterm.

The National Congress, without the necessary competence to do so andwithoutconcretelysettingouttherelevantfacts,declaredthatPresidentZelayawas guilty of violating the Constitution and the law in general, and guilty ofdisobeying and ignoring resolutions and judicial decisions. These abstractaccusations proved sufficient for the National Congress to declare PresidentZelaya’sguiltforhavingcarriedoutactionsthathavenotbeenclearlyidentified,even though under Honduran law the declaration of criminal responsibility isreserved exclusively for the judicial branch. Congress assumed the powers ofanotherbranch:thejudiciary.

“Substitution” is the term used in the Constitution for situations wherea public servant exercises executive powers when the President is totallyabsent—by reason of death, abdication, or legal exclusion—before the end ofthatconstitutionallydefinedpresidentialperiod.15Giventheforegoingdefinition,referringtotheexpulsionofPresidentZelayaas“substitution”isratherarbitrary,

15 ConstItutIon of the republIC,art.242.

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especiallywhenconsideringthathewasexpatriatedinviolationofarticle102oftheConstitution,whichexpresslyprohibitstheexpatriationofHondurans.

Although the removalofPresidentZelayameantastepbackwards in theconsolidation of democracy in Honduras and revealed the deficiencies of thecountry’s political and judicial system, the advances that havemade since the1980stowardmodernizingtheStatecannotbedenied.BelowIwillexplorethenatureof the institutional reforms thathavebeen implemented inHonduras inrecentyears.Suchreformhasallowedforthemodernizationofthejudicialsystemtosomeextent,despitenotyetachievingitsindependenceandautonomy.

II. Institutional Reform

A. The Judiciary

HondurasgainedindependencefromtheSpanishcrowninthe19thcenturyand adopted its firstConstitution in 1825, establishing theRepublic.With theliberalreformattheendofthatcentury,therepublicbuiltthelegalandinstitutionalfoundationsfordevelopingthenascentruleoflawinthecountry.Duringthefirstdecadeof the20thcentury, theHonduran legalsystemwasrevampedwith theadoptionofnew legalcodes—thecivilcode, thecodeofcivilprocedure,andthecriminalcode—aswellaswiththelegalframeworkfortheorganizationandjurisdictionofthecourts.However,theHonduranlegalsystem’sdevelopmentwaschaoticbecauseoftherampantpoliticalinstabilitythroughoutthelastcentury.16

Historically,theHonduranjudiciaryhasnotplayeditsproperrolewithinthesystemofchecksandbalancesnecessaryfortheruleoflaw.InsuchsystemthejudiciaryisassignedtheroleofsafeguardingtheConstitution,conductingjudicialreviewoftheconstitutionalityoflawsandgovernmentdecisions,andresolvingdisputesthatcomebeforeit.However,thejudiciaryhasadoptedaoninstitutionalprofileandhasfailedtoexerciseanyefectivelegalcontrolovereconomic,politicalandfinancialforces.

Duringthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury,theadministrationofjusticeinthecountrywasseriouslyunderminedbytheinfluenceofarmedwarlords,politicalbosses,andthetraditionalpoliticalparties,attimescharacterizedbydictatorshipsandfrequentstrugglesamongfactions.17 The second half of the century witnessed a seriesofmilitarycoupsandcivilgovernmentswhoseauthoritywascircumscribedbythemilitary.Havingtakenoverpublicpower,themilitaryeasilycontrolledaweakHonduranjudiciary.

16 ramón romero & letICIa salomón, Cedoh, la reforma JudICIal: un reto para la demoCraCIa 57(2000).

17 See barahona,supra note2.

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As indicated in the previous section, the formal transition fromauthoritarianism todemocracyduring the last centurymade it possible for thecountry’slegalsystemtobeginits“modernization.”Beginninginthemid-1980s,the Commission for the Reform of the Judicial System was established, thusgivingrisetoseveralchanges,including:theorganizationoftheJudicialSchool,the implementation of the Law for the Judicial Profession, the emergence ofadjunctjudges,theestablishmentofthePublicDefender’sOffice,thecreationoftheOfficeoftheGeneralCourtInspector,andthecreationofcourtswithspecificjurisdictionforfamilylaw,minors,andadministrativelaw,amongothers.

As mentioned above, as part of the State’s modernization process inthe 1990s, themilitarywas brought under the structure of theCentral PublicAdministrationandthepoliceforcewasshiftedovertothecivilsphere.Allofthistookplaceinacontextoflowjudicialcredibilityduetoitsweakinstitutionalpresenceanditslackoftransparencyandpredictabilityinapplyingthelaw,whichreaffirmed theneedfor impartialadministrationof justiceandanautonomousjudiciary.18

Thus,withthesupportofinternationalassistance,therehasbeenprogressin judicial reform inseveral respects: the implementationof tenure for judges,improvedorganization and administrationof the judiciary, developmentof theinfrastructureneededforeffectivejudicialservices,institutionalstrengtheningofthePublicDefender’sOfficeandtheOfficeoftheGeneralInspectorofCourts,andtheadoptionandimplementationofnewlaws.19In2001,anamendmenttotheConstitution’schapteronthejudiciarycameintoeffect.TheamendmentprovidedforanewmethodforelectingSupremeCourtmagistrates,describedfurtherbelowin reference to judicial independence.

Severalnewlawswerepassed:theCriminalProcedureCodein2002,theConstitutionalJusticeLawin2005,reformstotheCriminalCodein2005,anda newCode of Civil Procedure.These changes reveal a tendency in favor ofmodernizingtheHonduranlegalsystem.However,twonewlawsarestillpendingcongressional approval—the Law on the Judicial Branch and the Law on theJudicialCouncilandJudicialCareer—bothofwhichareimportantchallengesforstrengtheningthedemocraticruleoflawinHonduras.

In sum, judicial reform has been supported by bilateral andmultilateralcooperation, however, the reforms have been largely oriented towardsorganization,technical,andadministrativeaspects.Thesereformmeasureshaveallbeenpartoftheattempttomodernizethejudiciary,withouthavingastheirprincipalemphasisstrengtheningjudicialindependencewithrespecttotheotherbranchesoftheState.

18 UNDP,human deVelopment report: honduras 2002,at73.19 Id. at 76.

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1. PerceptionsoftheJudiciary

The 2003 Human Development Report on Honduras emphasized thatcorruptioninHondurasisperceivedasaphenomenonthathasevolvedovertimeandthathaspermeatedpublicinstitutionstotheextentthatitisinstitutionalized.20 ThisperceptionisareflectionoftheprogressivewaninganderosionoftheState’sinstitutional strength, an unfortunate reality that has seriously undermined thesocialandpoliticalfoundationsofthelegitimacyofthedemocraticState.

Theaforementionedreportthusrevealstheoverwhelminglyprevalentviewthatthejusticesystemsupportsastructureofimpunitythatservestheinterestsof“whitecollar”corruption,which,intarnreinforcesthegeneralbeliefthatthejusticesystemneitherworksnorisimpartial.Thisperceptionhashadanegativeimpacton democratic governance and socioeconomic development in the country.21 Despite the steps taken towards judicialmodernization, theperception that thejusticesystemservestosustaintheexistingstructuresofpower,corruption,andimpunitycontinuestoholdsway.

2. JudicialIndependence

Inthejudiciary,thereisaconfluenceoftwotypesofinfluence:externalandinternal.Externalinfluencecomesfromgovernmentauthorityandthetraditionalgroupswithdefactopower,particularlyinthenominationandelectionofSupremeCourtmagistrates.Internalinfluenceresultsfromthedominantpositionenjoyedbythesametwosourcesofpower,whichconcentrateadministrativepowersandthusincreasetheirpressureonthejudicialfunction.Thishasservedtoweakenjudicialindependenceandimpartiality.22

a. External Interference

Interferencebythelegislativebranchisevidencedbythefactthatitco-optedtheprocessofnominatingandelectingtheSupremeCourtofJusticemagistrates.ItsinfluenceisalsoapparentinitsintentiontoamendtheConstitutionsoastograntthelegislaturethepowertointerpretconstitutionalprovisions—apowerthatisalwaysreservedexclusivelyforthejudiciaryinanysysteminwhichtheruleoflawprevails.

In2002,theNationalCongressindeedapprovedaconstitutionalamendmentthatgrantedthelegislaturethepowertointerprettheConstitution,somethingthat

20 UNDP,human deVelopment report: honduras 2003,at158.21 Id.at159.22 See rIGoberto oChoa et al., due proCess of law foundatIon, Controles y desControles de la

CorrupCIón JudICIal 281(2007).

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ithadalreadybeendoingwithouttherequisitelegalpermission.Thisservedtounderminethejudiciary’sauthorityandfurtherweakenitsautonomywithrespectto the legislative and executive branches. Contrary to what the Constitutionexpresslyrequires,CongressdidnotpublishthisdecisionintheofficialGazette.The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice declared theamendmentunconstitutional.

Notwithstanding this decision, in 2007 the ruling party’s congressionalcaucuspresentedanotherinitiativetoreformoneoftheConstitution’sprovisionssoastoallowCongresstointerprettheConstitutionbyavoteoftwo-thirdsofallcongressionalvotesandthenaratificationvoteinthefollowinglegislativesessionpassingbyanequalmajority.Neitheroftheseattemptsatconstitutionalreformwassuccessful,buttherecontinuetobethreatstothebalanceofpoweralongwithgrowinguncertaintyastothelimitsoftheruleoflaw.

Withtheconstitutionalreformof2000,Congress’sinfluenceinthenominationandelectionofSupremeCourtmagistratesincreased.Magistratesareelectedbya two-thirdsmajority of allmembers of congress from a ballotwith forty-fivecandidates,allofwhomarenominatedbytheNominatingBoard,whichincludesonerepresentativefromeachofthefollowingbodiesorsectors:theSupremeCourtofJustice,theNationalBarAssociation,theNationalHumanRightsCommission,theHonduranPrivateEnterpriseCouncil,thefacultiesoftheseverallawschools,civil society organizations, and the labor unions.The amendment extended themagistrates’termsofservicefromfourtosevenyearsandincreasedthetotalnumberofSupremeCourtmagistratesfromninetofifteen.ThereformalsoorganizedtheCourtintoChambers,includingaconstitutionalchamberresponsibleforreviewingtheconstitutionalityoflawsandprotectingconstitutionalrights.

ThisnewmethodfornominatingandelectingSupremeCourtmagistrateshasbeenviewedasasteptowarddemocracy.However,whetherornotcitizensseeprogress in terms justice, especiallywith respect to judicial independence,canbeviewedtwoways:ononehand,citizensmaytakenoteofcivilsociety’sopportunity to participate in the nomination of candidates for positions asSupremeCourtmagistrates;ontheotherhand,somecitizenswillpointoutthatCongressultimatelychoosesthemagistratesfromthelistofproposedcandidates,and Congressmembers vote according to political and party alliances. This isfurthercomplicatedbytheinfluencethatpolitical,economic,andfinancialgroupsexerciseoverCongress,controllinganddelegitimizingthedemocraticprocessesinitiatedbythedifferentsectorsofsociety.23

TheimplementationofthismodelforelectingSupremeCourtmagistratesis,inpractice,subjecttotheinfluencesoftraditionalpartyinterests.Thisisattributableto, among other things, the legal framework that regulates the nomination and

23 See rIGoberto oChoa et al., dplf & world banK, las reformas a la admInIstraCIón de JustICIa en honduras y bolIVIa61(2008).

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electionsof thehighestcourt’smagistrates.Accordingly, theNominatingBoardbecomesaninstrumentpromotedbythetraditionalpoliticalpartiestocontrolthejudiciary.First,theywieldinfluencewithrespecttotheselectionandsupervisionofthemembersthatmakeuptheNominatingBoard.Then,theymanagetoassurethattheNominationBoardmembersnominatecandidateswhoareideologicallyalignedwith them andwith the economic and financial groups they represent.Afterwards, they do all the political maneuvering necessary to increase theirnegotiatingcapacitywithintheNominatingBoardinordertoensurethegreatestpossible number of candidates within the list of the forty-five nominees sharetheirpoliticalviews.Then, thepoliticalparties represented inCongress reachaconsensusonthecandidatesthataretobeelected,withapprovaloftheeconomicandfinancialforcesthattheirpartiesrepresent.Finally,thecongressionalcaucusesvotesinwhatisessentiallyamereformalitytomakeofficialandlegitimatetheirpreviouslyagreed-uponappointees.

Insum, theLawof theNominatingBoard toleratesconflictsof interest intermsofnominatorsandnominees,andgivesthemlegallegitimacy.ThisisthecasebecausethesystemfornominatingandelectingSupremeCourtmagistratesdoesnot guarantee the judiciary’s independence. Instead, the system facilitates deal-makingandpowerdistributionbetweenthetraditionalpoliticalparties.Oneofthemeansofholdingpowerinthejudiciaryisthroughclientelistpractices,whichhasallowedthepowersthatbetoequipandexpandthejudicialinfrastructurewhileatthesametimemaintainingtheindependenceofthejudiciarylimited.

b. Internal Interference

Internal interference results from the influence of institutional authoritiesand the traditional sourcesofpower, aswells as from internal interestgroups.Inparticular, it ischaracterizedbyconcentrationof theadministrativeroleanditsinfluenceoverjurisdictionalmatter,whichunderminesjudicialautonomyandimpartiality.

In Honduras, candidates from the opposition for judicial tenure are theexception,nottherule.Becauseofthediscretionalnatureofthemanagementofpersonnel,equaltreatmentdoesnotapplywithregardtopromotions, transfers,salary adjustments related to tenure, technical training, andnewopportunities.Theresulthasthusbeenasystemrifewithfavoritism.Demandsfromcivilsocietyhaveincludedthatjudicialpositionsbesubjecttointernaland/orexternalselectionprocesses,whenever appropriate; that a public auditing scheme be establishedto supervise the selectionprocess andappointmentof judges,magistrates, andsupport staff; and that there be a foundation for a balanced and transparentapproachwithrespecttojudgeships.

By virtue of the 2002 constitutional amendment to currentArticle 313,section8,andArticle317,theCounciloftheJudiciaryandJudicialCareerswas

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created.Thisnewbodywasdesignedtobethehighestadministrativeauthoritywithinthejudicialbranch,responsiblefortheselection,appointment,andremovalofjudgesandmagistrates.AccordingtotheConstitution,membersoftheCouncilaretobeappointedbytheSupremeCourtofJustice,thusconcentratingwithinthatbodybothjurisdictionalandadministrativeroles.However,inpracticethisCouncilhasnotbeensetup,anditsadministrativeresponsibilities—inviolationoftheConstitution—havebeenheldbythePresidentoftheSupremeCourt.

TotheextentthatthejudicialandadministrativefunctionsoftheStatearecentralizedandclientelismcontinuestobeencouragedbythejudicialhierarchy,bothfunctionsobviouslymixandpromotecorruption, thus leadingtonegativeresultsforthejudicialsystem.Forexample,theconcentrationofactivitiesrelatingtothemanagementofpersonnelinthePresidentoftheSupremeCourthasservedtounderminetheimpartialityofthejudiciary.

Indeed, the importanceofconcentratingpersonnelmanagementunder theauthorityofthePresidentoftheSupremeCourtstemsfromthefactthatitservestofacilitateandpromoteclientelistpractices.Directcontroloverpersonnel-relateddecisions—appointments,promotions, transfers,andtermination—establishesasystemofrewardsandpenalties.Whenpromotedfromthehighest levelof thejudicialsystem,thiscontroldirectlyrelatestothejobsecurityofjudgesandtheirchances forpromotionwithin thecourtsystem.Theforegoingdynamicsaffectanddirectly influence the independenceof judges, thusundermininghopes forbuildingademocraticjudiciary.24

In2006,theSupremeCourtsenttoCongressabillontheJudiciaryCounciland Judicial Career Law, which would derogate the current Judicial CareerLaw,andwhichtothisdatehasnotbeenratified.Thislawhasbecomethemaininstrumentforbringingorderandtransparencytothejudiciaryandstrengtheningits independencefromotherbranchesofgovernment.Congress’sconsiderationandratificationofthisbill,inaccordancewithdemocraticlegislativepractices,isfundamentalforstrengtheningtheruleoflawinHonduras.

Thecreationand integrationof theCouncil isessential to theprocessofstructuringthesystemofjudicialtenureandreorganizingthesystemofselectionand appointment of public servants to the judiciary, aswell as their training,evaluation,andprofessionalizationinjudicialactivity.TheCouncilwouldthusserve to guarantee judges’ job security and their promotion to higher judicialpositions based on objective, not clientelist, criteria,whichwould ensure theindependenceandimpartialityofjudgesandmagistratesintheirdecision-makingactivities.

24 Id.at59.

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B. Office of the Attorney General

TheOffice of theAttorneyGeneral (Ministerio Público) was created on the initiative of the “Ad-HocHighCommission for InstitutionalReforms thatGuarantee Peace and Social Security in Honduras,” and through Congress’sratificationofLegislativeDecree228-93.TheOfficecameintobeinginJanuary1994, with the objective of contributing to the independent, impartial, legal,practical,andefficientadministrationofjustice.Forthisreason,theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral has beengranted independence in carryingout its activities,anditwasdeterminedthattheprosecutorialpersonnelwouldbeselectedbasedonmeritsandcompetence.Thisinauguratedanewphaseinthestrengtheningofthelegalsystemandtheruleoflaw.

WhentheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneralbegancarryingoutitsactivitiesaninter-generationalclasharosebetween thenewprosecutorsand the judges thathadbeenappointedthroughpoliticalclientelism.Thisledtoreportsofcorruptioninthejudiciarysystem,revealingittobeoneofthemainobstaclestotheeffectiveadministrationofjusticeinthecountry.

The role assumedby theAttorneyGeneral is a determining factor in thestrengtheningorweakeningofthelegalsystem.ThisisdemonstratedbythecrisesthataffectedtheOfficeof theAttorneyGeneral in2004asaresultof thepoorpolicy decisionswith regard to the protection and defense of general societalinterests.ThecrisisbeganwhentheAttorneyGeneral(fromtheNationalParty)decidedtoabandonseveralhigh-impactcorruptioncases,thussparkingtheprotestofmanyprosecutors,tenofwhomwereremovedfromofficeandsixofwhomweretransferredtodifferentposts.Thisrepresentedasetbackinthestruggletocombatimpunityandcorruptionwhilestrengtheningtheruleoflaw.

TheOffice of theAttorneyGeneral already enjoyed little credibility andconfidenceamongcitizens.Thesituationworsened,however,when theUnitedStatesDepartmentofStaterevokedthevisaoftheAdjunctAttorneyGeneral(oftheLiberalParty)foractsofcorruption.25AftercomplicatednegotiationsbetweenthetraditionalNationalandLiberalpoliticalparties,theAttorneyGeneralresignedfrom his post after dealing with a severe crisis that lasted eight months. TheAdjunctAttorneyGeneralalsoresigned.Withinthiscontextofridiculouspartisanpolarizationandpowerdistribution,theNationalPartyreassumedthepositionofAttorneyGeneral,andtheliberalstheAdjunctAttorneyGeneral.

Byvirtueofthecriminalproceduralreformsin2002,theOfficeoftheAttor-neyGeneralassumedinvestigativeresponsibilitiesthroughoutthecriminaljusticeprocess—fromthecommissionofacriminalactallthewayuptothemomentofsentencing.However,theOffice’sbudget(400millionlempiras,approx.USD$21

25 See Por corrupción revocan visa a Yuri Melara,el heraldo,June8,2005.

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million)hasnotbeenincreasedinordertoallowtheinstitutiontofulfillitsnewresponsibilities.Therefore, theOfficeof theAttorneyGeneral lacks thehumanandlogisticalresourcesnecessarytosuccessfullyfacethechallengesofthenewcriminaljusticesystemandtosatisfysociety’sdemandstoreducethehighlevelsofimpunity.

1. CriminalInvestigation

With the implementation of the new police model in 1998—a singlepoliceforceunderthesupervisionof theSecretariatofSecurity—theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneralwasaffectedby the transferof itsCriminal InvestigationDirectoratetotheNationalPolice.Thispolicymeasureseriouslyweakenedthecriminal investigative capacity of the Office of theAttorney General furthercontributing to high levels of impunity. It has been deleterious and counter-intuitive.TheNationalCongress,ratherthanincreasethecapacityforprofessionalcriminalinvestigationunderthenewcriminalprocedureinsteadweakenedit.Thischangeincriminalpolicycamefromthecontextofsecuritysectorreform,whichsoughttoseparatetheNationalPolicefromtheArmedForces.

According to information from the Office of theAttorney General,26 of 62,463criminalreportsreceivedin2005,48,507weresenttotheNationalPoliceforinvestigation,ofwhichonly7825returnedwithaninvestigativereport.Thisdoesnotevenaccountforthedelayinprosecutionfromearlieryears.Anaverageof25%ofthecasestriedresultedinacquittal.Forexample,in2005,thejudiciaryissued1317oralverdicts,996ofwhichfoundthedefendantguilty.Theremaining321verdicts,inwhichthedefendantswerefoundnotguilty,amountedto24%ofthe all the cases.

OfallcriminalreportssentforinvestigationtotheCriminalInvestigationDirectorateoftheNationalPolicetherefore,only16%ofthecaseswereactuallyinvestigated.Ofthese,90%wereforcriminalinfractionsin flagrante delicto,andonly10%weretheresultsofinvestigations.Oftheinitial16%thatweretakenonbytheCID,only17%wereactuallytriedincourt,andofthese24%resultedinacquittal.

Inordertohaveanideaofthemagnitudeofthesituation,belowisatablethatsummarizestheyearlystatisticsfromtheTechnicalUnitonCriminalLegalReformoftheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral.Thegoalistohaveabetterunderstandingoftheeffectivenessofcriminalinvestigationduringtheperiodfrom2002to2006,duringwhichtheCodeofCriminalProcedurewasineffect.

26 offICe of the attorney General, teChnICal unIt for CrImInal leGal reform, statIstICal year-booK(2005).

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Table 1Effectiveness of Criminal Investigation: 2002-200627

Year Crimes Reported

Reported Crimes Submitted for Investigation

Reports Investigated

Verdicts Issued Acquittals

2002 41,689 23,644 4987 271 622003 52,965 26,104 8005 982 2232004 59,561 35,094 8697 1349 3162005 62,463 48,507 7825 1317 3212006 63,537 49,198 9213 1347 332Total 280,215 182,547 38,727 5266 1254

Generally speaking, from the foregoing tablewe can deduce that of allcrimesreportedtotheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneralduringtheperiodof2002-2006, 65%were sent to theCID of theNational Police.Of these, only 21%werereturnedwithinvestigationreports.Oftheseonly14%ledtoatrial,and24%ofthetriedcasesresultedinacquittals.Thelackincriminalinvestigationcorrespondsto79%ofallofthecrimereportsthatweresenttotheDGICforinvestigation.

Thepersonnelinchargeofinvestigationsrequirebettertraining,technicalresources, and materials in order to carry out their tasks more professionallyandtosuccessfullyfacethechallengesofanewcriminaljusticesystem.Someprosecutorspointoutthattheyareexpectedtoproducecertainresultsbutthattheinstitutionhasnotreceivedthefinancialandhumanresourcesneededinordertoeffectivelyconfrontthedifferenttypesofcrimes.

In general, the Criminal Investigation Directorate has been weakenedindifferentareas.This isevidencedby thepaltrybudgetandhumanresourcesallocated to the office, the lack of professionalism and competence amonginvestigators, and the lack of equipment andmaterials in order to effectivelycarry out a criminal investigation.These factors contribute to the inefficiencyofthecriminaljusticesystemandthehighlevelsofimpunity,anissuethathasunderminedthelegalityandlegitimacythatshouldcharacterizetheinstitutionalworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystem.

AccordingtotheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral’sAnnualActivityReport(Annual Statistics 2005-2006 and 2007-2008), the Office of Human RightsProsecutionsrevealsthefollowingdata:

27 TablecompiledbasedoninformationobtainedbytheauthorfromtheTechnicalUnitforCriminalLegalReformoftheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral.

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Table 2Human Rights Prosecutions: 2006-200828

Year Reports Received Convictions Acquittal Stay of

Proceedings2006 541 10 3 112007 605 6 8 132008 873 11 4 16Total 2019 27 15 40

Fromthischartwecanseethatduringtheperiod2006-2008,atotalof2019caseswerereceived,ofwhich27resultedinconvictions,15resultedinacquittals,and40instaysonproceedings.Thisisaclearindicationoftheineffectivenessof theOfficeofHumanRightsProsecutionsand theprevailinghigh levelsofimpunity.

2. TheReforminCriminalProcedure

InHonduras,criminalprocedurereformcameaboutintheformofthenewCriminalProcedureCode,whichcameintoeffectinFebruary2002.Thenewcodewas part of amovement throughoutLatinAmerica to revamp criminal justicesystems.Bydesign,thenewCodeisrespectfultowardcivilliberties,animportantpartofthisrenovationprocess.Thesystemisbasedonoraladvocacy,anditgivestheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneralcontroloverinvestigationandprosecution.Theprosecutorisinchargeofthecriminalinvestigation,whichisperformedbytheNationalPolice’sCriminalInvestigationDirectorate.Theinvestigationservesasthebasisforcriminalindictments.

Only theOfficeof theAttorneyGeneralhas thepower toprosecute.Thismonopolyoverprosecutionprocesshasstymiedaccesstojusticeandinterfereswiththerightsofvictimstobringcriminalactions.Thishascreatedaproceduralunbalance—there is no efficient prosecution (due to limits placed upon theprosecution),noduepunishmentofoffenders,noprotectionof thevictims29—given that criminal investigations require coordination between prosecutorsandinvestigators,somethingthathasnotyetbeenachieved.Thishasposedanobstacleforpresentingevidence,forboththeprosecutionandthedefense,andforchallengingtheargumentspresentedbythepartiestotheadversarialprocess.

The intermediate stage of trial does not, in fact, fulfill its stated purpose.Preliminary hearings are often held with the purpose of confirming what was

28 TablecompiledbytheauthorbasedoninformationfromtheTechnicalUnitforCriminalLegalReformoftheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral.

29 SeeCésarBarrientos,Las fugas epistemológicas,reVIsta JustICIa52(May2007).

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determinedinthepriorinitialhearing(generallywithoutofferingnewresultsoftheinvestigation).Assuch,whenanoralandpublictrialbegins,itisbasedonlyupontheinvestigationconductedfortheinitialhearing.Likewise,limitsareplacedonthedevelopmentofthedefense’scase,fordefenseattorneysoftenhaverestrictedaccesstothefileslocatedattheprosecutor’soffice.Moreover,defenseattorneysare not always given notice of new developments in investigation processesfromwhichevidencemaybederived.Thisgoesagainsttheprinciplesofjudicialobjectivityandthestandardrulesthatshouldapplytoanadversarialsystem.

Discovery has been distorted by prior evidence, which started out as anexception,buthasquicklybecometherule.So,insteadofproducingandevaluatingevidence at trial, attorneys make express references to evidence in writtensubmission,thusincorporatingitintothetrial.Expertwitnessesarerequiredtogive their testimonyat trial.However, thisgenerallydoesnothappen. Instead,theexpertwitnesses’writtenreportsarereadduringthecourtproceedings,thusincorporatingthemasevidenceattrial.Whentheexpertwitnesstakesthestand,heorshegenerallylimitshisorhertestimonytoamereconfirmationofthecontentofthewrittenreportthatwasalreadyreadtothecourtasevidence.

Asaresultofthissituation,witnessesarenotsummonedbecausethecourtreceivestheirtestimonypriortotrial.Thesameistrueforexpertwitnesses.Theydonotgive theiropinionsandtestimonyat trial. Instead, theirreportsarereadat trial and are not questioned.Documentary evidencebecomespreeminent incriminaltrials.30Therefore,theimmediate,adversarial,oral,andpublicelementsof the new system are effectively abandoned in favor of a system that reliesprimarilyonwrittendocuments,asisthecasewithmostinquisitorialsystems.

Insum,the2002CriminalProcedureCodesetthefoundationforacriminaljustice system thatwouldbe respectful of civil liberties.However, thesegoodintentionshavedisintegratedbecausethenewcodehasbeensubjecttovariousreforms and because the judicial officials, prosecutors, defense attorneys, andpoliceinvestigatorslacktherequisitetraining.Therefore,despitetheintroductionofthisnewcode,thelegalcultureofaninquisitivesystemhaspersisted.

III. Toward a Transitional Justice Model in Honduras

Asarguedabove,sincetheindependenceofHonduras,theStatehasbeenanassetexclusivelyattheserviceoftheelites;ithasbeenasourceforaccumulatingwealthandforexcludingofthemajorityofthepopulation.Hondurasadoptedarepublicanformofgovernment,understoodinthistextasamodelthatprotectsthehighestvaluesofliberty,equality,andjustice,isfoundonrightsandthelaw

30 See JoséMaríaTijerino,Mediatización de la oralidad: la perversión del juicio en la práctica judicial penal centroamericana,JustICIa25(June2006).

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as sovereign expressions of the people’s will, and is based on representativedemocracy.However,thelackoflegitimacyandlegalitythatcharacterizethewaysinwhichpoliticalpowerinHondurashasbeengainedandexercisedthroughoutthecountry’shistoryhavecreatedasituation inwhich the idealsof republicangovernmentanditsdemocraticfoundationshavebeenconvertedintoapoliticalfiction.

TheLiberal-Nationalbipartisanmodel—interruptedin1936bythedictator-shipofTiburcioCaríasandin1963bythemilitarycoup,andthenreestablishedwiththereturnofdemocracyin1982—hasnotbeenabletofulfillthegoalsofparticipatorydemocracyorthesocialdemandsofthemajorityofthepopulation.Hereinresidestheimportanceofrecuperatingtheprincipleofpopularsovereigntyinordertostrengthenarepublicangovernmentoffreecitizensthathaveavoiceinpoliticalmatters,therighttovote,andthecapacitytodecideimportantmattersthataffectthemdirectly.

The transition inHondurashasbeen slowdespite the endof themilitarydictatorships and the succession of formally elected governments. The majoradvancementsinthetransitionincludedestablishingaformaldemocracywiththreebranchesofgovernmentalpower;thecreationofanewinstitutionalframework(theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,theNationalHumanRightsCommission,theSuperiorCourtofthePublicBudget,theElectoralSuperiorCourt,theInstituteforAccess toPublicRecords, amongothers); themilitary’sdiminished role inthepublicsphere;and theestablishmentofanelectoral regime thatguaranteesthe alternation of political power. However, these changes did not translateintoimprovedsocial,economic,andculturalconditionstoallowtheHonduranpopulationtoreachasatisfactorystandardofliving.

From the perspective of transitional justice, the contribution of theseinstitutionalreformstodemocracyhasnotbeensufficient.Moreover,theyhavenotbeenaccompaniedbyinitiativesofhistoricalclarification,reparationforthevictims,orcriminalprosecutionsagainstthoseresponsibleforhumanrightsviolations.

Likewise, one cannot ignore the consequences of the deficiencies in thetransitionintermsofstrengtheningdemocracyinlightofthelowlevelsofhumandevelopmentinHonduras.TheUNDPreportDemocracy in Latin America indicates that,inordertounderstanddemocracyanditsdevelopment,socialdeficitsmustbeconsideredasshortfallsofdemocracy.31Thus,povertyandinequalityarenotsimplysocialproblems,butalsoproblematicforsustainabledemocracy.Inthisway,democracyamountstoacivilizingpromisethatliberty,equality,justice,andprogresswillbeexpanded.

According to theUNDP’sHuman Development Report: Honduras 2006,the country continues to suffer from a stalled human-development process.32

31 UNDP,supra note 1. 32 undp, human deVelopment report: honduras 2006.

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This can be explained by certain backward societal characteristics combinedwithhighlevelsofpoverty,ahighdegreeofinequality,andsignificantregionalfragmentationintermsofaccesstosocialservicesandeconomicopportunities.

InHonduras,inequalityisoneoftheprimaryfacetsofpoverty.Manifestationsofinequalityareevidentinthecountry’swealthandincomedistributions;inthegapsineducation,health,andsalaries; intheweaknessof thesystemofsocialsecurity and protection; as well as in social, generational, ethnic, and genderdifferences.Theforegoingscenariois,toalargeextent,theresultoffactorssuchastheunequaldistributionofwealth,thelackofabalanceinpoliticalrepresentation,and the existence of publicmanagement as a source of illicit self-enrichmentand continued impunity. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the people’ssovereignty as the basis of representative and participatory democracy and asaninstrumentforachievingpolitical,economic,social,andculturaldemocracy.Consequently,transitionaljusticeinitiativesshouldbecomplementedbyconcretemeasurestoovercomepovertyandpromotedevelopment.

Sincethesecondhalfof thetwentiethcentury, theArmedForceshaveledthreecoupsd’étatagainstconstitutionaladministrations:in1963againstRamónVilledaMorales,in1972againstRamónErnestoCruz,andin2009againstManuelZelayaRosales.Additionally,threedefactogovernmentswereremovedbymilitaryaction:JulioLozanoin1956,OswaldoLópezin1975,andJuanMelgarin1978.Theconstitutionalgovernmentsbroughtdownin1963andin2009,aswellasthedefactogovernmentin1975,hadseveralthingsincommon:theyproposedreformsthatgeneratedexpectationsofchange;theyopposedtheinterestsoftheeconomicallypowerfulsectorsofthetime;and,theyhadbeenattackedforsupposedlyservingasinstrumentsforforeigngovernmentsthatthreatendemocracy.33

Likewise,themediainthecountryrespondstoamodelofconcentrationofproperty;ownerscontrol theflowofinformationandpromotetheirbusinesses,socialpolicyagendas,andpoliticalcauses.Severalofthemainpoliticiansinthecountryownamediasourceoraretheimmediatefamilymemberofanowner,which guarantees their social influence, state control, and expansion strategy.Through themedia, the economic groups promote their particular agendas asagendas in the national interest and they seek to influence public opinion onpolicies in line with their interests.34

Two things are evident: the weakness of the Honduran State and thefragilityofthecountry’sdemocracy.Neitherispreparedtorespondtotheforcesof authoritarianism,caudillismo, and political clientelism that emanate from thetraditionalpower-holdinggroups.Thisiswhythe“ruleoflaw”thathaspredominatedinHondurashasservedtoreinforceillegalityandimpunity.Whenthepoliticalclass

33 ramón romero, por la demoCraCIa y Contra el Golpe: un análIsIs IndependIente 16(2009).34 See alexander seGoVIa, InteGraCIón real y Grupos de poder eConómICo en amérICa Central:

ImplICaCIones para el desarrollo y la demoCraCIa de la reGIón(2005).

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perceivesthreatstoitsinterests,itrespondsthroughtheuseofforce.Therefore,itismilitaryinterventionandnottheinstitutionalauthorityoftheruleoflawthatisusedtoresolveconflictsthatthreatenthetraditionalpoliticalorder.

CorruptioninHondurasisseenasaphenomenonthathasevolvedwithtimeandhaspermeatedstateinstitutionstothepointthatcorruptionhasbecomeapoliticalinstitutionofitsown.ThissituationhascontributedtotheinstitutionalweaknessoftheStateaswellasitsreducedeffectivenessandcredibility.Thishasbroughtaboutstagnationinthesocial,political,andeconomiclifeofthecountryandconsequentlythenation’slackofdemocraticdevelopment.35

With regard to the legal system, there has been progress in terms of its

modernization.However,therecontinuestobeageneralperceptionthatthelegalsystemservestomaintainastructureofimpunitythatbenefitscorruptelites.Thisviewservestoreinforcethebeliefthatthelegalsystemdoesnotworkandisnotimpartial.Afterall,thejudicialsystem,whichenjoyslittlecredibilityandtrust,is subject to influence by economic and political pressures.This perception isassociatedwith the progressivewaning and deterioration of the state’s formalinstitutions,asituation thatdestroysdesocialandpolitical foundations for thelegitimacyofdemocracyandtheruleoflaw.

With respect to amnesty, its validity is assessed based upon the extentto which it fosters reconciliation, helps establish a foundation for creating ademocratic society, satisfies the demands of justice, and does not includedamnesty for violationsof fundamental rights. In thepast, the amnestydecreeswereadoptedinthenameofpeaceandnationalreconciliation,denyingvictimsandtheirfamiliestherighttotruth,justice,andreparations,whileallowingstateactors to avoid punishment for human rights violations.Thesemeasures havecontinued,protectedbyerroneouscourtdecisions.

The general view is that the criminal justice system applies only to thepoor,36forthereareprivilegesandexceptionstotheapplicationofthelawanditsystematicallyviolatestheprincipleofimpartiality.Thisviewisreaffirmeduponreviewing the socioeconomic profile of the incarcerated population, composedprimarilyofpeoplewithscarceeconomicresourcesandlowlevelsofeducation.The legalsystemhasmaintainedastructureof impunity.The judiciaryneitherworksnorisimpartial,forit isinfluencedbyeconomic,financial,andpoliticalintereststhatseektobenefitonlythemselvesortheirallies.Thisexplainswhythelegalinstitutionshaveenjoyedlittleconfidenceandcredibility.

35 oChoa et. al., Controles y desControles,supra note22,at326-27.36 See generally andrés pérez munGuía, undp, CaraCterístICas soCIales de la poblaCIón

penItenCIarIa y su relaCIón Con las posIbIlIdades de trabaJo y eduCaCIón en los Centros penales y de reeduCaCIón soCIal de honduras: estudIo exploratorIo 53 (2005).

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Therehasbeenadiscussionaboutestablishingatruthcommission“inordertoclarifytheeventsthatoccurredbeforeandafterJune28,2009,toidentifytheactsthatleadtothecurrentsituation,andtooffertheHonduranpeopleelementstoavoid thatsucheventsbe repeated in the future.”37TherehavebeenseriouscriticismsofthiseffortthatcouldleadittofailinitsmandatetocontributetotheconsolidationofdemocracyinHonduras.Itisessentialthattheestablishmentofanysuchbody,thedefinitionofitsmandate,anditsinterventionbeprecededbybroadpublicconsultationsthatbuildconsensusandtakeintoaccounttheopinionsofthevictims.ThishasnotbeenthecaseinHonduras.38

Thereisariskthatsuchameasurewouldserveonlytojustifythecoupd’état,benefitthedefactoregime,andprioritizeimpunityovernationalreconciliation.ItisnotclearhowtheCommissionwouldcontributetoclarifyingtheviolentpastinHondurasand lay thefoundationfornon-repetitionof theevents.Given theparticularitiesoftheHondurancase,itwouldbepertinenttotackle:thepoliticaldimensionoftheeventsandtheirconsequencesforbuildingdemocracy;thelegaldimensionoftheconflictbetweenthebranchesofgovernmentandconstitutionalreviewofthelegalityoftheevents;thehumanrightsviolationsandtheroleofthearmedforcesinademocraticsociety;andthechallengesforstrengtheningthedemocraticruleoflaw.

Conclusion

Thereestablishmentoftheconstitutionaldemocraticorderisimperative.Itis important thatpoliticalagreementsandpeacenegotiationsexpressly includeguarantees of non-repetition and provisions oriented toward strengtheningdemocratic institutions.Moreover,anew legalcultureshouldbeestablished—basedonrespectforhumanrightsandrespondingtotheethicalchallengesrelatedto national reconciliation, seeking a balance between peace and justice whilefulfillingthelegaldutytoprotecttherightsofvictims.

All of this posits that the strengthening of justice depends on judicialindependence, both internal and external.This requires a formal program forjudicial tenure, transparency in the selection and appointment of judges andother judicial servants, training and technical improvement in order to assureprofessionalexcellenceinjudicialandadministrativeactivities,andthecreation

37 Tegucigalpa-SanJoséAccordforNationalReconciliationandStregtheningofDemocracyinHondu-ras,Oct.30,2009,available at http://www.boell-latinoamerica.org/downloads/AcuerdoTeguSJO.pdf.

38 See for example the criticisms of international organizations such as the International CenterforTransitional Justice and theCenter for Justice and InternationalLaw:CEJIL,Comisión de la Verdad de Honduras nace con graves carencias jurídicas, May 5, 2010, http://cejil.org/comunicados;ICTJ,Honduras: nueva comisión de la verdad debe garantizar los derechos de las víctimas, May6,2010,http://www.ictj.org/es/news/press/release/3713.html.

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ofexternalsupervisorymechanismsthatareabletomonitorthesocial,political,and technical aspects of the process.

Since the transition of the 1980s, Honduras has implemented a numberof judicial reforms, which continued into the 1990s and underwent furtherdevelopmentinthisdecade.However,thesemeasureshavefailedtodevelopinlightoftheguaranteeofnon-repetition.Thecreationofanefficientandeffectivesystemofjusticehasyettobeachieved,whichcontinuestobeoneofthemainchallengesfortheconsolidationofdemocracyinHonduras.

Moreovertheinstitutionalreformsdidnotincorporateanaimtofulfillthevictims’ legitimate expectations of justice, truth, and reparations.Therefore, abasicstepforcarryingouttransitionaljusticeinHonduraswouldbefortheStateandsocietytorecognizethatseriouspoliticalandhumanrightsviolationswerecommittedandthatitisnecessarytopunishtheperpetratorsandcompensatethevictims.Likewise,theremustbejudicialreformsthattranslateintoefficientandeffectivejusticeinvolvinginvestigationofthefacts,identificationandpunishmentoftheperpetrators,andreparationforvictims.

Finally, theHonduran transitionhasyet toaddress thedemilitarizationofthe State and the role of justice in achieving national reconciliation, fightingimpunity, anddefendingvictims’ rights.This iswhy it is so important togivethoughttotheroleoftransitionaljusticeincountriescharacterizedbyweakstates,controlledbypowerfulfactions,incontextsofnon-traditionalcoupd’étatsandtherealizationofelectoralprocessesundertheaegisofillegitimategovernmentsandinquestionabledeclarationsofstatesofemergency.Inthesecontextsitbecomesnecessarytoevaluatethedegreetowhichconstitutionalanddemocraticorderhasbeenreestablished,andparticipatorydemocracyrestored,thelevelofconfidenceinpublicinstitutionsraised,andtheefficiencyofthelegalsystemimproved.

InthecaseofHonduras,fromthepolitical-legalperspective,itisimperativetodevelopanewpolitical-electoralsystemandestablish thecompetenciesandlimitsofeachbranchofpowerundertheruleoflaw.ThisinvolvesthediscussionandpassingoftheLawoftheLegislativeBranch,whichregulatesitsdemocraticand transparent organization and functioning; pass the Law of Civil Serviceof theExecutiveBranch,whichwould ensure stability and professionalismofpublicservants;aswellastheapprovaloftheLawonJudicialAuthorityandtheJudiciaryCouncilandJudicialCareerLaw,instrumentsthatwouldguaranteetheindependenceoftheJudicialBranch.ItisalsoimportanttocreatetheConstitutionalCourtofHonduras,whichwouldbeinchargeofconstitutionalreviewandcontrolofthelaws,thedevelopmentofhumanrightsjurisprudence,andtheresolutionofdisputesamonggovernmentbodies.ThearrivalofthisCourtwouldgeneratetheconditionsandgreaterguaranteesforthedevelopmentandstrengtheningofdemocracyinHonduras.

Maybe Some Day...The Challenges of Non-repetition in El Salvador

Benjamín Cuéllar Martínez*

“En esta tierra donde nacimos, me da tristeza lo que vivimos.

Cuántas promesas de nuevos díasy la justicia no se avecina.”

(Illapu,Chile)

“In this land where we were born,I’m saddened by what we live.So many promises of new days

and justice does not come.”

Eighteen years after the signing of the PeaceAccords for El Salvador,1 the causes that gave rise to the conflict continue to be latent: economic andsocial exclusion, lack of opportunities for political participation, fragile orinoperativeinstitutions,violence,andaboveall,impunity.Whilesomeinitiativeshavebeentakentochangethesituation,theyhavenotbeenbasedonahumanrights approach, as pointed out by Ignacio Ellacuría, the Jesuit rector of theUniversidadCentroamericanaJoséSimeónCañas(UCA)assassinatedin1989.2 Ellacuría argued that the human rights approach should not be converted intoan interminable list of principles that end up as unfulfilled desires,which arevaluablebutnotattainableinpracticeexceptforafewprivilegedsectorsthatenjoytheminabundance.Consequently,heemphasizedtheimportanceofattainingtheliberationofmarginalizedsocialgroups,callingthis“thepathofthepoormajority,

1 ThePeaceAccords,alsoknownastheChapultepecAgreement,wasthefinaldocumentresultingfromtheprocessofnegotiationbetweentheSalvadoranGovernmentandtheFrenteFarabundoMartíparalaLiberaciónNacional(FMLN).ItwassignedinMexicoCityonJanuary16,1992.TheAccordsarereproducedinEnglishinUnitedNations,“ElSalvadorAgreements:ThePathtoPeace”,U.N.Doc.DPI/1208-92614(1992).

2 TheUCArectorwasexecutedinquartersatthatUniversityonNovember16,1989,bymembersoftheSalvadoranmilitary.HewasassassinatedalongwithfiveotherJesuitpriests—IgnacioMartínBaró,SegundoMontes,AmandoLópez,JuanRamónMoreno,andJoaquínLópezyLópez;alsoassassinatedwereJuliaElbaRamosandherteenagedaughter,CelinaMariceth.

Chapter 15

* This title (“Por si algún día”) is borrowed from the video of theTribunal for theApplicationofRestorativeJusticeinElSalvador,“Maybeoneday”.Seehttp://idhuca.blogspot.com/2009/04/sentencia-tribunal-internacional-para.html.

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whowillonlyaccedetotruefreedomwhentheyliberatethemselvesfromaworldofoppressionsandwhentherearegenuineconditionsforeveryonetobeabletoexercisetheirfreedom.”3

This is essentially the “fromwhere,” “forwhom,” and “towhat end” oftheproposalputforth in thischapter,whichseeks toaddress thechallengesofguaranteeingnon-repetitionofhumanrightsviolationsinElSalvador.PrimarilyI assert that to achieve this, the social and political causes that generated theviolencemustbeaddressed.

TheapproachproposedbyIgnacioEllacuríafindsconcreteexpressioninthefollowingSalvadoranconstitutionalprinciple:

ElSalvadorrecognizes thehumanpersonas theoriginandaimof theactivityoftheState,whichisorganizedtosecurejusticeandthecommonwell-being....Accordingly,itisanobligationoftheStatetoensurefortheinhabitantsoftheRepublictheenjoymentofliberty,health,culture,economicwell-being,andsocialjustice.4

For the martyred rector of the UCA, it is a question of imposing the“commongood”overthe“commonevil.”Thatwasthegoal,atleastintheory,oftheagreementsbetweenthebelligerentpartiesthat,amongothertools,createdaTruthCommission tohelpclarify theviolentevents thathadoccurred in thecountry since 1980 and to overcome impunity. Despite this, in El Salvadorsurvivingvictimsofgravehumanrightsviolations,crimesagainsthumanity,andwarcrimescontinuetobedeniedtruth,justice,andcomprehensivereparation.

The State completely ignored the “measures aimed at nationalreconciliation”thattheCommissionrecommendedinitsfinalreport.Manyotherrecommendations—to disqualify persons responsible for human rights abusesfrompublicofficeforexample—wereeithernotfullycarriedoutorsimplywerenottakenupatall.Thelackofpoliticalwillandpoliticalvalorneededtotakeon the human andmaterial obstacles that stood and still stand in theway ofjusticewasnotedfivedaysafterthatreportwaspresented.OnMarch20,1993anamnestythatcontinuesinforcewasapprovedwiththenodofthepoliticalpowersthatbe.Thiswasdespitetherepeatedcriticismsofmanyintergovernmentalandsocialorganizationsboth insideandoutside thecountry.Thegovernmentalsofailedtogiveeffectiveimpetusforstructuralchangessuchasvettingandjudicialreform,whichwereneededtoconstructandconsolidateagenuinelydemocraticsociety.

3 Ignacio Ellacuría,Historización de los derechos humanos desde los pueblos oprimidos y las mayorías populares,reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos 502,594-95(Aug.1990).

4 ConstItutIon of el salVador,art.1.

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Therefore it cannot be said that the Salvadoran peace process thatwasagreed to in theGenevaAccord5 culminated successfully.Except for endingthewarbypoliticalmeansintheshortesttimepossible,themajorrequirementsfor national reconciliation remain pending. Such requirements include theunconditional respect for human rights, democratization of the country, andthe“reunification”ofsociety.Inlargepart,thisfailurestemsfromthedecisionmadebysomeandacceptedbyotherstoprotectthoseguiltyoftheatrocities,manyofwhomcontinuetobeinfluentialpolitical,economic,andsocialactors.Theessentialmeasuresoftransitionaljusticewerenotappliedseriouslyinthepostwarperiod.DespitetheestablishmentandworkoftheTruthCommission,itsresultswerenotsufficientlydisseminated.Thismadeitpossibletodenyordistortthegraveactsofviolenceandthehumanrightsviolationsthatoccurredbeforeandduringthearmedconflict.Andthingswillcontinueinthisway,solong as there is no breakwith the “normalcy” that protects victimizers andoffendsvictims.

Lookingbackonthe“farewelltoarms”bythepartiesinconflict,thefourdimensions of impunity described by Roberto Garretón—judicial, political,moral,andhistoric—arestillpresent,inanaffronttothedignityofpersonsandsociety.6

Inorder tospeakofarealprocessofsocialre-foundationbasedontruth,justice,andcomprehensivereparationsforthevictimsfrombeforeandduringthewar,alongwithinclusionandequityforthepoormajority,itishelpfultoanalyzedevelopments in lightof theChicagoPrinciplesonPost-Conflict Justice.7 This analysiswillbethefocusofPartIofthischapter.PartIIwillthenaddressthestructuralcausesofthesocialandmilitaryconflictsthatcontinuetobepresentinElSalvador.Bywayofconclusion,thischapterwillproposeactionswithaviewtowardpositioningrespectforhumanrightsandthestruggleagainstimpunityonthepublicagenda,andguaranteeingthatthetragediesofthepastcentury,in1932andagainbeginningin1972,8 are not repeated.

5 ThisinitialaccordwassignedbytherepresentativesoftheSalvadorangovernmentandtheinsur-gency,withthesealofthethenUNSecretary-General,JavierPérezdeCuéllar,onApril4,1990,inGeneva,Switzerland.

6 SeetheinterviewwithRobertoGarretóninRogerRodríguez,Las dimensiones de la impunidad sin Pinochet,la repúblICa,No.2968,July14,2008.

7 See InternatIonal human rIGhts law InstItute, the ChICaGo prInCIples on post-ConflICt JustICe (2008).

8 Beginning on January 22, 1932, the Salvadoran Army unleashed a large-scale killing spreedirectedprincipallyagainsttheindigenouspopulation.FromFebruary1972on,afterafraudinthepresidentialelections,governmentrepressionandguerrillaviolencegrewtothepointofopenwarbreakingoutinJanuary1981.

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I. The Salvadoran State and the Chicago Principles

TheChicagoPrinciplesonPost-ConflictJusticesetoutessentialcriteriafordevisingstrategiestoaddresspastatrocitiesandtoachievedemocratizationofasocietywithaviewtoupholdingthedignityofthevictims,theresponsibilityoftheperpetrators, the functioningof the institutions,and theguaranteesofnon-repetition.Theseprinciples,whichwerediscussedandagreeduponoverthelasttenyears,findtheirclosestantecedentsinthemeetingsofexpertsinWashingtonandSiracusa(Italy)in1997and1998,respectively.Theyhaveproventobeusefulfor analyzing processes such as postwarEl Salvador.This analytical exercise,whilenota“straitjacket,”isofferedbelowinordertoassistinassessingtherealityofwhathashappenedinElSalvador.

A. Investigation into the Events of the Past (First Principle)

TheSalvadoranState cannot respond positivelywhen confronted on thisprincipleduetoitsconstantresistancetoinvestigating,prosecuting,andpunishingthoseresponsibleforthegravehumanrightsviolationsthatoccurredbeforeandduringthewar.AclearexampleofthisistheLawonGeneralAmnestyfortheConsolidationofPeace,9whichcontinuestobeineffect.Thislawisincompatiblewith commitments acquired in the area of human rights and is held up as themainbarrierstanding in thewayof investigations.This isdespite thefact thatthe parties to theChapultepecAgreement recognized “that acts of this nature,regardlessofthesectortowhichtheirperpetratorsbelong,mustbetheobjectoftheexemplaryactionbythelawcourtssothatthepunishmentprescribedbylawismetedouttothosefoundresponsible.”10

OnMarch14,1993—onedaybeforethepresentationofthereportbytheupTruthCommission at theUnitedNations headquarters inNewYork—thenPresidentAlfredoCristiani11 announced to the country and to the world his intent toapprovetheamnestylaw.Hissuccessor,ArmandoCalderón,12kepttheobstacleinplaceinordertoadvancepeace;andthenextthreepresidentswereemphaticinaffirmingthatthelawwouldnotbemodified.Thiswoundedthedignityofthevictims,theorganizationsthataccompaniedthem,andthepartofthepopulationthathasalwaysopposedcriminalauthoritarianism-madestatepolicy.

PresidentFranciscoFlores,whogovernedfromJune1,1999, toMay31,2004,saidthattheamnestywas“thecornerstoneofthepeaceaccords”andthat

9 LegislativeAssemblyofElSalvador,LeydeAmnistíaGeneralparalaConsolidacióndelaPaz,DecreeNo.486,Mar.20,1993.

10 UnitedNations,“ElSalvadorAgreements:ThePathtoPeace”,supranote2,at53.11 PresidentoftheRepublicfromJune1,1989toMay31,1994.12 PresidentoftheRepublicfromJune1,1994toMay31,1999.

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thecountrycouldbesubmerged“inanadditionalconflict”ifitwererepealed.13 ThesamethinghappenedwithAntonioSaca;14 when the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional(FMLN)demandedthatitberepealedinApril2005,Sacasaid that itwas the“frontierbetweenasadpast,whichwecondemnandwhichshouldnotberepeated,andapromisingfuture....[T]hosenostalgicforthepast,theonlythingtheyseekwiththisistodestabilizethecountry.”15

MauricioFunes,16 inhis electoral campaign andwith adiscoursedistinctfromthatwhichhadbeenofferedearlierbyhisparty,askedthatthenationtakestockof“themomentinwhichweare....Farfromcontributingtoreconciliation,itwould,tothecontrary,openwounds.”17“RepealingtheAmnestyLaw,”hesaid,“wouldimplycreatinganungovernableclimate,itwouldimplycreatingaclimatethatwouldnotallowforbuildingthefuture.”18Upontakingoffice,hesaid:

We need to bring an end to what remains of our victim-complex,becausethatfeedshatred,self-pity,vengeance,andeasyexcuses.Let’sacceleratethisprocessofemotionalandspiritualrenewal,theprocessofbelievinginourselves,respectingandseeingtoitthatwearerespected,leavingbehindthedarkshadowofourownworstsocialandpersonalexperiences.19

Theinter-AmericananduniversalhumanrightssystemshavepressuredtheSalvadoranState.TheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights(IACHR),in addition to its special report on the country’s situation in 1994, inwhich itquestioned theAmnestyLaw, recommended that theStateadjust“itsdomesticlegislation to theAmerican Convention and thereby render null and void theGeneralAmnestyLaw.”20AnditreiteratedthismessageinthereportonthemeritsinthecaseofMonsignorÓscarRomero.21

13 AsociaciónProBúsquedadeniñasyniñosdesaparecidosdurantelaguerra(Probúsqueda)etal.,La elección del nuevo secretario general de la OEA,25Proceso,No.1118,(Oct.20,2004).

14 PresidentoftheRepublicfromJune1,2004toMay31,2009.15 See El presidente salvadoreño rechaza derogar la ley de amnistía, como pide el FMLN,luKor,

Apr.14,2005,http://www.lukor.com/not-mun/america/0504/14033440.htm.16 PresidentoftheRepublicforthetermfromJune1,2009toMay31,2014.Hewontheelectionsasa

candidateoftheFMLNandisthefirstpresidentsincethewarthatisnotamemberoftheAlianzaRepublicanaNacionalista(ARENA).ARENAwasfoundedbyMajorRobertoD’AubuissonArrieta,describedbytheTruthCommissionasanorganizerof“deathsquads”andthepersonultimatelyresponsiblefortheassassinationofMonsignorRomero,thearchbishopofSanSalvador.

17 Eric Lemus, Sin perdón ni castigo,bbC.mundo.Com, Oct. 24, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7684000/7684038.stm.

18 JorgeÁvalos,FMLN abrirá juicios de Guerra,el dIarIo de hoy, Sept.4,2008.19 MauricioFunes,Discurso de toma de posesión de Mauricio Funes,inpresIdenCIa de la repúblICa,

dIsCursos(June1,2009),http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/discurso/index.html.20 IgnacioEllacuria,S.J.&Othersv.ElSalvador,Case10.488,Inter-Am.C.H.R.,ReportNo.136/99,

OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106,doc.3(1999).21 MonsenorOscarArnulfoRomero yGaldamez v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-Am.C.H.R.,

ReportNo.37/00,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106Doc.3rev.(2000).

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AmongthemainconcernsoftheUNHumanRightsCommitteein2003,thefirstwastheamnestylawanditsapplicationto“serioushumanrightsviolations,including those considered and established by the Truth Commission.”22 The Committeeconsideredthatthis“infringesupontherighttoaneffectiveremedyset forth inArticle 2 of the Covenant, since it prevents the investigation andpunishmentofallthoseresponsibleforhumanrightsviolations....”23

TheWorkingGrouponEnforcedorInvoluntaryDisappearancesalsogaveits opinion in this respect:

Withregardtotherightofvictimsandtheirfamiliestothetruth,justiceandredress,theWorkingGroupconcludesthatthe1993LawonGeneralAmnestyfor theConsolidationofPeaceclearlydepartsfromtheprin-ciplesoftheDeclaration,inparticularitsarticle18,asinterpretedbytheWorkingGroupinoneofitsgeneralcomments.24

Accordingly, it recommended that the State take effective steps “to

guaranteeand implement the rights to justice, truth, redress and rehabilitation.ItthereforerespectfullybutforcefullyurgestheLegislativeAssemblytoamendthe1993AmnestyActsubstantially”andbringitintolinewiththeguidelinesoftheWorkingGroup.25Yettheamnestyremainsunmovable.Andthatlaw,whichhasburiedthedemandsfortruth,justice,andcomprehensivereparationforthevictims, iswhatKofiAnnan, thenUNSecretary-General, cited in 1997 as anexampleoftheparties’rejectionoftheTruthCommission’srecommendations.26

While international human rights law and the Chicago Principles do notprohibitamnesties,theycannotbeappliedinfavorofthosewhocommittedcrimesagainsthumanity.Nonetheless,thatwasexactlywhathappenedinElSalvador.Initsfirstarticletheamnestylawgrants

broad,absolute,andunconditionalamnestyinbenefitofallthosepersonswho,inwhateverform,haveparticipatedinthecommissionofpoliticalcrimes,commoncrimesrelatedtopoliticalcrimes,andcommoncrimes

22 U.N.HumanRightsCommittee,Review of the reports submitted by the member states under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: El Salvador,para.6,U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/78/SLV(July22,2003).

23 Id.24 U.N.GeneralAssembly,PromotionandProtectionofAllHumanRights,Civil,Political,Economic,

SocialandCulturalRights,includingtheRighttoDevelopment,ReportoftheWorkingGrouponEnforcedor InvoluntaryDisappearances,Add.Mission toElSalvador,para.83,U.N.Doc.A/HRC/7/2/Add.2(Oct.26,2007)(internalcitationomitted).

25 Id.para.90.26 KofiAnnan,Assessment of the peace process in El Salvador,The situation in Central America:

Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace and progress in fashioning a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development, UnitedNations,GeneralAssembly,Fifty-firstsession,Agendaitem40,A/51/917,July1,1997.

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committedbyat least twentypersonsbeforeJanuary1,1992,whetherornotajudgmenthadbeenhandeddownagainstthosepersons,whetherornotaproceedinghadbeeninitiatedforthesamecrimes,grantingthispardontoallpersonswhohadparticipatedasdirectperpetrators,perpe-tratorsbymeans,oraccomplicesinthecriminalactsreferredtoabove.27

Thus,astherehasnotbeendomesticprogressintheseriousinvestigationinto the events that occurred before and during the war, in January 2009 theAudienciaNacionalofSpain(SpanishNationalCourt),admittedaclaimagainstthematerial and intellectual authorsof themassacre at theUCAbasedon theprinciples of universal jurisdiction and the subsidiary nature of internationalhumanrightslaw.28ThecomplaintwassubmittedbyaSpanishorganizationandaU.S. organization in response to the consistent disinterest on the part of theSalvadoranStatewhen it came to ensuring respect for thehuman rightsof allpersons under its jurisdiction.

B. Creation of Truth Commissions and Publication of Their Reports (Second Principle)

TheTruthCommissionpublisheditsreportonMarch15,1993,aftereightmonthsofworkandafterreceivingapproximately25,000denunciations—almost2000fromdirectvictims,andtheremainderindirect.It includedageneralandanalyticalchronologyoftheeventsfrom1980untiltheendofthewar,includingthe patterns of State and insurgent violence. It also established personal andinstitutional responsibilities on both sides for grave human rights violations,in both quantitative and qualitative terms.Yet thiswas not enough to achieveitsobjectiveandessencesetoutatthebeginningofthatreport:“thesearchfor,findingof,andpublicationofthattruth.”29

Thiswasnotenoughbecausealthoughtherewasasearchforthetruth,itwaswithoutthefirmbackingoftheauthorities,whobyactoromissionrejectedthereport.InadditiontoPresidentCristianidemandingamnestyandthecommuniquéreadbyGeneralRenéEmilioPonce,30theSupremeCourtofJusticeissuedaruling

27 LegislativeAssembly ofEl Salvador, Law on general amnesty for the consolidation of peace,DecreeNo.486,Mar.20,1993.

28 To learnmore about this case, see the reportCaso jesuitas, IDHUCA, http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/jesuitas.html.

29 BelisarioBetancur,etal.,Introducción, mandato y cronología,De la locura a la esperanza. La guerra de 12 años en El Salvador: Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador,48reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos162(Mar.1993)(hereinafter“TruthCommissionReport”).

30 SeeBenjamínCuéllarMartínez,Los dos rostros de la sociedad salvadoreña,in Verdad, JustICIa y reparaCIón: desafíos para la demoCraCIa y la ConVIVenCIa soCIal 160-61(InstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistence(IDEA)andInter-AmericanInstituteofHumanRights(IIDH)eds.,2007).ThereportisalsoavailableinEnglish,From Madness to Hope – The 12-year War in El Salvador: Report on the Commission on the Truth in El Salvador, U.N.Doc.S/25500Annex(Apr.1,1993).

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alongthesamelinesandsimilarlyharsh.TheSupremeCourtPresident,MauricioGutiérrezCastro,hinderedtheinvestigationsinthecaseoftheElMozotemassacre.ThismeddlingwasdenouncedbytheTruthCommissionitself,citinghiswordsanticipating that theexhumationatElMozotewould revealonly“burieddeadguerrillas.”31OnMarch22,1992,sevendaysaftertheTruthCommission’sreportwasreleased,theSupremeCourtrejecteditsconclusionsandrecommendations,consideringthemtobe“againsttheadministrationofjusticeinElSalvador,theSupremeCourtofJustice,anditsPresident.”32

IntermsoftheCommission’smissionandessence,“thepublicationofthattruth”wasreducedtoamodestandlimitededitionoftheactualdocumentandits annexes.What was published amounted to basically two thick pamphlets,preparedupon the initiativeandunder theresponsibilityof theUnitedNationsObserverMissioninElSalvador(ONUSAL).Withthis,theStateconsideredthemissionproclaimedintheintroductionofthereporttobefulfilled.OthereffortstodisseminatethereportandmakeSalvadoransocietymorefamiliarwiththetragicepisodes—the“madness”33—werefewinnumberandlimitedinscope.

Alloftherecommendationsthataimedatachieving“nationalreconciliation”wentunfulfilled.34Forexample,aForumofTruthandReconciliationwasproposedasaspecificentitythroughwhichdiversesocialsectorswithwell-knowntrackrecords in thematter couldcome together for thepurposeofmonitoring strictadherence to the recommendations. That Forum was never even created. ForAnnan:

[A] less than positive evaluation of the actions taken in response tothe substantive recommendations of the Commission on the Truth isunavoidable.This represents a disappointing failure to respond to theuniqueopportunityrepresentedbytheCommissionanditsworktomakeimportantadvancesintheeradicationofimpunityandthefurtheringofaclimateofnationalreconciliation.35

ThenUNSecretaryGeneralconsideredthatthemeasurestotackleimpunityandcontributetoreconciliationwerethemostimportantofallthoseproposedinthedocument.YetfortheSalvadoranGovernmentandtheFMLNtheywerenot;andconsequentlybothpartieshaveignoredthem.36Thisresultedintheircomplicitsilenceinthefaceofthevictimsofgravehumanrightsviolations,warcrimes,

31 TruthCommissionReport,supra note30,at264.32 SupremeCourtofJustice,La Corte Suprema de Justicia, respuesta oficial al informe y recomen-

daciones de la Comisión de la Verdad,inDocumentación, reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos 490(Mar.1993).

33 TheTruthCommissionentitleditsreport“FromMadnesstoHope:The12YearWarinElSalvador.”34 See Annan,supranote27,para.26. 35 Annan,supranote27,para.26. 36 CuéllarMartínez,supranote31,at152-67.

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andcrimesagainsthumanity,includingnotacknowledgingtheirresponsibilitiesintheevents.Thenext-of-kinofthedisappearedduringtheperiodexaminedbytheCommissionknownothingoftheirlovedones’whereaboutsandthejusticesystemhasnotrespondedtotheirdemands.

TheCommissionneversuggestedthatwhethertopunishthoseguiltywasadilemma.InconsonancewiththeChapultepecAgreement,theCommissionstatedthat “publicmorality demands that those responsible for the crimes describedherebepunished.”Theproblemwaswhether,in1993,theinstitutionsentrustedwith investigatingcrimesandenforcing the lawwerecapableofdoing so.Onthisquestion,itsufficestonotetheattitudeofthepresidentoftheSupremeCourtinthecaseofElMozotedescribedabove.AnotherexampleistheattitudeoftheAttorneyGeneralof theRepublicof thetime,whichledtheprosecutors in theUCAcasementionedabovetoleavetheirpositionsandinsteadbecomeprivateaccusersinthesamecase.

InElSalvador, towhat truthdowe refer in relation to theatrocities thatoccurredduringtheperiodscrutinizedbyCommission?TobegintounderstandtheorganizedcriminalstructuresandtheterribleconsequencesoftheiroperationsonemustgobackinElSalvador’shistorytoatleasttheearly1970s,whenstaterepressionagainsttheoppositionbegantointensifyandguerrillaactivitybegan.DespitetheCommission’sefforts,therearestillgreatdisparitiesinthedifferentvisionsandversionsofthoseeventsthatamountedtotheabsolutetransgressionof ethical and legal norms.The State failed in every respect by not honoringthe recommendations received and fully carrying them out in violation of itscommitmenttodosotogetherwiththeFMLN.37TheStatealsodidsobyhidingthecontentsofthereport.Thisisaseriousmatter,for“thetruthisgoodbecauseitmakesthefullreality—thatofthevictims,theirvictimizers,andtheirdefenders—realinsteadofafantasywithnotietoreality.”38ThathumanizationofrealitydidnotreachElSalvador,andthenegativeconsequencesofthisfailurepersist.

BasedontheCommission’srecommendations,anotherentitywascreated:the JointGroup for the Investigationof IllegalArmedGroupshavingPoliticalMotivations. The Commission referred to the “death squads” as one of the“themost horrendous instrumentsof theviolence,which swept the country inrecent years” and determined that they “operated with complete impunity.”39 Consequently theCommission demanded that necessarymeasures be taken toensuretheirdismantlingandtheirimmediateandin-depthinvestigationwiththetechnicalassistanceofpoliceagenciesfromothercountries.

Despitetherecommendationanddemandtolookintothismatterassoonaspossible,theStatedidnotestablishthatJointGroupuntilDecember8,1993—nine

37 ElSalvadorAgreements:ThePathtoPeace,supranote2.38 JonSobrino,La verdad de las víctimas,reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos 467(May2003).39 TruthCommissionReport,supranote30,at318.

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monthsaftertherecommendation.Thiswasalsointhemidstofaseriouswaveof selectivepolitical violence inwhich twoprominentmembers of the formerguerrillaforceswhohadbecomefullyincorporatedintocivilianlife,FranciscoVelisandHelenoHernánCastro,wereassassinated.

UnitedNationsUnder-Secretary-GeneralMarrackGoulding traveled toElSalvadorfromNovember8to11,1993topressurethegovernmenttostartuptheworkoftheJointGroup.Hedidsoafterhisboss,BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,expressedhisconcernthat“recentcasesofarbitraryexecutioninElSalvadorconfirmedtheneedfortheimmediateimplementationoftherecommendationsoftheCommissionon theTruth regarding the investigation of illegal groups.”40 One day after the installationof themechanismdesigned to thatend, JoséMarioLópez—ahigh-level leader of the FMLN,member of the party’s PoliticalCommission, and acandidatefordeputyintheCentralAmericanParliament—wasassassinated.

ThefirstdifficultyappearedintheverymandateconferredupontheJointGroup: itwouldonlyoperateforsixmonths, includingtheyear-endvacations,whichsubtractedvaluableworkingdays,especiallyinthestageoforganizationand start-up. In addition, this occurred during the first election campaignthatwould include the participation of the FMLN.This dealymay have beena deliberate attempt to further shorten the time available for the investigation,analysis,draftingof recommendations,andproductionof thefinal report.Thisisparticularlytroublinggiventhedepthrequiredineachsteptoaddresssuchacomplexphenomenon.ItsofficesdidnotopenuntilFebruary1994,andithadtopresentitsreportbyMay31.ThedeadlinewaseventuallyextendedtoJuly31.

Therewasalsocriticismoftheselectionofmembers,includingtheHumanRightsOmbudsperson,CarlosMauricioMolinaFonseca,andthedirectorofthehumanrightsdivisionofONUSAL,DiegoGarcíaSayán.Bothhadtodevotetimetotheimportantinstitutionstheyheadedanddedicateaspecialefforttothede-mandingworkthatwouldberequiredofthembytheJointGroup.TheGroup’sothertwomemberswereappointedbytheSalvadorangovernment.Anotherob-staclewasthatonlycasesfromJanuary16,1992andlaterwouldbeinvestigated.Ideallytheperiodcoveredshouldhavedatedbackto1980,whenthecivilwarbegan.Thisfurtherlimitedthepossibilitiesofestablishingthetiesbetweenthecriminalactivitythatoccurredbeforeandduringthewarandthecriminalactivityofthepostwarperiod.Inaddition,thevastmajorityofvictimsofgravehumanrights violations,whichwere committedmainly from 1979 and onward,weredeniedtheprospectofattainingjustice.

Itwaspreciselyin1979,onNovember6,followingtheOctober15coup,thattheSpecialCommissiontoInvestigateDisappearedPoliticalPrisonerswasestablished.ThisCommissionwasestablishedbytheRevolutionaryGovernment

40 U.N. Security Council, Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of theSecurityCouncil,U.N.Doc.S/26865(Dec.7,1993).

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JuntathroughDecreeNo.9.Seeninretrospect,itwasavaluableexampleforthetwopostwarinitiativesexaminedabove.ThatSpecialCommission,madeupofthreeattorneyseachwitharespectablepersonalandprofessionalrésumé,41 only seventeendaysintoitsmandate,recommendedthatthepresidentwhohadbeenoverthrownandhispredecessorbetriedintheircapacityasGeneralCommandersoftheArmedForcesofElSalvador,alongwiththedirectorsofallthesecurityagencies of those administrations. In addition, it proposed compensating thenext-of-kinof thedisappearedvictims.InitsfinalreportofJanuary3,1980, itconcludedthatthepersonsdetainedanddisappearedwereexecuted.

ReturningtothereportoftheJointGroup,therearethreeofitsconclusionsworthhighlightinghere:thatthe“deathsquads”continuedoperatingafterthewar;thatmembersofthemilitaryandtheformerrepressivecorpslinkedtopolitically-motivatedviolentactsparticipated in thosekillings;and that far fromgrowingweaker, they had become better-organized, diversifying their action withoutabandoning their origins. Before publishing its conclusions, the Joint Grouplamentedthelackofcollaborationateverylevelforcarryingoutitsinvestigation.Itplacedblameforlackofcooperationonthegovernment,thepoliticalparties,andwhatitcalled“non-governmentalorganizations.”Thisassessmentisunfair,especiallyvisavistheNGOs,astheinformationthatsocialorganizationscouldofferoncriminalstructureswasmuchmoregeneralgiventhattheydidnothavethecapacityorresourcesformorein-depthinquiries.

TheJointGroup’screation,operation,andpreparationofthefinaldocumentwasaimedat“helpingthegovernmentofElSalvadortodiscovertheexistenceofthepolitically-motivatedillegalarmedgroups.”42Nonetheless,itappearsthatthisobjectivewasnotattainedbecausetheofficialreactionsatthehighestpoliticalandmilitarylevelweresimilartothoseinresponsetotheTruthCommission.GeneralCarlosHumbertoCoradoFigueroa—thenrecentlyappointedas theMinisterofNationalDefense—withouthavinghadtimetoanalyzethereport,declaredalmostimmediatelythatitwasinconclusiveandconfusing.HisreasoningincludedthattheJointGroupdidnothavetheresourcestoestablishtheexistenceofthe“deathsquads”andthattheArmedForcesofElSalvadordidnothaveanythingtohide,fortherewerenoillegalgroupsinitsranks.MinisterofForeignAffairs,ÓscarAlfredoSantamaría,madeamockeryofthedocumentandassertedthatitdidnotcontributeanythingnew.

ItisclearthattheSalvadoranStatedidnotvaluetherecommendationsofthe JointGroup. It rejected the recommendations in both its discourse and itspractice, just as it haddonewith severalof the recommendationsof theTruth

41 RobertoLaraVelado,LuisAlonsoPosada,andRobertoSuárezSuaywerethemembersofthisCommission.

42 JointGroupfortheInvestigationofthePolitically-MotivatedIrregularArmedGroups,Documento Especial: Informe del Grupo Conjunto para la Investigación de los Grupos Armados Irregulares con Motivación Política,reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos 993(Sept.1994).

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Commission.Three years after ending the inquiry into the “death squads,” inJuly1997,Annanaffirmed that “the recommendations formulatedby the JointGroupfortheInvestigationofIllegalArmedGroupshavingPoliticalMotivationswerenot compliedwithby theGovernment, especially those that relate to thestrengtheningofaspecializedunitwithintheNationalCivilPolicetoinvestigatethese types of cases.”43Accordingly, those or other criminal groups continuedacting illegally and with impunity. Annan himself noted that “[t]he recentrecurrence of assassinationswith the appearance of execution,which seem tohavebeencarriedoutbygroupsoutsidetheformalpolicestructurededicatedto‘socialcleansing,’hasraisedconcern.”44

C. Comprehensive Reparation for Victims, Both Individual and

Social (Third Principle)

Thisprinciple,likethefirsttwo,hasalsobeenbreachedbytheSalvadoranState.TheStatehasnotevenrecognizedallvictimsandhasdeniedthemtimeandagain—infactandinlaw,byactandomission,insideandoutsidethecountry.Forthisreason,JoséMaríaTojeira,JesuitrectoroftheUCAstatedthefollowinginMarch2007,whenopeningameetingtoanalyzethecountryfifteenyearsafterthepresentationoftheTruthCommissionreport:

Certainly,thiscommemorationneedsanotherreadingbecausetheofficialceremonies have never considered the victims, the true and genuineprotagonistsofpeacethathavebeenentirelyforgotten.Thevictims,whomotivatedsomany,andsomuch,tostruggleforpeace,wereabsentfromthesigningoftheChapultepecAgreement.. . .Onthisday,areadingwasgiventhatsatisfieditssignatories.Itisthereadingofpeacefromthestandpointofthecomplacencyofthosewhoagreeduponthedocument....Therewasagreatdealofshowmanshipinthatceremony,incontrasttothedissatisfactionofthepeople“ontheground”inthecountry.Todaywewantanotherreading:thereadingofthoseofuswhobelieveinasocietywithout violence, without social injustices, without impunity, withoutsuchmarginalizing social structures. . . .A reading from the victimswhowantthetruthandrecognition,whichwascalledforbytheTruthCommissionat that timeandwhichhasneverbeencarriedout:moralcompensationforthevictims....Todatetherehasbeennone,forthevictimsareconsideredasortofgarbageofhistorythatmustbeforgottenand cast into a corner.45

43 Annan,supranote27,at6.44 Annan,supranote27,at6.45 JoséMaríaTojeira,Conferencias iniciales: Presentación, in el salVador QuInCe años después:

otra leCtura 13-14 (IdhuCa ed.,2007).

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Thesewordsarestrongandraw,buttruefromthestandpointoftheformaland de factopowersthatdecidedtoprotecttheperpetratorswiththeMarch1993amnesty—adecisionthattodatestands.

The Truth Commission recommended that a fund be established tocompensate the victims named in its report and its annexes It suggested thatpart of the resources fromnations committed to theSalvadoranpeaceprocessshouldbeearmarkedtothatend.Itevendefinedthestructureandparameterstogovernthefund’soperations.Yetthis,liketheotherrecommendationsaimedatmovingtowards“nationalreconciliation,”wasnotheeded.Withregardtomoralreparation,thenationalmonumentwiththenamesofthevictims,proposedbytheCommission,wasnotbuilt.Norwasthereeveranypublicrecognitionforthcomingtoupholdtheirhonor,aswasnecessaryandonlyfair—muchlessanyrecognitionoftheState’sresponsibilityandtheFMLN’sresponsibilityforthegravehumanrightsviolationscommitted.Therecommendationtodeclareanationalholidaytorememberthevictimssufferedthesamefate.

Justiceforthevictimshasnotbeendoneeither.Asalreadyindicated,theprecariousandlamentablesituationofthenationaljusticesystem,verifiedonthegroundby theTruthCommission,wasanobstacle that shouldhavebeenovercomebycarryingouttherecommendationsandobligationsassumedwiththepeaceaccords,aswellasintheorientationsofONUSAL.Yetthescenariodidnotchange,at leastnotsubstantively.Evidenceofthisisthefactthatthenext-of-kinoftheSerranoCruzsisters,twoyounggirlswhodisappearedduringthe war, had to bring a case against the Salvadoran State before the inter-American system.The Statewas held responsible for violating the rights tojudicial guarantees and judicial protection for bothof themand their family,as well as the family’s right to personal security.46 Even though almost fiveyearshaveelapsedsincetheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsissuedthatjudgment,asofyear-end2009ithadnotbeenmetwithcompliance.Atleastthefamilysecuredsomecompensation,althoughthisdoesnottaketheplaceoftheright tocomprehensivereparationfor thevictimsand theirnext-of-kin in thedomesticlegalsystem.

AsSalvadoran societyhasnever learnedand still doesnotknow the fullbreadthanddepthofthetruthofwhathashappenedinthepostwarperiod,therearetwomainversionsofwhathappened:thevictims’versionandthevictimizers’version.And two positions derive from these: one in favor of revealingwhathappenedandtheotherpreferringtocoverupwhathappened.ThelatterstancewasdescribedinthefollowingtermsbyIgnacioMartín-Baró:47

46 SeeSerrano-CruzSistersv.ElSalvador,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.120(Mar.1,2005).47 OneofthesixJesuitpriestsexecutedbymembersofthemilitaryonNovember16,1989,inthesame

crimeinwhichtherectoroftheUCA,IgnacioEllacuría,wasalsoexecuted.See supra note 3.

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Firstandforemost,itisaquestionofcreatinganofficialversionofthefacts,an“officialhistory,”thatignorescrucialaspectsofreality,distortsothers,and even falsifiesor invents others.This “official history” is imposedthrough an intense and very aggressive propagandistic deployment,which is supportedbydrawingon the fullweightof thehighest levelofficialpositions....When,howeveritmaybe,factscometolightthatdirectlycontradictthe“officialhistory”a“quarantine”isplacedaroundthem,acircleofsilencethatrelegatesthemtoquickoblivionortoapast,presumably overtaken by events.The continuing violations of humanrightsby themembersof theArmedForcesobviously fallwithin thatencasingsilence.48

Thefirststance,whichfavorsrevealingwhathashappened,isconsideredsubversivebyMartín-Baró.Thepowers-that-befeltthesameaboutthereportoftheTruthCommissionanddenouncementsmadeinElSalvadorandabroad—be-foregovernmentalagencies,intergovernmentalbodies,andsocialorganizations—before,during,andafterthewar.Martín-Baró,whowasassassinated,arguesthatthisisthecasebecause

theysubverttheestablishedorderofthelie.Thisleadstotheparadoxthatonewhodarestonamerealityortodenouncetheabusesbecomesatleastaprisonerofjustice.Whatmattersisnotwhetherthefactsreferredtoareorarenottrue,whichisalwaysdeniedapriori;whatmattersisthattheyarenamed.Itisnottherealitythatcounts,buttheimage.49

In addition, regarding reparations, all that exists is a law on benefits fortheprotectionofthewar-woundedandpersonsdisabledasaresultofthearmedconflict.Thislawhasnotachievedthefullsocialreinsertionofthesepersons,forthepensions they receiveareminimalanddonotcover theirbasicneeds.Thebenefitsalsodonotincludethemedicaltreatmentthatisrequired.

During theadministrationofPresidentFlores, theForeignMinistryhiredaconsultanttoestablishtheamountsofmaterialreparationstothevictims.50Yettheresultswerenevermadepublicanditisstillunknownwhatusewasmadeofthatstudy.WhatisclearisthattherewasnoprogresstowardfulfillingtheState’sobligationsin termsofmeasuresofrestitutionorwithregardtocompensation,rehabilitation,satisfaction,andguaranteesofnon-repetition.

48 Ignacio Martín-Baró, La violencia política y la guerra como causas en el país del trauma psicosocial en El Salvador,28reVIsta de psIColoGía de el salVador 70, 70-71 (1988).

49 Id. at 71.50 AlexanderSegovia,SalvadoraneconomistandTechnicalSecretaryofthePresidencyintheFunes

administration.

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D. Vetting and Administrative Punitive Measures Imposed on the Perpetrators (Fourth Principle)

The Truth Commission’s recommendations concerning administrativepunishmentsforperpetratorsstemmeddirectlyfromthefactsinvestigated.Threehadtodowiththefollowingbasiceffortstocombatimpunity:first,theCommissionhighlightedtheneedtoremovefromtheArmedForcesthoseactive-dutymembersofthemilitarymentionedinthereportfortheirspecificparticipationinhumanrightsviolations,cover-upsofviolations,oromissionintermsofinvestigatingandpunishingthepersonsresponsible.Second,itindicatedtheneedtoremovethosecivilianofficialsof thepublicadministrationand the judiciary thatcovereduphumanrightsviolationsandbreachedtheirobligationstoinvestigateandpunishtheperpetrators.Thethirdwastodisqualifyfromtheexerciseofpublicrightsallpersonsnotcoveredbytheforegoingcircumstances—whetherornottheywereactive-dutyofficers—whoexecuted,ordered,coveredup, failed to inquire intorelevantfacts,anddidnotpunishthepersonsresponsible; this includedretiredmilitary officers, civilians, andmembers of the guerrilla commandmentionedin the report. The proposal, which was not carried out, was to prohibit theseindividualsfromholdingpositionsinpublicadministrationfortenyears,andtoexcludethemforlifeintheareasofpublicsecurityornationaldefense.

Asmentionedabove,noreparationwasmadeto thevictimsfor theharmcausedthem,andfurthermore,thepersonsresponsibleforthatharmagreednottoabidebytheirdisqualifications,allegingthattheirconstitutionalrightswouldbe violatedwere they to do so.That subterfugewas used by persons allegingnobleideals—“thedefenseoftheHomelandanddemocracy”or“theliberationoftheoppressedclasses.”ThiswasusedtojustifygraveviolationsofhumanrightsandwastoleratedandevenlegitimatedbythenSecretaryGeneraloftheUnitedNations,BoutrosBoutros-Ghali.51Therefore, in thepostwarperiod, individualsthatwere called out by theTruthCommission have continued parading aboutinpublicaffairs.Andthecomplicitagreementcontinuesinforce,ever-renewed,so as to block any repeal of the amnesty or attempt to bring it into linewithinternationalhumanrightsstandards.

Theforegoingscenariocanbeconsideredafailedvettingprocess.Anotherfailedinitiativethathadbeensetoutinthepeaceaccordswastheadhoc CommissionforVettingtheArmedForcesofElSalvador.Thisinitiativewasplainlyboycottedandtruncatedonpurpose.TheCommissionwastoinvestigatetherecordofeachofficerinlightoflegalityandhumanrights,aswellasthecommitmenteachofficertocorrectingandsanctioningsubordinateswhoviolatedhumanrights.Itwasalsotoassess,one-by-one,theirprofessionalfitnessandcapacitytooperateinapeaceful

51 See CuéllarMartínez,supranote31,at155-58.

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anddemocraticsociety,asaguarantorofrespectforhumanrightsandpromoterofsocial“reunification.”Thatevaluationwoulddeterminewhocontinuedintheinstitution,whowouldbetransferred,andwhowouldbedismissed.

Overfourmonths,themilitaryhierarchyprovidedtheadhocCommissionwith information thatwas limitedand late andwhichdidnot contain casesofhuman rights violations. Most of the reports were presented by Salvadoranand international social organizations; cases of corruption and others relatedto organized crimewere not included because of lack of evidence.The high-levelmilitarycommanderssoughttointimidatetheorganizationsthatpresentedevidence.Tothisend,amongotherthings,theyfiledacriminalcomplaintagainstoneoftheinstitutions,accusingitoftryingtocauseharmtotheArmedForces.Suchresistancefurthercomplicatedanalreadydifficulttask.

And could the victims point to the persons responsible for the abusessuffered?Weretheyaffordedanyopportunitytoproduceevidenceofthesefactsto the ad hoc Commission?Were they capable of establishing the organizedpower apparatus—with its members and structures that planned, ordered,consentedto,andsoughttoconcealsuchbarbarism?Theanswerisno,andfortwobasicreasons.Theperpetratorsoperatedinamannerthatmadeitextremelydifficultorpracticallyimpossibletoidentifythem.Forexample,accordingtothesisterofadisappearedman:“thepersonswhosawhiscapturesaythattheagentswhodetainedhimwereuniformedasguardsandtooktheyoungmanawayonfoot,butnoonefollowedthem.”52Inanothercase:“[T]hedisappearedmanwasheadedtoZacatecolucatodistributebiblicalliterature,andithasbeenlearnedfromunreliablesourcesthatayoungmanofÓscar’scharacteristicswasdetainedbyplainclothesagents.”53Inaverylargenumberofcases, themostthat thosewhofiledcomplaintscouldsay,wasthattheresponsibilitylaywith“membersof thearmyandsecurityforces”or“heavilyarmedmen inplainclothes.”Theotherconsiderationistheprecariouseconomicandsocialsituationofmostofthevictims,withallthatthisentails.

The ad hocCommission submitted its report in September 1993. It tookstockofonly240cases,fromalistof2,203officerswhowereinthemilitaryasofMay22,1992:inotherwords 11%ofthetotal.ToaddressthissituationtheUCAHumanRightsInstitute(IDHUCA)proposedcreatinganentitythatwouldcontinuethevettingbasedonspecificallegationsbyvictims,socialorganizations,oranypersonorinstitutionwithalegitimateinterestinthematter.Theproposalwasnotimplemented;perhapsitwasnotevenconsidered.Bywayofcontrast,

52 Case of José Anibal Criollo Chacón, student, seventeen years of age, disappeared onAugust25,1980,inthecityofSanSalvador.OfficeofLegalAssistanceoftheArchdiocese,bookVIII(1980).

53 Case ofÓscarAlfredoCastellanosGutiérrez, student, seventeen years of age, disappeared onOctober8,1980,atanunknownplace.OfficeofLegalAssistanceoftheArchdiocese,bookVIII(1980).

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someleadersoftheFMLNandPresidentCristianinegotiatedtheretirementofthemilitaryhighcommandandotherofficersfacingaccusations; itwasretirementwithmoneyintheirpocketsandceremoniesintheir“honor.”54

UponleavingthepositionofMinisterofNationalDefenseonJuly1,1993,GeneralPoncesaid:“[w]esubmittedingoodfaithtoadrasticcutof50.2percentofourforce,tothedissolutionofimmediateresponsebattalions,tothedissolutionof thepublicsecurityagencies, to thedissolutionof theparamilitaryforces, toanill-intentionedadhocCommissionforaso-calledvetting....”55HeleftnolingeringdoubtsastowhatthemilitaryofficersfeltandthoughtabouttheadhocCommissionanditswork.

IfonecombinesthisexpressionofthestrengtheningofimpunitywiththeofficialattitudesandtheattitudesoftheFMLNafterthepresentationofthereportsbytheTruthCommissionandtheJointGroup,onecanunderstandinpartwhyElSalvadortodayisoneofthecountrieswiththelargestnumberofhomicidesregionallyandinternationally.

E. Restitution of Historical Memory (Fifth principle)

ThefirstsignofwhatappearstobetheState’spositiononhistoricalmemoryinElSalvadorwasevidencedinthedecisionnottoanalyze—eitherbroadlyornarrowly—thedocumentproducedbytheTruthCommission.TheFMLN,whichinthepastwastheleadingoppositionparty,didnotpromoteanyrelevantactioninthisregardeither.AndnowthattheFMLNhascometooccupythepresidency,ithasnotgivenanyclearsignsofachangeinpath.PresidentFuneshasstatedthathewillpromotetruth-seekingandreparationforthevictims;howeverthesewordshaveyettobetranslatedintoactionthatwouldallowonetojudgethescopeoftheproposalandtounderstandwhetherthefailuretomentiontheword“justice”inhisspeechisnothingmorethanamereerrororoversight.ThePresidenthassentaclearmessagethathewillnotliftafingertorepealtheamnesty.

Beyondformalities,theStatehasnot—asoftheendof2009—takenanyactionsorimplementedanyprogramstodisseminateorstudyhistoricalmemoryinschoolsorforthesocietyat-large.Norhasitmadeeffortstokeepalivethememoryofthevictimsofgravehumanrightsviolations.Onewhovisitsthecountryalreadyknowingwhat happenedwill note a lackofmonuments ormuseums,archives or dates, holidays or other expressions from the successive postwargovernmentstokeepalivethememoryoftheeventsthatsoshookSalvadoransocietyandmovedtheworld.Norhastherebeenaseriousandsustainedofficial

54 Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas”(IDHUCA),Se van los generales, permanece la impunidad,14proCeso13,14(June7,1993).

55 RenéEmilioPonce,Discurso de entrega de mando del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional,502reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos782,782-83(July-Aug.1993).

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concerntopromoteandconsolidateacultureofrespectforhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw.Insteadwhathasbeenpromotedfromthehighest-levelspheresisacultofperpetrators.Toillustrate,itsufficestocitetwoexamples.

On February 13, 2007, the Committee on Culture and Education of theLegislativeAssemblyapprovedareportintendedtopayposthumoustributetoaformerpresidentoftheRepublic,JoséNapoleónDuarte,andaformerpresidentofthelastConstitutionalAssembly,RobertoD’AubuissonArrieta.Therewasgreatindignationamongvictimsandsocialorganizations,sparkingacollectiveactionthatbroughttheinitiativetoahalt.56

Months later, on May 7, President Saca gave the key-note speechcommemorating thedayof the soldier.The thenMinisterofNationalDefenseGeneralOttoRomerogavehimabustofCoronelDomingoMonterrosa,whoboththeTruthCommission and the Inter-AmericanCommission onHumanRightsaccusedashavingbeenresponsiblefortheElMozotemassacre.Notwithstanding,SacaexaltedMonterrosa’s“image”and“charisma”;healsodescribedhimas“amilitaryofficerwholovedthehomeland,whodefendedthehomelandinthesadmomentsofthecommunistaggressionthatthiscountrysuffered.”57 In addition to presentinghimselfasanadmirer,hecitedMonterrosaasanexampleforthenewgenerationsofcadets.

56 IDHUCAissuedapublicstatementonthismatteronFebruary19,2007:Inothercountries, thevictimsofgravehumanrightsviolationsareaskedforforgivenessandmeasuresareadoptedtomakereparationfortheharmsuffered;here, the power structure ignores them and holds them in contempt. In othercountriesthereareinvestigations,trials,andpunishmentforthoseresponsibleforthoseterribleacts;here,thepowerstructurerewardsthem.Inothercountries,suchasGermany,Russia,andIraq,effigiesofthosecriminalswerebroughtdown,inElSalvador—15yearsafterthewar—theywanttopresenttheperpetratorsofgenocideasheroesandtheyintendtocompletetheprocessofsealingthearmorofimpunitythatprotectsthemwithinsultingandprovocativetributes.

Until[2006]theyhaddonesolessshamelessly.Inthecemetery,singingbelligerentsat the tombof themastermindof theassassinationofMonsignorRomeroandthefatherofthe“deathsquads,”asnotedbytheTruthCommission,orputtingupastatue tohimat theheadquartersofhisparty.Yet today, theyareno longer contentwithprivateworship.Withno shame, they steppedoutoftheshadowstobaptizepublicspaceswiththenameofRobertoD’AubuissonArrieta.Notsatisfiedwiththat,intheLegislativeAssemblytheysought—thispastThursday,February15—todeclareas“highlydistinguishedsons”(“hijos meritísimos”)ofElSalvadorthegreatestdeathsquadleaderandonewho,foryears,presidedoverthemassacressuchasthoseatElMozoteandElSumpul.NeitherD’AubuissonnorJoséNapoleónDuartemeritthisdistinction,becausetheirnamesarestainedwiththebloodofapeoplewhosemartyrsaretheoneswhoshouldbeenshrinedasthebestofourlong-sufferingHomeland.

Pressrelease,IDHUCA,Por la dignidad de las víctimas, no a los criminales impunes,Feb.19,2007,http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/comunicado.pdf.

57 InstitutodeDerechosHumanosdelaUniversidadCentroamericana“JoséSimeónCañas”(IDHUCA),Cuidado con ese militar que lleva dentro (I),28proCeso10,11(May23,2007).

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F. Focus on Populations in Vulnerable Situations (Sixth Principle)

Historically, the Salvadoran State has not promoted policies aimed atrespecting the rights of indigenous peoples. To the contrary, in the twentiethcenturythereweretwogenocidesthatleftthousandsofvictims.Priortothefirst,whichoccurredin1932,indigenouscommunitieswerestrippedoftheircommunallandsinordertointroducethecoffeecropandtogivewaytotheoligarchythatcametodominatepolitical,economic,andsociallifeformostofthatcentury.Noofficial figure has been established; however estimates indicate that 20,000 to30,000werekilledinsuppressingtheuprisingofapopulationanguishedbytheeffectsoftheglobaleconomiccrisis.

ThoseeventsinJanuary1932settheprecedentforatypeofconductthatwastobecomethecustom:theproclamationofamnesties.

On July 11, 1932, the National Legislative Assembly issued a decreegranting:

broadandunconditionalamnestyfortheofficials,authorities,employees,agentsofauthority,andanyothercivilianormilitarypersonwhomaysomehowappear toberesponsible forbreaking lawsofanynature, inordertoreestablishorderinthecountryandrepress,prosecute,punish,and capture the persons accused of the crime of rebellionmentionedabove.58

This is how the perpetrators “resolved” the matter. The victims, on the

otherhand,hid,blendedin—puttingawaytheirtraditionalgarbanddressingasladinos59—or fled, mostly to Honduras, where they were then persecuted andharassedinthecontextoftheeconomic,political,andmilitaryconflictbetweenElSalvadorandHondurasinthelate1960s.Thosewhoreturnedandjoinedthesurvivorswerethentrappedbythegrowingwaveofpoliticalviolenceandwar,whichrazedentirecommunitiesfrom1972to1992.

According to data from the Truth Commission, the vast majority of thevictimslivedinthecountryside.Basedonthedirectsources,itwasestablishedthat rural victims accounted for 57.7% of the total; according to the indirectsources,theywere40%.TheTruthCommissiondocumentedtheassassinationofsixteenpeopleonFebruary22,1983,butconsideredthemaspartofextrajudicialexecutions,andnotofmassacresinruralzones.SeveralofthevictimsbelongedtotheLasHojascooperative,whichwasaffiliatedwiththeAsociaciónNacionalIndígenaSalvadoreña(ANIS).60

58 NationalLegislativeAssemblyoftheRepublicofElSalvador.Decree121,July11,1932.59 According to the dictionary of the Real Academia Española, “ladino” is a person of mixed

EuropeanandindigenousbloodwhospeaksonlySpanish.60 SeeTruthCommissionReport,supranote30,at224-29.

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Once again, in this case the perpetrators were amnestied by applicationoftheLegislativeDecreeapprovedonOctober28,1987,andthedignityofthevictimswasonceagaintrampled.AcomplaintwasfiledwiththeInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights(IACHR)onJanuary27,1989.OnSeptember24,1992,theIACHRissueditsreportonthemerits,61identifyingtheSalvadoranStateasaviolatorofhumanrights,andrecommendingthatthefactsbeinvestigated,thatthepersonsresponsiblebepunished,andthatreparationbemadetothevictims;italsoaskedtheStatetotakemeasurestopreventtherepetitionofsimilaracts.TheSupremeCourtofJusticeusedthe1987amnestyasa“legal”reasonfornotfollowingthroughontheserecommendations.

Asregardswomen,children,adolescents,andseniors,theTruthCommissionreportdoesnotincludedata,analysis,orsignificantrecommendationsstemmingfromtheirvulnerablestatus.InthecaseofElMozote,wecanlooktotheforensicstudydoneatapropertyofapproximately31.5m2knownas“ElConvento”(“TheConvent”).

Amongthenon-combatantcivilianpopulationmassacred,theforensicstudyidentified:

thepresenceof143 skeletons, including136childrenandadolescentsand seven adults.The average age of the childrenwas approximatelysix;therewerewomenbetweenages21to40,oneofwhomwasinthethirdtrimesterofpregnancy,andamanapproximately50yearsold.Itis possible that thereweremore dead . . . . It is possible that severalchildrenofaveryyoungageweretotallycrematedandthatotherchildrenwere not counted because of the considerable bodily fragmentation.Approximately117victimswerechildrenunder12yearsofage.62

Accordingtotheannexestothereport,basedonthedirectwitnessstatementsitwasestablishedthat27.5%ofallvictimswerefemaleand72.5%male.Basedontheindirectsources,femalesaccountedfor24.2%andmales74.1%.Insummary,oneofeveryfourvictimswasfemale.Asforages,bothsourcesindicatethatthemajorityofthoseaffectedbytheviolencewereyoungpersonsages15andup.63

AstudybytheIDHUCAestablishedstatisticsforchildrenandadolescents:

more than16%ofall thevictimsonrecord . . . .Theagebracketofmostchildvictimsis12to17years:60%(2,424)ofallchildrenthat

61 AnnualReportoftheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights1992-1993,ReportNo.26/92,Case10,287,ElSalvador,Sept.24,1992,OEA/Ser.l/V/II.83,Doc.14(Mar.12,1993).

62 ClydeSnowetal.,El Mozote: Informe de la investigación forense,AnnextotheTruthCommissionReport,supra note 30.

63 SeeTruthCommission,“AnálisisestadísticodelostestimoniosrecibidosporlaComisióndelaVerdad,”xxAnnexes tome I, Report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador, United Nations, SanSalvador-NewYork,1993.

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wereaffectedbytheviolence(4,040).Thesedonotincludethecasesofpersonsunder18yearsofagewhowereindirectlyaffectedbythelossofoneoftheirparents,greaterimpoverishment,sadness,hunger,disease,orexile,butratherthesearepersonswhosehumanrightswereviolateddirectly.Likealargenumberofadults,theytoosufferedimprisonmentandweresubjectedtopracticesoftortureandothercruelandinhumanetreatment. . . . In that context,one shouldnote thealarmingnumberofminorswhoarevictimsofthemostgravehumanrightsviolations,suchas executionand forceddisappearance. Indifferentways1,449childrenweredeprivedoftheirlives,whileanother719weredetainedandsubsequentlydisappearedbytheircaptors.64

Combiningthesetwopatternsofviolence—homicidesanddisappearances—therewere2,168attacksonlife(37.85%).Inall,5,727humanrightsviolationswerecommittedagainstmorethan4,000childrenandadolescents,accordingtothat study.

Itissaidthattherewere“scant”casesofrapeandthattheyoccurred“almostexclusively in the first four years” of the 1980s.65 Neither the victims of thismodalityoftorturenorthevictimsofothergravehumanrightsviolationsweregivenaspecialplaceinthe“transition.”

G. Institutional Reform and Effective Governance (Seventh Principle)

One of the main initiatives that resulted from the accords between theSalvadorangovernmentandtheFMLNwasthefundamentaltransformationoftheArmedForcesofElSalvador,withaviewtoachievingtheswiftdemilitarizationofsociety.Inthisrespect,theTruthCommissionrecommended

1. Profoundandswiftchangesmarshaledbyaspecial legislativecommission,with a major emphasis on bringing the military under the control of thecivilianauthorities.Promotionsandcommandassignmentsshouldbesubjecttodemocraticcontrol,aswellasthebudget.Specialattentionmustbepaidto the new doctrine of the institution, its new educational system, and theconstantprofessionalizationofitsmembers.

2. Comprehensivereviewofmilitaryrulesandregulationstobringtheminlinewithconstitutionalreformsandrespectforhumanrights.

3. Creation of a simple and expeditious mechanism to resolve the cases ofsubordinateswhorefusetocarryoutanillegalorder;andmakingitclearthat“dueobedience”doesnotexonerateonewhocarriesoutanunlawfulorder.

64 InstitutodeDerechosHumanosdelaUniversidadCentroamericana“JoséSimeónCañas”(IDHUCA),Buscando entre las cenizas,589reVIsta estudIos CentroamerICanos 1126(Nov.-Dec.1997).

65 TruthCommissionReport,supranote30,at28.

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4. Internalpunishmentforthosewhocommithumanrightsviolations,includingtheirdischargewithnopossibilityofreadmission,withoutsuchactionreleasingthemfromcriminalliability.

5. Military studies should include in-depth research on human rights. Toaccomplishthis,civilianprofessorsshouldbeincluded.

6. The selectionofmilitaryofficers topursue studies abroad should take intoconsiderationdemocraticattitudesandrespectforhumanrights.

7. Anyrelationshipbetweenmembersofthemilitaryandparamilitaryapparatusesandillegalarmedgroupsmusttobedefinitivelysevered.

Theforegoingreviewwascarriedoutformally.ChangesweremadetotheConstitution andwithin theArmed Forces of El Salvador.Nonetheless, thereare indicia of regression at themoment of implementing the new provisions.IDHUCA has accompanied officers in the promotion of human rights withinandoutsidetheinstitutionandhasbeenabletoverifythegapbetweenwhatisonpaperandreality.IDHUCAhasalsofiledcriminalcomplaintsonbehalfofparticularvictims,whilefacingresistancefrommilitarysuperiors.66 Within the militarysystem,67whichincludesamilitaryjudgeandthe“tribunal de honor,”there isa lackof respect fordueprocessand theappointmentof independentjudgesandprosecutors.68

Theparticipationofmembersofthemilitaryinpublicsecuritytaskshasbeenaconstantforfifteenyears;thisisdespitethefactthatthereformofthemilitarydoctrinalprinciples stripped it of that authority anddefined its involvement insecuritytasksaspurelyexceptional.Thereformshavenotbeenimplementedinpractice.FromtheCristianiadministrationtotodaywiththeFunesadministration,

66 SeeOrderoftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,MatterofAdriánMeléndez-Quijanoetal.,Provisional Measures with regard to El Salvador in favor of Adrián Meléndez-Quijano et al. (May 12, 2007), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/melendez_se_02_ing.pdf;IDHUCA,El caso del cadete Peña Carmona,http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/cadete.html.

67 Article216oftheConstitutionestablishesmilitaryjurisdiction,indicatingthatinordertojudgepurelymilitaryoffensesandbreachestherewillbespecialproceduresandcourtsinkeepingwiththelaw.Themilitaryjurisdiction,asanexceptionalregime,willbelimitedtohearingpurelymil-itary-relatedoffensesandbreaches,understandingthattomeanthosewhichaffectalegalinterestthatisstrictlymilitary....Active-dutymembersoftheArmedForcesenjoymilitaryjurisdictionforpurelymilitaryoffensesandbreaches.

68 ItisworrisomethatfornamingmilitaryjudgestheElSalvadorMilitaryJusticeCodeofElSalvador,approvedin1964andamendedin1992,givespreferenceinappointmentsofmilitaryinvestigativejudgestoactiveofficerssubordinatedtothetop-levelcommands(Article195);AlsoconcerningisthattheMinistryofNationalDefensesendstheNationalJudicialCouncilthethree-personslateofaspirants tomilitaryjudgeoffirst instancetobeappointedbytheSupremeCourtofJustice(Article200).ThissameofficeroftheExecutivebranchmayproposetheappointment,removal,or replacementofmilitaryprosecutors to thePublicMinistry (Article216).Finally, toappointapublicdefender,priorityisgiventoactive-dutymilitaryofficersofequalorgreaterrankthantheaccused;thismakesitdifficulttogetrepresentationbyanindependentcivilianattorneywithabroadergraspofthelaw(Article228).See MilitaryJusticeCode(Codigo de Justicia Militar),DecreeNo.562,DiarioOficialNo.97,May29,1964.

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theArmedForcesofElSalvadorhavealmostconstantlypatrolledbothruralandurbanareaswiththeNationalCivilianPolice.Withthelattergovernment—thatofthe“center-left”—thenumbersofrank-and-file69increasedsubstantially.Theirfunctionswereextendedbeyonddeterrence,incorporatingtaskssuchassearches.This is notwithstanding the fact that theFMLNhadquestioned the use of themilitaryforsuchtaskswhenitwastheleadingoppositionparty.

In addition to the reform of its doctrinal principles, the military as awhole was reduced in size, including eliminating the elite battalions and theparamilitaryentities.Moreover,forcedrecruitmentwasended,andtheeducationsystemwasreformed.TheNationalIntelligenceAgency(Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia-DNI)wasdismantled,andtheArmedForcesofElSalvadorweresubordinatedtocivilianauthorities.Thenumericalreductionandeliminationofforcedrecruitmenthasbeenimplemented;however,theotherchangeshavebeennotbeenputintopractice.

The Armed Forces continue undertaking military intelligence activities,despitetheshuttingdownoftheDNIandthecreationof theStateIntelligenceAgency (Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado - OIE) under the executivebranch.Itmustbepointedoutthatfromitscreationin1992until1999theOIEwasdirectedbyMauricioEduardoSandovalAvilés,accusedbytheUCAastheinstigatorof the executionof the Jesuitpriests,ElbaRamos, andherdaughterCelina,andalsoofcoveringuptheparticipants.ContrarytowhatiscalledforintheChapultepecAgreement,70theactivityoftheOIEhasbeendarkandclosedtolegislativesupervision.

ThecaseofLieutenantCoronelAdriánMeléndezQuijanoisaclearexampleofthelackofsubordinationtothecivilianauthorityandofthepredominantviewofhumanrightsorganizationsamongthemilitary.71AsregardstheappointmentofapersonoutsidetheinstitutionasMinisterofNationalDefense,apossibilityestablished in the ChapultepecAgreement, it has not happened either in theARENAadministrationsorinthecurrentFMLNadministration.

Examination of the disqualifications and administrative punishmentsimposedontheperpetratorshashighlightedthetwoill-fatedvettingprocesses:

69 BypresidentialorderonNovember6,2009,2500membersofthemilitaryjoinedthe1500whowerealreadyconductingjointpatrolswiththeNationalCivilPolice.

70 “[T]hedoctrineoftheOIEwillreflectdemocraticprinciples;thenotionofstateintelligenceasafunctionoftheStateforthecommongood,independentofanypolitical,ideological,socialstatusconsiderationoranyotherdiscrimination;andstrictrespectforhumanrights.”UnitedNations,“AcuerdosdeElSalvador:enelcaminodelapaz”,p.56

71 See supra note67.TheHighCommandoftheArmedForcesofElSalvadorandtheprincipalactorsintheMinistryofNationalDefensesincetheFloresadministration,(particularlyGeneralOttoRomeroHerrera,whoheldthepostfromJune2004toDecember2007),wereincontemptofthejudgmentonanamparoactionresolvedbytheConstitutionalChamberoftheSupremeCourtinfavorofMeléndezQuijano.RomeroHerreradirectedintimidatingwordsatIDHUCA;thedirectorandattorneysofthatInstitute,whohaveaccompaniedthedefenseofthelieutenantcolonel’srights,reportedseveralthreatstheyreceivedbytelephonetotheOfficeofPublicProsecutor.

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that of the Truth Commission and that of the ad hoc Commission. OtherelementsreinforceddoubtsastothedepthofthechangesintheArmedForcesofEl Salvador, including the lack of cooperation to investigate human rightsviolations.Hadadifferentstancebeentaken,perhapsthefateofthemanywhoweredisappearedbeforeandduringthewarcouldhavebeendetermined.Openorveiledsupportforofficersinvestigatedandprosecutedoutsidethecountryhasalsobeenabadsign.

Intheareaofpublicsecurity,twoessentialagreementswerereached:(1)todissolvethebodiesthatsincebeforethewarhadbecomeinstrumentsofpoliticalpersecution and repression against the real or imaginary opposition, and (2) tocreatetheNationalCivilPolice(PNC).BeforeendingtheinternationalverificationprocessinElSalvador,Annanconsideredthatallthecommitmentshadbeencarriedout;72hecitedonlyonecaveat—thepracticeofhavingpolicepersonnellivinginbarracks,which,accordingtothenUNSecretaryGeneral,contradictedwhatwasagreeduponbytheparties.OneofthefirstchangesintheFunesadministrationwaspreciselytosuspendthatpractice.Nonetheless,uponannouncingtheincreaseinthenumberofmilitaryforcesonthegroundinpublicsecuritytasksinearlyNovember2009,theLegislativeAssemblyapprovedadecreewithcertainprovisionstypicalofhavingthepoliceforcesinmilitarybarracks.Thiswasdoneunderthe“regimeofavailability”or“régimen de disponibilidad”setforthinthatdecree.

ThePNCisquestionedespeciallyformistreatingyouthwhoarestigmatizeddue to their economic and social conditions, the areaswhere they live, and fortheirappearance,associatingthemalmostautomaticallywithmembersofgangsormaras.Inaddition,theexistenceof“socialcleansing”groupshasbeendenouncedwithintheNationalPolice,butwithoutsolidindicia;thatdoesn’tmeantherehasnotbeenindividualpoliceparticipationinthistypeofcriminalaction.73Alsonotedis the participation of police in other forms of organized crime, especially drugtrafficking.Thisincludes,amongothers,oneformergeneraldirectorofthePNC.74

Thisappearstoberelated,amongotheringredients,tothedifficultconditionsinwhichthelowlevelsoftheinstitutionperformtheirwork,andthehighlevelsofviolenceandinsecuritythatprevailinElSalvador.Yetaboveallitrespondstopoorpoliticalleadership,basedontheideaofa“party”police,or,inthebestofcases,apolicethatanswerstotheparticularadministrationinpower,andnottotheState.Oneparticularlynefariousresultisthedeficientanddiscretionalinternaldisciplinarycontrolsthatfavorarbitrariness,especiallyamonghigh-levelofficers,andeventheconfrontationofgroupswithintheinstitution.

72 Annan,supranote27,at4.73 See RaúlGutiérrez, El regreso de los grupos de exterminio,IPS,Aug.31,2007,http://ipsnoticias.

net/nota.asp?idnews=42030.74 SeeEquipoNación,PNC investiga ex director por vínculo con pandillero,la prensa GráfICa,

Oct.21,2009,http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/67562-pnc-investiga-ex-direc-tor-por-vinculo-con-pandillero.html.

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In addition, obstacles persist in terms of increasing the quality of theinvestigations.Thisstrengthensimpunity,whichismoreselectivethanabsolute:impunitydependsonwhothevictimisandwhothevictimizeris,theireconomicandsocialstatus,aswellas theirpoliticalpowerorrelationshipwithpoliticalpower.Thesefactorsdeterminehowwidespreadimpunityis,alwaysdisparatelyaffecting the poor. Institutional reforms could not be avoided, but they wereinsufficient;beyondtheirdecree,theymustbemadearealityinordertomeettheexpectationstheygenerated.ThoseseriousstructuraldeficiencieshavelimitedtheabilityofthePNCtosuccessfullytakeonthehighlevelsofcrimeandhaveincreased distrust of the population towards the institution. This generates awidespreadsenseofhelplessness,andanlauded,larger,anddangerousmilitaryprotagonism.75

On the protection of human rights, theTruthCommission recommendedstrengtheningtheinstitutionoftheOmbudsperson, beginningbytakingstockofitsprioritiesanditspresenceinthenationalterritory.Foryearstherehavebeenfourteenoffices:thecentralofficeandthirteendepartment-levelones.Recently,four local offices were established.With this, it is possible to assert that therecommendationregardingnationaldeploymentwasfollowed.Nonetheless,thatandothereffortshavebeenunderminedtotheextentthattheOfficeoftheHumanRightsOmbudsperson(Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos - PDDH) is victim of an ever-precarious budget, the election of inappropriateprincipals,andthefailureofotherauthoritiestoheeditsrecommendations.Thenegativeconsequencesare its lowinstitutionalprofile, limited impact,and lowcredibilityvis-à-visthepopulation.

The Truth Commission also proposed the need for the Office of theOmbudspersontomakefrequentuseofitsauthoritytovisitanysiteorfacilityinthecountry,especiallydetentioncenters.Ithasdonethis;theinstitutionhashadanacceptablelevelofcommunicationwiththeprisonauthorities.Exceptfortwo

75 Seetheop-edbyformerMinisterofNationalDefenseGeneralOttoRomeroOrellana,Organicé-monos contra las maras, elsalVador.Com,Oct.27,2009,available at http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_opinion.asp?idCat=6342&idArt=4192458.

ThereforewedareaffirmthatwhatmustbeexplainedtosocietyisnotthataneffortisbeingmadetousetheArmedForcesinpublicsecuritytasks,becausethatisonlypartofthesolution. . . itshouldbemadecleartoourpeoplethattoresolvetheproblemofstructuralinsecuritythatweexperience,asystemoflocalandcommunitysecuritymustbeconstructedanew,onethattiesinwiththemacro-levelofsecuritythatwealreadyhave,towhichendthefirststepisnecessarilytoorganizeandcontrolthecountry’sentirepopulation,beginningwiththeplaceswiththemostconflict,requiringnotonlytheuseoftheArmedForces,butofallofsociety,which,ledbyitsArmedForces,maybeorganizedinto barrios,colonias,andcantones,suchthattherearenospacesorgapsforcommittingawrongdoing.ThefunctionortaskiscomplexbuttheArmedForcescandoitwiththecollaborationoftheGovernmentandSalvadoransociety.

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worrisomeincidents,76ithasvisitedlocationsandintervenedinsituationswithoutanymajorproblem.

Italsoproposedtomakeamparo and habeas corpusremediesmoreeffectivebyexpandingknowledgeof themamong the justicesof thepeace.However, thisproposalwasnotcarriedout,asjurisdictionoverthemwasreservedforcourtsattheappellatelevel.Itshouldbeclearthatneithertheseremediesnortheguaranteesofdueprocesscouldbeannulledunderanycircumstance.Nonetheless,Article29oftheConstitutiononthestateofemergencyregimewasmaintained;itallowsfornotinformingadetainedpersonofhisorherrights—immediatelyandcomprehensively—and the reasonsofhisorher arrest.Moreover, it is still possible to set aside theguaranteeagainstself-incriminationandtherighttolegalcounselinalljudicialandextrajudicialproceedings.Finally,onceanemergencyregimeisdecreed,detentionscanexceedtheseventy-two-hourlimit,butarenottoexceedfifteendays.

Inaddition,humanrightsweretobeaccordedconstitutionalstatus,includingthoserecognizedonlyininternationalinstruments,yetthiswasnotdone.Anotherimportantrecommendationthatwasnotfullyimplementedwastoratifyinternationalhumanrightstreaties.Amongtheimportantdocumentsrelatedtofightingimpunityasaguaranteeofnon-repetition,ElSalvador isnotaparty to theRomeStatute,theConventionontheNon-ApplicabilityofStatutoryLimitationstoWarCrimesand Crimes against Humanity, or the Inter-American Convention on ForcedDisappearanceofPersons.ElSalvadoracceptedthecontentiousjurisdictionoftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsonJune6,1995,butwithareservationfor“thelegalactsoreventswhoseperformanceoroccurrencecommencedbefore...theestablisheddeadline...[butwhich]produceeffectsaftersuchdate...sincetheirmaincharacteristicisthattheycommencedbefore[thedateofacceptance].”77

76 See Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, Informe especial de la señora Procuradora para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, doctora Beatrice Alamanni de Carrillo, presentado al Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de la ONU sobre la aplicación del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales en El Salvador (1995-2005),SpecialReportbytheHumanRightsOmbudsperson,BeatriceAlamannideCarrillo,presentedtotheCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsontheapplicationoftheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsinElSalvador),(Nov.8,2005),available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/pddh-elsalvador.pdf. It highlightedtheattackonApril28,2005:

against two lawyers from the Office of the Ombudsperson and their driver,whenverifyingthearrestanddeportationofanEcuadorancitizenwhoservedasadvisertothesocialsecurityinstitutedoctors’union,Sindicato de Médicos Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro Social (SIMETRISSS),whichviolatedthemostbasicdueprocessprovisions,occurredwithexcessiveuseofforceandpoliceaggression,andviolatedrightsrelatedtotheprotectionofthefamily,astheprofessionalinquestionisthehusbandofaSalvadorancitizenand the fatherofaminorwho isalsoSalvadoran.On thatoccasion,even thePresidentoftheRepublicexpresseddirectresponsibilityinsaidprocedure.

Id. para. 44. 77 CaseofGarcía-Prietoetal.v.ElSalvador, InterpretationoftheJudgmentofPreliminaryObjections,

Merits,ReparationsandCosts,Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser.C)No.188,sectionIV.8(Nov.24,2008).

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II. Nefarious Past, Dubious Present, Risky Future

InJanuary1978,theIACHRmadeanobservationvisittoElSalvadoratthe invitation of the government. General CarlosHumberto Romero, the lastpresident ofEl Salvador to be overthrown in a coup d’état, decided to invitetheCommission“inordertomakeitsvaluablecontributiontothepromotionofhumanrights.”78TheresultofthatexperiencewasareportapprovedinNovemberofthatyear,inwhichseriousaccusationsweremadeagainstthegovernmentalauthoritiesconcerningthegravedisrespectfortherighttolife,righttohumanetreatment,righttophysicalliberty,andrighttoatrialanddueprocess,amongothers.

Afterthatdescription,theIACHRfocuseditsattentiononthedeteriorationof economic and cultural rights. Chapter XI of the report concludedwith thefollowing words: “the preceding data shows more clearly the economic andsocialimbalancethatseriouslyaffectstheSalvadoransociety,and,inparticular,theimmensemajorityofthepopulation,withconsequentnegativerepercussionsinthe...observanceofhumanrights.”79

WhatisthecurrentsituationinElSalvador,morethanthreedecadesafterthis report? Below are some illustrative data in this respect, obtained fromtheMultiplePurposeHouseholdSurveyfor2007and2008,preparedby theGeneralBureauofStatisticsandCensuses,themostrecentstatisticsfromthisbody.

Table 1: Employment situation

Category 2007 2008Fullyemployed 65.8% 62.4%Underemployed 28.4% 32.1%Unemployed 5.8% 5.5%Personswithemploymentproblems 34.2% 37.6%

Whilethepercentageofpersonsunemployeddroppedthree-tenths,thereis an increase of more than three percent in the level of underemployment,such that 37.6% of the population faces the difficulties of unemployment orunderemployment.

78 Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights,ReportontheSituationofHumanRightsinElSalvador,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.46,Doc.23rev.1,at3(Nov.17,1978).

79 Id. at 150.

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Table 2: Population employed ages 5 to 17 years (Child employment)

Category 2007 2008Total 172,588 190,525Boys 124,080 136,803Girls 48,508 53,722

Thedataareparticularlyrelevant, insofaras theyrevealanincreasefromoneyeartothenextinthenumberofboysandgirlswhoworkinElSalvador.ManyoftheformsofworkdonebychildreninElSalvadorconstitutebreachesofConvention182oftheInternationalLaborOrganization.80

Table 3: Percentage of households in poverty

Category 2007 2008Totalpoverty 34.6% 40.0%Extremepoverty 10.8% 12.4%Relativepoverty 23.8% 27.6%

The5.4percent increasein thenumberofSalvadoranhouseholds in totalpovertyrevealsadramaticworseninginthequalityoflife.From2000to2001,thepercentage0povertyheldsteadyat38.8%,accordingtotheMultiplePurposeHouseholdSurvey2000-2001.Thismeansthatfourofeverytenhouseholdsdonotadequatelymeettheirmostbasicneeds.Thedeclinehasbeenbrutal.Indeed,thatfigureofalmost40%meansthatElSalvadorisatthelevelofdevelopmentoftheearly1990s,i.e.theendofthewar.

Table 4: Situation of poverty by geographic area

Category 2007 2008Totalpoverty-urban 29.8% 35.7%Extremepoverty-urban 7.9% 10.0%Relativepoverty-urban 21.9% 25.7%

Totalpoverty-rural 43.8% 49.0%Extremepoverty-rural 16.3% 17.5%Relativepoverty-rural 27.5% 31.5%

80 ConventionConcerningtheProhibitionandImmediateActionfortheEliminationoftheWorstFormsofChildLabor(ILONo.182),2133U.N.T.S.161 enteredintoforceNov.19,2000.

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Fromthisperspective,thescenariobecomesevenworse.Ruralpovertyisgreaterinalmostallcases;yetboth,fromoneyeartothenext,shotupwards.EffortshavebeenmadetoaddressthatscenariowithofficialprogramslikeRedSolidaria(SolidarityNetwork) andComunidadesSolidarias (SolidarityCommunities);81. Judgingbytheresults,eithertheyhavenotbeeneffective,orthemechanismsthatgenerate poverty—exclusion, marginality, concentration of wealth—are morepowerful than the efforts to reduce it.

Manyproblemsstemfromthesituationofpoverty.Ofthese,thisencumbersprogresstowardattainingtheMillenniumGoals;disrespectforbasichumanrightssuchastherighttofoodinthecaseofextremepoverty,andtoeducation,health,clothing,andhousing,inthecaseofrelativepoverty.ItisclearthatElSalvadorlosesincompetitivenessbyfallingbackintheindicatorsofhumandevelopment.

According to the statistics and projections of the Central Reserve Bank(Banco Central de Reserva -BCR), the country’s economic outlook is hardlyencouraging.With negative growth of gross domestic product (GDP) of 1.5%for 2009, the problems proliferate.According to theMinister of Economy oftheFunesadministration,HéctorDadaHirezi,theyearendedwithadeclineof3.3%.Taxrevenueswill thusfall, inacontext inwhichresourcesareurgentlyneeded tofightpoverty.Although theBCRestimated thatexportswouldgrow7%,thefirstsemesterof2009presenteda16%drop.ThisperformancereinforcesthedecliningGDPandnegatively impacts the levelofemployment,especiallyin industry, commerce, and, to a lesser extent, agriculture. In addition, familyremittancesdropped10% in2009, i.e. someUS$350million.Thismakes thesituationevenmorecritical,insofarasthenationaleconomylargelydependsonthose funds.82

The conclusions of the IACHR’s 1978 report on El Salvador referred to“theexistenceofatenseatmosphereofpolarization,”83themaincausesofwhichincludedtheeconomicandsocialconditionsofthepoormajority.Theseconditionsexplained“toaconsiderableextentseriousviolationsofhumanrights”84inthecivilandpoliticalarea,butdidnotjustifythem.Poorlivingconditionsandviolationsofrightswerepartofaperversestateofaffairs,whichwasdiscriminatoryandexclusionaryfor largeportionsof thepopulationandfavoredaprivilegedfew,leadingtotheoutbreakofwarinElSalvador.

Aftertheendofthewar,oneofthegreatandundeniableachievementswasendingthestatepracticesofgrave,politicallymotivatedhumanrightsviolations.

81 ThefirstoftheseprogramswasgivenimpetusduringtheSacaadministrationandincludedthehundredpoorestmunicipalities in thecountry’s rural zones; the secondwas initiatedasof theFunesadministrationandalsoencompassedmunicipalitiesinurbanareas.

82 Remittances constitute approximately 18%ofGDP.See JamesPainter,US woes slow migrant remittances,bbC news, Mar. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7292216.stm.

83 IACHRReportontheSituationofHumanRightsinElSalvador,supranote79,at152.84 Id.

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Since the ceasefire, the annihilation of persons or organizations consideredopponents through executions and forced disappearances, the use of torture todiscouragepoliticalparticipationortoobtaininformationinthatcontext,andtheimpossibilityofreportingabusesofhumandignityoranyothertypeofabuseaspartofanofficialpolicyhavenotoccurredinElSalvador,withafewexceptions.

Havingcontainedsuchpracticeshasbeengoodforthecountry;butifitisnotmadeclearthattheycannotbeusedeveragain,notevenonanexceptionalbasis,whateverthereasonsinvoked,historymayrepeatitself.

TheconditionsareinplaceforElSalvadortosufferanothertragedy.Homicidalviolence isontheriseonceagainandmayclimbbackto itsmostcritical levelssincethearmedconflict.InFebruary1998theNationalCouncilonPublicSecuritypublishedanassessmentoftheinstitutionsinthepublicsecuritysectorinwhichitexpresseditsparticularconcernoverthe“veryhighlevelsofintentionalhomicides,whichhaveremainedatanaveragelevelof7,211peryearfrom1995to1997.”85 Even though tenyears later thatannualaverage fell toapproximately3,000, thenumberofintentionalkillingshasbeguntoclimbonceagain,takingatollof4,365victimsin2009,whichrepresentsmorethan75personskilledper100,000.86

Inadditiontopovertyandinsecurityinandofthemselves,thereareotherrelated factors toconsider: the lackofopportunities forcomprehensivehumandevelopment;anarmedsociety;violenceagainstwomen;expressionsoforganizedcrime engaged in trafficking drugs, persons, vehicles, and arms, among otherthings;selectiveimpunity;thecriminalactionsofthemarasandothergangs;aprisonsystemthatiscollapsedineverysenseoftheword;politicalparties—whicharedividedpubliclyorinternallydisputed—theleadershipofwhichbuysothers’willswheninpowerandintheoppositionnegotiatesfavors;corruption,untilashorttimeagoa“well-knownsecret”thatwasnotdenounced,isnowdenouncedbutnotfought.Andtoallofthisonecanaddthetemptationtoexperimentwithacoupd’état,suchastheonesufferedbyneighboringHondurasonJune28,2009.

Conclusion: Transition to Peace with Justice

PresidentFuneshasinsistedthathisisagovernmentofnationalunity.Yet,canonespeakofaunitedsociety if thevictimshavenotbeenaddressed?Is itpossible to expect victims to consider themselves part of a national project ifhistoricallytheyhavenotbeensoeconomically,socially,politically,orlegally?

85 natIonal CounCIl on publIC seCurIty, dIaGnóstICo de las InstItuCIones del ramo de seGurIdad públICa 1(Feb.1998).

86 See La violencia amenaza a algunas democracias de Centroamérica, alerta la WOLA,soItu,Sept.1,2009,http://www.soitu.es/soitu/2009/09/01/info/1251760718_918156.html;RossyTejada&ErnestoPérez,Año cierra con 4365 homicidios,la prensa GráfICa,Jan2,2010,http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/social/83167-ano-cierra-con.html.

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Therefore,it isnecessarytokeepacloseeyeonwhathappensduringtheadministration led by the FMLN and President Funes. So far, there aremoreshadowsthanlightintermsofensuringvictims’rightsandcombatingimpunity.UnfortunatestatementsbythePresidentregardingamnestyandhisperspectiveonthevictimshavealreadybeencited.TheofficialrepresentativesinthehearingresponsibleforfollowingupontherecommendationsoftheIACHRintheRomerocasestated,onNovember6,2009,that thegovernmentrecognizedthebindingnature of those recommendations.They noted however that “the investigationofthecrimeandthederogationoftheAmnestyLawarethecompetenceoftheOfficeofthePublicProsecutorandtheLegislativeAssembly.”87 The entirety of the IACHR’s recommendations included investigating the crime and repealingtheAmnestyLaw,alongwithpunishingthoseresponsiblefor theassassinationandmakingcomprehensivereparationtothevictims.YetatthehearingtheStateonlyundertooktobuildaplazaandproduceavideo in tribute to themartyredarchbishop.

InthecontextofthetwentiethanniversaryoftheexecutionofthesixJesuitpriests,JuliaElbaRamos,andherdaughterCelina,PresidentFunesbestowedonthenext-of-kinandrepresentativesoftheprieststhehighestnationalhonor.Andtheywerewellreceived.IntheUCAmassacrecasethereisanopportunity,unlikethekillingofMonsignorRomero,toopenthedoorstojusticeforallvictimsinElSalvador.

With scant material resources yet creative and generous capacities, thevictims and the organizations that accompany them have done quite a bit toovercomeimpunity.Andthisworkmakesthemmoredignifiedbecausethroughtheirdemandstheykeepalivethecauseoftheirlovedonesandproducethehopeofadvancesinthemuch-hinderedpeaceprocessagreeduponinGeneva,onApril4,1990.88Thisprocessdidnotmoveforwardsignificantly,asthevictimswerenotgivendueconsideration.Withoutvindicatingthevictims’dignity,therecanbenofullrespectforhumanrights,democratizationofthecountry,or“reunification”of society.

The victims haveworked arduously to keep the historicalmemory aliveby building monuments and mausoleums in symbolic sites; the best knownis in themainpark inSanSalvador.Theyhaveorganized artistic and culturalfestivals,gatheringsofcommittees,andinternationalevents;theyhaveproducedpublications, programs, and debates in the media—mostly alternative media,andhavebeenpersistent inpresentingtheirclaimsininternationalforums.Yettheireconomicandsocialconditions,inthecontextofanadversepoliticaland

87 SeeRicardoVaquerano,Tibio compromiso de Gobierno ante OEA por asesinato de monseñor Romero, elfaro.net, Nov.7,2009,ttp://archivo.elfaro.net/secciones/Noticias/20091102/noticias8_20091102.asp.

88 See supra note 6.

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institutionalscenario,havekept themfromhavingagreater impact.Hence thegreat question:will the change in government be as profound as is necessaryin order to leave behind the prevailing state of affairs after the war? Beyondbestowinghonorsandgivingexplanations,beyondacknowledgingandrepenting,willthenewgovernmenthavethepoliticalwillandvalortoseekthetransitiontopeacewithjustice?

The agenda is clear. The country needs development that is inclusiveeconomically,socially,politically,andlegally,asafundamentalguaranteeofnon-repetition.Thepoormajoritymustbetheprotagonistsofthatchangeannouncedintheofficialdiscourse.Accordingly,“theprincipleofaccordingprioritytocommonandhumaninterestsoverandaboveprivateinterestsshouldbeimplemented.”89

Tothatend,the“organsoftheState”shouldserveassuch,andnotastheycommonlyhave,generallyservingprivilegedminoritysectors.TheheadofStateshouldcarryouttheState’sinternationalcommitmentsintheareaofhumanrights,beforeboththeuniversalandtheinter-Americansystems.Inthisregard,heshouldalsoconsiderthedocumentsubmittedtotheuniversalperiodicreviewmechanismoftheUNHumanRightsCouncilinSeptember2009bytheInternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice(ICTJ)andIDHUCA.90

ElSalvadortodayisnotthesamecountrythatdrewtheworld’sattentionduetotheatrocitiesbeforeandduringthewar,inlightofthedialogueandnegotiationusedtobringittoanendandtheagreementsadoptedtofoundademocraticsocietyrespectfulofhumanrightsandunifiedaroundthe“commongood.”Consequently,itdoesnothavethesamemassivesupportitreceivedtoachievepeace,althoughthiscontinuestobeanunfinishedagenda.Itisratheracountrythatfacesmanydangersandwhosetimidadvancesintheseareasareatrisk.

Yetithastwoopportunitiesofwhichitsleadersshouldtakefulladvantage.The first is to investigate themost serious crimes of yesterday and today andto punish those responsible, regardless of their economic, social, or politicalstatus.This could help reduce the levels of insecurity and poverty andwouldset a precedent to discourage thosewhomight seek once again to capture ormanipulatetheinstitutionstotheirownends.Second,toseekandfindamongthepoormajoritythestrengthandvalorneededtofightimpunityinallitsdimensions,i.e.legal,moral,andhistorical.

“Alltheseeffortswillbefruitfultotheextentthattheyaresituatedinthecontextofpeacewithjusticeinthenationalterritory,whichappearsunfortunatelytobeautopiauntil there isaprofound transformationofsociety.”Thosewerethewordswithwhich the founderof IDHUCA,JesuitpriestSegundoMontes,

89 Ellacuría,supranote4,at595.90 SeeICTJ&IDHUCA,Presentación al Mecanismo de Revisión Universal Consejo de Derechos

Humanos de Naciones Unidas,Sept.8,2009,available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Publications/UPR_ElSalvador_Spanish.pdf.

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concludedaresearchprojectthathecoordinatedandpublishedinFebruary1988.91 HetitledthisprojectLa resistencia no violenta ante los regimenes salvadoreños que han utilizado el terror institucionalizado en el período 1972-1987 (Non-violentResistance to theSalvadoranRegimes thatHaveUsedInstitutionalizedTerrorDuring the Period, 1972-1987).Almost two years after the publicationof this research project, Father Segundo Montes was executed. Yet Montes’visionaryandrelevantwordscontinuetosetthebarforthosepersonsandsocialorganizations seeking precisely that: peace with justice. The current stage ofSalvadoransocietyposesthegreatchallengeforbeginningtoachievethat.Thisrequirespoolingeffortsandmultiplyingresults,soastodefeatthosewhoattempttodividesocietyanddiminishitsforce.

91 unIVersIdad CentroamerICana “José sImeón Cañas,” la resIstenCIa no VIolenta ante los reGímenes salVadoreños Que .han.utIlIzado el terror InstItuCIonalIzado en el período 1972-1987,at186(1988).

Chapter 16

Afghanistan and the Challenge of Non-repetition of Violence

Patricia Gossman

IthasbecomesomethingofaclichétodescribeAfghanistanasstandingattheprecipice,poisedbetweenthepossibilityforagenuinetransitiontopeaceandtheprospectofareturntoall-outcivilwar.TheapproachofspringinAfghanistantypicallysignalstheonsetofanewfightingseason.In2010,thislatestroundofoffensiveshasbeenaccompaniedbynegotiations,bothpublicandclandestine,amongthebelligerentpartiesasbothsidesflirtwiththeideaofmakingadeal.Talkofreconciliation,oratleast“reintegration,”isintheairwhileNATOandtheTalibanattempt to recouppoliticalcapital throughbattlefieldgains.Bothsidesknowthattheyhavelimitedtime;pressureisgrowinginsideAfghanistanandinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesforanendtotheinternationalmilitaryengagement.TheUnitedStatesanditsNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)alliesarenow weighing the benefits of negotiating with elements of the Taliban whileexpandingtheirmilitarypresenceinthefieldanddeployingtribalmilitiastocarrythefightforwardinthemostembattledprovinces.Wellawareoftheinternationalforces’timetable,theTalibanareequallyconsciousofthefactthatanyattemptontheirparttotakepoweroutrightwouldstrengtheninternationalresolve.AllofthissuggeststhatAfghanistanisindeedatacrossroads.Whetheritwillleadtoagenuinetransitiontopeace,ormorewar,remainstobeseen.

Aconferencewasheld inLondon in January2010under theauspicesofthe United Kingdom government to mark this crossroads and persuade thoseinvolvedwithboththemilitaryandreconstructioneffortthat“therewasaplanand an end in sight.”1However, nonewpolitical plans came to light; instead,militaryconsiderations“stilldominate[d]thediscussionandtheagenda...[was]setbydomesticissues”inthetroop-donatingcountries.2Indeed,sincetheTalibanresurgence emerged as a potent threat, a military approach has outpaced thedevelopmentofacoherentpoliticalstrategy.ThemajornationalandinternationalactorsinvolvedintryingtostabilizeAfghanistanacknowledgethatthereisaseriousgovernancedeficitinthecountrybutcannotagreeonthewayforward.Thedebate

1 MartineVanBijlert,London Conference (1): Calling for Afghan Ownership and Afghan Leadership,afGhan analysts networK,Feb.1,2010,http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=598.

2 ThomasRuttig,Are We Afghanistan-Driven in London?,afGhan analysts networK,Feb.1,2010,http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=598.

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continuestocenteronWashington’slatestapproach:moretroops,morepressureon theTaliban,andahearts-and-minds strategy towardcivilians, all combinedwiththerapidtrainingoflocalforces.HowcommittedtheAfghangovernmentis to this approach andwhy there is a lack of progress to date in achieving areasonablycompetentandminimallycorruptAfghansecurityforcesremainopenquestions.Norhasmuchdetailbeenmadepublicaboutthecompositionofthelocalforcesandthequalityoftheirtraining.Theentireexperimenthasbeengivenonlyeighteenmonths.

This chapter reflects on the challenges national and international actorshavefacedintryingtoincorporatetransitionaljusticemeasuresinthecontextofongoingconflictinAfghanistan,andhowthemajorpoliticalandmilitaryactorshave responded to calls for reckoningwith the country’s legacy of atrocities.PartIdiscussesgovernanceissuesinAfghanistan,andtheinter-connectednessofthecriticalproblemsofcorruption,impunity,andconflict.InPartII,IexaminethenatureofAfghanistan’stransition,whichhasnotnotyetreachedtoastateofpost-conflictanddoesnot resembleotherexamplesof transitionsbasedonnegotiated peace agreements. Part III looks at the difficulties and risks thatthose involved in promoting transitional justice face in a situation that is notactuallypost-conflict.PartIVanalyzesconcernsofstabilityandsecurityintheaccomodationistapproach.

I. The Governance Deficit

ThecrisisprovokedbyPresidentKarzai’sblatantriggingoftheAugust2009electionsepitomizestheconundrumattheheartoftheefforttofosterstabilityinAfghanistan. Just after the country’s inaptly named Independent ElectionCommissionruledthatHamidKarzaiwouldbepresidentforanotherfouryears,theUNSpecialRepresentativeKaiEideobservedthatitwastimeforallthoseinvolvedinAfghanistan’stransitiontochangecourse,notingthat“Wecannotdomoreofthesame,therehastobeachangeofmindset.”3HiscommentsechothoseofGeneralStanleyMcChrystal,theheadofU.S.operationsinAfghanistan,whohaspredicted failureand the riskof resumptionof full-fledgedconflictunlesstheUnitedStates,itsallies,andthegovernmentofAfghanistanfocusnotonlyon defeating the insurgency but on improving the performance of the State.4 TheUnitedStates and itsNATOpartners realize that the success of any exit

3 KittyDonaldson&CarolineAlexander, Taliban Has Infiltrated Afghan Police, Ex-U.K. Soldier Says,bloomerG.Com,Nov.5,2009,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=alxTSUyZU0yM.

4 See, e.g., US in Afghanistan failure warning,bbC news onlIne,Sept.21,2009,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8266072.stm.

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strategy inAfghanistan depends at leastminimally functional and sustainablegovernment.

The McChrystal report5 specifically links security and governance,and advocates for prioritizing accountability, noting that abuse of power andcriminalitywithinthegovernmenthasexacerbatedpopulardisenchantmentwiththe Karzai administration and increased support for the Taliban. The report’srecommendationshavebeenadoptedbytheObamaadministrationaspartofitsnewAfghanistan policy. However, detractors within the administration, mostnotablytheU.S.AmbassadortoAfghanistanKarlEikenberry,opposedsendinganymoreU.S. troopsunlessanduntil theKarzaiadministration takesgenuinestepstocurbcorruption.Eikenberry’scomments,whichbecamepublicwhenaclassifiedcabletotheWhiteHousewasleakedinearlyNovember2009,includedthe observation that PresidentKarzai “was not an adequate strategic partner,”“continues toshunresponsibilityforanysovereignburden,”andhasa“recordofinactionorgrudgingcompliance”indealingwithcorruption.6Healsoarguedthat therewas no “political ruling class that provides an overarching nationalidentity that transcends local affiliations and provides reliable partnership”inAfghanistan.7Other analysts have also argued that there can be nomilitarysolution; rather, defeating the insurgency and achieving a sustainable peacewill depend on improvements in four key areas:more voice and autonomy tolocalcommunities;coordinatedandcoherentinternationalaid;seriouseffortstocriminalizecorruptionandprosecute those involved;andmeasures tocurb themightandinfluenceofwarlordsandstrongmenwhohaveunderminedsecurityandengagedincriminalactivity.8ThenextfewmonthswillbecrucialfordetermininghowsuccessfultheUnitedStatesanditsallieswillbeingaininggroundonthebattlefieldandachievingmeaningfulprogresspolitically.

Karzai’s post-election promise of reform notwithstanding, there is littleindication thathisadministrationwilldoanything to reducecorruptionor reinin abusive political figures. His campaign strategy amounted to a wholesaleembrace of those powerful figures who could deliver votes, among them anumberofaccusedwarcriminalsfromtheranksofformermujahidinandmilitiacommanders. Politically, Karzai cannot afford to risk losing their support,especiallyiftheObamaadministrationgoesaheadwithannouncedplanstobypass

5 Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, Aug. 30, 2009 [hereinafter“McChrystal report”], as cited online by the Washington Post, Sept. 21, 2009, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

6 After the leak became public, Ambassador Eikenberry stated that his concerns had beenaddressedduringtheObamaadministration’sreviewofitspolicytowardAfghanistan,buthehasnotelaborated.See EricSchmitt,U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,n.y. tImes, Jan.25,2010,atA1.

7 Id.8 anders fanGe, afGhanIstan analysts networK, the state of the afGhan state (Jan. 2010),

http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100108AFaenge_paper_website_version.pdf.

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Karzai’snetworktotheextentpossible.Thatitwillisnotclear:thisapparentshiftinU.S.policycoincidedwithnewsreportsthattheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)wasprovidingaid toWaliKarzai, thepresident’sbrother,whohasbeenaccusedofinvolvementintheillegaldrugtrade,andthattheUnitedStatesandotherNATO forces havebeenusingprivatemilitias (many answering to localwarlords)toprovidesecurityformilitarybases.

TheothercrucialelementofthedebateiswhetherandhowtoeitherwinoverorvanquishtheTaliban.ThereisanemergingconsensusthatcreatingroomforthepoliticalparticipationofthoseTalibanleaderswillingtoforegoviolenceandacceptapoliticalroleinaccordwiththeAfghanconstitutionmustbepartofanoverallpoliticalstrategy.ButwhattodoaboutthoseTalibanleadersresponsiblefortheworstcrimesofthatperiod?ForalltherightnotesMcChrystalsoundsontheneedforlegitimacyandtransparencyingovernment,hisresponsetoquestionsabout theneed toaddress the legacyofwarcrimes isnotmuchdifferent fromhispredecessorswhoargueditwastoosoonortooriskytoraisesuchconcernsuntilAfghanistanhasmovedbackaninchortwofromtheedge.Notrockingtheboatwas themantraof theearlypost-2001years, invokedbypolitical leadersunwillingtoendorseaninternationalpeace-keepingforceandunwillingtoinvestinstate-building.IfnegotiationswithlocalTalibancommanderstoswitchsidesmerelyentailthefurtherco-optationofanothersetofwarlordstoactasabufferagainsttherestoftheTaliban,itwillworknobetterthanthepreviousco-optationoftheNorthernAlliancedidinfosteringaviablestate.Thequestionthatcontinuesto plague the entire undertaking iswhat to dowith the spoilers and potentialspoilers—includingnotonlytheinsurgentslikelytowreckanypeaceprocess,butpowerfulfigureswithinthegovernmentwhohavedonethemost toundermineeffortstowardachievingjusticeandreconciliation.

II. ¿Afghanistan’s Transition to What?

Likemanyothercountriesemerging—ortryingtoemerge—fromprolongedconflictorrepressiverule,Afghanistanhashadtotackleproblemsonmanyfronts.Infact,ithasneverachievedpost-conflictstatus.Instead,itrepresentsacriticalexampleofacountrynotintransitiontopeaceordemocracybutinsteadcaughtinanescalatingspiralofviolenceandrepressionfueledbythesameforcesthatlaunchedtheconflictmorethantwodecadesago.SincetheinitialmilitarysuccessoftheU.S.operationagainsttheTalibanandal-Qaedain2001,thecountryhashadonlyperiodsoflessconflict,neverpeace.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the primary objective ofU.S. forces has been to defeat al-Qaeda and their Taliban supporters, and onlysecondarily toprovidesecuritywithinAfghanistan.U.S. forceshaveoften takenaunilateralapproachbasedon theiroverridingpriorityoffightingal-Qaedaand

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theTaliban—anobjectivethathasdrawnthemtoseekalliesonthegroundwithoutregardtotheirhumanrightsrecords.IntheimmediateaftermathoftheTaliban’sdefeat, theCoalitionarmedandfundedAfghancommanders toactasabulwarkagainstanyreturnoftheTalibanandal-Qaeda.SomeofthesecommandersusedtheCoalition’ssupportandarmstoconsolidatetheircontroloverterritoryandcriminalenterprises—particularlyopiumproduction.Somealso engaged,or continued toengage,inabusesagainstthelocalcivilianpopulation,includinghumantrafficking,forced evictions, and extortion. The growing power of these commanders hasrepresentedoneofthemostseriousthreatstosecurityformostAfghans.

TheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)wasinitiallydeployedin2002,but itwashampered from thebeginningby a restrictedmandate thatconfinedittoKabul.WhileAfghanofficialsaswellasmanydonornationsandother international actors called for an expansion of ISAF, the United Statescontinued tooppose ISAFexpansionuntil late2003.TheISAFwashamperedbyitsrelationshipwiththeU.S.-ledAnti-terrorismCoalition,andcountrieswereslowtocommitadditionaltroops.After2001,AfghanmilitiaforcesalliedwiththeCoalitionweresupposedtowithdrawfromareasoccupiedbyISAF;theydidnot,butinsteadfurtherentrenchedthemselvestogainpoliticalinfluenceandtocarryoutvariouscriminalactivities,includingdrugtrafficking.

TheBonnAgreement9 establishedAfghanistan’s interim government andset out a timetable for the political processes thatwould follow, including theestablishment of a six-month interim administration; the holding of a LoyaJirga (Grand Council)10 to select the subsequent eighteen-month transitionaladministration; a constitutional Loya Jirga to ratify a new constitution; andpresidential and parliamentary elections. All of these benchmarks have beenmet,thoughthefactthatformermujahidinleadersandcommandersdominatedvirtuallyeverystagehashurtthecredibilityoftheso-calledBonnProcess.

TheEmergencyLoya Jirga, held in June2002, establishedAfghanistan’stransitionalgovernmentuntilpresidentialelectionswereheld inOctober2004.InDecember2003theConstitutionalLoyaJirgawasheld.Thoughthedocumentiteventuallyratifiedwaswidelyhailedasthemostdemocratic(andprotectiveofhumanrights)ofanyinthenation’shistory,theconsultationanddraftingprocesswasheavilyinfluencedbyformerfactionleaders.InOctober2004,presidentialelectionswere held andPresidentKarzaiwas elected; the pollwas viewed aslargelyfreeandfairandtookplacewithoutmajorincident.Therewasafarlower

9 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment ofPermanentGovernmentInstitutions,U.N.Doc.S/2001/1154(Dec.5,2001)(“BonnAgreement”).

10 See barnett rubIn,the fraGmentatIon of afGhanIstan: state formatIon and Collapse In the InternatIonal system166-75(1996).Ajirgaor“circle”isacouncil,usuallyconsistingofadultmalesofatribe.“Sinceatleastthe1920s,theAfghanstatehasdefinedaninstitutionalized,partlynontribalbody,theLoyaJirga(GreatCouncil),asthehighestrepresentativebodyoftheAfghanstate.”Id.at42. AnEmergencyLoyaJirgacouldbeconvenedtoaddressnationalemergencies.

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voterturnoutforthenationalassemblyelectionsheldinSeptember2005,whichalso tookplacewithoutanymajorsecurityproblems.However, theseelectionswereflawedintheeyesofmanyvotersbecauseofthefailuretodisqualifyalargenumberofcandidatesknowntobecommandersofillegalarmedmilitias.

UNSecurityCouncilResolution1510,signedonOctober13,2003,openedthewayforanexpansionofISAF.NATOhadtakenovercommandandcoordinationofISAFinAugust2003.Inmid-2006,ISAFunderNATOtookoverresponsibilityforsecurityintheinsurgency-riddensouthofthecountry,pavingthewayforawithdrawalofsome2500U.S.forcesandanincreaseinitsowntroopstrengthfromapproximately9000to18,000forces.InearlyOctober,NATOannouncedtheexpansionofISAFintotheeastofthecountry,withupto12,000U.S.troopscomingunderNATOcontrol.Another8000U.S. troops in theeastplanned toremainundertheU.S.-ledCoalition,whichhadbeencommandingthearea.Thepresenceof theseforeignmilitaryforceswasessential forAfghanistan tomeetthegoalsof the2001BonnAgreement: todraftandratifyanewConstitution;holdpresidentialandparliamentaryelections;andgraduallyimplementreformstobuildanarmy,policeforce,andotheressentialinstitutions.ThebenchmarksoftheBonnAgreementhavebeenmet,buttheAfghangovernmenthasyettotacklesomeof themost importantaspectsof institution-buildingandhasfar togo toestablishitsownlegitimacy.NearlysevenyearsaftertheU.S.intervention,U.S.andalliedCoalitionforcesarefightinganinsurgencythathasgrowninstrengthandnowthreatensareasjustoutsideKabul.

III. Transitional Justice in a Not-Yet-Post-Conflict Setting

Thechallengeofpursuingatransitionaljusticeprocessislinkedtotheproblemofpromotinghumanrightsmoregenerallyinthecountry.Inpost-2001Afghanistan,majorinternationalactorssteeringthestate-buildingprocesssawthepursuitoftransitionaljusticeaspotentiallydestabilizingandspurnedrobustinterventionsonhumanrightsforthesamereason.Asaresult,buildingsupportwithintheAfghangovernmentandamong international donors for a transitional justice process has been slow.Mostimportantly,anumberofpowerfulfactionleadersandcommanderswhoreturnedtopowerafterthedefeatoftheTalibanhaveattemptedtodiscredit transitionaljusticeinitiativesbyclaimingthatallsuchinitiativesareaimedatmaligningthemujahidin—thosecombatantswholiberatedAfghanistanfromtheSovietsandtheTaliban.

Inthefirstfewyearsofthepost-Talibanperiod,U.S.andUNpolicysoughttostabilizeapost-TalibanAfghanistanwithaminimalinvestmentinaninternationalforce and in security sector reform. The approach involved accommodatingcommanders and factional leaders in the emerging government administrationandpowerstructure.Thus,bytheendof2002,commanderswhonotonlyhadlongrecordsofhumanrightsabusesandwarcrimesaccusations,butwhowere

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also involved in drug-trafficking and other crimes, had entrenched themselvesin new positions of power. Questions of past war crimes were suppressed ordeferred, and thedisarmamentprocessproceeded selectively inorder to avoidconfrontation with the most powerful players. Throughout the state-buildingprocessinAfghanistan,theUNadopteda“lightfootprint”approachthatintheorywouldstrengthenthecapacityofthenewAfghanadministrationbydiscouragingrelianceonexternalsupport.Thisinturnwasmeanttoensuregreaterbuy-inforthereformprocessfromAfghanleaders.Inreality,the“lightfootprint”hasmeantthatvitalreformslaggedforlackofcapacityandclearleadership.Inaddition,withthe compartmentalization of key reform efforts—disarmament, police reform,judicial reform, human rights—cooperation amongdonor andAfghan officialshasbeeninadequate,underminingthecreationofaccountableinstitutions.

Transitionaljusticewaslargelyataboosubjectduringthefirstseveralyearsaftertheestablishmentoftheinterimandtransitionaladministrations.SeniorUNandU.S.officialsarguedthatitwasfartooearlytoinitiateanyreckoningwiththepast,andthattodosocoulddestabilizethefragilepeaceprocessthatdependedonthecooperationofthesamefactionalleaderswhowouldbeamongthesubjectsofanyinquiryintowarcrimes.Internationalactorswerereluctanttoconfrontanyofthemilitialeadersonthegroundsthatstabilityrequiredtheparticipation—orappeasement—ofallpowerfulfactions,andthattherewasagenuineriskofcivilwariftheseleaderswerenotgrantedpositionsofpower.Thus,theentrenchmentofmanyofthesecommanderswasnotinevitable,butaconsequenceinlargepartof thePentagon’spolicyof supporting thosewhomtheyhaveseenasausefulbulwarkagainstpenetrationbyal-Qaeda.

TheparticipantsattheBonnConferencediddiscusstheissueofwarcrimesinthecontextofaproposedprohibitionagainstanamnesty.DuringtheclosedsessionsatBonn, a heated discussion tookplace over the idea.Theoriginal draft of theagreement—writtenby theUN—stated that the interimadministrationcouldnotdecreeanamnestyforwarcrimesorcrimesagainsthumanity.ThisparagraphnearlycausedthetalkstobreakdownafteranumberofpowerfulfactionleaderstoldtheirsupportersthattheparagraphwasaimedatdiscreditingallAfghanswhotookuparms,andthatforeignerswouldusetheagreementtodisarmthem.PrincipalamongthosemakingthisargumentwasAbdulRasulSayyaf,aformerprofessorofIslamiclaw atKabulUniversity and the powerful leader of the Islamist Ittihad-i Islami(IslamicUnion).This party had amassed enormous support fromSaudi sourcesandbroughtmanyArabfighterstojointhejihad againsttheSovietoccupationintoAfghanistaninthe1980s.Itisalsoapartyallegedlyresponsibleformassacresandotherwarcrimes.UNSpecialRepresentativeLakhdarBrahimiarguedforcefullyinfavorofkeepingtheparagraphprohibitinganamnesty,butin theend,theparagraphwas removed, leaving open the possibility for an amnesty.11 InMarch 2007 the

11 E-mailinterviewwithparticipantinnegotiations(Feb.2006).

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NationalAssemblypassedabillonnationalreconciliationthatincludedaprovisiontograntimmunityfromprosecutionforactionsincludingwarcrimes.

The Bonn Agreement called for an Afghan human rights commission,mandated to promote human rights and investigate violations. The agreementalsogave theUN“the right to investigatehuman rights violations and,wherenecessary, recommend corrective action.”12 Transitional justice falls within the humanrightsmandateoftheUNAssistanceMissiontoAfghanistan(UNAMA).13 UNAMAhas provided support to theAfghanistan IndependentHumanRightsCommission (AIHRC) on its human rights programs, including transitionaljustice, while alsomaintaining human rightsmonitoring staff in various partsof the country. InMarch 2002, theUNOffice of theHighCommissioner forHumanRightsheldaseriesofworkshopsonhumanrightsissuesinKabul.Attheworkshopontransitionaljustice,Afghansvoicedstrongsupportforfindingwaystoaddresstheneedfortruth,reconciliation,andjustice.Attheinaugurationoftheworkshops,PresidentKarzaiendorsedtheideaofatruthcommission,althoughhesubsequentlydisavowedsupportfortheideaandinsteaddemonstratedgreatreluctancetopromoteatransitionaljusticeprogram.

TheAIHRC was formally established by presidential decree on June 6,2002,andwaschargedwith

developinganationalplanofactionforhumanrightsinAfghanistan,andwithhumanrightsmonitoring,investigationofviolationsofhumanrights,development and implementation of a national programme of humanrightseducation,undertakingofnationalhumanrightsconsultations,anddevelopmentofdomestichumanrightsinstitutions,inaccordancewiththetermsoftheBonnAgreement,applicableinternationalhumanrightsnorms,standards,andconventions,andtheprovisionsofthisdecreeandannex.14

Transitionaljusticewasunderstoodasfallingwithinthedefinitionofhumanrightsinvestigations.

TheestablishmentoftheAIHRCandtheMarch2002workshopscontrastedsharplywithotherdevelopmentsatthetime.IntheimmediateaftermathofBonn,the office of theUNSpecial Representative of the SecretaryGeneral activelyopposed efforts to draw international attention to human rights concerns or to

12 BonnAgreement,supranote9,AnnexII,art.6.13 TheHumanRightsUnit focuses on thefive priority issues of protection of civilians, violence

against women, transitional justice, freedom of expression, poverty, and human rights andassistanceandsupporttotheAfghanistanIndependentHumanRightsCommission(AIHRC).See UNAMAWebsite,“HumanRights” http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1816.

14 DecreeofthePresidencyoftheInterimAdministrationofAfghanistanontheEstablishmentofanAfghanIndependentHumanRightsCommissionart.2,June6,2002,available at http://www.aihrc.org.af/decreeofp.htm.

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focusonthecrimesofthepast.Thisresistancestemmedfromafearof“rockingtheboat,”aconvictionthatthesituationwastoofragileandthepossibilityofareturntowartoogreattoriskconfrontingdivisiveissueslikehumanrights.Fearofantagonizingpowerfulwarlordsandupsettingadelicatebalanceofpowermeantthathumanrightsissueswereunderemphasizedanddevalued.TheUnitedStatesalsohadgreat influenceoverpolicyat this timeandwasunwillingtoconfrontitsownalliesinthefieldorallowgreaterscrutinyofitsownpractices.InMarch2003,aproposalforaUNcommissionofinquiryonAfghanistanwasdroppedbecauseofU.S.opposition.

TwomonthsaftertheestablishmentoftheAIHRC,theEmergencyLoyaJirgawasheldtoselecta transitionaladministrationtogovernbeforeelectionsin 2004. The Loya Jirga took place in June 2002 and ratified the next phaseof administration—the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA). The rulesgoverning the selection of delegates for theLoya Jirga stipulated that personsagainstwhomtherewerecredibleallegationsofwarcrimesorotherabuseswerenoteligible.Therulewasrarelyenforced—inpartbecausesomeoftheUNstaffresponsible for making decisions found the grounds for exclusion too vague,andinpartbecauseofpressurewithinUNAMAnottochallengesomepowerfulcommanders.Moreimportantly,contrarytotherulesgoverningtheselectionofdelegates,anumberofpoliticaldelegateswereaddedatthelastminute,amongthemcommanders accusedofwar crimes.Delegates complained that the verypresenceofthesecommanderswasintimidating.Inanycase,littlechoicewaslefttothedelegates,asalltheimportantdecisionshadalreadybeenmadeinbackroomdealsinvolvingtheUN,theUnitedStates,andShura-iNazar.15

ControversyoverthelegacyofpastabusesagainreareditsheadduringtheConstitutionalLoyaJirgainDecember2003.AfterAbdulRasulSayyaf,aformermujahidinleader,hadmaneuveredtoensurethatamujahidinleaderheadedalltheimportantworkingcommittees,oneyoungdelegatecriticizedthearrangement,callingthefactionleaderswhowerepresent“criminals”andaccusingthemofdestroying thecountry.16Amidprotestsagainst the remarks frommanyof thedelegates,Sayyaftriedtohavethedelegateoustedfromtheproceedings.Sincethen,thedelegatehashadtheprotectionoftheUNinherhomedistrict.ShortlyaftertheconclusionoftheConstitutionalLoyaJirga,KabulTelevisionbroadcastfootageofaspeechSayyafmadein1993,duringtheheightofthecivilwar.Inthatyear,Sayyaf’sforceswereplayingamajorpart in themassacreofethnicHazarasandthedestructionoftheareasinwhichtheylivedinwestKabul.Thevideoclipshowedhimboasting:“WehavedestroyedmuchofKabul,butthere

15 J.AlexanderThier,The Politics of Peace-building: Year One: From Bonn to Kabul,in natIon-buIldInG unraVeled: aId, peaCe and JustICe In afGhanIstan55-56(AntonioDonini,NorahNiland&KarenWermestereds.,2004).

16 See Statementof“DefenseCommitteeforMalalaiJoya,”RiseinsupportofMalalaiJoya!,Dec.20,2003,available at http://www.malalaijoya.com(follow“OurStatements”).

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arestillsomebuildingsleft.Wewilldestroythesetoo,tomakewayfortheCityofGod.”17

TheAfghanConstitutionmakesnoreferencetotransitionaljusticeassuch,otherthangrantingofficialstatustotheAIHRC(itspowerstobedeterminedbythelegislature),andimposingtherestrictiononcandidatesforpresidentialofficeandforthenationallegislaturementionedabove.Article85oftheConstitutionspecifiesthatcandidates“shouldnothavebeenconvictedbyacourtforcommittingacrimeagainsthumanity,acrime,or sentenced todeprivationofhis/hercivicrights.”18Requiring“conviction”asthestandardforexclusionnegatedprospectsforvettingonthesegroundsasthereisnocompetentcriminaljusticesystemtoconducttrialsofthiskindinAfghanistan.

TheAIHRC’sfirstinitiativeontransitionaljusticewastoconductanationwidesurvey of public attitudes toward dealing with past abuses. The InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice(ICTJ)workedwiththeCommissiontodevelopadetailedproposalforapublicconsultationtohelpdetermineatransitionaljusticepolicyforAfghanistanandtotrainthosecarryingoutthesurvey.ByOctober2004,there hadbeenover 6000participants in individual surveys and focus groups.ICTJagainassistedwithanalysisoftheresultsandproductionoftheAIHRC’sconsultationreport,A Call for Justice.19

Theexercisealonewasasignificantachievementinacountrycompletelylacking in anyof themodern technological tools for assessingpublicopinion.Thirty-two ofAfghanistan’s thirty-four provinces were visited by teams whoconductedasurveyof4151individualrespondentsandseparatelyconvened200focusgroupswithover2000participants. Refugeecommunitiesweresurveyedseparately.Theresultsshowthatupto70percentofAfghansseethemselvesasvictimsofserioushumanrightsabusesduringthewarandthatmostbelievethatsimilarcrimescontinueinthepresent.Thereporthighlightsapublicperceptionthat impunity is entrenched inAfghanistan and that perpetrators are rewardedwithpositionsofpower.Thereportalsoreflectsapopulardemandforbreakingthe cycle of impunity.Thefinal recommendations includedvetting for officialappointments, provision for further documentation of war crimes, appropriatemechanismsfortruth-telling,theestablishmentofaspecialinvestigationsunitorprosecutor’sofficetobegininvestigatingpastwarcrimes,andsymbolicstepstocommemoratethevictims.

AmonthaftertheConstitutionalLoyaJirga,theAfghanIndependentHumanRightsCommissionheldapressconferencetoreleaseA Call for Justice. The plan wastoreleasetheAIHRCreporttogetherwitha300-pagereportpreparedbythe

17 ThevideoclipwasairedatatimewhenSayyaf’salliesinthecourtsweretryingtocensorKabulTelevisionandpreventitfrombroadcastingprogramsfeaturingfemalesingers.

18 Const. of afGhanIstan art.85.19 afGhan Independent human rIGhts CommIssIon, a Call for JustICe: a natIonal ConsultatIon

on past human rIGhts VIolatIons In afGhanIstan(2005).

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OfficeoftheUNHighCommissionerforHumanRightsmappingmajorincidentsofwar crimes and serious human rights violations committed by all parties totheconflictinthecourseofthewar;however,intheweeksbeforethescheduledreleaseoftheUNreport,UNAMApressedtheHighCommissioner,LouiseArbour,not tomake themapping report public.UNAMAofficials argued that a publicreleasewouldendangerUNstaff20 andcomplicatenegotiations surrounding theplanneddemobilizationofseveralpowerfulmilitias,includingtheTenthDivisionloyaltoSayyaf.Theyalsoarguedthatasa“shamingexercise,”thereportraisedexpectationsthatneithertheUNnortheAfghangovernmentcouldmeet:namelythatsomethingwouldbedoneabouttheindividualsidentifiedinthereport.

InMarch2005,attheHumanRightsCommissioninGeneva,U.S.pressuresucceededinterminatingthemandateoftheIndependentExpertonHumanRightsinAfghanistan,whowasatthetimeCherifBassiouni,aprofessoroflawwhoalsoservedasChairmanoftheUNSecurityCouncil’sCommissiontoInvestigateWarCrimesintheFormerYugoslavia.TheUnitedStatesarguedthatbecauseoftheprogresstowarddemocracyinAfghanistan,thecountrydidnotneedanindependentexpert.Bassiounicommentedthat“withoutaUNIndependentExpert,theAfghanIndependentHumanRightsCommissionaswellascivilsocietyinthatcountrywillnothavethatexternalsupporttoadvancehumanrights.”21

In the year following the release of theAIHRC report, theAIHRC andrepresentativesoftheKarzaigovernment,togetherwithstafffromtheUNAMAhumanrightsoffice,developedaplanofactionon transitional justice that laidoutanumberofstepstowardtruth-finding,memorializingvictims,establishingvettingprocedures,andothermeasures.Aftermonthsofdelay,theActionPlanonPeace,ReconciliationandJusticeinAfghanistanwasadoptedbythecabinetonDecember12,2005.Shortlyafterward,theUNheldaconferenceon“Peace,JusticeandReconciliation”todiscussthepracticalimplicationsofcarryingoutandfinancingtheprocess.Theplanincludedfiveareasforkeyaction:symbolicmeasures, institutionalreform,truth-seekinganddocumentation,reconciliation,andaccountability,totakeplaceoverathree-yeartimeframeendingin2008.Bymid-2008,therehadbeenlittleprogressonanyofthese.TherewasconsiderablecooperationamongaCoreGroupcomprisingofkeydonorcountriesandNGOstoprovideinputintothetransitionaljusticeactionplan.Thatefforthascontinued

20 InNovember2004,threeexpatriateUNstaffmemberswerekidnappedandheldforthreeweeksinKabul.Amassivemanhuntledtothearrestofscoresofsuspects,manyofthemformermembersoftheHizb-iIslamifaction,anarmedgroupwhoseleader,GulbuddinHikmatyar,isopposedtoboththecurrentAfghanadministrationandthepresenceofAmericanandotherforeigntroops.Thegovernmentappearedeagertopintheblameforthekidnappingsonhim.Onesuspectdiedasaresultofbeatingsincustody.FurtherinvestigationspointedtotheinvolvementofforcesloyaltoSayyafandformerDefenseMinisterFahim.AllthreeUNstaffmemberswerereleased—leftinacarinKabul,unharmed.UNstaffmembersandothersinvolvedininvestigatingtheincidentreaditasawarning.InterviewswithUNstaffmembersandotherdiplomats(Jan.-Feb.2005).

21 CherifBassiouni,e-mailcommunicationmadeavailabletothisauthor,Apr.27,2005.

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inanumberofareasrelated to transitional justice,notablyvettinggovernmentappointmentsandpoliceandjudicialreform.CoreGroupmembership,originallyincludingtheEU,theAIHRC,UNAMA,andtheNetherlands,hassincegrowntoincludeCanada,Germany,andotherAfghancivilsocietygroups.Thegroupworks tokeep transitional justice issueson thegovernmentaland internationalagenda—agoalthathasbecomemoredifficultwithincreasedattentionfocusedontherisinginsurgency—andcoordinateactionsamongmembers.

At a conference in London on January 31 and February 1, 2006,Afghanistan’smajordonors,plusPresidentKarzai,UNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan,andBritishPrimeMinisterTonyBlair,issuedtheAfghanistanCompact,anagreement that set forthboth the internationalcommunity’scommitment toAfghanistanandAfghanistan’scommitmenttostate-buildingandreformoverthenextfiveyears.SomeelementsoftheActionPlanonPeace,ReconciliationandJusticewereincludedintheAfghanistanCompact,includingtherequirementthatthe government establish an independent board for senior appointments to vetcandidates for thenecessaryqualificationsand toensure that theydonothavelinkstoarmedgroupsandhavenotbeeninvolvedindrug-trafficking,corruption,orpasthumanrightsviolations.OnDecember10,2006,PresidentKarzailaunchedtheActionPlananddedicatedDecember10astheNationalDayofRemembrancepayingtributetothosekilledinsuccessivewarsandcivilstrife.

As of 2010, little of theAction Plan has been implemented, although anumberofactivitieshavetakenplace,includingaconferenceontruth-seeking;limitedcapacity-buildingwithrespecttoforensicwork,includingaforensicsiteassessment;andalimitedamountofdocumentationtomapmajorincidentsofthewar.Aweakcivilsocietyandthelackofstrongpublicpressure,combinedwithanatmosphereofintimidationandgeneralinsecurity,haveunderminedeffortstocarryout intensive fact-finding investigationsor establish formal truth-seekingmechanisms.Thefailurethusfarofjudicialreformhasalsostymiedprospectsofcriminalprosecutions;evenordinarycriminaltrialslacklegalsafeguards,leavingthehigh-profilewarcrimescasesevenlesslikelytoenjoydueprocess.Therehavebeen several successful prosecutions abroad, but these have had only aminorimpactontheprocessesinsideAfghanistan.22

In the midst of this, the question of transitional justice has become abattleground, pitting the country’s formerwarriors againstwhat they claim isan imposed idea. Losing ground in this struggle have been the voices of thevictims—many of whom have just begun speaking out about the need forclarifyingthetruthaboutthecountry’sthirty-yearwar,withforeignforcesand

22 Cedric Ryngaert, Another Afghan Case in the Hague District Court: Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3, the hauGe JustICe portal, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/8/213.html; Trial Judgment in the case against HeshamudinH, Hague District Court, Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/5/104.html.

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with itself.Somefear that thechanceforanyreckoningwith thepastmaybeslipping away,with corruption, insurgency, and the exploding narcotics tradecripplingtherebuildingeffort.

Manykeyinterlocutors,includinghumanrightsactivistsandthoseworkingin legal aid, are generally of the view that the climate for doing anyworkontransitional justice inAfghanistan has never been worse.While there is littlediscussionanymoreaboutwhetherorhowanAmnestyLawpassedbyparliamentin2006mightbeimplemented,itsveryexistencehashadcripplingrepercussions.Thefact that thoseresponsibleforpromotingthe lawareamongthosegrantedgovernmental positions by the president or are members of parliament hasreinforcedtheperceptionoftotalimpunity.Increasedsurveillance,interference,andoutrightthreatstopersonsinvolvedinhumanrightsandtransitionaljusticework has created a repressive climate for civil society generally. The taintedKarzaivictoryandtheproximityoftheTalibanhaveledmanytodespair.

IV. ¿Stability or Security?

Security has been an elastic concept in Afghanistan, with little clarityamongtheinternationalactorsaboutwhoshouldbeprovidingsecurityforwhom.McChrystal’s reportmarks a shift in approach if for noother reason than thatit specificallyaddresses theneed toprotectAfghanciviliansnotonly fromtheTalibaninsurgentsbutalsofromcorruptandpredatoryofficialsandtheirmilitiason the other side. In the initial post-2001 period,U.S. policy defined securitynarrowlyascrushingal-Qaeda,andtriedtoachievethatbyco-optinganti-Talibanwarlords.After theTaliban’sdefeat, theUnitedStatespushedforanexpeditedprocesstocreateaninterimgovernmenttofillthevacuumandprovidestability;and for this theprincipal anti-Talibanpolitical-military leaderswere again co-opted.Theoperatingprinciplewas that agovernmentwasneeded, andalmostanygovernmentwoulddo—anapproachthatfindsanunfortunateechoinsomeofficialreactionstoKarzai’sdefactore-election.23

Luringcombatantsawayfromconflictbyco-optingthemisacceptedwisdom,andascrucialtonegotiatingpeaceasgettingcombatantstoworkouttheirdifferencesinthesphereofpoliticsratherthanonthebattlefield.Butwhilenecessaryandevendesirableinmanycases,itdoesnotanswerthequestionofwhattodowiththosewhohavenotsimplyfoughtawarbutalsoengagedinwarcrimes.

23 AfterKarzai’s rival for thepresidency,Dr.Abdullah,withdrew from the raceongrounds thatnothinghadbeendonetopreventarepeatoffraud,U.S.SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonstatedthatarunoffwithonlyonecandidatewouldnotnecessarilythreatenthelegitimacyoftheprocess.BenFarmer,Hillary Clinton: Afghanistan vote legitimate even if Abdullah boycotts,teleGraph,Oct.31,2009.

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In Afghanistan, in the absence of any constraints, many power-holdersresponsibleforpastwarcrimeshavecontinuedtoengageinarangeofcriminalpursuitswithimpunity:drug-trafficking,landgrabs,rape,murder,andkidnapping.They represent akeycomponentof a “nexusof corruption, incompetenceandcriminality”24 that lies at the heart of the government. In dealing with suchindividuals,Afghanistanconfrontsthekeyquestionsthathaveabearingontheapplicabilityoftransitionaljusticestandardstoanot-yet-post-conflictsituation:isitreallyfeasibletomarginalizeorexcludethoseresponsibleforpastcrimesinasituationofongoingconflict?Alternatively,isiteverdesirabletoaccommodatetheminthenewpoliticalorder?Inastatewherebasicpoliceandjusticeinstitutionsaretotallylacking,howcansuchfiguresbeconstrainedandbywhom?

ThedefeatoftheTalibanin2001,andtheendtothatparticularphaseofthewar,wasnotbroughtaboutbyapopularlybackedrevolutionorbyanegotiatedpower-sharingamongallpartiestotheconflict.TheBonnAgreementwasapower-sharingagreementamongthevictors,notapeacedeal.25Assuch,itdidnotaddressquestionsabouthowtodealwiththelegacyofpastabuses,northecontinuingpowerfulroleplayedbymany leadersandmilitaryfigureswhocontinued toholdpower. In theabsenceofanyinternationalforceinthefirstyearsaftertheinitialdefeatoftheTaliban,therewasnomilitaryforcecapableofconstrainingorcontainingthesemilitiaforces.Instead,powerfulfiguresfromthesemilitiaseitherseizedcontrolofexistingministriesorweregrantedpositionsinthegovernmentinexchangefornotopposingit.

WellawareofwhathadhappenedwhentheNajibullahgovernmentcollapsedin1992, leaving themujahidinrivals tobattleeachotherforcontrolofKabul,WesterninterlocutorsatBonnhadgoodreasontoworrythatthearmedoppositiontotheTalibanwouldresorttoapowerstruggleandprolongthecivilwarunlesstheywereinvitedtosharepowerinanewgovernment.FearthatcommandersandtheirmilitiaswouldresumehostilitieshauntedthenegotiatorsatBonnandhasinfluencedtheinternationalresponsetoincidentsofblatantabusebythesefigureseversince.AsoneadvisorwhowasattheBonnnegotiationswrote:

[T]hebiggestthreattohumanrightsandeverythingelseinAfghanistan[was]theautonomyofall thesearmedgroups.Themostimportantinitiative…[was]demobilizinganddisarmingthem.…[W]hatwillbringmore peace andmore justice toAfghanistan is not the removalofoffendingindividuals,butthecreationofasystemofinstitutionstocontrolthemandmakegovernmenteffectiveandlawbound.26

24 McChrystalreport,supra note 5. 25 “TheBonnAgreement...wasnota‘grandbargain’forpeace;itsealeda‘victors’peace’bylegitimiz-

ingachangeofregimethatinvolvedhandingoverpowertofactionalleaderswhowereonthe‘rightside’ofthewaronterror.”JonathanGoodhand&MarkSedra,Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditio-nalities and ‘Post-Conflict’ Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 14 Int’l peaCeKeepInG41(Jan.2007).

26 EmailcommunicationwithananalystworkingwithUNAMA(Dec.2001).

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Therehavebeenveryfewinstancessince2002whentheAfghangovernmentanditsinternationalsupporterswerewillingtousepoliticalormilitaryforcetocompelfactionalleaderstocomplywiththelawandrefrainfromabusiveactions.Asthepowerofthesemilitialeadershasgrown,thecentralgovernment’sleveragehasdiminishedtothepointwheremilitiacommandersandfactionleadersfunctionasashadowstate.AsRubinargues,“[t]hereisnostatethatoperatesindependentlyof power holders,”27 like these commanders and faction leaders, and there areno state institutions to hold such persons accountable. Instead, a neo-Talibaninsurgencythatre-emergedin2003hasgrowninstrengthandnowthreatenstoengulf theentirecountry inwar.At thesame time, theviabilityof theState isinquestion,particularlyafterthefraudulentelectionsofAugust2009.PresidentKarzai’sgovernmenthasdistinguisheditselfbyrampantcorruption,involvementintheopiumtrade,andamarkedunwillingnesstoaddresspastwarcrimesandhumanrightsabuses—allofwhichhasaddedtodoubtsabouthisleadershipandthelegitimacyofhisgovernment.Judicialmechanismstoaddresspastandcurrentcrimesandabusesarenon-existent;indeed,theutterincompetenceandvenalityof the judiciary is one of the principal reasons for popular discontent with the government, and support for theTaliban (and their versionof swift justice) insomepartsof the country.The few instances inwhich therewasanyeffort toaddresswarcrimesresultedinfurthermiscarriagesofjustice—badlyflawedtrialsofnow-powerlessfiguresmanipulatedforpoliticalpurposes.Thepossibilityofprosecutingpersonswhocontinuetowieldpowerremainsremote,andthereislittlepoliticalwillamonginternationalstosanctionpowerfulfigures.

Afghanistan’s international supporters recognized early on the need toaddresscorruption,narcotics,humanrightsabuses,and transitional justice,butarguedthattheseconcernshadtobe“sequencedin”afterthefundamentalissueofdisarmamentwastackled.Therewasareasonablefearthattotacklesuchissuestoo soon could derail disarmament at a timewhen difficult negotiationswereunderwaytoconvincethemostpowerfulNorthernAlliancemilitiastoagreetohandovertheirheavyweaponryandsupportthereformsnecessarytobuildanewNationalArmy. For a combatant—particularly onewho has lived virtually hisentirelifeinastateofwar,ashavemanyofthemilitiaforcesinAfghanistan—peace is far less secure than war.28Findingaplaceintheneworderforformerfightersunderliesthisphilosophyofinclusion,withtheultimateaimtopreventareturntohostilities.Defendingthatneworderagainstcorruptionfromwithin

27 Posting of Barnett R. Rubin, “Schweich, ICG, etc. -- Assume the Existence of a State inAfghanistan,”Informed Comment Global affaIrs,http://icga.blogspot.com/2008_07_01_archive.html(July25,2008,9:05EST).

28 For a thoughtful discussion on the implications for transitional justice, see Barnett Rubin,“TransitionalJusticeinAfghanistan,”TheAnthonyHymanMemorialLectureat theSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,UniversityofLondon, (Feb.3,2003),available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/Transitional.pdf.

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remainsthechallenge.Co-optationisatime-honoredstrategyforbrokeringpeacedealsamongformerenemiesandisoftenvitaltopreventspoilersfromsabotagingthepeace.Butwithoutsoundinvestmentintheinstitutionsfundamentaltogoodgovernment,especiallycapablepoliceandjudicialsystems,co-optationempowerswould-bespoilerswithoutprovidingthemeanstoconstrainthem.

Advocates for transitional justice argue that the new government or theinternational power or powers overseeing the transition should put vettingproceduresinplacetoexcludetheworstoffendersfrompositionsofpower,andestablishjudicialmechanismsoratruthandreconciliationprocesstoholdthemaccountable. TheWorld Bank cautions new governments to tackle corruption;UNagenciesalongwithdonorgovernmentsurgeswiftaction toeradicatedrugproduction.Thesearepotentiallycrushingdemandsforfledglingstatesemergingfromwar,repression,and,usually,interminablepoverty.Fewhavebeencapableontheirownofmetingoutjusticeandreininginpowerfulcriminalsintheimmediateaftermathof the endof conflict or transition fromaperiodof repression.HowtoavoidfurtherconflictamongahostofcontendersandfosterlegitimacyinthenewstatehasbeenthecriticalchallengeinAfghanistan.Inasocietythat isnotpost-conflictbutremainsengulfedinviolence,theprinciplesoftransitionaljusticeshouldprovideanimportantguidefortheappropriateusesofstatepower.Insuchsocieties, institutional reform and transitional justice should not be treated asseparateobjectives,thelattertobesequencedinaftertheformerhasbeenachieved.Thetwoarelinked,withsuccessinonedependentonprogressintheother.

Conclusion: Inclusion versus Exclusion

FindingaplaceforwarlordsandtheirfightersintheneworderinAfghanistanfollowsaphilosophyofinclusion;securingthatneworderagainstcorruptionandabusefromwithinisthechallenge.InAfghanistan,thestrategyofco-optationanddisarmamentofthewarlordsshouldhavebeenmutuallyreinforcing.Insteadthefailureofthelatterunderminedthepotentialbenefitsoftheformer.Afghanistan’sdisarmamentprogramscreenedprospectivecandidatesforlinkstoillegalarmedgroupsandusedtheircandidacyasanincentivetopersuadethemtovoluntarilydisarmanddisbandtheirmilitias.Theideawastoreducethethreattotheelectionsfrompotentiallyarmedcandidates;ensurethatsuchmilitiacommandersdidnotbecomemembers of parliament and thereby extend their access to power; andfinally, spur on disarmament by compelling reluctantmilitias to disarm.As ofJanuary2006,anestimated2795oftheseillegalarmedgroupsoperatedinsomecapacitythroughoutthecountry.29

29 undp/anbp, m&e seCtIon, dIsbandment of IlleGal armed Groups (dIaG) proJeCt and related proJeCts: phase I dIaG eValuatIon (Feb. 2006), available at http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1045.

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The UN, other donors, and international forces feared that such groupsposedaseriousthreattosecurityduringthe2005parliamentaryelections.SeveralreportsreleasedbylocalNGOsechoedthisconcern,citing“fearofthegun”asthemajorissuefortheAfghanelectorate.30ThisconcernpromptedtheUN,workingwithAfghangovernmentagencies,tolaunchaprogramtodisbandsomeportionofthesegroupsinthemonthsleadinguptotheelections.

Intheory,thosewhodidnotdisarmshouldhavebeendisqualifiedascan-didates.Infact,veryfewwerebarred,andofthose,fewwereverypowerfulorverydangerous.Thefactthatthelawwasnotenforcedagainstmanyknownandseriousviolators remains themain criticismof theprocess.Of208 candidatesinitiallyidentifiedashavinglinkstoillegalarmedgroups,onlythirty-fourweredisqualifiedintheend.Amongthecandidatesallowedtostandforelectionwereanumberofnotoriouscommanderswhohadbeenasourceoftroublenotonlyinthepastbutinthepost-Bonnperiodfortheircriminalactivities,attacksonrivals,predatory behavior toward civilians, and caches ofweapons.According to theAfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnitreportontheelections,thenewparlia-mentincluded“40commandersstillassociatedwitharmedgroups,24memberswhobelongtocriminalgangs,17drugtraffickers,and19memberswhofaceseri-ousallegationsofwarcrimesandhumanrightsviolations.”31

Militia candidates andmembers in parliament represent only part of theproblem.Many other warlords and others with links to illegal armed groupsholdpositionsasministers,governors,districtofficials,andpolicechiefs.TheAfghanistanCompactexplicitlyrecognizedtheneedtominimizethedamagesuchpersonscoulddobycallingfora“clearandtransparentnationalappointmentsmechanism . . . for all senior level appointments to the central governmentandthejudiciary,aswellasforprovincialgovernors,chiefsofpolice,districtadministrators and provincial heads of security.”32 But there has been littlesupportfortheadvisorypanelonpresidentialappointmentsthatissupposedtovetoutcandidateswithinappropriatecredentials.Likeotheressentialelementsofeffectivereformofthepoliceandjudiciary,avettingmechanismcannotsucceedwhilethosewhoneedtobevettedoutremainmorepowerfulthananywhowouldenforcethevetting.

An argument can be made that candidates who successfully made thetransitionfrommilitialeadertomembersofparliamentaretheposterchildrenoftheco-optationpolicy:thosewhowereelectedgotastakeinlegitimategovernment

30 human rIGhts researCh and adVoCaCy ConsortIum, taKe the Guns away: afGhan VoICes on seCurIty and eleCtIons(2004).Manypeopleinterviewedstatedthatmostlocalcommanderswereprotectedandsupportedbypowerfulindividualswithinthecentralgovernment.

31 andrew wIlder, afGhanIstan researCh and eValuatIon unIt, a house dIVIded? analysInG the 2005 afGhan eleCtIons14(Dec.2005).

32 Afghanistan Compact, London, Feb. 1, 2006, at 7, available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/AfghanistanCompact-English.pdf.

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withincentivestopreserveit,ratherthanbeingforcedoutsideofgovernmentwithincentivestodestroyit.OneAfghanpolicyanalysthasconcludedthat:

[P]arliament has been the preferred institutional home for thecommandersormilitary-politicalleaderswhodominatedAfghanistanin2001/02.Theysuccessfullytranslatedtheiroldmilitarystatusintoapositioninthenewlegislature....[M]anyofthemfoundthemselvessqueezed out of their original post-2001 homes in the Ministry ofDefence andMinistry of Interior. So they chose parliament as theirrehabilitationoption.33

Athesametime,gainingthestatusandpowerthatapositioninparliamentoffersemboldenedsomememberswhothensimultaneouslyclaimedtohavebeen“vetted” (because theywerenotdisqualified from theballot)while continuingcriminal pursuits for personal enrichment.This has contributed to the erosionofpublicfaithintheinstitutionsofelectoralpoliticsandtheparliamentitself.34 Having successfully“bought-in” thewarlords for theBonnarrangement, therewassubsequently“littleefforttomaketheirco-optionconditionaluponrespectfortheruleoflaworrefrainingfromnarcoticstrafficking.”35

Inmanyways themost dangerous approach to dealingwithwarlords inpost-TalibanAfghanistanhasbeen inclusion that allowedwarlords to entrenchthemselves and further their criminal activities and abusive behavior. Manyof theworst abusers frompast regimeswereappointed to important executivepositions, including thoseappointedasgovernors,ministers,andpolicechiefs.Withmore resources and opportunity for patronage at their disposal, some ofthosewhobenefitedfromKarzai’sprotectionhavehadagreaternegativeeffectongovernancethanthoseinparliament.36

MarshallFahimrepresentsoneexampleofthecostsofpoliticalexpediency.The prerogatives of the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan dictated theaccommodationofFahiminthe2001-2003period;hisforceswereoneofthefirsttobecontactedandfundedbyCIAandSpecialForcesunitsinSeptember2001.Withtherealizationthatsomemeasureofdisarmamenthadtotakeplacebeforethe presidential elections, theUnited States ultimately backed a confrontationwith Fahim that endedwith his resignation from theMinistry ofDefense andremoval fromthevicepresidency.However,by thensomeU.S.administrationofficialshadcometobelievethat

33 MichaelSemple,SSR and Non-state Actors, in loCal ownershIp and seCurIty seCtor reform (TimothyDonaised.,forthcoming).

34 wIlder,supranote31,at14.35 Semplesupranote34,at16.36 AntonioGiustozzi,“‘Good’Statevs.‘Bad’Warlords?ACritiqueofState-BuildingStrategiesin

Afghanistan,”CrisisStatesResearchCentre,LondonSchoolofEconomics,WorkingPaperno.51,October2004,p.1.

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thedecisiontoturnablindeyetothewarlordsanddrugtraffickerswhotook advantageof thepowervacuum in the aftermathof theSept. 11attackswasoneofthefundamentalstrategicmistakesoftheAfghanwar.ItsentasignaltotheAfghanpeoplethatthemostcorruptwarlordshadthebackingoftheUnitedStates,thattheKarzaigovernmenthadnorealpowerorcredibilityandthatthedrugeconomywasthepathtopowerinthe country.37

The2004confrontationdidnotresultinany“destabilizing”violence,andforatimeitappearedthatthisefforthadbeenatleastpartialsuccessful(Fahimreportedlycontinuedhisinvolvementinthenarcoticstrade).Fahimhasreturned,however, as President Karzai’s vice-president, and it appears that the UnitedStates andother international actorswill continue toworkwith him, althoughtherehavebeensomeindicationsthattheUnitedStatesisinvestigatinghistiestodrug-trafficking.38

OnecouldarguethatFahimrepresentsanextremecase,or—asproponentsofanaccomodationistapproachmaintain—onethatcannotbeweighedagainsttheoverallgainsmadeinholdingelections,establishingaparliament,andgenerallymeetingthebenchmarksoftheBonnAgreement.Butthecostofunconditionalco-optationhasbeenveryhigh.Thestrengthoftheinsurgency,andtheinsecurityandviolencethathasresulted,isoneconsequence.ThemajorityofthosefightersopposedtotheKarzaigovernmentandtheforeigntroopsismotivatedlessbyanextremistIslamistideologyandmoreby:

[P]ragmatic and opportunistic reasons . . . . [I]n spite of how muchdevelopmentassistanceisincreased,howmanymoreforeigntroopsandcivilianexpertsaresenttoAfghanistan,iftheperformanceofthestateisnotradicallychangedandimproved,theinsurgencyismostlikelytocontinueto grow. . . . Similarly, any efforts to negotiatewith the insurgency orreconcilewithpartsofitaredoomedtofailureandwillonlyserveastepstowardsacompletedefeatwithoutarelativelywellfunctioningstate.39

ThecostcanalsobemeasuredinordinaryAfghans’concernsaboutbasicsecurity.AccordingtotheAsiaFoundation’s2008nation-widesurvey,halfoftheadultpopulationinAfghanistanfearsforhisorhersafety.40Distrustofgovernmentandpessimismaboutthedirectionthecountryisheadinghasalsorisen—atrendconfirmedanecdotallyinmuchofthemediacoverageonAfghanistan.

37 JamesRisen&MarkLandler,Accused of Drug Ties, Afghan Official Worries U.S.,n.y. tImes,Aug.26,2009,atA1.

38 Id. 39 fanGe, supra note8,at2.40 asIa foundatIon, afGhanIstan In 2008: a surVey of the afGhan people (Oct.28,2008),available

athttp://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2008-poll.php.

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During the first crucial years after 9/11 theBush administration’s policytowardAfghanistanwastoarmandfundanycommanderwillingtofightAlQaedaand the Taliban. The administration shunned nation-building and effectivelyblocked deployment of an international peacekeeping force for many years.Building essential institutions that could have acted as a counterweight to thepowerofthewarlordswasunderfundedanduncoordinated.AsAmbassadorJimDobbinshasobserved“nonation,includingmostnotablytheUnitedStates,madetheeffortnecessary toget these institutionsupandrunning.Neitherwere leadnationsabletosecuresignificantsupportfortheirprogramsfromotherdonors.”41 Thegovernmentof Italy,which tookresponsibility for reformof the judiciary,was conspicuous in its lackluster approach to the effort. European officialsacknowledgedinNovember2009thattheEuropeanUnion’seffortsinrebuildingthepolicehavebeendismal.42Inanycase,theseparationofpolicereformfromjudicial reform was destined to fail. It was not just the initial “embrace” ofthewarlords thatmattered; it iseverydecisionsince then thathascrippled theprospectsforlegitimateinstitutionsandafunctioninggovernment.

InAfghanistan, rooting out abuse is not simply amatter of removing ormarginalizing those persons responsible for specific acts (which is not itself asimple task). The country’s police, judiciary, and intelligence apparatus haveinstitutionalized abuse in away that has endured through successive regimes.Prosecuting individuals represents an important deterrent against future abuse,butbuildingaccountabilitywillrequirefar-reachingreformstocreateeffective,accountableinstitutions.

Restoring legitimacy to the Afghan State will require an internationalinvestment in functioning institutions; a commitment to confronting powerfulmilitias;andacommitmenttotheintegrityofrepresentativepoliticalprocesses,be theyelectionsor—moreappropriately—traditional loya jirgasor somethingsimilar.Localcontroloverthedistributionofaidisalsoessential.Endlessroundsof training forAfghanpolicearenotenough; thereneeds tobe strongcivilianoversightoftheperformanceofpoliceandthejudiciaryandappropriatevettingforcivilserviceappointments.Theprinciplesthatinformtransitionaljusticehaveabearingonallofthesepoints.Onlythesewilllaythefoundationsofalegitimateandstrongstatecapableofwinningthesupportandconfidenceofitspublictofindapeacefulendtotheconflict.

41 James dobbIns, after the talIban: natIon-buIldInG In afGhanIstan105(2008).42 JudyDempsey,Training of Afghan Police by Europe Is Found Lacking,Int’l herald trIbune,

Nov.17,2009.

Contested Transitions: Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Colombia and Comparative ExperiencewasprintedinthecityofBogotá,D.C.,Colombiainoctober2010

intheworkshopofOpcionesGráficasEditoresLtda.